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30251  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Re: MMA on: February 08, 2007, 12:38:08 AM
Hmmm.  I'd like to see that , , ,  Analysis anyone?
30252  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Science, Culture, & Humanities / Re: Epidemics: Bird Flu, TB, etc on: February 07, 2007, 08:57:02 PM
From Bird to Person
February 7, 2007; Page A15

LONDON -- The "deadly" H5N1 avian flu is back on the front pages of newspapers and TV news shows. The British environment minister has pledged quick action to "eradicate" the disease from the U.K., and over 150,000 turkeys on one farm have been culled. "This is," someone said on the BBC's "Breakfast" show Monday, "a disease of birds, not humans." And so it is.

The H5N1 virus has still not made the critical interspecies leap which would make it easy for an infected person to give the disease to another person. That may happen, or it may not; and nobody can predict the outcome or its timing with any degree of confidence. Meanwhile, as of the World Health Organization's compilation on Feb. 3, there had been a total of 271 laboratory-confirmed cases of the virus in humans, and of that number a staggering 165, or 61%, died, making it one of the most lethal pathogens in history, even if not one of the most infectious.

Still, just 18 months ago many experts were predicting a global pandemic in a matter of months, perhaps one that would kill millions. There is historical precedent: The 1918-1919 "Spanish Flu" swept around the world in a matter of weeks, and before the disease burned out, more than 50 million people had died. Today H5N1 is reminiscent only of the Asian "Swine flu," which threatened the U.S. in 1976 but never turned into a serious threat to human life (although the media hype surrounding it helped undermine Gerald Ford's presidency). In 2004, worried people rapidly bought up much of the world's supply of Tamiflu and Relenza, the only two drugs that seemed to have a chance of beating H5N1. Now most of us have forgotten the names of these drugs.

Influenza viruses have eight genes and these mutate rapidly. Two sites on the viral genome, called H and N, are well catalogued, and each of those genes can come in many forms. Those are the markers that trigger the human immune system. If your body has seen a whiff of a particular virus, it will produce large numbers of antibodies if you later become infected with a strain having the same markers. If you have never been exposed to a particular strain, there are no antibodies in your bloodstream, and your body will fight an uphill battle for survival. The more virulent the virus, the less chance you have.

So far as is known, no H5N1 virus has ever circulated on the planet. That means nobody has any natural immunity. Our good fortune last flu season was that the bird flu virus had not yet learned the trick of passing easily from human to human. The few confirmed victims were almost all people who'd worked very closely with infected fowl in extremely unsanitary conditions. One can suppose that they were massively exposed, allowing this "disease of birds, not humans" to develop in their bodies.

Almost all influenza viruses originate in migrating water fowl in South-East Asia, and by and large the birds don't get sick. However, those birds can pass their viruses to domesticated birds. In the great viral mixing pot of China, where people live in close contact with both their birds and their pigs, influenza viruses can readily pass from one species to another, and sometimes to an animal or person already infected with another flu bug.

In this environment, mutations are guaranteed to occur, and from time to time a new pathogen with the ability to pass between people develops. If it carries the same marker combination as one or another previous flu virus, much of the world's population will have a basic immunity. If it does not have familiar markers, much of humanity is at risk once that virus learns to jump from person to person. Each year a panel of experts tries to guess which strains of flu will pose the highest risk in the coming influenza season, and orders up vaccines to give the vulnerable some protection. H5N1 has not been selected, because it still hasn't become contagious in our species. But it could make the jump at any time.

The last year has brought the world a major advantage, should H5N1 become a "disease of humans." The pharmaceutical industry has learned the difficult trick of making and producing a vaccine against a hitherto unknown disease. GlaxoSmithKline recently claimed that it had succeeded in developing a "second generation" bird flu vaccine that could be given in advance, even before knowing the detailed gene structure that would allow this bird flu to infect people. The vaccine could be given before the bug even learns that deadly trick. Other companies have also developed vaccines which appear to produce broad-spectrum antibodies against many strains of the virus, and many governments have ordered large stocks from various producers.

It is probably worth stockpiling many millions of doses before H5N1 escapes into the human population. Because none of us has any useful immunity, the virus could migrate around the world with the speed of commercial air travel, not the steamships that powered the Spanish Flu. If H5N1 escapes, and if it becomes as virulent as the Spanish Flu (which killed 1% of those who developed the disease), the pessimistic predictions of millions of people dead within months could come true. Only if vaccine bottles were already on the shelf, ready for instant use, could the virus be contained.

However, deadly as it could be, and as harmless as it has so far been, the H5N1 avian flu will not be the last new influenza virus to develop. The process that produced H5N1 is at work every year, and the more intense the agribusiness of raising chickens in China becomes, the more rapidly new viruses can spread and mutate. Even if we may have dodged the H5N1 bullet, another pandemic like the Spanish Flu is inevitable and could break out into the human population so quickly that vaccines cannot be produced in time.

New types of influenza virus must be detected and combated while they are still diseases of birds, not humans. Detection of new viruses will happen where they originate. A global pathogen surveillance system -- as Sen. Joseph Biden suggested almost five years ago -- is necessary because the global first line of defense against influenza is not the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, but the public health agencies of China, Vietnam and other nations in that region. Those agencies need multilateral support and encouragement, and the United States must take the lead. And countries where flu viruses originate need the courage to recognize that reporting a new disease does not reveal weakness, but rather demonstrates the strength of their health systems.

Mr. Zimmerman is professor of science and security at King's College London. He was chief scientist of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff and science adviser for arms control at the U.S. State Department.
30253  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Science, Culture, & Humanities / Re: Health Care Economics on: February 07, 2007, 08:53:42 PM


February 7
• The Biggest Secret in Health Care
January 31
• Future of Driving
January 24
• Decoding Climate Politics



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1. Beijing Gets Rid of Bad Translations
2. A Shoelace Obsession Goes Online
3. Kodak's Printer Strategy: Cheaper Cartridges
4. Should Bond Investors Watch the Thin Ice?
5. Steve Jobs Raises Pressure on Music Firms


Holman W. Jenkins Jr. is a member of the editorial board of The Wall Street Journal and writes editorials and the weekly Business World column.
Mr. Jenkins joined the Journal in May 1992 as a writer for the editorial page in New York. In February 1994, he moved to Hong Kong as editor of The Asian Wall Street Journal's editorial page. He returned to the domestic Journal in December 1995 as a member of the paper's editorial board and was based in San Francisco. In April 1997, he returned to the Journal's New York office. Mr. Jenkins won a 1997 Gerald Loeb Award for distinguished business and financial coverage.
Born in Philadelphia, Mr. Jenkins received a bachelor's degree from Hobart and William Smith Colleges in Geneva, N.Y. He received a master's degree in journalism from Northwestern University in Evanston, Ill., and studied at the University of Michigan on a journalism fellowship.
Mr. Jenkins invites comments to

The Biggest Secret in Health Care
February 7, 2007; Page A14
President Bush might seem a candidate for OCD treatment, what with his insistence that the fix for health care is tax reform. He was at it again in his latest budget proposal, which calls for reforming the unlimited tax break for job-related health insurance.

Where does he get such ideas?

The answer: From every recent president that went before him, including Presidents Reagan, Bush and Clinton. And from all the wonks in wonkdom, who've long understood that the tax code was the problem and who've occasionally even shared this understanding with the public, most recently during the heady days before the Clinton health plan was submitted to a congressional dumpster.

A newspaper we know and love, in 1993, reported as a nearly uncontested fact: "The tax breaks on this enormous transfer of wealth have created a health-care market characterized by inefficiency, ignorance and excess."

The head of Blue Cross & Blue Shield declared: "The most powerful incentive is the tax code. We've been through five decades of teaching the individual that health care is a free good."

Paul Ellwood, godfather of the Clinton plan, said: "Changing the tax status of health benefits is the glue that holds managed competition together."

Bill Clinton himself said: "There has to be some sort of personal responsibility in this health-care system we set up."

Let the current President Bush give voice to the same analysis, however, and it must be some kind of supply-side hokum.

To rehearse: The tax code is the original hectoring mommy behind our health-care neuroses. It gives the biggest subsidy to those who need it least. It pays the affluent to buy more medical care than they would if they were spending their own money. It prompts them to launder our health spending through an insurance bureaucracy, creating endless paperwork. It prices millions of less-favored taxpayers out of the market for health insurance. It fosters a misconception that health care is free even as workers are perplexed over the failure of their wages to rise.

Clark Havighurst, a Duke University sage, points to one of the many destructive consequences: "With insured consumer-voters generally believing that someone other than themselves is paying for their health care, they see no reason not to approve regulatory and other public policies that raise the cost of that care and foreclose opportunities to economize."

He was thinking of the congressional rage to prevent managed care from saving us money, after Congress and everyone else first championed managed care as a way to save us money.

Others point to a destructive consequence for the practice of medicine itself. Patients, because their only skin in the game is their skin, end up listening to doctors and hospitals who are massively incentivized to expose them to more procedures, more tests and more drugs than patients, quite apart from any consideration of costs, would choose for themselves.

Guess what? The patients are right. Much of this superfluous care is bad for their health. (Such is the finding of a long-running Dartmouth Medical School study of national treatment patterns.)

Much better, in our view, would be simply to do away with the tax break and let businesses and consumers adjust. The insurance industry wouldn't stand around and watch its livelihood vanish. And tax rates could be adjusted to make sure the overall tax burden remains unchanged. You'd be shocked at how quickly the system would right itself.

Alas, there is panic on K Street when anyone suggests doing away with the tax break directly. The health industry goes ape. (Think doctors, hospitals, drug makers, insurers, etc. don't enjoy having a $200 billion-a-year tax subsidy to encourage consumption of their products? Think big business doesn't like having a tax subsidy for a good chunk of its employment costs? Think they don't lobby?)

So Mr. Bush makes peace with the tax code's bias toward health spending in order to do battle with the particular vice of our overreliance on third-party payment. He does so by equalizing the tax treatment of health dollars whether they flow directly from a consumer pocket (the vehicle here is health savings accounts) or through a third-party laundromat.

He would do so by equalizing the treatment of health insurance whether you buy it yourself or your employer buys it for you (his latest plan).

No, hosannas will not be sung to him by left or right. However, keep something in mind as the 2008 debate heats up. The oft-mouthed goal of expanding health insurance to the poor would be far easier to achieve if we stopped subsidizing overconsumption by the non-poor.

There's a lesson in presidential leadership here. Mr. Clinton lost interest in health care after a few months when he discovered health care wouldn't result in a monument to his presidency. In a very pre-postmodern approach, Mr. Bush identified the same basic problem and has worked steadily away at it, showing that a president can accomplish something as long as he's willing not to receive any credit.

The one great and glaring fault in his record is the creation of an unsustainable drug benefit to add to the unsustainable burden of future Medicare spending. Then again, what is unsustainable is unsustainable.

The pattern for that reform is already present between the lines -- towards greater reliance on saving than taxing, towards greater reliance on individual responsibility than on the illusory free-lunchism of government transfers. For the problem of Medicare is the problem health care writ small: The illusion that somebody else is available to pay our bills for us.
30254  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / The Sinai War of 1956 on: February 07, 2007, 08:09:25 PM
The Second War of Independence
The Sinai campaign of 1956 established that Israel was here to stay.

Wednesday, February 7, 2007 12:01 a.m. EST

Fifty years ago, at dawn on Oct. 29, 1956, Israeli paratroopers under the command of Col. Ariel Sharon dropped into the Mitla Pass deep in the Sinai Peninsula, 25 miles from the Suez Canal. The action was the first phase in a plan secretly forged by representatives of France, Britain and Israel, triggered by Egypt's nationalization of the canal three months before. According to the scheme, the paratroopers' landing would provide a pretext for the French and British governments to order both Egypt and Israel to remove all of their forces from the canal area. The Europeans anticipated that Cairo would reject that ultimatum, thus allowing them to occupy the strategic waterway. Israel dutifully executed its part of the scheme, smashing the Egyptian army in four days and conquering all of the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip. The Anglo-French armada, however, was late in arriving, and soon withdrew under intense international pressure. The Suez War--known in Israel as the Sinai Campaign, or Operation Kadesh--was over within a week, but the battle over its interpretation was merely beginning.

Numerous books and articles have been written about the Suez Crisis, the first post-World War II crisis to pit nationalism against imperialism, and the West against the communist bloc. Historians have long agreed that the invasion was an unrelieved catastrophe for Britain and France, precipitating their expulsion from the Middle East and their decline as great powers. By contrast, the first three decades after the crisis saw debate over Israel's fortunes in the war, with some scholars asserting that Israel had benefited from the destruction of the Egyptian army, the opening of the Straits of Tiran, and the strategic alliance with France. Starting in the 1980s, however, a movement of self-styled New Historians, dedicated to debunking the alleged "myths" of Israeli history, depicted the Sinai Campaign as no less disastrous for the Jewish state. "Israel . . . paid a heavy political price for ganging up with the colonial powers against the emergent forces of Arab nationalism," wrote Avi Shlaim of Oxford University. "Its actions could henceforth be used as proof . . . that it was a bridgehead of Western imperialism in the . . . Arab world."

Twenty years later, Shlaim's analysis of the 1956 war has become universally accepted in academia, and not only among revisionists. In a New York Times article marking the 50th anniversary of Suez, Boston University's David Fromkin, author of the widely acclaimed study of the origins of the modern Middle East, "A Peace to End All Peace" (1989), similarly portrayed Israel's victory as Pyrrhic. "Israel compromised itself through its partnership with European imperialism," Fromkin alleged, echoing Shlaim. "The more Israel won on the battlefield, the further it got from achieving the peace that it sought."

Those who have challenged the magnitude of Israel's victory in 1956, however, fail to take into account the incompleteness of Israel's triumph in its 1948 War of Independence. Customarily, states that win on the battlefield dictate the terms of the peace. But while Israeli forces had repulsed the invading Arab armies and compelled them to sue for truce, Israeli negotiators failed to transform that military accomplishment into a diplomatic device for ending the conflict. The armistice agreements that Israel signed with its four neighboring Arab states between February and July 1949 did not, for example, extend recognition or legitimacy to the Jewish state; nor did they endow that state with permanent borders.
Further complicating this anomalous situation, the agreements created various demilitarized zones of uncertain sovereignty along Israel's frontiers--at the foot of the Golan Heights, for instance, and in Nitzana, along the Sinai-Negev border. Most deleterious of all for Israel, the armistice did not provide for peace. On the contrary, the agreements allowed the Arabs to insist that a state of war continued to exist between them and the "Zionist entity." This state of war, the Arabs argued, enabled them to fire at Israeli settlements in the demilitarized zones, to conduct an economic boycott of the Jewish state, and to blockade Israeli ships and Israel-bound cargoes through the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran. Arab states engaged in a relentless anti-Zionist and anti-Semitic propaganda campaign, designed to prepare their publics for a "second round" with Israel, this time to annihilate it. Propaganda did not suffice for some Arab countries, however, like Syria and Egypt, which sponsored cross-border terrorist (Fedayeen) attacks like that which killed eleven Israelis at Maaleh Akrabim in March 1954.

For the Arab states, the Palestine War, as they called it, had never really ended. Yet they were not alone in regarding Israel as an impermanent and unwanted presence: The Great Powers--the United States, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union--routinely treated Israel as a passing phenomenon and ignored its fundamental interests. Indeed, for the Powers, Israel was little more than what United States Secretary of State John Foster Dulles called "a millstone around our necks."

The period of 1948 to 1956 was one of profound upheaval in Great Power diplomacy in the Middle East. The United States was on the one hand striving to oust the old colonial powers, Britain and France, from the region, while on the other working with its European allies to prevent Soviet penetration. In response to the American threat, Britain and France sought to strengthen their alliances with local states--Britain with Jordan, Egypt and Iraq, and France with Syria and Lebanon--by guaranteeing their security and selling them modern arms. Israel, which was in no Power's interest, was completely left out of these arrangements. Worse, Israel's clashes with Egypt in 1949 and Jordan in 1956 nearly resulted in direct conflict between the IDF and British forces.

Viewed antagonistically by both Britain and France, Israel was hardly valued as an asset by the United States. The Republican administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower owed nothing to the Jewish vote, and was closely aligned with State Department Arabists and American oil companies active in the Middle East. Apart from parade items such as helmets and batons, the United States adamantly refused to sell arms to Israel, even laboring to prevent Israel from purchasing weaponry from its allies. Such transactions, the administration reasoned, would push the Arabs into the Soviet sphere and endanger vital oil supplies.

For their part, the Soviets had also thrown their support behind the Arabs. Though they had provided crucial diplomatic and military backing to the Jewish state in 1948, the Soviets, having secured their objective of ousting the British from Palestine, proceeded to change sides. By 1951, they were unremitting in their hostility to Israel, and after Stalin's death in 1953, the Kremlin adopted a policy of nurturing "bourgeois nationalist" regimes opposed to the West, such as those of Egypt and Syria.

America and Britain reacted to the Soviet threat by trying to organize Middle Eastern states into a regional defense organization similar to NATO. The alliance, known first as the Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO) and later as the Baghdad Pact, was to include Iraq, Jordan and hopefully Egypt. Israel, though it repeatedly petitioned for admission to the group, was continually rejected.

Moreover, while actively fortifying the Arabs, the Powers also implicitly upheld their own interpretation of the armistice. They refused, for example, to pressure the Arab states to end their economic boycott and blockade of Israel or to stem armed infiltration. Rather, they condemned Israel's attempt to establish settlements in the demilitarized zones, to send ships through the canal and the straits, and to retaliate against Fedayeen strongholds. They also opposed Israel's construction of a national water carrier that would transfer Galilee water to the Negev, thus facilitating the desert's settlement. The Negev, the Americans and the British determined in 1949, would eventually be detached from Israel and transferred to Arab sovereignty as part of a land-for-peace deal. Indeed, an Anglo-American plan, inaugurated in 1954 and codenamed "Alpha," called for the transfer of large swaths of the Negev to Egypt as a means of incentivizing it to join MEDO; the Egyptians, in turn, would grant nonbelligerency--not peace--to Israel. Though Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion rejected Alpha, American and British leaders were prepared to exert immense pressure on him to implement the plan should Cairo accept it.

Indeed, the Egyptians had long demanded the Negev as a land bridge between them and the Arab world. In secret meetings with Israeli diplomats after the armistice, Egyptian representatives repeatedly demanded that Israel forfeit all of the Negev--62% of its territory--as the price of ending the conflict. But the Egyptians were also express in stating that peace with the Jewish state was inconceivable for the foreseeable future. That position remained unchanged after the Egyptian Revolution of July 1952 and the ascendance of Col. Gamal Abd el-Nasser to power. Though Nasser continued the secret contacts with Israel, at one point even exchanging letters with Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett, at no time did he waver from the demand for all of the Negev, or change his rejection of immediate and full peace. In fact, starting in December 1954, Nasser embarked on a campaign to extend his primacy over the entire Arab world--an effort that required escalated hostility toward Israel and intensified opposition to the West. He proceeded to tighten the blockade and boycott of Israel, to order the Egyptian army to occupy parts of Nitzana, and to set up Fedayeen units to operate out of Gaza. He also declared war against the Baghdad Pact, rejecting Alpha and signing, in September 1955, the largest-ever Middle Eastern arms deal with the Soviet bloc.

This, then, was the regional and international situation that Israel confronted in the period before the Sinai Campaign. Surrounded by Arab states that were conducting acts of war against it--indeed, were arming themselves to obliterate it--Israel had no allies, no diplomatic support and no reliable supplier of weapons. Moreover, saddled with tens of thousands of new immigrants, many of them indigent, and a near-bankrupt economy in the wake of a devastating war that had killed 1% of its population, Israel was scarcely capable of maintaining its existence, much less of defending itself against Nasser, a regionally beloved and lavishly armed leader committed to its destruction. "O Israel! Weep . . . and await your end at any time now," declared the Egyptian-run Voice of the Arabs radio in 1955. "The Arabs of Egypt have found their way to Tel Aviv."
Israel's plight indeed seemed hopeless when, suddenly, in July 1956, Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal. The event prodded the French, who had begun to view Israel as a possible ally against Nasser and his support for Algerian rebels, to open secret discussions on a joint operation in Egypt and undertake to arm the IDF. The French, in turn, urged the British to cease threatening the Israelis and join in the clandestine talks. The result was the Sevres agreement, named after the Paris suburb in which it was surreptitiously signed. According to the document, Israel agreed to commence hostilities against Egypt. One month later, Sharon and his paratroopers descended into the Mitla Pass and the Sinai Campaign began.

The fighting was brutal, but the Israeli forces succeeded in crushing Nasser's troops with their newly supplied Soviet arms, conquering all of the Sinai and Gaza, and reaching the Suez Canal. Though a combination of Soviet military and American economic threats eventually persuaded Ben-Gurion to evacuate these territories, in return he received American pledges for Israel's future defense, along with the deployment of U.N. peacekeepers along the border with Egypt and in Sharm al-Sheikh, overlooking the Straits of Tiran. Finally freed of the danger of Egyptian attack and strengthened through commerce with Asia by way of the straits, Israel enjoyed a period of unprecedented peace and prosperity. It took advantage of those years to absorb waves of new immigrants and to galvanize its civil society. Many Israelis who lived through that time remember the decade after 1956 as the most halcyon in their lives, and in their country's history. And though Nasser unilaterally evicted the U.N. force in May 1967 and again blockaded the straits, the security guarantees Israel had obtained from the United States in 1956, and the international commitments it received regarding the inviolability of its borders and shipping rights, proved essential to generating support for Israel in the Six Day War.

Equally important, at least, was the permanence that Israel achieved as a result of the Sinai Campaign. In the aftermath of the war, the Powers ceased to regard Israel as a temporary entity whose territory could be bargained off to the Arabs. There would be no more Alphas, no more attempts to deprive Israel of the Negev or of any other part of its sovereign land. Nor did the United States endeavor to block Israel's acquisition of modern arms, which continued to flow from France. Indeed, with French assistance, Israel built the nuclear reactor that endowed it with capabilities unequaled except by those of the world's greatest powers.

Finally, though Israel did, by virtue of its collusion with Britain and France, confirm the Arab charge that the Jewish state was little more than a beachhead for imperialism, in truth that charge exists far more in the minds of contemporary Western historians than in Arab thinking of the late 1950s. An examination of Arab broadcasts and newspapers from the period reveals no substantial change in Arab hostility toward Israel--it was absolute before the war, and no less total after it. Similarly, the war could not have lessened chances for the success of a peace process that simply did not exist and, according to Nasser, would not for many, many years.

Contrary, then, to the conventional wisdom in academic circles today, Israel emerged from the Sinai Campaign economically, diplomatically, and militarily strengthened. It had forged vital alliances and earned the respect, if not yet the affection, of the Great Powers, while also enhancing its citizens' security. The situation that existed after 1948, in which Israel was denied legitimacy, permanence, and such fundamental rights as safe borders and freedom of shipping, had ended. The 1956 war allowed Israel to realize, finally, the unfulfilled aspirations of 1948, and in this represents the culmination of Israel's fight for independence.
Mr. Oren is a senior Fellow at the Shalem Center, a contributing editor of Azure and author of "Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East, 1776 to the Present" (Norton, 2007).
30255  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Islam in America and the rest of the western hemisphere on: February 07, 2007, 08:02:13 PM
In Defense of '24'
An Arab-American defends the real-life Bauers.

Wednesday, February 7, 2007 12:01 a.m. EST

I am an Arab-American as well as a fan of "24." The two things are not mutually exclusive, despite what the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR) and other such groups have to say about this season's opening episodes possibly increasing anti-Muslim and anti-Arab prejudice in American society.

Most of the terrorists represented in "24" through the years have been Arab Muslims. Why? Well, probably because most terrorists today are, in fact, Arab Muslims. As a descendant of Syrian Muslims, I am very well aware that the majority of Muslims world-wide are peaceful, hard working, and law abiding. That still does not change the fact that the greatest terrorist threat to the U.S. today comes not from the ETA, the IRA, etc., but from one group: Islamic terrorists.

And this is what makes "24" a compelling drama every week. Instead of pretending Islamic terrorists don't exist, the show presents frighteningly real worst-case scenarios perpetrated by Osama bin Laden's followers. So CAIR thinks it's over the top for the terrorists in "24" to blow up Los Angeles with a nuke? Please, if bin Laden and his crew had nukes, most of us would be way too dead to argue over such points.

