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10601  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Homeland Security and American Freedom on: November 22, 2010, 10:49:36 PM
http://www.usatoday.com/money/markets/us/2006-09-10-5-years-later_x.htm

Five years is a long time on Wall Street, except when it comes to erasing the psychological damage from the Sept. 11 attacks.

Stocks are up since then, though not by much: The Dow Jones industrial average is up 18.6% and the Standard & Poor's 500 18.9% from just before the attacks, a 3.5% annual return that's way below long-term averages.

It's impossible to know how much the terrorist attacks are to blame for the market's malaise. After all, an earnings recession started in late 2000, and the USA has just emerged from one of its worst periods of corporate fraud in at least a generation. But the attacks injected a new permanent variable into stocks: fear.

"There's a chronic sense of caution and pessimism" that didn't exist before the attacks, says Jim Paulsen of Wells Capital Management. That is showing up in:

•Depressed valuations. Heightened trepidation partly explains why investors won't pay as much for stocks, says Bob Doll, chief investment officer of Merrill Lynch Investment Managers.

Since Sept. 11, 2001, U.S. corporate profits have jumped nearly 75%. Yet that has minimal effect on stock prices, which have pushed the price-earnings ratio down. On Sept. 10, 2001, the S&P 500 traded for 23.2 times its earnings over the previous 12 months. That's sunk to 15.9. That quantifies reduced investor confidence. "The threat of terrorism is in people's minds, so it's in their investment lives," Doll says.

•Ripple effects. Since the attacks hit during a recession, it forced the Federal Reserve to slash short-term interest rates more than expected, says Liz Ann Sonders of Charles Schwab. Short-term rates hit an almost unheard of low of 1% in 2003, which helped inflate a housing bubble, she says. Now that bubble's deflation is haunting stocks as investors worry how consumers will be affected, she says.

•Faster reactions. Investors have learned to react more rapidly and less severely to terrorism, Doll says. When trading resumed after the Sept. 11 attacks, the S&P 500 initially tumbled 11.6% before bottoming. But investors collected themselves: The S&P was up 20.3% six months afterward. The Bali bombings in 2002 had a similar shock: The Jakarta composite index fell 10.4% at first and six months later was up 29.9%. Responses have been more muted since. The IBEX 35, FTSE 100 and BSE Sensex 30 indexes fell just 7.2%, 1.4% and 6.3%, respectively, after the 2004 Madrid, 2005 London and 2006 India bombings.

Investors realized many doomsday scenarios didn't materialize. "We now know that many of the fears ...that emerged in the wake of 9/11 proved to be unfounded," Joseph Quinlan of Bank of America wrote in a report. But Sonders hopes investors aren't forgetting the risk. "With additional time without an attack, (investors) may be lulled into the sense (terrorism) may not affect them."
10602  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Homeland Security and American Freedom on: November 22, 2010, 10:26:54 PM
So how many planes would have to kaboom before you figured that the statistical outliers had been exhausted?
10603  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Homegrown jihadis on: November 22, 2010, 09:27:13 PM


http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/Politics/jihad-jane-arrest-colleen-larose-raises-fears-homegrown/story?id=10056187

The arrest of a suburban Pennsylvania woman known by the alias Jihad Jane, who allegedly plotted with Islamic radicals abroad to kill a Swedish cartoonist, has raised fears about homegrown terrorists in the United States who may be difficult to spot.

"This woman might as well have advertised in the Washington Post," former White House counterterrorism official and ABC News consultant Richard Clarke said on "Good Morning America" today. "It was easy for the FBI to find her, but there are other people who are much more covert."

"There will likely be more attacks," Clarke said. "Hopefully, they will be small, and hopefully, we can catch them early." Colleen R. LaRose, 46, of Montgomery, Pa., was arrested in October 2009 and charged with trying to recruit Islamic fighters and plotting to assassinate a Swedish cartoonist who made fun of prophet Mohammed, according to a federal indictment unsealed Tuesday.

The FBI had kept the case secret while it looked for more suspects in the United States and abroad. The case was made public after seven men were arrested in Ireland this week, suspected of plotting to kill the Swedish cartoonist.

LaRose's case is rare, Clark said, but it shows the capability of international dissident groups to reach out to Americans via the Internet.

"This is a very rare case of a disturbed woman," he said, but it signifies how "the Internet not only allows them to communicate, it allows them to recruit."

Their persuasive speeches and sermons, which have been effective in recruiting men and women in the Middle East, are "beginning to work for some misfits in the United States," he said.

LaRose was arrested in Philadelphia Oct. 16, 2009, and has been in federal custody ever since, without bail. She has not entered a plea. If convicted, she faces a potential sentence of life in prison and a $1 million fine.

Her three federal public defender lawyers have yet to return calls from ABC News.

LaRose could easily fit the part of a soccer mom. She was described by neighbors as an average housewife.

"Oh, my God, unbelievable, I can't believe that," one neighbor told ABC News.

Another said the news was an "amazing, shocking surprise."

Clarke said there is likely a small group of people like LaRose. But their numbers are less of a concern than the idea that radical groups can convey their ideology via this "remote control through cyberspace," he said.

"I think it's very small but it doesn't have to be very large," he said. "So it's not so much a matter of size. It's the fact that it's going on."

Authorities said LaRose's U.S. citizenship and appearance made her appealing to the Islamic radicals she first contacted on the Internet.

"The terrorists figured out that they can't all look like Middle Eastern people, whether they be male or female," former FBI agent and ABC News consultant Brad Garrett said. "And so they've put a lot of time and energy particularly into the Internet, of recruiting people."
10604  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Homeland Security and American Freedom on: November 22, 2010, 08:57:53 PM
Crafty,

Ann Could should stick to things she's good at, like snarky comments and looking like a post-op tranny. Aviation security isn't anything she knows anything about.

If Byron York had actually read the law and researched the topic, he'd know that there are a number of airports that used non-TSA screeners from the very beginning, the catch being that they MUST use the exact same techniques that TSA uses, and are still regulated by the TSA.
10605  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Homeland Security and American Freedom on: November 22, 2010, 08:48:19 PM

WASHINGTON, Dec. 29, 2009

http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/12/29/eveningnews/main6035675.shtml?tag=mncol;lst;1

When Umar Farouk Abdulmuttalab attempted to trigger an in flight explosion, he also rekindled the fear every security official has felt since 9/11 - of a passenger smuggling explosives on an airplane.

"The number one area we need to focus on, the biggest potential vulnerability, is a bomb on the body," said Kip Hawley, head of the TSA under George W. Bush.

Eliminating that vulnerability has been a problem. Eight years since Richard Reid, tried to ignite his shoes, and five years since the 9/11 commission pointedly said, "The TSA and Congress must give priority attention to (detecting) … explosives on passengers," no clear solution has emerged.

For example, when passengers remove their shoes the x-ray machine can detect metal, powder or alterations in the shoe, but not the chemicals from a bomb.

For years the TSA thought the solution was "puffer machines" which do sniff out explosives. But more than $30 million later, there's only one problem: "What we found is the machines were constantly clogging and were out of service and that you end up in a worse case than not having them at all," Hawley said.

Hawley and other officials say the next best choice is full body imaging machine. These don't detect chemicals either, but would have found the package Abdulmutallab sewed into his underwear.

The system is not defenseless against bombs. The TSA has greatly expanded the use of dogs to detect explosives, and the machines used for secondary screening - when a passenger's bags are swabbed - do detect bomb making chemicals.

Officials firmly believe that had Abdulmutallab been flagged he would have gone to secondary screening and been caught.
10606  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Homeland Security and American Freedom on: November 22, 2010, 08:39:09 PM
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/12/08/eveningnews/main5942088.shtml

WASHINGTON, Dec. 8, 2009

(CBS)  It was a security breach and a big embarrassment for the Transportation Security Administration. A secret manual that tells airport screeners around the country how to do their jobs somehow wound up on line for all the world to see.

It detailed who should be screened, how often bags are checked for explosives, how to deal with CIA agents traveling with high-value intelligence assets - even provided images of various special identification cards, as CBS News correspondent Bob Orr reports.

The breach reveals some of the government's most sensitive aviation security secrets. A 93-page manual prepared for federal airport screeners shows samples of law enforcement and official credentials - federal air marshals, CIA officers, and members of Congress - IDs which criminals or terrorists could copy.

