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29551  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Re: Unarmed Knife Defense on: August 25, 2006, 09:45:52 AM
http://www.torontosun.com/News/Toron...75324-sun.html

Fri, August 25, 2006

'I knew the knife was in me'


Teen stabbing victim writes an open letter to the judge who allowed his assailant to return to live across the street

By MIKE STROBEL
(Fred Thornhill, Sun)

I wrote yesterday of the unprovoked and nearly fatal stabbing of Markham teen Nicolas Lastoria.
Neighbour Peter Galanos, 32, was found "not criminally responsible" by Justice William Gorewich last week and sent home. Take your paranoia-schizophrenia meds, the man was told.
This, little more than three months after the attack.
Neither York Regional cops nor Nicolas' mom, paramedic Elsa Ferraro, 45, were forewarned that a ruling was nigh.
"There was some kind of breakdown," says police Chief Armand LaBarge, who is trying to wrest a remedy from the Crown's office.

"The matter was disposed of without any contact with York Regional Police," LaBarge tells me.
"We're extremely concerned about this individual being back in the community, in immediate proximity to the victim."
Galanos, by the by, was "known to police," as they say, before the knifing.
The sudden ruling also deprived young Nicolas of his right to submit a victim's impact statement to court.
So, I meet him at his mom's near McCowan and Hwy. 7 and we sit at a laptop for an hour.
Over to you, Nicolas ...
---
Dear Justice Gorewich:

I am writing this at my mom's kitchen table, across the street from the man who stabbed me.
I just turned 16. I was 15 when I was attacked while I was working on my pocket bike (that's a miniature motorcycle) in our garage.
When Peter Galanos came home last week, I saw him once, getting into his car, before my mom sent me out of town to stay with my dad.
I am going back there after I write this.
I would like to tell you how my life and my family have been affected since April 22 around 1:30 in the afternoon.
You probably know most of what happened. I could show you the five scars on my back, side and arm.
He never said a single word, just crossed the street and started stabbing.
I was confused and a little pissed off. I didn't know what was happening.
The thing I remember most was looking down once and seeing the knife go into my ribs.
I can't really explain to you what that was like. It didn't really hurt, but I knew the knife was in me.
I got away and ran up the street for help. I didn't want him to follow me into my house. My mom and two sisters were inside.
The air from my lung was leaking out of one of the holes from the knife.

I NEARLY DIED

I don't remember much about the first two days in hospital, but I know I nearly died and for two months after, I could hear my lung gurgling when I breathed.
Now it has stopped doing that. But I am still angry and afraid.
It's fear of not knowing what might come across the street and to the door.
A policeman came and told us he was back. I was so angry I paced the house. I didn't want to leave. I was afraid for my mother and sisters, but my mom said I had to go away for now. I will have to come back before school starts.
She's still the same mom, but much more anxious.
My sisters, too.
My mother is a paramedic and she says my lung is weak and more likely to collapse again, but she is mostly worried about emotional scars.
I have started going to counselling with a psychologist she knows through work.
My friends all think it's crazy that Peter is home so soon.
I think it was the wrong decision. Peter should be the one to go away. I don't want to move.
I like this house and this area and I want to stay at the same school. I'm going into Grade 11.
Before this, I used to think no one would hurt me.
I'm not the same kid I was.
Now, in my mind, I don't trust anyone. I get suspicious of people I meet walking and think of how I will defend myself if I have to.
I don't think we should have to live like this.

Sincerely,
Nicolas Lastoria

P.S. I want my jeans and my shoes back from that day. They took them for evidence. They were my favourite jeans and shoes. They probably still have blood all over them, but I want them back.
===============================================================

http://www.guardian.co.uk/crime/arti...857941,00.html

Man questioned after knife attack on three teenage girls

Steven Morris
Friday August 25, 2006
The Guardian


Police were last night questioning a man over a "sustained and frenzied attack" in which three teenage girls were repeatedly stabbed with a long-bladed knife after being followed off a bus after an argument in Bridport, Dorset.
One of the girls, Charlotte Teague, 14, suffered "life-threatening" wounds to her chest and stomach and was treated in intensive care.
Her friend, Sophie Hyne, 15, was stabbed in the face and upper body, while Kirsty Edwards, 17, was wounded in her back and stomach. The three were later said to be stable in the Dorset County hospital in Dorchester.

The girls had spent Wednesday in Weymouth before taking the bus back to Bridport. Charlotte and Sophie live in Bridport, and Kirsty is from Staffordshire.
It is thought that they were laughing and joking during the journey and were told to shut up by a man who was sitting in front of them.
Chief Inspector Nick Maton said: "The bus arrived in Bridport shortly before 6pm and the three girls left the bus.
"What happened next can only be described as a sustained and frenzied attack on three friends who received serious stab wounds. The girls felt like they had been punched, then saw the puncture wounds and noticed that there was blood and realised they had actually been stabbed."
The girls will be interviewed once they are well enough.

Helen Choudhury, who works at the Taj Mahal restaurant near the scene of the attack, said the episode was like something out of a horror movie.
Alan McNamee, 39, who saw the aftermath, said: "One of the girls was saying they had been sat behind a man on the bus and were laughing and joking. The man turned round and told them to shut up."
Kay Taylor, the headteacher of Sir John Colfox school in Bridport, where Sophie and Charlotte are pupils, said: "The whole school is shocked by the attack on Charlie, Sophie and their friend. Both girls are loyal to their friends and caring towards others. It's terrible that this could happen in a small town like Bridport."

Police asked other passengers who were on the bus to come forward. They were also studying footage from CCTV cameras in Bridport.
The assault is the latest in a series of high-profile knife attacks. It follows the end of a national knife amnesty, during which 90,000 knives and other bladed weapons were handed in across the country. 
A 20-year-old man from Bridport was arrested yesterday afternoon.
29552  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Re: The Dog Brothers Tribe on: August 25, 2006, 09:44:51 AM
I see there's two threads of this. TTT for when I have a moment to combine the two.
29553  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Re: Grandfathers Speak Vol. 2: Sonny Umpad on: August 25, 2006, 01:39:34 AM


When we were done shooting, I kneeled at the edge of Maestro Sonny's bed and reassured him that we had gotten good footage-- which was the truth.  One of his students commented to me afterwords that when the shooting was over that he seemed quietly at ease.  I deeply would have loved for him to see the finished DVD, but at least he got to see a fairly polished rough edit which he relayed to us that he liked a lot.
29554  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Re: Grandfathers Speak Vol. 2: Sonny Umpad on: August 24, 2006, 05:56:28 PM
A Sad Howl:

I am informed that Maestro Sonny Umpad passed away this morning.

The Wood is consumed, but the Fire burns on.
Crafty Dog
29555  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Dog Brothers Gathering in Switzerland October 1, 2006 on: August 24, 2006, 10:00:35 AM

The Coming of ?the Dog Brothers? to Europe
By Marc ?Crafty Dog? Denny

ONE

I am often asked about our name, "the Dog Brothers." It can be explained on many levels, but one of my favorite ways of looking at it can be found in a newspaper article by one Jeff McMahon:

"Most actions of men can be explained by observing a pack of dogs. Not wild dogs, just neighborhood dogs who all scurry under the fence on the same night and set off together to reclaim a glimmer of the glory their species possessed before domestication."

I think that's right. The dog is the interface of man and the wolf and we can connect so strongly because our dynamics are so similar. Even as we humans change the wolf into the dog to suit our purposes, we still need its glimmer as wolf. In some breeds, and in certain individual dogs, the glimmer is brighter than others, and that is why you see an Akita named Zapata in our logo.

I know the Dog Brothers have a good reputation for airing it out pretty well, but we know what we do is well short of death matches of yore in the Philippines, a policeman going into an abandoned building after a bad guy or those who step forward to stop hooligans, mobs, or religious fascists.? It is important not to take ourselves too seriously, and I like the way the quote captures a certain perspective-- we are not wolves, we are but human dogs.

Still, it is important to be aware of something else too. Yes we are but dogs, and just like dogs we have territory, hierarchy, and squabbles over females. But there is something more.? There is also the bond of the pack.? ?In humans we call this the tribe.
The bond and aggression go hand in hand. ALL animals with individual relationships (wolves, monkeys, geese, dogs, humans etc.) also have aggression. Animals lacking the ability to discriminate between other members of their species, e.g. minnows do not. The presence of aggression does not always mean that there is a bond with other individuals, but a bond with other individuals always means there is aggression.

Aggression is an instinct, even as sex is an instinct. And just as a man eventually will have a nocturnal emission in the absence of sex, so too aggression will discharge eventually even in the absence of suitable reason.? ?All efforts at eliminating aggression by removing its ?causes? and/or its triggers are inherently doomed.? ?Indeed, to the extent that the efforts to eliminate the eliciting stimuli of aggression succeed in delaying the discharge, the greater the eventual discharge becomes and the time and place of the discharge becomes less predictable and thus far more dangerous!? As is so often the case in life, the law of unintended consequences is the rule.? We need to understand aggression and to channel its expression in healthy, productive and moral ways.

Aggression exists throughout Nature.? Why?

Aggression has three purposes in nature. The first is to spread a species out over territory so as to not overload an eco-system.? In humans this is sometimes known as War.

The second is for rank within the hierarchy of a social group.? Unlike the Anonymous Horde of a school of minnows, individual members of the group can distinguish each other.? All social groups have hierarchy.?

And the third is for reproduction. Classically this means two males fighting over the female, but it also means the female defending her young.
If there is no social unit, e.g. Siamese fighting fish, it does not matter that the loser dies, only that the winner breeds. In contrast, in social animals, there is a strong biological benefit if the second and third types of aggression do not damage the loser. This is so that the social unit, (the pack/the tribe), which exists precisely because of its survival value for the species, remains strong.

Most martial arts are usually of the second type of aggression, with overtones of the third: Young males competing. In contrast, the Filipino Martial Arts originate in the first form of aggression, in war. Thus there is a quality of cooperation in the learning process of the FMA that can be distinctive.

How so? If, as a tribe we are going to defend our land, women and children, it is in our respective individual interests that the other warriors of the tribe become good fighters as well. If I push you too hard and break your spirit, it does not serve my interests. If I push you too little and you are soft, it also does not serve my interests. And the same applies with you for me.

TWO

The Dog Brothers are not a pyramid with one Alpha at the peak.? Instead the ?governing body? of the Dog Brothers tribe is ?The Council of Elders? which consists of the three founders now so-called because we are old: Top Dog (title: The Fighting Force); Salty Dog (title: The Silent Force) and yours truly (title: The Guiding Force).? No money is involved in the Dog Brothers.? Although many Dog Brothers train in Dog Brothers Martial Arts (DBMA), this is not necessary-- anyone of the right values from any background is eligible to become a Dog Brother.? ?We look for people who manifest that of which they are capable.? ?A person of ordinary gifts who manifests his gifts with Dog Brother spirit will be accepted whereas we will pass by someone who is genetically gifted but lacks the understanding of what we are about: ?Higher Consciousness through Harder Contact??.

Since our founding in 1988 with three consecutive day long days of fighting known in our lore as ?the Rumble at Ramblas? (each man there averaged 20 fights over the three days), the Dog Brothers tribe has grown gradually.? ?With our recognition we certainly could have grown much more and much faster but to do so would have risked dilution and diminishment of what we are about.? ?Our tribe is real and requires real human connection.

We?ve had many people fight with us and profess their desire to be one of us, yet after one or two days of fighting we don?t see them again.? We?ve had a few people fight with us and seek to use it as a vehicle of self-promotion.? These we don?t want?nor do we want those who do not understand our code of ?Be friends at the end of the day?.

This means we need time to get to know someone, time to smell him and get to know what he is about.? Over time we have come to use the following framework:? ?A minimum of fighting at two of our ?Dog Brothers Gathering of the Pack? is necessary before someone is eligible to become a member of the tribe when someone in the tribe speaks in his behalf to the Council of Elders.? If he is accepted in our parlance be becomes ?a Dog?.? When someone begins to manifest that special level we look for in a full ?Dog Brother?, then they become a ?Candidate Dog Brother?.? If he maintains this level for three Gatherings and expresses that of which he is capable, he becomes a Dog Brother.? Thus, the shortest amount of time it takes to be a Dog Brother is five Gatherings.? ?In that we hold our Gatherings twice a year this has meant the whole process requires a minimum of two and a half years-- which is a considerable amount of time to maintain this level of fighting.

THREE

Even with the financial burdens that travel to our home in Hermosa Beach (Los Angeles) California entails, the Dog Brother tribe can be found throughout the United States, Canada and even Europe (at present in Switzerland, Italy and Great Britain).? ?And because of this financial burden I have often heard requests from those who would dearly love to get involved that we hold ?Dog Brothers Gatherings? beyond our home.

I am pleased that our efforts in holding a DB Gathering make it look easy.? That said there is far more to holding one of our Gatherings than meets the eye.? (If I make it to old age perhaps I will tell some of the behind-the-scenes stories in my memoirs!)? ?To have that much testosterone from so many different groups (not just different martial arts groups, but also different social and ethnic groups) in one place with security a matter of an honor code is a really good trick.? And so, for reasons explainable and inexplicable, I have kept our Gatherings exclusively here where I live and can steer them to maintaining their special quality-- until now.

Benjamin Rittiner of Bern, Switzerland first came to me with two students for a week of training in 1997.? Since then he has trained with me diligently and sedulously in Europe and at my home in Hermosa Beach.? He has assisted me at countless seminars and assisted me in many of our DVDs.? He has brought character, integrity, and talent to the process and he has become a close friend (his Cornelia and son Robin too!) and I have taught him as a son and should something happen to me he will do the same for mine when the time comes should mine be so inclined.? ?He is the only man that I have promoted to ?Guro? in Dog Brothers Martial Arts.? He heads up DBMA in Europe and is the only person I have authorized to present seminars in Europe. And with my authorization he recently taught a DVD on DBMA for Budo International.? And now by unanimous vote of the Council of Elders (the governing body of the Dog Brothers) he has become a member of the Council of Elders.

During this time he has become one of the most highly respected of all the Dog Brothers.? He fights seemingly without fear and with tremendous technical excellence (no student applies more of what I have taught than him) and shows the highest levels of true Dog Brothers spirit in his fighting.? ?People often comment to me after a Gathering that they thought he was ?the best man there?.
I go into this detail to make clear the depth of the connection which I believe is necessary for the next step in the Adventure of the Dog Brothers?to have someone there capable on all the many levels necessary of anchoring an additional ?Dog Brothers Gathering of the Pack?.? This Gathering will be held once a year in Bern, Switzerland and will be held for the first time on Sunday October 1, 2006.? I will continue to be there to serve as Guiding Force and as ?ringmaster?.

In respect of the importance of this special moment in the history of the Dog Brothers tribe, also there to witness will be co-Founder Eric ?Top Dog? Knaus.? Arlan "Salty Dog" Sanford intended to come, but business matters have intervened.? Top Dog looks forward to the opportunity to use his German (and some Norwegian!)

?Higher Consciousness through Harder Contact?? !
?Crafty Dog?
Guiding Force of The Dog Brothers
29556  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Re: Guro Saltys Training in thailand on: August 23, 2006, 07:20:15 PM
Tangent:

Woof PS Dog:

Your siniwali fight of Junr 2004 is going to be in the "DBMA Ass'n Los Triques Siniwali Vid-Llesson" and the general release of "DBMA Los Triques Siniwali DVD".

Woof,
Guro Crafty

29557  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Re: Grandfathers Speak Vol. 2: Sonny Umpad on: August 23, 2006, 05:05:11 PM
Night Owl is moving this thing along quite quickly.? I've just watched his next pass on the edit.? Very nice, including a mini-segment with GM Tatang Ilustrisimo demoing on the stuntmen from "Cyborg 4".?

We wait on some additonal footage and then we will be done.

Current running time: 75 minutes.
29558  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Re: Die Less Often: Interface of Gun, Knife and Emtpy Hand on: August 23, 2006, 12:33:37 PM
NOW SHIPPING!!! cool
29559  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Free Speech vs. Islamic Fascism (formerly Buy DANISH!!!) on: August 22, 2006, 07:28:12 PM
From the Wall Street Journal
Bret Stephens

The Many Faces of Belgian Fascism
August 22, 2006; Page A13

BRUSSELS -- Belgium is the birthplace of Ren? Magritte. So perhaps it's not surprising that, in politics, even the fascism here is surreal.

Take Belgian Socialists, Flemish or Walloon. The hallmark of nearly every European socialist party has long been hostility to religion. In recent years, Belgium's ruling Socialist-Liberal coalition has antagonized Catholics by legalizing gay marriage and euthanasia, banning crucifixes from government buildings and abolishing the traditional Te Deum service previously held by the government to commemorate the inauguration of Leopold I, first king of the Belgians.

But then the Socialists began taking note of Belgium's Muslim community, some 500,000 strong. In Brussels, notes Jo?l Rubinfeld of the Atlantis Institute think tank, half of the Socialist Party's 26-member slate in the city's 75-seat parliament is Muslim. In the commune of Molenbeek, longstanding Socialist mayor Philippe Moureaux has made Halal meals standard in all schools; police officers are also barred from eating or drinking on the streets during Ramadan. The Socialist Party was also, improbably, the leading opponent of a bill that would have criminalized the denial of the Armenian genocide. This, too, is a product of burgeoning Muslim-Socialist alliance, as is the party's routine denunciations of Israel.

Now take the Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest), the secessionist Flemish Party previously known as the Vlaams Blok until a court ruled it illegal in 2004. The Blok has longstanding links to Nazi collaborators. One of the party's founding members is Karel Dillen, who in 1951 translated into Flemish a French tract denying the Holocaust (possibly the only French text for which a Vlams Blok party member has ever shown sympathy.) For many years, the party's chief selling point was its call to forcibly deport immigrants who failed to assimilate. It also made plain its sympathies with other far-right wing European parties, such as Jean-Marie Le Pen's National Front in France.

But that's changing. Younger party leaders, realizing their anti-Semitic taint was poison, began making pro-Israel overtures. And the party's tough-on-crime, hostile-to-Muslims stance began to attract a considerable share of the Jewish vote, particularly among Orthodox Antwerp Jews who felt increasingly vulnerable in the face of the city's hostile Muslim community. Today, Vlaams Belang is the largest single party in the country.

Then there are the government's actual policies. In April, Belgians were shocked by the murder of a teenager named Joe Van Holsbeeck, who was stabbed to death in Brussels's central train station by two Gypsy youths, at the height of the afternoon rush hour, in broad view of dozens of onlookers. (Apparently, the killers wanted his MP3 player.)

Amid a pervasive and growing sense of lawlessness -- Belgium's per capita murder rate, at 9.1 per 100,000 is nearly twice that of the U.S. -- the murder became the occasion of much national soul-searching. When Jean-Marie Dedecker, a senator from the ruling Liberal Party, opined in an op-ed that "policemen look the other way in order to avoid being accused of racism," he was rebuked by Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt for "inciting hostilities."

There is also the amazing case of journalist Paul Belien, who edits the Brussels Journal, a pro-American, Euroskeptic, anti-Islamist blog. In February, the blog was one of the few news sources to republish the notorious Danish cartoons of the prophet Mohammad, thereby attracting some two million unique visits. It also attracted extraordinary scrutiny from the Flemish newsweekly Knack. Noting that Mr. Belien's blog had been cited by Middle East scholar Daniel Pipes, Knack described the link as "no coincidence," but rather a "deliberate provocation by the neocons," the ultimate aim of which was to make Americans and Europeans believe "that all Muslims are violent and dangerous, after which the clash in Palestine, Iran and Syria can really kick off."

But that was as nothing compared to the reaction Mr. Belien provoked by an article following the Van Holsbeeck murder, in which he described the killers as "predators" and called for Belgium to decriminalize the possession of self-defense weapons (pepper-spray is what he says he had mainly in mind).

Two weeks after the article appeared, Mr. Belien received a letter from the Center for Equal Opportunities and Opposition to Racism, a government-mandated body whose mission is to "assist victims of discrimination" and "sensitize the general public on anti-discrimination." (Belgium has one of the strongest anti-discrimination regimes anywhere.) Mr. Belien's article, according to the CEOOR, constituted an "incitement to violence"; he was ordered to remove it from his blog or face state prosecution. He complied. In the meantime, he says he received emails with pictures of burned corpses and messages reading, "This is what is going to happen to you."

Mr. Belien has since been questioned by the police for homeschooling his five children, four of whom have moved on to university or beyond. Part of Mr. Belien's problem, surely, is that his wife is a member in parliament for the Vlaams Belang. But whatever her politics, Mr. Belien is not a member of the party, and nothing on the Brussels Journal suggests that it is a party vehicle. His chief crime, rather, seems to be that he has laid bare, to an English-speaking audience, the lesser-known charms of the Belgian state.

Meanwhile, the real fascists in Belgium are gaining strength, largely protected from scrutiny by the country's "anti-racism" legislation. At Brussels's Imam Reza mosque, a preacher commemorated the 17th anniversary of the Ayatollah Khomeini's death: "The enemies cannot extinguish the light of the Islamic Revolution." And in Molenbeek, the newspaper Het Volk published a study of the local Muslim population: The editor, Gunther Vanpraet, described the commune as "a breeding ground for thousands of Jihad candidates."

The Belgian government may prefer not to notice. But as Magritte might have said, this is not a pipe.
29560  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: WW3 on: August 22, 2006, 07:05:27 PM
PART TWO

Perception shaping as art, not science: People in many regions of the world hate us. They have been led to these beliefs by an enemy whose perception-shaping effort is as brilliant as it is diabolical. If the center of gravity in World War IV is the perception of the people, then perhaps we should learn how the enemy manipulates the people. Information technology will be of little use in this effort. Damage is only amplified when inappropriate, culturally insensitive or false messages are sent over the most sophisticated information networks. Recent advances in the social psychology of leadership and persuasion can help train soldiers to win acceptance of local populations and obtain better intelligence from locals. Recent cognitive behavioral therapy has documented remarkably effective techniques for countering fear and abiding hatred such as we see in the Middle East. Our challenge is to create a human science intended specifically for shaping opinions, particularly among alien peoples. This task is too big for a single service or event for the Defense Department. It must be a national effort superintended by distinguished academics and practitioners in the human sciences who understand such things, rather than by policy-makers who have proven in Iraq that they do not.

Inculcate knowledge and teach wisdom: In Iraq and Afghanistan, junior soldiers and Marines today are asked to make decisions that in previous wars were reserved for far more senior officers. A corporal standing guard in Baghdad or Fallujah can commit an act that might well affect the strategic outcome of an entire campaign. Yet the intellectual preparation of these very junior leaders is no more advanced today than it was during World War III. However, the native creativity, innovativeness and initiative exhibited by these young men and women belie their woeful lack of psycho-social preparation.

Learning to deal with the human and cultural complexities of this era of war will take time. Leaders, intelligence officers and soldiers must be given the time to immerse themselves in alien cultures and reflect on their profession. Yet in our haste to put more soldiers and Marines in the field, we risk breaking the intellectual institutions that create opportunities to learn. Today, we are contracting out our need for wisdom by hiring civilians to teach in military schools and colleges. Educational science has long understood that reading and listening are the least effective means for retaining or increasing knowledge. Teaching is at least an order of magnitude more effective, while researching and writing are far better still.

Tactical intelligence: The value of tactical intelligence ? knowledge of the enemy's actions or intentions sufficiently precise and timely to kill him ? has been demonstrated in Iraq and Afghanistan. Killing power is of no use unless a soldier on patrol knows who to kill. We should take away from our combat experience a commitment to leverage human sciences to make the tactical view of the enemy clearer and more certain, to be able to differentiate between the innocents and the enemy by reading actions to discern intentions.

The essential tools necessary to make a soldier a superb intelligence gatherer must be imbedded in his brain rather than placed in his rucksack. He must be taught to perceive his surroundings in such a way that he can make immediate intuitive decisions about the intentions of those about him. His commanders must be taught to see the battlefield through the eyes of his soldiers. He must make decisions based on the gut feel and developed intuition that come from an intelligence gatherer's ability to see what others cannot. There is a growing science of intuition and gut feeling, and these capabilities might be enhanced by this new capability and its allied technology. Machines and processes might make intelligence easier to parse and read. But knowing the enemy better than he knows us is inherently a psycho-cultural rather than a technological, organizational or procedural challenge.