There is a dangerous trend in the U.S. today that involves skirting the truth at the risk of offending any individual or group. When Bill Cosby talks to African-Americans about self-respect and responsibility, and says publicly what many have been saying privately for years, he's branded a "reactionary," "misinformed," "judgmental," and so on. When "24" confronts America's worst fears about al Qaeda--whose goal remains to kill as many Americans as possible whenever possible--the show is said to be guilty of fueling anti-Muslim and anti-Arab prejudice.

Well, here's the hard, cold truth: When Islamic terrorists stop being a threat to America's survival, viewers will lose interest in "24," because it will have lost its relevancy. Until such time, I will continue to watch "24"--because, believe it or not, the idea that there are Jack Bauers out there in real life risking their lives to save ours does mean something to me.

And as for "24" causing a possible backlash against Muslims and Arab-Americans, where's the evidence of that? The show is now in its sixth season and there hasn't been one recorded incident of any viewer ever slurring or attacking any Muslim or Arab-American because of something that happened on the show. More to the point, in the latest episode President Palmer stated, "The American Muslim community is the greatest line of defense against these terrorists." He advocates strengthening ties with Islamic leaders across the U.S., and is opposed to measures that would in any way infringe upon the constitutional rights of Arab Americans.

That said, I would certainly welcome more characters in movies, TV programs and novels who reflect the overall Arab-American experience. Truth is, most of us don't have bomb-making skills or a desire to become human missiles. And there are Muslim and Arab-American CTU heroes out there, as well as doctors, superdads, women scientists, etc. But just as it took Saul Bellow to give literary voice to the Jewish-American experience, we need our own storytellers to weave the pastiche of tales that make up Arab-American life.
In the meantime, the next time a journalist decides to report on Arab-American concerns about shows like "24," maybe he could actually talk to someone other than CAIR and the Muslim Public Affairs Council, and seek out Arab-Americans with a different point of view. We actually do exist.

And maybe that same reporter could take a closer look at CAIR. Ask CAIR about the Holy Land Foundation and its support of Hamas. Ask it about the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the CAIR board member who was named as an unindicted co-conspirator in that case--yet still sits on CAIR's board. Look a little closer, and maybe you'll find that CAIR has good reason to get nervous about shows like "24."

Because terrorists and their supporters continue to hide among us in plain sight, we need Jack Bauer, now more than ever.

Mr. Dabul is a free-lance writer and the author of "Deadline," a novel about modern terrorism.

30256  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Re: What make Thornton think Kali is dead?? on: February 07, 2007, 06:38:40 PM
Lets be sure we are not mistaken for putting out whose style can beat up whose style vibrations , , ,
30257  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Re: WHERE IS THE FOOTWORK!?! on: February 07, 2007, 06:33:41 PM
My pleasure.  It is about one mile south of the R1 Gym.
30258  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / The Italians come through on: February 07, 2007, 05:13:40 PM
ITALY/AFGHANISTAN: Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi's Unione coalition voted to keep 1,800 troops in Afghanistan during a late-night coalition meeting, despite disagreements among coalition members. Prodi's allies in the coalition confirmed their full support for the prime minister and the military operation. Approximately 50 percent of Italians oppose Italy's involvement in the war.
30259  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Islam in America and the rest of the western hemisphere on: February 07, 2007, 12:45:05 PM
LBN News

WE DO USE BOOKS THAT CALL JEWS 'APES' ADMITS HEAD OF ISLAMIC SCHOOL: The principal of an Islamic school has admitted that it uses textbooks which describe Jews as "apes" and Christians as "pigs" and has refused to withdraw them. Dr Sumaya Alyusuf confirmed that the offending books exist after former teacher Colin Cook, 57, alleged that children as young as five are taught from racist materials at the King Fahd Academy in Acton. In an interview on BBC2's Newsnight, Dr Alyusuf was asked by Jeremy Paxman whether she recognized the books. She said: "Yes, I do recognize these books, of course. We have these books in our school. These books have good chapters that can be used by the teachers. It depends on the objectives the teacher wants to achieve."
30260  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Re: Euro Martial Arts on: February 07, 2007, 12:41:43 PM
Tricky Dog up in Vancouver was playing with some guys in some pretty serious medieval knight armor a couple of years ago.  I'll see if I can get him to post.
30261  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Re: What make Thornton think Kali is dead?? on: February 07, 2007, 12:38:12 PM
Woof All:

I've had my internet dueling keyboard sessions with Matt over the last few years and on occasion we butted heads pretty strongly.  I certainly didn't care for his crew and him parking on Guro Inosanto's forum a some years back to diss his work and push theirs, nor for certain comments that seemed to me inappropriately derogatory, but I suspect we have both moved on from that.  He's a bright guy, produces some good BJJ/MMA people and has amazing typing endurance!   cheesy   Also, I must credit those dueling keyboard sessions as playing their role in getting me to put out our Kali Tudo DVD and writing the article that become the Black Belt cover piece grin

Personally I seek to apply Guro Inosanto's advice of "Be the temperature, not the thermometer."  Sometimes I play with calling those of us who include the training that he mocks " we the living dead" and calling the relevant portions of our training "dead patterns" as in "OK, lets do some dead pattern training!"

I figure he does what he likes and we do what we like and that what he thinks of us is none of our business.

The Adventure continues,
30262  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Re: WHERE IS THE FOOTWORK!?! on: February 07, 2007, 12:12:32 PM
Concerning surfaces: 

I do the bulk of my training on the wreslting and judo mats at R1.  I think this allows me to go much harder and explosively than would otherwise be the case because of less strain on my joints.  I think it also helps me that I do The Dune in Manhattan Beach barefoot.  I think this really helps the muscles of the feet..
30263  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Re: Euro Martial Arts on: February 07, 2007, 11:26:00 AM
Society for Creative Anacronisms

I think we have had a couple of threads about them.  Use the search function and see what you can find , , ,
30264  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Re: MMA on: February 07, 2007, 09:08:35 AM
Who is FS fighting?
30265  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Fascinating Read from Stratfor on: February 06, 2007, 10:43:03 PM
U.S.-Iranian Tensions and an Abduction in Baghdad
By George Friedman and Kamran Bokhari

Iraqi officials said Tuesday that gunmen wearing Iraqi army uniforms kidnapped an Iranian Embassy official in central Baghdad on Sunday. Jalal Sharafi, a second secretary at the Iranian Embassy, was abducted from the Karrada district while on his way to a ribbon cutting at a new branch of an Iranian state-owned bank.

According to witnesses and unnamed Iraqi officials, gunmen wearing uniforms of the Iraqi army's elite 36th Commando Battalion -- part of the Iraqi Special Operations Forces Brigade, an aggressive unit that specializes in counterinsurgent operations -- were involved in the snatch. They reportedly used two of their vehicles to block Sharafi's car and then seized him. During the ambush, nearby Iraqi police -- apparently suspecting a kidnapping was taking place -- opened fire on one of the vehicles and brought it to a halt. The four gunmen inside -- all with official Iraqi military identification -- were arrested.

The story did not end there, however. On Monday, individuals showing official Iraqi government badges arrived at the police station where the gunmen were being detained and claimed to have authority to transfer them to the serious crimes police unit. It was later discovered that the suspects never arrived.

Iran has accused the United States of engineering the abduction through the Sunni-controlled Defense Ministry; the U.S. military has denied any involvement in the matter.

Given the tactical details of the operation and the geopolitical backdrop, there are two possible explanations for the incident. One is that Sunni insurgents are responsible: They have the means and motivation to pull off such an operation, and any number of Sunni factions would be interested in carrying out an abduction like this. But the United States has a motive as well.

It is important to note that Sharafi's position at the embassy is the kind of diplomatic posting that frequently would be a cover for intelligence operatives. So if he were an Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security operative of some importance, kidnapping him would disrupt Iranian operations as the U.S. security offensive in Baghdad gets under way. Second, the United States has been very public in saying it intends to become more aggressive toward Iranian covert operations as part of its effort to bring pressure against Tehran. U.S. intelligence has substantially ramped up the collection of information on Iran -- a move that would serve whether the goal was to actually attack Iran, plan negotiations or just try to figure out the mind of Tehran. The snatch of a second secretary would fit into this effort.

This is not the first incident of this kind. In January, U.S. forces arrested five officials from an Iranian diplomatic office in Arbil, a northern city, and have been holding them ever since -- a maneuver that fits with the Bush administration's strategy of demonstrating that Washington has the ability to weaken the Iranian position in Iraq. In an act of apparent retaliation, Shiite militants attacked the Provincial Joint Coordination Center in the southern city of Karbala on Jan. 20, and after a 20-minute gunbattle, abducted five U.S. soldiers, who later were killed. The operatives spoke English, had U.S. military uniforms and identification cards and arrived in armored white GMC suburbans. Using their English-language skills, the gunmen were able to arm themselves at a local police station and then penetrate multiple layers of security before opening fire on a U.S. civil affairs team.

At this point, this much is clear: No matter who is actually responsible for the Sharafi abduction, it will further heighten U.S.-Iranian tensions and could force Tehran to retaliate against the pressure being generated by the United States. The Iranians will blame the Americans under any circumstances. In the logic of the region, the Iranians will reason that even if the perpetrators were Sunnis, the United States somehow manipulated them into carrying out the operation. The Iranians are now as fixated on U.S. covert operations against Iran as the United States has become on Iranian covert operations in Iraq and elsewhere against U.S. interests.

Whatever the facts of this particular case might be, the United States has been transmitting numerous signals -- official and otherwise -- that Iran is vulnerable and is placing itself at risk by opposing U.S. interests in Iraq. The Sharafi abduction seems designed to enhance Tehran's sense of vulnerability, and hence to fuel disagreements among those in Iran who feel the United States is at a weak point and those who warn that the United States is most dangerous at its weakest. The debate between these camps is about how to deal with the United States: whether to retaliate against provocations, pursue negotiations or a mix of both. This is precisely the kind of re-evaluation of its stance and options that the United States wants to see from Iran. The Americans want the Iranians to view the United States as a dangerous foe, and to moderate their appetite for power in the region. Therefore, even if the United States didn't order the Sharafi operation, it still fits into a pattern of warnings that the Americans have been issuing.

There are some factors that allow us to speculate -- and this remains speculation -- that U.S. forces working with partners within the Iraqi Defense Ministry engineered the kidnapping. More specifically, the 36th Commando Battalion, whose uniforms were worn by the gunmen in the course of the kidnapping, is known to work closely with U.S. forces. Amid efforts to quell the Sunni insurgency and contain the growth of Iranian influence in Iraq, the United States in 2005 began moving to bring the Baathists back into Iraq's political system, especially the security forces. This policy has been central to the tensions between the Americans and Iraqi Shia, but it is a tool the Bush administration is using to counter Iranian moves.

Another point to consider is that Sharafi -- as an official with diplomatic immunity -- could not be held in detention for long under normal measures. The standard procedure for dealing with foreign diplomats who are deemed undesirable is to declare them persona non grata and order them out of the country within a matter of days. This is the course of action generally pursued if the goal is to rid a country of potential intelligence operatives -- and it is a sign of escalating tension between the diplomat's home state and the host country. In Sharafi's case, expulsion would have been the prerogative of the Iraqi government. But since the Shiite-dominated government has close ties to Iran, it is hardly likely that he would have been expelled.

In this case, the objective of the United States would not be simply to secure the Iranian's expulsion, but given his position, to extract intelligence about Tehran's plans and operational networks in Iraq. Arresting him and holding him for questioning would not be possible under international law, let alone in the face of the scandal that would ensue if U.S. forces had done this. Nevertheless, an opportunity to question him would be of real value to the United States. Maintaining plausible deniability would be the key. But arranging for Sharafi's abduction by a third party would be a feasible way of obtaining the intelligence sought by the United States. It is therefore quite possible that this was a U.S.-authorized operation executed by Washington's Sunni allies.

The Sunnis in Iraq -- both the nationalists and the jihadists -- have reasons of their own to abduct an Iranian official, and hence could have seized Sharafi as part of a completely independent operation. Sunni nationalists and jihadists feel that they are more threatened by Iranian influence in Iraq than by the U.S. military presence, which most believe eventually will come to an end. The Iranian-Shiite threat, however, is a permanent feature of the region and poses long-term danger.

The Sunnis also recognize that they do not have the means to deal with Iran or its Iraqi Shiite allies by themselves -- but the United States has the power to weaken the position of Iran, and by extension, its Iraqi patrons. With tensions between Washington and Tehran at their current heights, there is an opportunity to be exploited.

The Sunnis could exacerbate those tensions further by abducting an Iranian diplomat at a time when the United States already has five Iranian officials in custody. No claims of responsibility for the operation were issued, which means Tehran's suspicions of the Americans easily could be fueled.

The timing is interesting in another way as well. In efforts to maximize its position in Iraq, Tehran has been angling for negotiations with Saudi Arabia -- and this leaves Iraqi Sunnis feeling nervous. As a minority group that occupies a region without oil, the Sunnis would be at an inherent disadvantage: No matter what kind of support Riyadh might offer them, they would find it difficult or impossible to escape the pull of Iranian and Shiite power. Neither the nationalist insurgents nor the jihadists could accept such an outcome.

On the day of Sharafi's abduction, the al Qaeda-led alliance called the "Islamic State of Iraq" issued a statement saying U.S. military action against Iran would benefit Islamist militants. Therefore, it is entirely possible that the abduction was an attempt to provoke Iran -- which already is demanding the release of the officials captured in Arbil -- into retaliation against the Americans. The jihadists' hope would be that this could provoke a wider U.S.-Iranian conflict and hence torpedo any U.S.-Iranian dealings.

The Iranians seem sincere in their conviction that the abduction was the work of the United States. Their likely reaction would be to encourage their allies within the Iraqi Shiite militias to strike at both U.S. and Sunni targets -- reminding Washington that Tehran is not without options -- while at the same time pressing ahead on the diplomatic front. In other words, the likely short-term outcome of this incident will be increased violence.

At the same time, the United States is engaged in a long-term process designed to convince the Iranians that the risks incurred in destabilizing Iraq and blocking a political settlement in Baghdad are greater than they might have imagined, and that the U.S. resolve to resist Iran is sufficient to block Tehran's ambitions. From Washington's point of view, the primary hope for any satisfactory end to the Iraq war rests in a change of policy in Tehran. Regardless of whether this abduction triggers retaliation, if Iran comes to believe that Washington is dangerous, it might come to the bargaining table or -- to be more precise -- allow its Iraqi allies to come to the table.

An action like the Sharafi abduction allows the signal to be sent, while still falling short of mounting overt military strikes against Iran -- something for which the United States currently has little appetite or resources. A covert war is within the means of the United States, and the Americans might hope that their prosecution of that war will convince Iran they are serious and to back off. Therefore, even if the kidnapping had nothing to do with the United States and Iran misreads the incident, it still could serve American interests in signaling American resolve. Given the state of the U.S. position in Iraq, the strategy well might fail -- but once again, it is one of the few cards the United States has left to play.
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30266  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Mexico-US matters on: February 06, 2007, 07:25:10 PM
By NATALIA PARRA, Associated Press Writer
2 hours, 30 minutes ago

ACAPULCO, Mexico - More than a dozen armed assailants staged and videotaped simultaneous attacks on two offices of the state attorney general Tuesday in the Pacific resort city of Acapulco, killing at least seven people.

The attacks took place before 11 a.m. in two neighborhoods about nine miles north of the tourist zone, said Enrique Gil Mercado, special prosecutor for the attorney general's office in the state of Guerrero, which includes Acapulco.

Four of the victims, including three agents and a secretary, were killed at an office in the Emiliano Zapata neighborhood, while three, including two agents and a secretary, were killed in the Ciudad del Renacimiento neighborhood, Gil said.

About eight men armed with assault weapons participated in each attack. Gil said he did not immediately know how many people were wounded. He said all the attackers escaped, including one who fled on foot. Authorities initially said city police stations had been attacked, but later revised the information.

Acapulco government official Felipe Kuri Sanchez said the attackers, dressed in military uniforms, entered the offices and that one of them asked, "Are you the only ones here?"

When the officials responded in the affirmative, some of the assailants opened fire while at least one videotaped the shootings in each office, Kuri said.

Following the attacks, other offices were evacuated as a precaution, Formato 21 radio reported.

Police did not comment on the possible motive for the attacks.

Acapulco has suffered a wave of killings as rival drug cartels fight over coastal smuggling routes and control over a burgeoning local drug market.

Last year, the heads of at least six police officers and alleged drug smugglers were found in the resort and nearby towns.

President Felipe Calderon, who took power in December, has sent more than 24,000 federal police and soldiers to regions ravaged by drug violence. More than 7,000 troops arrived in the Acapulco region last month.

Tourists have not been immune from the violence.

On Saturday, two Canadians suffered minor injuries after being grazed by bullets fired at the city's Casa Inn Hotel. The two were treated at a hospital and released. Police have not made any arrests in that case.

30267  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Science, Culture, & Humanities / Race, religion, ethnic origin, LGBT, "discrimination", & discrimination. on: February 06, 2007, 12:52:50 PM

This thread is for discussion and articles treating the question of "Can't we all just get along?"  

I open with one from the investment newsletter of Richard Russell.


To my surprise, I received a slew of e-mails over the weekend all centered on whether quarterback Rex Grossman is Jewish or not. Along these lines, I have one interesting story. It concerns the great Jewish boxer, Bennie Leonard, considered by many the best lightweight boxer of all time. Bennie had lightening hands -- he scored 69 KOs out of his 157 fights, which is amazing for a lightweight. In his career during the 20s he was defeated only 11 times. Ring Magazine lists Bennie as number 8 in lists of the 80 best fighters of the last 80 years.

Back in the 40s there were a lot of Irish bars on 8th Avenue in New York. One chain was called the Blarney Stone. The Blarney was famous for having all sorts of free food at the bar, and many times I would drop in to the Blarney Stone for a ten cent beer and a hand full of meat balls. The Blarney was a tough place, and bar fights were commonplace.

At any rate, there's this famous story about Bennie Leonard. One day Bennie stopped in at an Irish bar on 8th Avenue. Bennie was drinking a beer when a fierce-looking Irishman stalked out to the middle of the bar, raised a fist and shouted, "Is there a Jew in the house?" There was a dead silence, and then Bennie walked up to the big guy and said, "Yeah, I'm a Jew." Where upon the big guy extended his hand and said, "I've always wanted to meet you, Mr. Leonard. This is a real pleasure. May I buy you a beer?" And that concludes my racial/religious stories, at least for a while.
30268  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Science, Culture, & Humanities / Re: Economics on: February 06, 2007, 12:25:56 PM
The charts referenced in the article may not come through here in the forum, but I think the larger point is clear.

Conversations with Dr. Gold

by Michael Nystrom
February 5, 2006

They say that copper is the only metal with a PhD in economics, because it has such an excellent record in forecasting future business activity. Much has been made recently about Dr. Copper and his preliminary diagnosis of an impending recession, but what many don't realize is that the king of metals -- gold -- also has a PhD. However, if Copper's doctorate is in economics, Gold's expertise is more along the lines of philosophy, and his degree has been awarded by the world's oldest, most venerable of schools: the school of hard knocks.

Dr. Gold still teaches at the school of hard knocks -- the same old classes that have been in session since the dawn of civilization. Dr. Gold lectures on the subjects of beauty, value, responsibility, and the rule of law. One of his most popular courses -- offered regularly -- is on the subject of inflation. Dr. Gold is a kind and patient teacher, repeating his lessons again and again for beginning students, never tiring but unmercifully strict. He will never fail to pull cocky young upstarts who think they they know better back into line -- sometimes quite violently.

I had a few conversations with Dr. Gold this weekend at the Boston Public Library. Many people don't know it, but most big city libraries subscribe to a number of excellent market letters. Boston Public has over 20, and every couple of weeks I like to go down and catch up with what some of the great market thinkers are thinking. Nearly all of these thinkers are long-time students, in one way or another, of Dr. Gold.

Richard Russell is an old timer. His January 24 Dow Theory Letter is a great one. He details how much investing has changed since he began, just after the War when the memory of Depression was still fresh in people's minds. Back then, nobody wanted a stock unless it payed a dividend - almost the complete opposite of today. I'll have more to say about that in future articles ( sign up here to be notified) But of particular interest was Russell quoting another old timer, Ian McAvity on one of Dr. Gold's many lessons:
Think of the Dow as a tradable ETF. In August 1929, your grandfatehr sold one unit of the Dow and bought 18 and 1/2 ounces of gold. Three years later, when the Dow/gold ratio bottomed at 2:1, he sold those 18 ounces of gold and bought back 9 units of the Dow with the proceeds.

Those nine units reached another peak in 1966, when the ratio hit 28:1. Now your father exchanged those 9 Dow units for 252 ounces of gold. In January 1980, the ratio got to an almost unprecedented 1:1, so he converted those 252 ounces of gold into 252 units of the Dow.

Come 1999 with the ratio at an unprecedented 43.85:1 level, the prudent family converted those 252 units of the Dow into 11,050 ounces of gold! No trades were based on the price of gold or the level of the Dow...It's just a simple question of how many ounces of gold is the Dow trading for in the market. This little fable started with 1 unit of the Dow at a peak in 1929. Two tops, two bottoms and five trades later, its 11,050 ounces of gold in 70 years.
Which would you rather have today? 11,000 Dow points, or 11,000 ounces of gold?

Of course it is just a story, but as Russell points out, it shows the importance of relative valuation, patience, and -- for lack of a better word -- the fashions of investing. Fashions come and go among investors, so don't get too attached to a trend. Once upon a time (back in Russell's early days) it was bonds and dividend stocks that everyone wanted. Later it was growth stocks, then real estate. But sooner or later, old styles come back into fashion. They always do.

Another lesson from Dr. Gold comes by way of December's Elliott Wave Theorist on the Silent Crash. This one was not available at Boston Public, but you can download the entire report and watch the video edition for free until Thursday. In this report, Robert Prechter points out that the nominal Dow peaked at 381 in September 1929, and today it is hovering somewhere around 11,500, a 30X increase over 77 years. Not bad, right? But amazingly, measured in gold, the recent Dow high's are actually right about where they were at their 1929 peak! Unbelievable but see for yourself:


Prechter says:
It took 18.5 ounces of gold to buy the Dow on September 3, 1929. On May 10, 2006, it took 16.5 ounces of gold, so it is actually cheaper. Now, you might think this is just an academic comment, but it's crucial to understand that there has been very little net manufacturing growth in the United States over that period. It's hard to believe, but it's being masked by tremendous credit inflation supported by the Federal Reserve and carried out by the banking system.
Or as Dr. Gold would put it: One dollar won't buy what it did in 1929, but one ounce of gold (about $20 at the time) sure will (about $650 today)! This is an incredibly important chart, and there are others that go along with it showing the hidden destructiveness of unchecked credit creation and the likely outcome.

Along these same lines, Dan Amoss, in the February issue of Strategic Investment, has some interesting teachings from Dr. Gold via a story about the current "Goldilocks" economy. As the Goldilocks scenario goes, Chairman Ben supposedly has the US economy running "just right," just like Goldilocks, who broke into the three bears' house and ate the bowl of porridge that was "just right." (huh?) But Amoss notes that the Goldilocks story has a tragic ending. When the bears come home and find her sleeping in their house, they kill young Goldilocks, rip her to shreds and eat her (or just scare her and chase her away, depending on who's telling the story). After all, she has no right trespassing in their house and eating their food, even if she is just a naive little girl. That's how things go in the school of hard knocks. Apparently Goldilocks wasn't one of Dr. Gold's better students.

Amoss goes on to say:
Taking this metaphor to a more plausible conclusion -- the Federal Reserve has broken into the house, sat in the chairs, ate the porridge, and slept in the beds of every individual saver of US dollars. This institution constantly injects new floods of cash into the banking system by "monetizing" government liabilities (mostly Treasury bills). With each new dollar created, the value of each existing dollar held by savers declines in value.
This is part of the story that is being told by the chart above. The Fed is apparently another one of those upstart young students that Dr. Gold is going to have a word with one of these days...

But there is more to the story: Only two of the Dow's original 1929 components remain in the index today. The rest have either shriveled up and been kicked out of the Dow, been acquired by foreign or domestic companies, or have simply disappeared. Poof. Bankrupt. Gone. Many of today's industrials are not even industrials at all. Can you honestly call American Express, AIG, Citigroup, JP Mogan, Disney, McDonald's, Coke, Home Depot and Wal-Mart "industrial" stocks?