The document also reveals that travelers from a dozen countries including Cuba, North Korea, Somalia and Yemen are always subjected to extra screening.

The Transportation Security Administration says the security playbook, prepared in May 2008, is out of date and sensitive methods have been updated six times since then, adding in a statement that "TSA is confident that screening procedures currently in place remain strong."

**No matter what they say officially, this was a major fcukup. It gave AQ and everyone else our entire aviation security playbook. Jihadist sites today post copies of it.**

___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

**Not long after they get what they need to plan an attack, we get a proof of concept attack.**


http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/12/27/national/main6026747.shtml

Airports worldwide tightened security a day after the passenger tried to detonate a device that contained a high explosive on a flight into Detroit. After that attack, passengers have had to contend with extra pat-downs before boarding, staying in their seats without blankets or pillows for the last hour of the flight and more bomb-sniffing dogs.

President Obama has called for a review of watch lists and screening procedures at airports in the wake of the attempted attack, White House spokesman Robert Gibbs said Sunday on CBS' "Face The Nation".

"The president has asked for two reviews to take place as a result of this potential terrorist attack," Gibbs said. "The first is a watch listing review… so we want to ensure that all of the information that needs to go to decision makers gets to where it needs to go. The president has asked for a review of the procedures that in some cases are several years old."

CBS News White House correspondent Peter Maer reports that Mr. Obama was briefed Sunday morning by Homeland Security and Counterterrorism advisor John Brenan and senior National Security official Denis McDonough.

White House spokesman Bill Burton said the briefing covered "security measures being taken to keep the traveling public safe, the most recent intelligence regarding that incident as well as reviews the president ordered into watch lists and detection capabilities."

10607  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Homeland Security and American Freedom on: November 22, 2010, 07:42:40 PM
Crafty,

I couldn't myself vouch for the effectiveness of Rapidscan 1000. I doubt either the TSA or Rapiscan would allow me to run my own tests due to OPSEC.

AQ is known to employ the following process:

1. General target consideration/Intelligence gathering

2. Secondary target selection

3. Secondary intelligence gathering/analysis

4. Acute intelligence gathering, physical recon of target

5. Final target selection/operational planning

6. Finalization of plan/Logistics in place

TSA uses OPSEC as part of a strategy to deny AQ the ability to effective plan attacks. If your jihadist operatives do not anticipate success, it's difficult to recruit high quality operatives. 72 virgins and paradise are denied to those who get caught and die in a kufir prison. In planning, they are forced to assume that the Rapiscan 1000 is totally effective, no matter if it is or not in reality.



10608  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Homeland Security and American Freedom on: November 22, 2010, 04:03:46 PM
http://www.securitymanagement.com/article/new-views-airport-screening-004586?page=0%2C1

Passengers

Passenger screening is also evolving to keep up with changing threats. Threats now include not only guns, knives, and plastic explosives but also liquid explosives, radioactive materials, and pathogens. These threats have increased the need to move beyond the traditional metal detector, but that creates special challenges because humans cannot be subjected to the same x-rays as baggage.

Full-body imaging. One way that this challenge is being met is with the full-body scan systems, which use backscatter x-ray or millimeter wave technology. These generate much lower levels of radiation (less than 10 microREM versus 100 milliREM allowed per year). While they rely on different bands of the electromagnetic spectrum, backscatter and millimeter wave machines operate on the same principle. Like radar or sonar, the machines project energy onto an object, and the software interprets what is reflected back.

Generally, the waves penetrate clothing unaffected, are absorbed by hard objects like guns or explosives, and are “scattered,” or reflected back to varying degrees by organic material, including flesh.

A backscatter machine is about the size and shape of a vending machine; the subject gets scanned twice—once while standing facing the machine, then again while facing away from it. The millimeter wave machines that TSA has purchased, manufactured by L-3 Communications, are hexagonal booths with dual sensors that simultaneously sweep across a subject’s front and posterior. They produce a photo negative-like image of a bare body with inorganic threats in black.

The technology works, but it has run into opposition based on privacy concerns. The American Civil Liberties Union has dubbed the machines a “virtual strip search” and “an assault on the essential dignity of passengers that citizens in a free nation should not have to tolerate.”

TSA defends the technology. The agency notes that it is far less invasive than the traditional physical search. In fact, passengers subjected to secondary screening at Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport, when given a choice between a physical pat down and a full-body scan, choose the latter 90 percent of the time, according to TSA. Civil libertarians counter that most people don’t know exactly what the images entail.

“Determining how the public feels about this is going to affect the future of it,” Howe says.

To address the privacy concern, TSA has asked manufacturers to tweak the algorithm to blur the face in the image. Certain backscatter systems offer what may be a more desirable privacy feature: the subject’s body is presented not as a full image, but instead as a white outline reminiscent of the chalk outline at a crime scene. Threat objects are superimposed.

To boost privacy further, the TSO who views the full scans is sequestered from the checkpoint. If the TSO spots a potential threat, he or she radios the checkpoint to order a pat down.

In addition, the TSA’s policy requires that the scan images be deleted the moment review of the scan has been completed, Howe says. Asked about the value that such threat images might have in criminal investigations, prosecutions, or for intelligence, Howe says the TSA wrestled with the question, but opted to make a clear commitment for the sake of privacy.

“If [a suicide bomber] was going to get screened, they’d have blown themselves up already. And if you call over law enforcement, you’re not going to need the image,” because they will have the actual item, Howe says.

As of this summer, the TSA operated backscatter machines manufactured by American Science & Engineering Inc. (AS&E) at three airports—Los Angeles International, JFK, and Phoenix—for secondary screening versus a pat down. A total of 38 L-3 millimeter wave machines were in use at nine major airports for primary continuous screening, with three more airports planned by the end of the year, says Howe.

Howe notes that a millimeter wave scan takes 15 seconds compared to the backscatter’s 40 seconds—extra time that adds up at high-volume checkpoints.

Checkpoints also still use magnetometers. Given the prevalence of nonmetallic threats and the prevalence of harmless metal items both on—and in—passengers’ bodies, such as medical devices, Joe Reiss, vice president of marketing for AS&E, questions the ongoing value of magnetometers.

Howe, however, predicts that walk-through magnetometers will be present at TSA checkpoints for the foreseeable future. Each one costs about $5,000, while a new millimeter wave scanner costs roughly $200,000.

As for the privacy issue—it’s not going away. Cathleen A. Berrick, director of homeland security and justice issues for the independent Government Accountability Office, tells Security Management that the TSA has yet to fully allay privacy concerns surrounding the use of full-body scans.
10609  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Homeland Security and American Freedom on: November 22, 2010, 03:46:45 PM
http://www.securitymanagement.com/news/faqs-whole-body-imaging-006637

01/08/2010 -

The decision by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab and his terrorist handlers to conceal high explosives in Abdulmutallab's underpants on a Detroit-bound flight on Christmas has led to renewed interest into whole body imaging technology, or full body scans, to detect contraband passengers may smuggle onboard an airplane.

Already, the British, French, Dutch, and Nigerian governments say they will embrace the technology, which allows operators to peer underneath a passenger's clothes and identify hidden threats on their body. The European Union, which overwhelmingly said no to the technology in 2008, is reconsidering its position post-Detroit, reports The Christian Science Monitor. And yesterday, Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano said her department will accelerate the deployment of whole body imaging technology at U.S. airports. There are already about 40 machines deployed at certain airports nationwide, but Napolitano said the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) will fast track at least another 300 units into the field this year.

This increased push for whole body imaging, however, has led to fears that the technology unnecessarily violates passengers' privacy rights and even their health. So what's true and false about whole body imaging technology? Security Management  has scoured publicly available information to answer some of the most pressing questions.

How does whole body imaging technology work?

That depends, because there are two different ways to generate a full body image: millimeter wave technology and backscatter technology.

How do these technologies differ?

Millimeter wave technology beams the passenger with millimeter wave radio frequency (RF) energy from two antennas that spin around the passenger at very fast speeds from head to toe. The energy reflected off the body and other objects generates a three-dimensional image of the passenger's body and anything else carried on his person.

Backscatter technology, however, uses very weak X-rays to generate a two-sided image of a passenger and anything else on that person's body.

Do these technologies identify the same types of threats?

