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28701  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: WW3 on: March 03, 2007, 01:21:49 AM
Though technically this belongs in the Iraq thread, it continues the conversation here.

_________________________

            BATTLING FOR BAGHDAD
            By RALPH PETERS


             March 1, 2007 -- WITH all of the mud-sling ing on Capitol Hill,
you could almost forget the gun-slinging in Baghdad.
            As Democrats, Iraqi insurgents and terrorists all struggle to
prevent an American win, it's hard to get an accurate sense of Iraq
nowadays.

            When in doubt, ask a soldier.

            My best source in Baghdad offered a soberly optimistic
assessment at odds with the "Gotcha!" negativity in Washington. He doesn't
claim that success is guaranteed. But he believes in his head, heart and
soul that we've got a fighting chance.

            And I believe him.

            I took the temperature of other officers, as well. They agree
unanimously that the administration made terrible mistakes from which we and
the Iraqis are still recovering. But not one of these soldiers is ready to
quit.

            Here are the key points I've heard from those I trust:

            * Of the five additional U.S. brigades headed for Baghdad, only
one is in place, with the second starting to arrive. Yet the city is already
quieter and safer. The terrorists continue to detonate their bombs - with
suicidal fanatics targeting the innocent - but sectarian killings
(death-squad hits) have dropped from over 50 each night down to single
digits.

            * The tactic of stationing U.S. units and their Iraqi
counterparts down in the Baghdad 'hoods is already paying off. (It should
have been used from the outset - instead of hunkering down on massive bases.
But better late than never.) The effort has triggered a flood of
intelligence tips: When citizens feel safe, they cooperate. And when they
help us, our success compounds.

            * U.S. commanders now have a lot of experience in Iraq. They're
not wide-eyed kids at the circus anymore. They understand there are no
uniform, easy answers to Iraq's violence and complex allegiances. As a
senior officer put it, "Every neighborhood and city is unique, with their
own challenges."

            I'll leave it to The New York Times to betray our military
secrets, and just say I'm very impressed by the insight shown by our brigade
and battalion commanders these days.

            * We hear the bad news from the rest of Iraq, such as this
week's monstrous car bombing of children at play on a soccer field in
Ramadi, but we don't hear that such attacks by al Qaeda operatives have
infuriated mainstream Sunni sheiks and their tribes - who increasingly make
common cause with us and their government. And winning over the Sunni
"middle" is crucial to Iraq's future.

            * We'll never stop all suicide bombers and car bombers, but our
security crackdown has already taken out two major Vehicle-Borne Improvised
Explosive Device (VBIED) factories. And we took down a huge arms cache late
last week.

            * No one's getting any "Mission Accomplished" banners ready to
go, but front-line leaders in Iraq are convinced the situation just isn't as
hopeless as politicians back home insist. I don't know a single officer
in-country who believes the reporting from Iraq gives an honest, balanced
picture.

            Of course, there are serious worries:

            * Above all, senior leaders worry that, thanks to political
shenanigans back home, they won't be given the time it would take to win.
Even with improved tactics, this just isn't easy work.

            Personally, I continue to believe that 2007 is the year of
decision - when the Iraqi government and its security forces have to show
their mettle. But 2007 has barely begun. Let's not declare defeat for April
Fool's Day. The stakes are so high that Iraq merits this last chance.

            * The sectarian violence between Sunni Arabs and the Shia that
gathered strength after last year's Golden Mosque bombing has "damaged trust
between the two sects enormously," as a U.S. official put it. It's possible
that the damage is too deep to be repaired - we just don't know. At best,
reconstructing a shared national identity is going to be hard. But many
gruesome conflicts have ended in national reconciliation.

            * There's one thing we know won't work: The nutty Pelosi-crat
proposal to restrict the mission of U.S. troops to "training Iraqis and
defeating al Qaeda." Would our troops have to wait to return fire until they
checked the ID cards of their attackers? If they saw a massacre of women and
children in progress, would we want them to stand by until they received a
legal opinion as to whether the killers were bona fide foreign terrorists?

            This ain't the NFL, where everybody wears a uniform and plays by
the rules. Proposals to limit the freedom of action of our troops reflect
domestic politics at their shabbiest - and you and I know it. Our troops
need fewer restrictions, not more.

            THERE are no guarantees of success. The president's troop surge
may not be enough to make a decisive difference; in the end, Iraq may
collapse all around us. A sectarian bloodbath could be inevitable.

            But our brave men and women in uniform have new coaches and a
new playbook for Iraq. They believe they've got a reasonable chance to cross
the goal line - and they've got more at risk than a sports celebrity's
salary.

            Yes, the Iraqis have to pick up the ball - but it would be an
immoral act of strategic madness to fumble the ball on purpose.

            In the end, we may not win. But you can't win if you walk off
the field while the game's still under way. The clock may run out on hope
for Iraq. But it hasn't yet.

            Ralph Peters' latest book is "Never Quit The Fight."

28702  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Cyber Jihad on: March 03, 2007, 12:05:35 AM
 U.S. INTELLIGENCE OFFICER FOR IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN SAYS INTERNET IS TERRORISTS' BIGGEST RECRUITING TOOL
Fri Mar 2 2007 14:11:05 ET

America's top intelligence officer overseeing Iraq and Afghanistan says terrorists have made the Internet their most important recruiting tool. Brig. Gen. John Custer tells Scott Pelley that terrorist groups like Al Qaeda are influencing Islamic youth to join their cause through Websites devoted to jihad, or religious war. Pelley's report will be broadcast on 60 MINUTES Sunday, March 4 (7:00-8:00 PM, ET/PT) on the CBS Television Network.

"I see 16, 17-yr.-olds who have been indoctrinated on the Internet turn up on the battlefield. We capture them, we kill them every day in Iraq, in Afghanistan,"says Custer. "Without a doubt, the Internet is the single-most important venue for the radicalization of Islamic youth," he tells Pelley.

Potential recruits can be lured to sites that offer news or information that contain links to other sites featuring violence against people the terrorists say are enemies of Islam. Those sites often show American soldiers being killed and military vehicles blown up, as well as journalists and contractors being murdered or shown in captivity. Custer says the sites can convince potential recruits that American soldiers are on the run. "It's a war of perceptionsÉ.They don't have to win on the tactical battlefield. They never will. No platoon has ever been defeated in Afghanistan or Iraq, but it doesn't matter."

The sites also provide religious justification for waging a holy war and celebrate suicide bombers by showing their farewell videos and depicting them enshrined in heaven. Chat rooms and message boards also play a role, manipulating visitors with religious guilt. Ultimately, the terrorists are trying to hijack Islam says Stephen Ulph, an expert on militant Islam and a consultant to West Point from the Jamestown Foundation. "[The terrorists] say 'You're not a proper Muslim, nor are your parents.' Very important implication here. If your parents aren't proper Muslims and if the sheik of a mosque isn't a proper Muslim, What are you doing obeying them?" says Ulph.

The Internet allows terrorists to use increasingly sophisticated methods, such as music videos distributed by media organizations, to reach more potential recruits with more effective messages. "Now they are able to distribute... anything they want anywhere they want. This is unheard of in history," says Ulph. "We're witnessing this ideological war on our own desktops."

To Custer, it's the end of conventional war. "Can you imagine thousands of tanks on a battlefield now? I can't,"he tells Pelley. "It's a different type of warfare. It's a battle of perceptions and Al Qaeda understands it and America needs to understand it."
28703  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Cyber Jihad: Part Two on: March 03, 2007, 12:03:14 AM
Attack Strategies

A General Call to Participate in a Virus Attack

Postings on Islamist Web sites reveal that the cyberspace mujahideen favor two main strategies. The first is to paralyze sites by "swarming," i.e., flooding them with hits and thus creating a traffic overload. When traffic to the site exceeds the Web site's or server's capacity, the site is blocked to additional users, and in some cases it even crashes. The second strategy is called "ping attack": special programs are used to flood a Web site with thousands of emails, sometimes containing viruses, thus clogging the Web site and infecting it. The programs utilized by mujahideen in these attacks are either programs available to the hacker community at large or programs created especially for Islamist hackers.

Reports posted by the mujahideen after attacks on Web sites indicate that these cyberassaults affect the Web sites only temporarily, if at all. In many cases the mujahideen themselves admit that their attack was ineffective and that the Web site returned to normal functioning only minutes or hours after the attack. In light of this, the mujhahideen often resort to another method in an attempt to completely eliminate the targeted site.

An Islamist hacker explained the method as follows: "We contact... the server [which hosts the target website] before and after the assault, and threaten [the server admin] until they shut down the target website. [In such cases], the 'host' [i.e., server] is usually forced to shut down the website. The battle continues until the enemy declares: 'I surrender.'"

Islamist Web sites present very little evidence of more sophisticated attacks utilizing actual hacking techniques (i.e., obtaining the admin password and using admin privileges to corrupt data or damage the server itself).

However, two examples do indicate that the cyberspace mujahideen may possess the capability to carry out such attacks. On October 17, 2006, an Islamist Web site posted a message containing a link to what appeared to be live pictures of Anchorage International Airport taken by the airport's security cameras. There was also a link to an admin control program allowing surfers to control the airport's security cameras. If this was an authentic break-in, it indicates that Muslim hackers are capable of hacking even into highly secure servers.

Another example which illustrates the extent of the mujahideen's hacking skills is the story of 22-year-old Younis Tsouli from West London, better know as Irhabi 007, who was arrested in 2005 by Scotland Yard. In his short but rich hacking career, Irahbi 007 wrote a hacking manual for mujahideen, instructed Islamist hackers online, and broke into servers of American universities, using them to upload shared files containing jihad-related materials.

Coordination of Attacks

Islamist Web sites provide extensive evidence that Islamist cyber-attacks are not random initiatives by individual mujahideen, but are steadily becoming more coordinated. Firstly, announcements of imminent attacks, which appear almost daily, are posted on numerous sites simultaneously. Participants are instructed to look out for postings specifying the time of attack, the URL of the target (usually posted some 30 minutes before the attack itself) and the program to be used for carrying out the attack. Secondly, before the attacks, Web sites have lately begun to post messages addressed to specific individuals referred to as "attack coordinators," each of whom is associated with a specific Islamist site. Finally, there is a significant increase in response to the calls for participation in electronic attacks.

Recently, for example, a message announcing an attack on a Shi'ite Web site received 15,000 hits, and approximately 3,000 forum members responded to the message. The attacks, then, seem to be well-organized and supervised by a network of specially appointed individuals on various sites, and they appear to generate high participation levels among forum members.

The following three examples demonstrate the coordinated nature of the attacks.

Instructions for Attack Coordinators

On December 21, 2006, the Al-Muhajirun Web site posted the following message regarding a planned attack: "Our attack will take place this coming Friday... I remind you that the name of the program to be used will not be posted until half an hour to an hour before the attack... Attack coordinators, you worked hard last week... and I ask you to display the same zeal in this [upcoming] attack. I ask [each] individual who intends to serve as attack coordinator on [his] website to reply [to this posting with the message]: "I will be the attack coordinator for this network..." [The coordinator] will be responsible for the following: ...urging forum participants [to take part in the attack], while [taking care] not to mention names of 'Hilf Al-Muhajirin' members and the names of those who take part in the attack... [The coordinators] must be online at least one full hour before the attack... in order to post links to the programs that will be used and to the [intended target] websites. [They are also] responsible for posting the code-name of the attack, along with the text shown below [which presents some general information about the attack]... "

Announcement of a Ping Attack Against a Web site That Harms Islam

The following message was posted November 23, 2006 on the website Majmu'at Al-Jihad Al-Electroni: "...An attack is about to be carried out by all the Internet mujahideen, may Allah accept it as jihad for His sake... [The targets are] websites that do harm to Islam... The attacks will take place on Saturday, Monday, and Thursday, between 6:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m., Mecca time, or between 5:00 p.m. and 9:00 p.m. Jerusalem time... The primary [computer] program to be used is Al-Jihad Al-Electroni 1.5... We have been able to create a better version of the [program]... and eliminate most of the problems that were encountered by members [in the past]. [The new version] is much lighter and is capable of producing a much more powerful attack..." "This action is a rapid [response] to [a website] that has annoyed us. This is war... Who is with me and who is against me? Allah is with me... and the Crusader Jew and his followers... are against me. I have... uploaded three viruses and a file which can disable firewalls. I will inform you of the time of the attacks... Whoever wishes to participate in the raid should download the virus he wishes to use and [then] send it [to the target]... I ask that before you do anything on the Internet... my mujahid brother, [please] place your trust in Allah."

Electronic Jihad: A Nuisance or a Real Threat?

The evidence presented here shows that electronic jihad is a form of cyber-warfare with ideological underpinnings and defined goals, which manifests in well-coordinated cyber-attacks. Examination of the Web sites reveals that the Islamist hackers maintain constant communication among themselves, share software and expertise and conduct debates on strategy and legitimate targets. There is also evidence of increasingly efficient coordination of attacks. The mujahideen's own statements show that they mean to position themselves as a formidable electronic attack force which is capable of inflicting severe damage - greater even than the damage caused by conventional terror-ist attacks.

At the same time, however, the information presented here reveals a significant gap between the mujahideen's aspirations and their actual capabilities. Despite their selfproclaimed intention to target key economic and government systems and Web sites in order to bring about a total economic collapse of the West, Islamist Web sites provide no evidence that such targets have indeed been attacked. In actuality, most of the attacks documented on Islamist Web sites were aimed at sites that are seen by the mujahideen as morally corrupt or offensive to Islam. In addition, most of the attacks were carried out using unsophisticated methods which are not very likely to pose a significant threat to Western economic interests or sensitive infrastructure. In this respect, electronic jihad can still be seen, at least present, as a nuisance rather than a serious threat.

Nevertheless, it is important not to underestimate the potential danger posed by this phenomenon. First, as shown above, at least two examples indicate that the mujahideen are already capable of compromising servers, even highly secure ones. Given the increasing communication and the constant sharing of expertise among Islamist hackers, the gap between their goals and their actual capabilities is bound to narrow down. In other words, the mujahideen's persistent pursuit of expertise in the area of hacking, as reflected in numerous Web site postings, may eventually enable them to compromise Western Web sites of a highly sensitive nature.

Second, past experience has shown that even primitive attacks, which do not damage servers, can cause substantial financial damage. For example, after a midair collision between a Chinese fighter jet and an American spy plane on April 1, 2001, Chinese hackers spread a malicious "worm," known as the "Code Red Worm," which infected about a million US servers in July 2001 and caused some $2.6 billion worth of damage to computer hardware, software, and networks. On another occasion, a ping attack against the retail giants Yahoo, eBay, and Amazon in February 2000 was estimated to have caused Yahoo alone a loss of $500,000 due a decrease in hits during the attack.

In conclusion, electronic jihad, in its current state of development, is capable of causing some moderate damage to Western economy, but there is no indication that it constitutes an immediate threat to more sensitive interests such as defense systems and other crucial infrastructure. Nevertheless, in light of rapid evolving of this phenomenon, especially during the recent months, the Western countries should monitor it closely in order to track the changes in its modes of operation and the steady increase in its sophistication.

The author is director of MEMRI's Jihad and Terrorism Studies Project


This article can also be read at http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=117189453751...JPArticle%2FShowFull

"We're all going to die, but three of us are going to do something"--Tom Burnett, citizen-warrior KIA 9/11/01 engaging the enemy on Flight 93
28704  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Cyber Jihad on: March 03, 2007, 12:01:52 AM
Cyberspace as a combat zone: The phenomenon of Electronic Jihad

E. ALSHECH , THE JERUSALEM POST Feb. 28, 2007
Alongside military jihad, which has been gaining momentum and extracting an ever growing price from many countries around the globe, Islamists have been developing a new form of warfare, termed "electronic jihad," which is waged on the Internet. This new form of jihad was launched in recent years and is still in its early stages of development. However, as this paper will show, Islamists are fully aware of its destructive potential, and persistently strive to realize this potential.

Electronic jihad is a phenomenon whereby mujahideen use the Internet to wage economic and ideological warfare against their enemies. Unlike other hackers, those engaged in electronic jihad are united by a common strategy and ideology which are still in a process of formation.

This paper aims to present the phenomenon of electronic jihad and to characterize some of its more recent developments. It lays out the basic ideology and motivations of its perpetrators, describes, as far as possible, its various operational strategies, and assesses the short and long-term dangers posed by this relatively new phenomenon. The paper focuses on electronic jihad waged by organized Islamist groups that mobilize large numbers of hackers around the world to attack servers and Web sites owned by those whom they regard as their enemies.

Organized Electronic Jihad

In the past few years Islamist Web sites have provided ample evidence that Islamist hackers do not operate as isolated individuals, but carry out coordinated attacks against Web sites belonging to those whom they regard as their enemies. As evident from numerous postings on the Islamist Web sites, many of these coordinated attacks are organized by groups devoted to electronic jihad. Six prominent groups of this sort have emerged on the Internet over the past few years: Hackboy, Ansar Al-Jihad LilJihad Al-Electroni, Munazamat Fursan Al-Jihad Al-Electroni, Majmu'at Al-Jihad Al-Electroni, Majma' Al-Haker Al-Muslim, and Inhiyar AlDolar. All these groups, with the exception of Munazamat Fursan Al-Jihad and Inhiyar alDolar, have Web sites of their own through which they recruit volunteers to take part in electronic attacks, maintain contacts with others who engage in electronic jihad, coordinate their attacks, and enable their members to chat with one another anonymously.

The Majmu'at Al-Jihad Al-Electroni Web site, for example, includes the following sections: a document explaining the nature of electronic jihad, a section devoted to electronic jihad strategy, a technical section on software used for electronic attacks, a section describing previous attacks and their results, and various appeals to Muslims, mujahideen, and hackers worldwide.

A more recent indication of the increasingly organized nature of electronic jihad is an initiative launched January 3, 2007 on Islamist Web sites: mujahideen operating on the Internet (and in the media in general) were invited to sign a special pact called "Hilf Al-Muhajirin" (Pact of the Immigrants). In it, they agree "to stand united under the banner of the Muhajirun Brigades in order to promote [cyber-warfare]," and "to pledge allegiance to the leader [of the Muhajirun Brigades]." They vow to "obey [the leader] in [all tasks], pleasant or unpleasant, not to contest [his] leadership, to exert every conceivable effort in [waging] media jihad...[and to persist] in attacking those websites which do harm to Islam and to the Muslims..."

This initiative clearly indicates that the Islamist hackers no longer regard themselves as loosely connected individual activists, but as dedicated soldiers who are bound by a pact and committed to a joint ideological mission.

The Ideology and Ethical Boundaries of Electronic Jihad

Mission statements posted on the Web sites of electronic jihad groups reveal that just like the mujahideen on the military front, the mujahideen operating on the Internet are motivated by profound ideological conviction.

They despise hackers who "engage in purposeless and meaningless sabotage" or are motivated by desire for publicity or by any other worldly objective. They perceive themselves as jihad-fighters who assist Islam and promote (monotheism) via the Internet.

More importantly, they view cyberspace as a virtual battlefield in which the mujahideen can effectively defeat the West.

That the mujahideen operating in cyberspace are motivated by ideology, in contrast to many hackers, is illustrated by the following example. Recently, a participant on an Islamist forum posted instructions for breaking into a UK-based commercial Web site and stealing the customers' credit card information in order to inflict financial damage on the "unbelievers" (i.e. on the non-Muslims customers and retailers). His initiative sparked a fierce debate among the forum participants, the dominant opinion being that this initiative falls outside the boundaries of legitimate cyberjihad. One forum participant wrote: "Oh brother, we do not steal... We attack racist, American and Shi'ite [websites] and all corrupt websites." Another participant reminded the forum members that stealing from unbelievers is forbidden.

One objective of electronic jihad which is frequently evoked by the mujahideen is assisting Islam by attacking Web sites that slander Islam or launch attacks against Islamic Web sites, or by attacking websites that interfere with the goal of rendering Islam supreme (e.g. Christian Web sites). More recently, however, the mujahideen have begun to cite additional objectives: avenging the death of Muslim martyrs and the suffering of Muslims worldwide (including imprisoned jihad fighters); inflicting damage on Western economy; affecting the morale of the West; and even bringing about the total collapse of the West.

The following excerpts from Arabic messages posted by Islamist hackers exemplify each of these objectives.

Eliminating Websites That Harm Islam

"The administration wishes to inform you of the following so that you understand our operational methods and our jihad strategy. My brothers, our operational methods are not only to assault... and target any website that stands in the way of our victory... We are indeed victorious when we disable such [harmful] websites, but the matter is not so simple. We target...websites that wage intensive war [against us]... We target them because they are the foremost enemies of jihad in cyberspace; their existence threatens Islamic and religious websites throughout the Internet..."

Avenging the Death of Martyrs and the Suffering of Muslims and Imprisoned Mujahideen Worldwide

"We shall say to the Crusaders and their followers: We take an oath to avenge the martyrs' blood and the weeping of Muslim mothers and children. The Worshipers of the Cross and their followers have already been warned that their websites may be broken into and destroyed. We must not forget our leaders, our mujahideen, our people and our children who were martyred in Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechnya and in other places. We shall take revenge upon you, O' Zionists and Worshipers of the Cross. We shall never rest or forget what you did to us. [There are only two options] in electronic jihad for the sake of Allah: Victory or death.

We dedicate these [operations of] hacking [into enemy websites] to the martyr and jihadfighter sheikh Abu Mus'ab Al-Zarqawi, to the jihad-fighter Sheikh Osama bin Laden, to the imprisoned fighter of electronic jihad Irhabi 007, to the fighter of electronic jihad Muhibb Al-Shaykhan and to all the mujahideen for the sake of Allah..."

Inflicting Economic Damage on the West and Damaging its Morale

"Allah has commanded us in various Koranic verses to wage war against the unbelievers... Electronic jihad utilizes methods and means which inflict great material damage on the enemy and [which also] lower his morale and his spirits via the Internet. The methods of [hacking] have been revealed [to us] by expert [hackers] on the Internet and networks... many of whom engage in purposeless and meaningless sabotage. These lethal methods will be harnessed [for use] against our enemies, so as to inflict the greatest [possible] financial damage [upon them] - which can amount to millions - and [in order] to damage [their] morale, so that [they] will be afraid of the Muslims wherever they go and even when they are surfing the Web."

Bringing About the Total Collapse of the West

"I have examined most of the material [available] in hacking manuals but have not found articles which discuss... how to disable all the [electronic] networks around the world. I found various articles which discuss how to attack websites, e-mails, servers, etc., but I have not read anything about harming or blocking the networks around the world, even though this is one of the most important topics for a hacker and for anyone who engages in electronic jihad. Such [an attack] will cripple the West completely. I am not talking about attacking websites or [even] the Internet [as a whole], but [about attacking] all the [computer] networks around the world including military networks, and [networks] which control radars, missiles and communications around the world... If all these networks stop [functioning even] for a single day... it will bring about the total collapse of the West... while affecting our interests only slightly. The collapse of the West will bring about the breakdown of world economy and of the stock markets, which depend on [electronic] communication [for] their activities, [e.g.] transfers of assets and shares. [Such an attack] will cause the capitalist West to collapse."