1929 Dow Components vs. 2007 Dow Components 
1929 Dow

Allied Chemical
American Can
American Smelting
American Sugar
American Tobacco B
Atlantic Refining
Bethlehem Steel
General Electric Company
General Motors Corporation
General Railway Signal
International Harvester
International Nickel
Mack Truck
Nash Motors
North American
Paramount Publix
Postum Incorporated
Radio Corporation
Sears Roebuck & Company
Standard Oil (N.J.)
Texas Company
Texas Gulf Sulphur
Union Carbide
U.S. Steel
National Cash Register
Westinghouse Electric
Wright Aeronautical

 2007 Dow

3M Company
Altria Group
American Express
American International Group
Exxon Mobil
General Electric
General Motors
Home Depot
Honeywell International Inc.
International Business Machines
Johnson & Johnson
J.P. Morgan Chase & Company
Procter & Gamble
United Technologies
Wal-Mart Stores
Walt Disney

The only two that remain from '29 are GE and GM, and it is questionable how much longer GM will last. The changes to the index reflect the changing nature of the US economy. Chrysler for example, a member of the '29 Dow, is now owned by a German company and just today announced that it will lay off 10,000 American workers and close at least two more US plants. As American manufacturing has crumbled, the US has moved increasingly towards a service economy, with special emphasis on financial services. Four of the Dow's current 30 stocks are financial services firms. In the long run, the question still remains -- at least in my mind -- if this kind of a service-based economy can create real wealth, or is it all just shuffling paper? Warren Buffett said it another way, "If you get in early on a chain-letter, you may make money, but no wealth is created."

Speaking of Buffett, let's pop on over and read a few pages of the Intelligent Investor, by Benjamin Graham (most certainly available at your local library). Remember that Graham was Warren Buffett's mentor, and Buffett calls this the greatest investment book ever written. A few of the most important insights found in the book include (from the introduction):
The market is a pendulum that forever swings between unsustainable optimism (which makes stocks too expensive) and unjustified pessimism (which makes them too cheap). The intelligent investor is a realist who sells to optimists and buys from pessimists.
The future value of every investment is a function of its present price. The higher the price you pay, the lower your return will be.
The secret to your financial success is inside yourself. If you become a critical thinker who takes no Wall Street "fact" on faith, and you invest with patient confidence, you can take steady advantage of even the worst bear markets. By developing your discipline and your courage, you can refuse to let other people's mood swings govern your financial destiny. In the end, how your investments behave is much less important than how you behave.
The last point very critical. Dr. Gold couldn't have said it better himself. Don't take anything on blind faith. The best (some say the only) education comes the hard way, from the school of hard knocks. The next best way is to study history, putting special emphasis on the teachings of Dr. Gold.
30269  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Iraq on: February 06, 2007, 12:12:12 AM
Thank you for that C-Stray Dog!

Here's some more little covered news:

IRAQ: Khadhim al-Hamadani, reportedly the head of radical Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr's political office in Iraq's Diyala province, was killed by Iraqi and U.S. forces during a raid on his home. The U.S. military said al-Hamadani was responsible for attacks against U.S. and Iraqi troops and was believed to have assisted in kidnappings, assassinations and other acts of violence.
30270  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Re: Adrenal Training on: February 05, 2007, 11:56:04 PM
No comments on this one?
30271  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Big Picture WW3: Who, when, where, why on: February 05, 2007, 11:47:13 PM

'The Iranians do not expect to be attacked'
Tovah Lazaroff and David Horovitz, THE JERUSALEM POST  Jan. 31, 2007

Seating himself in the center of The Jerusalem Post's conference room, Prof. Bernard Lewis preferred to eschew any kind of opening remarks, and instead simply invited our questions. Arguably the preeminent Islamic historian and scholar of his age, Lewis, who turned 90 last May, handled the resulting avalanche with absolute equanimity.

His English accent undimmed by recent decades spent living in America, Lewis, who was born in London into a middle-class Jewish family, sketched out a vision of extremist Islamic ambition at chilling odds with his placid, soft-spoken delivery.

For President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's Iran, he noted dryly, the notion of mutual assured destruction, of certain devastation so immense as to have kept the United States and the Soviet Union from firing their missiles at each other through the Cold War, was "not a deterrent," but rather "an inducement." Given the apocalyptic messianism of Ahmadinejad and his supporters, "if they kill large numbers of their own people, they are doing them a favor. They are giving them a quick free pass to heaven and all its delights, the divine brothel in the skies."

He dismissed Europe in a few sentences, a continent doomed to Islamist domination by dint of its own "self-abasement... in the name of political correctness and multiculturalism." What did this mean for Europe's Jews? The future, he said without hesitation, was dim.

Nonetheless, Lewis, whose recent bestsellers have included What Went Wrong? The Clash between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East and the post-9/11 The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror, was not unremittingly bleak in outlook. He argued that Iran's goals could yet be thwarted, by encouraging the Iranian people to turn against their regime. "There is a level of discontent at home, which could be exploited," he said strikingly. "I do not think it would be too difficult to bring it to the point when the regime could be overthrown."

An Iranian-wrought holocaust was not impossible, he acknowledged. But more likely, he said, was that "sooner or later," we and our leaders would "awake from our slumbers."

How will the Iranians be stopped? Do you think they are going to be stopped?

I do not know what Washington intends to do, or what Israel intends to do. My own preference would be to deal with the Iranian regime by means of the Iranian people.

All the evidence is that the regime is extremely unpopular with their own people. I am told that the Israeli daily [radio] program in Persian is widely listened to all over Iran with rapt attention and it is the only one that they believe.

Iranians were furious over the Lebanese war, feeling that they had been dragged into it and their resources were being squandered on promoting this dubious cause when things are deteriorating from bad to worse at home.

I think there is a level of discontent at home, which could be exploited. I do not think it would be too difficult to bring it to the point when the regime could be overthrown.

What should Israel be doing, therefore?

Israel should be doing everything that it can to change the regime in Iran. That is the only answer.


Yes, I think so. What the [discontented Iranians] are asking for is not a military invasion. My Iranian friends and various groups are unanimous on that point. They feel a military invasion would be counterproductive.

What do the Iranians think of their nuclear program?

That is a delicate issue because the nuclear program has become a matter of national pride. Look at it from the Iranian point of view: The Russians in the north have it, the Chinese in the east have it, the Pakistanis in the south have it, and the Israelis in the west have it. "Who is to tell us that we must not have it?"

I think one should try to make it clear at all stages that the objection is not to Iran having [a nuclear capacity] but to the regime that governs Iran having it. I am told now that in Iran most recently, support has virtually disappeared for the nuclear program. Previously it had some support, but it is now increasingly being realized that this is a method of strengthening the regime, which means that it is bad.

What would the Iranian regime do with a nuclear bomb if it got one?

That depends entirely on the balance of forces within the regime. There are people in Iran who know that using nuclear weapons, even threatening to use nuclear weapons, could bring terrible retribution upon them. On the other hand there are people with an apocalyptic mindset, and their supporters...

Do you have a sense of how far Arab states are willing to go to change things in Iran? Will they cooperate with the Israelis and the Americans?
The Arab states are very concerned about the Shia revolution. They see a militant, expansionist Shia movement which already seems to be spreading from Iran to Iraq, through Syria to Lebanon, all the way across to the Mediterranean and eastward to Afghanistan and Pakistan and so on.

One has to bear in mind that there are significant Shia minorities in Saudi Arabia and all around the Gulf, all the Gulf States. Yemen is in a sense a Shia state, though not of the same branch. From the Saudi point of view, the Shia revolution really constitutes a major menace. That is why they were so quietly supportive of Israel in the Lebanon war, and I think they would take that line again if there is a further clash. Or, should I say, when there is a further clash.

Does the Iranian regime believe that a military attack on its nuclear sites would strengthen it? Do they think that it can be avoided - that they can manage to keep the West from attacking them?

My guess is that they do not expect to be attacked. Remember, they have no experience of the functioning of a free society. The sort of self-criticism and mutual criticism that we see as normal is beyond their understanding and totally outside their experience. What we see as free debate, they see as weakness and division and fear.

Therefore I think they have a very low estimate of the forces that oppose them, whether in the US or Israel or elsewhere. They expect to have it their way, whatever way they choose.

Does that attitude stem from something inherent in Islam?

No, it is not inherent in Islam. It is inherent in the kind of government under which they have lived for the last 200 years or so. In the earliest stages of Islam, the government was more open. Traditional Islamic governments devoted great importance to consultation, to content, to limited authority, to government under law; all these things are part of the traditional Islamic background.

That all ended a couple of hundred years ago. Nothing remains of it. It ended in two phases. Phase one, modernization, mainly in the 19th and early 20th century - modernization which strengthened the power of the state and either weakened or eliminated all those intermediary powers which had previously acted as constraints on government.

The second phase, the crucial one, is Vichy, when the French government surrendered in Syria and in Lebanon, a crucial Arab country, and half of the Middle East came under German control. They were able to extend from there into Iraq, which is where the Ba'ath Party's foundations were laid. The Ba'ath Party has no roots in the Arab or Islamic past. It is the Nazi party.

Later, when the Germans left and the Russians came, it wasn't too difficult to switch from the Nazi model to the Soviet model. It only needed minor retouching.

How do you see the Arab-on-Arab violence in Iraq, Lebanon and the Palestinian territories being resolved?

The developments in the Middle East are both alarming and encouraging, depending on the angle of vision. The bad news on the general situation now is the increasing violence, the increasing support which the various extremist and terrorist movements seem to be getting. Most alarming of all is the steady increase in the area [in which] they have influence or dominate, which before long will probably include Europe.

A Syrian philosopher published an article not long ago in which he said the only question about the future of Europe is: "Will it be an Islamized Europe or Europeanized Islam?" And I am inclined to agree with him about that. In that respect, it is discouraging. Particularly alarming is the apocalyptic mood, which we see in Iran now.

This is something which Jews in particular should be able to understand very well. The messiah is coming. There is a well-known scenario of the course of events, the battle of Gog and Magog and so on and so forth. There is a final struggle ending with the final victory. Muslims generally believe that one can somehow expedite the process.

I have no doubt at all, and my Iranian friends and informants are unanimous on this, that Ahmadinejad means what he says, and that this is not, as some people have suggested, a trick or device. He really means it, he really believes it and that makes him all the more dangerous.

MAD, mutual assured destruction, [was effective] right through the Cold War. Both sides had nuclear weapons. Neither side used them, because both sides knew the other would retaliate in kind. This will not work with a religious fanatic. For him, mutual assured destruction is not a deterrent, it is an inducement. We know already that they do not give a damn about killing their own people in great numbers. We have seen it again and again.

In the final scenario, and this applies all the more strongly if they kill large numbers of their own people, they are doing them a favor. They are giving them a quick free pass to heaven and all its delights, the divine brothel in the skies. I find all that very alarming.

We turn now to the encouraging signs, the good news, such as it is. I would put it at two levels. One is that a number of Arab governments are coming to the conclusion that Israel is not their most serious problem and not their greatest danger.

This is very similar to what happened with [former Egyptian president Anwar] Sadat. If you go back to the Egyptian peace process, Sadat didn't decide to make peace because he was suddenly convinced of the merits of the Zionist case. Sadat decided to make peace because he realized that Egypt was becoming a Soviet colony.

The process was very visible. There were whole areas of Soviet bases and no Egyptian was admitted. Sadat, I think, realized that on the best estimate of Israel's power and the worst estimate of Israel's intentions, Israel was not a threat to Egypt in the way that the Soviet Union was.

So he took the very courageous step of ordering the Soviet specialists out of Egypt, facing the danger they might do what they did in Czechoslovakia or Hungary. They didn't, fortunately. Then he hoped that Washington would help him, instead of which Washington produced the Vance-Gromyko Agreement, a sort of diplomatic carve up, in effect giving Egypt back to the Soviets. That was [former president Jimmy] Carter's real contribution to the peace process. All the rest of it is imaginary; imaginary is the polite word.

That persuaded Sadat that he had to go to the Israelis.

I think that a number of the governments in the region have been through a similar process of reevaluation. During the recent war in Lebanon, it was quite clear that several Arab governments were quietly hoping that the Israelis would go in and finish the job. They were very disappointed that they didn't. That disappointment was certainly not a help, but that mood is still there. There is a willingness to reach some sort of a compromise to enable them to deal with what they see as the more pressing and more dangerous problem. That could be a short-term advantage. It might even lead to some sort of a peace process.

But as the Egyptian example I spoke of shows, that doesn't lead to any real cordiality. There is a peace process with Egypt, there is an exchange of diplomatic representatives and so on, but one would hardly talk about relations between Israel and Egypt, at the present time, as a model that one wants to extend to the rest of the Arab world. So it can bring some benefits, which might be quite substantial in the short range, but one should have no illusions about the long range.

The other encouraging sign, very faint and very distant, is of a genuine change of mood among people in some Arab countries. Talking to people in Arab countries in the last few years, some of those people express attitudes which I have never met before. I do not know how deep this goes and how strong it is, but it is there and it never was before. That is a good sign.

Can you elaborate? And does this include people in Syria?

No, it doesn't include Syria. It does include Syrians. There is a Syrian migr group called the Syrian Reform Party, headed by a man called Farid Ghadry. He publishes a journal and also has a Web site. He makes no secret of his admiration for Israel and his very positive attitude toward Israel. He lives in Washington, D.C.

The fact that a man who has ambitions, [who] hopes to lead a revolution, makes no attempt to pursue an anti-Israel, anti-Zionist line, but on the contrary he has a friendly one, that in itself is quite remarkable.

Another example on a very different level is the people in Jordan. In Jordan, Israel television is widely watched and they get the message of how a free society works. I have heard that the same thing happens elsewhere but for technical reasons it is more difficult.

As one fellow put it, it is amazing to watch these great and famous people banging the table and screaming at each other. They are used to people banging the table and screaming, but not at each other. They can get different points of view, but they have to tune in to different stations.

The sort of free debate on Israel television and, even more striking, the fact that Arabs can denounce the Israeli government on Israeli television, that has an impact. I have heard people mention this again and again. It doesn't go unnoticed.

Is there a perception in the Arab world that Hizbullah won the war in the summer?

The feelings about Hizbullah are very mixed, but always very strong, either for them or against them. Some see them as Arab heroes, the people who won a great victory for the Arab cause, and others see them as a major danger. In a sense both are right.

I had a telephone conversation with a Christian friend in Beirut not long after the Lebanon war. I asked his views on this. He said, "Israel has lost the war, but Hizbullah has not won." I asked him what he meant by that. He said that there was a swelling tide of anger against Hizbullah in Lebanon for having brought all this misfortune on the country, which is even gaining ground among the Shia population. That was a couple of days after the end of the war. Whether that is still true, I do not know. I am inclined to think that Hizbullah has gained some ground since then.

Given the civil unrest between Hizbullah and the Lebanese government, can Israel strengthen the government of Prime Minister Fuad Saniora without undermining it?

As things are now, Israeli support is the kiss of death. For Israel it is much better to refrain from expressing any support for anyone, except for certain causes like freedom and democracy, and so on.

In your writings you have spoken of the feelings of humiliation and rage in the Muslim world. When will their rage subside, if at all?

One way [for them] to alleviate their rage is to win some large victories. Which could happen. They seem to be about to take over Europe.

"About to take over Europe?" Do you have a time frame for that? It sounds pretty dramatic.

No, I can't give you the time frame, but I can give you the stages of the process: Immigration and democracy on their side, and a mood of what I can only call self-abasement on the European side - in the name of political correctness and multiculturalism, to surrender on any and every issue.

I was talking only the other day at the Herzliya conference with a German journalist. We were chatting informally over a cup of coffee. He was expressing his profound alarm at the mood of what he called self-abasement among the Germans at the present time. "We mustn't do anything to offend them. We must be nice to them. We must let them do things their way," and so on and so on and so on.

What does that mean for the Jewish communities of Europe, even in the short term?

The outlook for the Jewish communities of Europe is dim.

How do you explain the strength of the Islamic cultural psyche? There are third-generation Muslims in England who play cricket but whose loyalties to Muslim values are far stronger than anything they have picked up in England.

That is true. The loyalty is very strong, in Europe particularly. One sees a difference here between Europe and the US. One difference is that Europe has very little to offer. Europeans are losing their own loyalties and their own self-confidence. They have no respect for their own culture. It has become a culture of self-abasement. The diplomacy of what David Kelly called the "preemptive cringe." Naturally that is only going to encourage them in the worst aspects of their own.

If you look at the US, it is apparently somewhat different. There is much more, I hesitate to use the word assimilation, which in Jewish context has a negative connotation, [so] let us say acculturation.

There is also the fact that it is much easier to become American than to become European. To become American is a change of political allegiance. To become a Frenchman or a German is a change of ethnic identity. That is much more difficult for those who come and those who receive them.

Do you think that Arab nationalism will make a comeback? Is there any chance of achieving democratization when you talk about religion dictating trends?

I do not think that Arab nationalism is faring very well now. It has failed monumentally in every country. It has brought them greater tyranny, worse government and in many places lowered standards of living.

What I hope might be a more positive development is not nationalism but patriotism. It is a very different thing, which is much more compatible with the development of democratic institutions and liberal values.

Wouldn't there be a much greater chance of achieving liberalism and democracy through nationalism rather than religion?

No. That is why patriotism would give a better chance.

Though you are soft-spoken and eloquently spoken, you have given an utterly apocalyptic outlook. Are you of the view that Iran will get the bomb, that extremists will prevail, that they will use it, that the West in its self-abasement will allow this domination to succeed? Should we just go home now and hide under the covers, or is there a strategic process that, if followed, has a reasonable chance of thwarting this?

There is a real danger that these things will go the way of Benny Morris [the Israeli historian who chillingly described an Iranian-wrought holocaust in the January 19 Jerusalem Post], but that is less likely.

What is more likely is that sooner or later we will awake from our slumbers, and our leaders will find time to devote themselves to issues other than their own province. And then, as I said, there are things that can be done in Iran.
30272  DBMA Espanol / Espanol Discussion / Re: Pelea con palos y cuchillo a contacto real on: February 05, 2007, 11:28:17 PM
Guau XXXaviergs (?Que quiere que decir ese nombre?):

!Has abierto un tema sumanmente importante!

Ofresco lo siguiente:

Konrad Lorenz declaraba que hay tres tipos de agresion:

1) Teritorio
2) heriarquia
3) reproductivo (machos para la hembra, la hembra en defensa de los hijos)

Tipicamente, cazar (hunting) no se considera como ejemplo de agresion porque se trata el cazador no come miembros de su proprio especie.  Pero en mi opion no certificado en esa materia  wink en el caso de seres humanos podemos decir que varias acciones criminales son ejemplos de cazar-- el dinero o otro bien robado representando la comida.

Tambien hay que entender que el mundo moderno ha llegado a ser un ambiente ecologico para nosotros muy, muy distinto a los sistemas ecologicas en que nuestro especia se desarollaba.  Ya no vivimos en tribos donde todos conocen a todos y todos tienen el mismo entendimiento de las conceptos de comportamiento de la cultura del tribu sino todo lo contrario-- muchos de nosotros vivimos en un sistema ecologica de autonomia-- mira por ejemple el DF de Mexico donde tienes miles interacciones breves cada dia con personas quienes no conociste anteriormente y tambien con quienes no tendra's mas interaccion.

La pelea en la calle puede seguir las reglas no hablados de una pelea de herarquia entre dos miembros del mismo tribu o , , , uno o el otro puede cruzar lineas no bien definados a otras categorias de agresion.  El riesgo de eso aumenta dramaticamente en la ausencia de miembros del tribu como testigos causado precismente porque no hay tribu compartido.  ?Me explico bien aqui?  Es dificil escribir de esas cosas en otro idioma. , , ,

Entonces, diria yo en la calle es importante tener esas cosas en mente.

?Como se prepara para esa realidad?

1) Tecnicas:  Por ejemplo, hay que analizar llaves desde la punta de vista de los riesgos cuando si sueltas la llave por que el otro se rindo.  Por ejemplo la ahoga con piernas en JJB que se llama "triangle choke" cuando la sueltas permite que el otro de muerde en tu futuro reproductivo.  shocked cry

En DMBA tenemos materia para responder a problemas de este indole.

2) En la manera de entrenamiento.  Una de las cosas mas profundas del modelo Dog Brothers es el hecho "No juezes, no arbitrarios, ni medallas o premios".   Eso nos permite pelear en busca de la Verdad, no de egoismo.  Quiere subrayar eso. 

Tengo mucho por decir as respeto, pero es tiempo para preparar para ir a dormir.   Espero que lo anterior sirva para ayudar un charla (una platica?) interesante.

Si alguien no haya entendido mi espanol, no sere' ofendido para nada si me dicen "No entendi' tu espanol"  cheesy

La Aventura continua,

30273  DBMA Espanol / Espanol Discussion / Re: La experiencia del combate real con palos on: February 05, 2007, 08:48:51 PM
Guau a todos:

Mauricio acaba de haberme mandado unas fotos de las peleas de esa dia.  Me siento bien contento y muy orgulloso por la honda guerrera que se ve plenamente alli. 

Las fotos las vamos a poner en el "Gallery" del sitio la DBMA Asociacion.

Mauricio, cuando los problemas technologicas para tu entrada al foro de la DBMAA se aclaran (creo ese semana) pregunatame alli en un foro sobre la "embuscada Inosanto" que se usa para 2x2.

30274  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Afghanistan-Pakistan on: February 05, 2007, 08:38:19 PM
Afghanistan: Indications of a Busy Year Ahead
February 05, 2007 22 41  GMT


Taliban fighters attacked Afghan National Army (ANA) soldiers Feb. 4 in western Afghanistan's Farah province. The attack came as the Afghan government vowed to retake Musa Qala, a town in southern Afghanistan that has been overrun by the Taliban. Both the attack in Farah and the looming battle for Musa Qala indicate 2007 will be a busy year for NATO forces and the ANA in Afghanistan.


Afghan National Army (ANA) soldiers and coalition troops fought a small-arms battle against Taliban fighters in Afghanistan's Farah province Feb. 4. The fight started when the Taliban attacked an ANA checkpoint near the village of Farah. One Afghan soldier was killed and two were wounded in the battle. At least 10 Taliban fighters were reported dead. The engagement at Farah came as the Afghan government pledged to retake Musa Qala, a town in southern Afghanistan, from the Taliban.

The Farah engagement and the ANA's preparation for the battle in Musa Qala are examples of the ANA's increasing involvement in the fight against the Taliban -- and indications that the ANA will have plenty of opportunities to demonstrate its abilities in the coming year.

NATO, coalition forces and contractors in Afghanistan are heavily engaged in training ANA units in an effort to prepare them to play a more active role in the fight against the Taliban and the insurgents' allies. Troops from the ANA's 201st Corps, based in Pole-i-Charki, east of Kabul, increasingly are taking responsibility for security in the capital and recently formed the second of three authorized brigades.

NATO's focus on training the ANA is switching to a heavier emphasis on mobile training teams, which give ANA units instruction on staff operations, noncommissioned officer battle staff management, training management and decision-making. These skills are required if ANA officers and noncommissioned officers are to organize and lead their units in the field in a way that is compatible with NATO and coalition units.

On Feb. 1, just a few days before the battle in Farah, the U.S. military gave the ANA more than 200 up-armored Humvees, 800 trucks and 12,000 small and heavy arms. This was the U.S. military's first major presentation of new equipment to the Afghan forces.

Despite the equipment, the ANA will still depend completely on NATO and U.S. forces for air and artillery support. However, the new equipment replaces the ANA's old worn-out Soviet-era equipment, which was not compatible with the gear NATO and U.S. forces use. This new equipment and training will make the ANA more mobile and more capable of conducting patrols and taking on other battlefield responsibilities.

This move is geared toward NATO's overall strategy of eventually being able to hand over security to some form of native force so that NATO can leave -- but, realistically, this cannot happen for years. This kind of equipment is similar to that which the United States handed over to the Lebanese armed forces after the 34-day Israeli-Hezbollah conflict. Humvees and machine guns will give the ANA enhanced mobility and better firepower, but -- unlike heavier weapons, such as armored fighting vehicles and artillery -- they do not indicate that NATO especially trusts the ANA.

The equipment handover and intensified training comes ahead of the anticipated spring offensive by the Taliban and their al Qaeda and local militia allies. This offensive happens annually as the winter snows melt, clearing the mountain passes between Afghanistan and Pakistan. NATO believes that although the Taliban and their allies will launch a spring offensive, the Taliban are no longer capable of overrunning and holding any part of the country for any significant length of time. This diminished capability is likely due to the constant pounding NATO has delivered to the Taliban over the last several months in response to a record number of militant attacks, including a dramatic increase in suicide bombings.