Yes. Manufacturers of each technology say their respective technologies can detect the same types of threats.  L-3 Communications' machines, which use millimeter wave technology,  boast that they can "reveal and pinpoint hidden weapons, explosives, drugs and other contraband."

RapiScan, which uses backscatter technology, states that its machines screen passengers "for a wide range of potential threats including liquids, contraband, ceramics, explosives, narcotics, concealed currency and weapons." American Science and Engineering (AS&E), another manufacturer of backscatter technology, says its system "displays both organic and inorganic materials, revealing objects such as guns and knives, liquid and plastic explosives, composite weapons, and other hidden threats and contraband."

On its Web page devoted to whole body imaging, the TSA makes no distinction between the types of threats each technology can detect.
10610  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / UK's assessment of Rapiscan 1000 on: November 22, 2010, 03:41:01 PM
http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/security/aviation/airport/securityscanners/securityscanner/

Assessment of comparative ionising radiation doses from the use of rapiscan secure 1000 x-ray backscatter security scanner

Published: 1 February 2010.

Health Protection Agency, Centre for Radiation, Chemical and Environmental Hazards  January 2010 - Axel MacDonald, Phil Tattersall, John O’Hagan, Jill Meara, Richard Paynter, Peter Shaw.

The Government may require airport operators to use enhanced screening techniques using x-ray scanning equipment to safeguard flights from UK airports. The Justification of Practices Involving Ionising Radiation Regulations 2004 (SI 2004/1769)(Justification Regulations) came into force on 2 August 2004. These regulations are applied to new practices utilising ionising radiation that arose after May 2000. Those practices in use prior to May 2000 are regarded as existing practices and are not required to go through the justification process required of new practices, although any important new information on their effectiveness and potential doses may prompt a review of their justification. X-ray backscatter scanning systems to detect concealed items were in use prior to May 2000 and this is listed as an existing practice1.

This assessment addresses exposures and risks from the use of an x-ray backscatter body scanner, specifically a model that has been trialled in the UK in both a single scan and double scan (single pose) set-up. X-ray transmission body scanning systems, for instance those used by customs on those suspected of smuggling narcotics within their body, are not considered and it is thought that the use of such systems for routinely scanning passengers would be considered as a new practice. The Department of Energy and Climate Change hold a register of applications for new practices under the Justification Registrations2.

The effective dose from one scan from an x-ray backscatter unit (single or double scan) is 0.02 micro Sv or less (worst case scenario). Effective dose is a quantity that integrates radiation dose across the whole body. This dose is a small fraction of the annual background radiation.

People are constantly exposed to ionising radiation, most of which is from natural sources and medical exposures wherever they live. In the UK, the average dose to a member of the public from all sources (natural and artificial) is 2700 micro Sv/year. Natural radiation sources include cosmic rays, for which the radiation exposure increases with altitude; the typical dose rate during a commercial flight is approximately 5 micro Sv/h. In comparison, the dose rate from terrestrial and cosmic radiation sources at ground level is approximately 0.08 – 0.12 micro Sv/h.

Therefore the total radiation dose from an examination (which might involve 2 or 3 scans) is less than that received from two minutes flying at cruising altitude, or from one hour at ground level. However, it must be emphasised that these figures are based on the two variants (single and double scan) of the scanner model that HPA has assessed, and rely on the correct installation, operation and maintenance of the unit.  Significantly higher doses may occur if these criteria are not satisfied.

HPA recommends a dose constraint of 300 micro Sv/year to a member of the public from practices involving the deliberate use of ionising radiation sources3. A passenger would need to be examined 5000 times before exceeding this constraint value (based on three scans per examination). It is concluded that the potential doses received from the use of a correctly installed and used x-ray backscatter body scanner are likely to be very low.  Even in the case of frequent fliers the doses are unlikely to exceed 20 micro Sv/year.

It is important to note that the installation and use of this equipment will be subject to the requirements of the relevant radiation protection legislation4.
Comparative risks

The radiation doses from backscatter scanners are so low that the traditional radiation risk comparators, for example cancer risk may not provide the best illustration. A range of traditional and other comparators are given below. The data are taken from Office for National Statistics accident figures as presented on the ROSPA website5 and the JPNM “risk list” 6.

Whilst there are stages of pregnancy where a fetus is considered to be more susceptible to harm from radiation, the backscatter technology ensures that negligible doses are absorbed into the body (where the fetus is) and the fetal dose is thus much lower than the dose to a pregnant woman. Therefore for this comparison, which due to uncertainties only provides indicative risks, maternal and fetal dose can be considered the same. Similarly, because of the uncertainties at these low levels of exposure the risks to children, people with any type of illness or people undergoing any type of medical treatment are considered to be comparable to the risks to adults.
Therefore this risk assessment applies to the whole human population.
10611  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Homeland Security and American Freedom on: November 22, 2010, 03:34:45 PM
http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-9th-circuit/1265662.html

UNITED STATES v. AUKAI

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Daniel Kuualoha AUKAI, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 04-10226.

Argued and Submitted En Banc March 21, 2007. -- August 10, 2007

The Fourth Amendment requires the government to respect “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons ․ and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”  U.S. Const. amend. IV. “A search or seizure is ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.   While such suspicion is not an ‘irreducible’ component of reasonableness, [the Supreme Court has] recognized only limited circumstances in which the usual rule does not apply.”  City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37, 121 S.Ct. 447, 148 L.Ed.2d 333 (2000) (citations omitted).   However, “where the risk to public safety is substantial and real, blanket suspicionless searches calibrated to the risk may rank as ‘reasonable’-for example, searches now routine at airports and at entrances to courts and other official buildings.”  Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323, 117 S.Ct. 1295, 137 L.Ed.2d 513 (1997) (holding Georgia's requirement that candidates for state office pass a drug test did not fit within this exception) (citing Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 674-76 & n. 3, 109 S.Ct. 1384, 103 L.Ed.2d 685 (1989) (upholding warrantless drug testing of employees applying for promotion to positions involving drug interdiction)).   Thus, “where a Fourth Amendment intrusion serves special governmental needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, it is necessary to balance the individual's privacy expectations against the Government's interests to determine whether it is impractical to require a warrant or some level of individualized suspicion in the particular context.”  Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665-66, 109 S.Ct. 1384.

Under this rationale the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of so-called “administrative searches.” 2  In New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 107 S.Ct. 2636, 96 L.Ed.2d 601 (1987), the Supreme Court upheld the warrantless search of a junkyard's records, permits, and vehicles.   The Supreme Court reasoned:  “Because the owner or operator of commercial premises in a ‘closely regulated’ industry has a reduced expectation of privacy, the warrant and probable-cause requirements, which fulfill the traditional Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness for a government search have lessened application ․” Id. at 702, 107 S.Ct. 2636 (internal citation omitted).   Thus, New York's interest in regulating the junkyard industry, in light of the rise of motor-theft and comprehensive motor vehicle insurance premiums, served as a “special need” allowing inspection without a warrant.  Id. at 708-09, 107 S.Ct. 2636;  see also id. at 702, 107 S.Ct. 2636.   The regulatory statute also provided a “constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant” because the statute informed junkyard operators that inspections would be made on a regular basis and limited the discretion of inspecting officers.  Id. at 711, 107 S.Ct. 2636.

In Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990), Sitz challenged the constitutionality of suspicionless sobriety checkpoints conducted on Michigan's highways, contending that the program violated the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable seizures.  Id. at 447-48, 110 S.Ct. 2481.   The Supreme Court upheld the sobriety checkpoints because “the balance of the State's interest in preventing drunken driving, the extent to which [the sobriety checkpoints] can reasonably be said to advance that interest, and the degree of intrusion upon individual motorists who are briefly stopped, weighs in favor of” finding the sobriety checkpoints constitutionally reasonable.  Id. at 455, 110 S.Ct. 2481.

Significantly, the Supreme Court has held that the constitutionality of administrative searches is not dependent upon consent.   In United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 92 S.Ct. 1593, 32 L.Ed.2d 87 (1972), the Supreme Court upheld the warrantless search of a pawn shop owner's gun storeroom.   The search was authorized by a federal gun control statute.   The Court held that, “n the context of a regulatory inspection system of business premises that is carefully limited in time, place, and scope, the legality of the search depends not on consent but on the authority of a valid statute.” 3  Id. at 315, 92 S.Ct. 1593.   Thus, “[w]hen a[gun] dealer chooses to engage in this pervasively regulated business and to accept a federal license, he does so with the knowledge that his business records, firearms, and ammunition will be subject to effective inspection.”  Id. at 316, 92 S.Ct. 1593.