Actual Attacks and Their Effects

Reports on Islamist Web sites indicate that most of the hacking operations carried out by mujahideen have been aimed at three types of Web sites: a) Ideological Web sites which promote beliefs, doctrines and ideologies which the mujahideen perceive as incompatible with Sunni Islam, such as Christianity, Shi'ism and Zionism. b) Web sites which the mujahideen perceive as defamatory or harmful to Islam. Many of these are private blogs, news blogs and non-Islamic forums (e.g., http://answering-islam.org.uk ). c) Web sites which promote behavior that is contrary to the mujahideen's religious worldview (e.g., http://www.nscrush.org/news/journal, a Web site associated with a girls' sports team).

As for Web sites associated with governments, defense systems, and Western economic interests - Islamist Web sites present little or no evidence that mujahideen have actually attacked them. There is, however, sufficient evidence to suggest that such sensitive targets continue to be of intense interest to the mujahideen. For example, an Islamist forum recently conducted a survey among its participants regarding the targets they would like to attack. Among the targets suggested were Western financial Web sites and Web sites associated with the FBI and CIA. Moreover, in September 2006, an Islamic Web site posted a long list of IP addresses allegedly associated with key governmental defense institutions in the West, including "the Army Ballistics Research Laboratory," "the Army Armament Research Development and Engineering Center," "the Navy Computers and Telecommunications Station," "the National Space Development Agency of Japan," and others. The title of the message indicates that the list is meant for use in electronic attacks.

Another message, posted on an Islamist Web site on December 5, 2006, stated that Islamist hackers had cancelled a planned attack, nicknamed "The Electronic Guantanamo Raid," against American banks. The posting explained that the attack had been cancelled because the banks had been warned about the attack by American media and government agencies. It stated further that the panic in the media shows how important it is "to focus on attacking sensitive economic American websites [instead of] other [websites, like those that offend Islam]..." The writer added: "If [we] attack websites associated with the stock[market] and with banks, disabling them for a few days or even for a few hours, it will cause millions of dollars' worth of damage... I [therefore] call upon all members [of this forum] to focus on these websites and to urge all Muslims who are able to participate in this [type of] Islamic Intifada to attack websites associated with the American stock[market] and banks..."
28705  DBMA Espanol / Espanol Discussion / Re: Peru on: March 02, 2007, 11:48:57 PM

Saludos desde Peru.  Rainer esta organizando un seminario en Lima para Martes.
28706  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: WW3 on: March 02, 2007, 11:34:08 PM
*If you're not willing to tell me where I'm wrong, then I have to assume you agree.*

Rog, this is profoundly silly.  I have been interacting with you for several years on this now so you know quite well that this is not so.  As I said, there are points where our respective concepts of reality do not interface enough to make further conversation worth my time.

*Again, no disagreement with me as to the general cowardice and spinelessness of most Democrats.  My objection is to the deliberate focus on these types in order to avoid addressing the legitimate anti-war arguments.*

I think it a most fair point that these types have the effect of persuading our enemies, our would be friends and those who seek to back the strong horse that we are going to cut and run.   I really do not see any way around this.

As for avoiding the issues, again our respective realities do not interface.  The great bulk of this forum is precisely about discussing what to do!  If you want to make legitimate anti war arguments in the tone of friends breaking bread together by all means go for it.  That said, talking as if our troops are war criminals and other inflammatotry nonsense does not get respect from me.

Lastly, by leaving out this portion of what I said

*Similarly, if they were to tell me that we have blown it and that it is too late too pull off our original intention, that carries more weight with me than former Sec'y Rumbo.*

you leave out the answer to your final question.

28707  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Iran on: March 02, 2007, 11:12:19 PM
I wish this piece had addressed what the differences are, if any, when the Prince needs to get elected and needs to get authorized by Congress.  Anyway, here is this surprising tidbit from Stratfor.  We shall see if the French and the Russians et al live up to it.

''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''
IRAN: Russia, France, the United Kingdom, China, Germany and the United States are "completely in agreement" on a new U.N. Security Council resolution regarding Iran's nuclear program, French Foreign Minister Philippe Douste-Blazy said. The resolution is an extension of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1737, which imposed nuclear technology sanctions against Iran for not suspending its uranium enrichment program. Under the current framework, measures for the resolution's enforcement exclude military action.
28708  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Re: Tippy-tappy drills-- threat or menace? on: March 02, 2007, 09:47:42 PM
Yiip!

A quick yip from southern Peru where I am checking in with my mom to make sure she is OK.

The internet connection here is lousy and I just had a post I wrote vaporized.   Arrrghh.

The Adventure continues,
CD
28709  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Re: Calling all female fighters on: March 02, 2007, 09:21:42 PM
Linda attended the DLO 2 seminar by Gabe Suarez and me this past January and was in fine form cool
28710  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Giuliani-- Part Two on: February 28, 2007, 04:14:25 AM

Mr. Giuliani persisted, and when Congress finally passed welfare reform in 1996, giving states and cities broad powers to refocus the giant, federally funded welfare program for mothers and children, Mr. Giuliani applied many of the same kinds of reforms. He hired as welfare commissioner Jason Turner, the architect of welfare reform in Wisconsin, which had led the nation in putting welfare recipients back to work. Mr. Turner promptly converted the city's grim welfare intake offices into cheerful and optimistic job centers, where counselors advised welfare recipients on how to write a résumé and provided them with skills assessment and a space they could use to look for work.

By 1999, the number of welfare recipients finding work had risen to more than 100,000 annually, and the welfare rolls had dropped by more than 600,000. It took steadfast courage to win those gains. "The pressure on Rudy during these years was enormous," says Richard Schwartz, a Giuliani policy advisor. "The advocates and the press trained their sights on us, just waiting for something to go wrong in these workfare programs."

As part of Mr. Giuliani's quintessentially conservative belief that dysfunctional behavior, not our economic system, lay at the heart of intergenerational poverty, he also spoke out against illegitimacy and the rise of fatherless families. A child born out of wedlock, he observed in one speech, was three times as likely to wind up on welfare as a child from a two-parent family. "Seventy percent of long-term prisoners and 75% of adolescents charged with murder grew up without fathers," Mr. Giuliani told the city. He insisted that the city and the nation had to re-establish the "responsibility that accompanies bringing a child into the world," and to that end he required deadbeat fathers either to find a private-sector job or to work in the city's workfare program as a way of contributing to their child's upbringing. But he added that changing society's attitude toward marriage was more important than anything government could do: "If you wanted a social program that would really save these kids, . . . I guess the social program would be called fatherhood."





As a consequence of his rejection of the time-honored New York liberal belief in congenital black victimhood, Mr. Giuliani set out to change the city's conversation about race. He objected to affirmative action, ending the city's set-aside program for minority contractors, and he rejected the idea of lowering standards for minorities. Accordingly, he ended open enrollment at the City University of New York, a 1970s policy aimed at increasing the minority population at the nation's third-largest public college system but one that also led to a steep decline in standards and in graduation rates.
The reform of CUNY began when its chancellor complained that it was unfair to require students on welfare to work because it jeopardized their studies. Mr. Giuliani responded that it was unfair to expect middle-class kids to work their way through college by holding down jobs and going to classes while exempting students on welfare from working. While the controversy raged, several critics of CUNY pointed out that only 10% to 15% of CUNY students on welfare ever graduated, and that the system's overall graduation rate was abysmally low. Mr. Giuliani and Gov. George Pataki appointed a blue-chip panel led by former Yale president Benno Schmidt and former New York City congressman and longtime CUNY critic Herman Badillo to examine the system. The panel recommended widespread changes, including tightening admissions standards and eliminating remedial courses for students at the system's 11 senior colleges.

The moves sparked a startling turnaround. Within a few years, CUNY was attracting 20% more students from New York's elite high schools (who had previously shunned it), SAT scores of incoming freshmen had risen 168 points, and the student population reached its highest number since the mid-1970s.

Mr. Giuliani wanted to work the same dramatic reform on the city's K-12 school system, but the entrenched educational bureaucracy and his lack of direct control over the school system stymied him. The best he could do was to use the bully pulpit as well as his influence over the two Board of Education members (out of a total of seven) whom he appointed. He did this so relentlessly that he ultimately pushed out two schools chancellors who wouldn't install the reforms that he believed would spur dramatic, systemic change--reforms that included using city money for vouchers to provide low-income students in failing public schools with scholarships to private schools. He never could get his vouchers, however, and when he managed to prod the board into trying to privatize five of the city's worst public schools, the board's pointed lack of enthusiasm scared off necessary parental approval, and the idea died.

Although Mr. Giuliani didn't start out as a proponent of school choice, his frustration in trying to turn around a huge school system where the teachers union and the bureaucrats worked to stymie reform made him into a powerful proponent of vouchers, which he believed would force the public schools to compete for students with their private counterparts. "The whole notion of choice is really about more freedom for people, rather than being subjugated by a government system that says you have no choice about the education of your child," he said.

Mr. Giuliani's relentless attacks on the city's educational system finally convinced most New Yorkers that it could never be salvaged unless it was under the control of a mayor responsible to voters. In 2002, the state Legislature placed the city's school system under the mayor--too late for Mr. Giuliani.





Mr. Giuliani's efforts to revive entrepreneurial New York naturally focused on unleashing the city's private sector through tax cuts achieved by slowing the growth of government. Mr. Giuliani preached against New York's lingering New Deal belief that government creates jobs, arguing that government should instead get out of the way and let the private sector work. "City government should not and cannot create jobs through government planning," he said. "The best it can do, and what it has a responsibility to do, is to deal with its own finances first, to create a solid budgetary foundation that allows businesses to move the economy forward on the strength of their energy and ideas. After all, businesses are and have always been the backbone of New York City."
When Mr. Giuliani took office, the city's private sector was experiencing the worst of times. After four years under Mr. Dinkins, it had shrunk to its lowest level since 1978, losing 275,000 jobs--192,000 in 1991 alone, the largest one-year job decline that any American city had ever suffered. Not coincidentally, Gotham also had the highest overall rate of taxation of any major city and a budget that spent far more per capita than any other major city. Despite that, and despite billions of dollars in tax increases during the Dinkins years, New York could barely pay its bills, and Mr. Giuliani, immediately after taking office, faced a nearly $2.5 billion budget deficit.

Mr. Giuliani's first budget, submitted just weeks after he took office, stunned the city's political establishment by its fiscal conservatism. To demonstrate his disdain for the reigning orthodoxy, when the New York Times editorial board urged him to solve the budget crisis with tax and fee increases that a Dinkins-era special commission had recommended, Mr. Giuliani unceremoniously dumped a copy of the commission's report into the garbage and derided it as "old thinking." It was a pointed declaration that a very different set of ideas would guide his administration.

After years of tax hikes under Mr. Dinkins, Mr. Giuliani proposed making up the city's still-huge budget deficit entirely through spending cuts and savings. Even more audaciously, he proposed a modest tax cut to signal the business community that New York was open for business, promising more tax cuts later. "I felt it was really important the first year I was mayor to cut a tax," Mr. Giuliani later explained. "Nobody ever cut a tax before in New York City, and that was one of the reasons I wanted to set a new precedent."

To balance the city's budget early in his tenure, when tax revenues stagnated amid a struggling economy, the mayor played hardball, winning concessions from city workers that other mayors had failed to get. The city's police unions had used their power in Albany to resist efforts by Mr. Dinkins and his predecessor, Ed Koch, to merge the city's housing police and transit police into the NYPD. Mr. Giuliani strong-armed Albany leaders into agreeing to the merger, saving the city hundreds of millions in administrative costs and making the department a better crime-fighting unit, by threatening to fire every housing and transit officer and rehire each as a city cop if legislative leaders did not go along.

Similarly, though the city's garbage men, many of whom worked only half days because their department was so overstaffed, had rebuffed the Dinkins administration's push for productivity savings, Mr. Giuliani won $300 million in savings from them by threatening to contract out trash collection to private companies. Ultimately, with such deals, Mr. Giuliani reduced city-funded spending by 1.6% his first year in office, the largest overall reduction in city spending since the Depression.

Although Mr. Giuliani was no tax or economic expert when he took office, he became a tax-cut true believer when he saw how the city's economy and targeted industries perked up at his first reductions. One of his initial budgetary moves was to cut the city's hotel tax, which during the Dinkins administration had been the highest of any major city in the world. When tourism rebounded, Mr. Giuliani pointed out that the city was collecting more in taxes from a lower rate. "No one ever considered tax reductions a reasonable option," Mr. Giuliani explained. But, he added in a speech at the Reagan Library, "targeted tax reductions spur growth. That's why we have made obtaining targeted tax reductions a priority of every budget." In his eight years in office, Mr. Giuliani reduced or eliminated 23 taxes, including the sales tax on some clothing purchases, the tax on commercial rents everywhere outside of Manhattan's major business districts, and various taxes on small businesses and self-employed New Yorkers.

The national, and even world, press marveled at the spectacular success of Mr. Giuliani's policies. The combination of a safer city and a better budget environment ignited an economic boom unlike any other on record. Construction permits increased by more than 50%, to 70,000 a year, under Mr. Giuliani, compared with just 46,000 in Mr. Dinkins's last year. Meanwhile, as crime plunged, New Yorkers took to the newly safe streets to go out at night to shows and restaurants, and the number of tourists soared from 24 million in the early 1990s to 38 million in 2000. Under Mr. Giuliani, the city gained some 430,000 new jobs to reach its all-time employment peak of 3.72 million jobs in 2000, while the unemployment rate plummeted from 10.3% to 5.1%. Personal income earned by New Yorkers, meanwhile, soared by $100 million, or 50%, while the percentage of their income that they paid in taxes declined from 8.8% to 7.3%. During Mr. Giuliani's second term, for virtually the only time since World War II, the city's economy consistently grew faster than the nation's.





Today, Americans see Mr. Giuliani as presidential material because of his leadership in the wake of the terrorist attacks, but to those of us who watched him first manage America's biggest city when it was crime-ridden, financially shaky and plagued by doubts about its future as employers and educated and prosperous residents fled in droves, Mr. Giuliani's leadership on 9/11 came as no surprise. What Americans saw after the attacks is a combination of attributes that Mr. Giuliani governed with all along: the tough-mindedness that had gotten him through earlier civic crises, a no-nonsense and efficient management style, and a clarity and directness of speech that made plain what he thought needed to be done and how he would do it.
Like great wartime leaders, Mr. Giuliani displayed unflinching courage on 9/11. A minute after the first plane struck, he rushed downtown, arriving at the World Trade Center just after the second plane hit the South Tower, when it became obvious to everyone that New York was under attack. Fearing that more strikes were on the way--and without access to City Hall, the police department or the city's command center because of damage from the attacks--Mr. Giuliani hurried to reestablish city government, narrowly escaping death himself as the towers came down next to a temporary command post he had set up in lower Manhattan. "There is no playbook for a mayor on how to organize city government when you are standing on a street covered by dust from the city's worst calamity," one of his deputy mayors, Anthony Coles, later observed.

Mr. Giuliani understood that he needed not only to keep city government operating but to inspire and console as well. Within a few hours, he had reestablished New York's government in temporary headquarters, where he led the first post-9/11 meeting with his commissioners and with a host of other New York elected officials on hand to observe, prompting even one of his harshest critics, liberal Manhattan congressman Jerrold Nadler, to marvel at the "efficiency of the meeting." Within hours, the city launched a massive search-and-recovery operation. Some half a dozen times that day Mr. Giuliani went on TV, reassuring the city and then the nation with his calm, frank demeanor and his plainspoken talk. As the nation struggled to understand what had happened and President Bush made his way back to Washington, Mr. Giuliani emerged as the one public official in America who seemed to be in command on 9/11. He became, as Newsweek later called him, "our Winston Churchill."

In the weeks following the attacks, Mr. Giuliani became both the cheerleader of New York's efforts to pick itself up and the voice of moral outrage about the attacks. Mr. Giuliani exhorted private institutions within the city--the stock exchanges, the Broadway theaters--to resume operations and urged the rest of America and the world to come visit the city. Not waiting for federal aid, the city rapidly began a cleanup of the World Trade Center site, which proceeded ahead of schedule, and of the devastated neighborhood around the site, which reopened block by block in the weeks after the attacks. Meanwhile, the mayor led visiting heads of state on tours of the devastation, because, he said, "You can't come here and be neutral." He addressed the United Nations on the new war against terrorism, warning the delegates: "You're either with civilization or with terrorists." When a Saudi prince donated millions to relief efforts but later suggested that U.S. policy in the Middle East may have been partially responsible for the attacks, Mr. Giuliani returned the money, observing that there was "no moral equivalent" for the unprecedented terrorist attack. He attended dozens of funerals of emergency workers killed in the towers' collapse, leading the city not just in remembrance but in catharsis.





As "America's mayor," a sobriquet he earned after 9/11, Mr. Giuliani has a unique profile as a presidential candidate. To engineer the city's turnaround, he had to take on a government whose budget and workforce were larger than all but five or six states. (Indeed, his budget his first year as mayor was about 10 times the size of the one that Bill Clinton managed in his last year as governor of Arkansas.) For more than a decade, the city has been among the biggest U.S. tourist destinations, and tens of millions of Americans have seen firsthand the dramatic changes he wrought in Gotham.
Moreover, as an expert on policing and America's key leader on 9/11, Mr. Giuliani is an authority on today's crucial foreign-policy issue, the war on terror. In fact, as a federal prosecutor in New York, he investigated and prosecuted major terrorist cases. As mayor, he took the high moral ground in the terrorism debate in 1995, when he had an uninvited Yasser Arafat expelled from city-sponsored celebrations during the United Nations' 50th anniversary because, in Mr. Giuliani's eyes, Arafat was a terrorist, not a world leader. "When we're having a party and a celebration, I would rather not have someone who has been implicated in the murders of Americans there, if I have the discretion not to have him there," Mr. Giuliani said at the time.

These are impressive conservative credentials. And if social and religious conservatives fret about Mr. Giuliani's more liberal social views, nevertheless, in the general election such views might make this experience-tested conservative even more electable.

Mr. Malanga is a contributing editor of City Journal, in whose Winter issue this article appears.
Ed Koch is the former Mayor of New York City.


 
28711  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: The 2008 Presidential Race on: February 28, 2007, 04:11:55 AM
Giuliani the Conservative
And he's electable too.

BY STEVEN MALANGA
Wednesday, February 28, 2007 12:01 a.m. EST

Not since Teddy Roosevelt took on Tammany Hall a century ago has a New York politician closely linked to urban reform looked like presidential timber. But today Rudy Giuliani sits at or near the top of virtually every poll of potential 2008 presidential candidates. Already, Mr. Giuliani's popularity has set off a "stop Rudy" movement among cultural conservatives, who object to his three marriages and his support for abortion rights, gay unions and curbs on gun ownership. Some social conservatives even dismiss his achievement in reviving New York before 9/11. An August story on the Web site Right Wing News, for instance, claims that Mr. Giuliani governed Gotham from "left of center." Similarly, conservatives have been feeding the press a misleading collection of quotations by and about Mr. Giuliani, on tax policy and school choice issues, assembled to make him look like a liberal.

But in a GOP presidential field in which cultural and religious conservatives may find something to object to in every candidate who could really get nominated (and, more important, elected), Mr. Giuliani may be the most conservative candidate on a wide range of issues. Far from being a liberal, he ran New York with a conservative's priorities. Government exists above all to keep people safe in their homes and in the streets, he said, not to redistribute income, run a welfare state, or perform social engineering. The private economy, not government, creates opportunity, he argued; government should just deliver basic services well and then get out of the private sector's way. He denied that cities and their citizens were victims of vast forces outside their control, and he urged New Yorkers to take personal responsibility for their lives.

"Over the last century, millions of people from all over the world have come to New York City," Mr. Giuliani once observed. "They didn't come here to be taken care of and to be dependent on city government. They came here for the freedom to take care of themselves." It was that spirit of opportunity and can-do-ism that Mr. Giuliani tried to reinstill in New York and that he himself exemplified not only in the hours and weeks after 9/11 but in his heroic and successful effort to bring a dying city back to life.





The entrenched political culture that Mr. Giuliani faced when he became mayor was the pure embodiment of American liberalism, stretching back to the New Deal, whose public works projects had turned Gotham into a massive government-jobs program. Even during the post-World War II economic boom, New York politicians kept the New Deal's big-government philosophy alive, with huge municipal tax increases that financed a growing public sector but drove away private-sector jobs.
Later, in the mid-1960s, flamboyant mayor John Lindsay set out to make New York a poster child for the Johnson administration's War on Poverty, vastly expanding welfare rolls, giving power over the school system to black-power activists, and directing hundreds of millions of government dollars into useless and often fraudulent community-based antipoverty programs. To pay for all this, Lindsay taxed with abandon. The result: sharply increasing crime, a rising underclass inclined to languish on welfare rather than strive to uplift itself, a failing school system that emphasized racial grievance and separateness, and near-bankruptcy.

When Mr. Giuliani's predecessor, David Dinkins, came into office--thanks to voters' hopes that as the city's first black mayor, he'd defuse New York's intense racial tensions--he wholly embraced the War on Poverty's core belief that the problems of the urban poor sprang from vast external forces over which neither they nor the politicians had much control. Under Mr. Dinkins, the city's welfare rolls grew by one-third, or some 273,000 people. By 1992, with some 1.1 million New Yorkers on welfare, the city's political leadership seemed stuck on dependency, too. Mr. Dinkins became the chief proponent of a tin-cup urbanism, constantly hounding Washington and Albany with demands and grim warnings about what would happen if they were not met.

Mr. Dinkins's political philosophy substituted can't-do fatalism for the can-do optimism that had made New York great. As crime spiked--there were 2,262 murders in Mr. Dinkins's first year, compared with fewer than 600 in 1963, two years before Lindsay became mayor--Mr. Dinkins declared: "If we had a police officer on every other corner, we couldn't stop some of the random violence that goes on," since it resulted from poverty and racism, not poor policing.

Accordingly, Mr. Dinkins wanted to turn the police into social workers. His police commissioner, Lee Brown, believed that cops should stop reacting to crime and become neighborhood "problem solvers." In an article on that "community policing" approach, the New York Times informed readers that such experiments, in Houston and in Newark, N.J., were "enormously popular"--but "neither city experienced a statistical drop in crime." Under that policing regime, New York's already high crime rate soared, prompting the New York Post to plead, in a famous headline, "Dave Do Something."

As crime and welfare rocketed up, Mr. Dinkins decided that government should promote diversity and multiculturalism--"a gorgeous mosaic," in his phrase. Though the performance of the city's schools was crumbling, so that by 1992 fewer than half the pupils were reading at grade level, the Board of Education turned its energies to two controversies unrelated to education: it tried to adopt a "Rainbow Curriculum" geared to instilling in first-graders respect for homosexuality, and it proposed to distribute free condoms in high schools to promote safe sex among students. Although many parents objected that the board was promoting values that they did not share, Mr. Dinkins supported the board on both fiercely controversial issues.