This year is shaping up to be a violent one in Afghanistan, despite NATO's efforts. The spring offensive is expected to be intense, with large numbers of suicide attacks. NATO is preparing by sending in more forces. The ANA's increased mobility will allow it to join in the fight to a greater extent in 2007.
30275  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Lebanon on: February 05, 2007, 08:36:23 PM

Lebanon: A Tempestuous Anniversary Approaches

Feb. 14 marks the second anniversary of the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri. Lebanon's Shiite, Sunni, Druze and Christian factions are busy preparing for the event in traditional Lebanese fashion -- by gun shopping.


Feb. 14 will be a tumultuous day in the Lebanese capital of Beirut, as the country's various rival factions pour into the streets for the second anniversary of the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri. With Lebanon's various factions busily arming themselves for a potential confrontation, the anniversary is likely to be an explosive event.

Nearly two years ago, al-Hariri was killed in a massive car bombing that sparked widespread protests and forced Syrian troops out of Lebanon. Though Syria suffered a great deal of humiliation in being evicted from its western neighbor, it has managed to maintain a strong presence in Lebanon's political, military and economic apparatuses to serve Syrian interests. Syria's main militant asset, Hezbollah, is now in the middle of a campaign to undermine the Western-oriented Lebanese government led by Prime Minister Fouad Siniora. Damascus is working to expand Hezbollah's political prowess forcefully while ensuring Syrian allies are safeguarded from an international tribunal that would potentially implicate the Syrian regime in the al-Hariri assassination.

With communal tensions steadily rising in the capital city, Hezbollah's lengthy protest campaign has led Lebanon's sectarian communities to return to old habits from Lebanon's 1975-1989 civil war and to prepare for the worst by mounting a massive armament campaign.

The best-equipped of these groups is the Shiite bloc led by Hezbollah and the Amal movement. Sources in Beirut say hundreds of Hezbollah fighters armed with automatic rifles and hand grenades have arrived from the south and from the Bekaa Valley to replace civilian protesters in Beirut. Armed groups from Hezbollah, the Amal movement and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) already have begun reconnaissance missions to explore buildings overlooking downtown and place snipers on top floors to prevent any members of the anti-Syrian March 14 alliance from firing at SSNP supporters. Should any attempts be made to cut off Hezbollah supply routes on the coastal highway or the Beirut-Damascus highway that connects Beirut's southern suburbs to southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley, Hezbollah has indicated it will use Katyusha rockets to remove any blockades. Hezbollah's ability to accurately aim a Katyusha at a specific target remains in doubt, however.

Hezbollah is also busy monitoring the steady armament of Lebanon's Sunni faction, which is led by Saad al-Hariri (the slain former prime minister's son) and is heavily supported by Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Truckloads of arms including automatic rifles, guns, grenade launchers, heavy machine guns and mortars, ammunition and military uniforms are being regularly unloaded in building basements in mostly Sunni west Beirut. Saad al-Hariri is procuring arms paid for by Saudi Arabia to give the essentially urban Lebanese Sunnis the means for self-defense. In addition to Arab suppliers, the Lebanese parties associated with al-Hariri's anti-Syrian March 14 bloc are purchasing arms through Eastern and Southern European agents. Sources say popular items on their shopping lists include sniper rifles, night-vision binoculars, land mines and short-range missile launchers. Providing further evidence of the arms buying frenzy, used AK-47 prices in the local market already have risen from $200 to $700 since the 2006 summer war with Israel. Al-Hariri loyalists also have conducted training exercises on light and medium arms in schools, mosque yards, parking lots and social clubs in Beirut.

During the Lebanese civil war, Lebanon's Sunnis primarily relied on the Palestine Liberation Organization for their protection. In the aftermath of the war, the late al-Hariri believed it was the duty of Lebanese Sunnis to restore law and order in the country and to demilitarize the various factions. To this end, he created the Saudi-funded Hariri Foundation to provide an opportunity for Lebanese youths from all sectarian backgrounds to pursue a college education. His assassination and the summer 2006 conflict between Hezbollah and Israel, however, shook things up and gave the Sunnis under Saad al-Hariri's leadership a wake-up call to create their own militia. In Tarik al-Jadidah (a predominantly Sunni working-class neighborhood in Beirut), graffiti reveals the changing attitudes of Lebanese Sunnis: "Saad, you are as precious as our eyes; arm us and we will take care of the rest."

Meanwhile, Maronite Christians and Druze have maintained their own militias since the early 19th century. These two factions recognized the importance of self-defense in their Lebanon Mountain enclaves, which were autonomous from the Ottoman Empire. During the 1970s, the Druze and Maronites were among the most heavily armed groups in Lebanon as they sought to counter the rapid militarization of the Shiite community under Imam Musa al-Sadr, who founded Amal. The Druze today are actively arming their Sunni allies in Beirut with light arms and are contracting arms deals on Saad al-Hariri's behalf.

Maronite Christians, however, are seriously divided between the Hezbollah-led March 8 alliance and the al-Hariri-led March 14 alliance. Gen. Michel Aoun, a prominent figure in the Maronite community, is currently allied with Hezbollah's group along with Lebanon's pro-Syrian President Emile Lahoud. Samir Geagea's Lebanese Forces, on the other hand, are bitter foes of Aoun's movement and are allied with al-Hariri's bloc. Rumors suggest Maronite supporters of Lahoud and Aoun will lead an effort with their allies in the Lebanese army to confront the Lebanese Forces militarily in an attempt to weaken al-Hariri's alliance and prevent Geagea, an anti-Syria candidate, from becoming a serious contender for the presidency once Lahoud's term ends.

Escalating arms sales on all sides make a political compromise between the March 8 and March 14 factions unlikely in the near future. On Feb. 14, government loyalists will hold massive protests in downtown Beirut to commemorate the anniversary of al-Hariri's death, namely Riad al-Solh and Martyrs' squares. The presence of both the Hezbollah-led opposition and the March 14 alliance is bound to cause friction -- and could easily result in violent clashes in the capital. Though Hezbollah has an interest in containing the protesters and preventing violent outbreaks, a number of actors have an interest in allowing the protests to spiral out of control. For Damascus, a major destabilization in Beirut could legitimize a Syrian military intervention in Lebanon to restore its influence. Segments of the pro-government March 14 alliance are also interested in provoking clashes with Hezbollah supporters to give the Lebanese army an excuse to intervene and evict protesters from downtown and end Hezbollah's protest campaign.

Though a civil war repeat is still unlikely in the near future, the high potential for violence and the charged atmosphere in Beirut will certainly raise the bar for Hezbollah in the negotiations it conducts with the al-Siniora government. Saudi-Iranian competition over Beirut also will intensify, as Iran makes it clear that any political resolution in Lebanon will have to be negotiated with Hezbollah's patrons in Tehran.

In any case, it would be advisable to stay out of Beirut this Valentine's Day.
30276  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Science, Culture, & Humanities / Re: Humor/WTF on: February 05, 2007, 08:15:49 PM
Hillary and Bill were sitting around trying to figure the best way to get her elected President.  Hillary suggested that they needed to get in touch with middle America to shed her image as a wealthy snob.  They decided to get a Labrador Retriever and get in their car and drive to Iowa.  They arrived in a small town in Iowa and spotted a small bar and grill.  Hillary said that it would be a great place to meet with some common folk and start working on their image.

They went into the bar with the dog and sat at a booth.  The bar tender gave them each a drink and returned to the bar.  A minute later, a customer at the bar got up and went outside.  After a while a farmer came into the bar looked around, saw them sitting there and approached the table.  He didn’t say anything to the Clintons but went over to the dog and lifted his tail and looked at his rear end.  He put the tail down and went over to the bar.  A few minutes later a second then a third then a fourth farmer came over to their table, lifted the dogs tail and looked at his rear end.  Then without saying a word they went over to the bar.

This was too much for the Clintons so Bill went over to the bar and asked the bartender what was going on.  The bartender said that nothing was going on, just that the farmers had heard that there was a dog in the bar with two assholes.
30277  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Know Thy Enemy: Part Three on: February 05, 2007, 08:02:24 PM
If, as Kilcullen says, the global counterinsurgency is primarily an information war, one place where American strategy should be executed is the State Department office of Karen Hughes, the Under-Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. Hughes is a longtime Bush adviser from Texas. One of her first missions, in September, 2005, took her to the Middle East, where her efforts to speak with Muslim women as fellow-“moms” and religious believers received poor reviews. Last year, she sent out a memo to American embassies urging diplomats to make themselves widely available to the local press, but she also warned them against saying anything that might seem to deviate from Administration policy. The choice of a high-level political operative to run the government’s global-outreach effort suggests that the Bush Administration sees public diplomacy the way it sees campaigning, with the same emphasis on top-down message discipline. “It has this fixation with strategic communications—whatever that is,” an expert in public diplomacy with close ties to the State Department told me. “It’s just hokum. When you do strategic communications, it fails, because nothing gets out.” She cited a news report that the Voice of America wanted to produce on American-funded AIDS programs in Africa. The V.O.A. was told by a government official that the Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coördinator would have to give its approval before anything could be broadcast. (The decision was later overruled.) “We’re spending billions of dollars on AIDS,” the expert said—an effort that could generate considerable gratitude in African countries with substantial Muslim populations, such as Somalia and Nigeria. “But no one in Africa has a clue.”

After the Cold War, the government closed down the United States Information Service and, with it, a number of libraries and cultural centers around the world. Since September 11th, there has been an attempt to revive such public diplomacy, but, with American embassies now barricaded or built far from city centers, only the most dedicated local people will use their resources. To circumvent this problem, the State Department has established what it calls American Corners—rooms or shelves in foreign libraries dedicated to American books and culture. “It’s a good idea, but they’re small and marginal,” the expert said. She recently visited the American Corner in the main library in Kano, Nigeria, a center of Islamic learning. “I had to laugh,” she said. “A few Africans asleep at the switch, a couple of computers that weren’t working, a video series on George Washington that no one was using.” She mentioned one encouraging new example of public diplomacy, funded partly by Henry Crumpton’s office: Voice of America news broadcasts will begin airing next February in the language of Somalia, a country of increasing worry to counterterrorism officials. In general, though, there is little organized American effort to rebut the jihadist conspiracy theories that circulate daily among the Muslims living in populous countries such as Indonesia, Pakistan, and Nigeria.

According to the expert, an American diplomat with years of experience identified another obstacle to American outreach. “Let’s face it,” he told her. “All public diplomacy is on hold till George Bush is out of office.”

I once asked David Kilcullen if he thought that America was fundamentally able to deal with the global jihad. Is a society in which few people spend much time overseas or learn a second language, which is impatient with chronic problems, whose vision of war is of huge air and armor battles ended by the signing of articles of surrender, and which tends to assume that everyone is basically alike cut out for this new “long war”?

Kilcullen reminded me that there was a precedent for American success in a sustained struggle with a formidable enemy. “If this is the Cold War—if that analogy holds—then right now we’re in, like, 1953. This is a long way to go here. It didn’t all happen overnight—but it happened.” The Cold War, he emphasized, was many wars, constructed in many different models, fought in many different ways: a nuclear standoff between the superpowers, insurgencies in developing countries, a struggle of ideas in Europe. “Our current battle is a new Cold War,” Kilcullen said, “but it’s not monolithic. You’ve got to define the enemy as narrowly as you can get away with.”

President Bush has used the Cold War as an inspirational analogy almost from the beginning of the war on terror. Last month, in Riga, Latvia, he reminded an audience of the early years of the Cold War, “when freedom’s victory was not so obvious or assured.” Six decades later, he went on, “freedom in Europe has brought peace to Europe, and freedom has brought the power to bring peace to the broader Middle East.” Bush’s die-hard supporters compare him to Harry S. Truman, who was reviled in his last years in office but has been vindicated by history as a plainspoken visionary.

An Administration official pointed out that the President’s speeches on the war are like the last paragraph of every Churchill speech from the Second World War: a soaring peroration about freedom, civilization, and darkness. But in Churchill’s case, the official went on, nineteen pages of analysis, contextualization, and persuasion preceded that final paragraph. A Bush speech gives only the uplift—which suggests that there is no strategy beyond it. Bush’s notion of a titanic struggle between good and evil, between freedom and those who hate freedom, recalls the rigid anti-Communism of Whittaker Chambers, William F. Buckley, Jr., and Barry Goldwater. Montgomery McFate noted that the current avatars of right-wing Cold Warriors, the neoconservatives, have dismissed all Iraqi insurgents as “dead enders” and “bad people.” Terms like “totalitarianism” and “Islamofascism,” she said, which stir the American historical memory, mislead policymakers into greatly increasing the number of our enemies and coming up with wrongheaded strategies against them. “That’s not what the insurgents call themselves,” she said. “If you can’t call something by its name—if you can’t say, ‘This is what this phenomenon is, it has structure, meaning, agency’—how can you ever fight it?” In other words, even if we think that a jihadi in Yemen has ideas similar to those of an Islamist in Java, we have to approach them in discrete ways, both to prevent them from becoming a unified movement and because their particular political yearnings are different.

Kilcullen is attempting to revive a strain of Cold War thought that saw the confrontation with Communism not primarily as a blunt military struggle but as a subtle propaganda war that required deep knowledge of diverse enemies and civilian populations. By this standard, America’s performance against radical Islamists thus far is dismal. Bruce Hoffman, of Georgetown University, a former RAND Corporation analyst who began to use the term “global counterinsurgency” around the same time as Kilcullen, pointed to two Cold War projects: RAND’s study of the motivation and morale of the Vietcong in the mid-sixties, based on extensive interviews with prisoners and former insurgents, which led some analysts to conclude that the war was unwinnable; and a survey by Radio Free Europe of two hundred thousand émigrés from the East Bloc in the eighties, which used the findings to shape broadcasts. “We haven’t done anything like that in this struggle,” Hoffman said, and he cited the thousands of detainees in Iraq. “Instead of turning the prisons into insurgent universities, you could have a systematic process that would be based on scientific surveys designed to elicit certain information on how people joined, who their leaders were, how leadership was exercised, how group cohesion was maintained.” In other words, America would get to know its enemy. Hoffman added, “Even though we say it’s going to be the long war, we still have this enormous sense of impatience. Are we committed to doing the fundamental spadework that’s necessary?”

Kilcullen’s thinking is informed by some of the key texts of Cold War social science, such as Eric Hoffer’s “The True Believer,” which analyzed the conversion of frustrated individuals into members of fanatical mass movements, and Philip Selznick’s “The Organizational Weapon: A Study of Bolshevik Strategy and Tactics,” which described how Communists subverted existing social groups and institutions like trade unions. To these older theoretical guides he adds two recent studies of radical Islam: “Globalized Islam,” by the French scholar Olivier Roy, and “Understanding Terror Networks,” by Marc Sageman, an American forensic psychiatrist and former covert operator with the mujahideen in Afghanistan. After September 11th, Sageman traced the paths of a hundred and seventy-two alienated young Muslims who joined the jihad, and found that the common ground lay not in personal pathology, poverty, or religious belief but in social bonds. Roy sees the rise of “neo-fundamentalism” among Western Muslims as a new identity movement shaped by its response to globalization. In the margin of a section of Roy’s book called “Is Jihad Closer to Marx Than to the Koran?” Kilcullen noted, “If Islamism is the new leftism, then the strategies and techniques used to counter Marxist subversion during the Cold War may have direct or indirect relevance to combating Al Qaeda-sponsored subversion.”

Drawing on these studies, Kilcullen has plotted out a “ladder of extremism” that shows the progress of a jihadist. At the bottom is the vast population of mainstream Muslims, who are potential allies against radical Islamism as well as potential targets of subversion, and whose grievances can be addressed by political reform. The next tier up is a smaller number of “alienated Muslims,” who have given up on reform. Some of these join radical groups, like the young Muslims in North London who spend afternoons at the local community center watching jihadist videos. They require “ideological conversion”—that is, counter-subversion, which Kilcullen compares to helping young men leave gangs. (In a lecture that Kilcullen teaches on counterterrorism at Johns Hopkins, his students watch “Fight Club,” the 1999 satire about anti-capitalist terrorists, to see a radical ideology without an Islamic face.) A smaller number of these individuals, already steeped in the atmosphere of radical mosques and extremist discussions, end up joining local and regional insurgent cells, usually as the result of a “biographical trigger—they will lose a friend in Iraq, or see something that shocks them on television.” With these insurgents, the full range of counterinsurgency tools has to be used, including violence and persuasion. The very small number of fighters who are recruited to the top tier of Al Qaeda and its affiliated terrorist groups are beyond persuasion or conversion. “They’re so committed you’ve got to destroy them,” Kilcullen said. “But you’ve got to do it in such a way that you don’t create new terrorists.”

When I asked him to outline a counter-propaganda strategy, he described three basic methods. “We’ve got to create resistance to their message,” he said. “We’ve got to co-opt or assist people who have a counter-message. And we might need to consider creating or supporting the creation of rival organizations.” Bruce Hoffman told me that jihadists have posted five thousand Web sites that react quickly and imaginatively to events. In 2004, he said, a jihadist rap video called “Dirty Kuffar” became widely popular with young Muslims in Britain: “It’s like Ali G wearing a balaclava and having a pistol in one hand and a Koran in the other.” Hoffman believes that America must help foreign governments and civil-society groups flood the Internet with persuasively youthful Web sites presenting anti-jihadist messages—but not necessarily pro-American ones, and without leaving American fingerprints.

Kilcullen argues that Western governments should establish competing “trusted networks” in Muslim countries: friendly mosques, professional associations, and labor unions. (A favorite Kilcullen example from the Cold War is left-wing anti-Communist trade unions, which gave the working class in Western Europe an outlet for its grievances without driving it into the arms of the Soviet Union.) The U.S. should also support traditional authority figures—community leaders, father figures, moderate imams—in countries where the destabilizing transition to modernity has inspired Islamist violence. “You’ve got to be quiet about it,” he cautioned. “You don’t go in there like a missionary.” The key is providing a social context for individuals to choose ways other than jihad.

Kilcullen’s proposals will not be easy to implement at a moment when the government’s resources and attention are being severely drained by the chaos in Iraq. And, if some of his ideas seem sketchy, it’s because he and his colleagues have only just begun to think along these lines. The U.S. government, encumbered by habit and inertia, has not adapted as quickly to the changing terrain as the light-footed, mercurial jihadists. America’s many failures in the war on terror have led a number of thinkers to conclude that the problem is institutional. Thomas Barnett, a military analyst, proposes dividing the Department of Defense into two sections: one to fight big wars and one for insurgencies and nation-building. Lawrence Wilkerson, a retired Army colonel and Colin Powell’s former chief of staff, goes even further. He thinks that the entire national-security bureaucracy, which was essentially set in place at the start of the Cold War, is incapable of dealing with the new threats and should be overhauled, so that the government can work faster to prevent conflicts or to intervene early. “Especially in light of this Administration, but also other recent ones, do we really want to concentrate power so incredibly in the White House?” he asked. “And, if we do, why do we still have the departments, except as an appendage of bureaucracy that becomes an impediment?” In Wilkerson’s vision, new legislation would create a “unified command,” with leadership drawn from across the civilian agencies, which “could supplant the existing bureaucracy.”

Since September 11th, the government’s traditional approach to national security has proved inadequate in one area after another. The intelligence agencies habitually rely on satellites and spies, when most of the information that matters now, as Kilcullen pointed out, is “open source”—available to anyone with an Internet connection. Traditional diplomacy, with its emphasis on treaties and geopolitical debates, is less relevant than the ability to understand and influence foreign populations—not in their councils of state but in their villages and slums. And future enemies are unlikely to confront the world’s overwhelming military power with conventional warfare; technology-assisted insurgency is proving far more effective. At the highest levels of Western governments, the failure of traditional approaches to counter the jihadist threat has had a paralyzing effect. “I sense we’ve lost the ability to think strategically,” Field Marshal Sir Peter Inge, the former chief of the British armed forces, has said of his government. He could have been describing the White House and the Pentagon.

Kilcullen’s strategic mind, by contrast, seems remarkably febrile. I could call him at the office or at home at any hour of the night and he’d be jotting down ideas in one of his little black notebooks, ready to think out loud. Kilcullen, Crumpton, and their colleagues are desperately trying to develop a lasting new strategy that, in Kilcullen’s words, would be neither Republican nor Democratic. Bruce Hoffman said, “We’re talking about a profound shift in mind-set and attitude”—not to mention a drastic change in budgetary and bureaucratic priorities. “And that may not be achievable until there’s a change in Administration.” Kilcullen is now in charge of writing a new counterinsurgency manual for the civilian government, and early this month he briefed Condoleezza Rice on his findings in Afghanistan. But his ideas have yet to penetrate the fortress that is the Bush White House. Hoffman said, “Isn’t it ironic that an Australian is spearheading this shift, together with a former covert operator? It shows that it’s almost too revolutionary for the places where it should be discussed—the Pentagon, the National Security Council.” At a moment when the Bush Administration has run out of ideas and lost control, it could turn away from its “war on terror” and follow a different path—one that is right under its nose.
30278  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Know Thy Enemy: Part Two on: February 05, 2007, 08:01:29 PM
One good example of Taliban information strategy is their use of “night letters.” They have been pushing local farmers in several provinces (Helmand, Uruzgan, Kandahar) to grow poppy instead of regular crops, and using night-time threats and intimidation to punish those who don’t and convince others to convert to poppy. This is not because they need more opium—God knows they already have enough—but because they’re trying to detach the local people from the legal economy and the legally approved governance system of the provinces and districts, to weaken the hold of central and provincial government. Get the people doing something illegal, and they’re less likely to feel able to support the government, and more willing to do other illegal things (e.g. join the insurgency)—this is a classic old Bolshevik tactic from the early cold war, by the way. They are specifically trying to send the message: “The government can neither help you nor hurt us. We can hurt you, or protect you—the choice is yours.” They also use object lessons, making an example of people who don’t cooperate—for example, dozens of provincial-level officials have been assassinated this year, again as an “armed propaganda” tool—not because they want one official less but because they want to send the message “We can reach out and touch you if you cross us.” Classic armed information operation.

Kilcullen doesn’t believe that an entirely “soft” counterinsurgency approach can work against such tactics. In his view, winning hearts and minds is not a matter of making local people like you—as some American initiates to counterinsurgency whom I met in Iraq seemed to believe—but of getting them to accept that supporting your side is in their interest, which requires an element of coercion. Kilcullen met senior European officers with the NATO force in Afghanistan who seemed to be applying “a development model to counterinsurgency,” hoping that gratitude for good work would bring the Afghans over to their side. He told me, “In a counterinsurgency, the gratitude effect will last until the sun goes down and the insurgents show up and say, ‘You’re on our side, aren’t you? Otherwise, we’re going to kill you.’ If one side is willing to apply lethal force to bring the population to its side and the other side isn’t, ultimately you’re going to find yourself losing.” Kilcullen was describing a willingness to show local people that supporting the enemy risks harm and hardship, not a campaign like the Phoenix program in Vietnam, in which noncombatants were assassinated; besides being unethical, such a tactic would inevitably backfire in the age of globalized information. Nevertheless, because he talks about war with an analyst’s rationalism and a practitioner’s matter-of-factness, Kilcullen can appear deceptively detached from its consequences.

An information strategy seems to be driving the agenda of every radical Islamist movement. Kilcullen noted that when insurgents ambush an American convoy in Iraq, “they’re not doing that because they want to reduce the number of Humvees we have in Iraq by one. They’re doing it because they want spectacular media footage of a burning Humvee.” Last year, a letter surfaced that is believed to have been sent from Ayman al-Zawahiri, bin Laden’s deputy, to the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, nine months before Zarqawi’s death; the letter urged Zarqawi to make his videotaped beheadings and mass slaughter of Shiite civilians less gruesome. Kilcullen interpreted the letter as “basically saying to Zarqawi, ‘Justify your attacks on the basis of how they support our information strategy.’ ” As soon as the recent fighting in Lebanon between Hezbollah and Israeli troops ended, Hezbollah marked, with its party flags, houses that had been damaged. Kilcullen said, “That’s not a reconstruction operation—it’s an information operation. It’s influence. They’re going out there to send a couple of messages. To the Lebanese people they’re saying, ‘We’re going to take care of you.’ To all the aid agencies it’s like a dog pissing on trees: they’re saying, ‘We own this house—don’t you touch it.’ ” He went on, “When the aid agencies arrive a few days later, they have to negotiate with Hezbollah because there’s a Hezbollah flag on the house. Hezbollah says, ‘Yeah, you can sell a contract to us to fix up that house.’ It’s an information operation. They’re trying to generate influence.”

