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201  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Marie Le Pen on Brexit on: June 28, 2016, 11:15:17 AM
PARIS — IF there’s one thing that chafes French pride, it’s seeing the British steal the limelight. But in the face of real courage, even the proudest French person can only tip his hat and bow. The decision that the people of Britain have just made was indeed an act of courage — the courage of a people who embrace their freedom.

Brexit won out, defeating all forecasts. Britain decided to cast off from the European Union and reclaim its independence among the world’s nations. It had been said that the election would hinge solely on economic matters; the British, however, were more insightful in understanding the real issue than commentators like to admit.

British voters understood that behind prognostications about the pound’s exchange rate and behind the debates of financial experts, only one question, at once simple and fundamental, was being asked: Do we want an undemocratic authority ruling our lives, or would we rather regain control over our destiny? Brexit is, above all, a political issue. It’s about the free choice of a people deciding to govern itself. Even when it is touted by all the propaganda in the world, a cage remains a cage, and a cage is unbearable to a human being in love with freedom.

The European Union has become a prison of peoples. Each of the 28 countries that constitute it has slowly lost its democratic prerogatives to commissions and councils with no popular mandate. Every nation in the union has had to apply laws it did not want for itself. Member nations no longer determine their own budgets. They are called upon to open their borders against their will.

Countries in the eurozone face an even less enviable situation. In the name of ideology, different economies are forced to adopt the same currency, even if doing so bleeds them dry. It’s a modern version of the Procrustean bed, and the people no longer have a say.

And what about the European Parliament? It’s democratic in appearance only, because it’s based on a lie: the pretense that there is a homogeneous European people, and that a Polish member of the European Parliament has the legitimacy to make law for the Spanish. We have tried to deny the existence of sovereign nations. It’s only natural that they would not allow being denied.

Your Thoughts on Brexit
What fears or hopes do you have about your own country, whether you are in Europe or elsewhere, after Britain’s decision to exit? Share your thoughts.

Brexit wasn’t the European people’s first cry of revolt. In 2005, France and the Netherlands held referendums about the proposed European Union constitution. In both countries, opposition was massive, and other governments decided on the spot to halt the experiment for fear the contagion might spread. A few years later, the European Union constitution was forced on the people of Europe anyway, under the guise of the Lisbon Treaty. In 2008, Ireland, also by way of referendum, refused to apply that treaty. And once again, a popular decision was brushed aside.

When in 2015 Greece decided by referendum to reject Brussels’ austerity plans, the European Union’s antidemocratic response took no one by surprise: To deny the people’s will had become a habit. In a flash of honesty, the president of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, unabashedly declared, “There can be no democratic choice against the European treaties.”

Brexit may not have been the first cry of hope, but it may be the people’s first real victory. The British have presented the union with a dilemma it will have a hard time getting out of. Either it allows Britain to sail away quietly and thus runs the risk of setting a precedent: The political and economic success of a country that left the European Union would be clear evidence of the union’s noxiousness. Or, like a sore loser, the union makes the British pay for their departure by every means possible and thus exposes the tyrannical nature of its power. Common sense points toward the former option. I have a feeling Brussels will choose the latter.
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One thing is certain: Britain’s departure from the European Union will not make the union more democratic. The hierarchical structure of its supranational institutions will want to reinforce itself: Like all dying ideologies, the union knows only how to forge blindly ahead. The roles are already cast — Germany will lead the way, and France will obligingly tag along.

Here is a sign: President François Hollande of France, Prime Minister Matteo Renzi of Italy and acting Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy of Spain take their lead directly from Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany, without running through Brussels. A quip attributed to Henry Kissinger, “Who do I call if I want to call Europe?” now has a clear answer: Call Berlin.

So the people of Europe have but one alternative left: to remain bound hand-and-foot to a union that betrays national interests and popular sovereignty and that throws our countries wide open to massive immigration and arrogant finance, or to reclaim their freedom by voting.

Calls for referendums are ringing throughout the Continent. I myself have suggested to Mr. Hollande that one such public consultation be held in France. He did not fail to turn me down. More and more, the destiny of the European Union resembles the destiny of the Soviet Union, which died from its own contradictions.