Psychological and physiological tuning: Life sciences offer promise that older, more mature soldiers will be able to endure the physical stresses of close combat for longer periods. This is important because experience strongly supports the conclusion that older men make better close-combat soldiers. Scientific research also suggests that social intelligence and diplomatic skills increase with age. Older soldiers are more stable in crisis situations, are less likely to be killed or wounded and are far more effective in performing the essential tasks that attend to close-in killing. Experience within special operations units also suggests that more mature soldiers are better suited for fighting in complex human environments. Science can help determine when soldiers are at their cognitive peak. Psychological instruments are available today to increase endurance and sustained attention on the battlefield. Today, conditioning science has succeeded in keeping professional athletes competitive much longer than even a decade ago. These methods should be adapted to prepare ground soldiers as well for the physical and psychological stresses of close combat.

Develop high performing soldiers and small units: Close combat has always been a personal and intimate experience. Close combat is the only skill that cannot be bought off the street or contracted out. In all of our world wars, success of campaigns has been threatened by a shortage of first rate, professional infantrymen. Inevitably, a protracted campaign drains the supply of intimate killers. Many infantrymen are sent into close combat with about four months' preparation. What little social science the research and development community has devote to understanding the human component in war has not been spent on close-combat soldiers. We know far more about pilot and astronaut behavior than we do about those who in the next world war will do most of the killing and dying, the close-combat soldiers. If dead soldiers constitute our greatest weakness in war, then we should, as a matter of national importance, devote resources to making them better.

The enemy has drawn us unwillingly into fighting him at the tactical level of war where the importance of technology diminishes in proportion to the value of intangibles. Thus, winning World War IV will require greater attention to the tactical fight. Technology will play a part, to be sure. Our small units, squads and platoons should be equipped with only the best vehicles, small arms, sensors, radios and self-protection. But more important to victory will be human influencers such as the selection, bonding, and psychological and physical preparation of tactical units.

As the battlefield expands and becomes more uncertain and lethal, it also becomes lonelier and enormously frightening for those obliged to fight close. Most recent American campaigns have been fought in unfamiliar and horrifically desolate terrain and weather. Modern social science offers some promising solutions to this problem. Recently, we have learned that soldiers can now be better tuned psychologically to endure the stresses of close combat. Tests, assessments, role-playing exercises and careful vetting will reduce the percentage of soldiers who suffer from stress disorders after coming off the line.

Cognitive sciences can be leveraged to enhance small-unit training in many ways, from speeding the acquisition and enhancing the retention of foreign languages to training soldiers in command decision simulators to sharpen the ability to make decisions in complex tactical situations. Cognitive sciences can be employed in the creation of highly efficient and flexible training programs that can respond to the ever-changing problems. Models of human cognition can also be used to diagnose performance failures during simulated exercises. These measures can assist in training soldiers to attend to hidden variables and to properly weigh and filter the many factors that determine optimal performance in complex decision-making tasks.

But the social sciences can accelerate the process for building great small units only so much. The one ingredient necessary for creating a closely bonded unit is time. The aging of a good unit, like that of a good wine, cannot be hurried. Platoons need at least a year to develop full body and character. Because the pipeline will be so long and the probability of death so great, the ground services must create many more close-combat units than conventional logic would demand. The lesson from Iraq and Afghanistan is clear: In future wars we can never have too many close-combat units. The performance of small ground units will be so critical to success on the World War IV battlefield that we should replace the World War III methods of mass producing small units and treat them more like professional sports teams with highly paid coaching and dedicated practice with the highest quality equipment and assessment methods.

Leadership and decision-making: World War IV will demand intellectually ambidextrous leaders who are capable of facing a conventional enemy one moment, then shifting to an irregular threat the next moment before transitioning to the task of providing humanitarian solace to the innocent. All of these missions may have to be performed by the same commander simultaneously. Developing leaders with such a varied menu of skills takes time. Unfortunately, World War IV will be long and will occupy ground leaders to the extent that time available to sharpen leadership skills will be at a premium.

There are precedents for developing these skills. In Vietnam, the air services developed "Top Gun" and "Red Flag" exercises as a means of improving the flying skills of new pilots bloodlessly before they faced a real and skilled opponent. Recent advances in the science of intuitive decision-making will give the ground services a similar ability to improve the close-combat decision-making skills of young leaders. Senior commanders will be able to use these tools to select those leaders with the intuitive right stuff. Over time, leaders will be able to measure and assess improvements in their ability to make the right decisions in ever more complex and demanding combat situations. They will have access to coaches and mentors who will pass on newly learned experiences with an exceptional degree of accountability and scientific precision.

Intuitive battle command: The Army and Marine Corps learned in Afghanistan and Iraq that operational planning systems inherited from World War III would no longer work against an elusive and adaptive enemy. They were forced to improvise a new method of campaign planning that emphasized the human component in war. Gut feel and intuition replaced hierarchical, linear processes. They learned to command by discourse rather than formal orders. Information-sharing became ubiquitous, with even the most junior leaders able to communicate in real time with each other and with their seniors. Dedicated soldier networks have fundamentally altered the relationship between leaders and led and have changed forever how the Army and Marine Corps command soldiers in battle.

Developing new and effective command-and-control technologies and procedures will do no good unless we educate leaders to exploit these opportunities fully. We have only begun to leverage the power of the learning sciences to battle command. Teaching commanders how to think and intuit rather than what to think will allow them to anticipate how the enemy will act. Convincing commanders to leave World War III-era decision-making processes in favor of nonlinear intuitive processes will accelerate the pace and tempo of battle. The promise is enormous. But we will only achieve the full potential of this promise if we devote the resources to the research and education necessary to make it happen.

Strange partners

Military leaders have had three world wars to establish comfortable relationships with chemists, physicists and information technologists. This was a marriage of necessity, but it has worked. The relationship between the military and human and behavioral scientists has, to date, been one of antipathy and neglect. Academics and behavioral practitioners have rarely violated the turf of the soldier. Many are turned off by the prospects of relating their professions to war. But most take the war against terrorism seriously. If the Army and Marine Corps give them the opportunity, they will gladly turn the best of their sciences to the future defense of our nation.

We are in a race, and the times demand change. World War IV can only be won by harnessing the social and human sciences as the essential amplifiers of military performance, just as the physical sciences were the amplifiers of past world wars. Such a shift in how the defense community approaches war will require a fundamental shift in military culture. Of course, new planes, ships and combat vehicles will have to be built to win World War IV, but building new social, cultural and learning structures will have to become the first priority for resources within the Defense Department. There is an old saying that the Navy and the Air Force man the equipment and the Army and Marine Corps equip the man. Surely those services that focus on the man rather than the machine should receive a disproportionate share of future defense budgets?

Beyerchen convinces me that we have moved from one world war to the next with little ability to predict how science and human circumstances will dictate our course. We can only imagine how the human and biological sciences will redirect the course of war. What will the new amplifiers be? Will breakthroughs in bioscience make the battlefield more lethal? Will new human and behavioral developments make us more effective in battle? Only time will tell. But none of these questions can be answered by speculation alone. The Defense Department must invest the resources now to realize the potential of psycho-cultural sciences to winning World War IV.

One thing is certain, however: We are in for decades of psycho-social warfare. We must begin now to harness the potential of the social sciences in a manner not dissimilar to the Manhattan Project or the Apollo Project. Perhaps we will need to assemble an A team and build social science institutions similar to Los Alamos or the Kennedy Space Center. Such a transformational change is beyond the resources of a single service, particularly the ground services.

Thus a human and biological revolution will have to be managed and driven by the highest authorities in the nation. I sincerely hope they are listening.

THE EVOLUTION OF WARFARE

THE CHEMISTS' WAR

The decisive strategic advantage on the World War I battlefield was driven by new applications of chemistry and chemical engineering. Germany, for example, exhausted its supplies of gunpowder nitrates in 1915, but the synthesis of nitrates by German scientists allowed the war to continue for another three years.

THE PHYSICISTS' WAR

The atomic bomb ended World War II, but exploitation of the electromagnetic spectrum in the form of wireless communications and radar won it for the allies.

THE INFORMATION RESEARCHERS' WAR

In World War III, intelligence and the ability to fully exploit it allowed the U.S. to defeat the Soviet Union. Information-age concepts of transformation and net-centrism mark the end of this epoch.

THE SOCIAL SCIENTISTS' WAR

To win World War IV, the military must be culturally knowledgeable enough to thrive in an alien environment. Victory will be defined more in terms of capturing the psycho-cultural rather than the geographical high ground. Understanding and empathy will be important weapons of war.

■Retired Maj. Gen. Robert H. Scales is a former U.S. Army War College commander and deputy chief of staff for doctrine.


You may not be interested in the global jihad, but the global jihad is interested in you.
29561  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: WW3 on: August 22, 2006, 07:04:08 PM
My second post of the afternoon:
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http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/07/1866019

Clausewitz and World War IV

BY Maj. Gen. ROBERT H. SCALES (ret.)

The essence of every profession is expressed in the writings of its unifying theorists: Freud for psychology, Adam Smith on economics, Justice Marshall on law, and ? depending on one's preferences ? Marx or Jefferson on governance. War is no exception. The 19th-century Prussian writer Carl von Clausewitz is regarded as a prophet whose views on the character and nature of war have held up best over the past two centuries.

Periodically, changes in the culture, technology, economics or demographics induce movements to revise the classic masters. After the Great Depression, Keynes amended Smith, behavioralists supplanted Freud, Marshall gave way to Oliver Holmes, who eventually surrendered to the revisionist doctrines of Hugo Black and Earl Warren. The profession of arms, perhaps more than any other profession, has been ? is "blessed" the right word? ? by intellectual revisionists more frequently perhaps because armed conflict is the most complex, changeable and unpredictable of all human endeavors. And history has shown, tragically, that failure to amend theories of conflict in time has had catastrophic consequences for the human race.

Changes in theories of war come most often during periods of historical discontinuity. Events after 9/11 clearly show that we are in such a period now. Unfortunately, contemporary revisionists to the classical master have not been well treated in today's practical laboratory of real war. In the moment before Sept. 11, 2001, the great hope was that technology would permit the creation of new theories of war. This view, influenced by the historical successes of the U.S. in exploiting technology, has been carried to extremes by some proponents of "effects-based and net-centric operations." These true believers visualized that sensors, computers and telecommunications networks would "lift the fog of war." They postulated that victory would be assured when admirals and generals could sit on some lofty perch and use networks to see, sense and kill anything that moved about the battlefield. Actions of the enemy in Iraq have made these techno-warriors about as credible today as stockbrokers after the Great Depression.

Theory abhors a vacuum as much as nature, so newer revisionists have popped up in profusion to fill the void left by the collapse of technocentric theories of war. One philosophy proposes to build a new theory of war around organizational and bureaucratic efficiency. Build two armies, so the proponents argue, one to fight and the other to administer, and the new age of more flexible and adaptive military action will begin. Another group of theorists seeks to twist the facts of history into a pattern that brings us to a fourth generation of warfare, one that makes all Clausewitzian theories of state-on-state warfare obsolete. Thus Western states are threatened by an amorphous, globally based insurgent movement. The inconvenience of Middle Eastern states collapsing and reforming in the midst of a state-dependent terrorist environment makes this fourth generationalist assault on the master difficult to sustain, if not actually embarrassing.

To be generous, each of these revisions contains some elements of truth. But none satisfies sufficiently to give confidence that Clausewitz can be amended, much less discarded. To be sure, networks and sensors are useful, even against terrorists, particularly in ground warfare at the tactical level. Armies should be reorganized to fight irregular wars more efficiently. And the influence of the state in irregular war must be revised to accommodate the realities of nonstate threats or, perhaps more accurately, not-yet-state threats; Osama bin Laden's first desire is for his own caliphate, or even emirate. But at the end of the day ? and in light of the bitter experiences of recent years ? it's clear that none of these rudimentary attempts at revision possesses the intellectual heft or durability to challenge the tenets of the classic master of conflict theory.

The age of 'amplifiers'

Enter Alan Beyerchen, distinguished historian at Ohio State University. He's adopted a fundamentally different approach and by doing so has captured the intellectual high ground in the battle to amend theory in light of modern war's realities: Beyerchen would embrace rather than replace the master. Beyerchen has developed a taxonomy of war in the modern era in terms of four world wars. Each war was shaped by what he calls "amplifying factors." Amplifiers are not "multipliers" or "enablers" in that their influence on the course of war is nonlinear rather than linear; amplifiers don't simply accelerate the trends of the past, they make war different.

For example, World War I was a chemists' war in that the decisive strategic advantage on the battlefield was driven in large measure by new applications of chemistry and chemical engineering. The war should have ended for the Germans in 1915 when their supplies of gunpowder nitrates exhausted. But the synthesis of nitrates by German scientists allowed the war to continue for another three horrific years. World War II was a physicists' war. To paraphrase Churchill, the atom bomb ended the conflict, but exploitation of the electromagnetic spectrum in the form of the wireless and radar won it for the allies. "World War III" was the "information researchers'" war, a war in which intelligence and knowledge of the enemy and the ability to fully exploit that knowledge allowed the U.S. to defeat the Soviet Union with relatively small loss of life.

The information age

Most strikingly, Beyerchen places what is popularly known as "transformation" at the end rather than the beginning of an epoch in which the microchip accelerated the technology of the information age but only after the culmination point of the information age was reached and the war was substantially won. In other words, the value of net-centrism as an amplifier ? a factor that fundamentally shapes the nature of conflict ? has passed; its formative influence on the course of war is over. Al-Qaida's success in Iraq simply drives the last nail in its coffin.

Think of the shifts between world wars as tectonic rather than volcanic events. The physicists' war did not simply erupt to supplant the chemists' war. Their respective influences as amplifiers simply diminished over time. Amplifiers still retain influence: Armies still use chemistry and physics (and most certainly networks) to gain advantage on the battlefield. The danger is that a military force will remain devoted to an amplifier long after it can no longer offer truly decisive returns. Thus, by Beyerchen's logic, we may be spending trillions on old amplifiers, on better chemistry, better physics and better information technologies, only to gain marginal improvements, a few additional few knots of speed, bits of bandwidth and centimeters of precision. In doing so, the question that begs itself is: Are we ignoring the amplifying factor that promises to be truly decisive, that might win World War IV at very little cost?

In searching for this "emerging amplifier," Beyerchen returns to Clausewitz's basic insight: that war is influenced primarily by human beings rather than technology or bureaucracy. The problem in the past has been that the human factor could never be a significant amplifier simply because its influence was relatively fixed and difficult to exploit; humans have been considered constants more than variables. Yes, soldiers could be made better through conditioning, selection, psychological tuning and, since the last century, through education. But, ultimately, the human factor has usually come down to numbers. Bigger battalions make better armies. Clausewitz did allow for the amplifying factor of genius in war ? he fought repeatedly against Napoleon. But he conceded that human frailties made the identification and nurturing of genius problematic.

Winning World War IV

Beyerchen's idea is that the human and social sciences will change Clausewitz's perception of the constancy of the human influence in war. In effect, he argues that we are beginning the tectonic shift into World War IV, the epoch when the controlling amplifier will be human and biological rather than organizational or technological. From his theory we can postulate a new vision of the battlefield, one that shifts from the traditional linear construct to a battlefield that is amoebic in shape; it is distributed, dispersed, nonlinear, and essentially formless in space and unbounded in time. This war and all to follow will be what I would call "psycho-cultural" wars.

Let's come down from the clouds a bit: Experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have convinced many in the military intellectual community of the value of psycho-cultural factors in war, but the idea that these factors are now decisive, that indeed they comprise the battle space, may be a tough sell. After all, American forces have won three world wars through the efficient application of technology. And we have grown generations of generals who have been taught and have learned by their own experience that victories come from building better things. Our fixation on technology ? our very technological success ? has led us to believe that the soldier is a system and the enemy is a target. Soldiers are now viewed, especially by this U.S. Defense Department, as an "overhead expense," not a source of investment. Viewing war too much as a contest of technologies, we have become impatient and detached from those forms of war that do not fit our paradigms. Technocentric solutions are in our strategic cultural DNA.

Moreover, even if we were not burdened with the baggage of our past successes, trying to divine the depths of the coming human and biological era of war would be as problematic today as anticipating the arrival of the digital age immediately after World War II. Wars, blessedly, are fought infrequently, and epoch-defining conflicts are even more rare. Our base of experience for anticipating future events is limited to experimenting in the laboratory of war; we only discover that tectonic plates are moving when we feel the ground shake. We can perhaps say that Korea and the first Afghan war are the alpha and omega of World War III but can only dimly begin to see the plates of our new world war.

And so let us stipulate that Iraq and the second Afghan war are the beginnings of a new era, but let's also be extremely cautious not to forecast so much as to anticipate what these wars portend from the human and cultural perspective. Let's not look for a level of precision or prediction that we cannot achieve and is likely to lead us astray.

Building on Beyerchen, here's what I anticipate current conflicts in the Middle East and elsewhere are telling us about what is to come. In a nutshell: World War IV will cause a shift in classical centers of gravity from the will of governments and armies to the perceptions of populations. Victory will be defined more in terms of capturing the psycho-cultural rather than the geographical high ground. Understanding and empathy will be important weapons of war. Soldier conduct will be as important as skill at arms. Culture awareness and the ability to build ties of trust will offer protection to our troops more effectively than body armor. Leaders will seek wisdom and quick but reflective thought rather than operational and planning skills as essential intellectual tools for guaranteeing future victories.

As in all past world wars, clashes of arms will occur. But future combat will be tactical, isolated, precise and most likely geographically remote, unexpected and often terribly brutal and intimate. Strategic success will come not from grand sweeping maneuvers but rather from a stacking of local successes, the sum of which will be a shift in the perceptual advantage ? the tactical schwerpunkt, the point of decision, will be very difficult to see and especially to predict. As seems to be happening in Iraq, for a time the enemy may well own the psycho-cultural high ground and hold it effectively against American technological dominance. Perceptions and trust are built among people, and people live on the ground. Thus, future wars will be decided principally by ground forces, specifically the Army, Marine Corps, Special Forces and the various reserve formations that support them.

Clausewitz tells us that the side that holds the initiative will ultimately prevail. In this new era, the initiative will be owned by the side that controls time. As retired Lt. Gen. David Barno, former commander of U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan, is fond of saying, "In Afghanistan, Americans have all the wrist watches but Afghans have all the time." The enemy will attempt to control the clock with the strategic intent of winning by not losing. He will use the clock to wear down American resolve. Management of the clock will allow him to use patience as a means to offset American superiority in killing power. His hope is to leverage our impatience to cause us to overreact with inappropriate use of physical violence. Perception control will be achieved and opinions shaped by the side that best exploits the global media. And there is another sense of the clock that is important to appreciate. We are in a race between the rogue states or nonstate terrorists acquiring and using nuclear weapons versus our acquiring and deploying enough psycho-cultural armament to beat them on the ground. But even without nukes, the enemy has a natural advantage. He presents a paradox that plays to his intrinsic strengths. You must support us, he says, in spite of our brutality, or support the outsider who may be more humane but who is not part of our religion, culture, clan, tribe or ethnicity. And, he can say, I will always be here; will the Americans?

The Elements of Victories

How can we discover the path to victory in these future wars? Chemistry had little practical wartime utility when the irreducible elements of knowledge were earth, air, fire and water. During World War I, chemists learned to analyze and design molecules for desired functions. Applications quickly emerged for explosives, propulsion and poison gas. Only in the past few decades have the foundations of the social sciences advanced to the point that they might become the elements for victory. And until the military intellectual community acknowledges that virtually all failures in Afghanistan and Iraq were human rather than technological ? perhaps still an open question ? will the social sciences attract much interest as amplifiers. Can we yet say we understand the enemy's culture and intent? The evidence thus far is that we have been intellectually, culturally, sociologically and psychologically unprepared for this kind of war. To me, the bottom line is clear: If the single most important objective for the first three world wars was to make better machines, then surely the fourth world war corollary will be to make better soldiers, more effective humans. To do so, soldiers need improved social science in nine areas:

Cultural awareness: In Iraq, a curtain of cultural ignorance continues to separate the good intentions of the American soldier from Iraqis of good will. Inability to speak the language and insensitive conduct become real combat vulnerabilities that the enemy has exploited to his advantage. The military of the future must be able to go to war with enough cultural knowledge to thrive in an alien environment. Empathy will become a weapon. Soldiers must gain the ability to move comfortably among alien cultures, to establish trust and cement relationships that can be exploited in battle. Not all are fit for this kind of work. Some will remain committed to fighting the kinetic battle. But others will come to the task with intuitive cultural court sense, an innate ability to connect with other cultures. These soldiers must be identified and nurtured just as surely as the Army selects out those with innate operational court sense.

Social science can help select soldiers very early who possess social and cultural intelligence. Likewise, scientific psychology can assist in designing and running cultural immersion institutions that will hasten the development of culturally adept soldiers and intelligence agents. Cultural psychology can teach us to better understand both common elements of human culture and how they differ. An understanding of these commonalities and differences can help gain local allies, fracture enemy subgroups, avoid conflicts among allies, promote beneficial alliances and undermine enemy alliances.

Building alien armies and alliances: World War IV will be manpower-intensive. The U.S. cannot hope to field enough soldiers to be effective wherever the enemy appears. Effective surrogates are needed to help us fight our wars. The Army has a long tradition of creating effective indigenous armies in such remote places as Greece, Korea, Vietnam, El Salvador and now Iraq. But almost without exception, the unique skills required to perform this complex task have never been valued, and those who practice them are rarely rewarded. Today's soldiers would prefer to be recognized as operators rather than advisers. This must change. If our strategic success on a future battlefield will depend on our ability to create armies from whole cloth ? or, as in Iraq, to remove an army that has been part of the problem and make it a part of the solution ? then we must select, promote and put into positions of authority those who know how to build armies. We must cultivate, amplify, research and inculcate these skills in educational institutions reserved specifically for that purpose. We must also do this pre-emptively or prophylactically by building the most suitable psycho-cultural infrastructures, both in the theater of war and at home.
29562  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: WW3 on: August 22, 2006, 06:42:22 PM
The Nuclear Deadlines and a Strengthening Iran
By Kamran Bokhari

For weeks now, Aug. 22 has been marked as a red-letter day: the day Iran would formally respond to the incentives offered by world powers in exchange for a halt to its nuclear program. Given all the other things that have been occurring in the region -- especially the psychological impact that Hezbollah's successful resistance to Israeli forces has had -- there was a good deal of speculation (and in some quarters, trepidation) about what the day would bring. On the extremes, there were those among our readers who suggested Iran would launch a nuclear strike against Israel; others spoke of the potential for a direct U.S. military strike against Iran's nuclear facilities.

We have not been among those predicting apocalyptic action. It is our view that, despite the presence of some extremists in both the American and Iranian camps, the nations and governments as a whole are rational actors that (rhetoric notwithstanding) will not take actions that threaten their own core interests or survival. In short, actions are governed by very real and practical limitations, regardless of what some may think about Mahmoud Ahmedinejad's mental state or George W. Bush's abilities as a leader.

That said, at least a little craziness surrounding the calendar date was to be expected. And the Iranians made sure to put on a good show.

The day began with reports that Iranian security forces had assaulted and briefly occupied an oil rig operated by Romania's Grup Servicii Petroliere (GSP) in Iran's territorial waters. The incident (which Iran described as a police action that disrupted a robbery attempt) lasted only a few hours but sent a clear signal that Iran is prepared to escalate matters if Washington moves toward punitive sanctions over the nuclear issue.

Shortly afterward, Tehran issued its formal response to the incentives package -- though details, at this writing, remain secret. Leaks likely will emerge in the coming hours or by evening in the United States. If our thinking is correct, Iran has not yielded to demands that it cease uranium enrichment (as Tehran steadfastly has said that it won't), but instead will have issued a response that plays to and widens political divisions among the five permanent U.N. Security Council (P-5) members and Germany. The complexity of the response will demand considerable deliberation and debate within the P-5+Germany -- inviting infighting and delaying any meaningful action, such as a vote for sanctions against Iran. At this point, it appears that U.N. Security Council resolutions and diplomacy may be reaching the limits of their usefulness.