We have held that airport screening searches, like the one at issue here, are constitutionally reasonable administrative searches because they are “conducted as part of a general regulatory scheme in furtherance of an administrative purpose, namely, to prevent the carrying of weapons or explosives aboard aircraft, and thereby to prevent hijackings.”  United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908 (9th Cir.1973);  see also United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 178 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 945, 127 S.Ct. 111, 166 L.Ed.2d 255 (2006);  Marquez, 410 F.3d at 616.   Our case law, however, has erroneously suggested that the reasonableness of airport screening searches is dependent upon consent, either ongoing consent 4 or irrevocable implied consent.5

  The constitutionality of an airport screening search, however, does not depend on consent, see Biswell, 406 U.S. at 315, 92 S.Ct. 1593, and requiring that a potential passenger be allowed to revoke consent to an ongoing airport security search makes little sense in a post-9/11 world.6  Such a rule would afford terrorists 7 multiple opportunities to attempt to penetrate airport security by “electing not to fly” on the cusp of detection until a vulnerable portal is found.   This rule would also allow terrorists a low-cost method of detecting systematic vulnerabilities in airport security, knowledge that could be extremely valuable in planning future attacks.   Likewise, given that consent is not required, it makes little sense to predicate the reasonableness of an administrative airport screening search on an irrevocable implied consent theory.   Rather, where an airport screening search is otherwise reasonable and conducted pursuant to statutory authority, 49 U.S.C. § 44901, all that is required is the passenger's election to attempt entry into the secured area 8 of an airport.   See Biswell, 406 U.S. at 315, 92 S.Ct. 1593; 49 C.F.R. § 1540.107. Under current TSA regulations and procedures, that election occurs when a prospective passenger walks through the magnetometer or places items on the conveyor belt of the x-ray machine.9  The record establishes that Aukai elected to attempt entry into the posted secured area of Honolulu International Airport when he walked through the magnetometer, thereby subjecting himself to the airport screening process.

To the extent our cases have predicated the reasonableness of an airport screening search upon either ongoing consent or irrevocable implied consent, they are overruled.

IV.

  Although the constitutionality of airport screening searches is not dependent on consent, the scope of such searches is not limitless.   A particular airport security screening search is constitutionally reasonable provided that it “is no more extensive nor intensive than necessary, in the light of current technology, to detect the presence of weapons or explosives [ ][and] that it is confined in good faith to that purpose.”  Davis, 482 F.2d at 913. We conclude that the airport screening search of Aukai satisfied these requirements.

10612  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Homeland Security and American Freedom on: November 22, 2010, 02:31:43 PM
So let's wave Randy Royer and Yong Ki Kwan through and pull Massad Ayoob and Piyush Amrit Jindal aside for extra screening, right profilers?
10613  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Homeland Security and American Freedom on: November 22, 2010, 02:21:07 PM

http://www.jihadwatch.org/2005/04/witness-testifies-against-al-timimi.html

Witness testifies against Al-Timimi

The amazing story of Yong Ki Kwon, yet another convert to Islam who has misunderstood the religion. One would think, as long as we are being compelled by American Muslim advocacy groups and their allies in the media and government to swallow this farrago about how Islam is a peaceful religion that has been hijacked by "extremists," that at very least these advocacy groups would address this worldwide misunderstanding of Islam by the most pious Muslims. For here again, it is the Muslims who are most serious about Islam who are waging jihad, and those that are least devout and literal-minded who are staying home. Al-Timimi trial update, from the Pittsburgh Tribune-Review, with thanks to Jeffrey Imm:

    FAIRFAX, Va. -- He never made it to Afghanistan to fight for the Taliban, but Yong Ki Kwon -- a Northern Virginia engineer who fled the United States nine days after the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks -- said it wasn't for lack of effort.    Kwon, 29, is a South Korea-born graduate of Virginia Tech who is serving an 11-year prison sentence as a result of his guilty plea last year on federal conspiracy and weapons charges. He has emerged as the prosecution's star witness in the case against Ali Al-Timimi, an American Islamic scholar charged with recruiting soldiers for the Taliban just five days after Sept. 11....

    Kwon, one of nine men convicted last year in the so-called "paintball jihad" network, told a chilling tale of the birth of an American jihad.

    The holy war was conceived in the suburbs of Washington, D.C., in the dawn of the 21st century and was born at a meeting in his Fairfax, Va. apartment Sept. 16, 2001, when Kwon said he and several companions decided to heed the call of spiritual adviser Al-Timimi and to be trained to join the Taliban.

    Four days later, Kwon was on a flight to Karachi, Pakistan.

    The call to holy war took Kwon, who became a U.S. citizen in August 2001, to the mountain training camps of Lashkar-e-Taiba -- known as the LET -- a group that the U.S. placed on its terrorist list in December 2001.

    Under the guidance of militants who trained holy warriors for battle in Afghanistan, Kwon honed his skills with semi-automatic weapons and learned to fire a grenade launcher.

    Kwon, though, said he never was able to join the Taliban. He was simply too late. The border between Afghanistan and Pakistan closed as U.S. forces took control of Afghanistan shortly before Kwon completed his training at the LET camp.

    He said his mentors offered him another option: Go back to the United States and gather information for the mujahadeen, or holy warriors....

    Dressed in a dark-green prison jumpsuit, the tall, bearded Kwon told jurors how he first heard Al-Timimi speak in 1997 at an Islamic Assembly of North America conference in Chicago.

    Born to Christian parents, Kwon converted to Islam in 1997 and quickly found scholar Al-Timimi lecturing regularly near his Northern Virginia home.

    Al-Timimi was known in strict Muslim communities across the word for his taped and Internet lectures. Supporters point to well-known lectures calling for peace in the wake of the first World Trade Center attack in 1993.

    Al-Timimi also was listed as an advisory board member of Assirat Al-Mustaqueem -- an international Arabic language magazine published in Pittsburgh from 1991 to 2000.

    The magazine called for holy war against Christians and Jews. It also lauded the international army that Osama bin Laden assembled for the Taliban in Afghanistan. The magazine once featured an article lauding Shamil Basayev, the Chechen rebel who took credit for last fall's bloody Beslen school massacre in which more than 300 people -- many of them school children -- were slain.

Wait a minute. He called for "peace in the wake of the first World Trade Center attack in 1993" but stayed until 2000 on the advisory board of a magazine that "called for holy war against Christians and Jews" and "lauded the international army that Osama bin Laden assembled for the Taliban in Afghanistan"? Some Islamic apologists and their allies have criticized my use of the word "taqiyya" on this site, pointing out that taqiyya properly refers only to Shi'ites pretending to be Sunnis for fear of persecution. Very well. I won't call it "taqiyya" this time, although I am not going to be intimidated away from using a word that sums up very well the Islamic doctrine of religious deception. That doctrine allows Muslims to lie about their faith when under pressure (cf. Qur'an 16:106 and also 3:28) and when in battle (cf. Sahih Bukhari, vol. 4, book 52, nos. 268-270 and Sahih Muslim, book 32, no. 6303). Was al-Timimi practicing this deception that when he preached peace after the first WTC bombing? This is at least a question that prosecutors should investigate -- but they probably won't, because political correctness and fear will probably keep them from touching on any questions regarding Islam.

    Kwon said he grew to know and respect Al-Timimi as he regularly attended lectures at Dar Al Arqam mosque in Falls Church, Va.

    Al-Timimi's lectures on such topics as the purification of the soul and the new world order were only one side of Kwon's pursuit of Islam.

    The other side played out among Kwon and a small group of Muslim friends on the paintball fields and target ranges ringing Washington. That side focused on jihad -- violent holy war. And that focus turned to an obsession among Kwon and his friends long before Sept. 11, 2001, Kwon testified.

    The group, which included two U.S. military veterans and several engineers, gathered regularly, starting in early 2000, to talk about or prepare for jihad.

    "Russian Hell" -- a jihad video that featured bloody clips of a Chechen Muslim rebel leader executing a Russian prisoner of war -- was a favorite among the videos that the group exchanged and discussed.

    "They (the videos) motivated us. It was like they gave us inspiration," Kwon testified.

    Martyrdom, too, was a topic.