The People’s Spring is now inevitable! The only question left to ask is whether Europe is ready to rid itself of its illusions, or if the return to reason will come with suffering. I made my decision a long time ago: I chose France. I chose sovereign nations. I chose freedom.

Marine Le Pen is president of the National Front party in France. This essay was translated by John Cullen from the French.
202  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Howard Beale on: June 27, 2016, 09:07:40 PM
203  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / USMA: The Road to Orlando-- serious read on: June 27, 2016, 08:55:36 PM
204  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Science, Culture, & Humanities / Emergency Power and the Militia Acts: SERIOUS READ on: June 27, 2016, 08:17:30 PM
205  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: European matters on: June 27, 2016, 05:16:49 PM

NOW I have an answer to that accusation.  Thank you.
206  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Police: Progressive Fascists started it with the Neo Nazis on: June 27, 2016, 05:15:54 PM
207  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Stratfor: Brexit and Euro Balance of Power on: June 27, 2016, 01:45:05 PM

How a Brexit Would Undermine Europe's Balance of Power
Geopolitical Weekly
June 21, 2016 | 08:03 GMT Print
Text Size
If Britain quits the European Union, it risks disrupting the base of power the bloc has come to rest on. (CHRISTOPHER FURLONG/Getty Images)

By Adriano Bosoni

Britain's approaching referendum has led to rampant speculation about the economic and financial consequences of a vote to leave the European Union. And indeed, in the wake of a Brexit, uncertainty — the archenemy of economic growth and financial stability — would abound. But if Britain withdraws from the Continental bloc, its primary effect would be geopolitical, shaking the balance of power in Europe to its very foundation and forcing the bloc to rethink its role in the world.

The Franco-German alliance is the cornerstone on which European power dynamics rest. Conflict between the two drove three Continental wars between 1870 and 1945; its resolution facilitated peace after World War II, planting the seeds of eventual integration through the European Union. But France and Germany are not the only countries shaping Europe's course. A third actor plays the role of power broker between the two, stabilizing their relationship and, by extension, the Continent: the United Kingdom.

When France and West Germany founded the European Economic Community (EEC), the European Union's predecessor, in the 1950s, they had two goals. The first was to create a political and economic structure that would bind the two states together, reducing the chances of another war breaking out in Europe. The second was to facilitate trade and investment to rejuvenate Europe's war-weary economies. Both were pleased with the solution they found: France felt it had neutralized its eastern neighbor while maintaining control of Continental politics, and Germany had successfully reconciled with the West.

Meanwhile, the United Kingdom's relationship with the European project was somewhat ambiguous. As an island nation, Britain historically had been shielded from events unfolding on the mainland. If the United Kingdom intervened in Continental affairs, it was usually to ensure that power remained balanced and yet dispersed enough to keep Britain safe. When the EEC was born, London initially reacted with skepticism, wary of any project that would transfer more sovereignty from the British Parliament to unelected technocrats in Brussels. France, moreover, was eager to keep Britain out of the bloc; it was concerned about granting EEC membership to a country Charles de Gaulle described as "an American Trojan Horse in Europe." De Gaulle was also reluctant to include the only country in Western Europe capable of competing with France for leadership of the bloc. It came as no surprise when, in the 1960s, France vetoed Britain's membership twice.

But in the early 1970s, things changed. De Gaulle was no longer France's president, and both Paris and Berlin were quickly realizing the geopolitical importance of expanding the EEC's membership. Across the English Channel, London had lost its empire and was in the midst of reassessing its international priorities and trade relationships. Though it saw EEC membership as an opportunity to influence the process of Continental integration, Britain's interest in accessing the common market far outweighed its aspirations of building a federal Europe. Unlike France and Germany, Britain had little enthusiasm for transforming the Continent into a United States of Europe.

These motives formed the basis of Britain's modern relationship with Europe, which was largely established during the administration of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Under the Tory leader, Britain simultaneously pushed to lower its contribution to the EEC budget and eliminate trade barriers inside the bloc. In Thatcher's now-famous Bruges Speech, she dismissed the notion of a federal Europe, instead describing the Continental organization as an agreement among sovereign states to establish free trade. A few years later her successor, John Major, negotiated Britain's opt-out from the eurozone.