Events of the coming days will warrant attention, certainly, but the underlying reality is this: The Iranians, correctly or otherwise, perceive that their moment in history has arrived. With the nuclear issue, through Hezbollah, and to some extent in Iraq, they are moving to secure their interests and extend influence -- seeing before them the opportunity to establish Persian, Shiite Iran as a hegemon in the Middle East and a power within the Muslim and wider worlds. And for the United States, like its Western allies, there are few meaningful options left to block it.

The Diplomatic Backdrop

To fully understand this, it's useful to review the recent buildup over the nuclear issue -- and to note that the 34-day Israel-Hezbollah war erupted precisely in the middle of that escalation.

On June 1, the P-5+Germany agreed to a package of incentives and penalties designed to force Iran to give up uranium enrichment. Javier Solana, the EU foreign policy adviser, delivered the terms to Tehran, and the White House urged Iran to study them thoroughly before issuing a formal response. No firm deadline was set, but the United States and its European allies indicated that one would be expected within a matter of weeks.

Details of the incentives were kept secret by both sides until July 13. The terms include greater investments in water-power reactors, provisions for Iran to join the World Trade Organization, and the possibility that U.S. and European restrictions on purchases of civilian aircraft and telecommunications equipment from Iran will be lifted if Iran suspends uranium enrichment. The package also lists a "catalog of sanctions" that countries might enact if Iran refuses to halt enrichment.

It was made obvious during this time that the P-5+Germany is less than united over the Iranian nuclear issue; Russia and China retained the right to opt out of U.N. sanctions for Iran, even if enrichment were to continue. In short, Russia and China reportedly could refuse to adopt sanctions of their own, but they would not block attempts by other U.N. members to sanction Iran.

Tehran several times rebuffed pressures to issue its response to the package, saying officials needed time to study the proposal. On June 29, the G-8 foreign ministers said they expected Iran's response to come on July 5, at a meeting between Solana and Iranian national security chief Ali Larijani. At that point, the Iranians made it clear that no response would come before mid-August. Finally, on July 21 (several days after the Israel-Hezbollah conflict had begun), they set the Aug. 22 date in stone.

Throughout all of this, Tehran has steadfastly stated that it will not suspend enrichment. Thus, in the midst of the Israeli-Hezbollah war, the U.N. Security Council passed legally binding Resolution 1696, setting Aug. 31 as the deadline for uranium enrichment to cease.

There has been no meaningful change in the Iranian stance since the resolution was passed. Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki, on Aug. 16, did say Tehran was willing to negotiate about enrichment suspension, so long as Iran's right to pursue enrichment in the future remained unquestioned and world powers ceased to question Tehran's intentions for its nuclear program. Significantly, Mottaki called, on the same day, for Western states to re-evaluate their relations with Muslim countries in light of the emerging reality in the Middle East -- clearly referencing the outcome of the Israel-Hezbollah war.

A New Regional Paradigm?

The outcome of the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah has given Iran the opportunity to strengthen the influence it wields in the Levant, while also bolstering perceptions that any attempts to solve the nuclear issue militarily could be very costly.

The Israelis' mismanagement of the war effort worked to the advantage of the Iranians, who are intimating to other Muslim states that Israel not only is not an invincible military power, but now is a power in decline. At a higher level, the war also has divided Arab states into two camps -- pro- and anti-Hezbollah -- and, at the same time, allowed Iran, through its sponsorship of Hezbollah, to project itself as the leader of all Muslim groups in the struggle against Israel.

Given the psychological impacts that Hezbollah's successful resistance brings throughout the region, it is little surprise that Iran is surging forward with new, and probably excessive, confidence. From Tehran's standpoint, this is the perfect moment to press its advantage and establish itself as a regional hegemon and global player.

Events of the last few days should be viewed very much in this light.

For instance, during the weekend, a new round of Iranian military exercises -- the second this summer -- commenced, unveiling the country's new defense doctrine. The first stage of the war games -- code-named "Zarbat Zolfaghar," or "The Blow of Zolfaghar" (a reference to the double-pointed scimitar of Imam Ali) occurred in Sistan-Baluchistan, a province in the southeast, and will continue in 15 other provinces in the country over the next five weeks. During the battle drills, the military test-fired 10 surface-to-surface Saegheh missiles, which have a range of 50-150 miles.

Iran also unveiled what it calls a new "air mine system," which officials claimed could be used from low and high altitudes, and in general has upgraded its entire air defense system. These are attempts to mitigate Iran's vulnerability, since it lacks an air force. In fact, Brig. Gen. Mohammad Hassan Dadras, commander of Iranian ground forces, said on Saturday that no air force in the region would be capable of confronting the Iranian army. This seems to have excluded the United States, a non-regional power.

Along with that, the army's commander-in-chief, Maj. Gen. Ataollah Salehi, made the interesting statement that the Iranian military is prepared to meet any threat from Israel, which he described as an "insane enemy."

And if the situation wasn't highly charged enough, there was an apparently deliberate escalation of a commercial dispute involving Romania's GSP. This seemed designed to generate jitters in the oil markets without directly harming Iranian interests.

From all appearances, the Iranians and their Shiite allies in the region are quite confident that this is their moment. We do not expect this to lead to any of the more extreme outcomes that have been speculated -- distances, for instance, argue against a direct strike by Iran against Israel -- but the political and military dynamics of the region certainly are shifting.

The Iraq Angle

As a result, the situation in Iraq must be considered carefully. As the Israel-Hezbollah conflict drew to a close, U.S.-Iranian exchanges concerning Iraq began to take on a more confrontational tone. Larijani, for example, on Aug. 7 accused Zalmay Khalilzad, the U.S. ambassador to Iraq, of meeting with terrorist groups there and encouraging attacks against Iranian and Shiite targets. Khalilzad's retorts over the following days were rather ambiguous, but he essentially accused Iran of using agents to foment sectarian violence in Iraq and to stage attacks against U.S.-led forces -- in retaliation, he suggested, for Israeli strikes in Lebanon.

These statements were clarified a bit on Aug. 14: Maj. Gen. William Caldwell, the top U.S. military spokesman in Iraq, said there "is nothing that we definitively have found to say that there are any Iranians operating within the country of Iraq," though the Americans believe that "some Shia elements have been in Iran receiving training." Caldwell said it is not clear how much the government of Iran knows about or endorses such activity.

Ultimately, the American fear appears to be that Iran, if backed into a corner, would use the Shiite militias in Iraq against the United States. To an extent, this is a reasonable fear, but there also are reasons why Iran would not be willing to push things beyond the level of "managed chaos."

For one thing, it is not in Iran's interest for Iraq to descend into full civil war, since uncontrolled sectarian violence could lead to repercussions on the Iranian side of the border. In fact, the political and financial investments that Iran has been making in Iraq would indicate that Tehran wants to make sure the situation, though violent, does not spin utterly out of control.

The Iranians have realized that they will not be able to exert any more influence over Baghdad than they can now, through the Shiite-dominated government -- so the goal is to make sure that Tehran secures the gains it has made in Iraq. Moreover, Iran is well aware of the delicate ethnic and political balance that holds the government in Baghdad together and keeps the intra-Shiite rivalries within acceptable parameters.

If our assumption holds -- that Iran will escape any punitive consequences for its actions on the nuclear front -- this fear of uncontrolled chaos in Iraq could be one of the few points of leverage left for the United States. It is a weak card in what is certainly a bad hand for Washington, and poses great risks for the Bush administration itself. However, if the Americans are incapable of achieving their own goals in Iraq or in the nuclear issue, the next best option would be to ensure, through their own political maneuverings with the Sunnis, that the Iranians will not be able to achieve their goals either.

Latest Moves, Next Moves

As we issue this report, developments in the last 24 hours have been these:


Solana and Larijani spoke by phone on Aug. 21, saying they were open to "further contacts" about Tehran's nuclear ambitions.

The deputy director of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization said "suspension of uranium enrichment has now turned practically impossible."

Foreign Ministry officials said Tehran's response to the incentives package would be "multi-dimensional" and hopefully lead to a comprehensive negotiated settlement.

Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said Tehran will continue its pursuit of nuclear technology.

Tehran barred U.N. nuclear inspectors from an underground nuclear facility at Natanz, and the chairman of the parliament's National Security and Foreign Policy Commission said a bill is being drafted that would require inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency to cease immediately if sanctions are placed on Iran.

The Iranians delivered their point-by-point counteroffer to the P-5+Germany, saying they were offering a fresh approach and are ready for "serious negotiations," beginning Aug. 23.


Clearly, the Iranians have spent the past several weeks preparing not only the terms of their counteroffer, but also the international atmosphere in which those terms would be presented. Their goal has been to make sufficient positive gestures that not only Russia and China, but perhaps European powers as well, might be loathe to side with the United States over possible sanctions. At the same time, they have been sufficiently bellicose to ensure the world knows there will be international repercussions if things don't go their way.

The United States itself lacks political leverage over Iran, and the diplomatic process -- as it currently stands -- will not bring about the results Washington seeks. Therefore, the Bush administration's best option is to ensure that even if Tehran wins the current diplomatic battle, it will not win the entire war over uranium enrichment. We would expect Washington to argue that since there is no way to guarantee the Iranians will honor any deal they make on the nuclear issue, no deals can be made.

At most, the United States will open a new process to discuss the process of slapping eventual sanctions on Iran. Moreover, the pick-and-choose menu that was included in the June incentives package basically ensures that no meaningful sanctions will be enacted, even if U.N. Security Council members should eventually choose to go that route. All of the sound and fury over the incentives package will, in the end, signify next to nothing.

And Iran is well aware of this. So long as a military option is not on the table for the U.N. Security Council members -- and at this point, it is not -- it appears that Iran will emerge unscathed from this contest.

This should not be taken to mean that Iran will be on the fast track for acquiring nuclear weapons, since that is a function of technology rather than politics. But it does mean that Iran is growing stronger within a region where, on all sides, fundamental interests and assumptions are now being reassessed.

www.stratfor.com
29563  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Howl of Respect to our Soldiers/Veterans on: August 22, 2006, 06:14:15 PM
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14350685/

Mystery 9/11 rescuer reveals himself
Unknown Marine steps forward as one who helped save two NYPD cops

Bebeto Matthews / AP
Jason Thomas of Columbus, Ohio, during visit to New York on Thursday.
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Updated: 5:49 p.m. PT Aug 14, 2006
NEW YORK - For years, authorities wondered about the identity of a U.S. Marine who appeared at the World Trade Center on Sept. 11, 2001, helped find a pair of police officers buried in the rubble, then vanished.

Even the producers of the new film chronicling the rescue, "World Trade Center," couldn't locate the mystery serviceman, who had given his name only as Sgt. Thomas.

The puzzle was finally solved when one Jason Thomas, of Columbus, Ohio, saw a TV commercial for the new movie a few weeks ago as he relaxed on his couch.

Story continues below ↓
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His eyes widened as he saw two Marines with flashlights, hunting for survivors atop the smoldering ruins.

"That's us. That's me!" thought Thomas, who lived in Long Island during the attacks and now works as an officer in Ohio's Supreme Court.

Thomas, 32, hesitantly re-emerged last week to recount the role he played in the rescue of Port Authority police officers Will Jimeno and Sgt. John McLoughlin, who were entombed beneath 20 feet of debris when the twin towers collapsed.

Proof of identity
Back in New York to speak of his experience and visit family, Thomas provided the AP with photographs of himself at Ground Zero. As further proof of his identity, the movie's producer, Michael Shamberg, said Thomas and Jimeno have spoken by phone and shared details only the two of them would know.

Thomas, who had been out of the Marine Corps about a year, was dropping his daughter off at his mother's Long Island home when she told him planes had struck the towers.

He retrieved his Marine uniform from his truck, sped to Manhattan and had just parked his car when one of the towers collapsed. Thomas ran toward the center of the ash cloud.

"Someone needed help. It didn't matter who," he said. "I didn't even have a plan. But I have all this training as a Marine, and all I could think was, 'My city is in need.'"

Thomas bumped into another ex-Marine, Staff Sgt. David Karnes, and the pair decided to search for survivors.

?United States Marines!?
Carrying little more than flashlights and an infantryman's shovel, they climbed the mountain of debris, skirting dangerous crevasses and shards of red-hot metal, calling out "Is anyone down there? United States Marines!"

It was dark before they heard a response. The two crawled into a deep pit to find McLoughlin and Jimeno, injured but alive.

Jimeno would spend 13 hours in the pit before he was pulled free. Thomas stayed long enough to see him come up, but left due to exhaustion before McLoughlin, who remained pinned for another nine hours, was retrieved.


  Click for related content
Remembering the World Trade Center on film
Review: ?World Trade Center? a waiting game
 


Thomas said he returned to Ground Zero every day for another 2 1/2 weeks to pitch in, then walked away and tried to forget.

"I didn't want to relive what took place that day," he said.

Shamberg said he apologized to Thomas for an inaccuracy in the film: Thomas is black, but the actor cast to portray him, William Mapother, is white. Filmmakers realized the mistake only after production had begun, Shamberg said.

Thomas laughed and gently chided the filmmakers, then politely declined to discuss it further. "I don't want to shed any negativity on what they were trying to show," he said.

As for his story, Thomas said he is gradually becoming more comfortable telling it.

"It's been like therapy," he said.

? 2006 The Associated Press.
29564  DBMA Espanol / Espanol Discussion / Re: Mexico on: August 22, 2006, 06:09:13 PM
Texas Sheriffs Say Texas Sheriffs Say Terrorists Entering US from Mexico
By Kevin Mooney
CNSNews.com Staff Writer
August 21, 2006

(CNSNews.com) - The chief law enforcement officers of several Texas counties along the southern U.S. border warn that Arabic-speaking individuals are learning Spanish and integrating into Mexican culture before paying smugglers to sneak them into the United States. The Texas Sheriffs' Border Coalition believes those individuals are likely terrorists and that drug cartels and some members of the Mexican military are helping them get across the border.

Sheriff Sigifredo Gonzalez of Zapata County, Texas told Cybercast News Service that Iranian currency, military badges in Arabic, jackets and other clothing are among the items that have been discovered along the banks of the Rio Grande River. The sheriff also said there are a substantial number of individuals crossing the southern border into the U.S. who are not Mexican. He described the individuals in question as well-funded and able to pay so-called "coyotes" - human smugglers - large sums of money for help gaining illegal entry into the U.S.

Although many of the non-Mexican illegal aliens are fluent in Spanish, Gonzalez said they speak with an accent that is not native.

"It's clear these people are coming in for reasons other than employment," Gonzalez said.

That sentiment is shared by Rep. Tom Tancredo (R-Colo.).

"For years, Muslims and other 'Special Interest Aliens' from places other than Mexico have been streaming into the U.S. across our porous border," Tancredo told Cybercast News Service. "These people are not paying $50,000 or more a head just to 'take jobs no American will do.'

"Terrorists are working round the clock to infiltrate the United States," he added. "Congress and this administration must address this gaping hole in our national security and they must do it now."

Some of the more high profile pieces of evidence pointing to terrorist infiltration of the U.S. have been uncovered in Jim Hogg County, Texas, which experiences a high volume of smuggling activity, according to local law enforcement.

"We see patches on jackets from countries where we know al Qaeda to be active," Gonzalez explained.

The patches appear to be military badges with Arabic lettering. One patch in particular, discovered this past December, caught the attention of federal homeland security officials, according to Gonzalez and local officials familiar with the investigation.



Sheriff Wayne Jernigan of Valverde County, Texas, told members of the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee in March about one patch that read "midnight mission" and displayed an airplane flying over a building heading towards a tower. Translators with DHS have said some of the various phrases and slogans on the items could mean "martyr," "way to eternal life," or "way to immortality."

Gonzalez told the House International Relations Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation in July that the terrorists are getting smarter.

"To avoid apprehension, we feel many of these terrorists attempt to blend in with persons of Hispanic origin when entering the country." Gonzalez stated. "We feel that terrorists are already here and continue to enter our country on a daily basis."


Sheriff Arvin West of Hudspeth County, Texas, told Cybercast News Service that he believes some Mexican soldiers are operating in concert with the drug cartels to aid the terrorists.

"There's no doubt in my mind," he said, "although the Mexican government and our government adamantly deny it."

Statistics made available through the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) show more than 40,000 illegal aliens from countries "Other Than Mexico," designated as OTMs, were apprehended by the U.S. Border Patrol in the period ranging from October 2003 to June 2004, as they attempted to cross the southwestern border. An overview of border security challenges produced through the office of Texas Gov. Rick Perry indicates that almost 120,000 OTMs were apprehended while attempting to cross into the state from January through July 2005.

Local authorities are particularly concerned about illegal aliens arriving from Special Interest Countries (SICs) where a radical version of Islam is known to flourish. Perry's office cites Iraq, Iran, Indonesia and Bangladesh among those countries. A Tancredo spokesperson said the list also includes Afghanistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Somalia and Yemen.

As Cybercast News Service previously reported an internal audit of DHS that combines the number of illegal aliens arriving from SICs with the documented instances of illegal aliens arriving from countries identified as being state sponsors of terrorism (SSTs) yields a grand total of over 90,000 such illegal aliens who have been apprehended during the five year period from fiscal year 2001 to fiscal year 2005.

The border security report delivered by Perry's office focuses attention on the "Triborder region" of Latin America, which spans an area between Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay.

"The Triborder Region is a focal point of Islamic extremism," the report states. "Al Qaeda leadership plans to use criminal alien smuggling organizations to bring terrorist operatives across the border into the U.S."

Carlos Espinosa, a press spokesman for Tancredo, said his office is aware of a training camp in Brazil that actually teaches people from outside of Latin America how they can assimilate into the Mexican culture.

"They come up as illegal aliens and disguise themselves as potential migrant workers," Espinosa said.
29565  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Re: Humor on: August 21, 2006, 02:55:43 PM
She ran last time too.
29566  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: We the Well-armed People on: August 21, 2006, 11:17:22 AM
Some of we the well-armed people are idiots:

http://video.google.de/videoplay?docid=7279049101024789666&q=genre%3Acomedy
29567  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: WW3 on: August 21, 2006, 08:22:44 AM
PART TWO
Secession Breeds Secessionism