    "As a Muslim, it's something you aspire to," Kwon said, answering questions from assistant U.S. Attorney Gordon Kromberg. "We talked about it. I don't know how realistic we were, but we talked about it because it was very noble," Kwon told the jury of nine men and five women before U.S. District Court Judge Leonie M. Brinkema.

    Members of the group wanted to be ready to take up arms -- should the need to defend Islam arise, Kwon said -- and they began traveling to shooting ranges for target practice and to paintball fields to execute military maneuvers.

    Al-Timimi never was a part of their games, Kwon said, but he and other witnesses said the man they characterized as a respected mentor was aware of them. Indeed, they consulted Al-Timimi when the FBI visited one of the members of their group with questions. Al-Timimi's advice: Be more circumspect about their activities, Kwon and others testified.

    Kwon recalled driving Al-Timimi home from the mosque Sept. 11, 2001 after the terrorist attacks. He said Al-Timimi and another scholar argued, with Al-Timimi characterizing the attacks as a punishment of America from God, while his fellow scholar decried the attacks.

    That night, as they drove from the mosque, Kwon said Al-Timimi had a request.

    "He told me to gather some brothers, to have a contingency plan in case there were mass hostilities toward Muslims in America," Kwon said....

    Then, Kwon said, Al-Timimi advised the group that the effort to spread Islam in the United States was over and that the only other options open to them were to repent, leave the U.S. and join the mujahadeen -- the holy warriors preparing to defend Afghanistan against the coming U.S. invasion.

    Four days later, Kwon was on the plane to Pakistan, embarking on a jihad that would land him in prison.

    "I made the decision to go, but (Al-Timimi) was a big part of my decision to go," Kwon said.

Al-Timimi was, of course, wrong in thinking that "the effort to spread Islam in the United States was over." He didn't realize that even several years after 9/11, American leaders would prate about the religion of "tolerance" and "peace," and that apologists for Islam would compile reading lists for American generals, and that editors of supposedly tough, no-nonsense "conservative" publications would -- without having bothered to study Islam themselves -- refuse to publish some of the most important writers on Islam today (most notably Bat Ye’or), remove advertisements for books under pressure from an American Muslim advocacy group that a U. S. Senator has identified as having ties to terror, and dismiss as attempting to "discredit Muhammad and Islam" those who think that it is reasonable, in discussions of terrorism, to discuss Qur'anic passages and events in the life of Muhammad that terrorists themselves point to as the justification for their actions. No, if al-Timimi had foreseen all that, he would have been quite optimistic indeed.
10614  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Homeland Security and American Freedom on: November 22, 2010, 01:43:54 PM
a) that former DHS head Chertkoff (sp?) lobbied for the Rapiscan scanners? and/or

GM Having people leave either elected or appointed office to then lobby for private industry is nothing new.

Marc:   Neither is corruption, the possibility of which is the point of my question.

b) assertions that they do not spot items such as the Crispy Weiner bomber's bombs?

GM: To determine that, we'd need to experiment with the backscatter device as it's used by TSA. I don't know that the critics have done that.

Marc:  Nor am I aware of data showing that these things WOULD pick up Crispy Weiner bombs.   You frequently amaze me with your ability to come up with citations for your positions.    Please feel free to amaze me again.  smiley



http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/aviation/safety/the-truth-about-tsa-airport-scanning

http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/aviation/safety/airport-security-vs-personal-privacy


I think Popular Mechanics is credible.
10615  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Homeland Security and American Freedom on: November 22, 2010, 01:18:13 PM


Massad F. Ayoob (born July 20, 1948) is an internationally known firearms and self-defense instructor. He was the director of the Lethal Force Institute in Concord, New Hampshire from 1981 to 2009,[1] has taught police techniques and civilian self-defense to both law enforcement officers and private citizens in numerous venues since 1974, and has appeared as an expert witness in several trials. He has served as a part-time police officer in New Hampshire since 1972 and holds the rank of Captain in the Grantham, New Hampshire police department.[2]

Ayoob has authored several books and more than 1,000 articles on firearms, combat techniques, self-defense, and legal issues, and has served in an editorial capacity for Guns Magazine, American Handgunner, Gun Week, and Combat Handguns. Since 1995, he has written self-defense- and firearms-related articles for Backwoods Home Magazine. He also has a featured segment on the television show Personal Defense TV, which airs on the Sportsman Channel in the United States.

While Ayoob has been in the courtroom as a testifying police officer, expert witness, and police prosecutor, he is not an attorney; he is, however, a former Vice Chairman of the Forensic Evidence Committee of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL), and is believed to be the only non-attorney ever to hold this position.[3][4] His published work was cited by the Violence Policy Center in their amicus curiae brief filed with the U.S. Supreme Court in the District of Columbia v. Heller case, and he himself filed a declaration in another amicus brief in this case.[5] His course for attorneys, titled "The Management of the Lethal Force/Deadly Weapons Case", was, according to Jeffrey Weiner (former president of NACDL), "the best course for everything you need to know but are never taught in law school."[4]

Ayoob remains an internationally prominent law enforcement officer training instructor. Since 1987, he has served as chairman of the Firearms Committee of the American Society of Law Enforcement Trainers (ASLET).[dated info] He also serves on the Advisory Board of the International Law Enforcement Educators’ and Trainers’ Association, and is an instructor at the National Law Enforcement Training Center.[5]

Ayoob is of Arab descent

**Mas likes his Rolling Rocks. I've seen him put away many at ASLET functions. His parents were Syrian immigrants.**
10616  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Homeland Security and American Freedom on: November 22, 2010, 01:09:25 PM



FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
FRIDAY, APRIL 9, 2004
WWW.USDOJ.GOV
   CRM
(202) 514-2008
TDD (202) 514-1888

RANDALL TODD ROYER AND IBRAHIM AHMED AL-HAMDI SENTENCED FOR PARTICIPATION IN VIRGINIA JIHAD NETWORK

WASHINGTON, D.C. - Attorney General John Ashcroft, Assistant Attorney General Christopher A. Wray of the Criminal Division, and U.S. Attorney Paul J. McNulty of the Eastern District of Virginia announced that Randall Todd Royer and Ibrahim Ahmed Al-Hamdi were sentenced today by U.S. District Court Judge Leonie Brinkema for their convictions on charges stemming from their participation in a network of militant jihadists centered in Northern Virginia.

Royer, 31, pled guilty in January 2004 to a two-count criminal information charging him with aiding and abetting the use and discharge of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, and with aiding and abetting the carrying of an explosive during the commission of a felony. In his plea agreement, Royer admitted to aiding and abetting co-defendants Masoud Khan, Yong Ki Kwon, Muhammed Aatique and Khwaja Mahmoud Hasan in gaining entry to a terrorist training camp in Pakistan operated by Lashkar-e-Taiba, where they trained in the use of various weapons. Royer also admitted to helping co-defendant Ibrahim Ahmed Al-Hamdi gain entry to the Lashkar-e-Taiba camp, where Al-Hamdi received training in the use of a rocket-propelled grenade in furtherance of a conspiracy to conduct military operations against India.

Royer acknowledged that he committed his offenses to help other jihadists gain entry to the Lashkar-e-Taiba training camp following a meeting on Sept. 16, 2001, at which an unindicted conspirator said that the terrorist attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, would be used as an excuse to trigger a global war against Islam, and that the time had come for them to go abroad and, if possible, join the mujahideen. Three other individuals attending that meeting, Yong Kwon, Muhammed Aatique, and Khwaja Hasan - all of whom pled guilty - stated that they went to the Lashkar-e-Taiba camp to obtain combat training for the purpose engaging in violent jihad in Afghanistan against the American troops that they expected would soon invade that country.

Royer was sentenced today to 20 years in prison. Judge Brinkema sentenced him to serve 10 years in prison on both counts, and the sentences are to run consecutively. In addition, he was sentenced to three years of supervised release.

Al-Hamdi, 26, pled guilty in January 2004 to Count 20 of the government’s Superseding Indictment, charging him with possessing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, and to a one-count criminal information charging him with carrying an explosive during the commission of a felony. In his plea agreement, Al-Hamdi admitted to possessing a Saiga.308 caliber rifle with a telescopic sight and various ammunition, including tracer rounds, for the purpose of enhancing his ability to train for violent jihad in Chechnya, Kashmir or other places outside of the United States. Al-Hamdi also admitted to carrying a rocket-propelled grenade in furtherance of a conspiracy to undertake a military operation against India.