Thatcher also advocated enlarging the EEC to the east, a strategy Labour Party Prime Minister Tony Blair continued in the early 2000s. Bringing the former communist states under the Continental umbrella not only sped up their transition to market economies but also created new demand for British exports. As an added perk for London, the bloc's expansion into a larger and more loosely connected entity helped to dilute France and Germany's hold over Europe.

But Britain's approach has produced only mixed results. Few new EU members have joined the eurozone, showing the limits of the federal union, and many share Thatcher's view of the bloc as a pact among sovereign states. At the same time, the admission of countries such as Poland and Romania has led to a significant increase in immigration to the United Kingdom, a development that Brexit supporters consider a primary reason for leaving the bloc. 
Upsetting the Balance of Power

If Britain quits the European Union, though, it risks disrupting the base of power the bloc has come to rest on. Germany relies on Britain's backing when it comes to promoting free trade in the face of France's protectionist tendencies. France sees Britain as not only a key defense partner but also a potential counterweight to German influence. Removing Britain from the equation would shatter this tenuous arrangement at a particularly dangerous time for the deeply fragmented Europe, when neither Germany nor France is satisfied with the status quo.

Should the "leave" camp win the British referendum, tension would rise between the Continent's north and south. Countries in Southern Europe want to turn the European Union into a transfer union that redistributes wealth from the relatively rich north to the less developed south and shares risk equally among members. Northern Europe, by comparison, is eager to protect its affluence and would agree to share risk only if the bloc assumed greater control over the south's ability to borrow and spend. The regions also disagree on how the European Union should use its funds. Southern Europe advocates generous subsidies for agriculture and development, a view most Eastern European states share, but Northern Europe would prefer to freeze or even reduce the bloc's budget.

As a net contributor to the European Union's budget, Britain has been particularly vocal on these issues. According to VoteWatch Europe, the country was on the losing side of votes related to EU spending more often than any other member between 2009 and 2015. Generally speaking, Northern European states such as Sweden, the Netherlands and Denmark tend to vote alongside Britain. Germany also usually sees see eye to eye with Britain on certain topics, such as Europe's common market, though the two tend to disagree on issues like the environment. But regardless of other members' stances, Britain has proved more willing than any of its peers to openly voice opposition to EU decisions. Without it, the European Union would be short a liberalizing and market-friendly member, and the bloc's political balance would shift in the favor of protectionist countries in Southern Europe such as France, Italy and Spain.

As fears of a takeover by this Mediterranean group grow among Northern European governments, they would probably become more resistant to the process of Continental integration. After all, the European Union is already deeply divided over related issues such as the eurozone and Schengen Agreement, which have little to do with Britain since it is not a member of either. The looming referendum has only revealed more points of contention within the bloc that would be aggravated by a Brexit. The Dutch government, for example, recently argued for limiting membership in the Schengen zone to a handful of countries in Northern Europe, while the right-wing Alternative for Germany party proposed the creation of a "northern eurozone."

The north-south divide would not be the only gulf to widen on the Continent, either. Should Britain leave, the European Union would split between east and west, too. Countries in Central and Eastern Europe see Britain as the defender of non-eurozone members' interests, and many share London's views on the sovereignty of member states. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, for instance, are generally supportive of the European Union but suspicious of Brussels' attempts to interfere with their domestic affairs. In particular, these countries have sympathized with British Prime Minister David Cameron's campaign to give national parliaments more power to block EU legislation. Poland and the Baltic states also see Britain as a critical partner on the issue of Russia, since London has fought for a tough European stance against Moscow in response to its annexation of Crimea. In the event that Britain leaves the Continental bloc, its Central and Eastern European allies may eventually become more isolated from Brussels.
Weakening Europe's Influence Abroad

The loss of one of the few EU members that is able to operate on a global scale would undermine the bloc's external strength as well. Only France can match the international presence Britain has, thanks to London's vast political and economic connections and its considerable military prowess. Though a Brexit would not keep Britain from cooperating with Europe completely, given its continued NATO membership and shared security interests with France and Germany, its collaboration with the Continent would be limited. As a result, Europe's ability to cope with challenges abroad — whether the migrant crisis, international terrorism or a more assertive Russia — would diminish.