Iraq's neighbors are just as fractured as Iraq itself. Should Iraq fragment, voices for secession elsewhere will gain strength. The dynamic is clear: One oppressed group with a sense of national identity stakes a claim to independence and goes to war to achieve it. As long as that group isn't crushed immediately, others with similar goals can be inspired to do the same.
The various civil wars in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s provide a good example. Slovenia was determined to declare independence, which led the Croats to follow suit. When the Serbs opposed Croatian secession from Yugoslavia by force, the first of the Yugoslav civil wars broke out. The European Union foolishly recognized both Slovene and Croatian independence, hoping that would end the bloodshed. However, many Bosnian Muslims wanted independence, and when they saw the Slovenes and Croats rewarded for their revolts, they pursued the same course. The new Bosnian government feared that if it did not declare independence, Serbia and Croatia would gobble up the respective Serb- and Croat-inhabited parts of their country. When Bosnia held a March 1992 referendum on independence, 98 percent voted in favor. The barricades went up all over Sarajevo the next day, kicking off the worst of the Balkan civil wars.
It didn't stop there. The eventual success of the Bosnians -- even after four years of war -- was an important element in the thinking of Kosovar Albanians when they agitated against the Serbian government in 1997-98. Serbian repression sparked an escalation toward independence that ended in the 1999 Kosovo War between NATO and Serbia. Kosovo, in turn, inspired Albanians in Macedonia to launch a guerrilla war against the Skopje government in hope of achieving the same or better.
In Iraq's case, the first candidate for secession is obvious: Kurdistan. If any group on Earth deserves its own country, it is surely the Kurds -- a distinct nation of 25 million people living in a geographically contiguous space with their own language and culture. However, if the Iraqi Kurds declare their independence and are protected by the international community, it is not hard to imagine Kurdish groups in Turkey and Iran following suit.
Moreover, the Kurds are not the only candidates. Shiite leader Abdul Aziz Hakim has called for autonomy for Iraq's Shiite regions -- a likely precursor for demands of outright independence. If Iraqi Shiites try to split off, other Shiites in the Gulf region might agitate against their own regimes along similar lines. Moreover, if ethnic or sectarian self-determination begins spreading throughout the Middle East more generally, secessionist movements could also spread to unlikely groups such as Iran's minority Azeri and Baluch populations.
Beware of Neighborly Interventions
Another critical problem of civil wars is the tendency of neighboring states to get involved, turning the conflicts into regional wars. Foreign governments may intervene overtly or covertly to "stabilize" the country in turmoil and stop the refugees pouring across their borders, as the Europeans did during the Yugoslav wars. Neighboring states will intervene to eliminate terrorist groups setting up shop in the midst of the civil war, as Israel did repeatedly in Lebanon. They also may intervene to stem the flow of "dangerous ideas" into their country. Iran and Tajikistan intervened in the Afghan civil war on behalf of co-religionists and co-ethnicists suffering at the hands of the rabidly Sunni, rabidly Pashtun Taliban, just as Syria intervened in Lebanon for fear that the conflict there was radicalizing its Sunni population.
In virtually every case, these interventions brought only further grief to the interveners and to the parties of the civil war.
Opportunism is another powerful motive. States often harbor designs on their neighbors' land and resources and see the chaos of civil war as an opportunity to achieve long-frustrated ambitions. Much as Croatia's Franjo Tudjman and Serbia's Slobodan Milosevic may have felt the need to intervene in the Bosnian civil war to protect their ethnic brothers, it seems clear that a more important motive for both was to carve up Bosnia between them.
Many states attempt to influence the course of a civil war by providing money, weapons and other support to one side. In effect, they use their intelligence services to create proxies who can fight the war for them. But states find that proxies are rarely able to secure their interests, typically leading them to escalate to open intervention. Both Israel and Syria employed proxies in Lebanon, for example, but found them inadequate, prompting their own invasions.
Pakistan is one of the few countries to succeed in using a proxy force (the Taliban) to secure its interests in a civil war. However, the nation's support of these radical Islamists encouraged the explosion of Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan itself -- increasing the number of armed groups operating from Pakistan and creating networks for drugs and weapons to fuel the conflict. Today, Pakistan is a basket case, and much of the reason lies in its costly effort to prevail in the Afghan civil war.
Covert foreign intervention is proceeding apace in Iraq, with Iran leading the way. U.S. military and Iraqi sources think there are several thousand Iranian agents of all kinds already in Iraq. These personnel have simultaneously funneled money, guns and other support to friendly Shiite groups and established the infrastructure to wage a large-scale clandestine war if necessary. Iran has set up an extensive network of safe houses, arms caches, communications channels and proxy fighters, and will be well-positioned to pursue its interests in a full-blown civil war. The Sunni powers of Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Turkey are frightened by Iran's growing influence and presence in Iraq and have been scrambling to catch up.
Turkey may be the most likely country to overtly intervene in Iraq. Turkish leaders fear both the spillover of Turkish secessionism and the possibility that Iraq is becoming a haven for the PKK. Turkey has already massed troops on its southern border, and officials are threatening to intervene.
What's more, none of Iraq's neighbors thinks that it can afford to have the country fall into the hands of the other side. An Iranian "victory" would put the nation's forces in the heartland of the Arab world, bordering Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Syria; several of these states poured tens of billions of dollars into Saddam Hussein's military to prevent just such an occurrence in the 1980s. Similarly, a Sunni Arab victory (backed by the Jordanians, Kuwaitis and Saudis) would put radical Sunni fundamentalists on Iran's doorstep -- a nightmare scenario for Tehran.
Add in, too, each country's interest in preventing its rivals from capturing Iraq's oil resources. If these states are unable to achieve their goals through clandestine intervention, they will have a powerful incentive to launch a conventional invasion.
* * *
Much as Americans may want to believe that the United States can just walk away from Iraq should it slide into all-out civil war, the threat of spillover from such a conflict throughout the Middle East means it can't. Instead, Washington will have to devise strategies to deal with refugees, minimize terrorist attacks emanating from Iraq, dampen the anger in neighboring populations caused by the conflict, prevent secession fever and keep Iraq's neighbors from intervening. The odds of success are poor, but, nonetheless, we have to try.
Providing Support
The United States, along with its Asian and European allies, will have to make a major effort to persuade Iraq's neighbors not to intervene in its civil war. Economic aid should be part of such an effort, but will not suffice. For Jordan and Saudi Arabia, it may require an effort to reinvigorate Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations, thereby addressing one of their major concerns -- an effort made all the more important and complex in light of the recent conflict between Hezbollah and Israel. For Iran and Syria, it may be a clear (but not cost-free) path toward acceptance back into the international community.
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait would be extremely difficult for the United States to coerce, and the best Washington might do is to convince them that their intervention is unnecessary because the United States and its allies will take great pains to keep Iran from meddling, which will be one of Riyadh's greatest worries.
When it comes to foreign intervention, Iran is the biggest headache of all. Given its immense interests in Iraq, some involvement is inevitable. For Tehran, and probably for Damascus, the United States and its allies probably will have to put down red lines regarding what is absolutely impermissible -- such as sending uniformed Iranian military units into Iraq or claiming Iraqi territory. Washington and its allies will also have to lay out what they will do if Iran crosses any of those red lines. Economic sanctions would be one possibility, but they could be effective only if the European Union, China, India and Russia all cooperate. On its own, the United States could employ punitive military operations, either to make Iran pay an unacceptable price for one-time infractions or to persuade it to halt ongoing violations of one or more red lines.
Don't Pick Winners
From Washington, it is tempting to consider ways to play one Iraqi faction against another in an effort to manage the civil war from within. The experiences of other powers, however, suggest how difficult this is. The Soviet Union tried to prop up President Najibullah when it left Afghanistan, and Israel used various Maronite militias as its proxies in Lebanon, but they all proved ineffective. Syria tried to use the Palestine Liberation Army to secure its interests in Lebanon, but its failure forced Damascus to invade instead. Washington tried to use a proxy force and intervene directly in Somalia, with equally disastrous results.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to determine a priori who will prevail in a civil war. The victor is rarely a key player in the country beforehand. Hezbollah did not exist in Lebanon at the start of the civil war there, nor did the Taliban in Afghanistan.
In Iraq, it is not clear which proxy would be the most effective militarily. Many communities are divided, fighting against one another more than against their supposed enemies. Iraq's Shiites may go the way of the Palestinians or the various Lebanese factions, who generally killed more of their own than of their declared enemies.
Manage the Kurds
Should chaos engulf Iraq, the Kurds will understandably want out, but this risks inspiring secessionists elsewhere in Iraq and throughout the region. In return for the Kurds agreeing to postpone formal secession, Washington should offer them extensive economic aid, assistance with refugees and security assurances (perhaps backed by U.S. troops) -- as well as promising support for their eventual independence when Iraq is more stable.
Buffer the Borders
One of Washington's hardest tasks would be to prevent the flow of dangerous people across Iraq's borders in either direction -- refugees, militias, foreign invaders and terrorists.
One option might be to create a system of buffer zones and refugee collection points inside Iraq staffed by U.S. and other coalition personnel. These collection points would be located on major roads, preferably near airstrips along Iraq's border -- thus on the principal routes that refugees would take to flee, providing a good logistical infrastructure to house, feed and otherwise care for tens or hundreds of thousands of refugees. Iraqi refugees would be gathered at these points and held there. In addition, coalition military forces would defend the refugee camps against attack, pacify and disarm them, and patrol large swaths of Iraqi territory nearby.
These zones would serve as "catch basins" for Iraqis fleeing the fighting, offering a secure place to stay within the nation's borders and thus preventing them from destabilizing neighboring countries. At the same time, they would serve as buffers between Iraq and its neighbors, preventing other forms of spillover -- such as militia movements, refugee flows out of Iraq and invasions into Iraq.
The catch-basin concept, while potentially useful, faces at least one big problem: Iran. Unlike Iraq's borders with Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Syria, the Iranian border is too long and has too many crossing points for it to be policed effectively by smaller numbers of coalition troops. Iran will never allow the United States the access across its territory, let alone logistical support, that would be necessary to make catch-basins along the Iran-Iraq border realistic. Thus, this scheme could make it look as though the United States was turning Iraq over to the Iranians, with the catch-basins effectively preventing intervention by Iraq's Sunni neighbors while doing nothing to deter Iran. For this reason, the United States's clear red lines to Iran about not intervening (at least overtly) would have to be enforced assiduously.
Perhaps most important, the catch-basin proposal requires Americans to endure significant long-term costs -- both in blood and treasure -- in Iraq. The United States would still need to deploy tens of thousands of troops to the nation (albeit on its periphery), as well as supplies to feed and care for hundreds of thousands of refugees. The United States would still occupy parts of Iraq, and the U.S. presence would remain a recruiting poster for the jihadist movement. Finally, all of these costs would have to be endured for as long as the war rages; recall that refugees from the wars in Afghanistan lived away from their homes for more than 20 years.
* * *
No country in recent history has successfully managed the spillovers from a full-blown civil war; in fact, most attempts have failed miserably. Syria spent at least eight years trying to end the Lebanese civil war before the 1989 Taif accords and the 1991 Persian Gulf War gave it the opportunity to finally do so. Israel's 1982 invasion was also a bid to end the Lebanese civil war after its previous efforts to contain it had failed, and when this also failed, Jerusalem tried to go back to managing spillover. By 2000, it was clear that this was again ineffective and so Israel pulled out of Lebanon altogether.
Withdrawing from Lebanon was smart for Israel for many reasons, but it did not end its Lebanon problem -- as the latest conflict showed all too clearly. In the Balkans, the United States and its NATO allies realized that it was impossible to manage the Bosnian or Kosovar civil wars and so in both cases they employed coercion -- including the deployment of massive ground forces -- to bring them to an end.
That point is critical: Ending an all-out civil war typically requires overwhelming military power to nail down a political settlement. It took 30,000 British troops to bring the Irish civil war to an end, 45,000 Syrian troops to conclude the Lebanese civil war, 50,000 NATO troops to stop the Bosnian civil war, and 60,000 to do the job in Kosovo. Considering Iraq's much larger population, it probably would require 450,000 troops to quash an all-out civil war there. Such an effort would require a commitment of enormous military and economic resources, far in excess of what the United States has already put forth.
How Iraq got to this point is now an issue for historians (and perhaps for voters in 2008); what matters today is how to move forward and prepare for the tremendous risks an Iraqi civil war poses for this critical region. The outbreak of a large-scale civil conflict would not relieve us of our responsibilities in Iraq; in fact, it could multiply them. Unfortunately, in the Middle East, one should never assume that the situation can't get worse. It always can -- and usually does.
dlb32@georgetown.edu
kpollack@brookings.edu
Daniel L. Byman is director of Georgetown University's Center for Peace and Security Studies. Kenneth M. Pollack is research director at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution.
? 2006 The Washington Post Company
29568  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: WW3 on: August 21, 2006, 08:21:48 AM
What Next?
By Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack
Sunday, August 20, 2006; B01


The debate is over: By any definition, Iraq is in a state of civil war. Indeed, the only thing standing between Iraq and a descent into total Bosnia-like devastation is 135,000 U.S. troops -- and even they are merely slowing the fall. The internecine conflict could easily spiral into one that threatens not only Iraq but also its neighbors throughout the oil-rich Persian Gulf region with instability, turmoil and war.
The consequences of an all-out civil war in Iraq could be dire. Considering the experiences of recent such conflicts, hundreds of thousands of people may die. Refugees and displaced people could number in the millions. And with Iraqi insurgents, militias and organized crime rings wreaking havoc on Iraq's oil infrastructure, a full-scale civil war could send global oil prices soaring even higher.
However, the greatest threat that the United States would face from civil war in Iraq is from the spillover -- the burdens, the instability, the copycat secession attempts and even the follow-on wars that could emerge in neighboring countries. Welcome to the new "new Middle East" -- a region where civil wars could follow one after another, like so many Cold War dominoes.
And unlike communism, these dominoes may actually fall.
For all the recent attention on the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict, far more people died in Iraq over the past month than in Israel and Lebanon, and tens of thousands have been killed from the fighting and criminal activity since the U.S. occupation began. Additional signs of civil war abound. Refugees and displaced people number in the hundreds of thousands. Militias continue to proliferate. The sense of being an "Iraqi" is evaporating.
Considering how many mistakes the United States has made in Iraq, how much time has been squandered, and how difficult the task is, even a serious course correction in Washington and Baghdad may only postpone the inevitable.
Iraq displays many of the conditions most conducive to spillover. The country's ethnic, tribal and religious groups are also found in neighboring states, and they share many of the same grievances. Iraq has a history of violence with its neighbors, which has fostered desires for vengeance and fomented constant clashes. Iraq also possesses resources that its neighbors covet -- oil being the most obvious, but important religious shrines also figure in the mix -- and its borders are porous.
Civil wars -- whether in Africa, Asia, Europe or the Middle East -- tend to spread across borders. For example, the effects of the Jewish-Palestinian conflict, which began in the 1920s and continued even after formal hostilities ended in 1948, contributed to the 1956 and 1967 Arab-Israeli wars, provoked a civil war in Jordan in 1970-71 and then triggered the Lebanese civil war of 1975-90. In turn, the Lebanese conflict helped spark civil war in Syria in 1976-82.
With an all-out civil war looming in Iraq, Washington must decide how to deal with the most common and dangerous ways such conflicts spill across national boundaries. Only by understanding the refugee crises, terrorism, radicalization of neighboring populations, copycat secessions and foreign interventions that such wars frequently spark can we begin to plan for how to cope with them in the months and years ahead.
Refugees Spread The Fighting
Massive refugee flows are a hallmark of major civil wars. Afghanistan's produced the largest such stream since World War II, with more than a third of the population fleeing. Conflicts in the Balkans in the 1990s also generated millions of refugees and internally displaced people: In Kosovo, more than two-thirds of Kosovar Albanians fled the country. In Bosnia, half of the country's 4.4 million people were displaced, and 1 million of them fled the country altogether. Comparable figures for Iraq would mean more than 13 million displaced Iraqis, and more than 6 million of them running to neighboring countries.
Refugees are not merely a humanitarian burden. They often continue the wars from their new homes, thus spreading the violence to other countries. At times, armed units move from one side of the border to the other. The millions of Afghans who fled to Pakistan during the anti-Soviet struggle in the 1980s illustrate such violent transformation. Stuck in the camps for years while war consumed their homeland, many refugees joined radical Islamist organizations. When the Soviets departed, refugees became the core of the Taliban. This movement, nurtured by Pakistani intelligence and various Islamist political parties, eventually took power in Kabul and opened the door for Osama bin Laden to establish a new base of operations for al-Qaeda.
Refugee camps often become a sanctuary and recruiting ground for militias, which use them to launch raids on their homelands. Inevitably, their enemies attack the camps -- or even the host governments. In turn, those governments begin to use the refugees as tools to influence events back in their homelands, arming, training and directing them, and thereby exacerbating the conflict.
Perhaps the most tragic example of the problems created by large refugee flows occurred in the wake of the Rwandan genocide in 1994. After the Hutu-led genocide resulted in the death of 800,000 to 1 million Tutsis and moderate Hutus, the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front "invaded" the country from neighboring Uganda. The RPF was drawn from the 500,000 or so Tutsis who had already fled Rwanda from past pogroms. As the RPF swept through Rwanda, almost 1 million Hutus fled to neighboring Congo, fearing that the evil they did unto others would be done unto them.
For two years after 1994, Hutu bands continued to conduct raids in Rwanda and began to work with Congolese dictator Mobutu Sese Seko. The new RPF government of Rwanda responded by attacking not only the Hutu militia camps, but also its much larger neighbor, bolstering a formerly obscure Congolese opposition leader named Laurent Kabila and installing him in power in Kinshasa. A civil war in Congo ensued, killing perhaps 4 million people.
The flow of refugees from Iraq could worsen instability in all of its neighboring countries. Kuwait, for example, has just over 1 million citizens, one-third of whom are Shiite. The influx of several hundred thousand Iraqi Shiites across the border could change the religious balance in the country overnight. Both these Iraqi refugees and the Kuwaiti Shiites could turn against the Sunni-dominated Kuwaiti government, seeing violence as a means to end the centuries of discrimination they have faced at the hands of Kuwait's Sunnis.
Numbers of displaced people are already rising in Iraq, although they are nowhere near what they could be if the country slid into a full civil war. About 100,000 Arabs are believed to have fled northern Iraq under pressure from Kurdish militias. As many as 200,000 Sunni Arabs reportedly have been displaced by the fighting between Sunni groups and the American-led coalition in western Iraq. In the past 18 months, 50,000 to 100,000 Shiites have fled mixed-population cities in central Iraq for greater safety farther south. So far, in addition to the Palestinians and other foreigners, only the Iraqi upper and middle classes are fleeing the country altogether, moving to Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon or the Gulf States. As one indicator of the size of this flight, since 2004 the Ministry of Education has issued nearly 40,000 letters permitting parents to take their children's academic records abroad. If the violence continues to escalate, even those without resources will soon flee to vast refugee camps in the nearest country.
Terrorism Finds New Homes
The war in Iraq has proved to be a disaster for the struggle against Osama bin Laden. Fighters there are receiving training, building networks and becoming further radicalized -- and the U.S. occupation is proving a dream recruiting tool for young Muslims worldwide. As bad as this is, a wide-scale civil war in Iraq could make the terrorism problem even worse.
Such terrorist organizations as Hezbollah, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) were all born of civil wars. They eventually shifted from assaulting their enemies in Lebanon, Sri Lanka, Algeria, Northern Ireland and Israel, respectively, to mounting attacks elsewhere. Hezbollah has attacked Israeli, American and European targets on four continents. The LTTE assassinated former Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi because of his intervention in Sri Lanka. The IRA began a campaign of attacks in Britain in the 1980s. The GIA did the same to France the mid-1990s, hijacking an Air France flight then moving on to bombings in the country. In the 1970s, various Palestinian groups began launching terrorist attacks against Israelis wherever they could find them -- including at the Munich Olympics and airports in Athens and Rome -- and then attacked Western civilians whose governments supported Israel.
In Afghanistan, the anti-Soviet struggle in the 1980s was a key incubator for bin Laden's movement. Many young mujaheddin went to Afghanistan with only the foggiest notion of jihad. But during the fighting in Afghanistan, individuals took on one another's grievances, so that Saudi jihadists learned to hate the Egyptian government and Chechens learned to hate Israel. Meanwhile, al-Qaeda convinced many of them that the United States was at the center of the Muslim world's problems -- a view that almost no Sunni terrorist group had previously embraced. Other civil wars in Muslim countries, including the Balkans, Chechnya and Kashmir, began for local reasons but became enmeshed in the broader jihadist movement. Should Iraq descend into a deeper civil war, the country could become a sanctuary for both Shiite and Sunni terrorists, possibly even exceeding the problems of Lebanon in the 1980s or Afghanistan under the Taliban.
Right now, the U.S. military presence keeps a lid on the jihadist effort. There are no enormous training camps such as those the radicals enjoyed in Afghanistan. Likewise, Hezbollah and other Shiite terrorist groups have maintained a low profile in Iraq so far, but the more embattled the Shiites feel, the better the chance they will invite greater Hezbollah involvement. Shiite fighters may even strike the Sunni backers of their Iraqi adversaries, such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, or incite their own Shiite populations against them. And lost in the focus on Arab terrorist groups is the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), an anti-Turkish group that has long fought to establish a Kurdish state in Turkey from bases in Iraq. The more Iraq is consumed by chaos, the more likely it is that the PKK will regain a haven in northern Iraq.
The Sunni jihadists would be particularly likely to go after Saudi Arabia given its long, lightly patrolled border with Iraq, as well as their interest in destabilizing the ruling Saud family. The turmoil in Iraq has energized young Saudi Islamists. In the future, the balance may shift from Saudis helping Iraqi fighters against the Americans to Iraqi fighters helping Saudi jihadists against the Saudi government, with Saudi oil infrastructure an obvious target.
Radicalism Is Contagious
Civil wars tend to inflame the passions of neighboring populations. This is often just a matter of proximity: Chaos and slaughter five miles down the road has a much greater emotional impact than a massacre 5,000 miles away. The problem worsens whenever ethnic or religious groupings also spill across borders. Frequently, people demand that their government intervene on behalf of their compatriots embroiled in the civil war. Alternatively, they may aid their co-religionists or co-ethnics on their own -- taking in refugees, funneling money and guns, providing sanctuary.
The Albanian government came under heavy pressure from its people to support the Kosovar Albanians who were fighting for independence from the Serbs. As a result, Tirana provided diplomatic support and covert aid to the Kosovo Liberation Army in 1998-99, and threatened to intervene to prevent Serbia from crushing the Kosovars. Similarly, numerous Irish and Irish American groups clandestinely supported the Irish Republican Army, providing money and guns to the group and lobbying Dublin and Washington.
Sometimes, radicalization works in the opposite direction if neighboring populations share the grievances of their comrades across the border, and as a result are inspired to fight in pursuit of similar goals in their own country. Although Sunni Syrians had chafed under the minority Alawite dictatorship since the 1960s, members of the Muslim Brotherhood (the leading Sunni Arab opposition group) were spurred to action when they saw Lebanese Sunni Arabs fighting to wrest a share of political power from the minority Maronite-dominated government in Beirut. This spurred their own decision to organize against Hafez al-Assad's regime in Damascus. By the late 1970s, their resistance had blossomed into civil war, but Assad's regime was not as weak as Lebanon's. In 1982, Assad razed the center of the city of Hama, a Muslim Brotherhood stronghold, killing 20,000 to 40,000 people and snuffing out the revolt.
Iraq's neighbors are vulnerable to this aspect of spillover. Iraq's own divisions are mirrored throughout the region; for instance, Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia all have sizable Shiite communities. In Saudi Arabia, Shiites make up about 10 percent of the population, but they are heavily concentrated in its oil-rich Eastern Province. Bahrain's population is majority Shiite, although the regime is Sunni. Likewise, Iran, Syria and Turkey all have important Kurdish minorities, which are geographically concentrated adjacent to Iraqi Kurdistan.
Populations in some countries around Iraq are already showing dangerous signs of radicalization. In March, after the Sunni jihadist bombing of the Shiite Askariya shrine in Iraq, more than 100,000 Bahraini Shiites took to the streets in anger. In 2004, when U.S. forces were battling Iraqi Sunni insurgents in Fallujah, large numbers of Bahraini Sunnis protested. There has been unrest in Iranian Kurdistan in the past year, prompting Iran to deploy troops to the border and even shell Kurdish positions in Iraq. The Turks, too, have deployed additional forces to the Iraqi border to prevent any movement of Kurdish forces between the two countries.
Most ominous of all, tensions are rising between Shiites and Sunnis in the key Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia. As in Bahrain, many Saudi Shiites saw the success of Iraq's Shiites and are now demanding better political and economic treatment. The government made a few initial concessions, but now the kingdom's Sunnis are openly accusing the Shiites of heresy. Religious leaders on both sides have begun to warn of a coming civil war or schism within Islam. The horrors of such a split are on display only miles away in Iraq.

Secession Breeds Secessionism
29569  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Invitation to dialog to Muslims on: August 21, 2006, 07:25:56 AM
Kenneth Dickerman for The New York Times
Pakistani immigrants and their American-born children flock to Devon Avenue in Chicago because of its traditional restaurants and goods.

         By NEIL MacFARQUHAR
Published: August 21, 2006
CHICAGO, Aug. 18 ? The stretch of Devon Avenue in North Chicago also named for Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, seems as if it has been transplanted directly from that country. The shops are packed with traditional wedding finery, and the spice mix in the restaurants? kebabs is just right.


 
Kenneth Dickerman for The New York Times
Businesses on Devon Avenue in Chicago, like an Islamic bookstore, attract a large Pakistani clientele.
Similar enclaves in Britain have been under scrutiny since they have proved to be a breeding ground for cells of terrorists, possibly including the 24 men arrested recently as suspects in a plot to blow up airliners flying out of London.

Yet Devon Avenue is in many ways different. Although heavily Pakistani, the street is far more exposed to other cultures than are similar communities in Britain.

Indian Hindus have a significant presence along the roughly one-and-a-half-mile strip of boutiques, whose other half is named for Gandhi. What was a heavily Jewish neighborhood some 20 years ago also includes recent immigrants from Colombia, Mexico and Ukraine, among others.

?There is integration even when you have an enclave,? said Nizam Arain, 32, a lawyer of Pakistani descent who was born and raised in Chicago. ?You don?t have the same siege mentality.?

Even so, members of the Pakistani immigrant community here find themselves joining the speculation as to whether sinister plots could be hatched in places like Devon (pronounced deh-VAHN) Avenue.

The most common response is no, at least not now, because of differences that have made Pakistanis in the United States far better off economically and more assimilated culturally than their counterparts in Britain. But some Pakistani-Americans do not rule out the possibility, given how little is understood about the exact tipping point that pushes angry young Muslim men to accept an ideology that endorses suicide and mass murder.

The idea of a relatively smaller, more prosperous, more striving immigrant community inoculating against terror cells goes only so far, they say.

?It makes it sound like it couldn?t happen here because we are the good immigrants: hard-working, close-knit, educated,? said Junaid Rana, an assistant professor of Asian-American studies at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and an American-born son of Pakistani immigrants. ?But we are talking about a cult mind-set, how a cult does its brainwashing.?

Yet one major difference between the United States and Britain, some say, is the United States? historical ideal of being a melting-pot meritocracy.

?You can keep the flavor of your ethnicity, but you are expected to become an American,? said Omer Mozaffar, 34, a Pakistani-American raised here who is working toward a doctorate in Islamic studies at the University of Chicago.

Britain remains far more rigid. In the United States, for example, Pakistani physicians are more likely to lead departments at hospitals or universities than they are in Britain, said Dr. Tariq H. Butt, a 52-year-old family physician who arrived in the United States 25 years ago for his residency.

Nationwide, Pakistanis appear to be prospering. The census calculated that mean household income in the United States in 2002 was $57,852 annually, while that for Asian households, which includes Pakistanis, was $70,047. By contrast, about one-fifth of young British-born Muslims are jobless, and many subsist on welfare.

Hard numbers on how many people of Pakistani descent live in the United States do not exist, but a forthcoming book from Harvard University Press on charitable donations among Pakistani-Americans, ?Portrait of a Giving Community,? puts the number around 500,000, with some 35 percent or more of them in the New York metropolitan area. Chicago has fewer than 100,000, while other significant clusters exist in California, Texas and Washington, D.C.

Pakistani immigration to the United States surged after laws in the 1960?s made it easier for Asians to enter the country. Most were drawn by jobs in academia, medicine and engineering. It was only in the late 1980?s and 90?s that Pakistanis arrived to work blue-collar jobs as taxi drivers or shopkeepers, said Adil Najam, the author of the book on donations and an international relations professor at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.

In Britain, by comparison, the first Pakistanis arrived after World War II to work in factories. Many were fleeing sectarian strife in Kashmir ? a lingering source of resentment ? and entire communities picked up and resettled together. This created Pakistani ghettos in cities like Bradford and Birmingham, whereas in the United States immigrants tended to be scattered and newcomers forced to assimilate. The trends intensified with time.

A decade ago, for example, a Pakistani in Chicago who wanted to buy halal meat, from animals butchered in a religiously sanctioned manner, could find it only on Devon Avenue. Now halal butchers dot the city and its suburbs.

Thousands of immigrants and their American-born offspring still flock to Devon Avenue because of its restaurants and traditional goods, including wedding saris for women and long, elaborate shirts and gilded slippers with curled toes for men. The avenue?s half-dozen rudimentary mosques have a reputation for being more conservative than those elsewhere in Chicago, with the imams emphasizing an adherence to Muslim tradition.



 
Published: August 21, 2006
(Page 2 of 2)



?They go to an area where they have a feeling of nostalgia, and even psychologically it is important for immigrant communities to feel that their home country is represented,? said Dr. Butt, an early member of the Association of Physicians of Pakistani Descent of North America, one of the oldest immigrant organizations here.