The result is an intimidated or motivated population, and a spike in fund-raising and recruiting. “When you go on YouTube and look at one of these attacks in Iraq, all you see is the video,” Kilcullen said. “If you go to some jihadist Web sites, you see the same video and then a button next to it that says, ‘Click here and donate.’ ” The Afghan or Iraqi or Lebanese insurgent, unlike his Vietnamese or Salvadoran predecessor, can plug into a global media network that will instantly amplify his message. After Kilcullen returned from Afghanistan last month, he stayed up late one Saturday night (“because I have no social life”) and calculated how many sources of information existed for a Vietnamese villager in 1966 and for an Afghan villager in 2006. He concluded that the former had ten, almost half under government control, such as Saigon radio and local officials; the latter has twenty-five (counting the Internet as only one), of which just five are controlled by the government. Most of the rest—including e-mail, satellite phone, and text messaging—are independent but more easily exploited by insurgents than by the Afghan government. And it is on the level of influencing perceptions that these wars will be won or lost. “The international information environment is critical to the success of America’s mission,” Kilcullen said.

In the information war, America and its allies are barely competing. America’s information operations, far from being the primary strategy, simply support military actions, and often badly: a Pentagon spokesman announces a battle victory, but no one in the area of the battlefield hears him (or would believe him anyway). Just as the Indonesians failed in East Timor, in spite of using locally successful tactics, Kilcullen said, “We’ve done a similar thing in Iraq—we’ve arguably done O.K. on the ground in some places, but we’re totally losing the domestic information battle. In Afghanistan, it still could go either way.”

However careful Kilcullen is not to criticize Administration policy, his argument amounts to a thoroughgoing critique. As a foreigner who is not a career official in the U.S. government, he has more distance and freedom to discuss the war on jihadism frankly, and in ways that his American counterparts rarely can. “It’s now fundamentally an information fight,” he said. “The enemy gets that, and we don’t yet get that, and I think that’s why we’re losing.”

In late September, Kilcullen was one of the featured speakers at a conference in Washington, organized by the State and Defense Departments, on bringing the civilian branches of the government into the global counterinsurgency effort. In the hallway outside the meeting room, he made a point of introducing me to another speaker, an anthropologist and Pentagon consultant named Montgomery McFate. For five years, McFate later told me, she has been making it her “evangelical mission” to get the Department of Defense to understand the importance of “cultural knowledge.” McFate is forty years old, with hair cut stylishly short and an air of humorous cool. When I asked why a social scientist would want to help the war effort, she replied, only half joking, “Because I’m engaged in a massive act of rebellion against my hippie parents.”

McFate grew up in the sixties on a communal houseboat in Marin County, California. Her parents were friends with Jack Kerouac and Lawrence Ferlinghetti, and one of her schoolmates was the daughter of Jefferson Airplane’s Grace Slick and Paul Kantner. Like Kilcullen, she was drawn to the study of human conflict and also its reality: at Yale, where she received a doctorate, her dissertation was based on several years she spent living among supporters of the Irish Republican Army and then among British counterinsurgents. In Northern Ireland, McFate discovered something very like what Kilcullen found in West Java: insurgency runs in families and social networks, held together by persistent cultural narratives—in this case, the eight-hundred-year-old saga of “perfidious Albion.” She went on to marry a U.S. Army officer. “When I was little in California, we never believed there was such a thing as the Cold War,” McFate said. “That was a bunch of lies that the government fed us to keep us paranoid. Of course, there was a thing called the Cold War, and we nearly lost. And there was no guarantee that we were going to win. And this thing that’s happening now is, without taking that too far, similar.” After September 11th, McFate said, she became “passionate about one issue: the government’s need to actually understand its adversaries,” in the same way that the United States came to understand—and thereby undermine—the Soviet Union. If, as Kilcullen and Crumpton maintain, the battlefield in the global counterinsurgency is intimately local, then the American government needs what McFate calls a “granular” knowledge of the social terrains on which it is competing.

In 2004, when McFate had a fellowship at the Office of Naval Research, she got a call from a science adviser to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He had been contacted by battalion commanders with the 4th Infantry Division in a violent sector of the Sunni Triangle, in Iraq. “We’re having a really hard time out here—we have no idea how this society works,” the commanders said. “Could you help us?” The science adviser replied that he was a mathematical physicist, and turned for help to one of the few anthropologists he could find in the Defense Department.

For decades, the Pentagon and the humanistic social sciences have had little to do with each other. In 1964, the Pentagon set up a program called, with the self-conscious idealism of the period, Project Camelot. Anthropologists were hired and sent abroad to conduct a multiyear study of the factors that promote stability or war in certain societies, beginning with Chile. When news of the program leaked, the uproar in Chile and America forced Defense Secretary Robert McNamara to cancel it. “The Department of Defense has invested hardly any money in conducting ethnographic research in areas where conflict was occurring since 1965,” McFate told me. After Project Camelot and Vietnam, where social scientists often did contract work for the U.S. military, professional associations discouraged such involvement. (“Academic anthropologists hate me for working with D.O.D.,” McFate said.) Kilcullen, who calls counterinsurgency “armed social science,” told me, “This is fundamentally about the broken relationship between the government and the discipline of anthropology. What broke that relationship is Vietnam. And people still haven’t recovered from that.” As a result, a complex human understanding of societies at war has been lost. “But it didn’t have to be lost,” McFate said. During the Second World War, anthropologists such as Margaret Mead, Gregory Bateson, Geoffrey Gorer, and Ruth Benedict provided the Allied war effort with essential insights into Asian societies. Gorer and Benedict suggested, for example, that the terms of Japan’s surrender be separated from the question of the emperor’s abdication, because the emperor was thought to embody the country’s soul; doing so allowed the Japanese to accept unconditional surrender. McFate sees herself as reaching back to this tradition of military-academic coöperation.

By 2004, the military desperately needed coöperation. McFate saw Americans in Iraq make one strategic mistake after another because they didn’t understand the nature of Iraqi society. In an article in Joint Force Quarterly, she wrote, “Once the Sunni Ba’thists lost their prestigious jobs, were humiliated in the conflict, and got frozen out through de-Ba’thification, the tribal network became the backbone of the insurgency. The tribal insurgency is a direct result of our misunderstanding the Iraqi culture.” In the course of eighteen months of interviews with returning soldiers, she was told by one Marine Corps officer, “My marines were almost wholly uninterested in interacting with the local population. Our primary mission was the security of Camp Falluja. We relieved soldiers from the 82nd Airborne Division, and their assessment was that every local was participating or complicit with the enemy. This view was quickly adopted by my unit and framed all of our actions (and reactions).” Another marine told McFate that his unit had lost the battle to influence public opinion because it used the wrong approach to communication: “We were focussed on broadcast media and metrics. But this had no impact because Iraqis spread information through rumor. We should have been visiting their coffee shops.”

The result of efforts like McFate’s is a new project with the quintessential Pentagon name Cultural Operations Research Human Terrain. It began in the form of a “ruggedized” laptop computer, loaded with data from social-science research conducted in Iraq—such as, McFate said, “an analysis of the eighty-eight tribes and subtribes in a particular province.” Now the project is recruiting social scientists around the country to join five-person “human terrain” teams that would go to Iraq and Afghanistan with combat brigades and serve as cultural advisers on six-to-nine-month tours. Pilot teams are planning to leave next spring.

Steve Fondacaro, a retired Army colonel who for a year commanded the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Task Force in Iraq, is in charge of the Human Terrain project. Fondacaro sees the war in the same terms as Kilcullen. “The new element of power that has emerged in the last thirty to forty years and has subsumed the rest is information,” he said. “A revolution happened without us knowing or paying attention. Perception truly now is reality, and our enemies know it. We have to fight on the information battlefield.” I asked him what the government should have done, say, in the case of revelations of abuse at the Abu Ghraib prison. “You’re talking to a radical here,” Fondacaro said. “Immediately be the first one to tell the story. Don’t let anyone else do it. That carries so much strategic weight.” He added, “Iraqis are not shocked by torture. It would have impressed them if we had exposed it, punished it, rectified it.” But senior military leadership, he said, remains closed to this kind of thinking. He is turning for help to academics—to “social scientists who want to educate me,” he said. So far, though, Fondacaro has hired just one anthropologist. When I spoke to her by telephone, she admitted that the assignment comes with huge ethical risks. “I do not want to get anybody killed,” she said. Some of her colleagues are curious, she said; others are critical. “I end up getting shunned at cocktail parties,” she said. “I see there could be misuse. But I just can’t stand to sit back and watch these mistakes happen over and over as people get killed, and do nothing.”

At the counterinsurgency conference in Washington, the tone among the uniformed officers, civilian officials, and various experts was urgent, almost desperate. James Kunder, a former marine and the acting deputy of the U.S. Agency for International Development, pointed out that in Iraq and Afghanistan “the civilian agencies have received 1.4 per cent of the total money,” whereas classical counterinsurgency doctrine says that eighty per cent of the effort should be nonmilitary. During Vietnam, his agency had fifteen thousand employees; it now has two thousand. After the end of the Cold War, foreign-service and aid budgets were sharply cut. “Size matters,” Kunder said, noting that throughout the civilian agencies there are shortages of money and personnel. To staff the embassy in Baghdad, the State Department has had to steal officers from other embassies, and the government can’t even fill the provincial reconstruction teams it has tried to set up in Iraq and Afghanistan. While correcting these shortages could not have prevented the deepening disaster in Iraq, they betray the government’s priorities.

In early 2004, as Iraq was beginning to unravel, Senator Richard Lugar, the Indiana Republican who chairs the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Senator Joseph Biden, the Delaware Democrat, introduced legislation for a nation-building office, under the aegis of the State Department. The office would be able to tap into contingency funds and would allow cabinet-department officials, along with congressional staff people and civilian experts, to carry out overseas operations to help stabilize and rebuild failed states and societies shattered by war—to do it deliberately and well rather than in the ad-hoc fashion that has characterized interventions from Somalia and Kosovo to Iraq. Lugar envisioned both an active-duty contingent and a reserve corps.

The bill’s biggest supporter was the military, which frequently finds itself forced to do tasks overseas for which civilians are better prepared, such as training police or rebuilding sewers. But Colin Powell, then the Secretary of State, and other Administration officials refused to give it strong backing. Then, in the summer of 2004, the Administration reversed course by announcing the creation, in the State Department, of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization; the office was given the imprimatur of National Security Presidential Directive 44. At the September conference in Washington, Kilcullen held up the office as a model for how to bring civilians into counterinsurgency: “True enough, the words ‘insurgency,’ ‘insurgent,’ and ‘counterinsurgency’ do not appear in N.S.P.D. 44, but it clearly envisages the need to deploy integrated whole-of-government capabilities in hostile environments.”

But the new office was virtually orphaned at birth. Congress provided only seven million of the hundred million dollars requested by the Administration, which never made the office a top Presidential priority. The State Department has contributed fifteen officials who can manage overseas operations, but other agencies have offered nothing. The office thus has no ability to coördinate operations, such as mobilizing police trainers, even as Iraq and Afghanistan deteriorate and new emergencies loom in places like Darfur and Pakistan. It has become insiders’ favorite example of bureaucratic inertia in the face of glaring need.

Frederick Barton, an expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think tank, considers failures like these to be a prime cause of American setbacks in fighting global jihadism. “Hard power is not the way we’re going to make an impression,” he told me, and he cited Pakistan, where a huge population, rising militancy, nuclear weapons, and the remnants of Al Qaeda’s leadership create a combustible mix. According to Barton’s figures, since 2002 America has spent more than six billion dollars on buttressing the Pakistani military, and probably a similar amount on intelligence (the number is kept secret). Yet it has spent less than a billion dollars on aid for education and economic development, in a country where Islamist madrassas and joblessness contribute to the radicalization of young people. On a recent visit to Nigeria, Barton heard that American propaganda efforts are being outclassed by those of the Iranians and the Saudis. “What would Pepsi-Cola or Disney do?” he asked. “We’re not thinking creatively, expansively. We are sclerotic, bureaucratic, lumbering—you can see the U.S. coming from miles away.”
30279  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Know Thy Enemy on: February 05, 2007, 08:00:05 PM

Because I would like for this piece to get specific attention, I give it its very own thread.    I am hoping more for our own personal comments, than posting of additional articles.


Can social scientists redefine the “war on terror”?
Issue of 2006-12-18
Posted 2006-12-11


In 1993, a young captain in the Australian Army named David Kilcullen was living among villagers in West Java, as part of an immersion program in the Indonesian language. One day, he visited a local military museum that contained a display about Indonesia’s war, during the nineteen-fifties and sixties, against a separatist Muslim insurgency movement called Darul Islam. “I had never heard of this conflict,” Kilcullen told me recently. “It’s hardly known in the West. The Indonesian government won, hands down. And I was fascinated by how it managed to pull off such a successful counterinsurgency campaign.”

Kilcullen, the son of two left-leaning academics, had studied counterinsurgency as a cadet at Duntroon, the Australian West Point, and he decided to pursue a doctorate in political anthropology at the University of New South Wales. He chose as his dissertation subject the Darul Islam conflict, conducting research over tea with former guerrillas while continuing to serve in the Australian Army. The rebel movement, he said, was bigger than the Malayan Emergency—the twelve-year Communist revolt against British rule, which was finally put down in 1960, and which has become a major point of reference in the military doctrine of counterinsurgency. During the years that Kilcullen worked on his dissertation, two events in Indonesia deeply affected his thinking. The first was the rise—in the same region that had given birth to Darul Islam, and among some of the same families—of a more extreme Islamist movement called Jemaah Islamiya, which became a Southeast Asian affiliate of Al Qaeda. The second was East Timor’s successful struggle for independence from Indonesia. Kilcullen witnessed the former as he was carrying out his field work; he participated in the latter as an infantry-company commander in a United Nations intervention force. The experiences shaped the conclusions about counter-insurgency in his dissertation, which he finished in 2001, just as a new war was about to begin.

“I saw extremely similar behavior and extremely similar problems in an Islamic insurgency in West Java and a Christian-separatist insurgency in East Timor,” he said. “After 9/11, when a lot of people were saying, ‘The problem is Islam,’ I was thinking, It’s something deeper than that. It’s about human social networks and the way that they operate.” In West Java, elements of the failed Darul Islam insurgency—a local separatist movement with mystical leanings—had resumed fighting as Jemaah Islamiya, whose outlook was Salafist and global. Kilcullen said, “What that told me about Jemaah Islamiya is that it’s not about theology.” He went on, “There are elements in human psychological and social makeup that drive what’s happening. The Islamic bit is secondary. This is human behavior in an Islamic setting. This is not ‘Islamic behavior.’ ” Paraphrasing the American political scientist Roger D. Petersen, he said, “People don’t get pushed into rebellion by their ideology. They get pulled in by their social networks.” He noted that all fifteen Saudi hijackers in the September 11th plot had trouble with their fathers. Although radical ideas prepare the way for disaffected young men to become violent jihadists, the reasons they convert, Kilcullen said, are more mundane and familiar: family, friends, associates.

Indonesia’s failure to replicate in East Timor its victory in West Java later influenced Kilcullen’s views about what the Bush Administration calls the “global war on terror.” In both instances, the Indonesian military used the same harsh techniques, including forced population movements, coercion of locals into security forces, stringent curfews, and even lethal pressure on civilians to take the government side. The reason that the effort in East Timor failed, Kilcullen concluded, was globalization. In the late nineties, a Timorese international propaganda campaign and ubiquitous media coverage prompted international intervention, thus ending the use of tactics that, in the obscure jungles of West Java in the fifties, outsiders had known nothing about. “The globalized information environment makes counterinsurgency even more difficult now,” Kilcullen said.

Just before the 2004 American elections, Kilcullen was doing intelligence work for the Australian government, sifting through Osama bin Laden’s public statements, including transcripts of a video that offered a list of grievances against America: Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, global warming. The last item brought Kilcullen up short. “I thought, Hang on! What kind of jihadist are you?” he recalled. The odd inclusion of environmentalist rhetoric, he said, made clear that “this wasn’t a list of genuine grievances. This was an Al Qaeda information strategy.” Ron Suskind, in his book “The One Percent Doctrine,” claims that analysts at the C.I.A. watched a similar video, released in 2004, and concluded that “bin Laden’s message was clearly designed to assist the President’s reëlection.” Bin Laden shrewdly created an implicit association between Al Qaeda and the Democratic Party, for he had come to feel that Bush’s strategy in the war on terror was sustaining his own global importance. Indeed, in the years after September 11th Al Qaeda’s core leadership had become a propaganda hub. “If bin Laden didn’t have access to global media, satellite communications, and the Internet, he’d just be a cranky guy in a cave,” Kilcullen said.

In 2004, Kilcullen’s writings and lectures brought him to the attention of an official working for Paul Wolfowitz, then the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Wolfowitz asked him to help write the section on “irregular warfare” in the Pentagon’s “Quadrennial Defense Review,” a statement of department policy and priorities, which was published earlier this year. Under the leadership of Donald Rumsfeld, who resigned in November, the Pentagon had embraced a narrow “shock-and-awe” approach to war-fighting, emphasizing technology, long-range firepower, and spectacular displays of force. The new document declared that activities such as “long-duration unconventional warfare, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and military support for stabilization and reconstruction efforts” needed to become a more important component of the war on terror. Kilcullen was partly responsible for the inclusion of the phrase “the long war,” which has become the preferred term among many military officers to describe the current conflict. In the end, the Rumsfeld Pentagon was unwilling to make the cuts in expensive weapons systems that would have allowed it to create new combat units and other resources necessary for a proper counterinsurgency strategy.

In July, 2005, Kilcullen, as a result of his work on the Pentagon document, received an invitation to attend a conference on defense policy, in Vermont. There he met Henry Crumpton, a highly regarded official who had supervised the C.I.A.’s covert activities in Afghanistan during the 2001 military campaign that overthrew the Taliban. The two men spent much of the conference talking privately, and learned, among other things, that they saw the war on terror in the same way. Soon afterward, Condoleezza Rice, the Secretary of State, hired Crumpton as the department’s coördinator for counterterrorism, and Crumpton, in turn, offered Kilcullen a job. For the past year, Kilcullen has occupied an office on the State Department’s second floor, as Crumpton’s chief strategist. In some senses, Kilcullen has arrived too late: this year, the insurgency in Iraq has been transformed into a calamitous civil war between Sunnis and Shiites, and his ideas about counterinsurgency are unlikely to reverse the country’s disintegration. Yet radical Islamist movements now extend across the globe, from Somalia to Afghanistan and Indonesia, and Kilcullen—an Australian anthropologist and lieutenant colonel, who is “on loan” to the U.S. government—offers a new way to understand and fight a war that seems to grow less intelligible the longer it goes on.

Kilcullen is thirty-nine years old, and has a wide pink face, a fondness for desert boots, and an Australian’s good-natured bluntness. He has a talent for making everything sound like common sense by turning disturbing explanations into brisk, cheerful questions: “America is very, very good at big, short conventional wars? It’s not very good at small, long wars? But it’s even worse at big, long wars? And that’s what we’ve got.” Kilcullen’s heroes are soldier-intellectuals, both real (T. E. Lawrence) and fictional (Robert Jordan, the flinty, self-reliant schoolteacher turned guerrilla who is the protagonist of Hemingway’s “For Whom the Bell Tolls”). On his bookshelves, alongside monographs by social scientists such as Max Gluckman and E. E. Evans-Pritchard, is a knife that he took from a militiaman he had just ambushed in East Timor. “If I were a Muslim, I’d probably be a jihadist,” Kilcullen said as we sat in his office. “The thing that drives these guys—a sense of adventure, wanting to be part of the moment, wanting to be in the big movement of history that’s happening now—that’s the same thing that drives me, you know?”

More than three years into the Iraq war and five into the conflict in Afghanistan, many members of the American military—especially those with combat experience—have begun to accept the need to learn the kind of counterinsurgency tactics that it tried to leave behind in Vietnam. On December 15th, the Army and the Marine Corps will release an ambitious new counterinsurgency field manual—the first in more than two decades—that will shape military doctrine for many years. The introduction to the field manual says, “Effective insurgents rapidly adapt to changing circumstances. They cleverly use the tools of the global information revolution to magnify the effects of their actions. . . . However, by focusing on efforts to secure the safety and support of the local populace, and through a concerted effort to truly function as learning organizations, the Army and Marine Corps can defeat their insurgent enemies.”

One night earlier this year, Kilcullen sat down with a bottle of single-malt Scotch and wrote out a series of tips for company commanders about to be deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. He is an energetic writer who avoids military and social-science jargon, and he addressed himself intimately to young captains who have had to become familiar with exotica such as “The Battle of Algiers,” the 1966 film documenting the insurgency against French colonists. “What does all the theory mean, at the company level?” he asked. “How do the principles translate into action—at night, with the G.P.S. down, the media criticizing you, the locals complaining in a language you don’t understand, and an unseen enemy killing your people by ones and twos? How does counterinsurgency actually happen? There are no universal answers, and insurgents are among the most adaptive opponents you will ever face. Countering them will demand every ounce of your intellect.” The first tip is “Know Your Turf”: “Know the people, the topography, economy, history, religion and culture. Know every village, road, field, population group, tribal leader, and ancient grievance. Your task is to become the world expert on your district.” “Twenty-eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency”—the title riffs on a T. E. Lawrence insurgency manual from the First World War—was disseminated via e-mail to junior officers in the field, and was avidly read.

Last year, in an influential article in the Journal of Strategic Studies, Kilcullen redefined the war on terror as a “global counterinsurgency.” The change in terminology has large implications. A terrorist is “a kook in a room,” Kilcullen told me, and beyond persuasion; an insurgent has a mass base whose support can be won or lost through politics. The notion of a “war on terror” has led the U.S. government to focus overwhelmingly on military responses. In a counterinsurgency, according to the classical doctrine, which was first laid out by the British general Sir Gerald Templar during the Malayan Emergency, armed force is only a quarter of the effort; political, economic, and informational operations are also required. A war on terror suggests an undifferentiated enemy. Kilcullen speaks of the need to “disaggregate” insurgencies: finding ways to address local grievances in Pakistan’s tribal areas or along the Thai-Malay border so that they aren’t mapped onto the ambitions of the global jihad. Kilcullen writes, “Just as the Containment strategy was central to the Cold War, likewise a Disaggregation strategy would provide a unifying strategic conception for the war—something that has been lacking to date.” As an example of disaggregation, Kilcullen cited the Indonesian province of Aceh, where, after the 2004 tsunami, a radical Islamist organization tried to set up an office and convert a local separatist movement to its ideological agenda. Resentment toward the outsiders, combined with the swift humanitarian action of American and Australian warships, helped to prevent the Acehnese rebellion from becoming part of the global jihad. As for America, this success had more to do with luck than with strategy. Crumpton, Kilcullen’s boss, told me that American foreign policy traditionally operates on two levels, the global and the national; today, however, the battlefields are also regional and local, where the U.S. government has less knowledge and where it is not institutionally organized to act. In half a dozen critical regions, Crumpton has organized meetings among American diplomats, intelligence officials, and combat commanders, so that information about cross-border terrorist threats is shared. “It’s really important that we define the enemy in narrow terms,” Crumpton said. “The thing we should not do is let our fears grow and then inflate the threat. The threat is big enough without us having to exaggerate it.”

By speaking of Saddam Hussein, the Sunni insurgency in Iraq, the Taliban, the Iranian government, Hezbollah, and Al Qaeda in terms of one big war, Administration officials and ideologues have made Osama bin Laden’s job much easier. “You don’t play to the enemy’s global information strategy of making it all one fight,” Kilcullen said. He pointedly avoided describing this as the Administration’s approach. “You say, ‘Actually, there are sixty different groups in sixty different countries who all have different objectives. Let’s not talk about bin Laden’s objectives—let’s talk about your objectives. How do we solve that problem?’ ” In other words, the global ambitions of the enemy don’t automatically demand a monolithic response.

The more Kilcullen travels to the various theatres of war, the less he thinks that the lessons of Malaya and Vietnam are useful guides in the current conflict. “Classical counterinsurgency is designed to defeat insurgency in one country,” he writes in his Strategic Studies article. “We need a new paradigm, capable of addressing globalised insurgency.” After a recent trip to Afghanistan, where Taliban forces have begun to mount large operations in the Pashto-speaking south of the country, he told me, “This ain’t your granddaddy’s counterinsurgency.” Many American units there, he said, are executing the new field manual’s tactics brilliantly. For example, before conducting operations in a given area, soldiers sit down over bread and tea with tribal leaders and find out what they need—Korans, cold-weather gear, a hydroelectric dynamo. In exchange for promises of local support, the Americans gather the supplies and then, within hours of the end of fighting, produce them, to show what can be gained from coöperating.