By the time Mr. Giuliani ran against Mr. Dinkins for a second time, in 1993 (his first try had failed), the former prosecutor had fashioned a philosophy of local government based on two core conservative principles vastly at odds with New York's political culture: that government should be accountable for delivering basic services well, and that ordinary citizens should be personally responsible for their actions and their destiny and not expect government to take care of them. Mr. Giuliani spoke of the need to reestablish a "civil society," where citizens adhered to a "social contract." "If you have a right," he observed, "there is a duty that goes along with that right." Later, when he became mayor, Mr. Giuliani would preach about the duties of citizenship, quoting the ancient Athenian Oath of Fealty: "We will revere and obey the city's laws. . . . We will strive unceasingly to quicken the public sense of civic duty. Thus in all these ways we will transmit this city not only not less, but far greater and more beautiful than it was transmitted to us."
In New York, where generations of liberal policy had produced a city in which 1 in 7 citizens lived off government benefits, in which lawbreakers whose actions diminished everyone else's quality of life were routinely ignored or excused, in which the rights of those who broke the law were often defended vigorously over the rights of those who adhered to it, Mr. Giuliani's prescriptions for an urban revival based on shared civic values seemed unrealistic to some and dangerous to others. The head of the local American Civil Liberties Union chapter described Mr. Giuliani's ideas on respect for authority and the law as "frightening" and "scary." But New Yorkers who had watched their city deteriorate were more frightened of life under an outdated and ineffective liberal agenda. Mr. Giuliani rode to victory in 1993 with heavy support from the same white ethnic Democratic voters who, a decade earlier, had crossed party lines even in liberal New York to vote for Ronald Reagan.

To those of us who observed Mr. Giuliani from the beginning, it was astonishing how fully he followed through on his conservative principles once elected, no matter how much he upset elite opinion, no matter how often radical advocates took to the streets in protest, no matter how many veiled (and not-so-veiled) threats that incendiary figures like Al Sharpton made against him, and no matter how often the New York Times fulminated against his policies.

In particular, offended by the notion that people should be treated differently and demand privileges based on the color of their skin, Mr. Giuliani was fearless in confronting racial extortionists like Mr. Sharpton. Early in his tenure, he startled the city when he refused to meet with Mr. Sharpton and other black activists after a confrontation between police and black Muslims at a Harlem mosque. And though activists claimed that Mr. Giuliani inflamed racial tensions with such actions, there were no incidents during his tenure comparable with the disgraceful Crown Heights riot under Mr. Dinkins, in which the police let blacks terrorize Orthodox Jews for several days in a Brooklyn neighborhood.





For Mr. Giuliani, the revival of New York started with securing public safety, because all other agendas were useless if citizens didn't feel protected. "The most fundamental of civil rights is the guarantee that government can give you a reasonable degree of safety," Mr. Giuliani said. He aimed to do so by reinstituting respect for the law. As a federal prosecutor in New York in the 1980s, he had vigorously hunted low-level drug dealers--whom other law enforcement agencies ignored--because he thought that the brazen selling of drugs on street corners cultivated disrespect for the law and encouraged criminality. "You have to . . . dispel cynicism about law enforcement by showing we treat everyone alike, whether you are a major criminal or a low-level drug pusher," Mr. Giuliani explained.
As mayor, he instituted a "zero tolerance" approach that cracked down on quality-of-life offenses like panhandling and public urination (in a city where some streets reeked of urine), in order to restore a sense of civic order that he believed would discourage larger crimes. "Murder and graffiti are two vastly different crimes," he explained. "But they are part of the same continuum, and a climate that tolerates one is more likely to tolerate the other." He linked the Dinkins era's permissive climate, which tolerated the squeegee men (street-corner windshield cleaners who coerced drivers into giving them money at the entrances to Manhattan), to the rise of more serious crime. "The police started ignoring all kinds of offenses," Mr. Giuliani later recounted of the Dinkins years. They "became," he deadpanned, "highly skilled observers of crime."

Civil rights advocates warned that Mr. Giuliani's promise to deprive the squeegee men of their $40 to $100 weekly shakedown might drive them to more violent crime; in effect, they endorsed a lesser form of criminality, hoping that it would forestall more serious crime. The city's newspapers were happy to print threats from squeegee men, like this one: "I feel like if I can't hustle honestly, I've got to go back to doing what I used to do . . . robbing and stealing." But the squeegee-men campaign provided Mr. Giuliani with his first significant victory, showing a beleaguered citizenry that government actually could bring about change for the better. Within months, the squeegee men disappeared. "A city, and especially a city like New York, should be a place of optimism," Mr. Giuliani later explained about his policing strategies. "Quality of life is about focusing on the things that make a difference in the everyday life of all New Yorkers in order to restore this spirit of optimism."

Mr. Giuliani changed the primary mission of the police department to preventing crime from happening rather than merely responding to it once it had occurred. His police chief, William Bratton, reorganized the NYPD, emphasizing a street-crimes unit that moved around the city, flooding high-crime areas and getting guns off the street. Mr. Bratton also changed the department's scheduling. Crime was open for business 24 hours a day, but most detectives, including narcotics cops, had previously gone off duty at 5 p.m., just as criminals were coming on "duty." No more.

The department brought modern management techniques to its new mission. It began compiling a computerized database to track the city's crime patterns and the effectiveness of the NYPD's responses to them. That database, known as Compstat, helped police target their manpower where it was needed, and in due course it became a national model. The department drove authority down to its precinct captains and emphasized that it expected results from these top managers. Mr. Bratton replaced a third of the city's 76 precinct commanders within a few months. "If you were to manage a bank with 76 branches every day, you would get a profit-and-loss statement from the bank," explained Mr. Giuliani. "After a week or so, you would see branches that were going in the wrong direction, and then you would take management action to try to reverse the trend. That is precisely what is happening in the police department."

The policing innovations led to a historic drop in crime far beyond what anyone could have imagined, with total crime down by some 64% during the Giuliani years, and murder (the most reliable crime statistic) down 67%, from 1,960 in Mr. Dinkins's last year to 640 in Mr. Giuliani's last year. The number of cars stolen in New York City every year plummeted by an astounding 78,000.

Criminologists tried to dismiss this achievement by arguing that the police have little influence on crime. The crime drop, they contended, was merely the fruit of an improving national economy, though the decline preceded the city's economic rebound by several years. Others argued that New York was just riding a demographic trend, as the population of teenagers prone to break the law declined. One criminologist even suggested that Mr. Giuliani's New York would soon see another upsurge, as a new cohort of children reached the teen years. "I don't need a crystal ball," the criminologist confidently predicted. Instead, crime declined relentlessly over Mr. Giuliani's eight years, even when it rose nationally.

Critics, especially those on the left, have tried to minimize Mr. Giuliani's accomplishment by claiming that he lowered crime by letting cops oppress black and Latino New Yorkers with brute force. As evidence, they point to unfortunate incidents such as the shootings of unarmed black immigrants Amadou Diallo and Patrick Dorismond. But the data tell a far different story: Mr. Giuliani's NYPD managed to drive down crime while showing admirable restraint. From 1995 to 2000, civilian complaints of excessive force by the NYPD declined from one complaint per ten officers to one per 19 officers. Meanwhile, shootings by cops declined by 50% and were far lower under Mr. Giuliani than under Mr. Dinkins--lower in fact than in cities like San Diego and Houston, hailed for practicing community policing.

Moreover, Mr. Giuliani's policing success was a boon to minority neighborhoods. For instance, in the city's 34th Precinct, covering the largely Hispanic Washington Heights section of Manhattan, murders dropped from 76 in 1993, Mr. Dinkins's last year, to only seven by Mr. Giuliani's last year, a decline of more than 90%. Far from being the racist that activists claimed, Mr. Giuliani had delivered to the city's minority neighborhoods a true form of equal protection under the law.





Mayor Giuliani's success against crime wasn't merely the singular achievement of a former prosecutor. He applied the same principles to social and economic policy, with equally impressive results. Long before President Bush's "ownership" society, Mr. Giuliani described his intention to restore New York as the "entrepreneurial city," not only providing the climate for new job creation but also reshaping government social policy away from encouraging dependency and toward reinforcing independence.
New York had gone in the opposite direction starting in the mid-1960s, when Lindsay had drastically increased welfare rolls, believing many of the poor too disadvantaged ever to succeed and thus needing to be permanently on the dole. The Gotham welfare bureaucracy saw signing people up as its goal, while an entire industry of nonprofit organizations and advocacy groups arose to cater to and contract with the city's vast welfare system. Budget documents from the Dinkins years projected an eventual 1.6 million people on welfare. "The City of New York was actually quite successful in achieving what it wanted to achieve, which was to encourage the maximum number of people to be on welfare," Mr. Giuliani later explained. "If you ran a welfare office, . . . you had a bigger budget, and you had more authority, if you had more people on welfare."

Mr. Giuliani decided to launch a welfare revolution, moving recipients from the dole to a job. Mindful that for years the city's welfare bureaucracy had focused on signing up new recipients (Lindsay's welfare chief had been nicknamed Mitchell "Come and Get It" Ginsberg), the Giuliani administration first set out to recertify everyone in the city's own home-relief program to eliminate fraud. In less than a year, the rolls of the program (for able-bodied adults not eligible for federal welfare programs) declined by 20%, as the city discovered tens of thousands of recipients who were actually employed, living outside the city, or providing false Social Security numbers.

Mr. Giuliani then instituted a work requirement for the remaining home-relief recipients, mostly men, obliging them to earn their checks by cleaning city parks and streets or doing clerical work in municipal offices for 20 hours a week. Welfare advocates vigorously objected, and one advocate pronounced the workfare program "slavery." The New York Times editorialized that most people on home relief were incapable of work.
28712  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Libertarian themes on: February 28, 2007, 03:59:06 AM
Nice read Buz  smiley

Coincidentally enough I ran across a different kind of libertarian thought piece today:

Marc
=====================

Enforcing Virtue

Is social stigma a threat to liberty, or is it liberty in action?
Cathy Young | March 2007 Print Edition

It's the debate that won't die: the endless face-off between conservatives and libertarians over the tension between liberty and morality.

In his foreword to the 1998 anthology Freedom and Virtue: The Conservative/Libertarian Debate-much of it composed of essays from the 1950s and '60s-editor George W. Carey described it as the main fault line dividing the two philosophies.

In Carey's words, conservatives "believe that shared values, morals, and standards, along with accepted traditions, are necessary for the order and stability of society" and that some restrictions on individual freedom, including censorship, may be needed to preserve this social cohesion. Most libertarians, he continued, share the conservatives' alarm about the "erosion of both public and private virtues" but regard individual liberty as the highest value and free choice as the prerequisite for true virtue.
So far, so good. But beyond rejecting moral enforcement by government, what is the libertarian view of moral and cultural standards upheld by a voluntary social consensus?
Some conservatives accuse libertarians of treating all shared values or conventions with contempt.

Take W. James Antle III, a reporter for The American Spectator (and occasional contributor to Reason) who describes himself as a "conservative-libertarian hybrid." In a May 2003 article in Enter State Right, he pointed to the response to the then-recent flap over virtue czar William Bennett's gambling problem.

Antle acknowledged that Bennett "was an unrepentant drug warrior and leading force for using the federal government to promote traditionalist conservative objectives." But he charged that "libertarian criticism was not limited to Bennett's designs for the state: many were clearly put off by his propensity to judge lifestyles, criticize individual choices and espouse limits on personal appetites."

In a Wall Street Journal article published around the same time, Journal columnist Susan Lee, while basically sympathetic to the libertarian viewpoint, wrote that libertarian tolerance "comes from indifference to moral questions, not from a greater inborn talent to live and let live."

Is that a fair description? Libertarians certainly have been known to criticize and ridicule moralists even when they aren't calling for government coercion-for instance, when they wring their hands over the loss of cultural constraints on sexuality. Of course, such hand wringing is often an inviting target.
Consider a November 2006 rant on the American Spectator website by the blogger Carol Platt Liebau. Liebau lamented our culture's alleged failure to stigmatize the crotch-flashing antics of Britney Spears and Lindsay Lohan, and the alleged message to young girls that such tawdry displays are a path to empowerment.
In fact, Spears' indecent exposure was cruelly mocked by the same gossip outlets that publicized it, and Rosie O'Donnell, hardly a right-wing moralist, pleaded for a cover-up on ABC's The View.

But the merits of specific conservative pleadings aside, is there anything illiberal about an argument for the cultural stigmatization of, say, casual sex?
Does supporting the free speech right to chronicle your sex life or explore your sexual fantasies online mean that you cannot regard such porno-blogging as tacky and narcissistic?
Must you oppose not just state censorship but the social conventions that generally compel such bloggers to conceal their activities from relatives and employers?
Few libertarians, I think, would argue that stigmatization as such is abhorrent. While no libertarian worth the name would support legal prohibitions on hate speech, the overwhelming majority would agree that racist, anti-Semitic, or homophobic slurs should be socially unacceptable, penalized through severe disapproval if not outright ostracism.

To take a less extreme example, many (myself included) would also agree with the mainstream culture's dislike of such voluntary traditionalist initiatives as the Southern Baptists' call for wifely submission.
The question, then, is not whether undesirable conduct should be curbed through social censure. It's which conduct should be seen as undesirable-and on that, self-professed libertarians should be able hold a wide range of opinions.

Within the libertarian milieu, there is a tension between political libertarians, whose chief concern is limiting and reversing the expansion of the state and its powers, and social or cultural libertarians, whose central interest is maximizing individual opportunities and freedom of choice.

For some political libertarians, the centralized government is so unquestionably the greatest enemy that they not only oppose civil rights laws banning private race and gender discrimination but reject the post-Civil War constitutional doctrine that state governments must abide by the Bill of Rights.
(That was the position espoused by the late Libertarian Party presidential candidate Harry Browne, who opposed Jim Crow laws but felt they should have been fought on the local level.

State infringements on individual rights, he argued, posed a far smaller danger to liberty than expanded federal power.

Meanwhile, some cultural libertarians are concerned about constraints on individual freedom from government as well as from traditionalist familial, religious, and community institutions-the same civil institutions that conservatives see as necessary for ordered liberty to thrive.

In his 1960 book The Constitution of Liberty, F.A. Hayek wrote that his real quarrel with conservatives was not their opposition to drastic change in institutions but their readiness to use government force to curb such change.
To Hayek, moral and cultural standards were the product of spontaneous order emerging from the interplay of economic and social forces, from evolution and experimentation unguided by any central authority.

Yet noncoercive criticism of what some of us deem to be negative social and cultural trends is itself a vital part of that evolution. It's one thing to demand a federal virtue police; it's another to write and market a book about virtue and hope that its lessons will catch on.

As long as the Bill Bennetts of the world are intent on using not just persuasion but force (and public funds) on behalf of their favorite virtues-promoting premarital abstinence through federal programs, banning legal protections for same-sex unions, censoring sexually explicit materials, waging the war on drugs-libertarians can be forgiven for fearing even noncoercive moralizing on their part.

But it's important to remember that cultural progressives have not hesitated to use the government on their side: to promote liberal attitudes toward sexuality and sex roles through public education, say, or to compel landlords to rent to unmarried cohabiting couples even if they have religious objections to such a lifestyle.

The backlash from the social right is directed at such social engineering as well as spontaneous cultural change.

It is also true, of course, that even noncoercive moralizing can be egregiously misguided. If criticism of modern cultural trends is a part of the spontaneous order, so is anti-traditionalist countercriticism.

But this is where libertarian discourse can benefit from a greater variety of viewpoints and a more calibrated approach to social issues.

Just because conservatives are quite wrong (in my opinion) to argue that young women are victimized by sexual freedom doesn't mean that only right-wing killjoys can have misgivings about prepubescent girls parading in T-shirts with vulgar messages and gyrating to music with sexually explicit lyrics.

Just because I think the right is wrong to cling to a family model based on rigid gender roles doesn't mean I'm happy about the growth of single parenthood.

The Hayekian principle that "neither moral nor religious ideals are proper objects of coercion" is one most Americans will readily embrace.

But if libertarians are seen as championing not simply freedom of choice but a rigidly nonjudgmental attitude toward all choices-if we are seen not simply as tolerant but as indifferent to moral questions-then many people who might be sympathetic to liberty will be pushed into the arms of the authoritarians.

Contributing Editor Cathy Young (CathyYoung63@aol.com) is the author of Ceasefire! (Free Press).
__________________
28713  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Science, Culture, & Humanities / Re: Economics on: February 28, 2007, 02:08:07 AM
Another interpretation:

WSJ

Credit Correction
Will the Fed and the Democratic Congress tempt a larger stock market selloff?

Wednesday, February 28, 2007 12:01 a.m. EST

Any equity selloff as large as yesterday's will produce a multitude of explanations. Among other culprits, we heard about "overbought" Chinese stocks that were due for a correction, a weak durable goods report, the Kabul explosion aimed at Vice President Dick Cheney (see below), and former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan for declaring Monday that a "recession" was possible later this year.

Our own "whodunit" contribution would point to the mortgage-related markets, which sold off nearly as much as stocks. This reflects the cracks appearing in the housing credit markets, especially in subprime loans but with some damage up the income chain as well. Along with emerging markets such as China, this is where the excesses have been most notable. And when Adam Smith does a house cleaning like yesterday's, he sweeps the dirtiest corners first.

The question is whether this is a forecast or merely a correction. As evidence of the latter, we'd point to Mr. Greenspan, whose Monday remarks seem to have been over-interpreted as a recession prediction. In the same discussion, we're told, he called the world economy "benign and stable." Nonetheless, we'd also note that Mr. Greenspan's predecessor as Fed Chairman, Paul Volcker, didn't muse about recession dangers after he left office in the 1980s. He didn't want to complicate Mr. Greenspan's monetary task at the time.

We also wouldn't make too much of one month's decline in durable goods. These are notoriously volatile, especially in transportation, which was way down in January. Today's report on fourth quarter GDP is also widely expected to be revised downward from the original 3.5%. But much of that revision may be due to an inventory work off, which bodes better for growth going forward. The labor market remains strong, if slowing from the rapid pace of job growth in 2006.





The bigger risks continue to be political and monetary. The era of tax cutting has ended with the arrival of the Democratic Congress, and other policy errors are possible. As for the Fed, we'd feel better if current Chairman Ben Bernanke had been running a tighter monetary policy for the last year; it might have left him with more policy room if the economy does turn sour. As it is, any easing now runs the risk of a dollar rout, which could lead to an even larger loss of confidence and selloff.
The current problems in the housing credit markets owe a great deal already to the Fed's mistake in keeping monetary policy too easy for too long during the late Greenspan era. We now have to ride them out, and Mr. Bernanke shouldn't make them worse with a panicky, premature easing.

 
28714  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Science, Culture, & Humanities / Chinese meltdown on purpose on: February 27, 2007, 11:43:49 PM
stratfor.com

Global Market Brief: China's Engineered Drop
February 28, 2007  0156 GMT


China's Shanghai Composite Index tumbled 8.84 percent Feb. 27, its largest fall in a decade. Its sister index, the Shenzhen Composite Index, fell 8.54 percent. The size of the drop in China is not significant in and of itself. On a number of occasions during the past year, the Shanghai Stock Exchange has experienced 5 percent plus daily reductions, and it has already boomed and busted once this decade.

But that hardly means the development is insignificant. The fall is important both for how it happened and what it triggered.

How it Happened

This was an engineered drop.

The Chinese government has become increasingly concerned about levels of investment in its economy or, more accurately, the sheer amount of money that is chasing projects. State firms with limitless access to subsidized capital from state banks have used that access to launch thousands of nonprofitable firms. This glut in "investment" money drives up the cost of commodities and adds industrial capacity without actually producing anything of much use, making life more difficult for the average Chinese and unduly harming relations with foreign powers that face a glut of otherwise noncompetitive Chinese goods.

This penchant for overinvestment has now spread to the stock market in two ways. First, the same politically connected government officials who started dud companies are taking out loans to buy shares, or are using shares they already hold as collateral for new loans. Second, ordinary Chinese citizens have started borrowing -- sometimes against their homes -- in order to play the market. In January, the number of total traders on the Chinese exchanges grew by 1.38 million, an increase of 134 percent from a month earlier, while stock turnover was up 700 percent from a year earlier.

The net result is an absurd stock surge with no basis in fundamentals. At present, some Chinese banks now have price-to-earnings ratios higher than financial behemoths such as Deutsche Bank and Chase, despite deplorable management and a history of highly questionable lending policies.

For the past few months, the government has been working to drive down this speculative investing. On Feb. 26, China's State Council launched a new "special task force" that accurately could be referred to as the "get-those-idiots-to-stop-borrowing-to-gamble-on-the-stock-exchanges" team. Its express goal is to get the Chinese domestic security brokers to lay off such speculative decision-making, while also putting a crimp in the source of the subsidized capital.

Day one started by the script, and Beijing is likely quite pleased with the way things are going (or at least it was until its actions unintentionally triggered a global meltdown). Also, since the Shanghai exchange is actually still up 3 percent for the past week despite suffering its largest drop in a decade, the State Council probably hopes for more drops in the days ahead.

What it Triggered

But the rest of the world took a different lesson. Why the Chinese stock crash occurred was unimportant to the outside world, only that it did -- and that it affected everyone else.

For the first time, China has become the trendsetter in the global stock community. Normally, the U.S. exchanges -- especially the S&P 500 index and the Dow Jones Industrial Average -- set the tone for global trading patterns. Not on Feb. 27. This time, China led Asia to a wretched day. The wider the contagion spread, the more margin calls were forced to be called in. (If an account's value falls below a minimum required level, the broker will issue a margin call for the account holder to either deposit more cash or sell securities to fix the problem.)

As the drops snowballed, Europe filed in dutifully behind, mixing the China malaise with its own nervousness about overextended markets in Central Europe and the former Soviet Union. By the time markets opened in the United States -- where investors already were fretting about the subprime mortgage markets -- the only question remaining was how far U.S. markets would descend. In the end, the Dow dropped by the most since the fall triggered by the 9/11 attacks.

So why has this not happened before now? As China's market capitalization has increased, its links to the global system have increased apace. These links have developed very quickly, and with few controls. The Shanghai exchange, for example, more than tripled in total value in 2006 to more than $900 billion -- and much of the rapid-fire initial public offerings (IPOs) of Chinese banks on the Hong Kong and other international exchanges are not included in that little factoid. Indeed, China's mainland exchanges are only the tip of the iceberg -- and they certainly do not include foreign firms that are heavily invested in the mainland.

Two years ago, China's market capitalization was too small for its problems to impact the global system. Now, between ridiculous foreign subscriptions to IPOs, irresponsible corporate policies and irrational valuations all around, that capitalization is to a level -- around $1.3 trillion -- where its integration with the global system via funds and margins makes China a sizable chunk of the international financial landscape. The insulation that once protected international exchanges from Chinese policies is gone, which makes the international system more vulnerable to Chinese crashes.

Feb. 28 and Beyond

Follow-on crashes can come from one of three places.

First, the Chinese believe their exchanges are massively overvalued (hence the engineered crash). They will do this again, and are not (yet) particularly concerned with the international consequences. China planned to dampen its own stock market, not the world's markets. Along with the rest of the world, Beijing did not expect the contagion effect to be so extreme. Yet, for now at least, China's own exchanges are its primary concern, and it will act according to that belief.

Second, everyone else now is going to chew on the fact that Beijing did this intentionally. They will either agree with the Chinese that the exchanges are overvalued and that additional measures are needed, or they will be terrified that Beijing did this intentionally and not care about the reasons. Whether what is sold is a domestic Chinese firm or a foreign firm invested in China does not matter much. Neither does it matter if the stock is on an exchange in China or abroad. Either way, the reaction will be the same: Sell.