But immigrants are not mired in the Devon Avenue neighborhood; many move out once they can afford better. Unlike the situation in Britain, there is no collective history here of frustrated efforts to assimilate into a society where a shortened form of Pakistani is a stinging slur, and there are no centuries-old grievances nursed from British colonial rule over what became Pakistan.

Where such comparisons fail, however, is in providing a model to predict why some young Muslims turn to violence, although no religion is immune. In the United States there have been a few cases of young Pakistani men being arrested or tried in terror plots, in Atlanta and in Lodi, Calif., for example.

Ifti Nasim, a former luxury car salesman turned poet and gay rights advocate, greets a visitor with a slim volume of his works. The cover photograph shows him wearing a bright orange dress, ropes of pearls and a long blond wig. He has been in the United States since 1971.

Some shoppers crowding the sidewalks on Devon Avenue greet Mr. Nasim warmly, telling him they listen to his radio show or read his columns in a local Urdu-language newspaper. In Pakistan, Mr. Nasim says, his flamboyance would not be tolerated, but here he calls his acceptance ?the litmus test of the society.?

Like many, however, he has moments of doubt, saying, ?Pakistani society in Chicago has made a smooth transition so far, but you never know.?

A more important factor in determining who becomes a militant is most likely the feeling of being stigmatized as less than equal, community activists say, noting that such discrimination remains far more common in Britain. It is probably compounded by the fact that violence against Muslims in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine and Lebanon feels so much closer there, they say.

Overt bigotry is rarer here, but it exists. For instance, Mohamed Hanis, a taxi driver who is a Pakistani immigrant, said that on the Friday night after the terror alert in London, a young white man climbed into his cab. Noticing the name Mohamed, the man threatened to report that Mr. Hanis had admitted to supporting terrorist attacks unless he could get a free ride. Instead, Mr. Hanis hailed a police officer who forced the passenger to pay.

Mr. Mozaffar, the University of Chicago student, said he had grown up with revered Muslim role models like Muhammad Ali and Kareem Abdul-Jabar, but now there were none. He teaches religion classes for young Muslims, and the question inevitably arises whether the creed justifies using violence for political or religious aims. He emphasizes that Islam forbids killing innocent civilians, and community members here have said they will not tolerate a mosque prayer leader advocating violence.

Initial reports about the British suspects quoted neighbors as saying that some of the men had become more religious, adopting Islamic dress and praying five times a day. That kind of transformation happens in Chicago, too, but the idea that any such change should automatically arouse suspicion rather than be considered teenage rebellion or a religious conversion makes community activists bridle.

For the past eight years, Abdul Qadeer Sheikh, 46, has managed Islamic Books N Things on Devon Avenue, which sells items like Korans, prayer rugs and Arabic alphabet books. He says that since Sept. 11, he has seen signs of the bias that has existed in Britain for decades developing here. He describes a distinctive fear of being seen as Muslim, even along Devon Avenue. Before, a good 70 percent of the women who came into his shop were veiled, he said. Now the reverse is true, and far fewer men wear traditional clothes.

The attitude of the American government in adopting terms like ?Islamic fascists? and deporting large numbers of immigrants, he said, makes Muslims feel marked, as if they do not belong here. ?The society in the United States is much fairer to foreigners than anywhere else,? he said, ?but that mood is changing.?


29570  DBMA Espanol / Espanol Discussion / Re: Venezuela Pol?tica on: August 21, 2006, 07:06:07 AM
NEW YORK TIMES

August 21, 2006
Venezuela Strengthens Its Relationships in the Middle East

By SIMON ROMERO
CARACAS, Venezuela, Aug. 20 ? Venezuela has long cultivated ties with Middle Eastern governments, finding common ground in trying to keep oil prices high, but its recent engagement of Iran has become a defining element in its effort to build an alliance to curb American influence in developing countries.

In a visit late last month to Tehran by President Hugo Ch?vez and his oil minister, Rafael Ram?rez, the two countries agreed to produce jointly nearly a dozen products, including crude oil and medicines. In a further sign that their ties have taken on a new dimension, the two countries are speaking in a more unified voice in their criticism of Israel and the United States.

The strengthening of ties has turned Iran into Venezuela?s closest ally outside Latin America, adding clout to Mr. Ch?vez?s efforts within OPEC to increase revenue through output limits by oil-exporting countries. Venezuela has also become the most vociferous defender of Iran?s nuclear program at a time when Iran feels increasingly isolated.

?We stand by Iran at every moment, in any situation,? Mr. Ch?vez said in Tehran, where he received the golden High Medallion of the Islamic Republic from President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Venezuela, Syria and Cuba were the only countries to oppose referring Iran to the United Nations Security Council at a meeting in February of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Though Venezuela maintains close economic ties with the United States, relations have been strained by verbal sparring between the Bush administration and Mr. Ch?vez.

Mr. Ch?vez has also shown recent interest in strengthening ties with Syria, sending his deputy foreign minister, Alcides Rond?n, to Damascus last week. Mr. Ch?vez continues to push for tighter relations with close trading partners of the United States. He is scheduled to arrive in China on Tuesday for a six-day visit aimed at finding ways to ship more Venezuelan oil to Chinese refineries. He is also expected to visit Malaysia and Angola.

Now, with Iranian investment in Venezuela climbing fast, what began as a trickle of ventures has evolved into the most vivid example of Venezuela?s move to reshape its foreign policy and distance itself from the United States by reaching out to countries on the margins of American influence, including Belarus, Zimbabwe and Cuba.

Hundreds of Iranian tractors are already rolling off an assembly line at a plant in Venezuela?s interior, and Khodro, the Iranian car manufacturer, plans to produce 5,000 Samand sedans a year at factory near Caracas starting in November.

With Venezuela vying for a nonpermanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, the ties with Iran have led to additional friction with the United States.

In testimony last month before the House Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation, Frank Urbancic Jr., the principal deputy coordinator for counterterrorism in the State Department, said Venezuela?s close relations, including intelligence operations, with Iran and Cuba helped illustrate a ?near complete lack of cooperation? with American efforts to fight terrorism.

The Bush administration further irked Mr. Ch?vez last week by appointing J. Patrick Maher, a longtime Central Intelligence Agency official, to oversee intelligence-gathering operations on Venezuela and Cuba. A comparable post had existed previously only for Iran and North Korea. Mr. Ch?vez ridiculed the move and said he had captured four people accused of spying for the United States, though the American Embassy here said it had no knowledge of such apprehensions.

The Bush administration?s more aggressive stance has drawn sharp rebuttals from officials here, who contend the United States is planning military action against Venezuela with an eye to controlling the country?s petroleum resources, the largest conventional reserves outside the Middle East.

Petropars, the Iranian national oil company, said it could invest as much as $4 billion in petroleum ventures in Venezuela to produce crude oil and natural gas. ?We want to help them,? said Mohammad Ali Talebi, a Petropars representative in Venezuela and director of a venture that may extract sulfur-laden heavy oil in an eastern region there.

Venezuela has also supported Iran?s effort to price oil in euros instead of dollars, a move aimed at weakening the influence of American investment banks and hedge funds, and the creation of an oil exchange in Iran to trade such contracts.

?Geopolitically, the most important front for Ch?vez in the world at this moment is Iran,? said Alberto Garrido, a historian who is writing a book on Venezuela?s ties to Muslim countries. ?Ch?vez, together with his closest advisers, have defined the strategic alliance with Iran as a means with which to counter American power.?

The ties with Iran have fueled theories among Mr. Ch?vez?s fractious opponents ? though without any substantiation ? that Venezuela could be sending uranium from its Amazonas state to Iran in exchange for nuclear technology. There have also been unsubstantiated claims that Mr. Ch?vez wants eventually to replay the Cuban missile crisis.

Venezuela has repeatedly said it has no plans to develop nuclear weapons. Mr. Ch?vez said in Tehran that he would support an effort to develop a nuclear energy program by Mercosur, the South American trade bloc that Venezuela recently joined.

A strong relationship between Venezuela and Muslim countries is nothing new, dating to the formation of OPEC in Baghdad in 1960, largely the brainchild of a Venezuelan oil minister. An approximation with Iran may have gotten under way in the mid-1990?s by Norberto Ceresole, an Argentine sociologist known for his anti-Semitic views who was a Ch?vez adviser. Mr. Ch?vez later distanced himself from Mr. Ceresole, who died in 2003. After Mr. Ch?vez was elected in 1998, he made relations with Iran a priority in his push for OPEC to raise oil prices.

Recent statements by Mr. Ch?vez in Iran and other Muslim countries, however, are increasing concern here in Caracas that Mr. Ch?vez is aligning himself too closely with Muslim leaders who have little in common with Venezuela?s generally inclusive and pluralistic political system. While in Qatar, Mr. Ch?vez said in an interview with Al Jazeera that Israeli military actions in Lebanon were ?being carried out in the style of Hitler, in a fascist fashion.?

After the fighting between Israel and the Lebanese Hezbollah militia began, Mr. Ch?vez recalled his highest-ranking diplomat in Israel. Then, in his weekly television program, Mr. Ch?vez accused Israel of a ?new Holocaust.? The authorities in Jerusalem responded by recalling Israel?s ambassador in Venezuela, Shlomo Cohen, for consultations.

?We have to categorically reject the comments for attempting to make the Holocaust banal,? said Fred Pressner, president of the Confederation of Jewish Associations of Venezuela. But some Jewish leaders here also said earlier this year that comments by Mr. Ch?vez about the ?descendants of the same ones who crucified Christ? were too hastily interpreted as anti-Semitic.

Political analysts here said the comments about Israel and other recent moves, like the appointment of Nicolas Maduro as foreign minister, were evidence of a radicalization of foreign policy that had stronger ties with Iran at its center. Mr. Maduro, who has stepped down as speaker of the National Assembly to take the post, had traveled to Iran in February to show explicit support for its nuclear program.
29571  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Re: Humor on: August 20, 2006, 05:27:57 AM
http://www.bertrand-soulier.com/2006/08/04/magicienne-nue/

There is some pleasant nudity smiley
29572  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Re: The Tradition and Culture Thread on: August 19, 2006, 09:34:00 AM
Please forgive the fragmented nature of my posting in fragments, but at the moment it is all I have time to do.
----------

Concerning "selling" techniques to the general public via DVDs, here is my current thinking:

As noted in the two "Rumination" clips, and as discussed in greater detail in the interviews which are included in Disc three of the the "Die Less Often" DVD (the duplication house promises we will have our first ones by August 23rd) I seek to teach in a way that does not give bad guys additional bad ideas, but rather to communicate to what we call "the warriors of the Unorganized Militia" what I understand to be the reality of knife in our culture.  IMHO a substantial portion of the attacks will be of the sort done by criminals/convicts in prison.  That is to say that they will be done with primal killing frenzy with extreme forward pressure and multiple stabs and slashes principally from the forehand side-- the "prison sewing machine".  (Of course there are other kinds of attacks! -- but in DBMA one of our general principles is to seek to deal with primal realities first.)  By my addressing this in the DVD I am not telling criminals something they don't know already!!!  Instread, IMHO I am making a point that many martial art people who train knife defense do not appreciate.  My hope is that by appreciating this point and training with awareness of it with techniques that can work in the adrenal state against serious killing intention, that they will be better prepared to act effectively to defend themselves.

Does this make sense?

Next matter:  I sense in the questioning of the teacher referenced by BataanVet a sense that we lack respect for the Art.  The point is made graciously and with respect and so I am glad to answer.

I would point out our DVD "The Grandfathers Speak" is about allowing people to learn about where the Art came from and about those who brought and bring it to us.  We put a lot of editing into this (translation-- we spent a lot of money to do this right) The 28 minute piece on Manong Giron in particular took a tremendous amount of time and work, but we wanted the story to be told as it deserves to be told.  And now we work on "The Grandfathers Speak 2: Maestro Sonny Umpad".  These DVDs are not big sellers.  They do not make us money.  We lose money on them.  We do them because we are in a position to give back to the Art something (creating a good DVD of this sort of thing) that not many people can do-- and so we do it.

Normally I would not mention this and I do not mention it now to seek applause, but in that the question has been asked, I answer.

My next post on all this will come as I have time.

Time for breakfast and then a full day of teaching/training.  The Adventure continues,
Crafty Dog
29573  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Re: The Tradition and Culture Thread on: August 18, 2006, 10:41:24 PM
Have you had a chance to watch "Knife Ruminations" and "Rambling Ruminations"?

29574  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Re: Grandfathers Speak Vol. 2: Sonny Umpad on: August 18, 2006, 10:37:42 PM
Maestro Sonny has graciously had some of his students make footage available to us, including some very impressive knife footage.
29575  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Re: Guro Saltys Training in thailand on: August 18, 2006, 10:36:08 PM
Thank you for that info Porn Star Dog (That's because his last name is "JungwiwattanattaPORN" or "Jung" for short).

Ajarn Salty's life now requires his attention elsewhere.  We'll be glad for him and for ourselves when the wheel rolls around and he can join us once again.
29576  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Lebanon on: August 17, 2006, 07:48:40 PM
HASSAN NASRALLAH and Ehud Olmert both say they won. But in asymmetrical warfare, the test of victory is asymmetrical too. Israel's prime minister set himself an absurd aim?the complete demolition of Hizbullah's power in Lebanon?and failed to achieve it. The shrewder Mr Nasrallah said victory would consist merely of surviving, and Hizbullah, however battered, did survive. On the last day it was not just standing, it also fired a record 246 rockets into Israel.

Hizbullah being what it is, Mr Nasrallah lost no time claiming that this was ?a strategic, historic victory?; crowds in Tehran chorused that Israel had been ?destroyed?. Did Hizbullah not kill 159 Israelis, including 116 Zionist soldiers? Israel being what it is, Mr Olmert's political foes lost no time denouncing the prime minister's failings as Israelis sank into a collective despond about the disappointing showing of their army and the blunting of their country's long-term deterrent power.

Mr Olmert, echoed by George Bush, says that Israel won because it has transformed Lebanon. Under Security Council Resolution 1701, which brought the fragile ceasefire, Hizbullah is to withdraw north of the Litani river, make way for the Lebanese army plus a strengthened UN force, and disarm. That would, Israel says, put an end to Hizbullah's ?state within state?. And so it would?if it happened. But it may not. Within days of the ceasefire, Mr Nasrallah said it was ?too early? to discuss disarming. Syria's president, Bashar Assad, said so too. And the likelihood of the Lebanese army or a UN force trying to disarm Hizbullah against its will is zero. Two years ago, the UN passed a splendid resolution, 1559, demanding the disarmament of all militias in Lebanon. If Hizbullah did not comply then, why should it do so now, flushed with self-declared victory and with Israel's army still inside Lebanon?

 

Lebanon could lose too

The plain fact is that if Hizbullah is ever to give up its weapons and become just another political party, it will be through the pressure of the other Lebanese, not as a direct result of Israel's war. The diplomacy should therefore not be built on the pretence that Israel won a war it didn't. The more that Israel and America claim otherwise, the less able the caught-in-the-middle Lebanese government of Fouad Siniora will be to extract favours from Mr Nasrallah. A better idea would be to deprive Hizbullah of the pretexts it has invented for keeping up its war. It would be useful, for example, if Israel gave up the Shebaa Farms, the bit of Syrian territory Hizbullah says is Lebanon's, and accepted a prisoner swap.

However, Israel needs to save face too. Mr Olmert has no interest in concessions that reinforce the idea that he led his warrior nation to defeat. Israelis feel they dare not let their country look weak. And now come ominous signs that it does. Mr Assad has started talking again about liberating the Golan Heights. Having previously denied arming Hizbullah, Iran this week started to boast about the weapons it sent. If Israel is to give up Shebaa at such a time it must have something big in return, such as the actual removal of Hizbullah's arms?not just their concealment?in the south at least. Since America is not seen as an honest broker, closing such a deal may well require some new mediator. France? Turkey? Germany? Without an agreement, the war could resume at any moment.

 

When will they ever learn?

If a deal is done, what lesson will Israel take from this war? Probably something along the lines of: more infantry, fewer tanks. Those who preach sagaciously from afar that Israel should learn something bigger?the necessity of making peace instead of relying on force?have not been paying attention.

The hubris that blinded Israel after its great victory of 1967 cleared decades ago. Since the 1980s at least two prime ministers, Yitzhak Rabin and Ehud Barak, gave their all in the search for peace. The first paid with his life and the second with his job. Even the hawkish Ariel Sharon budged. He pulled Israel out of Gaza and knocked the legs from under Israel's settler movement. The trouble for Israel is that in peacemaking, as well as in war, the enemy gets a vote. What the well-meaning protesters who have been marching in Europe in praise of Hizbullah refuse to acknowledge is that today, as in the 1940s, Israel still has some neighbours who continue to deny its very right to exist as a Jewish state.

This is not to say that Israel is blameless. It has made mistakes aplenty down the years. This war was probably just that: a mistake after a provocation and not a plot cooked up either by Israel and America against Iran, or by Iran against Israel and America, as the rival conspiracy theories go. It followed a bigger blunder: Israel's failure after Yasser Arafat's death to work seriously with his moderate successor, Mahmoud Abbas.

But peace does not depend only on Israel. Six years ago Israel withdrew from Lebanon to a border painstakingly demarcated by the UN. Hizbullah fought on anyway. Like Iran, it says its aim is Israel's destruction. Though an authentic political movement with a domestic agenda in Lebanon, it is also blatantly anti-Semitic. Mr Nasrallah once reflected that collecting the Jews in Palestine made them easier to wipe out. Its al-Manar TV station is a beacon of hate: one series purported to show Jews murdering Christian children to use their blood for Passover bread. Whether Hizbullah and Iran seriously propose to destroy Israel is hard to tell, but it is what they keep saying?and they have imitators. The Palestinians' ruling Hamas movement has not yet dared to say out loud that it accepts even the principle of sharing Palestine with a Jewish state.

Following Mr Sharon's withdrawal from Gaza, Mr Olmert hoped to follow his example by uprooting Israeli settlements from much of the West Bank. Hizbullah has now killed stone dead the idea of Israel giving up territory again without cast-iron security assurances. So there will be no leaving any of the West Bank until there is a deal. Israel must find some way to re-engage with the Palestinians. But right now it is not even talking to Hamas?and Hamas, after the Lebanon war, is in danger of subscribing anew to the old illusion that Palestine can be liberated by force. Black days ahead for the Middle East.
===================================

?Victory? for Hizbullah is not quite the same as victory for Lebanon, whatever its divided politicians feel they have to say

?DIVINE Victory?No Trespassing.? So says the message, in English and Arabic, printed on the yellow crime-scene tape that cordons off bomb sites in Haret Hreik, the Beirut suburb that is Hizbullah's firmest stronghold. The speed with which the Shia party, emerging bruised but triumphant in spirit after a month-long war, produced its own jaunty tape for this particular purpose says much about its efficiency. As the shaky ceasefire that started on August 14th took hold, party workers stole a march on the Lebanese government, fanning out across the country to give away victory sweets, clear debris, pull bodies from the rubble, and process claims for compensation from the estimated 15,000 householders who lost their homes to Israel's bombing.

Impressive in peace as in war, Hizbullah's tenacity carries heavy costs, however. The main one is that it is preventing the government of Lebanon from implementing the terms of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701, which it gratefully accepted in order to bring the fighting to an end. The core of this resolution is that Hizbullah should no longer operate as a military force in southern Lebanon, of which it was undisputed master before the war erupted. In its place, under the resolution and in the imagination at least of Fouad Siniora, Lebanon's prime minister, the official Lebanese army is supposed now to hold sway?assisted by a new international force that will give some bite to the toothless UNIFIL force that has been deployed ineffectually in the south for years.

As a part of the government, Hizbullah too has notionally accepted 1701. But now that the guns are silent and it has declared itself the victor, the organisation is in no hurry to implement its part of the deal. Hassan Nasrallah, the leader who evaded Israel's bombs for a month, is riding high on a region-wide wave of enthusiasm. In a typically soft-spoken but caustic television address, he called his Lebanese critics ?immoral? in their haste to see Hizbullah defanged. ?At this emotionally difficult and fateful time, some individuals speaking with wooden tongues sit behind desks in their air-conditioned offices and talk about these issues,? he said. One could virtually feel Lebanon's other politicians and grandees, none of whom now rivals him in popular standing, squirm.

If Mr Nasrallah refuses to disarm, even in the south, who can make him? He has the support of Iran, his chief armourer, which denounced 1701 as ?a Zionist document?. He also has the support of Syria. Its president, Bashar Assad, made this clear in a speech celebrating Hizbullah's ?victory?. Those Lebanese who were demanding that the group lay down its arms were ?Israeli creations? who wished to provoke civil war, he said in a fire-breathing peroration. The ramshackle Lebanese army is no match for Hizbullah, and the parts of the army recruited from the Shias of south Lebanon would probably refuse to fire on Hizbullah even if they were ordered to. The new international force may have robust rules of engagement, but it will not try to finish Israel's job for it.
 

That leaves Israel. Since the fighting ended, it has withdrawn many of its soldiers from Lebanon. But many remain?and may stay on for months, according to Israel's top general, if Lebanon's government fails to disarm Hizbullah or assert its authority in the south. Israel may also keep up the air and sea blockade that has throttled Lebanon's import-dependent economy. However, beyond its strenuous insistence that the Lebanese government has a duty to honour the agreement it signed, Israel does not seem eager to resume the war. For the present, its soldiers and Hizbullah's remain edgily intermingled in the south. There have been some lethal skirmishes. But neither army seems to relish another round just yet.

The man who is in the toughest predicament of all is Mr Siniora. Lebanon's prime minister is in a fix. Lebanese patriotism obliges him to celebrate Mr Nasrallah's great victory. But most of the coalition government over which he presides wants to seize the opportunity, enshrined in 1701 (and made possible by Israel's deplorable bombs), to turn Lebanon into a normal country, not one in which Iran and Syria maintain the Hizbullah fief. Behind the victory talk, many non-Shia Lebanese are appalled by the cost to Lebanon of Mr Nasrallah's war. They would love to use 1701 as a tool to strip Hizbullah of its arms and power.

Which is precisely why Mr Nasrallah is unlikely to oblige. In the eyes of many Shias, who were until recently Lebanon's most downtrodden sect, military strength is a guarantor of influence against the historically dominant and wealthier Christians and Sunni Muslims. Hizbullah's own leaders hold an even more paranoid worldview, regarding their fighting strength as a buffer that protects not just Lebanese Shias, but Arabs and Muslims at large, from American hegemony.

On paper, Mr Siniora's coalition of Sunni, Druze and right-wing Christian parties commands a strong parliamentary majority. His government, a product of the ?cedar revolution? that resulted last year in the eviction of Syria's army and looked set to recapture Lebanon for the West, enjoys the backing of the oil-rich Arab Gulf states, the United States and Lebanon's former colonial master, France. Yet its street-level power is hardly a match for Hizbullah's. Though pro-government businessmen have pledged to pay for rebuilding bridges across the country, their efforts are likely to be eclipsed by the door-to-door thoroughness of Hizbullah charities, augmented by the deep pockets of Iran.

At best, it seems, Mr Nasrallah will allow the Lebanese army to deploy to the south, aided later perhaps by the new international force. But his consent will be based on an agreement to conceal Hizbullah's weapons, not actually to remove or hand them over. He will pretend to comply with 1701, and the world may pretend to believe him. This fictitious construct may give Israel the cover it needs to withdraw its own army. But all the conditions will exist for a resumption of the war.