But the Taliban seem to be waging a different war, driven entirely by information operations. “They’re essentially armed propaganda organizations,” Kilcullen said. “They switch between guerrilla activity and terrorist activity as they need to, in order to maintain the political momentum, and it’s all about an information operation that generates the perception of an unstoppable, growing insurgency.” After travelling through southern Afghanistan, Kilcullen e-mailed me:
30280  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Science, Culture, & Humanities / Re: Books on: February 05, 2007, 03:35:26 PM
My friend Tom writes:

I may be the last one to discover this service, but ... just in case ... I thought I would bring it to every body's attention. is using a service called Lulu to make a bunch of out-of-print books available. I am not suggesting that anybody on the circular will want to buy the books -- just using it to illustrate the Lulu service. Here is the link to the mises offerings:
I haven't read all Lulu's stuff, but apparently anybody with a "pdf" formatted book can have it published, one book at a time. I think is using this capability for a worthy purpose -- making out of print books available at such a nominal price.
Has anybody had experience with this or a similar print-on-demand service?
30281  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Mexico-US matters on: February 05, 2007, 03:18:53 PM
Mexico: Violence Crossing the Line in Acapulco
Two Canadian tourists suffered minor injuries Feb. 4 when they were struck by stray bullets in an apparent drive-by shooting in Acapulco, Mexico. It was the second violent incident involving Canadian tourists in Acapulco in less than a month, though this time the incident occurred at a hotel. Violence, much of it related to drug wars, has been escalating in the Pacific coastal resort for some time -- and is now beginning to spread to the tourist sector.

The shooting occurred on the ground-level veranda of the Casa Inn Hotel on the main street in the city's tourist district, about half a block from the beach. The Casa Inn is a modest hotel that is popular with older tourists on a budget and college students on spring break. According to reports, the gunman appeared not to be shooting at the tourists, but rather was targeting another man who was walking in front of the hotel. Nonetheless, the incident further demonstrates that the city's growing lawlessness now directly affects foreign tourists. On Jan. 8, a Canadian teenager died after being involved in an incident outside an Acapulco nightclub. Local officials said the boy died in an auto accident, though another official alleged that he was struck by a car while fleeing the club's bouncers and local taxi drivers, who were beating him.

Aside from its popularity among Canadians and other foreign tourists, Acapulco is an entry point for drugs coming from Colombia for shipment to the United States. Because of its geographical importance, Mexico's rival drug cartels are vying for control of Acapulco, which caused violence to spike in 2006. The increase in violence, which has included several gruesome beheadings, forced Mexican President Felipe Calderon to deploy nearly 8,000 federal troops to Guerrero state in January. Although his efforts could have some initial success, they have little chance of stabilizing the situation over the long term, and could even incite more violence as the cartels test his resolve or try to defend their operations against federal troops. This happened in 2005 when then-President Vicente Fox sent a much smaller contingent of 200 troops to the city as part of a nationwide crackdown.

Although it is unclear whether this latest shooting was connected to Acapulco's drug-related violence, it does indicate that criminals no longer consider the once-peaceful tourist zone off limits -- and that the danger level is rising. Moreover, local police, who normally would react forcefully to incidents that can affect tourist revenue, appear quite unable to prevent the violence. As a result, some Canadians are pressuring Ottawa to update its standing travel advisory regarding Mexico, and slumping sales have caused a number of Canadian travel agencies to reduce or cancel package tours to Acapulco.

Acapulco's warring drug cartels -- whose concern is securing the flow of drugs into Mexico for transshipment to U.S. markets -- have little reason to avoid inflicting collateral damage on the city's tourist industry. With the winter tourist season in high gear and spring break crowds soon descending on the beach hotels, Acapulco's already weak law enforcement will have its hands full -- and cannot be counted on to keep the turf wars out of the tourist district.
30282  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: The 2008 Presidential Race on: February 05, 2007, 03:18:23 PM
I share the essence of Tancredo's concerns, but think he makes a major mistake with his thinking about legal immigration.  There are many categories of legal immigration which are quite good for the United States and I am not getting that he gets that.  I am also not getting that he gets the consequences for Mexico of successful execution of his ideas-- to have millions of motivated people kept in Mexico unemployed on top of those already there on top of the burgeoning narco economy is something that needs to be thought about carefully.  I also am not getting that he gets all the ways in which Mexco and Mexicans are good for the US.  Yes, I agree 100% that we need to control our borders!!!  AND he needs to grow in his message to address these other things.

Monday, February 5, 2007 4:00 p.m. EST

Indecision 2008
Last Monday we faulted Sen. Hillary Clinton for demanding that President Bush "extricate" America from Iraq before he leaves office, and for saying, of the president's view that troops will have to remain there into his successor's (i.e., her) term, "I really resent it." We wrote, "If withdrawing from Iraq is in America's interests, why doesn't Mrs. Clinton--who by the way voted for the war--simply urge President Bush to do so on that ground, or promise to do so herself if elected?"

By the end of the week she had done as we suggested--or so the headlines seemed to indicate. "Clinton Promises to End War if Elected" was the title of an Associated Press dispatch Friday afternoon, which reported that Mrs. Clinton told a meeting of the Democratic National Committee, "If we in Congress don't end this war before January 2009, as president, I will."

Well, now, that sounds definitive. Yet on Friday's "Lou Dobbs Tonight," Democratic operative Robert Zimmerman (who, according to, had just been "bagged" by Mrs. Clinton as a fund-raiser) was furiously backtracking, in an exchange involving your humble columnist (we've made a few corrections to the CNN transcript):

Dobbs: And Sen. Clinton told you today and all those other folks sitting there, she's out of Iraq immediately if she's elected president in 2008.

Zimmerman: Well, she laid out a plan, and she put some ideas before the table that were received very well. And I applaud her initiative for doing so. Obviously, she's not pulling everyone out Jan. 20, and that's--

Dobbs: Good grief.

Zimmerman: And that's not the full statement of what she said.

Dobbs: Robert, we're going to have to pull you out of Washington. You're starting to sound like you live there, man.

Zimmerman: No, but I think, truly, you can't--you know, as Kenneth Pollack pointed out from Brookings, there aren't solutions. There are just very tough choices.

Dobbs: Let me turn to James Taranto. Now, what is the solution from--in your lights, to Iraq? What is the solution?

Taranto: Well, I don't know. I think whatever it is, it's going to be long and hard. I'm just not a military strategist. I don't--I don't feel qualified to answer that question.

I will say on Mrs. Clinton, though, I think that Robert is actually right, at least in terms of predicting what she's going to do. If she becomes president in 2009 and we are still in Iraq, as I suspect we will be, she's not going to pull out. She's not going to keep this promise. She's telling this to rally the base.

Zimmerman: I didn't say that, James. I have every belief that she will keep her promise. And she's been remarkably consistent on Iraq, where others have wavered. Because the solution is not going to be military, it's going to be a political solution.

We had not seen or read the speech when we appeared on the Dobbs show, but we looked it up later and found that (1) Zimmerman's description of it was substantially accurate, and (2) Mrs. Clinton's promise to withdraw upon inauguration was even emptier than we had thought. Here's what she said:

Now, I know very well that we're going to be debating, starting this week in the Senate, a resolution of disapproval of this president's ill-conceived plan to escalate our involvement in Iraq. Now, there are many people--there are many people who wish we could do more, but let me say that if we can get a large bipartisan vote to disapprove this president's plan for escalation, that will be the first time that we will have said "no" to President Bush and begin to reverse his policies.

Now, I want to go further. I propose capping the troop levels. I want to make it very clear that we need to threaten the Iraqi government, that we're going to take money away from their troops, not our troops who still lack body armor and armored vehicles; that we're going to send a clear message--that we are finished with their empty promises and with this president's blank check.

And let me add one other thing, and I want to be very clear about this. If I had been president in October of 2002, I would not have started this war. I would not--and if in Congress, if we in Congress, working as hard as we can to get the 60 votes you need to do anything in the Senate--believe me, I understand the frustration and the outrage, you have to have 60 votes to cap troops, to limit funding, to do anything.

If we in Congress don't end this war before January 2009, as president, I will.

And I expect to be busy in the White House in January 2009, because once and for all, we are going to provide quality, affordable, universal health-care coverage to every single American.

So she's going to end the war and give health insurance to everyone--all in the last 11 days of January! Okey dokey, artichokey.

The most telling line in Mrs. Clinton's speech is that counterfactual conditional: "If I had been president in October of 2002, I would not have started this war." This is quite an astonishing statement, seeing as how in October 2002 Mrs. Clinton voted for the war. And yet when you stop and think about it, the statement is not intuitively false. If you can imagine Mrs. Clinton as president in October 2002, you probably can imagine her not starting the Iraq war.

Whether or not you think the war was a good idea, it was indisputably the product of President Bush's leadership. He rallied the country behind it, so that it commanded something like 70% support in opinion polls. Congress's support was similarly strong, with 69% of the House and 77% of the Senate (including not just Mrs. Clinton but also fellow Democratic presidential candidates John Edwards, Joe Biden and Chris Dodd, along with John Kerry) voting in favor of the war.

Mrs. Clinton now says that if she were president in 2002, she would not have led the country to war. This amounts to an acknowledgment that her vote in favor of the war was not an act of leadership--that she was a follower. Was she following the president? This president? Obviously not. President Bush led the public to support the war, and Sen. Clinton followed the public. Now that public opinion has turned against the president and the war, so has Mrs. Clinton.

How does Mrs. Clinton deal with a problem about which public opinion has not yet gelled? On Thursday she spoke to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, and blogress Heather Robinson captured this choice quote:

I have advocated engagement with our enemies and Israel's enemies because I want to understand better what we can do to defeat those who . . . are aiming their weapons at us. . . . This is a worthy debate. . . . There are many, including our president, who reject any engagement with Iran and Syria. I believe that is a good-faith position to take, but I'm not sure it's the smart strategy that'll take us to the goal we share.

What do I mean by engagement or some kind of process? I'm not sure anything positive would come out of it . . . but there are a number of factors that argue for doing what I'm suggesting.

Says Robinson: "And what was it she was suggesting, exactly? Well, she never said."

So on Iraq, Mrs. Clinton stands resolutely on the side of public opinion, whichever side that may be in any given year. On Iran, about which public opinion is unformed, she is maddeningly noncommittal. This is fine for a senator, who merely casts one vote among 100. But the president--especially in times of international peril--needs to be able to make decisions in the national interest. Sometimes that means shaping public opinion, as President Bush did when he persuaded the public and Congress to support the war in Iraq. Sometimes it means defying public opinion, as Bush has done lately by resisting pressure to flee.

Were these decisions bad ones? History will judge, but at the moment most Americans seem to think so. Mrs. Clinton is seeking to become President Bush's successor by countering his dangerous boldness with extreme caution. She is presenting herself as the candidate who won't make bad decisions because she won't make decisions--who won't lead us astray because she will not lead.

But an excess of caution is itself a form of recklessness. Someone who won't make decisions won't make good or necessary decisions either. Therein lies the peril of a Hillary Clinton presidency.

Oh Grow Up!

"The president gets on my nerves. The war gets on my nerves. I don't think it's affected our lives that much, 'cause I'm too young to drive, I'm too young to vote. But killing and death in general, I don't know, it bothers me mentally."--Colin Wilkey, 15, a freshman at Hopkinton High School, quoted in the "Teen Life" feature of the Concord (N.H.) Monitor, Feb. 5

"I think it's the height of irresponsibility and I really resent it--this was his decision to go to war, he went with an ill-conceived plan, an incompetently executed strategy, and we should expect him to extricate our country from this before he leaves office."--Hillary Clinton, 59, a sophomore in the U.S. Senate, quoted in the "Politics" section of the New York Times, Jan. 28
30283  DBMA Espanol / Espanol Discussion / Re: Mexico on: February 05, 2007, 03:11:06 PM
Omar (y todos):

Un gusto tenerte aqui con nosotros de nuevo.

Lo siguiente habla de las mismas temas como tu-- auque sea en ingles  embarassed


Mexico: Violence Crossing the Line in Acapulco
Two Canadian tourists suffered minor injuries Feb. 4 when they were struck by stray bullets in an apparent drive-by shooting in Acapulco, Mexico. It was the second violent incident involving Canadian tourists in Acapulco in less than a month, though this time the incident occurred at a hotel. Violence, much of it related to drug wars, has been escalating in the Pacific coastal resort for some time -- and is now beginning to spread to the tourist sector.

The shooting occurred on the ground-level veranda of the Casa Inn Hotel on the main street in the city's tourist district, about half a block from the beach. The Casa Inn is a modest hotel that is popular with older tourists on a budget and college students on spring break. According to reports, the gunman appeared not to be shooting at the tourists, but rather was targeting another man who was walking in front of the hotel. Nonetheless, the incident further demonstrates that the city's growing lawlessness now directly affects foreign tourists. On Jan. 8, a Canadian teenager died after being involved in an incident outside an Acapulco nightclub. Local officials said the boy died in an auto accident, though another official alleged that he was struck by a car while fleeing the club's bouncers and local taxi drivers, who were beating him.

Aside from its popularity among Canadians and other foreign tourists, Acapulco is an entry point for drugs coming from Colombia for shipment to the United States. Because of its geographical importance, Mexico's rival drug cartels are vying for control of Acapulco, which caused violence to spike in 2006. The increase in violence, which has included several gruesome beheadings, forced Mexican President Felipe Calderon to deploy nearly 8,000 federal troops to Guerrero state in January. Although his efforts could have some initial success, they have little chance of stabilizing the situation over the long term, and could even incite more violence as the cartels test his resolve or try to defend their operations against federal troops. This happened in 2005 when then-President Vicente Fox sent a much smaller contingent of 200 troops to the city as part of a nationwide crackdown.

Although it is unclear whether this latest shooting was connected to Acapulco's drug-related violence, it does indicate that criminals no longer consider the once-peaceful tourist zone off limits -- and that the danger level is rising. Moreover, local police, who normally would react forcefully to incidents that can affect tourist revenue, appear quite unable to prevent the violence. As a result, some Canadians are pressuring Ottawa to update its standing travel advisory regarding Mexico, and slumping sales have caused a number of Canadian travel agencies to reduce or cancel package tours to Acapulco.

Acapulco's warring drug cartels -- whose concern is securing the flow of drugs into Mexico for transshipment to U.S. markets -- have little reason to avoid inflicting collateral damage on the city's tourist industry. With the winter tourist season in high gear and spring break crowds soon descending on the beach hotels, Acapulco's already weak law enforcement will have its hands full -- and cannot be counted on to keep the turf wars out of the tourist district.
30284  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Military Science on: February 05, 2007, 09:33:31 AM
Geopolitical Diary: Helicopter Losses and New Questions in the War

Over the past two weeks, four U.S. helicopters have been shot down in Iraq -- one of them a Blackhawk carrying 12 people. Maj. Gen. William Caldwell, a senior military spokesman, confirmed on Sunday that all four were shot down as a result of ground fire. He went on to say, "Obviously, based on what we have seen, we are already making adjustments to our tactics and techniques, as to how we employ our helicopters." The announcement was accompanied by speculation that Iraqi insurgents have acquired new weapons that have made helicopters vulnerable.

There have been dozens of other shoot-downs of helicopters in Iraq, but the sudden surge in crashes of late raises some significant strategic issues for the United States. Iraqi insurgents using improvised explosive devices and other ambush tactics have imposed penalties on U.S. troops moving on the roads. They have not been able to shut down the roads entirely, as happened in Vietnam, but they have been able to impose significant costs in terms of delays, the quantities of vehicles and manpower needed to move things around on the roads, and casualties inflicted on a casualty-averse force.

The movement of men and materiel by helicopter has been a safer alternative. Certainly the roads have to be used, and the helicopter fleet is limited, but it has been utilized heavily as a low-friction alternative. It also is the preferred mode of transport for high-ranking officers and VIPs. If the friction is building up and helicopter travel becomes increasingly hazardous, it will increase the pressures related to road travel. In other words, the insurgents are not so much shutting down transport as increasing the cost of transport in terms of effort, time and casualties -- and they now are extending those costs to air transports.

It is not clear what sorts of weapons the insurgents might have that were not in their possession previously. Helicopters traditionally have been vulnerable to small-arms fire, but contemporary U.S. helicopters have sufficient armor to withstand smaller caliber rounds, at least in limited volume. Insurgents have used rocket-propelled grenades, but these weapons are effective in close engagements with helicopters moving rather slowly, not against helicopters in rapid flight. There are a number of missiles and radar-guided heavy caliber guns that are extremely effective against helicopters, but it is not clear that the insurgents possess these.

At this point, it is necessary to distinguish between Sunni and Shiite fighters. The Iranians might well be moving advanced anti-helicopter weaponry into Iraq, but it is unlikely they would be giving this to the Sunnis. It is possible that insurgents or militia groups have better weapons, but it is also possible that there are simply more sorties being flown and, therefore, more choppers at risk. Indeed, with larger numbers of forces moving into Baghdad and troops being shifted around the country, roads and air space are both being utilized more intensely. That creates a more target-rich environment.

But still, the possibility that the various insurgents and militias have acquired advanced anti-air systems that can increase the attrition of helicopters opens new questions about the war. Who could be supplying these to the Sunnis? What other weapons systems are being supplied? Who is training the insurgents in their use, since more advanced systems require greater expertise to be utilized? It is not so much the attacks on these helicopters that matters as the geopolitical significance of more advanced weapon systems starting to show up on the battlefield. If this is the case -- and it is not at all certain that it is -- it would mean someone has made a strategic decision to take on the United States head-on. It could be the Iranians, but if the Sunni insurgents have improved weapons as well, then it likely would be someone else.

It is pure speculation, but we note that the Russians have been selling anti-air systems in the region. Someone might be reshipping them to Sunni insurgents. Alternatively, there might just be more U.S. choppers in the air, and the insurgents have gotten lucky.
30285  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Islam the religion on: February 05, 2007, 01:42:33 AM

Ayaan Hirsi Ali
30286  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: The Dog that didn't bark, Part Two on: February 05, 2007, 12:10:56 AM

Sherlock Holmes in the 21st Century

by Ray Van Dune


The Case of the Purloined NSC Documents

Mrs. Hudson had only just cleared away the remains of a fast-food luncheon she had brought us from 'round the corner, when my esteemed colleague startled me with a question. "Watson, pray can you tell this humble student of the misdeeds of men, what so perplexes you in the incident of Mr. Sandy Berger?"

Having observed the great Sherlock Holmes for several lifetimes now, I am no stranger to his powers. But I can scarcely describe my amazement at having my thoughts read as clearly as if they were tattooed upon my forehead! I stammered out "But Holmes, how on Earth could you possibly know that bit of nastiness was indeed the subject of my private thoughts?!"

Holmes replied, softly and deliberately in his usual manner of speaking, but he used a charming turn of phrase I had certainly never heard from him before. I instantly determined to work it into my next commercial efforts at chronicling his exploits.

What he said was: "Elementary, my dear Watson."

Holmes continued: "As you were joylessly masticating your wretched cheeseburger, I observed you also distractedly tugging at the tops of your stockings. Have I not told you on occasion before this that such unthinking behaviors offer a window into the thoughts of men, but only to the observer who has attuned his senses to the accurate reading of them?"

I had indeed been ruminating on the actions of the now-disgraced (if insufficiently so) former National Security Advisor. So I was relieved to share with Holmes the exact question that puzzled me. "Yes, indeed you have, but can you now tell me how on Earth could that rascal Berger practically beat this rap altogether? Had he not at a minimum demonstrably lied to Federal investigators, the heinous crime for which the hapless Ms. Stewart did time, and for which the long-suffering Mr. Libby may yet?"

I was taken aback at the uncharacteristic bitterness in Holmes' response. "My good Doctor, please enlighten me… by what mechanism could Berger possibly be convicted of a crime, while never being at the slightest risk of being charged with one?! Can you seriously be unaware, or have you forgotten as has every newspaper reporter, that on the first day after his infamous Patron took an oath on the Good Book, he demanded and received letters of resignation from every US Attorney in the nation, with a view to selectively replacing the last few honest ones with cronies, guaranteed to overlook the skullduggeries from which Democrats have come to enjoy immunity not merely before the law, but just as importantly, in the press!"

"Then I suppose that clears up any remaining mystery," I mumbled, and began to quaff my soft drink. Again I was surprised by the coarseness of speech that Holmes apparently reserves for the subject of Democrats: "It bloody well does no such thing, Watson! There is still the mystery surrounding the true motives of Berger!"

Now, I was perfectly sure that I could identify his motivation, and felt positively giddy with the prospect that I might have seen the truth where the Great Detective had not. Regrettably, I again neglected Mum's advice to "remain silent and let them wonder if you are a fool," etc., and plunged ahead in my quest to be proven one. "Well, his motive is obvious, is it not, Holmes? What plainer impetus to his crime could there be than preserving the fulsome "legacy" of that vainest of former Presidents? Would not that precious national treasure be sullied, were it revealed that he had frittered away several opportunities to vaporize that vile murderous Saudi, whom his fellow Democrats have subsequently made an Albatross for his successor?"

"Ha!" my companion sniffed. "Watson, like you, I curse our bad luck that the first of the 9-11 "pilots" did not dive his aircraft empty of passengers into a certain office address in Harlem, and that the second, perhaps laden with Lawyers, was not plunged into that glass slab of a building on the East River, whose occupants are in the main devoted to the advancement of knavery worldwide!"

"Or vice-versa, it matters not, if only such a just fate could have been meted out to a few hundred professional thieves and hypocrites, instead of such protracted agony to thousands of innocents!" Holmes may speak floridly, but he knows how to make a point.

"Sadly, the attention span of the American public has lapsed thrice over or more since the tragedy occurred, and culpability for it has been villainously sown in nearly every place but the one where it should truly have taken root. Berger's Patron could now simply admit his mistake and claim, with some justification, that in the climate of those times most of his fellow politicians would have made the very same one. Consider that even today there are sitting US Senators who propose that America should emulate the strategies of our own most execrable Prime Minister, Mr. Chamberlain, the ninny who continues to defile the soil of England by virtue of his burial in it!"

"No, I am afraid that Bubba the First's position in the Pantheon of Presidents is as secure as a fawning press and the hosannas of preening movie stars can make it, which in today's world means it is as sound as Gibraltar."

"Given these sad realities, I must conclude that there was some far greater game afoot than we have yet perceived in this matter. The Democrats' frenzied efforts to, as it were, "Win one for the Groper", seem to have merely been staged for the benefit of the naïf's among us. Nothing could be more certain than that these poseurs value their reputations only insofar as it will serve to cloak their deceits."

I protested to Holmes "But, of those who were present at the National Security Council meetings, and so could have left evidence of their fecklessness in the margins of these documents, surely all are either dead or have retired from the labors of attaining political glory?"

I had to add "True, I can name one Democrat of that vintage who is lamentably neither dead nor retired, but surely even that fool must have known that during a Democrat administration, he had better remain silent on his peanut plantation, lest he lose any more allies or embassies while his party holds office!"

Even as I spoke these last words, I saw that Holmes had closed his eyes and traveled to some inward sanctum of thought, and that he had ceased to be aware of the comparative simpleton who sat before him. But as I prepared to rise for a stroll pending his eventual return to this world, Holmes suddenly exclaimed "Ha!" and awoke. Evidently those with his powers of the intellect need not tarry long in the land of contemplation.

With his first words Holmes demonstrated the acumen for which he has justly earned his immortality, and the right to insist that Mrs. Hudson and I be allowed to accompany him on that long journey. But I digress.

Holmes now spoke: "It is clear as crystal to me, my good friend! You will note that having eliminated the motive of protecting any who were entitled and required to participate in those NSC meetings, especially as they and their political aspirations have died away, we are inexorably drawn toward one stunning conclusion."

After an awkward silence of several seconds, I assayed "We may indeed be inexorably drawn there, Holmes, but could you favor me with a description of our destination?"

Holmes drew upon his pipe and came forth with one of his trademark perfectly-formed smoke rings. "Very well, can there be any doubt that Mr. Berger and his Patron were seeking to protect someone who has neither of the characteristics I have just mentioned?"

Holmes saw my confusion and elaborated "They seek to protect the identity of one who should NOT have been at any meeting of the National Security Council, and whose thirst for political power has NOT yet been slaked!"