Third, trading in 800 of the 1,400 stocks on the Shanghai exchange was suspended during the sudden drops Feb. 27; they have a lot farther to fall, even without any engineered drops caused by panicky selling.

Considering the flaws on which the Chinese system is based, this certainly will not be the last engineered drop. In theory, the move will make foreign investors far more cautious before diving into the Chinese system, but as longtime Stratfor readers know, we have been wrong on the timing of that particular development before.
28715  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: WW3 on: February 27, 2007, 09:39:52 PM
First, a gentle leash yank:  Rog, GM, lets make that extra special effort that distinguishes this forum to speak to each other as if we were breaking bread together.

Returning now to the subject at hand.

"As far as I can see, the "different approach" is to terrorize the Iraqi population into not supporting the insurgents, grant US forces virtual immunity from prosecution for any war crimes, and as best as possible keep any negative reporting on our actions in Iraq from making it into the news.  Does that more or less sum it up?  Let's the quit the pussy-footing around about this."

Our planes of reality do not sufficiently overlap to make conversation here productive.

""I'm not sure how any meaningful discussion of withdrawing troops or ending the war is supposed to take place without the enemy somehow hearing about it.  It sounds like you're saying the discussion shouldn't take place, or that if it must take place then we have a patriotic duty to dismiss and ridicule anti-war views so the enemy doesn't get the idea that any of us take them seriously.  Please clarify if I'm misrepresenting your position.""

I agree the point is a difficult one.  What irks me greatly is that a goodly portion of the Democratic Party seems not to consider in the slightest amount the costs in human lives of our troops of the things it says in the search for political advantage and the complete lack of sincerity of so many of them.  For example, all summer long during the campaign many Dems ragged Bush for not having sufficient troops to do the job-- then when he proposes increasing the troops, without batting an Orwellian eyelash they reverse direction and vote against more troops even while funding them.  WTF?  They are telling the enemy to wait us out even as President Bush and Gen. Petraeus (seemingly quite well qualified for the job) are trying a new and different approach.  This is vile and is but one example of the sort of thing which really gets me seething.

I distinguish this from someone who consistently says "I think this is a mistake and that we should come home."

As for the relevance of the troops views, those of them who interact with the people and with the enemy have more and better real time intel than the Barbie Doll enemedia safely esconsed in the Emerald City.  If they tell me that we can do it, that carries a lot more weight with me than the NY Slimes telling me that we cannot-- especially after the NY Slimes reveals how we spy on enemy financial transactions.  Scum!  Similarly, if they were to tell me that we have blown it and that it is too late too pull off our original intention, that carries more weight with me than former Sec'y Rumbo.



28716  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Environmental issues on: February 27, 2007, 09:24:25 PM
C'mon Rog, the accusation here is one of hypocrisy so no, it is not a point on the merits.

As for the merits of his documentary, that has been discussed already.  Glad you agree his credentials are overblown.
28717  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Science, Culture, & Humanities / Re: Environmental issues on: February 27, 2007, 08:51:08 AM
NY Times

VISALIA, Calif., Feb. 23 — David Bradshaw has endured countless stings during his life as a beekeeper, but he got the shock of his career when he opened his boxes last month and found half of his 100 million bees missing.

 
In 24 states throughout the country, beekeepers have gone through similar shocks as their bees have been disappearing inexplicably at an alarming rate, threatening not only their livelihoods but also the production of numerous crops, including California almonds, one of the nation’s most profitable.

“I have never seen anything like it,” Mr. Bradshaw, 50, said from an almond orchard here beginning to bloom. “Box after box after box are just empty. There’s nobody home.”

The sudden mysterious losses are highlighting the critical link that honeybees play in the long chain that gets fruit and vegetables to supermarkets and dinner tables across the country.

Beekeepers have fought regional bee crises before, but this is the first national affliction.

Now, in a mystery worthy of Agatha Christie, bees are flying off in search of pollen and nectar and simply never returning to their colonies. And nobody knows why. Researchers say the bees are presumably dying in the fields, perhaps becoming exhausted or simply disoriented and eventually falling victim to the cold.

As researchers scramble to find answers to the syndrome they have decided to call “colony collapse disorder,” growers are becoming openly nervous about the capability of the commercial bee industry to meet the growing demand for bees to pollinate dozens of crops, from almonds to avocados to kiwis.

Along with recent stresses on the bees themselves, as well as on an industry increasingly under consolidation, some fear this disorder may force a breaking point for even large beekeepers.

A Cornell University study has estimated that honeybees annually pollinate more than $14 billion worth of seeds and crops in the United States, mostly fruits, vegetables and nuts. “Every third bite we consume in our diet is dependent on a honeybee to pollinate that food,” said Zac Browning, vice president of the American Beekeeping Federation.

The bee losses are ranging from 30 to 60 percent on the West Coast, with some beekeepers on the East Coast and in Texas reporting losses of more than 70 percent; beekeepers consider a loss of up to 20 percent in the offseason to be normal.

Beekeepers are the nomads of the agriculture world, working in obscurity in their white protective suits and frequently trekking around the country with their insects packed into 18-wheelers, looking for pollination work.

Once the domain of hobbyists with a handful of backyard hives, beekeeping has become increasingly commercial and consolidated. Over the last two decades, the number of beehives, now estimated by the Agriculture Department to be 2.4 million, has dropped by a quarter and the number of beekeepers by half.

Pressure has been building on the bee industry. The costs to maintain hives, also known as colonies, are rising along with the strain on bees of being bred to pollinate rather than just make honey. And beekeepers are losing out to suburban sprawl in their quest for spots where bees can forage for nectar to stay healthy and strong during the pollination season.

“There are less beekeepers, less bees, yet more crops to pollinate,” Mr. Browning said. “While this sounds sweet for the bee business, with so much added loss and expense due to disease, pests and higher equipment costs, profitability is actually falling.”

Some 15 worried beekeepers convened in Florida this month to brainstorm with researchers how to cope with the extensive bee losses. Investigators are exploring a range of theories, including viruses, a fungus and poor bee nutrition.

They are also studying a group of pesticides that were banned in some European countries to see if they are somehow affecting bees’ innate ability to find their way back home.

It could just be that the bees are stressed out. Bees are being raised to survive a shorter offseason, to be ready to pollinate once the almond bloom begins in February. That has most likely lowered their immunity to viruses.

=========

Mites have also damaged bee colonies, and the insecticides used to try to kill mites are harming the ability of queen bees to spawn as many worker bees. The queens are living half as long as they did just a few years ago.


Relying on Bees Researchers are also concerned that the willingness of beekeepers to truck their colonies from coast to coast could be adding to bees’ stress, helping to spread viruses and mites and otherwise accelerating whatever is afflicting them.

Dennis van Engelsdorp, a bee specialist with the state of Pennsylvania who is part of the team studying the bee colony collapses, said the “strong immune suppression” investigators have observed “could be the AIDS of the bee industry,” making bees more susceptible to other diseases that eventually kill them off.

Growers have tried before to do without bees. In past decades, they have used everything from giant blowers to helicopters to mortar shells to try to spread pollen across the plants. More recently researchers have been trying to develop “self-compatible” almond trees that will require fewer bees. One company is even trying to commercialize the blue orchard bee, which is virtually stingless and works at colder temperatures than the honeybee.

Beekeepers have endured two major mite infestations since the 1980s, which felled many hobbyist beekeepers, and three cases of unexplained disappearing disorders as far back as 1894. But those episodes were confined to small areas, Mr. van Engelsdorp said.

Today the industry is in a weaker position to deal with new stresses. A flood of imported honey from China and Argentina has depressed honey prices and put more pressure on beekeepers to take to the road in search of pollination contracts. Beekeepers are trucking tens of billions of bees around the country every year.

California’s almond crop, by far the biggest in the world, now draws more than half of the country’s bee colonies in February. The crop has been both a boon to commercial beekeeping and a burden, as pressure mounts for the industry to fill growing demand. Now spread over 580,000 acres stretched across 300 miles of California’s Central Valley, the crop is expected to grow to 680,000 acres by 2010.

Beekeepers now earn many times more renting their bees out to pollinate crops than in producing honey. Two years ago a lack of bees for the California almond crop caused bee rental prices to jump, drawing beekeepers from the East Coast.

This year the price for a bee colony is about $135, up from $55 in 2004, said Joe Traynor, a bee broker in Bakersfield, Calif.

A typical bee colony ranges from 15,000 to 30,000 bees. But beekeepers’ costs are also on the rise. In the past decade, fuel, equipment and even bee boxes have doubled and tripled in price.

The cost to control mites has also risen, along with the price of queen bees, which cost about $15 each, up from $10 three years ago.

To give bees energy while they are pollinating, beekeepers now feed them protein supplements and a liquid mix of sucrose and corn syrup carried in tanker-sized trucks costing $12,000 per load. Over all, Mr. Bradshaw figures, in recent years he has spent $145 a hive annually to keep his bees alive, for a profit of about $11 a hive, not including labor expenses. The last three years his net income has averaged $30,000 a year from his 4,200 bee colonies, he said.

“A couple of farmers have asked me, ‘Why are you doing this?’ ” Mr. Bradshaw said. “I ask myself the same thing. But it is a job I like. It is a lifestyle. I work with my dad every day. And now my son is starting to work with us.”


Almonds fetch the highest prices for bees, but if there aren’t enough bees to go around, some growers may be forced to seek alternatives to bees or change their variety of trees.

“It would be nice to know that we have a dependable source of honey bees,” said Martin Hein, an almond grower based in Visalia. “But at this point I don’t know that we have that for the amount of acres we have got.”

To cope with the losses, beekeepers have been scouring elsewhere for bees to fulfill their contracts with growers. Lance Sundberg, a beekeeper from Columbus, Mont., said he spent $150,000 in the last two weeks buying 1,000 packages of bees — amounting to 14 million bees — from Australia.

He is hoping the Aussie bees will help offset the loss of one-third of the 7,600 hives he manages in six states. “The fear is that when we mix the bees the die-offs will continue to occur,” Mr. Sundberg said.

Migratory beekeeping is a lonely life that many compare to truck driving. Mr. Sundberg spends more than half the year driving 20 truckloads of bees around the country. In Terra Bella, an hour south of Visalia, Jack Brumley grimaced from inside his equipment shed as he watched Rosa Patiño use a flat tool to scrape dried honey from dozens of beehive frames that once held bees. Some 2,000 empty boxes — which once held one-third of his total hives — were stacked to the roof.

Beekeepers must often plead with landowners to allow bees to be placed on their land to forage for nectar. One large citrus grower has pushed for California to institute a “no-fly zone” for bees of at least two miles to prevent them from pollinating a seedless form of Mandarin orange.

But the quality of forage might make a difference. Last week Mr. Bradshaw used a forklift to remove some of his bee colonies from a spot across a riverbed from orange groves. Only three of the 64 colonies there have died or disappeared.

“It will probably take me two to three more years to get back up,” he said. “Unless I spend gobs of money I don’t have.”

28718  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Iraqi Oil Law Legislation Approved on: February 27, 2007, 08:39:02 AM
Geopolitical Diary: Iraqi Oil Law Legislation Approved
stratfor.com

The Iraqi Cabinet approved draft legislation on Monday for a new oil law, giving the United States a new claim to success in its nation-building efforts for Iraq. The division of oil revenues between Iraq's Kurdish and Shiite factions is critical to the formation of a comprehensive political resolution in the country. Though the legislation is certainly a step in the right direction, a closer look at the details reveals it is more of a time bomb than a functional agreement.

The legislation was approved nearly two months after a self-imposed deadline by the Iraqi government to enact an oil law. With Iraq's oil wealth concentrated in the Kurdish-dominated north and Shiite-dominated south, the Sunni population in western and central Iraq is left with little more than improvised explosive devices to negotiate for its share. Meanwhile, the Kurds, who already have a well-established regional government to manage oil contracts in Iraq's relatively stable north, have resisted efforts to give the central government in Baghdad more control over the oil revenues that fall under their domain. It comes as little surprise that the United States played a large part in rushing the negotiations over the oil legislation in an attempt to force a compromise among Iraq's rival factions; it is hoping the legislation will help improve security in the country.

The negotiations evidently got pretty tense over the weekend, when U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad met with Kurdish leaders Jalal Talabani, Iraq's president, and Massoud Barzani, the president of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in Sulaymaniyah, Iraq. The day after the meeting, Talabani was rushed to a hospital in Amman, Jordan, where his doctors said he was recovering from dehydration and extreme fatigue because of a heavy workload. The negotiations apparently took their toll on the aging Kurdish president, but it looks like the Kurds might have ended up with a favorable compromise for the time being.

In a nutshell, the new oil law would empower the central government to allocate oil revenues to Iraq's 18 provinces on the basis of population (a concession for the Sunnis) while leaving the responsibility for negotiating existing and future oil deals with the regional governments (a concession for the Kurds). This is an incremental step in the effort to adopt an oil law, but it is hardly the end of the story.

Under the existing draft the regional governments are pledged to pay their oil revenues into a central depository, and an independent panel of experts will review any contracts negotiated by the KRG. However, the central government has not yet pledged to pay them out in any organized way.

So far there is no mechanism to decide on which oil fields will be managed by the national, regional or private oil firms. This allocation of specific territories and oil fields is referred to as the annexes -- a rather thorny issue that was left out of the existing oil draft in the rush of the negotiations.

The draft leaves open the issue of the disputed oil-rich territory of Kirkuk until a referendum is held on whether Kirkuk should join the Kurdistan Regional Confederacy (the united administration of Arbil, Dohuk and Sulaymaniyah provinces).

The draft is contingent upon all three factions supporting it when the Iraqi parliament meets (likely in March or April). Before that happens, the factions will have to agree on the remaining annexes and revenue-sharing law.

In other words, there is an oil law, but the issues of who controls the oil and the money remain unclear. Put another way, the agreement is a done deal -- so long as the stickiest issues that have held up Iraqi development for the past four years get resolved in the following two months. The survival of this oil deal will heavily revolve around what the Kurds get in return for allowing the legislation to move forward.

It is likely no coincidence that the same day the Cabinet approved the oil legislation, both Talabani and Barzani decided to make nice with Turkey. During a broadcast interview, Barzani said he is ready to discuss operations against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), the most active Kurdish militant group in Turkey, with his Turkish counterparts. Talabani also said Monday during a press conference that Iraq's leading Kurdish parties have never supported the PKK, and stressed that Iraqi Kurds want good relations with Turkey.

Iraq's Kurdish leadership does not see eye to eye on a number of issues with the PKK, but realizes the leverage it gains against Turkey by providing limited support to PKK fighters in the mountainous regions of northern Iraq. Though the PKK is of major concern to Ankara's security interests, the bigger issue for Turkey involves Kirkuk. The oil-rich city is home to roughly 600,000 people -- approximately half of them Kurdish, a third Turkmen and the rest Arab. Under Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution, a referendum is to be held by December this year to decide whether Kirkuk should become part of the Kurdistan Regional Confederacy. With a flood of Kurds moving back to the city to reverse Saddam Hussein's Arabization demographic project, the Kurds have every reason to demand the referendum take place on schedule.

Turkey, on the other hand, does not want to see Iraq's Kurdistan region annex Kirkuk, and has signaled to Washington and Baghdad the military consequences of holding the referendum by threatening cross-border military incursions to ostensibly root-out PKK strongholds in Iraq. The Kurdish annexation of Kirkuk would greatly empower Iraq's Kurdish faction and enhance Ankara's fears of a future independent Kurdistan, which Turkey sees as a threat to its own territorial integrity. This is why Turkey has very vocally resisted any U.S. redeployment plans to station a large number of U.S. troops in northern Iraq that would block any Turkish military operations in the region. Iraq's Sunni and Shiite factions also will resist any decision for Kirkuk to fall under Kurdish control in order to deprive the Kurds of an incentive to further distance themselves from the central government.

Barzani and Talabani's cooperative statements toward Turkey came just two days after Barzani said he would not allow any country to attack PKK fighters stationed in northern Iraq. The about-face by Iraq's Kurdish leadership could very well have stemmed from a guarantee the two leaders received from Washington to have the Kirkuk referendum take place as planned. But there is no telling how long this guarantee would hold.

The Kurds have more or less stayed out of the fray as Iraq's Shiite and Sunni factions have engaged in all-out war. But as the oil negotiations proceed, the Kirkuk referendum issue heats up and more of Iraq's Kurdish forces are sent to Baghdad as part of the new security plan, Iraqi Kurds will soon find themselves playing a bigger part in Iraq's bloody power struggle. The new oil draft legislation looks good on paper, but it is only delaying the inevitable battle.
28719  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: The War on Drugs on: February 27, 2007, 08:31:15 AM
Jason:

Here too we have restrictions on advertising for cigarettes and alchohol.

I would offer that there is a range of options here; decriminalization is not the same thing as legalization and within legalization there are various regulatory regimes possible.

IMHO going in this direction would pretty much put an end to the vast and extremely violent criminal enterprises devoted to drugs-- enterprises which have corrupted entire nations.  IMHO going in this direction would put an end to many rationalizations for the vast expansion of the police power of the state and enable a restoration of the sanctity of people's homes and the sanctity of our privacy.

Marc
28720  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Re: Tippy-tappy drills-- threat or menace? on: February 27, 2007, 08:17:52 AM
Woof All:

A story I sometimes tell is comes from the late 1980s when I was in Pendekar Paul DeThouars' Bukti Negara Silat class at the Inosanto Academy.  He asked for a volunteer, then called on me wink  He stood in front of me with his nose about 1" from mine.  His presence was quite formidable.  Then he said "Do something." 

For me this was a moment of satori. BN material which I had wondered about now made more sense.

I had doubted BN because I had in my mind typical young male ritual hierarchical combat which typically starts with both fighters at a distance at agreed upon time and place already in movement, but this was something different.  We were already at close quarters in stillness.  DIFFERENT PARADIGM.   Gabe Suarez can speak for himself, but I think he would agree that many civilians envision a gun fight through the filter of the paradigm of a Hollywood western movie:  Bad Guy and Good Guy face off.  GG allows BG to start his draw first because a GG should never start a fight.  Again the same question, what percentage of gun fights look like this?

In knife fighting I think it important to remember what we in DBMA sometimes playfully call "sport knife dueling" is but one paradigm amongst many when it comes to knives and may not be one that the media and corto training has in mind.   When the stakesare for real, what percentage of actual cases where a knife is used fall into this category?  I'm guessing quite low.   

If this is so, then the reason for the drill may be for something different than the behaviors of the sport knife paradigm.  For example, what about a homicidal rage?  I am reminded of a conversation I had with an ex-con wherein he told me about his kills in prison.  "Technique?  There's no technique!  You pump him until he is dead and then you bind your wounds."  So perhaps in the wild swirling frenzy of such an attack one might one want to have the extensive vocabulary of possible responses that can be developed in tippy tap training?  I'm thinking "Yes."  To paraphrase what Maija says above, you want to have the eyes to recognize what is happening and have solutions.

Which brings us to a key point:  Most TT/flow training is only done at a very low intensity.  This is good and a necessary part of the installation process, but IMHO many people commit a major error by never upping the intensity from there, even those who spend years at it.

This thinking was the starting point for my development of the Kali Fence and the Dog Catcher.   

I would like to say that what I show in the  "Die Less Often" DVD I did with Gabe Suarez is only what I could show those people in attendance in the day and a half of training before we began the scenario training-- and that is with Gabe and I covering a lot of other material as well!  There is a whole bunch of DBMA Dog Catcher curriculum that I simply did not have the time to go into that I think is pretty durn sharp (Yes it will ge part of a future DBMA DVD  cheesy ) -- as the line went in a TV western of my youth, "no brag, just fact"  grin  -- and I was able to develop this curriculum due to my years of training with Guro Inosanto and others.

The last point I would like to offer for consideration is that looking at fights and asking what percentage of the time looks like the range/training of the drills is not how I look at it.  IMHO the idea is that the idea is to have things which define the pivotal instants in which a fight is decided.

In closing, yes I know I have not addressed one of the key questions presented here-- that of how much time/what proportion of one's time should be spent on TT drills-- beyond saying that many people don't spend anywhere enough time on pressure testing.  I will add that many people also do plenty of pressure testing, but may lack a broad vocabulary with which to answer the questions presented.

The Adventure continues,
Crafty Dog
28721  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Military Science on: February 26, 2007, 10:13:41 PM
Iran: Sounding Off on its Latest Rocket Test
Summary

Iran launched a sounding rocket for educational and research purposes Feb. 25, Mohsen Bahrami and Ali Akbar Golrou of Iran's Space Research Center said. Though unconfirmed, the launch offers insight into both Iranian politics and the pace of the country's missile program.

Analysis

An Iranian sounding rocket capable of flinging its payload to an altitude above 90 miles was reportedly launched Feb. 25 for educational and research purposes, Ali Akbar Golrou, deputy head of Iran's Space Research Center, said. Earlier that day, Mohsen Bahrami, head of the research center, described the missile as a "space rocket." Though official Russian statements and an anonymous U.S. military source cited by Agence France-Presse on Feb. 26 questioned the launch, the events of Feb. 25 illustrate two dynamics within Iran's government -- portions of which are quick to tout any new weapon or scientific advance even if they do not understand it.

In January, the chairman of the Iranian parliament's National Security and Foreign Policy Commission leaked to Aviation Week & Space Technology that an Iranian satellite launch vehicle had been assembled and was being prepared for launch. Though this is very possible, it now appears that he could have been touting the sounding rocket.

Sounding rockets can serve many purposes and are commonly used for atmospheric tests or experiments that require several minutes of weightlessness. Sounding rockets do not insert their payload into orbit. Sounding rockets undergo less acceleration and release their payloads earlier than satellite launch vehicles (SLVs). The payload -- be it an experiment or a test object -- travels in a parabolic arc as gravity drags it back to Earth. Most experimental payloads deploy a parachute on the downward flight so they can be recovered.

A sounding rocket does not necessarily represent a new degree of technical prowess for Iran. Even some of the country's older surface-to-air missiles and much of its ballistic missile arsenal could have been rewired to perform this very mission. However, the possibility that this was a more substantive test should not be ruled out. Whatever the truth, Iran's primary concern of late is not the molecular makeup of the rarified upper atmosphere. This sounding rocket could have carried a new re-entry vehicle for a ballistic missile (although Golrou said a parachute brought the rocket's payload back to Earth) or a second stage for a new two-stage missile or SLV.

South Korea's quick progression of three Korean Sounding Rockets (KSR-I, KSR-II and KSR-III) in the last 15 years has provided the foundation for its SLV program, still in development. The KSR-III was particularly useful in the areas of propulsion, guidance, control and mission design. Similarly, whatever Iran might have learned Feb. 25 is certainly a step forward for Tehran's ballistic missile and SLV programs.

Though information about the events of Feb. 25 is limited, two other aspects of Iran became apparent with the announcement of the launch. First, certain elements in the Iranian government have a penchant for touting Iran's latest scientific achievements without knowing exactly what they might be. Second, the launch revealed the deliberate nature of Iran's missile program.

Iran's program -- despite the common Scud design heritage and shared development efforts -- is not like North Korea's. North Korean missile tests are so rare that, after a single-stage Nodong test and years of quiet, the world was stunned by the 1998 launch of the three-stage Taepodong-1 SLV, which very nearly succeeded. In contrast, Iran regularly tests even its already proven Scud and Zelzal rockets. The latest Shahab-3 was test-launched several times in 2006.