29577  DBMA Espanol / Espanol Discussion / Re: Mexico on: August 17, 2006, 02:43:16 PM

MEXICO: Mexico's highest electoral court rejected complaints about the July congressional elections, which gave conservative candidate Felipe Calderon's party, the ruling National Action Party (PAN), the largest stake in the legislature. PAN will have 52 seats in the senate and the rival Institutional Revolutionary Party will have 33 seats. Defeated presidential candidate Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador's Democratic Revolutionary Party will have 28 seats.
29578  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Re: Grandfathers Speak Vol. 2: Sonny Umpad on: August 17, 2006, 02:33:39 PM
A snippet of this motion done single stick will probably appear in "Grandfathers Speak 2: Sonny Umpad" (he says craftily in promotion thereof  wink )
29579  DBMA Espanol / Espanol Discussion / Medio Oriente on: August 16, 2006, 07:23:13 PM
Lo presente llego' de un amigo en Espana:


Hezbollah, el factor confuso
http://www.lanacion.com.ar/opinion/nota.asp?nota_id=826770  <http://www.lanacion.com.ar/opinion/nota.asp?nota_id=826770+>



WASHINGTON

Sorpresa: acaba de difundirse una fatwa contra Hezbollah firmada por Abdala Ben Jabr?n, importante sheik wahabi de Arabia Saudita. Asegura que viola la ley cor?nica quien apoya a esta organizaci?n, quien se pliega a ella o reza por ella. Sigue a un documento asombroso publicado el 12 de julio por otro sheik, el kuwait? Hamid al Al?, que condena las ambiciones imperiales de Ir?n instrumentadas por Hezbollah desde el L?bano. Estos pronunciamientos son apenas la parte visible del iceberg que anuda viejos y nuevos conflictos dentro de la familia ?rabe y musulmana, ocultos hasta ahora por el fragor de la obsesiva lucha contra la existencia de Israel.

Es necesario advertir que no todos los ?rabes quieren un Estado palestino y que m?s ?rabes a?n detestan a los palestinos, como lo prueba la inexpugnable valla egipcia que impide la fuga de palestinos hacia el Sina? o las prohibiciones que impiden a los palestinos, en casi todos los Estados ?rabes, comprar propiedades o gozar de los mismos derechos que poseen los dem?s habitantes. Basta recordar que fueron asesinados por las tropas jordanas, sirias y libanesas cinco o seis veces m?s palestinos que todos los que cayeron en sus enfrentamientos con Israel desde hace m?s de medio siglo.

Para entender a Hezbollah conviene tener en cuenta las cuatro corrientes de opini?n que prevalecieron en la zona sucesivamente, en tan s?lo un siglo. Tratar? de ser breve y claro.

Antes de la Primera Guerra Mundial, cinco pa?ses que ahora son Siria, el L?bano, Israel, Jordania y los territorios palestinos constitu?an una provincia pobre y marginal del imperio turco. El movimiento nacional jud?o, que hab?a comenzado a desafiar la opresi?n turca desde fines del siglo XIX para constituir un Hogar Nacional Jud?o en la antigua tierra de Israel, determin? que tras la Primera Guerra Mundial Gran Breta?a fuera encomendada por la Liga de las Naciones para ejercer su mandato sobre lo que entonces empezaba a llamarse Palestina. Este nombre resucitaba la denominaci?n romana impuesta por el emperador Adriano, en reemplazo del militante nombre de Judea.

El movimiento nacionalista ?rabe, que naci? en Siria a principios del siglo XX y fue teorizado por personalidades cristianas y pro occidentales, dijo que "Palestina" era un invento de los sionistas, para independizarla de Siria. En efecto, el nacionalismo ?rabe de entonces consideraba que toda esa regi?n constitu?a una gran Siria, opini?n que subsiste en ese pa?s. Por eso sus tentaciones para dominar el L?bano e Israel.

Esa primera corriente de opini?n fue sustituida por la que despleg? el presidente egipcio Gamal Abdel Nasser sobre el panarabismo, que adem?s de secular era autoritario y estatizante. Nasser fund? la Rep?blica Arabe Unida, que lig? por unos a?os a Egipto con Siria y que deb?a incorporar r?pidamente al resto de los pa?ses ?rabes. La insensata Guerra de los Seis D?as acab? con ese sue?o.

Empez? a crecer una tercera tendencia, que inclu?a a la OLP. Pretend?a un perfil nacional diferenciado para cada pa?s. A la OLP, sin embargo, no le bastaba con crear un Estado palestino en Cisjordania y Gaza, que durante 19 a?os estuvieron bajo la ocupaci?n egipcio-jordana sin que se hiciera nada para establecerlo, sino que pretend?a incluir en ese Estado todo Israel, y conquistar Jordania. Por eso, en 1971, Yasser Arafat, que hab?a formado en Jordania un Estado dentro del Estado, asalt? el gobierno y fue repelido un septiembre llamado desde entonces Septiembre Negro. Las tropas jordanas asesinaron a alrededor de 20.000 palestinos y luego otros cayeron ante las balas sirias cuando intentaron refugiarse en el Norte.

En el L?bano, la OLP form? otro Estado dentro del Estado, hasta que la guerra civil y la intervenci?n de Israel la expulsaron. En esa ?poca naci? Hezbollah como una enga?osa alternativa pac?fica, por su compromiso con la asistencia religiosa y social. No se limitaba a ella, sino a desplegar una acci?n terrorista sostenida por el Ir?n teocr?tico de Khomeini. Inaugur? los cr?menes suicidas mediante la matanza de las fuerzas de paz francesas y norteamericanas que hab?an llegado al L?bano para yugular la atroz guerra civil. Luego habr?a ejecutado los dos atentados de Buenos Aires (embajada de Israel y AMIA), con el posible apoyo de la embajada iran?. Este hecho inaugur? la elecci?n de objetivos civiles para generar infinito p?nico. Al mismo tiempo, inici? la interminable serie de ataques contra las poblaciones civiles de Israel. Esta es la cuarta y ?ltima corriente de opini?n, que oscurece a las otras tres.

La oscurece porque esta tendencia anhela la reconstrucci?n del gran califato medieval, que unir?a a cincuenta naciones musulmanas bajo una sola conducci?n teocr?tica. No importa la diferenciaci?n nacional, sino la imposici?n de la sharia (ley isl?mica) y una guerra perpetua contra los infieles de cualquier denominaci?n.

Es curioso que Hezbollah, una organizaci?n chiita, fan?tica y dependiente de Ir?n, cuente con el manifiesto apoyo de Siria, que es una cruel dictadura castrense secular basada en la minor?a alawita. Profundas contradicciones separan a ambos reg?menes. Sin embargo, los dos tienen en com?n su desprecio por los sunnitas y por Israel. Siria invadi? el L?bano en 1975 de la mano de la Falange cristiana que combat?a a la OLP, porque tambi?n detestaba a la OLP, que interfer?a con sus intereses en el L?bano, y deseaba un Estado independiente en Palestina, espacio que Siria segu?a considerando suyo, aunque no lo expresara en forma transparente.

Hezbollah pedalea con un pie en Ir?n y otro en Siria, merced a tres elementos comunes: odio a Israel, odio a los Estados Unidos y posici?n ambigua sobre la creaci?n de un Estado palestino en Gaza y Cisjordania (ambig?edad disimulada con las protestas por el sufrimiento palestino, al que no se apresura a ponerle fin, porque siempre los terroristas hacen algo para frustrar la soluci?n negociada).

Llama tambi?n la atenci?n que cuando no se quiere tener enfrentamientos con Israel, baste con no atacarlo. Siria, por ejemplo, no ha protagonizado ni un solo cruce de balas con Israel desde la guerra de Iom Kipur. En cambio, hostiliza en forma c?nica a ese pa?s por medio de Hezbollah, Hamas y la Jihad Isl?mica desde el Norte (L?bano) y desde el Sur (Gaza). Cuando se produjo la retirada israel? de la zona de seguridad que manten?a en el L?bano, en vez de que ese territorio fuera ocupado por el ej?rcito liban?s, como ordenaron las Naciones Unidas, lo hizo con celeridad extrema Hezbollah, gracias a la protecci?n que le brindaban las tropas sirias establecidas en el valle de la Bekaa.

S?lo ahora se puede advertir que los servicios de inteligencia israel?es fueron ineficaces para percibir la preparaci?n de la guerra en gran escala que efectuaba Hezbollah durante seis febriles a?os, con un acopio impresionante de armamento, construcci?n de bastiones, perforaci?n de t?neles enormes y un control absoluto de la zona, adem?s de instalar bases de lanzamiento misil?stico en barrios densamente poblados, incluso edificios de departamentos y hasta escuelas, que le sirven de atroz escudo.

Siria fue expulsada por la mayor?a de la poblaci?n libanesa tras el asesinato del premier Harari. Pero si algo deseaba la rencorosa Siria era que despu?s de su retiro estallara el caos. Lo acaba de producir su ahijado Hezbollah, precisamente.

Los ataques de Israel para bloquear sus fuentes de abastecimiento (aeropuertos, carreteras, estaciones de radar y edificios enteros controlados por esta organizaci?n) han provocado horribles da?os humanos y materiales a un bell?simo pa?s como el L?bano. Un pa?s d?bil que no pudo aplicar la orden de las Naciones Unidas, porque Hezbollah, gracias a la caudalosa intervenci?n sirio-iran?, se convirti? en una fuerza m?s poderosa que su ej?rcito nacional.

Se calcula que cerca del 80 por ciento de la poblaci?n libanesa, incluidos chiitas, perciben que los frutos de Hezbollah son un derrame de la tragedia, un sanguinario c?ncer que les naci? en los a?os 80 y que los llev? a esta guerra mediante su fabuloso acopio de armas y sus incesantes ataques a Israel. Sin embargo, los libaneses no pueden extirpar este c?ncer por s? solos.

Adem?s, crece una tensi?n religiosa trasnacional que ojal? no se transforme en conflagraci?n abierta: los chiitas y los sunnitas se asesinan en Irak y en otras regiones en las que compiten por el poder del mundo isl?mico.

Nunca tantos pa?ses ?rabes y musulmanes se mantuvieron tan inm?viles como en esta lamentable operaci?n de limpieza policial que realiza Israel dentro de un pa?s ?rabe. S?lo hay discursos: ninguna acci?n firme. Ellos parecen agradecer el maldito trabajo que no se atreven a realizar ellos mismos.

Hezbollah es un peligro para el L?bano y dem?s pa?ses ?rabes que no desean ser dominados por Ir?n ni hundirse en un totalitarismo fundamentalista. Pero Israel tampoco podr? barrer a Hezbollah por completo, aunque se empe?e durante otras semanas que aumentar?n el luto de ambas partes. S?lo conseguir? debilitarlo. Entonces es probable que el gobierno liban?s, con sus fuerzas armadas, apoyadas por tropas extranjeras, tal vez por la OTAN, se encargue de acabar la tarea: decomisar el armamento acumulado en t?neles o zonas civiles para que el L?bano pueda reconstruirse y volver a ser uno de los pa?ses m?s hermosos, pac?ficos, cultos y progresistas de Medio Oriente.

Por Marcos Aguinis

Para LA NACION

29580  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Invitation to dialog to Muslims on: August 16, 2006, 06:50:51 PM
Concerning the term Islamofascism, for which Rogt has taken me to task, I bring this piece, first posted by Buzwardo in the "Rants" thread over to here:

-------------------

What Is 'Islamofascism'?

By Stephen Schwartz


"Islamic fascists" -- used by President George W. Bush for the conspirators in the alleged trans-Atlantic airline bombing plot -- and references by other prominent figures to "Islamofascism," have been met by protests from Muslims who say the term is an insult to their religion. The meaning and origin of the concept, as well as the legitimacy of complaints about it, have become relevant -- perhaps urgently so.

I admit to a lack of modesty or neutrality about this discussion, since I was, as I will explain, the first Westerner to use the neologism in this context.

In my analysis, as originally put in print directly after the horror of September 11, 2001, Islamofascism refers to use of the faith of Islam as a cover for totalitarian ideology. This radical phenomenon is embodied among Sunni Muslims today by such fundamentalists as the Saudi-financed Wahhabis, the Pakistani jihadists known as Jama'atis, and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. In the ranks of Shia Muslims, it is exemplified by Hezbollah in Lebanon and the clique around President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Iran.

Political typologies should make distinctions, rather than confusing them, and Islamofascism is neither a loose nor an improvised concept. It should be employed sparingly and precisely. The indicated movements should be treated as Islamofascist, first, because of their congruence with the defining characteristics of classic fascism, especially in its most historically-significant form -- German National Socialism.

Fascism is distinguished from the broader category of extreme right-wing politics by its willingness to defy public civility and openly violate the law. As such it represents a radical departure from the tradition of ultra-conservatism. The latter aims to preserve established social relations, through enforcement of law and reinforcement of authority. But the fascist organizations of Mussolini and Hitler, in their conquests of power, showed no reluctance to rupture peace and repudiate parliamentary and other institutions; the fascists employed terror against both the existing political structure and society at large. It is a common misconception of political science to believe, in the manner of amateur Marxists, that Italian fascists and Nazis sought maintenance of order, to protect the ruling classes. Both Mussolini and Hitler agitated against "the system" governing their countries. Their willingness to resort to street violence, assassinations, and coups set the Italian and German fascists apart from ordinary defenders of ruling elites, which they sought to replace. This is an important point that should never be forgotten. Fascism is not merely a harsh dictatorship or oppression by privilege.


Islamofascism similarly pursues its aims through the willful, arbitrary, and gratuitous disruption of global society, either by terrorist conspiracies or by violation of peace between states. Al-Qaida has recourse to the former weapon; Hezbollah, in assaulting northern Israel, used the latter. These are not acts of protest, but calculated strategies for political advantage through undiluted violence. Hezbollah showed fascist methods both in its kidnapping of Israeli soldiers and in initiating that action without any consideration for the Lebanese government of which it was a member. Indeed, Lebanese democracy is a greater enemy of Hezbollah than Israel.

Fascism rested, from the economic perspective, on resentful middle classes, frustrated in their aspirations and anxious about loss of their position. The Italian middle class was insecure in its social status; the German middle class was completely devastated by the defeat of the country in the First World War. Both became irrational with rage at their economic difficulties; this passionate and uncontrolled fury was channeled and exploited by the acolytes of Mussolini and Hitler. Al-Qaida is based in sections of the Saudi, Pakistani, and Egyptian middle classes fearful, in the Saudi case, of losing their unstable hold on prosperity -- in Pakistan and Egypt, they are angry at the many obstacles, in state and society, to their ambitions. The constituency of Hezbollah is similar: the growing Lebanese Shia middle class, which believes itself to be the victim of discrimination.

Fascism was imperialistic; it demanded expansion of the German and Italian spheres of influence. Islamofascism has similar ambitions; the Wahhabis and their Pakistani and Egyptian counterparts seek control over all Sunni Muslims in the world, while Hezbollah projects itself as an ally of Syria and Iran in establishing regional dominance.

Fascism was totalitarian; i.e. it fostered a totalistic world view -- a distinct social reality that separated its followers from normal society. Islamofascism parallels fascism by imposing a strict division between Muslims and alleged unbelievers. For Sunni radicals, the practice of takfir -- declaring all Muslims who do not adhere to the doctrines of the Wahhabis, Pakistani Jama'atis, and the Muslim Brotherhood to be outside the Islamic global community or ummah -- is one expression of Islamofascism. For Hezbollah, the posture of total rejectionism in Lebanese politics -- opposing all politicians who might favor any political negotiation with Israel -- serves the same purpose. Takfir, or "excommunication" of ordinary Muslims, as well as Hezbollah's Shia radicalism, are also important as indispensable, unifying psychological tools for the strengthening of such movements.

Fascism was paramilitary; indeed, the Italian and German military elites were reluctant to accept the fascist parties' ideological monopoly. Al-Qaida and Hezbollah are both paramilitary.

I do not believe these characteristics are intrinsic to any element of the faith of Islam. Islamofascism is a distortion of Islam, exactly as Italian and German fascism represented perversions of respectable patriotism in those countries. Nobody argues today that Nazism possessed historical legitimacy as an expression of German nationalism; only Nazis would make such claims, to defend themselves. Similarly, Wahhabis and their allies argue that their doctrines are "just Islam." But German culture existed for centuries, and exists today, without submitting to Nazi values; Islam created a world-spanning civilization, surviving in a healthy condition in many countries today, without Wahhabism or political Shiism, both of which are less than 500 years old.

But what of those primitive Muslims who declare that "Islamofascism" is a slur? The Washington Post of August 14 quoted a speaker at a pro-Hezbollah demonstration in Washington, as follows: "'Mr. Bush: Stop calling Islam "Islamic fascism,' said Esam Omesh, president of the Muslim American Society, prompting a massive roar from the crowd. He said there is no such thing, 'just as there is no such thing as Christian fascism.'"

These curious comments may be parsed in various ways. Since President Bush used the term "Islamic fascists" to refer to a terrorist conspiracy, did Mr. Omesh (whose Muslim American Society is controlled by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood) intend to accept the equation of Islam with said terrorism, merely rejecting the political terminology he dislikes? Probably not. But Mr. Omesh's claim that "there is no such thing as Christian fascism" is evidence of profound historical ignorance. Leading analysts of fascism saw its Italian and German forms as foreshadowed by the Ku Klux Klan in the U.S. and the Russian counter-revolutionary mass movement known as the Black Hundreds. Both movements were based in Christian extremism, symbolized by burning crosses in America and pogroms against Jews under the tsars.

The fascist Iron Guard in Romania during the interwar period and in the second world war was explicitly Christian -- its official title was the "Legion of the Archangel Michael;" Christian fascism also exists in the form of Ulster Protestant terrorism, and was visible in the (Catholic) Blue Shirt movement active in the Irish Free State during the 1920s and 1930s. Both the Iron Guard and the Blue Shirts attracted noted intellectuals; the cultural theorist Mircea Eliade in the first case, the poet W.B Yeats in the second. Many similar cases could be cited. It is also significant that Mr. Omesh did not deny the existence of "Jewish fascism" -- doubtless because in his milieu, the term is commonly directed against Israel. Israel is not a fascist state, although some marginal, ultra-extremist Jewish groups could be so described.

I will conclude with a summary of a more obscure debate over the term, which is symptomatic of many forms of confusion in American life today. I noted at the beginning of this text that I am neither modest nor neutral on this topic. I developed the concept of Islamofascism after receiving an e-mail in June 2000 from a Bangladeshi Sufi Muslim living in America, titled "The Wahhabis: Fascism in Religious Garb!" I then resided in Kosovo. I put the term in print in The Spectator of London, on September 22, 2001. I was soon credited with it by Andrew Sullivan in his Daily Dish, and after it was attributed to Christopher Hitchens, the latter also acknowledged me as the earliest user of it. While working in Bosnia-Hercegovina more recently, I participated in a public discussion in which the Pakistani Muslim philosopher Fazlur Rahman (1919-88), who taught for years at the University of Chicago (not to be confused with the Pakistani radical Fazlur Rehman), was cited as referring to "Islamic fascists."

If such concerns seem absurdly self-interested, it is also interesting to observe how Wikipedia, the online encyclopedia, dealt with the formulation of Islamofascism as an analytical tool. After a long and demeaning colloquy between me and a Wikipedian who commented negatively on an early book of mine while admitting that he had never even seen a copy of it, Wikipedia (referring to it collectively, as its members prefer) decided it to ascribe it to another historian of Islam, Malise Ruthven. But Ruthven, in 1990, used the term to refer to all authoritarian governments in Muslim countries, from Morocco to Pakistan.

I do not care much, these days, about Wikipedia and its misapprehensions, or obsess over acknowledgements of my work. But Malise Ruthven was and would remain wrong to believe that authoritarianism and fascism are the same. To emphasize, fascism is something different, and much worse, than simple dictatorship, however cruel the latter may be. That is a lesson that should have been learned 70 years ago, when German Nazism demonstrated that it was a feral and genocidal aberration in modern European history, not merely another form of oppressive rightist rule, or a particularly wild variety of colonialism.

Similarly, the violence wreaked by al-Qaida and Hezbollah, and by Saddam Hussein before them, has been different from other expressions of reactionary Arabism, simple Islamist ideology, or violent corruption in the post-colonial world. Between democracy, civilized values, and normal religion on one side, and Islamofascism on the other, there can be no compromise; as I have written before, it is a struggle to the death. President Bush is right to say "young democracies are fragile ... this may be [the Islamofascists'] last and best opportunity to stop freedom's advance." As with the Nazis, nothing short of a victory for democracy can assure the world's security.

Stephen Schwartz is Executive Director of the Center for Islamic Pluralism.

http://www.tcsdaily.com/article.aspx?id=081606C
 
 
29581  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Invitation to dialog to Muslims on: August 16, 2006, 11:53:18 AM
Capt:

I think the Holocaust cartoon contest should be a non-event.

All:

Some of the recent posts here have drifted off topic.  Here's to staying on topic:

CD
=============
Today's NY Times op-ed page:

Muslim Myopia
               E-MailPrint Save
 
By IRSHAD MANJI
Published: August 16, 2006
New Haven

LAST week, the luminaries of the British Muslim mainstream ? lobbyists, lords and members of Parliament ? published an open letter to Prime Minister Tony Blair, telling him that the ?debacle? of both Iraq and Lebanon provides ?ammunition to extremists who threaten us all.? In increasingly antiwar America, a similar argument is gaining traction: The United States brutalizes Muslims, which in turn foments Islamist terror.

But violent jihadists have rarely needed foreign policy grievances to justify their hot heads. There was no equivalent to the Iraq debacle in 1993, when Islamists first tried to blow up the World Trade Center, or in 2000, when they attacked the American destroyer Cole. Indeed, that assault took place after United States-led military intervention saved thousands of Muslims in Bosnia and Kosovo.

If Islamists cared about changing Iraq policy, they would not have bothered to abduct two journalists from France ? probably the most antiwar, anti-Bush nation in the West. Even overt solidarity with Iraqi suffering did not prevent Margaret Hassan, who ran a world-renowned relief agency in Baghdad, from being executed by insurgents.

Meanwhile, at least as many Muslims are dying at the hands of other Muslims as under the boots of any foreign imperial power. In Sudan, black Muslims are starved, raped, enslaved and slaughtered by Arab militias, with the consent of an Islamic government. Where is the ?official? Muslim fury against that genocide? Do Muslim lives count only when snuffed out by non-Muslims? If not, then here is an idea for Muslim representatives in the West: Go ahead and lecture the politicians that their foreign policies give succor to radicals. At the same time, however, challenge the educated and angry young Muslims to hold their own accountable, too.

This means reminding them that in Pakistan, Sunnis hunt down Shiites every day; that in northern Israel, Katuysha rockets launched by Hezbollah have ripped through the homes of Arab Muslims as well as Jews; that in Egypt, the riot police of President Hosni Mubarak routinely club, rape, torture and murder Muslim activists promoting democracy; and, above all, that civil wars have become hallmarks of the Islamic world.

Muslim figureheads will not dare be so honest. They would sooner replicate the very sins for which they castigate the Bush and Blair governments ? namely, switching rationales and pretending integrity.

In the wake of the London bombings on July 7, 2005, Iqbal Sacranie, then the head of the influential Muslim Council of Britain, insisted that economic discrimination lay at the root of Islamist radicalism in his country. When it came to light that some of the suspects enjoyed middle-class upbringings, university educations, jobs and cars, Mr. Sacranie found a new culprit: foreign policy. In so doing, he boarded the groupthink express steered by Muslim elites.

The good news is that ordinary people of faith are capable of self-criticism. Two months ago, 65 percent of British Muslims polled believed that their communities should increase efforts to integrate. The same poll also produced troubling results: 13 percent lionized the July 7 terrorists, and 16 percent sympathized. Still, these figures total 29 percent ? less than half the number who sought to belong more fully to British society.

Whether in Britain or America, those who claim to speak for Muslims have a responsibility to the majority, which wants to reconcile Islam with pluralism. Whatever their imperial urges, it is not for Tony Blair or George W. Bush to restore Islam?s better angels. That duty ? and glory ? goes to Muslims.

Irshad Manji, a fellow at Yale University, is the author of ?The Trouble with Islam Today: A Muslim?s Call for Reform in Her Faith.?


29582  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Re: Die Less Often: Interface of Gun, Knife and Emtpy Hand on: August 16, 2006, 10:07:56 AM
Bad news and good news.

The bad news is the duplication house will not be shipping us DLO until 8/23. 

The good news is that the pre-order price remains in place until then AND the reason for the delay is that because of the size of our order the duplication house is using the top grade technology in running off the discs.
29583  DBMA Espanol / Espanol Discussion / Re: Mexico on: August 16, 2006, 09:00:01 AM
1119 GMT -- MEXICO -- Mexico's apparent President-elect Felipe Calderon will be placed "under siege" and unable to operate outside his office if he is declared the winner of the election, a spokesman for Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador's Democratic Revolutionary Party said Aug. 16. Official election results are due Sept. 6.