Germany's and France's recent calls for the European Union to deepen its military and security cooperation seem to suggest the two are concerned about this very outcome. Berlin has steadfastly avoided taking on the more active role in world affairs that a Brexit would require. Since the start of the European financial crisis, Germany has reluctantly shouldered the burden of leading the bloc's political and economic policymaking, but assuming a prominent military role is another matter. France, for one, would accept it only within the framework of an EU-wide military union, something that would be difficult to achieve amid the atmosphere of isolationism that has settled over the Continent. The political calculations of French and German leaders preparing for general elections in 2017 would make such cooperation even harder to come by.

No matter what British voters choose, the damage to Europe has already been done. If Britain leaves the European Union, it would throw the Continent into yet another political and economic crisis, giving Euroskeptic forces greater ammunition against the bloc and voters fewer reasons to defend it. But if Britain keeps its membership, it would have proved to other European governments that it is possible to demand concessions from Brussels while winning support at home. And so, regardless of what happens June 23, Britain has set a precedent that Brussels cannot stop other EU members from following.
208  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: European matters on: June 27, 2016, 01:42:42 PM
"But within hours of the result on Friday morning, the Ukip leader, Nigel Farage, had distanced himself from the claim that £350m of EU contributions could instead be spent on the NHS"
209  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Stratfor: China's Future-- serious read on: June 27, 2016, 01:39:12 PM

Editor's Note: This is the next installment of an occasional series on China's transformation.

Between 1864 and 1871, something extraordinary happened in the heart of Europe. In three short wars, each following hot on the heels of the last, the Continent's great powers failed to unite to contain an ascendant Prussia. The failure to build a coalition against Prussia — during the Danish-Prussian War of 1864, the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 and the Franco-Prussian War of 1871 — resulted in the unification of Germany under Prussian dominion in early 1871. A few decades later, Germany was the leading power on the European continent, rivaling Great Britain for influence in global economic and political affairs. Its power would continue to grow, virtually unchecked, until 1914. How it managed such a feat is important when considering China's ambitions today.

It is scarcely an overstatement, in light of later events, to suggest that Prussia's rise and eventual unification of Germany was a watershed in the history of modern international politics. Even at the time, it was understood by leading statesmen in Britain, Russia and France as a profound shift in the European balance of power — one that directly threatened their own position and interests. In short, few, if any, observers outside of Germany desired Prussia's rise, and well before Otto von Bismarck launched the first of the conquests that produced a unified German nation-state, Europe's leading figures expressed concern over, and even called for containing, Prussian expansionism. Why did these calls go largely unheeded? What prevented Europe from uniting to halt Prussia's rise?

Europe's failure to contain Prussia represents an enduring challenge for international relations theory, which generally expects balances of power to form organically and efficiently from competition among states. If there are exceptions to this theory, the real world implications are many, especially for rising powers such as China. Most international relations scholars regard states as rational actors bent on survival in a competitive and potentially dangerous strategic environment and therefore anticipate that as one or several states grow in wealth and military power, others will emerge to balance against them, either by encouraging domestic economic growth or by forming alliances with other threatened states. From this process, scholars argue, arise the equilibriums known as international balances of power. Only rarely, and for reasons that continue to puzzle both scholars and policymakers, do these stabilizing balances fail to form or function.

A Question of Agency

The story of Prussia's rise taps into fundamental questions of the relationship between structure and agency in international relations. Prussia's ability to skirt the formation of a balancing coalition by its European rivals forces us to consider how emerging powers sometimes succeed in overcoming or preventing efforts to contain them. But the significance of this event extends beyond the theoretical realm. For a country like China today, the Prussian advance offers lessons in the arts of subterfuge and manipulation in international politics. As they struggle to avoid concerted containment by the United States and its Asian allies, China's leaders would do well to consider the example of Prussia under Bismarck.

International politics is a complex affair. The factors that shape events are many and often lie beyond the control of individual leaders or institutions, including states. In Prussia's case, a combination of historical, geographic and demographic forces provided a powerful thrust for the construction of a German state. Prussian dominance also profited from the emergence of communication and transport technologies that made it feasible for people in distant locales to imagine themselves as part of a single nation. In China's case, a variety of structural factors help explain the developments of the past decade. For example, China's large and relatively well-educated populace, combined with the ready supply of capital from international markets and ravenous demand for cheap goods in the United States and Europe, lent enormous momentum to the country's post-Mao "Reform and Opening," creating conditions that facilitated China's rise in the decades that followed.