In other words, barring the launch of a North Korean-designed and manufactured SLV with an Iranian flag painted on it, Feb. 25's sounding rocket seems to suggest that any indigenous Iranian SLV launch will proceed via a more conventional development program that could include more sounding rocket launches. But given certain Iranian leaders' apparent inability to hold their tongues, it will be more difficult for Iran to proceed with the same discretion North Korea did leading up to its 1998 Taepodong-1 launch. Iran also intends to be more certain that its SLV will work the first time.

stratfor.com
28722  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Environmental issues on: February 26, 2007, 09:59:27 PM
A VERY INCONVINIENT TRUTH: POWER: GORE MANSION USES 20X AVERAGE HOUSEHOLD; CONSUMPTION INCREASE AFTER 'TRUTH': 
 
The Tennessee Center for Policy Research, an independent, nonprofit and nonpartisan research organization committed to achieving a freer, more prosperous Tennessee through free market policy solutions, issued a press release late Monday: 
 
Last night, Al Gore's global-warming documentary, An Inconvenient Truth, collected an Oscar for best documentary feature, but the Tennessee Center for Policy Research has found that Gore deserves a gold statue for hypocrisy.   
 
Gore's mansion, [20-room, eight-bathroom] located in the posh Belle Meade area of Nashville, consumes more electricity every month than the average American household uses in an entire year, according to the Nashville Electric Service (NES).   
 
In his documentary, the former Vice President calls on Americans to conserve energy by reducing electricity consumption at home. 
 
The average household in America consumes 10,656 kilowatt-hours (kWh) per year, according to the Department of Energy. In 2006, Gore devoured nearly 221,000 kWh--more than 20 times the national average.   
 
Last August alone, Gore burned through 22,619 kWh--guzzling more than twice the electricity in one month than an average American family uses in an entire year. As a result of his energy consumption, Gore's average monthly electric bill topped $1,359.   
 
Since the release of An Inconvenient Truth, Gore's energy consumption has increased from an average of 16,200 kWh per month in 2005, to 18,400 kWh per month in 2006.   
 
Gore's extravagant energy use does not stop at his electric bill. Natural gas bills for Gore's mansion and guest house averaged $1,080 per month last year.   
 
"As the spokesman of choice for the global warming movement, Al Gore has to be willing to walk to walk, not just talk the talk, when it comes to home energy use," said Tennessee Center for Policy Research President Drew Johnson. 
 
In total, Gore paid nearly $30,000 in combined electricity and natural gas bills for his Nashville estate in 2006.
 
 
28723  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: WW3 on: February 26, 2007, 09:24:03 PM
Rog:

C'mon Rog!  You may have a way of looking at things that I think is quite off-kilter is many regards, but you are not a stupid guy-- so please don't pretend you don't know what the different approach is.

As for the meaning of the Democrats taking majority position in the Congress, apart from the role of various corruption scandals I would submit that in most cases the Dems offered absolutely nothing as to what they would do.  They simply criticized President Bush and Sec'y Rumbo.  In that there is plenty there to criticize, the people voted to express discontent with the way things were going.

Would someone refresh my memory as to when the President began discussing the "surge"?  (What an inept name for it, but I digress , , ,)  IIRC Bush proposed it AFTER the election.  IOW it was not part on the table for the election-- yet another inept Bush step.

We have troops on the field of a very difficult battle and I do find it despicable that the Congressional Democrats let our enemies know that all they have to do is sit it out for a few months-- all the more so when so many of them during the summer were criticizing the President for not having enough troops to do the job! 

I suspect I am in touch with more men with their boots on the ground in Iraq than you.  I agree that there is some discontent-- but I find that most of it is with having their hands tied, not shutting the borders with Syria, Saudi Arabia, etc not going after Mookie Sadr, the firing of the Iraqi Army, and things of that sort-- all of which cut against the point you seek to make.

Of course in America the President, a civilian, is the Commander in Chief-- but given that there are something like only a handful of  reporters outside of the Emerald City it seems to me that we would want to get the troops sense of things --without drawing them into domestic politics.  By the way, anyone who wants to read from someone who IS on the ground in the sh*t, I highly recommend Michael Yon's blog-- see the thread nearby http://dogbrothers.com/phpBB2/index.php?topic=1168.0

Marc

28724  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Politically (In)correct on: February 26, 2007, 07:55:23 PM
1) My point about homosexuality is that as a legal matter people should be free to hold whatever opinion they want to.   

2) I invite you to respond to my other points.
28725  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Help our troops/our cause: on: February 26, 2007, 01:44:00 PM
Woof Rog:

Answering these questions does not fit with the subject of this thread.  If you would like, please take them over to the "WW3" or "Iraq" threads.

Marc
28726  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Help our troops/our cause: on: February 26, 2007, 12:52:15 PM
I'll agree that the use of the legal term "treason" is over the top, but IMHO as our troops, who have strong re-enlistment rates, are finally being unleashed to apply a different approach, that the actions of the Democratic majority are for the most part despicable.  They are telling the enemy AND those who would be our friends, to just wait it out a few months and we will be gone.  This dramatically reduces the chance of success of the mission for which our troops fight.
28727  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Intel Matters on: February 26, 2007, 11:36:28 AM
February 26, 2007 -- LAST week, American troops checking traffic from Iran detained Amar al-Hakim, a cleric and the son of the head of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) - the key Shia political organization we're counting on.


The bust was a mistake - although the soldiers followed their orders to the letter. Young Hakim's bodyguards got to kiss the dirt while the vehicles in the cleric's convoy were searched. The troops didn't know the mullah from a moonshine runner.

SCIRI certainly has some dark connections with Iran. The party's a dubious ally, at best. But jerking the boss' kid around was, in diplo-speak, "unhelpful." Even if Hakim Jr. was smuggling money, or worse.

I'd be shocked if he wasn't. It's the Middle East, folks. We're just betting we can handle the least poisonous local snakes.

As a former Military Intelligence officer, my first reaction to teaching Little Hakim the perp walk was: "Who's responsible for tracking this guy?"

A sound intel effort would monitor all of the male family members of Iraq's key leaders 24/7. How did Hakim Jr. slip off the reservation?

My second reaction was more indulgent. Even with a first-rate intel program, mistakes happen under combat conditions. No amount of training, information flow and technical support will ever achieve perfection.

The good news is that the Army's Military Intelligence branch has been learning fast in Iraq. Official and un-official reforms are underway, driven from below by the divisional, brigade and battalion-level "deuces" who've paid their combat-zone dues.

The Military Intelligence ancien regime badly needed a trip to the guillotine. The ethical corruption of MI branch over the last quarter-century was appalling. In peacetime, we wasted billions; in wartime, we wasted lives.

While a minority of us had argued since the mid-1980s that the human factor would be paramount in our future conflicts and that technology couldn't replace the human mind, the MI establishment just went on buying platinum-plated junk that never delivered a tenth of what the contractors and apostles of hi-tech promised.

Appropriate technologies can help us - but no database or collection system is a substitute for seasoned human judgment. The key task in intelligence is understanding the enemy. Machines do many things, but they still don't register flesh-and-blood relationships, self-sacrifice or fanaticism.

Forgetting that tech is supposed to support people, we wasted talented people supporting worthless technologies.

The cardinal example of this corrosive mentality was the purchase of a multibillion-dollar, Rube Goldberg contraption called the All Source Analysis System (ASAS). Under development for more than two decades, ASAS never worked. But a generation of senior MI leaders made rank pitching the system as the answer to every intelligence need.

ASAS was going to fuse the data from every classified intel source and give the commander instant, perfect answers. Early on - in 1984 - a self-assured technocrat in uniform told me that, within 10 years, human analysts would be irrelevant.

ASAS was disastrously flawed from the start, but impossible to kill once the funding got going. Not only were MI careers at stake, Congress preferred to buy gear built by home-district contractors, rather than "waste" money on soldiers. And those contractors ensured that key MI apparatchiks wouldn't flip burgers after they retired.

When ASAS consistently failed to work, the inevitable response from above was "Make it work!"

It never did, no matter how much money we squandered.

By the time ASAS deployed to Iraq, it was an obese behemoth requiring so much technical support to achieve minimal output that it became a liability, robbing our forces of human capital needed to deal with the real problems of insurgency, such as ethnic rivalries and religious hatred. To quote one disgusted officer, ASAS was, at best, "the world's most-expensive communications van."

ASAS was the monster that ate MI.

Now ASAS has been slain at last, the one good kill our enemies made. And a new generation of officers has earned its spurs. MI's combat veterans understand what intelligence must do, and they realize that satellites can't pierce the human soul. There's a powerful reform effort underway, from Iraq and Afghanistan back to the Army Intelligence Center and School.

Today's Military Intelligence personnel are a damned sight better than my inept, physically slovenly and intellectually lazy generation was.

On a recent visit to the Intel School at Fort Huachuca, Ariz., I found that the last ASAS nonsense had been swept away. Captains returning from Iraq and Afghanistan for the Advanced Course - a training staple - had no patience with yesteryear's bureaucratic approach to intel. They know that commanders need results, not just data dumps. The lives of our soldiers depend upon the quality of our intel.

There still isn't nearly enough money for language training (Congress would rather pay contractors, as usual), and there isn't sufficient classroom time to make up fully for the lost years. But it was reassuring to see commanders, students and faculty discarding the old faith in technology's divine powers and coming to grips with the rigors of real intel work.

Under wartime pressures, Military Intelligence is finally coming of age. We'll still get some things wrong. Now and then the wrong guy will be told to assume the position. Our struggle with Islamist terror is more than Andy and Barney keeping the peace in Mayberry. MI's maturation process will take years - and more wars. The profiteers and careerists will fight back. But the reformers have the upper hand at last.

That isn't just good news for our troops, but for our country.

Ralph Peters' latest book is "Never Quit The Fight."

http://www.nypost.com/php/pfriendly/...lph_peters.htm
28728  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Israel, and its neighbors on: February 26, 2007, 11:09:26 AM
stratfor.com

LEBANON: Hezbollah is increasing its forces north of Lebanon's Litani River, reinforcing its positions in anticipation of another conflict with Israel, following the one in August 2006, the Times of London reported. Shiite businessman Ali Tajiddine reportedly is aiding Hezbollah by buying land for the group to use as a base of operations.
28729  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Iraq on: February 26, 2007, 08:56:02 AM
Geopolitical Diary: Emerging Strains in U.S. Partnerships

Iraqi President Jalal Talabani took ill on Sunday and was flown aboard a U.S. military C-130 aircraft from Suleimaniyah, in northern Iraq, to Amman, Jordan, for treatment. According to Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih, Talabani -- who is also chief of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) -- suffered from a drop in blood pressure, but his son, Qubad Talabani, maintains that he was hospitalized for exhaustion.

Talabani's health is worth keeping an eye on. This is not only because of his position in the Iraq government, but because he is among the most prominent of the Kurds -- the one ethnic faction in Iraq that so far has given the United States the least amount of trouble.

It is quite likely that the 74-year-old Talabani, whose health problems are not limited to poor blood pressure, will be gone from the political scene before Iraq sees any move toward a negotiated settlement. Should this happen, the presidency would be up for grabs -- and it does not simplify matters that the senior-most Kurdish leader in line behind Talabani is Masoud Barzani, head of the rival Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). With political ambitions in play, it is unlikely that the current power-sharing agreement between the PUK and KDP will hold. In short, Talabani's departure or physical incapacitation probably would ignite an intra-Kurdish struggle -- further exacerbating the myriad sectarian and communal tensions in Iraq.

Just as the story about Talabani's illness was making headlines, Oil Ministry spokesman Assem Jihad was downplaying reports that the Kurds had agreed to support a draft oil law. The draft law concerns whether there would be one authority in Baghdad to oversee all Iraqi oil contracts -- a position supported by the Sunnis and Shia -- or whether the Kurds should have an autonomous oil authority of their own. Barzani had claimed during a press conference with Talabani on Saturday that "a final agreement" had been reached and the Kurds had accepted the draft, but the spokesman for the Shiite-controlled Oil Ministry said on Sunday the negotiations were still under way. Confusion over how to share oil revenues -- the issue at the heart of the ethno-sectarian conflict in Iraq -- will only deepen if Talabani no longer is able to serve as chief of his party and president of the country.

Problems involving the Shia also cropped up on Sunday, as Muqtada al-Sadr denounced the U.S.-Iraq security plan for Baghdad. One of al-Sadr's aides read out a statement to a gathering of supporters in Baghdad's Sadr City district, in which the Shiite leader called for Iraqi security forces to come up with their own plan and to refrain from working with U.S. forces on security issues. Al-Sadr can see the rift that is emerging between the United States and his main Shiite rival, Abdel-Aziz al-Hakim -- leader of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq -- which became apparent when U.S. forces detained al-Hakim's son on Feb. 23. Clearly, al-Sadr is moving to take advantage of the situation and revive his own political fortunes.

Whether he can do so successfully and avert a crackdown against his militia, the Mehdi Army, remains to be seen. The Iranians -- who support al-Sadr to some extent, and support his rival al-Hakim even more -- are likely very pleased with the emerging tensions between Washington and mainstream Iraqi Shiite forces, as the rift will only push the Iraqi Shia further into Iran's orbit.

The tensions were made even more apparent on Sunday in a statement from Iraq's national security adviser, Muwaffaq al-Rubaie, who said, in perhaps deliberately ambiguous phrasing, "Recently the Iranians have changed their positions, and we have some evidence that they have stopped supplying arms or creating any of these shaped mines in the streets of Baghdad." It was not clear whether al-Rubaie -- a leading independent within the ruling Shiite coalition in Baghdad -- was referring to the government in Tehran. He went on to say he had no doubt that over the past few weeks the Iranians had "changed their position and stopped a lot of their tactics and interference in Iraq's internal affairs."

It is important to note that the Iraqi Shia, whom Washington identified as its chief partner in Iraq even prior to the March 2003 invasion, actually are closer to Tehran than they are to the Bush administration. Therefore, the tensions with the Shia -- combined with the potential for internal problems among the Kurds -- should be watched closely, as these are the United States' two principal means for dealing with Sunni unrest in Iraq.

stratfor.com
28730  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Science, Culture, & Humanities / Re: Legal issues on: February 26, 2007, 08:48:35 AM
Second post of the morning:
NY Times
Editorial Observer
Why Have So Many U.S. Attorneys Been Fired? It Looks a Lot Like Politics
By ADAM COHEN
Published: February 26, 2007

Carol Lam, the former United States attorney for San Diego, is smart and tireless and was very good at her job. Her investigation of Representative Randy Cunningham resulted in a guilty plea for taking more than $2 million in bribes from defense contractors and a sentence of more than eight years. Two weeks ago, she indicted Kyle Dustin Foggo, the former No. 3 official in the C.I.A. The defense-contracting scandal she pursued so vigorously could yet drag in other politicians.

In many Justice Departments, her record would have won her awards, and perhaps a promotion to a top post in Washington. In the Bush Justice Department, it got her fired.

Ms. Lam is one of at least seven United States attorneys fired recently under questionable circumstances. The Justice Department is claiming that Ms. Lam and other well-regarded prosecutors like John McKay of Seattle, David Iglesias of New Mexico, Daniel Bogden of Nevada and Paul Charlton of Arizona — who all received strong job evaluations — performed inadequately.

It is hard to call what’s happening anything other than a political purge. And it’s another shameful example of how in the Bush administration, everything — from rebuilding a hurricane-ravaged city to allocating homeland security dollars to invading Iraq — is sacrificed to partisan politics and winning elections.

U.S. attorneys have enormous power. Their decision to investigate or indict can bankrupt a business or destroy a life. They must be, and long have been, insulated from political pressures. Although appointed by the president, once in office they are almost never asked to leave until a new president is elected. The Congressional Research Service has confirmed how unprecedented these firings are. It found that of 486 U.S. attorneys confirmed since 1981, perhaps no more than three were forced out in similar ways — three in 25 years, compared with seven in recent months.

It is not just the large numbers. The firing of H. E. Cummins III is raising as many questions as Ms. Lam’s. Mr. Cummins, one of the most distinguished lawyers in Arkansas, is respected by Republicans and Democrats alike. But he was forced out to make room for J. Timothy Griffin, a former Karl Rove deputy with thin legal experience who did opposition research for the Republican National Committee. (Mr. Griffin recently bowed to the inevitable and said he will not try for a permanent appointment. But he remains in office indefinitely.)

The Bush administration cleared the way for these personnel changes by slipping a little-noticed provision into the Patriot Act last year that allows the president to appoint interim U.S. attorneys for an indefinite period without Senate confirmation.

Three theories are emerging for why these well-qualified U.S. attorney were fired — all political, and all disturbing.

1. Helping friends. Ms. Lam had already put one powerful Republican congressman in jail and was investigating other powerful politicians. The Justice Department, unpersuasively, claims that it was unhappy about Ms. Lam’s failure to bring more immigration cases. Meanwhile, Ms. Lam has been replaced with an interim prosecutor whose résumé shows almost no criminal law experience, but includes her membership in the Federalist Society, a conservative legal group.

2. Candidate recruitment. U.S. attorney is a position that can make headlines and launch political careers. Congressional Democrats suspect that the Bush administration has been pushing out long-serving U.S. attorneys to replace them with promising Republican lawyers who can then be run for Congress and top state offices.

3. Presidential politics. The Justice Department concedes that Mr. Cummins was doing a good job in Little Rock. An obvious question is whether the administration was more interested in his successor’s skills in opposition political research — let’s not forget that Arkansas has been lucrative fodder for Republicans in the past — in time for the 2008 elections.

The charge of politics certainly feels right. This administration has made partisanship its lodestar. The Washington Post reporter Rajiv Chandrasekaran revealed in his book, “Imperial Life in the Emerald City,” that even applicants to help administer post-invasion Iraq were asked whom they voted for in 2000 and what they thought of Roe v. Wade.

Congress has been admirably aggressive about investigating. Senator Charles Schumer, Democrat of New York, held a tough hearing. And he is now talking about calling on the fired U.S. attorneys to testify and subpoenaing their performance evaluations — both good ideas.

The politicization of government over the last six years has had tragic consequences — in New Orleans, Iraq and elsewhere. But allowing politics to infect U.S. attorney offices takes it to a whole new level. Congress should continue to pursue the case of the fired U.S. attorneys vigorously, both to find out what really happened and to make sure that it does not happen again.

28731  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Afghanistan-Pakistan on: February 26, 2007, 08:42:56 AM
Bush to Warn Pakistan to Act on Terror
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By DAVID E. SANGER and MARK MAZZETTI
Published: February 26, 2007
WASHINGTON, Feb. 25 — President Bush has decided to send an unusually tough message to one of his most important allies, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, the president of Pakistan, warning him that the newly Democratic Congress could cut aid to his country unless his forces become far more aggressive in hunting down operatives with Al Qaeda, senior administration officials say.

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The Reach of War
Go to Complete Coverage » The decision came after the White House concluded that General Musharraf is failing to live up to commitments he made to Mr. Bush during a visit here in September. General Musharraf insisted then, both in private and public, that a peace deal he struck with tribal leaders in one of the country’s most lawless border areas would not diminish the hunt for the leaders of Al Qaeda and the Taliban or their training camps.

Now, American intelligence officials have concluded that the terrorist infrastructure is being rebuilt, and that while Pakistan has attacked some camps, its overall effort has flagged.

“He’s made a number of assurances over the past few months, but the bottom line is that what they are doing now is not working,” one senior administration official who deals often with South Asian issues said late last week. “The message we’re sending to him now is that the only thing that matters is results.”

Democrats, who took control of Congress last month, have urged the White House to put greater pressure on Pakistan because of statements from American commanders that units based in Pakistan that are linked to the Taliban, Afghanistan’s ousted rulers, are increasing their attacks into Afghanistan.

For the time being, officials say, the White House has ruled out unilateral strikes against the training camps that American spy satellites are monitoring in North Waziristan, in Pakistan’s tribal areas on the border. The fear is that such strikes would result in what one administration official referred to as a “shock to the stability” of General Musharraf’s government.

General Musharraf, a savvy survivor in the brutal world of Pakistani politics, knows that the administration is hesitant to push him too far. If his government collapses, it is not clear who would succeed him or who would gain control over Pakistan’s arsenal of nuclear weapons.

But the spread of Al Qaeda in the tribal areas threatens to undermine a central element of Mr. Bush’s argument that he is succeeding in the administration’s effort to curb terrorism. The bomb plot disrupted in Britain last summer, involving plans to hijack airplanes, has been linked by British and American intelligence agencies to camps in the Pakistan-Afghan border areas.

General Musharraf has told American officials that Pakistani military operations in the tribal areas in recent years so alienated local residents that they no longer provide the central government with quality intelligence about the movements of senior Islamic militants.

Congressional Democrats have threatened to review military assistance and other aid to Pakistan unless they see evidence of aggressive attacks on Al Qaeda. The House last month passed a measure linking future military aid to White House certification that Pakistan “is making all possible efforts to prevent the Taliban from operating in areas under its sovereign control.”

Pakistan is now the fifth-largest recipient of American aid. Mr. Bush has proposed $785 million in aid to Pakistan in his new budget, including $300 million in military aid to help Pakistan combat Islamic radicalism in the country.

The rumblings from Congress give Mr. Bush and his top advisers a way of conveying the seriousness of the problem, officials said, without appearing to issue a direct threat to the proud Pakistani leader themselves.

“We think the Pakistani aid is at risk in Congress,” said the senior official, who declined to speak on the record because the subject involved intelligence matters.

The administration has sent a series of emissaries to see the Pakistani leader in recent weeks, including the new secretary of defense, Robert M. Gates. Mr. Gates was charged with prompting more action in a region in which American forces operate with great constraints, if they are allowed in at all.

“This is not the type of relationship where we can order action,” said an administration official involved in discussions over Pakistan policy. “We can strongly encourage.”

Relations between General Musharraf and Mr. Bush have always been tense, as the Pakistani leader veers between his need for American support and protection and his awareness that many Pakistani people — and the intelligence service — have strong sympathies for Al Qaeda and the resurgent Taliban. Officials involved with the issue describe the current moment between the leaders as especially fraught.

Mr. Bush was deeply skeptical of the deal General Musharraf struck with the tribal leaders last year, fearing that it would limit the government’s powers to intercede in what Mr. Bush has called the “wild west” of Waziristan, administration officials said at the time.

During his visit to Washington last fall, General Musharraf said the agreement he signed with tribal leaders, giving them greater sovereignty in the region, had “three bottom lines.” He said one was “no Al Qaeda activities in our tribal agencies or across the border in Afghanistan.” The second was “no Taliban activity” in the same areas. And the third was “no Talibanization,” which he described as “obscurantist thoughts or way of life.”

American intelligence officials have made an assessment that senior Qaeda leaders in Pakistan have re-established significant control over their global network and are training operatives in some of the camps for strikes on Western targets.

One American official familiar with intelligence reports about Pakistan said intelligence agencies had established “clear linkages” between the Qaeda camps and the plot to blow up trans-Atlantic flights that was thwarted last August. American analysts said the recent trials of terrorism suspects in Britain showed that some defendants had been trained in Pakistan.