Al-Hamdi was sentenced today to 15 years in prison. Judge Brinkema sentenced him to serve five years in prison on the firearms count and 10 years on the explosives count; the sentences are to run consecutively to each other and to the 18-month sentence Al-Hamdi presently is serving for his illegal possession of a firearm as a non-immigrant alien. In addition, he was sentenced to three years of supervised release.

“Today’s sentences demonstrate the severe penalties for aiding terrorist causes,” said Attorney General John Ashcroft. “We will not allow terrorist groups to exploit America’s freedoms to pursue their deadly goals.”

The pleas by Royer and Al-Hamdi follow guilty pleas in the case in August and September 2003 by Donald Surratt, Muhammed Aatique, Yong Kwon and Khwaja Hasan, who were members of the same jihad network in Northern Virginia. Defendants Seifullah Chapman, Masoud Khan, and Hammad Abdur-Raheem were convicted of various terrorism-related offenses by Judge Brinkema on March 4, 2004, after a three-week trial in which Surratt, Aatique, Kwon, Hasan, and Al-Hamdi each testified.

Khan, who Royer helped reach the Lashkar-e-Taiba camp in Pakistan shortly after Sept. 11, 2001, was convicted for his actions after 9/11 of conspiracy to wage war against the United States and provide to support to the Taliban. Khan, Chapman and Hammad Abdur-Raheem all were convicted of conspiring to provide material support to Lashkar-e-Taiba, a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, and to attack India in violation of the Neutrality Act, as well as of various firearms related offenses, for conduct that spanned from 2000 to 2003. Two other defendants charged in the case, Caliph Basha Ibn Abdur-Raheem and Sabri Benkhala, were acquitted at trial.

The government’s investigation of the Virginia jihad network is continuing. Under the terms of their plea agreements, both Royer and Al-Hamdi are required to cooperate fully with the government in the investigation and prosecution of other individuals associated with this network.

This case was investigated by agents of the Washington Field Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Assistant United States Attorneys Gordon D. Kromberg and David H. Laufman, and Department of Justice Trial Attorney John T. Gibbs of the Counterterrorism Section of the Criminal Division, prosecuted the case for the United States.
10617  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Homeland Security and American Freedom on: November 22, 2010, 12:28:48 PM
Cleanskin-an undercover operative unknown to his or her targets, or a terrorist unknown to national security services.

Before Randall Todd Royer (Very profiling worthy name  rolleyes) developed his legal troubles, he would be free to sign up for a background check to fly with reduced screening. So could have Maj. Hasan, prior to the Ft. Hood shooting. Both were US born. Hasan had a secret level security clearance.
10618  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Homeland Security and American Freedom on: November 22, 2010, 12:03:22 PM


a) that former DHS head Chertkoff (sp?) lobbied for the Rapiscan scanners? and/or

Having people leave either elected or appointed office to then lobby for private industry is nothing new.


b) assertions that they do not spot items such as the Crispy Weiner bomber's bombs?

To determine that, we'd need to experiment with the backscatter device as it's used by TSA. I don't know that the critics have done that.


c) Also, what about the use of dogs instead of radiation and groping?

Dogs are a useful tool, but they have a limited time they can be used, and they can't be used to detect all potential weapons/explosives. Some explosives are composed of such commonly available chemicals, that there would be an endless amount of false positives if the dogs were trained to detect them.
10619  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Homeland Security and American Freedom on: November 22, 2010, 11:33:18 AM
The TSA personnel and/or LEOs at the airport looking at the teeming masses lining up to fly don't know who Crafty's mom, your sister or JDN's wife are. They are looking for the terrorist needle in the haystack. And the needles aren't going to be nice enough to label themselves as such.
10620  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Homeland Security and American Freedom on: November 22, 2010, 11:25:28 AM
One of these two was arrested on a traffic stop with an AK-47 type rifle. One of these two is known for his love of Rolling Rock beer.
10621  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Homeland Security and American Freedom on: November 22, 2010, 10:57:59 AM
Anyone can buy an NRA jacket. Who gets profiled? One of those two is a convicted terrorist. Both were born in the US.
10622  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Ok profilers, spot the terrorist on: November 22, 2010, 10:28:55 AM
   

10623  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Science, Culture, & Humanities / Re: The Power of Word on: November 21, 2010, 05:49:12 PM
Thanks.
10624  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Science, Culture, & Humanities / Re: The Power of Word on: November 21, 2010, 05:22:05 PM
Rachel,

What's the Jewish concept(s) of the afterlife?
10625  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Science, Culture, & Humanities / Re: Privacy on: November 21, 2010, 11:43:15 AM
It's not just congress, it's anyone with a LEO security detail, like mayors, Governors and the like. The assumption is that the NYPD cops assigned to Bloomberg will keep him from wearing a suicide vest onto the flight.
10626  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Political Rants & interesting thought pieces on: November 21, 2010, 11:40:22 AM
More wailing and ad hominem attacks on the TSA. Oh noes!

Shut down the TSA now. Let's just see what the loss of life looks like.

The smell of jet fuel and human flesh burning. It's the smell of freeeedom!
10627  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Science, Culture, & Humanities / Re: Privacy on: November 20, 2010, 10:21:59 PM
Title 49: Transportation
PART 1544—AIRCRAFT OPERATOR SECURITY: AIR CARRIERS AND COMMERCIAL OPERATORS
Subpart C—Operations

Browse Next
§ 1544.219   Carriage of accessible weapons.

(a) Flights for which screening is conducted. The provisions of §1544.201(d), with respect to accessible weapons, do not apply to a law enforcement officer (LEO) aboard a flight for which screening is required if the requirements of this section are met. Paragraph (a) of this section does not apply to a Federal Air Marshal on duty status under §1544.223.

(1) Unless otherwise authorized by TSA, the armed LEO must meet the following requirements:

(i) Be a Federal law enforcement officer or a full-time municipal, county, or state law enforcement officer who is a direct employee of a government agency.

(ii) Be sworn and commissioned to enforce criminal statutes or immigration statutes.

(iii) Be authorized by the employing agency to have the weapon in connection with assigned duties.

(iv) Has completed the training program “Law Enforcement Officers Flying Armed.”

(2) In addition to the requirements of paragraph (a)(1) of this section, the armed LEO must have a need to have the weapon accessible from the time he or she would otherwise check the weapon until the time it would be claimed after deplaning. The need to have the weapon accessible must be determined by the employing agency, department, or service and be based on one of the following:

(i) The provision of protective duty, for instance, assigned to a principal or advance team, or on travel required to be prepared to engage in a protective function.

(ii) The conduct of a hazardous surveillance operation.

(iii) On official travel required to report to another location, armed and prepared for duty.

(iv) Employed as a Federal LEO, whether or not on official travel, and armed in accordance with an agency-wide policy governing that type of travel established by the employing agency by directive or policy statement.

(v) Control of a prisoner, in accordance with §1544.221, or an armed LEO on a round trip ticket returning from escorting, or traveling to pick up, a prisoner.

(vi) TSA Federal Air Marshal on duty status.

(3) The armed LEO must comply with the following notification requirements:

(i) All armed LEOs must notify the aircraft operator of the flight(s) on which he or she needs to have the weapon accessible at least 1 hour, or in an emergency as soon as practicable, before departure.

(ii) Identify himself or herself to the aircraft operator by presenting credentials that include a clear full-face picture, the signature of the armed LEO, and the signature of the authorizing official of the agency, service, or department or the official seal of the agency, service, or department. A badge, shield, or similar device may not be used, or accepted, as the sole means of identification.

(iii) If the armed LEO is a State, county, or municipal law enforcement officer, he or she must present an original letter of authority, signed by an authorizing official from his or her employing agency, service or department, confirming the need to travel armed and detailing the itinerary of the travel while armed.

(iv) If the armed LEO is an escort for a foreign official then this paragraph (a)(3) may be satisfied by a State Department notification.

(4) The aircraft operator must do the following:

(i) Obtain information or documentation required in paragraphs (a)(3)(ii), (iii), and (iv) of this section.

(ii) Advise the armed LEO, before boarding, of the aircraft operator's procedures for carrying out this section.

(iii) Have the LEO confirm he/she has completed the training program “Law Enforcement Officers Flying Armed” as required by TSA, unless otherwise authorized by TSA.