By the same token, one could point to numerous events in surrounding countries — intra-European power struggles and domestic politics in Britain, Russia and France in the 1860s, or in the United States today, for instance — to account for European powers' ineffective response to Prussia's rise, or for what might look like underwhelming progress in the U.S. "pivot" to Asia. Indeed, one could even argue that Britain, France and Russia failed to effectively balance against Prussia in the 1860s because they did not see it as a true threat, or that the U.S. pivot has remained relatively limited because China, in fact, poses little real or immediate threat to American interests in the region. After all, China is decades from being able to truly challenge U.S. military dominance in Asia, let alone globally, and faces immense risks domestically that could stall, or even undermine, its rise to regional pre-eminence.

But these explanations, though helpful and no doubt partly true, miss an important aspect of Prussia's story, and possibly of China's, too. In placing emphasis either on structural factors — geography, demography, technology — or on the unpredictable messiness of domestic politics in surrounding countries, they obfuscate the role that Prussian strategy and statecraft played in neutralizing unified opposition to its rise in the 1860s and the role that Chinese statecraft has had in hampering the formation of an effective U.S.-led coalition to constrain China today. In particular, they neglect the ways in which Prussia and arguably China struggled (and in important ways succeeded) to represent their rise as consistent with the status quo and concordant with the long-term interests and principles of the status quo's upholders. In Prussia's case, these efforts amounted to a rhetorical and diplomatic sleight of hand that, in making a persuasive case for the legitimacy of Prussia's claims and of their congruence with international norms, immobilized opposition to Prussian expansion just long enough for Bismarck to ensure Germany's unification and transformation into an industrial and military juggernaut.

Spinning Narratives

As the political scientist Stacie Goddard argues, Prussia deployed a mix of rhetorical strategies to legitimize its expansion in 1864, 1866 and 1871, often tailoring its claims to the specific interests of the countries it dealt with. For example, in its war with Denmark in 1864, Prussia mobilized Austrian support and ensured British and Russian noninterference by defending its actions as a way of upholding prior treaties and fending off incursion by the Danish — a move that spoke to conservative European powers' desire to preserve the post-Napoleonic legal and political order. At other times, Prussia appealed to the principle of national self-determination, framing itself as a liberator of German-speaking peoples in non-German territories to stave off criticism from democratic Britain and post-Revolution France — a strategy, as Goddard suggests, of "setting rhetorical traps" to neutralize potential opposition.

Taken together, Goddard argues, these strategies made it difficult for leaders in Britain and France to overcome their own mutual distrust of each other, leading to an inability to balance against Prussia or justify expending national resources on military containment, let alone marshaling domestic popular support for war. By presenting its rise as consistent with powerful norms such as national self-determination, sovereign freedom from external intervention, and the maintenance of treaties, Prussia succeeded in deterring full-scale containment by Europe's major powers. European leaders were aware, even frightened, of Prussia's rise — but they could not justify the expense and risks of coalescing to oppose it.

What lessons can China's leaders glean from Prussia's example? It can be argued that Beijing has already taken several cards from Bismarck's playbook. At a time when the United States and Europe flirt with concepts of humanitarian intervention and democracy promotion, China has proclaimed itself a staunch defender of national sovereignty and sovereign freedom from external intervention — powerful and appealing norms not only to countries liable to find themselves on the receiving end of U.S. interventionism but also to many within the United States and Europe. Likewise, China wields concepts such as "economic interdependence," "development" and "multipolarity" to temper overt criticism of its rise. Such terms also go some way to legitimize Beijing's policies in regions such as Central Asia and Africa — after all, it is difficult for U.S. policymakers on the global stage to openly decry a multipolar world, or to condemn interdependence and development outright. It is not surprising, against this backdrop, that China in 2004 reframed its "peaceful rise" in more politically neutral terms, as "peaceful development."

This is not to suggest that China's rhetorical strategies are always and perfectly successful, or to deny that many of its counterparts view such rhetoric as thin cover for naked self-interest. The crucial point is that regardless of China's intent, its actions have yet to provoke concerted, effective balancing by the United States and its allies. As noted above, this may merely reflect confused domestic politics in Washington or that the United States and its Asian allies have more pressing tasks. But these facts do not negate the important role that China's political and foreign policy rhetoric — and its generally low-key behavior in international bodies such as the United Nations — play in staving off more overt efforts at containment by the United States, Japan and others.