American officials say one reason General Musharraf agreed to pull government troops back to their barracks in North Waziristan and allow tribal leaders greater control over security was to give him time to rebuild his intelligence network in the border region gradually.
28732  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Science, Culture, & Humanities / D'Souza goes PC, part two on: February 26, 2007, 08:24:37 AM


Mr. D'Souza seeks "to understand [Muslims] as they understand themselves." His effort culminates in a chapter devoted to a defense of patriarchy. There he observes that the practices most offensive to modern Americans, such as arranged marriage and polygamy, are not distinctively Islamic. Rather, Mr. D'Souza explains, they are characteristic of patriarchal cultures such as those of ancient Israel. "More recently in America," Mr. D'Souza adds, "polygamy was permitted and practiced by the Mormons." Mr. D'Souza fails to note the traditional American condemnation of polygamy, in the words of the 1856 Republican platform, as a relic of barbarism; Utah was not admitted as a state until it prohibited polygamy. Mr. D'Souza seeks to mitigate our antipathy to polygamy with the observation that Islamic law limits polygamy to four wives and that it is conditioned on requirements so onerous that "its practice is quite rare in the Muslim world." Reliable data on the incidence of polygamy are not readily available and Mr. D'Souza cites no data whatsoever. It is at least worth noting in this context, even if Mr. D'Souza does not see fit to do so, that bin Laden is the issue of a polygamous marriage and is himself a polygamist. Bin Laden's father took numerous wives who collectively bestowed some fifty children on him.





Mr. D'Souza ignores secondary sources that contradict or fail to support his thesis, and he fares no better in his treatment of primary sources. Mr. D'Souza only briefly discusses bin Laden's pre-9/11 manifestos and does so in an extremely misleading manner. Foremost among them is bin Laden's 1996 "declaration of war" against the United States. The declaration obviously bears on Mr. D'Souza's thesis, but he never even cites the declaration by name: "Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places (expel the infidels from the Arab peninsula)." Bin Laden decries "the Zionist-Crusader alliance" and asserts that, with the American "occupation" of Saudi Arabia, Islam has suffered "the latest and greatest of" the aggressions committed against it in recent history. "It is the duty of every tribe in the Arabian peninsula to fight jihad," bin Laden announced, "and cleanse the land from these Crusader occupiers." According to Mr. D'Souza, bin Laden's grievance with the American occupation of Saudi Arabia "must be understood in a metaphorical sense. . . . What bin Laden objected to was America staying in the Middle East, importing with it the immoral ingredients of American values and culture." I think it's fair to say that the rambling 25-page text of the 1996 declaration belies Mr. D'Souza's reading of it.
The second of bin Laden's pre-9/11 manifestos is his 1998 declaration of holy war against the West and Israel. Again bin Laden complains of America "occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of places." Again bin Laden refers to the "Crusader-Zionist alliance," alleging that more than one million Iraqis have been killed by Americans stationed in Saudi Arabia. Bin Laden then issues his "ruling to kill the Americans and their allies--civilians and military," proclaiming it the "individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip." Mr. D'Souza does not devote more than a few words to bin Laden's 1998 manifesto specifically, though it is bin Laden's final pre-9/11 written declaration of war. Mr. D'Souza generally observes, "When bin Laden calls America a Crusader state, he means that America is on a vicious international campaign to impose its atheist system of government and its pagan values on Muslims."

According to Mr. D'Souza, bin Laden's war against the "Crusader" United States and his condemnation of the "Zionist" half of the "Zionist Crusader alliance" are not based on the religion of either, but rather their lack of it. "The context of bin Laden's arguments clearly shows that bin Laden is not speaking of a religious war between Islam and Christianity. . . . In the classical Muslim understanding, there is a fundamental distinction between Jews and Christians on the one hand and polytheists and atheists on the other." Mr. D'Souza suggests that bin Laden either thinks highly of Christians and Jews, consistent with Mr. D'Souza's understanding of traditional Islam, or maintains a discreet silence concerning his dissent from the tradition for fear of "alienat[ing] traditional Muslims." To paraphrase the Biblical verse, in Mr. D'Souza's book you shall not hear of jihad or rumors of jihad. The word does not appear in the index and the concept is not discussed in the book.

Mr. D'Souza places great stock in bin Laden's November 2002 "Letter to America." Mr. D'Souza cites it as cardinal evidence of bin Laden's hatred of "the cultural left." In the letter, bin Laden calls on Americans to "reject the immoral acts of fornication, homosexuality, intoxicants, gambling and trading with interest." For the purposes of argument we might concede that "fornication" and "homosexuality" can in some sense be laid at the feet of "the cultural left" and shoehorned into Mr. D'Souza's thesis. But alcohol, gambling and trading with interest cannot. Mr. D'Souza uses the passage to support his claim that bin Laden's quarrel with America does not derive primarily from foreign policy. He does not even pause to take note that the passage supports the proposition that Islam contributes more to the quarrel than does "the cultural left." Mr. D'Souza conveniently omits bin Laden's statement that "the first thing we are calling you to is Islam."

Mr. D'Souza is neither a historian nor a student of Islam. His research is neither broad nor deep. He refers in passing to interviews he conducted for the book, but he does not appear to have interviewed many scholars, journalists, or witnesses who have devoted themselves to the subjects that bear on his book's thesis.

"The Enemy at Home" is a strange book, both for what it says and for what it does not say on subjects that Mr. D'Souza must know conflict with its thesis. Mr. D'Souza says, for example, that he would rather go to a baseball game or have a drink with Michael Moore than with the grand mufti of Egypt (is this another lame stab at humor?), but that when it comes to "core beliefs," he feels closer to "the dignified fellow in the long robe and prayer beads than to the slovenly fellow with the baseball cap."

Having engaged in the effort to understand the Muslims as they understand themselves, in "The Enemy at Home" Mr. D'Souza generally does not seek to judge them by a standard above or beyond Islam. In this respect "The Enemy at Home" stands in contrast with Mr. D'Souza's first post-9/11 book, "What's So Great About America." In the earlier book, Mr. D'Souza first rehearsed many of the same themes that he explores in "The Enemy at Home." There he placed radical Islamists among the "blame America first" crowd. There Mr. D'Souza lauded the disentangling of the institutions of religion and government, "a separation that was achieved most completely in the United States." There he argued that Islamic fundamentalists don't just object to the excesses of American liberty, they object to liberty itself. There he noted that America could not appease the radical Islamists by staying out of their world because we live in an age when the flow of information is unstoppable. There he concluded that there was no alternative to facing their hostility. There he condemned the "coerced virtues" of the realm of Islam, because "compulsion cannot produce virtue." There he declared America to be, on balance, "an oasis of goodness in a desert of cynicism and barbarism." There he chose to cast his lot with his fellow citizens rather than with the grand mufti of Egypt.

If provocation is the standard by which "The Enemy at Home" is to be measured, the book is undoubtedly successful. It seems to me, however, that its cynicism exceeds its provocation.

Mr. Johnson writes at Power Line Blog This article appears in the March issue of The New Criterion.


28733  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Science, Culture, & Humanities / D'Souza goes PC on: February 26, 2007, 08:23:42 AM
D'Souza Goes Native
A onetime scourge of political correctness offers an ultra-PC view of Islam.
WSJ
BY SCOTT W. JOHNSON
Monday, February 26, 2007 12:01 a.m. EST

Dinesh D'Souza was an early editor of the Dartmouth Review, the conservative student newspaper. He earned a reputation as an enfant terrible before he graduated from college. In his tenure at the Review, Mr. D'Souza brilliantly tormented the liberal college administration that presented him with the perfect target. Whatever his earlier attainments, he established himself as a writer of substance with his 1991 book "Illiberal Education: The Politics of Race and Sex on Campus," a critique of political correctness and multiculturalism. Intensely reported, the book was full of astute commentary and analysis. It justly won the applause of such knowledgeable observers as the eminent historian Eugene Genovese, who celebrated the book in a New Republic cover story.

In his subsequent career as an author and controversialist, Mr. D'Souza has followed the path he started down in "Illiberal Education." If he has sought to provoke, he has also sought to illuminate. Thus in his 1995 book, "The End of Racism: Principles for a Multiracial Society," Mr. D'Souza ably summarized a massive body of scholarship and literature. While there was much to disagree with in the book, he presented the evidence in such a way that an intelligent reader could both learn from him and form his own opinions.

"The Enemy at Home: The Cultural Left and Its Responsibility for 9/11"--Mr. D'Souza's new book--is something else entirely. The book works a strange metamorphosis. Whereas "Illiberal Education" and "The End of Racism" proved Mr. D'Souza a precocious commentator and gifted polemicist, the new book is crude and sophomoric. Worse than its sophomoric treatment of serious issues is its presentation of a blinkered and politically correct version of the Muslim world. It is a presentation that the young Mr. D'Souza would have scorned. It is as though, having arrived on the scene as Franz Kafka, he has turned himself into Gregor Samsa.

The subject of the book is the shooting war and the culture war. Mr. D'Souza frames the book on a thesis that, he acknowledges, "will seem startling at the outset." His thesis is an indictment that he levels in the second sentence of the book's introduction: "The cultural left in this country is responsible for causing 9/11." Mr. D'Souza does not reveal how, more than five years after the event, he alone among the thousands of commentators on 9/11 has tumbled to its root cause.

Mr. D'Souza identifies "the cultural left" that is responsible for 9/11 as "the left wing of the Democratic Party" and "a few Republicans, notably those who adopt a left-wing stance on foreign policy and social issues." As Mr. D'Souza himself proudly notes, he doesn't just hold a piece of paper in his hand and wave a list of names around. He actually names names, identifying the "leading figures" among the cultural left: Hillary Clinton, Ted Kennedy, Nancy Pelosi, Barbara Boxer, George Soros, Bill Moyers and Noam Chomsky. He also names organizations including the American Civil Liberties Union, People for the American Way, and Planned Parenthood. (And to those named in the introduction he adds an extensive enemies' list in the last chapter of the book.)

The charge is serious, even if Mr. D'Souza's invocation of Joe McCarthy belies its seriousness. And the list is long. Does Mr. D'Souza prove his case? Although prosecutors are famously able to get grand juries to indict ham sandwiches, I don't think that Mr. D'Souza's indictment would make it out of a grand jury room. Mr. D'Souza simply lacks any evidence to sustain the charge connecting "the visceral rage," as Mr. D'Souza calls it, of the Muslims who carried out 9/11 to "the cultural left" that supposedly provoked it. Given the disparity between the seriousness of the charge and the thinness of the evidence, the book is a disgrace.





Mr. D'Souza acknowledges that he "is making a strong charge, one that no one has made before." One therefore expects that the book will bear the stamp of deep research to support its controversial thesis. On this count "The Enemy at Home" is a curious book. It purports to probe the deepest motives of Osama bin Laden and his followers. Yet the book lacks a bibliography and otherwise shows no evidence of familiarity with important accounts of the evolution of al Qaeda such as Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon's "Age of Sacred Terror" (2002), Richard Miniter's "Losing bin Laden" (2004) and, most recently, Lawrence Wright's "Looming Tower" (2006). Mr. D'Souza acknowledges the 9/11 Commission Report but does not mention its account (chapter two of the report) of the evolution of bin Laden's thought. Mr. D'Souza observes dismissively of the 9/11 Commission Report that "it does not tell us why [9/11] happened." None of these basic secondary sources support Mr. D'Souza's thesis. But a vision has been vouchsafed unto Mr. D'Souza.
Were Mr. D'Souza not a respected conservative commentator affiliated with one of the finest research institutes in the United States (the Hoover Institution), one could write his book off as unserious or worse. To be sure, as might be expected from a writer of Mr. D'Souza's caliber, parts of the book sparkle, such as Mr. D'Souza's exposition of the unholy alliance (in David Horowitz's words) between elements of the American left and radical Islam. Nevertheless, the book's insubstantial thesis and superficial research are not its only curiosities. In the four years he claims to have spent studying America and the West "through Muslim eyes," Mr. D'Souza appears to have gone native. Early in the book, for example, Mr. D'Souza writes: "No one can deny the horror of Palestinian and Chechen attacks on civilians, but these have to be measured against the state-sponsored terror on the other side: the bulldozing of Palestinian homes, the shooting of stone-throwing teenagers." I'm not sure that even State Department foreign service officers have yet gone quite as native as Mr. D'Souza.

Mr. D'Souza's reference to alleged "state-sponsored terror" by Israelis desperately seeking to defend themselves is of a piece with the blind eye he turns to the anti-Semitism that is ubiquitous in the Muslim world. Muslim anti-Semitism has turned "Mein Kampf" into a bestselling book, as Victor Davis Hanson has pointed out, under the title "Jihadi." Television in Muslim countries likewise features such rank anti-Semitic programming as the 41-part series based on "The Protocols of the Elders of Zion." Mr. D'Souza cannot even see bin Laden's anti-Semitism. "Yes," Mr. D'Souza asserts without any citation or support, "bin Laden opposes Israeli occupation because in his view it constitutes foreign rule over Muslims. But as bin Laden sees it, the deeper problem is a conspiracy on the part of Israel and America to take over the Muslim world." Mr. D'Souza omits any reference to the title of bin Laden's 1998 manifesto--"Declaration of the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and the Crusaders." According to Mr. D'Souza, Muslim radicals "could repudiate the entire Islamic tradition and argue that Christians and Jews are no different from atheists and deserve the same treatment." Daniel Pearl didn't get much of an argument on the subject of his religion before he was murdered by radical Islamists, but they appear to have "repudiated the entire Islamic tradition" as Mr. D'Souza understands it. Mr. D'Souza appears to be unfamiliar with the sermons denouncing Jews as apes and monkeys that regularly issue from fundamentalist mosques.





Mr. D'Souza's portrait of the Muslim world verges on apologetics. He makes a gratuitous gibe at Jewish tradition in his discussion of the severity of Islamic justice: "Islam is notorious for the harshness of some its punishments, such as cutting off the arms and legs of thieves, flogging adulterers and executing drug dealers. In this respect, one may say, with only a hint of irony, that Muslims are in the Old Testament tradition."
One wonders if Mr. D'Souza is making a lame stab at humor with his concession that the "Western effort to understand the Islamic world is never more difficult than when Muslims do things like blow themselves up while flying planes into buildings--actions no sane Westerner would even contemplate." Mr. D'Souza holds himself out as one who has made the effort to understand Islam even in the face of 9/11. He issues pronouncements that suggest he is not a reliable guide either to Islam or to 9/11 as in the false antithesis he draws to dispel conservative misunderstanding: "This may come as news to some conservatives, but Wahhabi Islam is not a breeding ground of Islamic radicalism. It is a breeding ground of Islamic obedience." Mr. D'Souza does not address the authoritative accounts that connect Wahhabi Islam with Islamic radicalism or to the perpetrators of 9/11.

Mr. D'Souza's parenthetical comment on the Danish cartoon controversy is as inexplicable as his characterization of Wahhabi Islam: "If it is within the parameters of acceptable satire to blame Muhammad for the pathologies of radical Islam, why is it not within those same bounds to blame [Martin Luther] King for the pathologies of inner-city black America"? Mr. D'Souza condemns as "churlish and exaggerated" the view that, "since pious Muslims are the ones launching terrorist attacks against Europe and America, Islam is to blame and Islam is the problem," just as he does the view that Islam fosters "the fanatical mind-set that leads to terrorism." He does not stop to explain why.

Indeed, Mr. D'Souza stigmatizes such views as "Islamophobic." It is a judgment he expresses in the lexicon of the high church of political correctness that Mr. D'Souza mocked in a previous life. Getting in the spirit, he asserts that conservatives "have to cease blaming Islam for the behavior of radical Muslims." (We must instead learn to blame "the cultural left" for the behavior of radical Muslims.) Mr. D'Souza also advises that "it is time for conservatives to retire the tiresome invocation of Turkey as a model for Islamic society." Why? "What Atatürk did for Turkey was anomalous and, in all candor, ridiculous." Such candor! Of all the Muslim countries discussed in The Enemy at Home, Turkey is the only one that earns Mr. D'Souza's frank contempt.

Mr. D'Souza seeks to "refute the notion that radical Islam can be understood as the latest incarnation of totalitarian movements the West has seen before, such as the Nazis and the communists." Mr. D'Souza draws the following distinctions. There is no intellectual lineage between the Western totalitarian movements and radical Islam. Moreover, "there is not even a similarity" between fascism and contemporary Islamic fundamentalism. Islamic radicalism has produced true believers "who are willing to give their lives to destroy America and the West," while Nazism and communism did not. Finally, the totalitarian movements were atheistic, but "the distinguishing feature of Islamic radicalism is Islamic." Eureka!

Compared with his discovery that the distinguishing feature of Islamic radicalism is Islamic, his assertion that the totalitarian movements of the 20th century lacked true believers comes as a surprise. When Auden referred to Hitler as a "psychopathic god" and Richard Crossman titled his famous anthology of essays on disillusionment with Communism "The God That Failed," well, they lacked the benefit of Mr. D'Souza's insight. Will somebody get this man a copy of "Darkness at Noon"?

28734  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Islam in Europe on: February 26, 2007, 08:15:53 AM
An Upside-Down World
The British far left makes common cause with Muslim reactionaries.

BY NICK COHEN
Sunday, February 25, 2007 12:01 a.m. EST
WSJ

LONDON--The other day Ken Livingstone, the mayor of my hometown of London, organized a conference on Islam and the West. It was a carefully rigged affair in which handpicked speaker after handpicked speaker stood up and announced that the democracies were to blame for the tidal wave of murder sweeping the world. To provide a spurious air of balance, the organizers invited a few people who dissented from the line of the Muslim Brotherhood and its British allies. Agnès Poirier, a French feminist, was one of them, but she pulled out because although there were no special facilities for Christians, Hindus and Jews, Mr. Livingstone had provided separate prayer rooms for Muslim men and Muslim women.

She wanted to know: Does Ken Livingstone's idea of multiculturalism acknowledge and condone segregation? It clearly does, but what made this vignette of ethnic politics in a European city worth noting is that commentators for the BBC and nearly every newspaper here describe Mr. Livingstone as one of the most left-wing politicians in British public life. Hardly any of them notice the weirdness of an apparent socialist pandering to a reactionary strain of Islam, pushing its arguments and accepting its dictates.

Mr. Livingstone's not alone. After suicide bombers massacred Londoners on July 7, 2005, leftish rather than conservative papers held British foreign policy responsible for the slaughters on the transport network. ("Blair's Bombs," ran the headline in my own leftish New Statesman.) In any university, you are more likely to hear campaigns for the rights of Muslim women derided by postmodernists than by crusty conservative dons. Our Stop the War coalition is an alliance of the white far left and the Islamist far right, and George Galloway, its leader, and the first allegedly "far left" member to be elected to the British Parliament in 50 years, is an admirer of Saddam Hussein and Hezbollah.

I could go on with specific examples, but the crucial point is the pervasive European attitude to the Iraq catastrophe. As al Qaeda, the Baathists and Shiite Islamists slaughter thousands, there is virtually no sense that their successes are our defeats. Iraqi socialists and trade unionists I know are close to despair. They turn for support to Europe, the home of liberalism, feminism and socialism, and find that rich democrats, liberals and feminists won't help them or even acknowledge their existence.





There were plenty of leftish people in the 20th century who excused communism, but they could at least say that communism was a left-wing idea. Now overwhelmingly and everywhere you find people who scream their heads off about the smallest sexist or racist remark, yet refuse to confront ultra-reactionary movements that explicitly reject every principle they profess to hold.
Why is the world upside down? In part, it is a measure of President Bush's failure that anti-Americanism has swept out of the intelligentsia and become mainstream in Britain. A country that was once the most pro-American in Western Europe now derides Tony Blair for sticking with the Atlantic alliance. But if Iraq has pummeled Mr. Blair's reputation, it has also shone a very harsh light on the British and European left. No one noticed it when the Berlin Wall came down, but the death of socialism gave people who called themselves "left wing" a paradoxical advantage. They no longer had a practical program they needed to defend and could go along with ultra-right movements that would once have been taboo. In moments of crisis, otherwise sane liberals will turn to these movements and be reassured by the professed leftism of the protest organizers that they are not making a nonsense of their beliefs.

If, that is, they have strong beliefs to abandon. In Europe and North America extreme versions of multiculturalism and identity politics have left a poisonous legacy. Far too many liberal-minded people think that is somehow culturally imperialist to criticize reactionary movements and ideas--as long as they aren't European or American reactionary movements. This delusion is everywhere. Until very recently our Labour government was allowing its dealings with Britain's Muslim minority to be controlled by an unelected group, the Muslim Council of Britain, which stood for everything social democrats were against. In their desperate attempts to ingratiate themselves, ministers gave its leader a knighthood--even though he had said that "death was too good" for Salman Rushdie, who happens to be a British citizen as well as a great novelist.

Beyond the contortions and betrayals of liberal and leftish thinking lies a simple emotion that I don't believe Americans take account of: an insidious fear that has produced the ideal conditions for appeasement. Radical Islam does worry Europeans but we are trying to prevent an explosion by going along with Islamist victimhood. We blame ourselves for the Islamist rage, in the hope that our admission of guilt will pacify our enemies. We are scared, but not scared enough to take a stand.





I hope conservative American readers come to Britain. But if you do, expect to find an upside-down world. People who call themselves liberals or leftists will argue with you, and when they have finished you may experience the strange realization that they have become far more reactionary than you have ever been.
Mr. Cohen, a columnist for the Observer and The New Statesman, is the author of "What's Left?: How Liberals Lost Their Way" (Fourth Estate, 2007).


WSJ
28735  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Science, Culture, & Humanities / Re: Legal issues on: February 26, 2007, 08:09:35 AM

GLOBAL VIEW

Who Needs Jacques Bauer?
The Napoleonic Code is more conducive to counterterrorism than the U.S. Constitution.

BY BRET STEPHENS
Sunday, February 25, 2007 12:01 a.m. EST

Twenty-nine defendants went on trial earlier this month in a Spanish courtroom for complicity in the March 11, 2004 Madrid train bombings that killed 191 commuters and injured another 1,800. Among the accused: Jamal Zougam, a 33-year-old Moroccan immigrant who once ran a cell-phone business. In June 2001, Spanish police raided Mr. Zougam's apartment, where they found jihadist literature and the telephone numbers of suspected terrorists. But the Spaniards judged the evidence insufficient to arrest or even wiretap him. Today, the Moroccan is believed to have furnished the cellphones through which the train bombs were detonated.

In raiding Mr. Zougam's apartment, the Spanish were acting on a request from French investigative magistrate and counterterrorism supremo Jean-Louis Bruguiere. Earlier, Mr. Bruguiere had also warned the Canadian government about a suspicious Algerian asylum-seeker named Ahmed Ressam, but the Canadians took no real action. On Dec. 14, 1999 Mr. Ressam--a k a the Millennium Bomber--was arrested by U.S. customs agents as he attempted to cross the border at Port Angeles, Wash., with nitroglycerin and timing devices concealed in his spare tire.

It would be reassuring to believe that somewhere in the ranks of the FBI or CIA America has a Jean-Louis Bruguiere of its own. But we probably don't, and not because we lack for domestic talent, investigative prowess, foreign connections, the will to fight terrorism or the forensic genius of a Gallic nose. What we lack is a system of laws that allows a man like Mr. Bruguiere to operate the way he does. Unless we're willing to trade in the Constitution for the Code Napoleon, we are not likely to get it.