Lo que tengo entendido (corrigame si me equivoco por favor) es que AMLO se ha producido muy poca evidencia; que y "complete recount" seria fuera de la ley; y que la Comision Elector si' esta' cumpliendo sus deberes segun la ley.

Por lo cual, AMLO me esta' paraciendo un hombre a quien le importa mas su ambicion que el bienestar de Mexico y su democracia.
29584  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Grandfathers Speak Vol. 2: Sonny Umpad on: August 15, 2006, 08:46:44 PM
Woof All:

I first met Sonny a couple of years ago in Dusseldorf, Germany at Dieter Knuettel and Alfred Plath's extravaganza of many FMA teachers under one roof for one weekend.  Sonny was one of the people I most wanted to check out, but due to scheduling conflicts between my sessions and his, I was able to catch only one of his sessions.

WOW!  shocked shocked shocked  I was greatly impressed and now am very proud to announce that Vol 2 of our irregular series "The Grandfathers Speak" will be featuring Manong/Guro/GM Sonny Umpad. 

The footage was shot at his home two weeks ago with many of the instructors Manong Sonny created in attendance and participating as well.  Footage of him as a younger man is being provided and DBMA's editor extraordinaire Ron "Night Owl" Gabriel has already finished the first edit and is now at work on the second pass.

The Adventure continues,
Crafty Dog
29585  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Re: Chris Poznik on: August 15, 2006, 08:37:57 PM
I'm not man enough to put a kimura on the Poz embarassed
29586  DBMA Espanol / Espanol Discussion / Re: Mexico on: August 15, 2006, 08:06:19 PM
Guau Arturo:

Esperamos tus justificaciones  smiley

CD
29587  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Lebanon on: August 15, 2006, 07:51:33 PM
Cease-Fire: Shaking Core Beliefs in the Middle East
By George Friedman

An extraordinary thing happened in the Middle East this month. An Israeli army faced an Arab army and did not defeat it -- did not render it incapable of continued resistance. That was the outcome in 1948, 1956, 1967, 1973 and 1982. But it did not happen in 2006. Should this outcome stand, it will represent a geopolitical earthquake in the region -- one that fundamentally shifts expectations and behaviors on all sides.

It is not that Hezbollah defeated the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). It did not. By most measures, it got the worst of the battle. Nevertheless, it has been left standing at the end of the battle. Its forces in the Bekaa Valley and in the Beirut area have been battered, though how severely is not yet clear. Its forces south of the Litani River were badly hurt by the Israeli attack. Nevertheless, the correlation of forces was such that the Israelis should have dealt Hezbollah, at least in southern Lebanon, a devastating blow, such that resistance would have crumbled. IDF did not strike such a blow -- so as the cease-fire took effect, Hezbollah continued to resist, continued to inflict casualties on Israeli troops and continued to fire rockets at Israel. Hezbollah has not been rendered incapable of continued resistance, and that is unprecedented.

In the regional equation, there has been an immutable belief: that, at the end of the day, IDF was capable of imposing a unilateral military solution on any Arab force. Israel might have failed to achieve its political goals in its various wars, but it never failed to impose its will on an enemy force. As a result, all neighboring nations and entities understood there were boundaries that could be crossed only if a country was willing to accept a crushing Israeli response. All neighboring countries -- Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, prior to the collapses of central authority -- understood this and shaped their behavior in view of it. Even when Egypt and Syria initiated war in 1973, it was with an understanding that their war aims had to be limited, that they had to accept the probability of defeat and had to focus on postwar political maneuvers rather than on expectations of victory.

The Egyptians withdrew from conflict and accepted the Sinai as a buffer zone, largely because 1973 convinced them that continued conflict was futile. Jordan, since 1970, has been effectively under the protection of Israel against threats from Syria and internal dangers as well. Syria has not directly challenged the Israelis since 1973, preferring indirect challenges and, not infrequently, accommodation with Israel. The idea of Israel as a regional superpower has been the defining principle.

In this conflict, what Hezbollah has achieved is not so much a defeat of Israel as a demonstration that destruction in detail is not an inevitable outcome of challenging Israel. Hezbollah has showed that it is possible to fight to a point that Israel prefers a cease-fire and political settlement to a military victory followed by political accommodation. Israel might not have lost any particular battle, and a careful analysis of the outcome could prove its course to be reasonable. But the loss of the sense -- and historical reality -- of the inevitability of Israeli military victory is a far more profound defeat for Israel, as this clears the way for other regional powers to recalculate risks.

Hezbollah's Preparations

Hezbollah meticulously prepared for the war by analyzing Israeli strengths and weaknesses. Israel is casualty-averse by dint of demographics. It therefore resorts to force multipliers such as air power and armor, combined with excellent reconnaissance and tactical intelligence. Israel uses mobility to cut lines of supply and air power to shatter centralized command-and-control, leaving enemy forces disorganized, unbalanced and unsupplied.

Hezbollah sought to deny Israel its major advantages. The group created a network of fortifications in southern Lebanon that did not require its fighters to maneuver and expose themselves to Israeli air power. Hezbollah stocked those bunkers so fighters could conduct extended combat without the need for resupply. It devolved command to the unit level, making it impossible for a decapitation strike by Israel to affect the battlefield. It worked in such a way that, while the general idea of the defense architecture was understood by Israeli military intelligence, the kind of detailed intelligence used -- for example, in 1967 -- was denied the Israelis. Hezbollah acquired anti-tank weapons from Syria and Iran that prevented Israeli armor from operating without prior infantry clearing of anti-tank teams. And by doing that, the group forced the Israelis to accept casualties in excess of what could, apparently, be tolerated. In short, it forced the Israelis to fight Hezbollah's type of war, rather than the other way around.

Hezbollah then initiated war at the time and place of its choosing. There has been speculation that Israel planned for such a war. That might be the case, but it is self-evident that, if the Israelis wanted this war, they were not expecting it when it happened. The opening of the war was not marked by the capture of two Israeli soldiers. Rather, it was the persistent and intense bombardment of Israel with missiles -- including attacks against Israel's third-largest city, Haifa -- that compelled the Israelis to fight at a moment when they obviously were unprepared for war, and could not clearly decide either their war aims or strategy. In short, Hezbollah applied a model that was supposed to be Israel's forte: The group prepared meticulously for a war and launched it when the enemy was unprepared for it.

Hezbollah went on the strategic offensive and tactical defensive. It created a situation in which Israeli forces had to move to the operational and tactical offensive at the moment of Hezbollah's highest level of preparedness. Israel could not decline combat, because of the rocket attacks against Haifa, nor was it really ready for war -- particularly psychologically. The Israelis fought when Hezbollah chose and where Hezbollah chose. Their goals were complex, where Hezbollah's were simple. Israel wanted to stop the rockets, break Hezbollah, suffer minimal casualties and maintain its image as an irresistible military force. Hezbollah merely wanted to survive the Israeli attack. The very complexity of Israel's war aims, hastily crafted as they were, represented a failure point.

The Foundations of Israeli Strategy

It is important to think through the reasoning that led to Israeli operations. Israel's actions were based on a principle promulgated by Ariel Sharon at the time of his leadership. Sharon argued that Israel must erect a wall between Israelis and Arabs. His reasoning stemmed from circumstances he faced during Israel's occupation of Lebanon: Counterinsurgency operations impose an unnecessary and unbearable cost in the long run, particularly when designed to protect peripheral interests. The losses may be small in number but, over the long term, they pose severe operational and morale challenges to the occupying force. Therefore, for Sharon, the withdrawal from Lebanon in the 1980s created a paradigm. Israel needed a national security policy that avoided the burden of counterinsurgency operations without first requiring a political settlement. In other words, Israel needed to end counterinsurgency operations by unilaterally ending the occupation and erecting a barrier between Israel and hostile populations.

The important concept in Sharon's thinking was not the notion of impenetrable borders. Rather, the important concept was the idea that Israel could not tolerate counterinsurgency operations because it could not tolerate casualties. Sharon certainly did not mean or think that Israel could not tolerate casualties in the event of a total conventional war, as in 1967 or 1973. There, extreme casualties were both tolerable and required. What he meant was that Israel could tolerate any level of casualties in a war of national survival but, paradoxically, could not tolerate low-level casualties in extended wars that did not directly involve Israel's survival.

Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert was Sharon's protege. Olmert was struggling with the process of disengagement in Gaza and looking toward the same in the West Bank. Lebanon, where Israel learned the costs of long-term occupation, was the last place he wanted to return to in July 2006. In his view, any operation in Lebanon would be tantamount to a return to counterinsurgency warfare and occupation. He did not recognize early on that Hezbollah was not fighting an insurgency, but rather a conventional war of fixed fortifications.

Olmert did a rational cost-benefit analysis. First, if the principle of the Gaza withdrawal was to be followed, the last place the Israelis wanted to be was in Lebanon. Second, though he recognized that the rocket attacks were intolerable in principle, he also knew that, in point of fact, they were relatively ineffective. The number of casualties they were causing, or were likely to cause, would be much lower than those that would be incurred with an invasion and occupation of Lebanon. Olmert, therefore, sought a low-cost solution to the problem of Hezbollah.

IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Dan Halutz offered an attractive alternative. Advocating what air force officers have advocated since the 1930s, Halutz launched an air campaign designed to destroy Hezbollah. It certainly hurt Hezbollah badly, particularly outside of southern Lebanon, where longer-range rocket launchers were located. However, in the immediate battlefield, limited tactical intelligence and the construction of the bunkers appear to have blunted the air attack. As Israeli troops moved forward across the border, they encountered a well-prepared enemy that undoubtedly was weakened but was not destroyed by the air campaign.

At this point, Olmert had a strategic choice to make. He could mount a multi-divisional invasion of Lebanon, absorb large numbers of casualties and risk being entangled in a new counterinsurgency operation, or he could seek a political settlement. He chose a compromise. After appearing to hesitate, he launched an invasion that seemed to bypass critical Hezbollah positions (isolating them), destroying other positions and then opting for a cease-fire that would transfer responsibility for security to the Lebanese army and a foreign peacekeeping force.

Viewed strictly from the standpoint of cost-benefit analysis, Olmert was probably right. Except that Hezbollah's threat to Israel proper had to be eliminated, Israel had no interests in Lebanon. The cost of destroying Hezbollah's military capability would have been extremely high, since it involved moving into the Bekaa Valley and toward Beirut -- let alone close-quarters infantry combat in the south. And even then, over time, Hezbollah would recover. Since the threat could be eliminated only at a high cost and only for a certain period of time, the casualties required made no sense.

This analysis, however, excluded the political and psychological consequences of leaving an enemy army undefeated on the battlefield. Again, do not overrate what Hezbollah did: The group did not conduct offensive operations; it was not able to conduct maneuver combat; it did not challenge the Israeli air force in the air. All it did was survive and, at the end of the war, retain its ability to threaten Israel with such casualties that Israel declined extended combat. Hezbollah did not defeat Israel on the battlefield. The group merely prevented Israel from defeating it. And that outcome marks a political and psychological triumph for Hezbollah and a massive defeat for Israel.

Implications for the Region

Hezbollah has demonstrated that total Arab defeat is not inevitable -- and with this demonstration, Israel has lost its tremendous psychological advantage. If an operational and tactical defensive need not end in defeat, then there is no reason to assume that, at some point, an Arab offensive operation need not end in defeat. And if the outcome can be a stalemate, there is no reason to assume that it cannot be a victory. If all things are possible, then taking risks against Israel becomes rational.

The outcome of this war creates two political crises.

In Israel, Olmert's decisions will come under serious attack. However correct his cost-benefit analysis might have been, he will be attacked over the political and psychological outcome. The entire legacy of Ariel Sharon -- the doctrine of disengagement -- will now come under attack. If Israel is thrown into political turmoil and indecision, the outcome on the battlefield will have been compounded politically.

There is now also a crisis in Lebanon and in the Muslim world. In Lebanon, Hezbollah has emerged as a massive political force. Even in the multi-confessional society, Hezbollah will be a decisive factor. Syria, marginalized in the region for quite a while, becomes more viable as Hezbollah's patron. Meanwhile, countries like Jordan and Egypt must reexamine their own assumptions about Israel. And in the larger Muslim world, Hezbollah's victory represents a victory for Iran and the Shia. Hezbollah, a Shiite force, has done what others could not do. This will profoundly effect the Shiite position in Iraq -- where the Shia, having first experienced the limits of American power, are now seeing the expanding boundaries of Iranian power.

We would expect Hezbollah, Syria and Iran to move rapidly to exploit what advantage this has given them, before it dissipates. This will increase pressures not only for Israel, but also for the United States, which is engaged in combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as in a vague confrontation with Iran. For the Israelis and the Americans, restabilizing their interests will be difficult.

Now, some would argue that Israel's possession of weapons of mass destruction negates the consequences of regional perception of weakness. That might be the case, but the fact is that Israel's possession of such weapons did not prevent attacks in 1973, nor were those weapons usable in this case. Consider the distances involved: Israeli forces have been fighting 10 miles from the border. And if Damascus were to be struck with the wind blowing the wrong way, northern Israel would be fried as well. Israel could undertake a nuclear strike against Iran, but the threat posed by Iran is indirect -- since it is far away -- and would not determine the outcome of any regional encounter. Certainly, the possession of nuclear weapons provides Israel a final line from which to threaten enemies -- but by the time that became necessary, the issue already would have shifted massively against Israel. Nuclear weapons have not been used since World War II -- in spite of many apparent opportunities to do so -- because, as a weapon, the utility is more apparent than real. Possession of nuclear weapons can help guarantee regime survival, but not, by itself, military success.

As it stands, logic holds that, given the tenuous nature of the cease-fire, casus belli on Israel's part can be found and the war reinitiated. Given the mood in Israel, logic would dictate the fall of Olmert, his replacement by a war coalition and an attempt to change the outcome. But logic has not applied to Israeli thinking during this war. We have been consistently surprised by the choices Israel has made, and it is not clear whether this is simply Olmert's problem or one that has become embedded in Israel.

What is clear is that, if the current outcome stands, it will mean there has been a tremendous earthquake in the Middle East. It is cheap and easy to talk about historic events. But when a reality that has dominated a region for 58 years is shattered, it is historic. Perhaps this paves the way to new wars. Perhaps Olmert's restraint opens the door for some sort of stable peace. But from where we sit, he was sufficiently aggressive to increase hostility toward Israel without being sufficiently decisive to achieve a desired military outcome.

Hezbollah and Iran hoped for this outcome, though they did not really expect it. They got it. The question on the table now is what they will do with it.
29588  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Health Thread (nutrition, medical, longevity, etc) on: August 15, 2006, 07:22:00 PM
Very interesting Robert.

Dannyboy et al, I too am very interested in enzymes. 
29589  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Homeland Security on: August 15, 2006, 07:18:58 PM
2006/8/14 10:11:13 
 
http://www.homelandsecurityus.com/site/modules/news/article.php?storyid=28
Liquid explosives carried in child's baby bottle

14 August 2006: According to authorities at Scotland Yard, Abdula Ahmed ALI, 25, and his 23-year-old wife Cossor ALI were arrested and are being questioned over suspicions that they were planning to use their baby's bottle to hide a liquid bomb. Cossor's grandfather, Nazir Ahmed, 84, admitted that Abdula ALI traveled to Pakistan about four weeks ago. That admission follows information from British Intelligence officials that many of the airline bomb plot suspects posed as relief workers to travel to al-Qaeda training camps in Pakistan. Police spent Sunday searching the suspect?s east London housing commission flat for evidence.

Police in the UK have recovered baby bottles containing peroxide, including some with false bottoms, from a recycling centre close to the homes of some of the arrested suspects.

In a separate but related case, a Muslim family of five- a husband, wife and 3 children, boarded American Airlines flight 109 at Britain?s Heathrow airport destined for Boston Logan airport on Sunday, 6 August 2006.

According to intelligence officials, the family checked in at the last minute, and as a result, only a superficial check of the children?s carry-on bags was conducted by airport security personnel.

Following the take off of the airliner, the check-in computer at the airport flashed a warning that a person under observation had boarded the flight. The airline staff informed immigration and security officials, and a background check found that the male adult member of the family was on a suspect list prepared by Scotland Yard subsequent to the 7/7 terror bombings in London. The pilot was ultimately alerted to the situation and after careful consideration, returned to Heathrow airport rather than continuing on to Boston.

Upon landing back at Heathrow, armed marshals boarded the aircraft and took the suspect and his family into custody. It was at that time a search of the children?s carry-on baggage revealed the deadly cargo.
29590  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Re: The Tradition and Culture Thread on: August 15, 2006, 08:52:01 AM
Woof Nasigoreng:

As I mentioned previously, this is a very good question.  I've woken up a little early and will take a stab at beginning to answer:

Bataanvet writes "Nothing against DBMA  but in my opinion DBMA does not really offer traditional PS training (djurus, salutations, adat, hormat, etc) I haven't seen any of it in their vid clips.  Maybe it would worthwhile for a notable group like the DB to establish some formal PS trainng as part of their growth."

He is right that we do not offer a lot of traditional PS training.  First, please allow me to point out that we do not see ourselves or present ourselves as a one-stop shop for all things.  My teacher, Guro Inosanto, is readily available to any who are interested in this.  Many of our people come from Guro I. or someone trained by him and with my abilities and proclivities with regard to traditional PS I would feel quite inadequate in teaching it.

Second, while we do not have traditional djurus, we do have our own seguidas/djurus.  We do have our own salutation.  I forget what adat means (See!  I'm not the right man for teaching traditional PS!   embarassed

As for hormat, if I remember correctly, the term refers to imparting values, including spiritual matters.  IMHO we do offer this, and rather extensively.  I would go so far as to say hormat is woven through most everything we do from the Dog Brothers credo "Higher Consciousness through harder contact" (c) forward.   Look at the powerful spiritual effects from fighting as we do:  "No judges, no referees, no trophies.  One rule only:  Be Friends at the end of the day." (c) 

How liberating to fight without keeping score!!!

No judges:  The meaning of the experience is what each fighter makes of the experience.  He does not submit himself to the judgement of others.

No referees:  Even in full blown adrenal state, the fighter remains morally responsible for his actions, for in what we do a referee cannot intervene in time.  To experience simultaneously high adrenaline aggression AND the calmness required to not do what would be too much, is a duality of powerful tranformational qualities.  It is to what we refer when we use the full statement of our credo "The greater the dichotomy, the profounder the transformation.  Higher consciousness through harder contact." (c)  Our intention is that a warrior tested and seasoned through the Dog Brothers experience is one who can step forward as a member of "the unorganized militia" in a moment of trouble to act with wisdom and morality-- as well as fighting skill.

No trophies:  The fighter does not do this for hierarchical reasons or the approval of the crowd.  He does this for himself.

Be friends at the end of the day:  No matter who our teachers or what our system may be, We are all members of the same tribe, preparing each other to stand together to defend our land, women and children.  We learn to fight so that we have maximal ability to win without lastingly damaging our opponent at the Gathering or an adversary in the street-- and have the ability to go as far as necessary to defend our land, women and children.  We prepare ourselves for the true Warrior's mission: To Protect and Serve.

I also submit that our hormat can be found in what many have come to call "The Dog Brothers philosophy"-- a mad blend of evolutionary biology/pyschology (especially Konrad Lorenz), Jungian psychology (and some of its offshoots such as Robert Bly and Joseph Campbell), and elements of various spiritual disciplines.  The DB philosophy seeks to offer DBMA practitioners a context in which and a framework with which to think about the biology of aggression, the pyschology of aggression, and the morality of aggression.

Many elements of our hormat which I discuss here also can be seen in our clips "Rambling Ruminations", "Knife Ruminations", and "The Unorganized Militia".



Lets turn now to the matter of teaching methodolgy.  Traditional PS tends to be highly secretive, even to its own students until they "prove their loyalty".  I too have my secrets and hold the instructors I develop responsible for maintaining certain things secret.  (Indeed, as I will discuss a bit more fully below, if I am any good at keeping secrets, people will not realize when I am doing it.)

That said, the mission statement of DBMA is to help good people "To walk as a warrior for all our days".  There is so much to learn, far more than can be learned in one life, that it makes little sense to me to tarry, dawdle and mislead in the process as I saw done in one traditional PS system.  And because tomorrow is promised to no one, I want people who train with me to get functional fast as well as "to walk as a warrior for all their days".  As a teacher I seek to establish long term benefits from the beginning even as I help our people become functional fast.  Growing in the art of doing this is an adventure for me every time I teach.

Because life is promised to no one, I seek the most effective teaching methods I can.  If they are traditional, I use them.  If they are not traditional, I use them.

It is time for me to turn to family matters of the morning and to prepare myself for a full day of teaching.  I am blessed.

More later.

The Adventure continues,
Guro Crafty

29591  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Re: Head Gear on: August 15, 2006, 07:23:50 AM
A friend writes:

I noticed your post re: the FIST helmet on the forum. Couldn't remember my login etc, so I figured I'd just e-mail you. My instructors in Santa Cruz use the entire FIST suit when they teach women's self-defense seminars.  The helmet (w/ plastic face shield) seems to spin around and lead to a rather unfortunate, cartoonish, head-in-a-bucket type of situation. Although, I'm not sure of whether they have an older model rather than the latest and greatest. But since Ryan mentioned they weren't as "stationary" -- I'm guessing the problem hasn't been solved entirely.  Hope that helps.
29592  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Lebanon on: August 14, 2006, 06:03:35 AM

Comment: An unmitigated disaster

Caroline Glick, THE JERUSALEM POST
Aug. 13, 2006

There is a good reason that Hizbullah chief Hassan Nasrallah has accepted UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which sets the terms for a cease-fire between his jihad army and the State of Israel.
The resolution represents a near-total victory for Hizbullah and its state sponsors Iran and Syria, and an unprecedented defeat for Israel and its ally the United States. This fact is evident both in the text of the resolution and in the very fact that the US decided to sponsor a cease-fire resolution before Israel had dismantled or seriously degraded Hizbullah's military capabilities.
While the resolution was not passed under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter and so does not have the authority of law, in practice it makes it all but impossible for Israel to defend itself against Hizbullah aggression without being exposed to international condemnation on an unprecedented scale.
This is the case first of all because the resolution places responsibility for determining compliance in the hands of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. Annan has distinguished himself as a man capable only of condemning Israel for its acts of self-defense while ignoring the fact that in attacking Israel, its enemies are guilty of war crimes. By empowering Annan to evaluate compliance, the resolution all but ensures that Hizbullah will not be forced to disarm and that Israel will be forced to give up the right to defend itself.
The resolution makes absolutely no mention of either Syria or Iran, without whose support Hizbullah could neither exist nor wage an illegal war against Israel. In so ignoring Hizbullah's sponsors, it ignores the regional aspect of the current war and sends the message to these two states that they may continue to equip terrorist armies in Lebanon, the Palestinian Authority and Iraq with the latest weaponry without paying a price for their aggression.
The resolution presents Hizbullah with a clear diplomatic victory by placing their erroneous claim of Lebanese sovereignty over the Shaba Farms, or Mount Dov - a vast area on the Golan Heights that separates the Syrian Golan from the Upper Galilee and is disputed between Israel and Syria - on the negotiating table. In doing so, the resolution rewards Hizbullah's aggression by giving international legitimacy to its demand for territorial aggrandizement via acts of aggression, in contravention of the laws of nations.
Moreover, by allowing Lebanon to make territorial claims on Israel despite the fact that in 2000 the UN determined that Israel had withdrawn to the international border, the resolution sets a catastrophic precedent for the future. Because Lebanon is receiving international support for legally unsupportable territorial demands on Israel, in the future, the Palestinians, Syrians and indeed the Jordanians and Egyptians will feel empowered to employ aggression to gain territorial concessions from the Jewish state even if they previously signed treaties of peace with Israel. The message of the resolution's stand on Shaba Farms is that Israel can never expect for the world to recognize any of its borders as final.
By calling in the same paragraph for the "immediate cessation by Hizbullah of all attacks and the immediate cessation by Israel of all offensive military operations," the resolution treats as equivalent Hizbullah's illegal aggression against Israel and Israel's legitimate military actions taken in defense of its sovereign territory.
Operational Paragraph 7, which "affirms that all parties are responsible for ensuring that no action is taken contrary to paragraph 1 [which calls for a cessation of hostilities] that might adversely affect the search for a long-term solution, humanitarian access to civilian populations, including safe passage for humanitarian convoys, or the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons," all but bars Israel from taking military action to defend itself in the future. Any steps Israel takes will open it to accusations - by Annan - of breaching this paragraph.
Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni had let it be known that Israel's conditions for a cease-fire included the institution of an arms embargo against Hizbullah. The government also insisted that the international force it wished to have deployed along the border would work to dismantle Hizbullah.
However, paragraph 8 puts both the question of an arms embargo and Hizbullah's dismantlement off to some future date when Israel and Lebanon agree to the terms of a "permanent cease-fire." In addition, it places the power to oversee an arms embargo against Hizbullah in the hands of the Lebanese government, of which Hizbullah is a member.
While the resolution bars Israel from taking measures necessary to defend its territory and citizens, by keeping UNIFIL in Lebanon it ensures that no other force will be empowered to take these necessary actions. Furthermore, paragraph 2 "calls upon the government of Israel, as that deployment [of the Lebanese military and UNIFIL] begins, to withdraw all of its forces from southern Lebanon in parallel. This means that Israel is expected to withdraw before a full deployment of Lebanese and UNIFIL forces is carried out. As a result, a vacuum will be created that will allow Hizbullah to reinforce its positions in south Lebanon.
Finally, the resolution makes no operative call for the release of IDF soldiers Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev now being held hostage by Hizbullah. By relegating their fate to a paragraph in the preamble, which then immediately turns to Hizbullah's demand for the release of Lebanese terrorists held in Israeli jails, the resolution all but eliminates any possibility of their returning home.
Aside from the resolution's egregious language, the very fact that the US has sponsored a resolution that leaves Hizbullah intact as a fighting force constitutes a devastating blow to the national security of both Israel and the US, for the following reasons:

It grants the Lebanese government and military unwarranted legitimacy. The resolution treats the Lebanese government and military as credible bodies. However, the Lebanese government is currently under the de facto control of Hizbullah and Syria.
Moreover, the Lebanese army is paying pensions to the families of Hizbullah fighters killed in battle, and its forces have actively assisted Hizbullah in attacking Israel and Israeli military targets.
Indeed, the seven-point declaration issued by the Lebanese government, which the UN resolution applauds, was dictated by Hizbullah, as admitted by Lebanese Prime Minister Fuad Saniora and Nasrallah last week.