(iv) Ensure that the identity of the armed LEO is known to the appropriate personnel who are responsible for security during the boarding of the aircraft.

(v) Notify the pilot in command and other appropriate crewmembers, of the location of each armed LEO aboard the aircraft. Notify any other armed LEO of the location of each armed LEO, including FAM's. Under circumstances described in the security program, the aircraft operator must not close the doors until the notification is complete.

(vi) Ensure that the information required in paragraphs (a)(3)(i) and (ii) of this section is furnished to the flight crew of each additional connecting flight by the Ground Security Coordinator or other designated agent at each location.

(b) Flights for which screening is not conducted. The provisions of §1544.201(d), with respect to accessible weapons, do not apply to a LEO aboard a flight for which screening is not required if the requirements of paragraphs (a)(1), (3), and (4) of this section are met.

(c) Alcohol. (1) No aircraft operator may serve any alcoholic beverage to an armed LEO.

(2) No armed LEO may:

(i) Consume any alcoholic beverage while aboard an aircraft operated by an aircraft operator.

(ii) Board an aircraft armed if they have consumed an alcoholic beverage within the previous 8 hours.

(d) Location of weapon. (1) Any individual traveling aboard an aircraft while armed must at all times keep their weapon:

(i) Concealed and out of view, either on their person or in immediate reach, if the armed LEO is not in uniform.

(ii) On their person, if the armed LEO is in uniform.

(2) No individual may place a weapon in an overhead storage bin.
10628  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Science, Culture, & Humanities / Re: Privacy on: November 20, 2010, 10:06:29 PM
Those traveling with armed LEOs are exempted from screening. This includes prisoners.
10629  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Science, Culture, & Humanities / Re: Privacy on: November 20, 2010, 06:30:34 PM
http://www.securitymanagement.com/article/profiling-aviation-threats-004454

A key reason for Israel’s excellent air-safety record, many security experts agree, is stringent screening of passengers before they even approach check-in counters. However, this procedure is being changed, because the Israeli Supreme Court ruled in April that security screens were discriminatory.

The Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) filed suit in Israel’s supreme court in May 2007, arguing that airport security procedures wrongfully discriminate against Israeli Arabs, who make up 23 percent of Israel’s population of 7.1 million.

“This is an issue that we found across the board for Arab citizens. They are searched in a disproportionate way regardless of anything,” says Melanie Takefman, ACRI’s international media coordinator.

Security procedures begin as passengers approach the airport. Vehicles deemed to be a risk are ordered to stop for a search. At the terminal, agents closely question each passenger and run their names through databases. They tag passports and luggage with coded labels, according to each passenger’s ethnicity, essentially identifying Israeli Arabs as security risks.

Guards usually order more intensive searches for these passengers before they can proceed to check-in counters. Guards then escort them straight to their aircraft. The problem is that while few Israeli Jews are subjected to the extra scrutiny, nearly all Israeli Arabs have to undergo exhaustive checks, which can include body searches.

Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza are not even permitted to use Israeli airports. They must travel through Jordan instead.
10630  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Homeland Security and American Freedom on: November 20, 2010, 06:24:11 PM
http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/aviation/safety/the-truth-about-tsa-airport-scanning

The Truth About TSA Airport Scanning
What's all this about the government trying to give us cancer and storing clothing-free images? Here's the truth about what you'll encounter—the radio frequencies, radiation and patdowns—when flying during Thanksgiving
10631  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Homeland Security and American Freedom on: November 20, 2010, 06:06:27 PM
http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/19/no-security-pat-downs-for-boehner/

At a Capitol Hill news conference after Election Day, as Mr. Boehner began laying out the changes he would make when he becomes House Speaker, he announced that he would continue to fly commercial airlines (usually Delta) back to Ohio. It was a not-so-subtle dig at the outgoing Democratic speaker, Nancy Pelosi of California, who had been criticized by Republicans for flying military airplanes when she returned home to San Francisco.

“Over the last 20 years, I have flown back and forth to my district on a commercial aircraft,” Mr. Boehner said at the time, “and I am going to continue to do that.”

And so on Friday, he did. But not without the perquisites of office, including avoiding those security pat-downs that many travelers are bracing for as holiday travel season approaches.

Michael Steel, a spokesman for the Republican leader, said in a statement that Mr. Boehner was not receiving special treatment. And a law enforcement official said that any member of Congress or administration official with a security detail is allowed to bypass security.

“The appropriate security procedures for all Congressional leaders, including Speaker Pelosi and Senator Reid, are determined by the Capitol Police working with the Transportation Security Administration,” Mr. Steel said.
10632  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Science, Culture, & Humanities / Re: Privacy on: November 20, 2010, 03:13:46 PM
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10763.pdf

10Although SPOT is based in some respects on El Al’s aviation security program, El Al’s processes differ in substantive ways from those used by the SPOT program. In particular, El Al does not use a list of specific behaviors with numerical values for each, or a numerical threshold to determine whether or not to question a passenger; rather, El Al security officers utilize behavioral indicators as a basis for interviewing all passengers boarding El Al passenger aircraft, and accessing relevant intelligence databases, when deemed appropriate. In addition, El Al officials told us that they train all their personnel—not just security officers—in elements of behavior analysis, and conduct covert tests of their employees’ attentiveness at frequent intervals. According to these officials, El Al also permits what is termed “profiling,” in which passengers may be singled out for further questioning based on their nationality, ethnicity, religion, appearance, or other ascriptive characteristics, but these are not the only basis on which a passenger may be questioned. In addition, El Al security officers are empowered to bar any passenger from boarding an aircraft. The scale of El Al operations is considerably smaller than that of major airlines operating within the United States. As of 2008, El Al had a fleet of 34 aircraft. In Israel, El Al operates out of one hub airport, Ben-Gurion International, and also flies to Eilat, a city in southern Israel; in contrast, there are 457 TSA-regulated airports in the United States. In 2008, El Al had passenger boardings of about 3.6 million; in contrast, Southwest Airlines alone flew about 102 million passengers in the same year.
10633  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Science, Culture, & Humanities / Re: Privacy on: November 20, 2010, 03:07:11 PM
http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=D8VGOUA00&show_article=1

Swaid says he understands the need for security checks. "It's in my interest and that of all the other travelers," he said. But the screening should be done equally for both Arabs and Jews, he said.

Proponents of Israel's approach say checking all passengers equally would require manpower and resources many times greater than are needed today and would needlessly extend the time passengers spend waiting for flights.

Ariel Merari, an Israeli terrorism expert who has written about aviation security, said ethnic profiling is both effective and unavoidable.

"It's foolishness not to use profiles when you know that most terrorists come from certain ethnic groups and certain age groups," he said. "A bomber on a plane is likely to be Muslim and young, not an elderly Holocaust survivor. We're talking about preventing a lot of casualties, and that justifies inconveniencing a certain ethnic group."
10634  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Science, Culture, & Humanities / Re: Privacy on: November 20, 2010, 02:46:52 PM
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-31727_162-20005566-10391695.html

A new government report released Thursday reveals that federal officers with the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) who are tasked with the job of spotting terrorists at airports have little training.

As CBS News Chief Investigative Correspondent Armen Keteyian first reported on Wednesday the TSA's behavior detection officers have never spotted a terrorist. Furthermore, the Government Accountability Office discovered that at least 16 known terrorists travelled through 8 different U.S. airports 23 times where the program had been implemented.

The GAO report says the TSA implemented its behavior detection program, which now costs taxpayers about $200 million annually, without first determining if there was any scientific valid basis for using it.

Read the GAO Report

As part of the program, specialized TSA officers watch passengers waiting in lines at select U.S. airport checkpoints and are supposed to be able to recognize anyone who is a security threat based on an analysis of facial expressions and body language.