Consider the powers granted to Mr. Bruguiere and his colleagues. Warrantless wiretaps? Not a problem under French law, as long as the Interior Ministry approves. Court-issued search warrants based on probable cause? Not needed to conduct a search. Hearsay evidence? Admissible in court. Habeas corpus? Suspects can be held and questioned by authorities for up to 96 hours without judicial supervision or the notification of third parties. Profiling? French officials commonly boast of having a "spy in every mosque." A wall of separation between intelligence and law enforcement agencies? France's domestic and foreign intelligence bureaus work hand-in-glove. Bail? Authorities can detain suspects in "investigative" detentions for up to a year. Mr. Bruguiere once held 138 suspects on terrorism-related charges. The courts eventually cleared 51 of the suspects--some of whom had spent four years in preventive detention--at their 1998 trial.
In the U.S., Mr. Bruguiere's activities would amount to one long and tangled violation of the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Amendments to the Constitution. And that's not counting the immense legal superstructures that successive Supreme Courts have built over and around the Bill of Rights. In France, however, Mr. Bruguiere, though not without his critics, is a folk hero, equally at home with governments of the left and right. The main point in his favor is that whatever it is he's doing, it works.

"Every single attempt to bomb France since 1995 has been stopped before execution," notes a former Interior Ministry senior official. "The French policy has been [to] make sure no terrorist hits at home. We know perfectly well that foreign-policy triangulation is not sufficient for that, [even if] it helps us go down a notch or two in the order of priority [jihadist] targets. So we've complemented our anti-U.S. foreign policy with ruthless domestic measures."

That's something that U.S. civil libertarians, who frequently argue that the Bush administration should follow the "European model" of treating terrorism as a law-enforcement issue instead of a military one, might usefully keep in mind. As lawyers David Rivkin and Lee Casey argue in the forthcoming issue of The National Interest, "the [Napoleonic] Civil Law system offers considerable advantages to the state in combating terrorism--especially in terms of investigative tools and a level of secrecy--that are simply unavailable in the ordinary Common Law criminal prosecution and trial, at least as governed by the United States Constitution."





Again, review the contrasts between American and European practices. Except in limited circumstances, the U.S. does not allow pretrial detentions. But according to figures compiled by the U.S. State Department, 38% of individuals held in Italian prisons in 2005 were awaiting trial or the outcome of an appeal, while Spanish law allows for pre-trial detentions that can last as long as four years for terrorism suspects. In the U.S., the Posse Comitatus Act forbids the use of the military in law-enforcement work, and paramilitary units are relatively rare. By contrast, most European countries deploy huge paramilitary forces: Italy's Carabinieri; France's Gendarmerie Nationale; Spain's Guardia Civil.
Even Britain, which shares America's common law traditions, has been forced by Irish and now Islamist terrorism to resort to administrative detentions, trials without jury (the famous Diplock courts) and ubiquitous public surveillance. Wiretapping is authorized by the Home Secretary--that is, a member of the government--rather than an independent judge. In the early days of the Northern Irish "troubles," the government of Edward Heath placed some 2,000 suspects, without charge, in internment camps. Ironically, it was the decision to treat terrorists as ordinary criminals that led to the famous hunger strikes of Bobby Sands and his IRA crew.

All this calls into question the seriousness, if not the sincerity, of European complaints that under the Bush administration the U.S. has become a serial human-rights violator. Europeans have every right to be proud of civil servants like Mr. Bruguiere and a legal tradition that in many ways has been remarkably successful against terrorism. But that is not the American way, nor can it be if we intend to be true to a constitutional order of checks and balances, judicial review and a high respect for the rights of the accused. When President Bush declared a war on terror after 9/11, it was because he had no other realistic legal alternative. And when the rest of us make invidious comparisons between Europe and America, we should keep our fundamental differences in mind. There is no European 82nd Airborne, and there is no American Jean-Louis Bruguiere.

Mr. Stephens is a member of The Wall Street Journal's editorial board. His column appears in the Journal Tuesdays.
28736  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / North on Moscow-Tehran Ties on: February 25, 2007, 11:16:04 PM
Moscow-Tehran Ties
Thursday , February 22, 2007

By Lt. Col. Oliver North
Washington, D.C. — “The lion and the bear are hunting the eagle.” That's how a refugee from Tehran's reigning ayatollahs put it when he called me this week about recent developments in his homeland. The lion to which my friend referred was on the coat of arms of nearly every Persian king for more than a thousand years. The bear, of course, is imperial Russia. And we're the bird.

It's an apt metaphor. Vladimir Putin, Moscow's current czar, is behaving like a bear awakened from hibernation — hungry and territorial. His recent words condemning U.S. foreign policy are mirrored by actions — both overt and covert — aimed at undermining U.S. national security. While eschewing animal symbols on their green, white and red flag, the Islamic radicals running Iran's theocracy act like lions on the prowl — dangerous to any prey. And while the simile is unlikely in nature — the lions and bears in my friend's parable have certainly teamed up to hunt the eagle. The only trouble with the allegory is that the United States is acting more like an ostrich than an eagle. A few examples:

Last week Mr. Putin told European leaders gathered in Munich "the United States has overstepped its national borders in every way." He claimed that the U.S. is forcing weaker nations to “acquire weapons of mass destruction" and defended Moscow's recent sale of $700 million worth of TOR-M1 anti-aircraft batteries to Iran. And in an effort to sound less like a bear and more like a Democrat running for the U.S. presidency, he declared that “wars, local and regional conflicts, have only grown in number" and charged America with taking "unilateral, illegitimate actions" in Iraq and elsewhere that "have not managed to resolve any problems, but made them worse."

This week, General Nikolai Solovtsov, commander of Russia's strategic missile forces, warned the U.S. against installing anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defenses in Eastern Europe. Construction is scheduled to begin on an ABM interceptor site in Poland and a radar array in the Czech Republic later this year. Both are components of a U.S.-NATO defense system to shield against a nuclear attack. In a clear-cut effort to intimidate the Czechs and the Poles to reconsider their participation, General Solovtsov suggested that Russia may abrogate the 1987 Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and observed that “[Russia's] strategic missile forces will be capable of targeting these facilities.”

While Moscow was busy dusting off its Cold War nuclear attack plans, Mohamed ElBaradei, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency — the United Nation's toothless “nuclear watchdog” — told the U.N. Security Council that Iran has increased production of weapons-grade uranium and decreased cooperation with the IAEA. ElBaradei told the Financial Times that Iran would be able to enrich uranium on an industrial scale within six months, having now developed the technology to do so.

The phrase “industrial scale” is diplo-speak for “sufficient to build nuclear weapons.” U.S. and British intelligence agencies believe that much of the technology being used by Iranian engineers to construct 3,000 gas centrifuges to enrich uranium is being obtained from Moscow. In response to this frightening report, Russia's ambassador to the U.N. once again threatened to veto any resolution tightening sanctions on Tehran.

For their part, the lions in Iran have clearly stated their perspective on nuclear arms. In December 2001, Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani publicly announced that a nuclear exchange “would not leave any thing in Israel but the same thing would just produce [minor] damages in the Muslim world." Last week, after rejecting an offer for multi-party talks on stopping the production of fissile nuclear material, Iran's mercurial President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad accused the U.S. of pursuing false peace initiatives while secretly plotting with Israel to "hit Islamic countries," presumably with nuclear weapons.

But Moscow and Tehran aren't just cooperating on weapons of mass destruction. Last week, U.S. and allied officials in Baghdad presented irrefutable evidence that Iran has been supplying advanced weaponry to anti-coalition forces and killing Americans — charges Mr. Ahmadinejad describes as "excuses to prolong the stay" of U.S. forces in Iraq.

On Wednesday, Iraqi terrorists downed another U.S. helicopter — the eighth in the last five weeks. A U.S. commander on the ground told me that “nearly new SA-14 and SA-16 man-portable surface-to-air missiles are now being used against us” in Iraq. Source of the weapons: Russia — sold to Iran and slipped across the porous border for delivery to Iranian supported terror cells operating inside Iraq. That's cooperation between the bear and the lion, indeed.

Meanwhile, there is no “Eagle-Eye” on this burgeoning Moscow-Tehran nexus of evil. Our mainstream media remains fixated on the never-ending Anna Nicole Smith soap opera. The State Department is furiously cranking out press releases on how Condi is going to convene yet another “Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process.” And the navel-gazers in Congress busy themselves by doing all things possible to damage the commander-in-chief — regardless of the consequences to our troops in harm's way.

Those who think none of this matters should consider the comments of Iran's “Supreme Spiritual Guide.” After meeting this week with Syrian President Bashar Assad, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei — the leading “Lion” in Tehran — said that "the position of [President George W.] Bush is so weak that even members of his own party criticize him." It's time for the Eagle to pull his head out of the sand.
28737  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Re: Tippy-tappy drills-- threat or menace? on: February 25, 2007, 12:06:00 PM
Woof Maija:

WOOF!

I like very much the insight and articulation of the Eyes-- what they scan for and what they see-- very good!  What you describe for us is Snake Range.  In the context of RCSFg (as versus blade) we speak of Protecting our Head, Hands, and Knees; Hiding our Intention;  and Masking our Initiation.

yip!
CD
28738  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Re: Crime Statistics on: February 25, 2007, 11:29:10 AM
CW:

By the way, , , Forgive me please a moment of shameless marketing, but the question you raise is directly addressed in the joint triple DVD that Gabe and I did:  "Die Less Often:  Intro to the Interface of Gun, Knife, and Empty Hand".    To flesh out the answer of my previous post, that brisk movement would be in what we call a "Kali Fence" structure from which one can pre-empt, intercept, or react.  The "Dogcatcher" is a low diagnostic quasi default reaction technique.

Yip!
CD
28739  DBMA Espanol / Espanol Discussion / Re: Venezuela Pol?tica on: February 25, 2007, 08:13:06 AM
Venezuela Spending on Arms Soars to World’s Top Ranks
NY Times
By SIMON ROMERO
Published: February 25, 2007

CARACAS, Venezuela, Feb. 24 — Venezuela’s arms spending has climbed to more than $4 billion in the past two years, transforming the nation into Latin America’s largest weapons buyer and placing it ahead of other major purchasers in international arms markets like Pakistan and Iran.

Venezuelan military and government officials here say the arms acquisitions, which include dozens of fighter jets and attack helicopters and 100,000 Kalashnikov assault rifles, are needed to circumvent a ban by the United States on sales of American weapons to the country.

They also argue that Venezuela must strengthen its defenses to counter potential military aggression from the United States.

“The United States has tried to paralyze our air power,” Gen. Alberto Muller Rojas, a member of President Hugo Chávez’s general staff, said in an interview, citing a recent effort by the Bush administration to prevent Venezuela from acquiring replacement parts for American F-16s bought in the 1980s. “We are feeling threatened and like any sovereign nation we are taking steps to strengthen our territorial defense,” he said.

This retooling of Venezuela’s military strategy, which includes creation of a large civilian reserve force and military assistance to regional allies like Bolivia, has been part of a steadily deteriorating political relationship with the United States.

The Bush administration has repeatedly denied that it has any plans to attack Venezuela, one of the largest sources of oil for the United States. But distrust of such statements persists here after the administration tacitly supported a coup that briefly removed Mr. Chávez from office in 2002.

Venezuela’s escalation of arms spending, up 12.5 percent in 2006, has brought harsh criticism from the Bush administration, which says the buildup is a potentially destabilizing problem in South America and is far more than what would be needed for domestic defense alone.

The spending has also touched off a fierce debate domestically about whether the country needs to be spending billions of dollars on imported weapons when poverty and a surging homicide rate remain glaring problems. Meanwhile, concern has increased among Venezuela’s neighbors that its arms purchases could upend regional power balances or lead to a new illicit trade in arms across Venezuela’s porous borders.

José Sarney, the former Brazilian president and a leading senator, caused a stir this week when he was quoted in the newspaper O Globo as describing Venezuela’s form of government as “military populism” and “a return to the 1950s,” when Venezuela was governed by the army strongman Marcos Pérez Jiménez.

“Venezuela is buying arms that are not a threat to the United States but which unbalance forces within the continent,” Mr. Sarney said. “We cannot let Venezuela become a military power.”

Still, officials in the administration of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil have been hesitant to publicly criticize Venezuela’s arms purchases.

The issue remains delicate after the Brazilian company Embraer lost a deal to sell military aircraft to Venezuela because the planes included American technology.

After turning unsuccessfully to Brazil and Spain for military aircraft, Venezuela has become one of the largest customers of Russia’s arms industry.

Since 2005, Venezuela has signed contracts with Russia for 24 Sukhoi fighter jets, 50 transport and attack helicopters, and 100,000 assault rifles. Venezuela also has plans to open Latin America’s first Kalashnikov factory, to produce the Russian-designed rifles in the city of Maracay.

A report in January by the Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence Agency pegged Venezuela’s arms purchases in the past two years at $4.3 billion, ahead of Pakistan’s $3 billion and Iran’s $1.7 billion in that period.

In a statement before the House Intelligence Committee, Lt. Gen. Michael D. Maples, the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, called attention to Mr. Chávez’s “agenda to neutralize U.S. influence throughout the hemisphere,” contrasting Mr. Chávez with the “reformist left” exemplified by President Michelle Bachelet of Chile.

============

Beyond Russia, Venezuela is also considering a venture with Iran, its closest ally outside Latin America, to build a remotely piloted patrol aircraft. Gen. Raúl Isaías Baduel, the Venezuelan defense minister, recently told reporters that the project to build 20 of the aircraft could be used to bolster border surveillance and combat environmental destruction in Venezuela. Venezuela is also strengthening military ties with Cuba, sending officers and soldiers there for training.

Supporters of the arms buildup contend that under Mr. Chávez, who has been in power for eight years, Venezuela has spent proportionately less on its military in relation to the size of its economy than the United States or than other South American countries like Chile and Colombia.

In 2004, the last year for which comparative data were immediately available and before Venezuela’s arms buildup intensified, overall defense spending by Venezuela, including arms contracts, was about $1.3 billion and accounted for about 1.4 percent of gross domestic product, compared with 4 percent in the United States and 3.8 percent in Colombia, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, which tracks military spending.

Doubts persist as to how powerful Venezuela’s armed forces have become in a regional context, even as they acquire new weapons. Military experts here say pilots in the air force still need training to start flying their new Russian fighters. And in terms of troop strength, Venezuela’s 34,000-soldier active-duty army still lags behind the armies of Argentina and Brazil, with about 41,400 and 200,000 members respectively, according to GlobalSecurity.org, a Web site that compiles data on military topics.

Pro-Chávez analysts also say the president is less adventurous in relation to military policy outside Venezuela than predecessors like Luis Herrera Campíns, who supported Argentina in the Falklands War in 1982 to detract attention from a decline in oil revenue and climbing inflation.

But critics of the arms purchases say they are being made with little participation from or discussion with the National Assembly, which recently allowed Mr. Chávez to govern by decree for 18 months.

Ricardo Sucre, a political scientist at the Central University of Venezuela, said that the lack of transparency of the weapons contracts had heightened concern that Mr. Chávez could be arming parts of the army, the new civilian reserve and partisans like the Frente Francisco de Miranda, a pro-Chávez political group, that would be loyal to him in the event of fractures within the armed forces.

General Muller Rojas, the president’s military adviser, said concern about the arms purchases was overblown, pointing to reports that Venezuela was considering an acquisition of nine diesel-powered submarines from Russia for about $3 billion.

He said the navy had “aspirations” for more submarines, but that no “concrete plan” for such a large contract had been developed.

“We simply have an interest in maintaining peace and stability,” General Muller Rojas said, describing the Caribbean as a crucial to its military influence. “We have no intent of using the Venezuelan armed forces to repress human rights.”
28740  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Iraq on: February 25, 2007, 08:06:24 AM
NY Times (so read with care)
Iraq Rebel Cleric Reins In Militia; Motives at Issue


By DAMIEN CAVE
Published: February 25, 2007
BAGHDAD, Feb. 24 — Moktada al-Sadr, the radical Shiite cleric and founder of the Mahdi Army militia, discovered recently that two of his commanders had created DVDs of their men killing Sunnis in Baghdad. Documents suggested that they had received money from Iran.


So he suspended them and stripped them of power, said two Mahdi leaders in Sadr City, the heart of Mr. Sadr’s support here in the capital.

But did he do so as part of his cooperation with the new security plan for Baghdad, which aims to quell the sectarian violence tormenting the city? Because his men had been disloyal, taking orders from Iran, whose support he values but whose control he fights? Or was it just for show — the act of an image-conscious leader who grasped the risk of graphic videos and wanted to stave off direct American action against him?

Mr. Sadr has been the great destabilizer in Iraq since 2003, wielding power on the streets and in the ruling Shiite bloc, thwarting the Americans and playing out at least a temporary alliance with Iran.

With the new security plan for Iraq under way, every question about Mr. Sadr’s motives touches on a different facet of Iraq’s complicated struggle.

He now finds himself under pressure from several sources. One is his popular Shiite base, which demands protection from devastating Sunni attacks. Another is Iran, with which he has had long but difficult ties. Then there are renegade factions of his own militia that resent his move into the political mainstream.

Finally, the Americans, who have accused Iran of supplying Shiite militias, including Mr. Sadr’s, with an especially deadly roadside bomb known as an explosively formed projectile, or E.F.P, which has killed an increasing number of American soldiers.

It is not clear whether the Americans will move directly against him. The United States has demanded that the government of Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki act forcefully against the Mahdi Army; Mr. Maliki, however, owes much of his political strength in the ruling Shiite coalition to Mr. Sadr’s backing.

For now, American and Iraqi officials say Mr. Sadr seems to be cooperating with the effort to pacify Baghdad, ordering his men not to fight even as American armored vehicles roll into Mahdi strongholds in eastern Baghdad. He seems to be cleaning house of fighters who could taint him by association with Iran or with death squad killings. His aides say he has called for a sectarian truce. “Moktada al-Sadr said to protect your clerics, protect your shrines and cooperate with the government,” said Hazim al-Araji, head of the Sadr office in western Baghdad. “So no actions have been taken.”

In perhaps his boldest move yet, Mr. Sadr has assisted the joint Iraqi-American campaign against parts of his militia, signaling whom to arrest and telling others to flee, said two Mahdi commanders and a Shiite politician in Baghdad. On his own, they said, Mr. Sadr has “frozen” more than 40 commanders, including about 20 with links to Iran.

The moves are part of an organizational overhaul, the Sadr aides said. Though Mr. Sadr’s whereabouts are unknown — the Americans say he is in Iran, which his aides and Iran dispute — a new Mahdi general for all of Baghdad has been appointed for the first time, they said. Mr. Sadr has also selected new commanders for east and west Baghdad.

Some of the Sadr aides and commanders who described Mr. Sadr’s recent moves during separate interviews in Najaf and Baghdad refused to give their names, saying they had not been authorized to speak and feared reprisals from current or former members of the militia.

They said the cleric allowed the arrests of members of his own militia, or suspended them himself, because evidence showed that they had not obeyed his orders and because he wanted to show Iran, American officials and his militia that he was a strong leader who must be respected and feared.

“He wants to prove to the people that he has full control of his militia,” said a 47-year-old Mahdi commander from Sadr City who referred to himself as Jabar Abdul al-Hahdi. “He wants to show he’s in charge.”

Mr. Sadr’s conflicted relationship with Iran mirrors Iraq’s. Each country’s majority Shiites revere the other’s clerics and visit the other’s religious shrines. But they speak different languages, are dominated by different ethnic groups, and fought each other in a long war in the 1980s.

Mr. Sadr’s father, Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, became one of Iraq’s most popular Shiite clerics largely because he set himself up as the rebel alternative to Iran’s religious leadership, focusing on poor, oppressed Iraqis, not just theological debate. His mix of social and religious resistance led Saddam Hussein to order his assassination in 1999.

Moktada al-Sadr rose to prominence after the American invasion in 2003 with anti-American speeches and echoes of his father’s populism. But he was young, not yet 30, and less educated than his clerical rivals. So even as he railed against Iranian meddling, he sought money and support from Iran’s top clerics, meeting with Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme religious leader, in June 2003. It was a dramatic reversal from family tradition.

Less than a year later, he led a revolt against American troops in Najaf, and again Iran played the role of patron. On the 11th day of the revolt, with Mr. Sadr under siege, an Iranian delegation arrived in Iraq to mediate. The Iranians were joined by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Iraq’s most revered Shiite cleric, who called for Shiite unity and calm.

Mr. Sadr eventually agreed to stop fighting and join the political process. The Americans let him.

His popularity rose with the speed of a pop star’s, and the Mahdi Army grew like a fan club, from a few hundred young men to thousands — including some who proved hard to control.

=======================

Page 2 of 2)



Since then, according to some Shiite officials, Iran has funneled support to his organization. What it receives, how much and how consistently, remain a mystery, but some Shiite leaders say Mr. Sadr collects less from Iran than does a rival Shiite party: the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, which was founded in Iran by Iraqi exiles in 1984.


Iran generally supports many groups simultaneously, including some Sunni ones, so that it can benefit from any eventuality, said Sami al-Askari, a Shiite member of Parliament who works closely with Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki.

“Iran intervenes in many ways, with many methods,” Mr. Askari said.

In the case of the Mahdi Army, he said, Iran has recognized its diffuse nature, sprinkling support at high and low levels. Some support comes through ties to Hezbollah, the Shiite militia in Lebanon that also receives Iranian support. Beirut now has a Sadr office, and Mahdi commanders say they have been sending fighters to Hezbollah at least since last summer, when Hezbollah battled Israel.

Iran also provides institutional assistance to Iraq, mainly to the Health Ministry, which is run by Mr. Sadr’s political bloc. Three days after bombs killed more than 140 people in Sadr City last fall, for example, 50 Iraqi ambulances carried some of the wounded to the Iranian border. They were transferred to Iranian ambulances and taken to Iranian hospitals, with much of the cost covered by organizations in Iran.

Qasim Allawi, a spokesman for the Health Ministry who described the process, said another 25 wounded men and women from the recent Sadriya market bombing in Baghdad were to head to Iran any day.

Iran’s more potent forms of aid are direct — and some goes not to Mr. Sadr, but to underlings.

“Sometimes the aid comes for the leadership, and they get to decide where it goes,” Mr. Askari said. “Sometimes it goes to the local leadership, and this encourages them to rebel.”

“Iran puts Moktada al-Sadr between two pressing sides,” he said. “On one hand, they are helping him and they have the ability to take that away. At the same time, they’re undermining him by helping people below him.”

According to Sadr aides and Mahdi commanders, Mr. Sadr’s recent purges aim to put Iran on notice that he is in charge and independent. They said he also wanted to remind members of his militia that he would use every available tool, including Iraqi and American troops, to maintain control of the militia, the source of any political power he wields.

The goal is a top-down, tightly managed operation.

“We’re going to end the decentralized system that we had before,” said one of the aides in Najaf.

If Mr. Sadr consolidates power over his unruly militia, he could be held more responsible for the actions of its members. Until now, American and Iraqi efforts against the Mahdi Army have focused on so-called rogue elements.

The 30 members of Parliament associated with the Sadr bloc have not been arrested, keeping Mr. Sadr’s legitimate influence intact. At the same time, American, Iraqi and British officials are engaged in classified negotiations with his envoys over how to address the Mahdi Army and its Sadr City stronghold, the neighborhood named for Mr. Sadr’s father.