It incites Shi'ite violence in Iraq. From a US perspective, the resolution drastically increases the threat of a radical Shi'ite revolt in Iraq. Hizbullah is intimately tied to Iraqi Shi'ite terrorist Muqtada al-Sadr.
In April 2003, Hizbullah opened offices in southern Iraq and was instrumental in training the Mahdi Army, which Sadr leads. During a demonstration in Baghdad last week, Sadr's followers demanded that he consider them an extension of Hizbullah, and expressed a genuine desire to participate in Hizbullah's war against the US and Israel.
It should be assumed that Hizbullah's presumptive victory in its war against Israel will act as a catalyst for violence by Sadr and his followers against the Iraqi government and coalition forces in the weeks to come. Indeed, the Hizbullah victory will severely weaken moderate Shi'ites in the Maliki government and among the followers of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani.

It empowers Iran. Iran emerges as the main victor in the current war. Not only was it not condemned for its sponsorship of Hizbullah, it is being rewarded for that sponsorship because it is clear to all parties that Iran was the engine behind this war, and that its side has won.
The UN resolution does not strengthen the US hand in future Security Council deliberations regarding Iran's illicit nuclear weapons program because the states that object to any action against Iran - Russia and China - will continue with their refusal to sign on to any substantive action.
Indeed, Russia's behavior regarding the situation in Lebanon, including the fact that a large percentage of Hizbullah's arsenal of advanced anti-tank missiles was sold by Russia to Syria and Iran, exposes that Moscow's role in the current conflict has been similar to the position taken by the Soviet Union in earlier Middle East wars.
Furthermore, because the resolution strengthens the UN as the arbiter of peace and security in the region, the diplomatic price the US will be forced to pay if it decides to go outside the UN to contend with the Iranian threat has been vastly increased.
Many sources in Washington told this writer over the weekend that the US decision to seek a cease-fire was the result of Israel's amateurish bungling of the first three weeks of the war. The Bush administration, they argued, was being blamed for the Olmert government's incompetence and so preferred to cut its losses and sue for a cease-fire.
There is no doubt much truth to this assertion. The government's prosecution of this war has been unforgivably inept. At the same time it should be noted that the short-term political gain accrued by the US by forging the cease-fire agreement will come back to haunt the US, Israel and all forces fighting the forces of global jihad in the coming weeks and months.
By handing a victory to Hizbullah, the resolution strengthens the belief of millions of supporters of jihad throughout the world that their side is winning and that they should redouble efforts to achieve their objectives of destroying Israel and running the US out of the Middle East.


This article can also be read at http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1154525859901&pagename =JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
29593  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: WW3 on: August 14, 2006, 05:26:44 AM
U.S. Troops kill 26 insurgents, wound 6, capture 60

RAMADI, Iraq - The military said it had killed 26 rebels on Friday night after coming under fire from several locations in the insurgent stronghold of Ramadi, west of Baghdad.

Six insurgents were wounded and there were no U.S. casualties in the fighting, said the military. Street battles continue in Ramadi, a key bastion for the insurgency.

In Baghdad, 60 Iraqis suspected of links with a local al-Qaeda cell were captured in a raid on a funeral on the outskirts of Baghdad, US forces say.

US troops are being bolstered by reinforcements to help stop daily attacks by militants.

Iraqi man rescued by US Soldiers

TIKRIT, Iraq ? An Iraqi man being held hostage by unknown kidnappers was freed after US Soldiers found him blindfolded and bound in the back of a vehicle Thursday morning.
 
    The rescue occurred after the vehicle was spotted by a US helicopter that was patrolling the area. The pilot noticed a suspicious gathering of people around the vehicle and reported the sighting.
 
    A ground patrol attached to the 4th Infantry Division was sent to the area to investigate and found the man who claimed to have been kidnapped in Baqubah on Aug. 2.  The Soldiers treated the man for his injuries and provided him a cell phone to call his family before taking him to a nearby base.
 
    This is the second hostage rescue by Iraqi and U.S. Soldiers in the past two weeks.  On July 30, Iraqi and U.S. Soldiers raiding a terrorist weapons cache near Muqdadiyah freed another Iraqi man the day before he was to be ?judged? by his kidnappers.
 
    Kidnapping, whether for ransom, terror or propaganda use, continues to be a tactic of terrorists and criminals throughout Iraq.
 
Wanted terrorist captured
 
BAGHDAD ? Coalition forces captured a wanted terrorist leader and 6 other insurgents during coordinated raids in Bayji Aug. 11.
 
The targeted individual is reported to be a new senior al-Qaida in Iraq leader.  He is additionally reported to be supplying terrorists to al-Qaida in Baghdad to target innocent Iraqis. The ground forces apprehended the individuals without incident.
 
This operation was part of ongoing efforts that have successfully captured several other terrorist leaders in the last 30 days.  Coalition forces will use information gathered from this raid to continue building a clear picture of the terrorist network in the region, and how best to capture or eliminate them.

 
 
HOW'S THIS FOR U.S. TROOPS CUTTING DOWN THE MURDER RATE IN THIS DISTRICT:
 
US, Iraqi forces seal off Baghdad district in crackdown
10 Aug 2006

BAGHDAD - U.S. and Iraqi forces sealed off parts of one of Baghdad's most dangerous districts on Thursday, searching thousands of homes in an effort to regain control of the capital's lawless streets.

The sweep in the southern Dora district, involving 5,000 troops and lasting three days, has had one immediate result, U.S. Colonel Michael Beech said -- the murder rate, which peaked at 20 a day after a surge in sectarian violence, is now zero.

"There is no place safer in Baghdad right now," the commander of the U.S. 4th Brigade Combat team told journalists at an Iraqi police compound in Dora.

When U.S. troops break down doors or smash windows to enter homes in search of illegal weapons, explosives and wanted insurgents, they are followed shortly afterwards by local contractors who repair the locks or replace the windows.

The aim of the operation, expected to last another 24 hours, was to radically reduce the number of murders, kidnappings and assassinations in the area.

Iraqi Police Brigadier General Abd al-Rahman Yusif said thousands of homes had been searched. Fourteen AK-47s, a rocket-propelled grenade launcher and improvised hand grenades had been seized and 36 insurgents and supporters were arrested.
"We are striking with an iron fist," he told the same news briefing.

In other news, Iraqi police raided a mosque Thursday in western Baghdad to arrest three gunmen involved in an armed attack on Iraqi police in which a police colonel was killed. "A group of terrorists attacked the national police in Saydiah area in Baghdad, and then took refuge in a mosque," said the statement.

The gunmen "continued firing from the mosque killing Colonel Dhiaa Al-Samirrai and two other policemen," added the statement.

The Iraqi police then arrested the 3 gunmen, one of whom was wounded by police fire. Police also confiscated a large quantity of weapons stored in the mosque.

US troops kill 4 armed men
BAGHDAD, Aug 8 (KUNA) -- The United States military said that its warplanes killed 4 armed men who were trying to plant bombs in the suburbs of the Iraqi capital.

A statement from the US military said its reconnaissance planes along with US military forces have scouted places of 13 armed men who were planting explosives near a road in an agriculture location along the bank of the Euphrates River.

The statement added US warplanes have conducted a raid on the targets, killing four while a fifth man managed to escape.

Meanwhile, the US military also said that a joint Iraqi and US paratrooper force has arrested 13 armed men in an operation in the northern part of the capital.

29594  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Re: Head Gear on: August 14, 2006, 05:25:04 AM
Alain:

When I have a chance I am going to check out the FIST headgear.  Anyone have an URL?

CD
29595  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Help our troops/our cause: on: August 13, 2006, 03:25:04 PM
TTT
29596  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Howl of Respect to our Soldiers/Veterans on: August 13, 2006, 03:22:25 PM
http://www.blackfive.net/main/2006/08/us_army_infantr.html cool cool cool
29597  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: WW3 on: August 13, 2006, 01:30:53 PM
The Guns Of August
By Richard Holbrooke
Thursday, August 10, 2006; A23


Two full-blown crises, in Lebanon and Iraq, are merging into a single emergency. A chain reaction could spread quickly almost anywhere between Cairo and Bombay. Turkey is talking openly of invading northern Iraq to deal with Kurdish terrorists based there. Syria could easily get pulled into the war in southern Lebanon. Egypt and Saudi Arabia are under pressure from jihadists to support Hezbollah, even though the governments in Cairo and Riyadh hate that organization. Afghanistan accuses Pakistan of giving shelter to al-Qaeda and the Taliban; there is constant fighting on both sides of that border. NATO's own war in Afghanistan is not going well. India talks of taking punitive action against Pakistan for allegedly being behind the Bombay bombings. Uzbekistan is a repressive dictatorship with a growing Islamic resistance.
The only beneficiaries of this chaos are Iran, Hezbollah, al-Qaeda and the Iraqi Shiite leader Moqtada al-Sadr, who last week held the largest anti-American, anti-Israel demonstration in the world in the very heart of Baghdad, even as 6,000 additional U.S. troops were rushing into the city to "prevent" a civil war that has already begun.
This combination of combustible elements poses the greatest threat to global stability since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, history's only nuclear superpower confrontation. The Cuba crisis, although immensely dangerous, was comparatively simple: It came down to two leaders and no war. In 13 days of brilliant diplomacy, John F. Kennedy induced Nikita Khrushchev to remove Soviet missiles from Cuba.
Kennedy was deeply influenced by Barbara Tuchman's classic, "The Guns of August," which recounted how a seemingly isolated event 92 summers ago -- an assassination in Sarajevo by a Serb terrorist -- set off a chain reaction that led in just a few weeks to World War I. There are vast differences between that August and this one. But Tuchman ended her book with a sentence that resonates in this summer of crisis: "The nations were caught in a trap, a trap made during the first thirty days out of battles that failed to be decisive, a trap from which there was, and has been, no exit."
Preventing just such a trap must be the highest priority of American policy. Unfortunately, there is little public sign that the president and his top advisers recognize how close we are to a chain reaction, or that they have any larger strategy beyond tactical actions.
Under the universally accepted doctrine of self-defense, which is embodied in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, there is no question that Israel has a legitimate right to take action against a group that has sworn to destroy it and had hidden some 13,000 missiles in southern Lebanon. In these circumstances, American support for Israel is essential, as it has been since the time of Truman; if Washington abandoned Jerusalem, the very existence of the Jewish state could be jeopardized, and the world crisis whose early phase we are now in would quickly get far worse. The United States must continue to make clear that it is ready to come to Israel's defense, both with American diplomacy and, as necessary, with military equipment.
But the United States must also understand, and deal with, the wider consequences of its own actions and public statements, which have caused an unprecedented decline in America's position in much of the world and are provoking dangerous new anti-American coalitions and encouraging a new generation of terrorists. American disengagement from active Middle East diplomacy since 2001 has led to greater violence and a decline in U.S. influence. Others have been eager to fill the vacuum. (Note the sudden emergence of France as a key player in the current burst of diplomacy.)
American policy has had the unintended, but entirely predictable, effect of pushing our enemies closer together. Throughout the region, Sunnis and Shiites have put aside their hatred of each other just long enough to join in shaking their fists -- or doing worse -- at the United States and Israel. Meanwhile, in Baghdad, our troops are coming under attack by both sides -- Shiite militias and Sunni insurgents. If this continues, the U.S. presence in Baghdad has no future.
President Bush owes it to the nation, and especially the troops who risk their lives every day, to reexamine his policies. For starters, he should redeploy some U.S. troops into the safer northern areas of Iraq to serve as a buffer between the increasingly agitated Turks and the restive, independence-minded Kurds. Given the new situation, such a redeployment to Kurdish areas and a phased drawdown elsewhere -- with no final decision yet as to a full withdrawal from Iraq -- is fully justified. At the same time, we should send more troops to Afghanistan, where the situation has deteriorated even as the Pentagon is reducing U.S. troop levels -- which is read in the region as a sign of declining U.S. interest in Afghanistan.
On the diplomatic front, the United States cannot abandon the field to other nations (not even France!) or the United Nations. Every secretary of state from Henry Kissinger to Warren Christopher and Madeleine Albright negotiated with Syria, including those Republican icons George Shultz and James Baker. Why won't this administration follow suit, in full consultation with Israel at every step? This would clearly be in Israel's interest. Instead, administration officials refuse direct talks and say publicly, "Syria knows what it must do" -- a statement that denies the very point of diplomacy.
The same is true of talks with Iran, although these would be more difficult. Why has the world's leading nation stood aside for over five years and allowed the international dialogue with Tehran to be conducted by Europeans, the Chinese and the United Nations? And why has that dialogue been restricted to the nuclear issue -- vitally important, to be sure, but not as urgent at this moment as Iran's sponsorship and arming of Hezbollah and its support of actions against U.S. forces in Iraq?
Containing the violence must be Washington's first priority. Finding a stable and secure solution that protects Israel must follow. Then must come the unwinding of America's disastrous entanglement in Iraq in a manner that is not a complete humiliation and does not lead to even greater turmoil. All of this will take sustained high-level diplomacy -- precisely what the American administration has avoided in the Middle East. Washington has, or at least used to have, leverage over the more moderate Arab states; it should use it again, in the closest consultation with and on behalf of Israel.
And we must be ready for unexpected problems that will test us; they could come in Turkey, Pakistan, Egypt, Syria, Jordan or even Somalia -- but one thing seems sure: They will come. Without a new, comprehensive strategy based on our most urgent national security needs -- as opposed to a muddled version of Wilsonianism -- this crisis is almost certain to worsen and spread.
Richard Holbrooke, a former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, writes a monthly column for The Post.
29598  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Re: The Tradition and Culture Thread on: August 13, 2006, 12:03:46 PM
Woof Nasigoreng:

Outstanding question.  Carry on.

CD
29599  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Homeland Security on: August 13, 2006, 07:49:14 AM
My second post of the day:

http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/13/world/europe/13disrupt.html?th&emc=th



WASHINGTON, Aug. 12 ? The disclosure that British officials conducted months of surveillance before arresting 24 terrorism suspects this week highlighted what many terrorism specialists said was a central difference between American and British law enforcement agencies.

The British, they say, are more willing to wait and watch.
Although details of the British investigation remain secret, Bush administration officials say Britain?s domestic intelligence agency, MI5, was for at least several months aware of a plot to set off explosions on airliners flying to the United States from Britain, as well as the identity of the people who would carry it out.

British officials suggested that the arrests were held off to gather as much information as possible about the plot and the reach of the network behind it. Although it is not clear how close the plotters were to acting, or how capable they were of carrying out the attacks, intelligence and law enforcement officials have described the planning as well advanced.

The Justice Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation have suggested in the past that they would never allow a terrorist plot discovered here to advance to its final stages, for fear that it could not be stopped in time.

In June, the F.B.I. arrested seven people in Florida on charges of plotting attacks on American landmarks, including the Sears Tower in Chicago, with investigators openly acknowledging that the suspects, described as Al Qaeda sympathizers, had only the most preliminary discussions about an attack.

?Our philosophy is that we try to identify plots in the earliest stages possible because we don?t know what we don?t know about a terrorism plot,? Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales said at the time. ?Once we have sufficient information to move forward with a prosecution, that?s what we do.?

The differences in counterterrorism strategy reflect an important distinction between the legal systems of the United States and Britain and their definitions of civil liberties, with MI5 and British police agencies given far greater authority in general than their American counterparts to conduct domestic surveillance and detain terrorism suspects.

Britain?s newly revised terrorism laws permit the detention of suspects for 28 days without charge. Prime Minister Tony Blair?s government had been pressing for 90 days, but Parliament blocked the proposal. In the United States, suspects must be brought before a judge as soon as possible, which courts have interpreted to mean within 48 hours. Law enforcement officials have detained some terrorism suspects designated material witnesses for far longer. (The United States has also taken into custody overseas several hundred people suspected of terrorist activity and detained them at Guant?namo Bay, Cuba, as enemy combatants.)

At the same time, Britain has far stricter contempt-of-court laws intended to prevent the prejudicing of trials. Anything that is said or reported about the suspects rounded up this week could, the police contend, prejudice their trial and prevent their prosecution.

Andrew C. McCarthy, a former terrorism prosecutor at the Justice Department, said he believed that British authorities were willing to allow terrorist plots to progress further because, if an attack appeared imminent, they could immediately round up the suspects, even without formal criminal charges.

?They have this fail-safe,? he said. ?They can arrest people without charging them with a crime, which would make a big difference in how long you?d be willing to let things run.? He said F.B.I. agents, who are required to bring criminal charges if they wanted to arrest a suspect, had a justifiable fear that they might be unable to short-circuit an attack at the last minute.

There is a difference, too, in how information is shared, with American law enforcement officials typically communicating much more fully with the news media and other agencies than their British counterparts do.

In one case in particular, last year after the London bombings when New York police officers traveled there to pitch in, the different working style created tension. British police and intelligence officials complained to the F.B.I., C.I.A. and State Department after the New York officers, used to speaking more openly, gave interviews to the press in London and sent information on to their headquarters in New York, where officials then held a news conference with some details about the investigation, according to one senior American official involved in the relationship with British agencies.

While American officials say they do not believe there were any serious compromises of the investigation, the British were extremely upset. ?They don?t want us to share so widely,? the senior American official said.

A senior federal law enforcement official said MI5 also had a distinct advantage over the F.B.I. in that it had a greater store of foreign-language speakers, giving British authorities greater ability to infiltrate conspiracy groups. The F.B.I. still has only a handful of Muslim agents and others who speak Arabic, Urdu or other languages common in the Islamic world.

Justice Department officials and others involved in developing American counterterrorism strategies, however, say it is wrong to suggest that the F.B.I. always moves hurriedly to arrest terrorism suspects, rather than conduct surveillance that may lead to evidence about other conspirators and plots.

On Saturday, as news reports surfaced describing significant disagreements between British and American officials over the the timing of the arrests in the bombing plot, Frances Fragos Townsend, the president?s homeland security adviser, said in a statement: ?There was unprecedented cooperation and coordination between the U.S., U.K. and Pakistan officials throughout the case and we worked together to protect our citizens from harm while ensuring that we gathered as much information as possible to bring the plotters to justice. There was no disagreement between U.S. and U.K. officials.?
John O. Brennan, a former official of the Central Intelligence Agency who set up the government?s National Counterterrorism Center two years ago, said in an interview that he had been involved in a number of recent cases ? most of them still classified ? in which the F.B.I. had placed suspected terrorists under surveillance rather than rounding them up.

He said the bureau?s willingness to wait reflected a new sophistication as supervisors adapted to the rhythm of terrorism investigations. ?Especially given the history of 9/11, of course the bureau wants to move quickly and make sure there is no risk of attack,? he said. ?But over the past two years, I think the bureau has become much more adept at allowing these operations to run and monitor them.?

But others are less certain that the bureau has overcome its traditional desire to make quick arrests.

Daniel Benjamin, a counterterrorism specialist in the National Security Council in the Clinton administration, said the apparent success of the British surveillance operation ? and the failure of the F.B.I. to identify and disrupt any similar terrorist cell in the United States since Sept. 11 ? argued for creation of an American counterpart to MI5. ?The F.B.I. has still not risen to the domestic intelligence task,? he said.

But MI5, others note, may have benefited from the longer experience of dealing with domestic terrorism in connection with the Irish Republican Army. And it has its own critics who question its strategy by noting that it had some of the suspects in last summer?s bombings in the London subway and on a bus under surveillance before the attacks.

British security officials have publicly acknowledged that two of the London bombers ? Mohammed Siddique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer ? had been observed in connection with a different terrorist plot that was subject to heavy surveillance. But when they dropped out of sight ? well before the London bombings ? intelligence agencies did not pursue them because the other conspiracy seemed a much greater priority.

John Timoney, the Miami police chief who also has run the Philadelphia Police Department and served in the No. 2 post in the New York Police Department, has worked extensively over the years in Britain on policing matters. He said comparing the two country?s approaches was difficult.

?First and foremost, the policing systems are completely different,? said Chief Timoney, noting that in Britain the Metropolitan Police is the dominant national law enforcement agency and is served by MI5.

In the United States, on the other hand, there is intense competition between various federal agencies and between some federal agencies and some state and local forces, he said.

But neither approach is guaranteed to succeed. In June, about 250 police officers stormed an East London row house looking for chemical weapons and arrested two brothers, Abul Koyair and Mohammed Abdul Kahar. Mr. Kahar was shot and wounded during the operation. But the two men were later released without charge after the authorities failed to find any evidence linking them to terrorist activities.

David N. Kelley, a former United States attorney in Manhattan who has overseen a range of international terrorism cases, including prosecuting the mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, said, ?The real challenge in law enforcement when you have a plot like that is when do you pull the trigger.?

He also said that the longer investigators waited to take down a case, the risks that they might lose track of suspects increased, even if the plotters were under 24-hour surveillance.

?People think when you have someone under surveillance, it?s a fail-safe, but losing someone is a real fear in these things,? he said. ?It?s not like television. It?s a real juggling act. You?ve got to keep a lot of balls in the air and not let any of them drop.?
29600  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Re: Next gathering... on: August 13, 2006, 07:34:22 AM
Woof All:

Herewith one of my teaching techniques for helping a man concerned about how he well he will do his first time or for a man disappointed in his initial performance:

Q:? You remember the first time you had sex?

A:? Of course!

Q:? Were you any good at it?

A:? Ummm , , , well , , ,? not really.

Q:? Have you gotten any better since then?

A: grin

Yip!
Guro Crafty

PS:  Feel free to quote me if you use this one  grin
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