To be sure, the Prussian analogy has its limits. The events of the 1860s gain their meaning because we know what came after. In China's case, what may now look to some like a failure by the United States to balance against China's rise could look, five or 10 years from now, like wisdom on Washington's part. China may be best positioned among the United States' potential competitors to challenge American dominance in the coming decades, but it also faces immense political, social and economic challenges at home — challenges compounded by the country's extreme regional geographic and socio-economic imbalances. These are factors and forces that threaten to halt China's rise well before it becomes a tangible danger to U.S. interests. As Stratfor has observed, these challenges will likely come to a head in the next 5-10 years, beyond which it is unclear if the Communist Party government can survive, at least in a form recognizable today.

Nonetheless, China, despite mounting risks and recent stumbles, is growing more powerful. And as it does, the consequences of lethargy will increase for the countries whose interests and positions are directly threatened by China's rise. So, too, will Beijing need to avert containment — an effort that, if Prussia's example is any lesson, will require steadfast and effective defense of China's actions in ways that neutralize opposition by rivals and mobilize support from allies and domestic audiences elsewhere. If, like Prussia in the 1860s, China makes it through the next 10 years without provoking conspicuous balancing by the United States and its partners, it will undoubtedly have its rhetoric partly to thank.
210  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Noonan on the Trump-Reagan comparison on: June 27, 2016, 01:34:15 PM
211  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Baraq refuses Committee questions on: June 27, 2016, 01:22:36 PM

I can't say that the Separation of Powers argument is without merit-- even if it aides that , , , anus.

212  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Progressive Fascists vs. , , , various neo-Nazi and others Sacramento, CA on: June 27, 2016, 01:20:39 PM
213  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: 2016 Presidential on: June 27, 2016, 12:41:41 PM
Caught a bit of the EDC with Forked Tongue Warren this morning.

Seems to be good synergy between the two. 

FTW has some very good populist issues (Feds should not be profiting on your students loans , , , on an education which should be free anyway) and that Consumer Protection Board she helped set up. 

Regarding the latter, they ARE some seriously hideous practices by finance companies (See "This Week with John Oliver" episode on this) and FTW's attacks on them and other consumer protection issues will play very well AND allow the EDC to ride the coat tails of her popularity on this issue-- allowing her to shore up her very weak link of being 'for' the little guy.

Also, FTW is a very good attack dog against Trump.  EDC was chortling about how she gets under Trump's skin.

Prediction:  The EDC will choose FTW for VP.
214  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: European matters on: June 27, 2016, 12:34:20 PM
Not enough to say "The Guardian is of the Left."

Is what the article says true or not?
215  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Rules of the Road/Fire Hydrant on: June 27, 2016, 12:33:05 PM

I have taken the liberty of filling in subject lines.  I'd rather not have to-- it gives the appearance of me trying to put words in your mouth, but I am just trying to make the posts more findable through the Search function.

Please take a moment to make the subject lines to your posts more findable.
216  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Another unlucky death in the Clinton universe; Snopes on this on: June 27, 2016, 12:29:01 PM
217  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Sen.Ted Cruz on: June 27, 2016, 11:43:06 AM
Fair points all.  I simply found it interesting the consciousness of Ted reached her to conclusions similar to those of Glenn Beck.
218  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Milo to March in Muslim neighborhood in Sweden on: June 27, 2016, 11:41:46 AM
219  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Donald Trump's Turnberry on: June 27, 2016, 11:38:03 AM
220  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Some Brexit backstroking? on: June 27, 2016, 09:02:10 AM
221  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / A win for the rule of law: CA's Yee to prison on: June 27, 2016, 08:43:55 AM
222  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / The Saudis, Muslim Brotherhood, Huma Abedin, the Clinton Foundation, and Hillary on: June 27, 2016, 08:26:42 AM

223  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / The Saudis, Muslim Brotherhood, Huma Abedin, the Clinton Foundation, and Hillary on: June 27, 2016, 08:26:14 AM