When asked about the talks, Maj. Gen. William B. Caldwell IV, the top military spokesman in Iraq, said the meetings represented a reasonable and appropriate attempt to avoid unnecessary bloodshed.

“Anytime you can find a political solution instead of a military solution,” he said, “it’s always better.”

But can Mr. Sadr deliver what the Americans want? Are his efforts adequate? Some American military officers remain skeptical.

“You know what their intent is,” said Maj. Kevin Hosier, an intelligence officer with the Third Stryker Brigade Combat Team, as his unit prepared for sweeps through predominantly Shiite areas near Sadr City this month. “They want Baghdad. They want to make Baghdad a Shia city.”

Peter Harling, a senior analyst with the International Crisis Group, a research organization, who wrote a thorough profile of Mr. Sadr last summer, said the impact of the Mahdi purges and command restructuring would likely be short-lived.

“He has been excommunicating some of his key commanders, that’s a fact, but he has just put them in the corner,” Mr. Harling said, relying on interviews with several Mahdi commanders cited in his July profile. “Many of them, after Sadr really accused them in the harshest terms, actually came back in the movement and carried on with their careers. All this is kind of temporary.”

According to Mr. Harling, Mr. Sadr has little choice but to trim at the edges of his organization. His hold on power remains tenuous, dependent on a loose association of clients all over the country who he knows could turn on him at any moment.

“He remains in a strong position as a leader only as long as he is useful to all these smaller leaders,” Mr. Harling said. “He rules by consensus.”

Vali Nasr, a professor of national security affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School and author of “The Shia Revival,” says Mr. Sadr should be viewed as a politician who was trying to preserve his power. Poor Shiites have made him an Iraqi celebrity, a national symbol whose bearded visage graces everything from wristwatches to alarm clocks and large posters. Above all else, he will be loyal to them, Mr. Nasr said.

“Since the Samarra bombing last year, Moktada has received a lot of pressure to be tougher on the Sunnis,” he said, referring to the explosion in the northern city of Samarra last February that destroyed one of Shiite Islam’s holiest shrines. “He’s found that the tougher he’s been, the more his popularity has gone up.”

In the long run, Mr. Nasr said, “he’s not very concerned with what the Americans think of him. What matters to him is what the Shiites think.”

Reporting was contributed by Hosham Hussein, Richard A. Oppel Jr., Ali Adeeb, Khalid al-Ansary and Wisam A. Habeeb, in Baghdad, and an Iraqi employee of The New York Times in Najaf.
28741  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Re: Tippy-tappy drills-- threat or menace? on: February 25, 2007, 07:50:27 AM
Woof All:

Karsk's ruminations on flow during TT drills and coming into harmony with the opponent reminded me of something I wrote some years ago:

BEGIN
The Days Before A Fight by Guro Crafty
 
The days before the fight are always a powerful crucible. I have a non-martial art teacher who when someone seeks to leave a situation that makes them uncomfortable says, "Whatever you do, keep on being here in this moment." I may not have the quote exactly right, but I hope I have the gist of it.

Scientist Konrad Lorenz's book "Behind the Mirror" addresses the evolutionary biology of consciousness. There is a passage in the book wherein he describes how a cat at play will seamlessly string together unrelated behaviors/movements from stalking prey, fighting a rival, bluffing a predator, courtship, killing prey etc. He then points out that the instant that the cat is stressed (e.g. the appearance of a rival) this ability disappears.

Many martial arts discuss how there are different mindsets/qualities with which one can defend/fight. Often the names are a bit poetic; Fire, Water, Wind, Rock, Earth, etc. but the point is made that the more realized the fighter is, the better his ability to fluidly shift between them. In the intense adrenal state of a fight, this can be a very good trick to actually do, yet as Lorenz's point about the cat makes clear, the state of Play is the state where this happens best. ("What Is Play?" in evolutionary biological terms is an interesting question in its own right.) Thus, the best fight is where the fight is play. Thus in Dog Brothers Martial Arts we say

"Do not have a Way as you Play. Fight the Way you Play. Let your Fight be Play" (c)

The Learning that takes place in the adrenal state is some of the deepest and highest that there is. (The adrenal state of course can be triggered by many things, not only immediate physical danger; criticism by loved ones, humiliation, etc etc.) The greater the adrenal state, the profounder the Learning. The greater the state of Play, the better the result. The more that one can move in both directions simultaneously, the better. "The greater the dichotomy, the profounder the transformation. Higher consciousness through harder contact." (c)

Woof!
Guro Crafty
http://dogbrothers.com/article_info.php?articles_id=7
END

The mental fluidity referred to in this piece also refers to ranges and the various skill sets developed in TT drills.  I suspect some people are disappointed by fighting not looking like TT drills-- I am reminded by Hot Dog (the Jester of the Hermosa Clan of the DBs) faux belligerent riff about "Don't make me hu-bud you!"  OF COURSE fighting does not look like the drills!  The idea is that the drills produce good results in the fluidity of the fight.  In our DVD "DB Gathering of the Pack"  there is a very nice staff fight between two good men, but as I comment in the voice over, one has a very clear advantage and he is the one of the two who had sombrada training.  With excellent fighting spirit and understanding and closing skills, this man simply lights up the other man every time the fight comes to media range with superior skills with his weapon.  THIS is what good sombrada training is intended to produce!  Paraphrasing what Cranewing noted above, doing sombrada well as most people do it does not develop fighting spirit, nor does it teach closing soundly to media against a 250 pound man swinging a staff at you, but if you do have fighting spirit and understanding and you have the ability to close to media THEN the skills cultivated in sombrada manifest.

TAC,
CD
28742  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Re: Crime Statistics on: February 25, 2007, 07:26:24 AM
Start moving briskly as necessary to keep distance, possibly while verbalizing "Keep your distance" or something like that.  If he keeps coming you know you have a problem.
28743  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Re: Tippy-tappy drills-- threat or menace? on: February 24, 2007, 08:36:40 PM
Woof Maija:

Thank you for sharing a very nice tidbit.

TAC,
CD

28744  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Re: Unity of spirit on: February 24, 2007, 08:33:46 PM
Woof Jeff:

Tail wags for your very kind words.

What we have here I attribute to three things:  First, we seek truth.  Second, "Friends at the end of the day".  Third, my Pretty Kitty, DBMA's VP in Charge of Reality.

The Adventure continues,
Crafty Dog
28745  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Thailand on: February 24, 2007, 08:22:14 PM
http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/thais-sense-of-self-th...ullpage#contentSwap1

Thais' sense of self threatened by insurgency

Tom Allard National Security Editor
February 24, 2007

Brutality … a man carries a bar girl injured in a bombing in Yala province last Sunday.
Photo: AFP

BEHEADINGS, mutilated Buddhist monks, assassinations of secular teachers, mass-casualty attacks - the Islamist insurgency raging in Thailand's south is getting more barbaric and effective with each passing month.

That is the assessment of terrorism analysts and Thai Government advisers after a spate of co-ordinated and deadly bombings this week, and warnings of more to come, including in Bangkok.

Even more worrying is the possibility of attacks on tourist resorts where Westerners, including thousands of Australians, flock.

"The brutality is amazing," said Zachary Abuza, a US terrorism expert who specialises in a conflict that has simmered for decades. "For the previous generation, these acts would have been considered unseemly. No one would have done things like hacking apart monks, blowing them up when they are collecting their alms, targeting women and children."

Thailand's Islamic minority, centred on four provinces abutting Malaysia, has long complained of mistreatment. But the ferocity of the insurgency has stunned the Government, with more than 2000 people killed since 2004.

There have been about 30 beheadings, and 60 more botched attempts. More than 60 teachers have died, along with hundreds of bystanders, police and soldiers.

"This is new to the Thai people," said Panitan Wattanayagorn, an academic who advises the Prime Minister, Surayud Chulanont. "It's been quite a shock. Thais are learning about cultural differences. They assumed everyone was Thai, had the Thai national identity. Apparently, not so."

The bombs are becoming larger and more sophisticated, and the ideology underpinning the attacks more virulent.

Dr Abuza said: "It's more Islamist than it's ever been … [but] they want separate communities, from private Islamic schools to their own courts. They are convincing women not to go to hospital to give birth."

The insurgency has received scant attention in the West, which is puzzling given the scale of the violence and Thailand's popularity as a tourist destination.

For Thailand's military-backed government, deposing Thaksin Shinawatra in September was justified, at least in part, by his inability to come to grips with the insurgency. It was Mr Thaksin who reacted with indifference when mosques were attacked and when 78 unarmed protesters died of asphyxiation in the back of army trucks. This infuriated Thai Muslims and prompted a surge of recruits.

However, a public apology, the dropping of charges against protesters, even a willingness to introduce a degree of Islamic law in the region have failed to gain the Government any kudos.

The Thai authorities do not even know who their enemy is, Dr Abuza says. The insurgents operate in largely autonomous cells, never stating their goals or accepting responsibility for attacks.

Jemaah Islamiah and other al-Qaeda-affiliated groups have been in contact with the insurgency - the JI leader Hambali was arrested in Thailand - but the consensus is that it remains self-directed.

Nevertheless, it has adopted many techniques of the global jihadist movement, from simultaneous bomb attacks, to the emphasis on civilian targets. Like Jemaah Islamiah, it also abhors the West, in particular the nightclubs, bars and others "dens of sin" that are so common in Bangkok and the tourist towns.

Tourism operators, who are enjoying a revival in business following the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami, are terrified, Professor Panitan said. Muslims in Phuket "watch anyone who comes up from the south very closely. It's worked to date, but how long will it hold?" Dr Abuza says information from Phuket's Muslim minority led to the arrests of a group of suspected insurgents in November.

For now, Dr Abuza believes the insurgents will stay away from tourist centres. "It would be easy enough [to attack tourists]. But I don't think they have to yet, because they are winning. The change of strategy comes when you are losing.

"If they were backed into a corner, I don't think they would hesitate for a second."
28746  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Politically (In)correct on: February 24, 2007, 11:54:04 AM
Well, because I didn't see anything from Buzwardo supporting censorship-- indeed the opening sentence of his posted piece was "Remember when the Right had a near-monopoly on censorship?"

Hamas & Hezbollah go quite a bit further than your replacement of "anti-semitism" with "politically incorrect".  They want to wipe out the Jews of Israel-- which sounds rather anti-semitic to me.

Also, you interject a separate albeit related point when you talk about defunding the KKK-- we are talking here about free speech.

Lastly, I reject the inflation of homosexuality to the same status as race.  I reject the notion that it is/should be a thought crime to disapprove of homosexuality. 

28747  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Re: Tippy-tappy drills-- threat or menace? on: February 24, 2007, 08:55:28 AM
Woof All:

All:  I hope I don't embarass Maija, but she can be seen in our promo clip for "The Grandfathers Speak Vol 2: Maestro Sonny Umpad".  I was very impressed by her movement and bilateralism when she performed for Maestro Sonny when I was up in Oakland.

Using her point about ranges as a starting point:

In DBMA we have 7 Ranges:

Snake: Pre-contact
Weapon Range:  Where the fighters' bubbles collide.  This range's importance varies according to the weapons involved. With small knives, it is not important but with staffs it is.
Largo:  Known to all here
Medio: Known to all here
Corto: Known to all here
Clinch:  Self-explanatory
Ground: Self-explanatory

In ritual fighting, the fight usually starts in Snake Range and a lot of people experience a lot of cognitive dissonance right away.  They may have lots of experience training medio and corto range drills, but when confronted by someone moving around and whizzing a stick or two at them they realize they have absolutely no idea how to get to where they have skills without getting clocked.

Around this point some of them begin muttering about tippy tappy drills, when the real issue IMHO is that they lack the science of entering and striking and/or the science of entering and closing.  In DBMA this is where we use the concept of the Triangle from the Third Dimension, Attacking Blocks, Snaggletooth Variations, Los Triques and Dos Triques, etc.  These are the portals into the dimension where the skills cultivated in medio and corto range isolation drills are expressed.  From the little I've seen of Maestro Sonny this is where he used the pendulum step-- Maija?

Cranewings point is sound, people may do the medio and corto training without understanding but the answer for me is to supply the missing understanding, not delete the medio and corto training.

TAC,
CD

28748  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Translation of AQ strategy book on: February 24, 2007, 07:43:03 AM
http://www.ctc.usma.edu/naji.asp

Translation of Major al-Qaeda Book that Outlines Its Plan for Defeating U.S. and Its Allies

The genre of “strategic studies”—the name given by jihadi ideologues to their books and articles on the strengths and weakness of the jihadi movement and those of its enemies—had, until recently, been neglected by Western governments and analysts involved with counterterrorism. In 2004, Hegghammer and Lia called attention to the genre (which they dubbed “jihadi strategic studies”) and usefully commented on its features (Hegghammer and Lia, SCT, 2004). More recently, Brachman and McCants demonstrated how this genre can be used to identify and exploit the weaknesses of the jihadi movement (Brachman and McCants, SCT, 2006—a draft is available online). Despite this growing attention, a full translation of one of these books has not been publicly available.

One reason for the neglect of works in this genre is that they are written in Arabic and they are often quite lengthy. Moreover, they are much more difficult to translate than the usual diatribes by Bin Ladin and other prominent jihadi leaders. Unlike the latter, which are meant for popular consumption, jihadi strategic texts require translators to have a familiarity with Western strategic studies (from which they draw heavily), medieval Islamic history and theology, and contemporary developments in the jihadi movement. The reward for overcoming these obstacles is immeasurable—these works are brilliant (if diabolical) studies of global insurgency written by its most intellectually-gifted participants. While it is still an open question as to whether these texts guide the actions of foot soldiers, they are certainly read by the jihadi intelligentsia and they remain the best source for understanding the nature of the jihadi movement.

In recognition of their value, the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard commissioned William McCants in 2005 to translate one of the most recent and significant of these works, Abu Bakr Naji’s Management of Savagery (some of its salient features are summarized in the Brachman and McCants article cited above). The Olin Institute, in collaboration with West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center, is making this translation available online for free. Writing as a high-level insider, Naji explains how al-Qaeda plans to defeat the U.S. and its allies in the Middle East, establish sanctuaries for Jihadis, correct organizational problems, and create better propaganda. It is essential reading for anyone who wants to understand the strategic thinking of al-Qaeda’s leadership and the future of the jihadi movement.

Download "Stealing al-Qa`ida's Playbook"

The translation is available at the Olin Institute website (www.wcfia.harvard.edu/olin/) and the Combating Terrorism Center website (www.ctc.usma.edu).
28749  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: The Middle East War on: February 24, 2007, 07:27:33 AM

NY Times 2/23/07

ABU DHABI, United Arab Emirates, Feb. 22 - As fears grow over the escalating
confrontation between Iran and the West, Arab states across the Persian Gulf
have begun a rare show of muscle flexing, publicly advertising a shopping
spree for new weapons and openly discussing their security concerns.


Iran Expanding Nuclear Effort, Agency Reports (February 23, 2007)

Typically secretive, the gulf nations have long planned upgrades to their
armed forces, but now are speaking openly about them. American military
officials say the countries, normally prone to squabbling, have also
increased their military cooperation and opened lines of communication to
the American military here.

Patriot missile batteries capable of striking down ballistic missiles have
been readied in several gulf countries, including Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and
Qatar, analysts say, and increasingly, the states have sought to emphasize
their unanimity against Iran's nuclear ambitions.

"There has always been an acknowledgment of the threat in the region, but
the volume of the debate has now risen," said one United Arab Emirates
official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized
to speak on the subject. "Now the message is there's a dialogue going on
with Iran, but that doesn't mean I don't intend to defend myself."

The Persian Gulf monarchies and sheikdoms, mostly small and vulnerable, have
long relied on the United States to protect them. The United States Fifth
Fleet is based in Bahrain; the United States Central Command is based in
nearby Qatar; and the Navy has long relied on docking facilities in the
United Arab Emirates, which has one of the region's deepest water ports at
Jebel Ali.

The United States, too, has begun a significant expansion of forces in the
gulf, with a second United States aircraft carrier battle group led by the
John C. Stennis now in the Persian Gulf and with minesweeping ships.

The expansion has helped calm fears among gulf governments that the United
States could pull out of the region in the future, even as it has raised
concerns about a potential American confrontation with Iran, accidental or
intentional.

As tensions with Iran rise, many gulf countries have come to see themselves
as the likely first targets of an Iranian attack. Some have grown more
concerned that the United States may be overstretched militarily, many
analysts say, while almost all the monarchies, flush with cash as a result
of high oil prices, have sought to build a military deterrent of their own.

"The message is first, 'U.S., stay involved here,' and second, 'Iran, we
will maintain a technological edge no matter what,' " said Emile el-Hokayem,
research fellow at the Henry L. Stimson Center, a research center based in
Washington. "They are trying to reinforce the credibility of the threat of
force."

Military officials from throughout the region descended this week on the
Idex military trade fair, a semiannual event that has become the region's
largest arms market, drawing nearly 900 weapons makers from around the
world. They came ready to update their military capacities and air and naval
defenses. They also came armed with a veiled message of resolve.

"We believe there is a need for power to protect peace, and strong people
with the capability to respond are the real protectors of peace," said Sheik
Khalifa bin Zayed al-Nahyan, the president of the United Arab Emirates and
ruler of the emirate of Abu Dhabi, at the exposition. "That is why we are
keen to maintain the efficiency of our armed forces."

The Persian Gulf has been a lucrative market for arms. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait
and Oman spend up to 10 percent of their gross domestic product on the
military, amounting to nearly $21 billion, $4 billion and $2.7 billion,
respectively, estimates John Kenkel, senior director of Jane's Strategic
Advisory Services.

If they follow through on the deals announced recently, it is estimated that
countries like the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Oman and Saudi Arabia will
spend up to $60 billion this year. The biggest buyer in 2006, according to
the defense industry journal Defense News, was Saudi Arabia, which has
agreed to buy 72 Eurofighter Typhoon combat jets for $11 billion. It also
has a $400 million deal to upgrade 12 Apache AH-64A helicopters to the
Longbow standard. The kingdom also reportedly plans to acquire cruise
missiles, attack helicopters and tanks, all for a total of $50 billion.

=============



Arab States, Wary of Iran, Add to Their Arsenals but Still Lean on the U.S.




Published: February 23, 2007
(Page 2 of 2)



Kuwait reportedly bought 24 Apache Longbow helicopters, while the United
Arab Emirates has continued to take delivery of 80 F-16 Block 60 fighters,
with plans to buy air tankers, missile defense batteries and airborne early
warning systems. Bahrain ordered nine UH-60M Black Hawk helicopters in an
estimated $252 million deal, while Oman reportedly bought 30 antitank rocket
launchers in a $48 million purchase and is planning a naval overhaul.


"It is a message to enemies that 'We are taking defense seriously,' " Mr.
Kenkel said, emphasizing that the new arms were for deterrence.

"If the U.S. ever does pull back, these countries in the gulf have realized,
they may have to fend for themselves," Mr. Kenkel said. "As the Boy Scouts
say, always be prepared."

The most marked change is in the public nature of the acquisitions, which
previously would have been kept secret, many analysts here said, itself a
form of deterrence.

"They have been doing these kinds of purchases since the '90s," said Marwan
Lahoud, chief executive of the European missile maker MBDA. "What has
changed is they are stating it publicly. The other side is making
pronouncements so they have to as well," he said, speaking of Iran's recent
announcements about its weapons capacity.

Senior United States military officials say gulf countries have become more
nervous as Iran has conducted naval maneuvers, especially near the Straits
of Hormuz, the main artery through which two-fifths of the world's oil
reaches markets.

"A year ago you could have characterized the interaction with the Iranians
as professional," said Vice Adm. Patrick Walsh, departing commander of the
Fifth Fleet. "What's different today has been the number and amount of
exercises and the proximity of those exercises to the Straits of Hormuz
themselves."

The exercises were among the reasons for the expansion of Navy forces in the
region, he said, but have also raised alarm about the potential for
accidents to lead to an unintended war.

Admiral Walsh said that American warships remained in international waters,
and that Iranian and American ships kept close watch on one another. Some
critics of the Bush administration have alleged that the increased military
presence in the gulf risks igniting a conflict.

Admiral Walsh said the increased American presence was aimed at o reassuring
gulf states that the United States remained committed to their security, but
also welcomed their efforts to build deterrence.

"We have found that we need to be physically present to prevent such armed
behavior," he said of the Iranian maneuvers. "We're mindful we're not giving
up any water, but also being careful not to take a provocative stance."
28750  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Islam in America and the rest of the western hemisphere on: February 24, 2007, 06:48:10 AM


From Daniel Pipes http://www.danielpipes.org/blog/679#meeting

Dear Reader:

A further decision is due in the controversy over taxi drivers at the Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport who refuse to transport passengers visibly carrying alcohol. The Metropolitan Airports Commission, which has jurisdiction over the drivers, invites the public's opinion; and I urge your involvement.

MAC has sent a notice (which I have posted in full on my website, at http://www.danielpipes.org/blog/679#meeting) that recounts developments since its decision in October 2006 to deny requests by drivers to distinguish between Shar'i-compliant and -noncompliant taxis. MAC writes:

For the past several months, the Metropolitan Airports Commission has worked with airport taxi industry representatives and with leaders from the Muslim American Society and the Somali Justice Advocacy League. The goal was to find a solution acceptable to everyone and transparent to the customer seeking airport taxi service. Unfortunately, those discussions have not resulted in a workable, voluntary, consensus-based solution. As a result, the Airports Commission is proposing stricter penalties for refusal of service: a 30-day suspension of a driver's airport taxi license for the first instance, and license revocation for a second instance.

Bravo to MAC. It is important that the drivers be sent a strong signal that they must obey the regulations. Were they allowed to boycott travelers with alcohol, I pointed out in "Don't Bring That Booze into My Taxi," that would intrude Islamic law "into a mundane commercial transaction in Minnesota" and could lead to the transport system as a whole being divided "between those Islamically observant and those not so."

I appealed to readers in October to urge MAC to impose penalties on those who insist on imposing Shar'i norms in Minnesota and to send a message that this practice is unacceptable. The barrage of e-mails and phone calls had the hoped-for effect. According to airport spokesman Patrick Hogan back then, "we've heard from Australia and England. It's really touched a nerve among a lot of people. The backlash, frankly, has been overwhelming. People are overwhelmingly against any kind of cultural accommodation."

Again now, I appeal to all those opposed to application of the Shari'a in the United States to make their views heard in Minnesota. You can do this in either of two ways.

In writing: MAC is asking for "input from the public" through Friday, March 2, 2007, before it makes a decision on the proposed increase in penalties. Written comments should be addressed to:

Landside Operations Department
Metropolitan Airports Commission
MSP International Airport/Lindbergh Terminal
4300 Glumack Drive
Suite LT-3129B
Saint Paul, MN 55111-3010.

In person: For those living in the Twin Cities area, MAC will hold a public hearing on Tuesday, February 27, 2007, at 2 p.m., to solicit testimony from the public via verbal or written testimony. The location will be at:

Ramada Mall of America (formerly, the Thunderbird Hotel)
2300 East American Boulevard
Bloomington, Minnesota

I thank you in advance.

Yours sincerely,

Daniel Pipes


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