"I dare say that this person argued eloquently for "kicking the can down the road", a course that would ultimately lead to disaster. Indeed, they argued for it so convincingly that their disastrous advice carried the day! And their words that will ultimately prove a curse on them are noted on the margins of the purloined documents! Nay, I should say they were so noted, until our gallant Sandbagger rescued them from the possibility of inspection by future historians!"

Indignant, I could only splutter "My God, Holmes! Who the deuce is this mystery man that the Democrats strive to protect from his own disgraceful advice?!"

Suddenly the door to our sitting chamber was kicked violently open by an obviously enraged Mrs. Hudson! She stood with one foot drawn back as if to ready to resume the kicking of things, and from her expression I feared she was set on starting out with me! Clearly, the old girl had been eavesdropping outside our chamber, when at this hour of the afternoon we should have expected to find her at the neighborhood bingo parlor!

In her fury, her lips at first could only move soundlessly, but she overcame this obstacle soon enough.

"Dr. Watson, you must certainly know our Mr. Holmes is acclaimed as the smartest man in the whole bloody world, but do you realize how my conviction in that is tested whenever I see him handing you his loaded revolver! You must be utterly bereft of a clue, and probably are still a virgin. Quite evidently, you lack even the requisite two brain cells that might by accident rub up against each other to create the illusion of thought!"

I sat there, totally at a loss for words. Mrs. Hudson however, was far from out of them, and she re-exploded…

"Oh, for Pete's sake — right-click on it, you old fart! There is no bloody mystery man!" Her eyes rolled back into her head until nearly only the whites showed. She almost screamed.

"Hallooo — this is the bloody Earth calling Dr. Watson! We'll have film at 11:00, but the breaking news about your friggen mystery man is that he's a she!!"

I could only croak out "A she…?" Mrs. Hudson went on "Now perhaps even you can guess why the old Sandbagger was happy to help her out of a jam, and even take that suite at the Crowbar Hotel if need be?"

"No, not for sex, you old buzzard — it was for his bloody health! He wanted to avoid that lead-poisoning this lady's ex-friends are so prone to… the kind you can catch from a .45 automatic!"

Mrs. Hudson paused for a long breath, which I feared was only a reload for another broadside. But her irritation was now dissipating, and perhaps she even felt a twinge of care that her stinging words may have wounded me. She came forward into the room, and looked down at me with pity as I slumped in my chair, more bewildered than ever.

"Dear silly old Watson, can't you see who Holmes is on about… it's Hillary!"

I cried out "Holmes, for God's sake, what say you of this?!" The Great Detective languidly drew at his pipe and produced another perfect smoke ring. His smile flashed, but his eyes were devoid of any mirth.

"Bingo!" said Holmes.
30287  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: The Dog that didn't bark on: February 05, 2007, 12:10:09 AM
Doug, GM:

VDH is probably right that the battlefield may well trump all-- but given the political position of our Commander in Chief, at the moment I glumly doubt a favorable outcome.  My understanding is the plan for the "surge" (what a stupid word that is-- for it clearly implies that this effort will promptly recede) that was presented to the President called for 30k troops, so , , , he asked for 20K.  IMHO this is simply the latest version of the same mistake that President Bush has been making for quite a while now.

But I digress (please feel to discuss further on the Iraq thread or the Politics thread) and this is the 2008 Presidential Race thread.  So here are two articles that must be read together for the relevance to this thread to be understood.  evil



Paper Chase
Did investigators turn a blind eye to the seriousness of the Sandy Berger scandal?

Monday, January 29, 2007 12:01 a.m. EST

Washington scandals are curious things. Sometimes special prosecutors are appointed and the media provide saturation coverage of their doings. An example would be the Valerie Plame episode, which led to this month's perjury trial of Scooter Libby, the former White House aide accused of lying about who first told him Joe Wilson's wife worked for the CIA.

Then there are the barely noticed scandals, which prosecutors pursue quietly and professionally. Take the case of Donald Keyser, a former State Department official who last week was sentenced to just over a year in jail for keeping classified documents at his home and for lying about his personal relationship with a Taiwanese diplomat.

Then there is Sandy Berger, the former Clinton national security adviser who pleaded guilty last year to knowingly taking and destroying classified documents from the National Archives while preparing for his testimony before the 9/11 Commission. When archives officials caught Mr. Berger, they bizarrely first asked a friend of his, former Clinton White House counsel Bruce Lindsey, for an explanation, rather than contact the Justice Department. After initially lying to investigators, Mr. Berger finally admitted that he took the documents, but only for "personal convenience."

Prosecutors accepted Mr. Berger's assurance that he had taken only five documents from the archives, even though on three of his four visits there he had access to original working papers of the National Security Council for which no adequate inventory exists. Nancy Smith, the archives official who provided the materials to Mr. Berger, said that she would "never know what if any original documents were missing." We have only Mr. Berger's word that he didn't take anything else. The Justice Department secured his agreement to take a polygraph on the matter, but never followed through and administered it.

The issue is still relevant. Officials of the 9/11 Commission are now on record expressing "grave concern" about the materials to which Mr. Berger had access. A report from the National Archives Inspector General last month found he took extraordinary measures to spirit them out of the archives, including hiding them in his pockets and socks. He also went outside without an escort and put some documents under a construction trailer, from where he could later retrieve them.

After archives staff became suspicious of Mr. Berger during his third visit, they numbered some of the documents he looked at. After he left, they reviewed the documents and noted that No. 217 was missing. The next time he came, the staff gave him another copy of 217 with the comment that it had been inadvertently not made available to him during his previous visit. Mr. Berger appropriated the same document again.

What could have been so important for Mr. Berger to take such risks? Was he trying to airbrush history by removing embarrassing information about the Clinton administration's fight against Osama bin Laden? As columnist Ron Cass has noted with dry understatement, "Bill Clinton has great sensitivity to his place in history and to accusations that he did too little to respond to al Qaeda." Last year the former president blew up when Chris Wallace of "Fox News Sunday" asked him, "Why didn't you do more to put bin Laden and al Qaeda out of business when you were president?"
Richard Miniter, author of "Losing bin Laden," notes that in 1996 President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan wrote Mr. Clinton a letter offering to hand over bin Laden, then living in Khartoum. A draft of that document was seen on the desk of a Sudanese official by then-U.S. Ambassador Tim Carney. The document itself has never been found, although there is no suggestion it was among the papers Mr. Berger was perusing.

Despite all of these unanswered questions, Mr. Berger was allowed to plead guilty last year to only a misdemeanor charge. As part of a plea agreement, the Justice Department asked him to pay a $10,000 fine for the violations, perform 100 hours of community service and lose his security clearance for just three years (meaning that he will be eligible to regain it just about the time the next president takes office). The presiding judge, outraged at the lenient plea bargain, bumped the fine up to $50,000.

The Inspector General's report found that the papers Mr. Berger took outlined the adequacy of the government's knowledge of terrorist threats in the U.S. in the final months of the Clinton administration--documents that could have been of some interest to the 9/11 Commission, before which Mr. Berger was scheduled to testify. The Washington Post buried news of the Inspector General's report on page 7; the New York Times dumped it on page 36.

But the report did catch the attention of Rep. Tom Davis, the ranking Republican on the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, who last month, while he was still committee chairman, finished his own probe of the Berger affair. This week he and 17 other top Republicans wrote to Attorney General Alberto Gonzales to detail the deficiencies the committee has found in the Justice Department's handling of the Berger case. They specifically asked him to administer the polygraph examination that Mr. Berger agreed to but was inexplicably never given.

While a polygraph is not admissible in court, it is a valuable tool investigators can use to lead them to other evidence. Andrew Napolitano, a former judge who is a legal analyst for Fox News, notes: "If they ask him, did you take document X, Y, Z, and he says no, and the polygraph shows that he's lying, that will send them on a hunt for document X, Y, Z." In addition, Mr. Berger would have to take the test under oath and thus could be prosecuted for perjury if he lied, even though his document-theft case is closed.

Philip Zelikow and Daniel Marcus, respectively the executive director and general counsel of the 9/11 Commission, told Mr. Davis's investigators that they were never told Mr. Berger had access to original classified documents for which no copies existed. Had he known, Mr. Zelikow says, he would had "grave concern."
As it was, the 9/11 Commission was not informed of any investigation of Mr. Berger's alleged tampering with documents until only two days before his testimony, and then in only the most vague terms. Not only were the 9/11 Commission not told that Mr. Berger had access to original documents; they were affirmatively led to believe that the commission got all the documents that Mr. Berger took. Both Mr. Zelikow and Mr. Marcus understood Justice to mean that there was no way Mr. Berger had taken any other documents. An investigator for the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee bluntly told Fox News last week: "The Justice Department lied to the 9/11 Commission about Sandy Berger. That is a fact." A Justice Department spokesman still insists it "has no evidence that Sandy Berger's actions deprived the 9/11 Commission of documents." But that raises the question: How hard did Justice look for such evidence?

The 9/11 Commission wishes it had known answers to that and more. It's time that Congress and the public learn why the Berger scandal was treated so nonchalantly.

30288  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Re: MMA on: February 04, 2007, 09:24:43 AM
Comments on last night?

Mine:  If they are going to be doing this once a month and charging $50 a show, that's $600 a year and that's more than I want to spend on this, especially shows like last nights show, which for me was a disappointment.

Concerning Silva's downward elbows to the head, I found this description of the rules on another site:


1. Butting with the head. 2. Eye gouging of any kind. 3. Biting. 4. Hair pulling. 5. Fish hooking. 6. Groin attacks of any kind. 7. Putting a finger into any orifice or into any cut or laceration on an opponent. 8. Small joint manipulation. 9. Striking to the spine or the back of the head. 10. Striking downward using the point of the elbow. 11. Throat strikes of any kind, including, without limitation, grabbing the trachea. 12. Clawing, pinching or twisting the flesh. 13. Grabbing the clavicle. 14. Kicking the head of a grounded opponent. 15. Kneeing the head of a grounded opponent. 16. Stomping a grounded opponent. 17. Kicking to the kidney with the heel. 18. Spiking an opponent to the canvas on his head or neck. 19. Throwing an opponent out of the ring or fenced area. 20. Holding the shorts or gloves of an opponent. 21. Spitting at an opponent. 22. Engaging in an unsportsmanlike conduct that causes an injury to an opponent. 23. Holding the ropes or the fence. 24. Using abusive language in the ring or fenced area. 25. Attacking an opponent on or during the break. 26. Attacking an opponent who is under the care of the referee. 27. Attacking an opponent after the bell has sounded the end of the period of unarmed combat. 28. Flagrantly disregarding the instructions of the referee. 29. Timidity, including, without limitation, avoiding contact with an opponent, intentionally or consistently dropping the mouthpiece or faking an injury. 30. Interference by the corner. 31. Throwing in the towel during competition.


Rule 10 certainly sounds to me like Silva's strikes were illegal.

Also I note Rule 17, which certainly hurts guard game for no good reason I can discern.

Rule 13 reminds me of a story about Dog Bro legend, Chris "the Tree that Walks" Poznik  wink

30289  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Islam in America and the rest of the western hemisphere on: February 04, 2007, 08:40:54 AM
Iraq’s Shadow Widens Sunni-Shiite Split in U.S.
NY Times
Published: February 4, 2007
DEARBORN, Mich. — Twice recently, vandals have shattered windows at three mosques and a dozen businesses popular among Shiite Muslims along Warren Avenue, the spine of the Arab community here.

A restaurant in Dearborn, Mich., was one of several businesses recently vandalized in a Shiite neighborhood. Although the police have arrested no one, most in Dearborn’s Iraqi Shiite community blame the Sunni Muslims.

“The Shiites were very happy that they killed Saddam, but the Sunnis were in tears,” Aqeel Al-Tamimi, 34, an immigrant Iraqi truck driver and a Shiite, said as he ate roasted chicken and flatbread at Al-Akashi restaurant, one of the establishments damaged over the city line in Detroit. “These people look at us like we sold our country to America.”

Escalating tensions between Sunnis and Shiites across the Middle East are rippling through some American Muslim communities, and have been blamed for events including vandalism and student confrontations. Political splits between those for and against the American invasion of Iraq fuel some of the animosity, but it is also a fight among Muslims about who represents Islam.

Long before the vandalism in Dearborn and Detroit, feuds had been simmering on some college campuses. Some Shiite students said they had faced repeated discrimination, like being formally barred by the Sunni-dominated Muslim Student Association from leading prayers. At numerous universities, Shiite students have broken away from the association, which has dozens of chapters nationwide, to form their own groups.

“A microcosm of what is happening in Iraq happened in New Jersey because people couldn’t put aside their differences,” said Sami Elmansoury, a Sunni Muslim and former vice president of the Islamic Society at Rutgers University, where there has been a sharp dispute.

Though the war in Iraq is one crucial cause, some students and experts on sectarianism also attribute the fissure to the significant growth in the Muslim American population over the past few decades.

Before, most major cities had only one mosque and everyone was forced to get along. Now, some Muslim communities are so large that the majority Sunnis and minority Shiites maintain their own mosques, schools and social clubs. Many Muslim students first meet someone from the other branch of their faith at college. The Shiites constitute some 15 percent of the world’s more than 1.3 billion Muslims, and are believed to be proportionally represented among America’s estimated six million Muslims.

Sectarian tensions mushroomed during the current Muslim month of Muharram. The first 10 days ended on Tuesday with Ashura, the day when Shiites commemorate the death of Hussein, who was the grandson of the Prophet Mohammad and who was killed during the bloody seventh-century disputes over who would rule the faithful, a schism that gave birth to the Sunni and Shiite factions.

The Shiites and the Sunnis part company over who has the right to rule and interpret scripture. Shiites hold that only descendants of Mohammad can be infallible and hence should rule. Sunnis allow a broader group, as long as there is consensus among religious scholars.

Many Shiites mark Ashura with mourning processions that include self-flagellation or rhythmic chest beating, echoing the suffering of the seventh-century Hussein. As several thousand Shiites marched up Park Avenue in Manhattan on Jan. 28 to mark Ashura, the march’s organizers handed out a flier describing his killing as “the first major terrorist act.” Sunnis often decry Ashura marches as a barbaric, infidel practice.

Last year, a Sunni student at the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor sent a screed against Ashura to the Muslim Student Association’s e-mail message list. The document had been taken off, one of many Web sites of Islamic teachings that Shiite students said regularly spread hate disguised as religious scholarship.

Azmat Khan, a 21-year-old senior and political science major, said that she, like other Shiites on campus, was sometimes asked whether she was a real Muslim.

“To some extent, the minute you identify yourself as a Shiite, it outs you,” Ms. Khan said. “You feel marginalized.”

Yet some Shiite students said they were reluctant to speak up because they felt that Islam was under assault in the United States, so internal tension would only undermine much-needed unity among Muslims. At the same time, the students said, the ideas used by some Sunnis to label Shiites as heretics need to be confronted because they underlie jihadi radicalism.


At the Ann Arbor campus, Shiite students set up a forum for all Muslims to discuss their differences, but no Sunnis who had endorsed the e-mail message about Ashura showed up, and the group eventually disbanded.

Trying to ease tensions, the Muslim Student Association this year invited a prominent Shiite cleric to speak.
“I don’t want Shiite students to feel alienated,” said Nura Sediqe, the president of the Ann Arbor student group. “But the dominant group never sees as much of a problem as the minority.”

At the University of Michigan’s campus in Dearborn, the Muslim association pushed through rules that effectively banned Shiites from leading collective prayers.

Apart from a greater veneration among Shiites for the Prophet’s descendants, there are slight variations in practice. Shiites, for example, pray with their hands at their sides, while Sunnis cross them over their chests.

“Most Sunni Muslims can’t pray behind a Shiite because if you are praying differently from the way the leader is, then it doesn’t work, it’s not valid,” said Ramy Shabana, the president of the association on the Dearborn campus.

Shiite students at various universities said they faced constant prejudice. Some Sunni students have refused to greet Shiites with “Salamu aleikum,” or “Peace be upon you,” to slight them.

At Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, Salmah Y. Rizvi, a junior who stocked a reading room with Islamic texts, said the Muslim Student Association there told her to remove them because too many were by Shiite authors.

Students have also taken note of attacks on their faith from the broader world through the Internet. One YouTube video showed Catholics bleeding by crucifying themselves and then showed Shiites bleeding through self-flagellation, as the Arabic voiceover suggested that Shiites were more Catholic than Muslim.

Not all campuses have been affected. Some, like Georgetown University and Cornell University, were considered oases of tolerance.

At Rutgers University, the tension started last year after 15 to 20 conservative Sunni students began openly mocking Shiites, and considered barring women from leading the student association. “They felt it was time to correct individuals within the organization, cleansing the beliefs of the students,” said Mr. Elmansoury, who opposed the rift.

Several students involved said the group was heavily influenced by teachings from Saudi Arabia. The puritanical Wahhabi sect there holds that Shiite reverence for the Prophet’s family smacks of idolatry.

Shiite advocates believe that that thinking has influenced some mainstream American Muslim organizations like the Islamic Society of North America and the Council on American Islamic Relations, which they said were slow to criticize attacks against Shiites abroad until the violence in Iraq escalated. As a consequence, Shiites founded their own national lobbying organizations.

Both organizations denied that they disregarded Shiite issues.

Still, some Muslims said that prejudices had continued.

After Saddam Hussein’s execution Dec. 30, one Sunni cleric near Dearborn reportedly gave a sermon concluding that the Prophet Mohammad forgave his enemies, so why couldn’t certain people in Iraq?

Much of the Middle East tension stems from the sense that Shiite power is growing, led by Iran. The grisly video of Mr. Hussein’s execution, with his Shiite executioners mocking him, fanned the flames.

“As a Shiite, I was taking in this event very differently from the Sunnis,” said Shenaaz Janmohamed, a graduate student at the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor. “In a lot of ways Saddam has become this martyr figure who sort of represents Shiite unruliness.”

It is not the first time Shiite-Sunni tensions have spilled over into the West. Britain has experienced periodic outbursts for years. Stabbings and other violence between Sunni and Shiite prisoners in New York state jails prompted a long-running lawsuit by Shiite inmates seeking separate prayer facilities.

Some Muslims worry that the friction might erupt in greater violence in the United States. Others, in both camps, think the tension could prove healthy, forcing American Muslims to start a dialogue about Muslim differences.
30290  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Big Picture WW3: Who, when, where, why on: February 03, 2007, 11:49:49 PM
The author of this piece is a man with serious on the ground CIA experience throughout the middle east, including Iraq.  Author of "See No Evil" which I have read and recommend highly.


Why Did the Saudi Ambassador Quit?
Thursday, Dec. 21, 2006 By ROBERT BAER


Saudi Arabian Ambassador Prince Turki Al Faysal arrived in Washington and left with barely a murmur, more or less ignored by the Bush Administration. Turki was at the post only 15 months before he suddenly resigned last week without explanation; by contrast his predecessor, Prince Bandar, the best connected envoy in Washington in the last half century, spent 22 years in the post. As if anyone had any doubt about Bandar's status, two days after 9/11 Bandar was sitting on the Truman balcony with Bush, helping to decide the world's future.

But it isn't as if Turki lacked for status in Washington. When Turki was Saudi intelligence chief, he more or less ran the mujahedin forces in the Afghan war, putting the last nail in the coffin of the Soviet empire. When Congress halted funding to the Contras, Turki was behind the decision to step in and help pay the Reagan Administration's bills. A Georgetown graduate and realist, Turki would have made an ideal interlocutor for the new secretary of defense Bob Gates. You would have thought Washington would have embraced Turki. Even the neocons.

The explanations for Turki's abrupt departure vary wildly: Turki will replace his ailing brother as foreign minister; Turki was furious he was cut out of last month's Cheney-King Abdullah meeting; Turki felt slighted because Bandar was actively undermining him in Washington; Turki is in a succession fight with Sultan, the defense minister and Bandar's father; Turki couldn't get an audience with the neocons; Turki was caught secretly meetings the Israelis. It's not surprising there isn't a consensus; the Saudis keep their own counsel.

But someone who saw Turki before he left Washington advised me to consider another explanation: Turki was recalled to prepare for the possibility of war with Iran.

After all, the controversial Nov. 29 Washington Post op-ed written by Turki's political consultant Nawaf Obaid — in which Obaid writes that Saudi Arabia will fight to protect Iraq's Sunnis if the U.S. were to begin withdrawing its forces from the country — was authorized by King Abdullah. When I asked this person why the Saudis immediately denied Obaid spoke for the Kingdom — and in fact dismissed him from his official duties — he said: "It's all a smoke screen. The Saudis want to deliver a message, but they also need plausible denial to preserve their options."

"Don't be mistaken," my friend added. "Obaid is Turki's creation, his employee. Obaid doesn't freelance. And neither does Turki, for that matter. The op-ed was sanctioned by Riyadh. End of story. It's tantamount to Saudi declaration of war on Iran" His call, then, was that "Turki was promoted, not fired."

It makes sense. King Abdullah, faced with Iran's grab for influence in Iraq and Lebanon, needs Turki home by his side. Turki knows Iran better than any other Saudi prince. It was Turki who opened the first official backchannel to Iran after the Iran-Iraq war. Since then, Turki has kept a dialogue with Iran open. At the same time, Turki knows Tehran is a threat. Iran can and will close the Strait of Hormuz, cutting off 20% of the world's daily oil production, if provoked. And so, with Turki's advice falling on deaf ears in Washington, why not bring him home where he can do some good?

Robert Baer, a former CIA field officer assigned to the Middle East, is the author of See No Evi land, most recently, the novel Blow the House Down
30291  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Islam in Islamic Countries: on: February 03, 2007, 08:16:49 PM
Cruellest cut in the name of Islam

Genital mutilation and forced marriage occurs even among educated Muslims in some countries, writes Ayaan Hirsi Ali in a shocking account of her early life in Somalia, in her new book
February 03, 2007

KORAN school was a shed down the road. The other pupils were from the neighbourhood. At first I liked it. I learned to mix ink from charcoal, water, and a little milk, and to write the Arabic alphabet on long wooden boards. I began learning the Koran, line by line, by heart. It was uplifting to be engaged in such an adult task.
But the kids at madrassah (Islamic religious school) were tough. They fought. One girl, who was about eight years old, they called kintirleey, "she with the clitoris".
I had no idea what a clitoris was, but the kids didn't even want to be seen with this girl. They spat on her and pinched her; they rubbed sand in her eyes, and once they caught her and tried to bury her in the sand behind the school.

The madrassah teacher didn't help. Once in a while he called her dammin, dunce, and kintirleey, too. My teenage cousin Sanyar used to pick me up after madrassah. One day she arrived just as a girl hit me in the face. Sanyar took me home and told the story. "Ayaan didn't even defend herself," she said in horror. "Coward!" my family jeered.

The next day Sanyar waited for me outside the madrassah with another teenager, the older sister of the girl who had hit me the day before. They caught hold of the two of us and tugged us over to an open space, then ordered us to fight. "Scratch her eyes out. Bite her," Sanyar hissed at me. "Come on, coward, think of your honour."

The other girl got the same encouragement. We flew at each other, fists tight, hitting, wrestling, pulling each other's hair, biting. "Ayaan, never cry!" Sanyar called out. The other children cheered us on. When they let us stop, our dresses were torn and my lip was bleeding, but Sanyar was delighted. "I don't want you to ever let another child hit you or make you cry," she said. "Fight. If you don't fight for your honour, you're a slave."

Then, as we walked away, the other girl shouted after me, "Kintirleey!" Sanyar winced. I looked at her, horror dawning on me. I was like that other girl? I, too, had that filthy thing, a kintir? In Somalia, like many countries across Africa and the Middle East, little girls are made "pure" by having their genitals cut out. There is no other way to describe this procedure, which typically occurs around the age of five.

After the child's clitoris and labia are carved out, scraped off, or, in more compassionate areas, merely cut or pricked, the whole area is often sewn up, so that a thick band of tissue forms a chastity belt made of the girl's own scarred flesh. A small hole is situated to permit a thin flow of pee. Only great force can tear the scar tissue wider, for sex.

Female genital mutilation predates Islam. Not all Muslims do this, and a few of the peoples who do are not Islamic. But in Somalia, where virtually every girl is excised, the practice is always justified in the name of Islam. Uncircumcised girls will be possessed by devils, fall into vice and perdition, and become whores. Imams never discourage the practice: it keeps girls pure.

Many girls die during or after their excision, from infection. Other complications cause enormous, more or less lifelong pain. My father Abeh was a modern man and considered the practice barbaric. He had always insisted that his daughters be left uncut. In this he was quite extraordinarily forward-thinking. Though I don't think it was for the same reason, Mahad, who was six, had also not yet been circumcised.