According to the GAO, the TSA's behavior detection officers typically work in teams of two and "training includes 4 days of classroom courses, followed by 3 days of on-the-job training."
10635  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Science, Culture, & Humanities / Re: Privacy on: November 20, 2010, 02:43:17 PM
Doug,

I'm pointing out that there are people in the US with positions in society that seems to be model citizens that could potentially be recruited to do things that could cause a catastrophic attack. Israel has a large domestic intelligence agency that does things not done in the US, this and their ethnically based profiling system are not things that can be done here under our legal system.
10636  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Science, Culture, & Humanities / Re: Privacy on: November 19, 2010, 09:04:46 PM
Before Maj. Hasan went on his shooting spree, he was a US Army officer with a DOD ID and a secret level security clearance. Exactly what sort of security screening should he have gone through before flying?
10637  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Dutch government attempts to ban sale of marijuana to tourists on: November 19, 2010, 08:54:02 PM
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/netherlands/8144369/Dutch-government-attempts-to-ban-sale-of-marijuana-to-tourists.html

Dutch government attempts to ban sale of marijuana to tourists
The new conservative Dutch government wants to force the country's marijuana cafés to become "members only" clubs, in a move that would effectively block foreigners from buying the drug.
Coffee shop in Holland
Marijuana has been sold openly in designated cafés in the Netherlands for decades Photo: REUTERS
7:36PM GMT 18 Nov 2010

If the idea ever becomes reality – it would be legally complicated and politically divisive – it would be the latest of the country's liberal policies to be scrapped or curtailed as the Dutch rethink the limits of their famed tolerance.

While marijuana is technically illegal in the Netherlands, it has been sold openly in designated cafés for decades, and police make no arrests for possession of small amounts.

Justice Minister Ivo Opstelten said that in the future, only residents of Dutch cities will be allowed to purchase cannabis. "Not tourists. We don't like that," he said on state television in remarks broadcast on Wednesday.
10638  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Homeland Security and American Freedom on: November 19, 2010, 08:42:01 PM
http://www.tsa.gov/press/releases/2002/press_release_0104.shtm

Items permitted in aircraft cabins:

    * Pets (if permitted by airline check with airline for procedures)
    * Walking canes and umbrellas (once inspected to ensure prohibited items are not concealed)
    * Nail clippers with nail files attached
    * Nail files
    * Tweezers
    * Safety razors (including disposable razors)
    * Syringes (with medication and professionally printed label identifying medication or manufacturer’s name)
    * Insulin delivery systems
    * Eyelash curlers
10639  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Science, Culture, & Humanities / Re: Privacy on: November 19, 2010, 08:31:27 PM
BBG,

Yes, and that small country has a domestic intelligence agency that allows it to assemble a dossier on every passenger and then profile. Are you advocating that we duplicate that here?
10640  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: The War on Drugs on: November 19, 2010, 03:45:03 PM
Let's see, the Whiskey Rebellion was put down by a paramilitary force armed with the latest in weapons technology, lead by one George Washington. Alert Radley Balko!
10641  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Homeland Security and American Freedom on: November 19, 2010, 03:40:59 PM
Nail clippers aren't a prohibited item.
10642  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Re: Body Language on: November 19, 2010, 03:38:27 PM
"Barney Miller", "Homicide, life on the Street" and "The Wire" are cop shows that people in law enforcement tend to like. I've seen season 1 and 2 of The Wire, and loved it.
10643  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Science, Culture, & Humanities / Re: Privacy on: November 19, 2010, 03:33:59 PM
Ok, so stop screening anyone that doesn't look "muslimy". Jihadists would never use children, or the disabled or the elderly in their plots, or jihadis that don't a middle eastern appearance. Perhaps the US could force every muslim to register their religious affiliation so as to facilitate the screening process?
10644  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Homeland Security and American Freedom on: November 18, 2010, 11:21:46 PM
Pilots leading less than legal lifestyles become vulnerable to blackmail.

"Take this package past the security checkpoint, or your wife, your boss and the FAA get a tape of you doing a line off the flight attendant's ass at the Hilton. Don't look inside.*
10645  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Homeland Security and American Freedom on: November 18, 2010, 10:35:21 PM
(08-10) 04:00 PST Washington — 2002-08-10 04:00:00 PST Washington -- The Transportation Security Administration has warned airlines to be on the lookout for impostors wearing stolen uniforms trying to gain access to planes or airports, citing a series of recent thefts from flight crews.

Agency officials would not comment on the confidential warning, which was issued July 22 -- a week after burglars took airline uniforms, keys and identification tags from the New York apartment of two Delta Airlines flight attendants.
10646  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Re: Body Language on: November 18, 2010, 10:29:20 PM
Tapping out at the 27 min mark. Geeze, can't they at least put the Captain's bars on right?
10647  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Re: Body Language on: November 18, 2010, 10:17:54 PM
Based on reading this I'm trying to watch the "Mentalist". Ugh.  rolleyes

Nothing like watching scripts written by screenwriters who only know police work from watching earlier police shows written by people who also knew nothing about police work.
10648  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Homeland Security and American Freedom on: November 18, 2010, 09:42:51 PM
PORT HURON, Mich. (AP) - An off-duty Northwest Airlines pilot was suspected of driving under the influence of cocaine when he headed the wrong way on an interstate to avoid the U.S.-Canada border and led deputies on a chase, authorities said Sunday.

Investigators said Walter L. Dinalko, a veteran pilot of 20 years, had flown to Detroit Metropolitan Airport Saturday afternoon and then rented a Hummer that he drove about 70 miles to Port Huron.

Dinalko turned around three times on the Blue Water Bridge, apparently changing his mind about heading into Sarnia, Ontario, said St. Clair County sheriff's Lt. A.J. Foster.

He then drove on the wrong side of the bridge and Interstate 94, Foster said.

U.S. Customs agents alerted sheriff's deputies, who closed down the expressway and gave chase, Foster said.

Deputies laid down stop sticks, which flattened the Hummer's tires. Dinalko stopped but refused to surrender to deputies, Foster said.

"He started giving them a hard time, and a tussle ensued," Foster said. Deputies subdued him and found suspected cocaine on the floor of the vehicle and in Dinalko's pocket, the lieutenant said.

Dinalko, 50, of St. Paul, Minn., was taken to a hospital for a drug test before he was taken to jail, said sheriff's Lt. Jim DeLacy.

"He appeared to be highly under the influence of narcotics," said DeLacy, who was on the scene of the arrest.
10649  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Homeland Security and American Freedom on: November 18, 2010, 09:32:16 PM
United Airlines pilot charged with flying drugs to Shelby
By Tony Burbeck
NewsChannel 36
Posted: Saturday, Aug. 28, 2010

SHELBY - A United Airlines pilot based in San Francisco is charged with flying 173 pounds of marijuana to the Shelby-Cleveland County Regional Airport.


Read more: http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2010/08/28/1648027/united-airlines-pilot-charged.html#ixzz15hBjmwlM
10650  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: The War on Drugs on: November 18, 2010, 07:42:06 PM
http://www.city-journal.org/html/7_2_a1.html

It is of course true, but only trivially so, that the present illegality of drugs is the cause of the criminality surrounding their distribution. Likewise, it is the illegality of stealing cars that creates car thieves. In fact, the ultimate cause of all criminality is law. As far as I am aware, no one has ever suggested that law should therefore be abandoned. Moreover, the impossibility of winning the “war” against theft, burglary, robbery, and fraud has never been used as an argument that these categories of crime should be abandoned. And so long as the demand for material goods outstrips supply, people will be tempted to commit criminal acts against the owners of property. This is not an argument, in my view, against private property or in favor of the common ownership of all goods. It does suggest, however, that we shall need a police force for a long time to come.

In any case, there are reasons to doubt whether the crime rate would fall quite as dramatically as advocates of legalization have suggested. Amsterdam, where access to drugs is relatively unproblematic, is among the most violent and squalid cities in Europe. The idea behind crime—of getting rich, or at least richer, quickly and without much effort—is unlikely to disappear once drugs are freely available to all who want them. And it may be that officially sanctioned antisocial behavior—the official lifting of taboos—breeds yet more antisocial behavior, as the “broken windows” theory would suggest.

Having met large numbers of drug dealers in prison, I doubt that they would return to respectable life if the principal article of their commerce were to be legalized. Far from evincing a desire to be reincorporated into the world of regular work, they express a deep contempt for it and regard those who accept the bargain of a fair day’s work for a fair day’s pay as cowards and fools. A life of crime has its attractions for many who would otherwise lead a mundane existence. So long as there is the possibility of a lucrative racket or illegal traffic, such people will find it and extend its scope. Therefore, since even legalizers would hesitate to allow children to take drugs, decriminalization might easily result in dealers turning their attentions to younger and younger children, who—in the permissive atmosphere that even now prevails—have already been inducted into the drug subculture in alarmingly high numbers.
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