224  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / London's mayor using buses for Muslim propaganda on: June 27, 2016, 08:20:26 AM
225  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Unsecured email revealed Amb. Stevens was moving comms to a boat?!? on: June 26, 2016, 04:28:14 PM
226  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Caroline Glick likes Ted Cruz on: June 26, 2016, 04:19:02 PM
"This will be an interesting convention.  Whatever happens, Ted Cruz is quite simply the most amazing leader the Republican Party has produced since Reagan as far as im concerned. "
227  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Learned and witty speech on Brexit; 70 minute dcoumentary on: June 26, 2016, 12:00:41 PM

a 70 minute documentary advocating the Brexit vote:
228  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Oppose CA bill registering rifles with magazines on: June 26, 2016, 11:38:39 AM
229  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Donald Trump on: June 25, 2016, 01:51:31 PM
I posted this in the Politics thread too, but post it here to underline that Trump's appeal to the black vote on the basis of eliminating competition and downward wage pressure from illegal aliens.

Prediction:  Trump will surprise with how well he does with the Black vote.
230  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Black voices on Dem disastrous policies on: June 25, 2016, 01:49:57 PM
231  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Even ABC is beginning to report on this with a semblance of seriousness on: June 25, 2016, 01:42:51 PM
232  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / An Italian lets rip in support of Brexit on: June 25, 2016, 12:52:56 PM
233  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Sen.Ted Cruz on Orlando on: June 25, 2016, 12:51:30 PM
234  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Science, Culture, & Humanities / Sen. Cruz opposing Obama's release of US control of internet on: June 25, 2016, 10:57:53 AM
235  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / EVen more!!! Where is the fg indictment already?!? on: June 24, 2016, 10:48:26 PM
236  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / California bill against semi-auto magazines on: June 24, 2016, 06:01:17 PM
237  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / LGBT considering Trump on: June 24, 2016, 05:53:54 PM
238  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: European matters on: June 24, 2016, 02:36:29 PM
Apparently Northern Ireland is now making noises about exiting Britain to unify with Ireland

and Scotland and Wales are making similar noises.

We live in interesting times.

And, a trip down memory lane with the Iron Lady:
239  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Opposing points of view? Oh no! We can't have that! on: June 24, 2016, 11:53:34 AM
240  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Zuckerberg meeting w Saudi Prince on: June 24, 2016, 01:59:22 AM
241  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: European matters on: June 24, 2016, 01:10:55 AM
242  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Watchlist quotas; 8 years to get off the list on: June 24, 2016, 01:10:14 AM
243  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / DHS bans religiously charged terms on: June 23, 2016, 01:16:51 PM
244  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / DHS bans religiously charged terms on: June 23, 2016, 01:16:15 PM
245  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Ministry of Truth's allies in Hollywood on: June 23, 2016, 12:16:41 PM
246  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Donald Trump on: June 23, 2016, 09:46:49 AM
A most worthy target!-- but a tangent for Trump in this moment (and would play into anti-woman irrelevancies)  Let him stay focused (always a challenge for him  rolleyes ) on the EDC now. 
247  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / It is worse than we realized on: June 23, 2016, 09:44:31 AM
248  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / It is worse than we realized on: June 23, 2016, 09:44:11 AM
249  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Media, Ministry of Truth Issues on: June 22, 2016, 09:01:33 PM
OTOH someone cited this to me:
250  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Donald Trump on: June 22, 2016, 05:45:23 PM
I caught Trump's speech this morning while stretching out.

Very encouraging!

Particularly catching my attention were:

1) Appealing to gays-- he did this after Orlando, (every American deserves to be protected, every American has a right to be armed to defend themselves)-- this will serve well to blunt the bigotry/homphobia demogoguery charges not only viz gays but also signals that Trump stands aside from the culture wars in this regard, also see how he stood aside from the potty wars;
2) Superb attack on Hillary's treasonous corruption-- great specificity for once!
3) Superb planting of seed of doubt concerning her blackmailability if enemies have her 30,000 deleted emails, or her 20,000 undeleted emails.
4) Superb moment with "Hillary's slogan is 'I'm with Hillary, but I am with America/you" 
5) Great opening pitch to the Sandernistas-- we agree, the system is rigged, the EDC is the insider, I am the outsider WE (Sandernistas and Trump) can stand TOGETHER.

Very promising developments!!!
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