Not long after that first fight of mine at the madrassah, Grandma decided that the time was right for us to undergo the necessary and proper dignity of purification. My father was in jail and my mother was away for long periods, but Grandma would ensure that the old traditions would be respected in the old ways.

After she made the arrangements, Grandma was cheerful and friendly all week long. A special table was prepared in her bedroom, and various aunts, known and unknown, gathered in the house. When the day itself came I was not frightened, just curious. I had no idea what was going to happen, except that there was a festive atmosphere in the house and we - all three of us - were going to be cleansed. I wouldn't be called kintirleey any more.

Mahad went first. I was driven out of the room, but after a while I stole back to the door and watched. Mahad was on the floor, with his head and arms on Grandma's lap. Two women were holding down his spread-eagled legs, and a strange man was bending down between them. The room was warm and I could smell a mixture of sweat and frankincense.

Grandma was whispering in Mahad's ears, "Don't cry, don't stain your mother's honour. These women will talk about what they have seen. Grit your teeth." Mahad wasn't making a sound, but tears rolled down his face as he bit into Grandma's shawl. His face was clenched and twisted in pain.

I couldn't see what the stranger was doing, but I could see blood. This frightened me. I was next. Grandma swung her hand from side to side and said, "Once this long kintir is removed you and your sister will be pure."

From Grandma's words and gestures I gathered that this hideous kintir, my clitoris, would one day grow so long that it would swing sideways between my legs. She caught hold of me and gripped my upper body in the same position as she had put Mahad. Two other women held my legs apart. The man, who was probably an itinerant traditional circumciser from the blacksmith clan, picked up a pair of scissors. With the other hand, he caught hold of the place between my legs and started tweaking it, like Grandma milking a goat. "There it is, there is the kintir," one of the women said.

Then the scissors went down between my legs and the man cut off my inner labia and clitoris. I heard it, like a butcher snipping the fat off a piece of meat. A piercing pain shot up between my legs, indescribable, and I howled. Then came the sewing: the long, blunt needle clumsily pushed into my bleeding outer labia, my loud and anguished protests, Grandma's words of comfort and encouragement. "It's just this once in your life, Ayaan. Be brave, he's almost finished." When the sewing was finished, the man cut the thread off with his teeth. That is all I can recall of it. But I do remember Haweya's bloodcurdling howls. Though she was the youngest - she was four, I five, Mahad six - Haweya must have struggled much more than Mahad and I did, or perhaps the women were exhausted after fighting us, and slipped, because the man made some bad cuts on Haweya's thighs. She carried the scars of them her whole life.

I must have fallen asleep, for it wasn't until much later that day that I realised that my legs had been tied together, to prevent me from moving to facilitate the formation of a scar. It was dark and my bladder was bursting, but it hurt too much to pee. The sharp pain was still there, and my legs were covered in blood. I was sweating and shivering. It wasn't until the next day that my Grandma could persuade me to pee even a little.

By then everything hurt. When I just lay still the pain throbbed miserably, but when I urinated the flash of pain was as sharp as when I had been cut.

It took about two weeks for us to recover. Grandma tended to us constantly, suddenly gentle and affectionate. She responded to each anguished howl or whimper, even in the night. After every tortured urination she washed our wounds carefully with warm water and dabbed them with purple liquid. Then she tied our legs again and reminded us to stay completely still or we would tear, and then the man would have to be called again to sew us back up.

After a week the man came and inspected us. He thought that Mahad and I were doing well, but said Haweya needed to be resewn. She had torn her wound while urinating and struggling with Grandma. We heard it happening; it was agony for her. The entire procedure was torture for all of us, but undoubtedly the one who suffered the most was Haweya.

Mahad was already up and about, quite healed, when the man returned to remove the thread he had used to sew me shut. This was again very painful. He used a pair of tweezers to dig out the threads, tugging on them sharply. Again, Grandma and two other women held me down. But after that, even though I had a thick, bumpy scar between my legs that hurt if I moved, at least my legs didn't have to be tied together any more, and I no longer had to lie down without moving all day.

It took Haweya another week to reach the stage of thread removal, and four women had to hold her down. I was in the room when this happened. I will never forget the panic in her face and voice as she screamed with everything in her and struggled to keep her legs closed. Haweya was never the same afterward. She became ill with a fever for several weeks and lost a lot of weight. She had horrible nightmares, and during the day began stomping off to be alone. My once cheerful, playful little sister changed. Sometimes she just stared vacantly at nothing for hours. We all started wetting our beds after the circumcision. In Mahad's case, it lasted a long time.

When Ma came back from her trip this time, she was furious. "Who asked you to circumcise them?" she yelled, more angry with her mother than I had ever seen her. "You know their father doesn't want it done! Allah knows, I have never in my life been so betrayed as by you. What possessed you?"

Grandma turned on my mother in fury. She yelled that she had done Ma a huge favour. Everyone was cut.

ONE Friday afternoon at the end of January 1992, my father Abeh came straight from the mosque to our flat. He never did that - never paid us a visit these days - and when he arrived he was completely excited. "Ayaan, my daughter, I have good news for you - the best news - my prayers are answered!" he crowed. "Today in the mosque a blessed man came to me with a proposal of marriage, and I offered him your hand!"

I remember letting him talk while I felt my heels sinking into the ground. I cleared my throat and said no, but he didn't hear me. I said, "I'm not going to marry a stranger!" and my father, bubbling with enthusiasm, answered, "But he's not a stranger! He's not a stranger at all! He's your cousin! He's an Osman Mahamud!" He began chanting back all of this man's names.

I said, "Not a stranger in that sense, Abeh," and he answered, "In what sense, then?" "But I haven't even met him!" I wailed. My father told me, "That's fine - you will meet him tomorrow."

My father had given me away to a man called Osman Moussa, a fine young Somali man who had grown up in Canada. He had come to Nairobi to find and rescue family members who had been stranded by the civil war, and also to find a bride. He thought the Somali girls in Canada were too Westernised, by which he meant that they dressed indecently, disobeyed their husbands, and mixed freely with men; they were not baarri, which made them unworthy of marriage. And the civil war meant that daughters of the best families in Somalia were available for practically nothing.

My father had met this young man in the mosque barely two hours before. He was tall, he told me, with strong bones and white teeth, well fed on milk and meat in North America. Osman Moussa must have approached him. I can imagine the scene, the respectful recitation of lineage, finally the request: "You are the father of daughters, and I seek a bride." My father must have felt so very happy.

There was no bride price. Because of the civil war, it would have been indecent to ask for one. But this was a strategic marriage; Osman Moussa could boast that he was married to a Magan, and we would now have relatives in Canada. There were all kinds of reasons for my father to be happy about this match.

I summoned the strength to say to my father "Abeh, what if I am already with some other person?" but he wasn't even listening. He said, "Allah has sent us the answer." He was overcome with his own cleverness. The next day, my father came to the house with Osman Moussa.

The living room was clean, and everyone was excited except me. I just wore normal clothes, a loose dress and headscarf. I wasn't going to dress up for this.
This man came in. He wanted to shake my hand. He was very tall, and wore enormously long blue jeans; he looked like a basketball player, with a shaved head and a baseball cap. I was polite. I said, "Hello, come in. I am Ayaan," without looking him in the eye, and fetched my mother.

My father and mother both remained in the room with us - Ma and I sat on the bed - and this man talked about Canada, where he had lived since he was a small boy, and about the refugees and the war. We didn't make eye contact. Osman Moussa was talking with my mother, trying to pass muster. When I could look up, I scrutinised him - the way he talked, his face - thinking, "Will I like this man?" I was supposed to make a home and a life with him; cook, bear his kids, respond to his whims. And what did I know of him? His Somali was poor, half-learned. He seemed earnest.

He neither repelled nor attracted me. I felt indifferent, completely without feeling. I didn't detect that he had any special interest in me, either. The marriage was set for Saturday, six days away.

Our second meeting was more intimate. Osman Moussa and his sister came, and I asked Haweya and Mahad to be with me, to help me evaluate this man. Ma left us five young people alone. I asked about prayer; I wanted to find out how religious this Osman Moussa was. I felt I had to make some sort of decision fast, even though there seemed to be no way I could stop the arrangement from proceeding.

I asked, "What do you expect of a wife?" Osman's sister was mortified, and said, "Maybe we shouldn't be here if you're going to discuss such things!" But Osman Moussa belly-laughed and said, "You're going to give me six sons. We will be a home for all the Osman Mahamud."

We grilled him subtly in the Somali epics we had learned from our mother, some of them composed by the Abdihalin brothers' greatgrandfather, to our eternal wonder. He knew none of them. Worse still, instead of admitting his ignorance he pretended he knew what we were talking about, which made him seem small. We asked him Grandma's old riddles; he failed them.

We switched to English - we assumed this man's English must be better than his limping Somali - and Haweya asked him what kind of books he read. He said, "Hmya. I read, you know, stuff." I realised his English was half-learned, too, and he clearly read nothing at all.

I summoned enough courage to ask him to take off his baseball cap, which he did. I thought perhaps I might fall in love with his head of hair or something. But though Osman was only 27 years old, his head was already as bald as the bottom of baby Abbas. Baldness is associated with wisdom among Somalis, but this man had nothing to show for losing so much hair at such an early age.

He thought the Osman Mahamud were the chosen people; he was dull, trite, and a bigot, a dyed-in-the-wool Brotherhood type. I remember thinking, "No, surely Abeh could not do this to me?"

When Osman Moussa finally left I tried to pull together the courage to take matters into my own hands. I put on my coat and went to Buruburu, where my father was living. When he opened the door I said, "Osman Moussa came to our house today and Haweya and Mahad and I tested him. We think he's a pea-brain. He's not eloquent, he's not brave enough to admit his shortcomings, and he's a bigot."

Just like that. That way my father couldn't ignore what I was saying, as he mostly did. He had me come and sit down and said, "Now tell me."

"I don't think this man and I are compatible," I said.

He said, smiling broadly, "On the basis of one afternoon?" I told my father, "You thought on the basis of one minute that we would be compatible, so I may think on the basis of one afternoon that we are not."

But Abeh said, "No, I know more than that. He is the son of the son of the son of" - he quoted the lineage. "He has a good job in Canada, he doesn't chew qat, he is clean and a conscientious worker, he is strong. I am giving you to him to ensure your safety."

He went on, "The ceremony will be Saturday, at Farah Goure's house. The sheep have been bought, the qali has been hired. Your saying you don't want this - it's not a question. We are living in bad times. Surely you won't reject my choice of a husband for you just because he doesn't read novels." He reduced it to the smallest thing. Imagine how trivial my opposition would sound to Abeh if I added: but he has no hair!

Still, I sat up straight and told him, "I am not going to do it." My father said, "I can't accept a no from you for something you haven't even tried."

I asked, "You mean I can't say no before I get married?"

He answered, "Of course not. Everything is all arranged." Nobody tied me up. I was not shackled. I was not forced at gunpoint. But I had no realistic way out.

Edited extract from Infidel by Ayaan Hirsi Ali, to be published next week by Free Press (an imprint of Simon & Schuster), $34.95.
30292  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Philippine Prison Conditions on: February 03, 2007, 05:43:59 PM

Some of the stories we've heard about the development of various FMA systems refer to time someone spent in prison.


Philippine prison system a living hell reminiscent of 19th century by Cecil Morella
Fri Feb 2, 10:38 AM ET

MANILA (AFP) - Raymund Narag spent nearly seven years in Manila's notorious Quezon City jail for a crime he did not commit.

Three years after he was released from his living hell he published a book about his experience called "Freedom and Death: Inside the Jail."

Published in 2005 it painted a harrowing picture of a prison system more in tune with the 19th century than the modern age.  Narag laid out in graphic detail the subhuman existence inmates were forced to endure: the stench, the overcrowding, the toilets that ran like rivers through the cells, disease and death.

Built in the 1950s Quezon City jail was only supposed to house 236 inmates. Today it is home to more than 3,000 packed in so tight that many inmates sleep standing up. 

It is a scene repeated around the country in a prison system grossly undermanned, poorly funded and neglected by the country's economic planners.  According to Chief Superintendent Antonio Cruz, head of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology and the largest cog in a fragmented penal service, the system is near to breaking point.

"Overcrowding is our most pressing problem," he told AFP.

Cruz's bureau, which is an arm of the interior department, runs 1,100 prisons with a total cell area of just over 56,000 square metres (about 603,000 square feet) and a population at the end of 2006 of more than 60,000 inmates.

Most are awaiting trial while a small percentage are serving sentences for minor crimes like theft and illegal drug use.  Another 200 prisons are run by the police forces of smaller provincial towns as Cruz's bureau with just 7,000 personnel, cannot cope. Ideally, he said, the system needs another 35,000 guards and support staff.

"The situation is not ideal," said Avelino Razon, deputy chief of the Philippines police. "This takes up a big complement of men and women from their principal police duties."

About 17,000 other inmates convicted of more serious crimes like murder, kidnapping and drug dealing are housed in slightly better facilities at the National Penitentiary compound in southern Manila.

The UN Standard of the Minimum Treatment of Prisoners, to which the Philippine government is a signatory, gives clear guidelines on how prisoners should be treated, including bedding and food, and states: "It is not desirable to have two prisoners in a cell or room."

In Quezon City jail a 30-square-metre cell with a holding capacity for 20 houses 180 to 200 inmates.  Nearly a thousand Death Row inmates contributed to the overcrowding at the maximum security section of the National Penitentiary after Congress abolished the death penalty last year.

"Conditions are a bit better here," says inmate Rodolfo Fernandez. "Back at the provincial jail there would be 100 of us in a cell built for 40. Even the spaces beneath the beds were occupied."

Fernandez was jailed for life for swindling neighbours seeking work abroad of their life savings.

Still, of the 185 inmates at his new quarters, only 80 have beds while 105 use their own mats to sleep on the floor. Policing packed jails with a handful of men is "very difficult," Cruz said. The rotting jail facilities themselves "become a rich source for improvising deadly weapons" such as rusted iron bars.  (!!!)

He said the bureau "has no jail facility for high-risk inmates nor maximum security cells."

The US State Department, in a human rights report on the Philippines two years ago, said the country's prison conditions were "rudimentary and sometimes harsh," were "overcrowded, lacked basic infrastructure, and provided prisoners with an inadequate diet."

It said the "slow judicial process exacerbated the problem of overcrowding. Some inmates took turns sleeping, and others slept on their feet."

The study also cited "widespread corruption" among guards as well as "reports that guards abused prisoners," including women who were "particularly vulnerable to sexual and physical assault by police and prison guards."

Cruz admits congestion exposes inmates to "diseases, contamination," and warns the problem will probably get worse before it gets better.

But he denies prisoners are physically or sexually abused.

He estimates the prison population will rise by about 13 percent a year over the next eight years mainly due to case overload within the undermanned judicial system, as well as higher bail bonds imposed on drugs offenders who make up 60 percent of the national prison population. Manila-based business consultant Peter Wallace said recently there are about a million cases pending for 1,470 judges across the country because a third of the country's courts are without a judge.

"For a salary of 20,000 pesos (about 409 dollars), there's little question as to why that's so," he said. Less than one percent of the national budget goes to the judiciary.  With an annual budget of just 2.8 billion pesos (57 million dollars), "we don't have enough financial support to construct new jails," Cruz said. Realistically, he added, under these conditions, rehabilitation -- the fundamental objective of the penal system -- just does not take place.

"You just go back and forth in the system, committing the same offense. In the Manila city jail, for example, if we release 100 prisoners today, there will be another 300 (offenses) committed," he said.
30293  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Environmental issues on: February 03, 2007, 07:19:03 AM

I put threads of this name on both the Politics and the S,C & H forums precisely to see what people would do  cheesy

I see today's NY Times front page reports on a big study saying "There is no doubt!" and note the contrast with the seemingly most pertinent observation that Mars is heating up too-- so maybe we're not the cause after all.

The Adventure continues,

Neal Boortz blog

A 21-page report from something called the "Intergovernmental Panel On
Climate Change" has been released Paris, no less...and as
expected, it's predictions are dire. According to the report: "Warming of
the climate system is unequivocal, as is now evident from observations of
increases in global average air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting
of snow and ice, and rising global mean sea level." Yeah right...we've heard
all this before.

But the biggest bombshell here is this one: no matter what we do, global
warming will not be reversed. It will go on for centuries, according to this
report. The sea levels will continue to rise as polar ice caps melt. So I
guess if Al Gore wins his Nobel Peace Prize, we'll still experience global
warming. So much for riding to work everyday in your hybrid's not
doing a thing. The situation is futile, according to this report.

But really, it makes sense that the global warming crowd would come to this
conclusion. After all, global warming is a religion. The anti-capitalist
enviro-nazis don't ever want the problem to be solved. After all, if global
warming were to be solved tomorrow, what would they blame the United States
for? They'd have to find some other reason.

Sorry .. I'm still a skeptic. In no particular order here are just a few of
the reasons why I'm not buying this man-made global warming scare:

* The United Nations is anti-American and anti-Capitalist. In short .. I
don't trust them. Not a bit. The UN would eagerly engage in any enterprise
that would weaken capitalist economies around the world.

* Because after the fall of the Soviet Union and worldwide Communism many in
the anti-capitalist movement moved to the environmental movement to continue
pursuing their anti-free enterprise goals. Many of the loudest proponents of
man-made global warming today are confirmed anti-capitalists.

* Because the sun is warmer .. and all of these scientists don't seem to be
willing to credit a warmer sun with any of the blame for global warming.

* The polar ice caps on Mars are melting. How did our CO2 emissions get all
the way to Mars?

* It was warmer in the 1930s across the globe than it is right now.

* It wasn't all that long ago that these very same scientists were warning
us about "global cooling" and another approaching ice age?

* How much has the earth warmed up in the last 100 years? One degree. Now
that's frightening.
* Because that famous "hockey stick" graph that purports to show a sudden
warming of the earth in the last few decades is a fraud. It ignored previous
warming periods ... left them off the graph altogether.

* The infamous Kyoto accords exempt some of the world's biggest CO2
polluters, including China and India.

* The Kyoto accords can easily be seen as nothing less than an attempt to
hamstring the world's dominant capitalist economies.

* Because many of these scientists who are sounding the global warming scare
depend on grant money for their livelihood, and they know the grant money
dries up when they stop preaching the global warming sermon.

* Because global warming "activists" and scientists seek to punish those who
have different viewpoints. If you are sure of your science you have no need
to shout down or seek to punish those who disagree.

* What happened to the Medieval Warm Period? In 1996 the United Nations
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change issued a chart showing climatic
change over a period of 1000 years. This graph showed a Medieval warming
period in which global temperatures were higher than they are today. In 2001
the IPCC issued another 1000 year graph in which the Medieval warming period
was missing. Why?

* Why has one scientist promoting the cause of man-made global warming been
quoted as saying "we have to get rid of the medieval warming period?"

* Why is the ice cap on the Antarctic getting thicker if the earth is
getting warmer?

* In the United State, the one country with the most accurate temperature
measuring and reporting records, temperatures have risen by 0.3 degrees
centigrade over the past 100 years. The UN estimate is twice that.

* There are about 160,000 glaciers around the world. Most have never been
visited or measured by man. The great majority of these glaciers are
growing, not melting.

* Side-looking radar interferometry shows that the ise mass in the West
Antarctic is growing at a rate of over 26 gigatons a year. This reverses a
melting trend that had persisted for the previous 6,000 years.

* Rising sea levels? The sea levels have been rising since the last ice age
ended. That was 12,000 years ago. Estimates are that in that time the sea
level has risen by over 300 feet. The rise in our sea levels has been going
on long before man started creating anything but natural CO2 emissions.

* Like Antarctica, the interior of Greenland is gaining ice mass.

* Over the past 3,000 years there have been five different extended periods
when the earth was measurably warmer than it is today.

* During the last 20 years -- a period of the highest carbon dioxide levels
-- global temperatures have actually decreased. That's right ... decreased.

* Why did a reporter from National Public Radio refuse to interview David
Deming, an associate professor at the University of Oklahoma studying global
warming, after his testimony to the Senate Environment and Public Works
Committee unless Deming would state that global warming was being caused by

* Why are global warming proponents insisting that the matter is settled and
that no further scientific research is needed? Why are they afraid of
additional information?

* On July 24, 1974 Time Magazine published an article entitled "Another Ice
Age?" Here's the first paragraph:

"As they review the bizarre and unpredictable weather pattern of the past
several years, a growing number of scientists are beginning to suspect that
many seemingly contradictory meteorological fluctuations are actually part
of a global climatic upheaval. However widely the weather varies from place
to place and time to time, when meteorologists take an average of
temperatures around the globe they find that the atmosphere has been growing
gradually cooler for the past three decades. The trend shows no indication
of reversing. Climatological Cassandras are becoming increasingly
apprehensive, for the weather aberrations they are studying may be the
harbinger of another ice age."

Hey ... I could go on. There's much more where that came from. But I need to
get ready to go on the air. Just know that many of the strongest proponents
of this "man-made" global warming stuff are dedicated opponents to
capitalism and don't feel all that warm and fuzzy about the United States.
30294  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Science, Culture, & Humanities / Re: Internet and related technology on: February 03, 2007, 06:18:07 AM
Viacom Tells YouTube: Hands Off
NY Times
Published: February 3, 2007
In a sign of the growing tension between old-line media and the new Internet behemoths, Viacom, the parent company of MTV and Comedy Central, demanded yesterday that YouTube, the video-sharing Web site owned by Google, remove more than 100,000 clips of its programming.

“The Colbert Report” on Comedy Central, a Viacom unit, is popular with young viewers, and clips from it appear frequently on YouTube.
Viacom, along with other major media companies, including the News Corporation and NBC Universal, has become increasingly frustrated with YouTube as it has amassed a vast library of copyrighted clips, placed on the site by its users.

While such companies regularly ask YouTube to remove their material, Viacom’s demand, which it disclosed in a statement circulated by e-mail, was the most militant and public move of its kind so far.

As it has with the similar request from other companies, Google removed the Viacom clips from the YouTube site yesterday.

The dispute underscored the tense dance that major media companies are doing with Google, which bought YouTube for $1.65 billion last October. Google hopes to strike deals that will give it the rights to mainstream programming and also wipe away its potential liability for any violations of copyright law by YouTube so far.

Despite intense negotiations in recent months, Google has not been able to announce any such deals with media companies. YouTube is supported by advertising, but in most cases it does not share that revenue with copyright holders.

Viacom is particularly unhappy because so many of its shows, like “The Daily Show With Jon Stewart,” a YouTube favorite, appeal to the young audiences who visit the site.

“We cannot continue to let them profit from our programming,” Philippe P. Dauman, Viacom’s chief executive, said in an interview. Mr. Dauman said that Viacom had been in discussions with Google for months, but that Google kept delaying and did not make what Viacom saw as a serious offer.

David Eun, a vice president for content partnerships at Google, said that his company had been “very serious” about the talks, but that the companies could not agree on financial terms. “We put in a lot of time to figure out what would be a mutually beneficial deal,” he said.

A Viacom spokesman said the company had repeatedly asked YouTube to filter out its programming automatically, but that Google had not responded.

“They choose not to filter out copyrighted content, “ said the spokesman, Carl D. Folta. He added that the company apparently had the technology to filter out pornography and hateful material, which is rarely seen on YouTube.

Chad Hurley, the co-founder and chief executive of YouTube, said the company was still working on its filtering technology. He said it had agreed to use it to identify and possibly remove copyrighted material from Warner Music, and it would discuss a similar arrangement with Viacom as part of a broader deal.

Mr. Folta said he found that stand unacceptable. “They are saying we will only protect your content if you do a deal with us — if not, we will steal it.”

Whether YouTube is stealing content by serving up clips of copyrighted programs is very much up for debate. Like most big Internet companies, Google says it is protected by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, so long as it removes material whenever a copyright owner requests it.

John G. Palfrey Jr. , the executive director of the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School, said Google may well be able to use this defense, but “I don’t think the law is entirely clear.” And if Google loses, “the damages could get astronomically high,” he said.

Viacom’s move comes at a time when it and other media companies have contemplated creating a service to rival YouTube. There have been off-again-on-again negotiations among a variety of companies, including the News Corporation, NBC Universal and the Walt Disney Company.

Viacom’s cable networks, meanwhile, are increasingly putting clips from their programs on their own Web sites and selling advertising on them.

In the face of uncertainty, media companies have taken different approaches to YouTube. For the last year, NBC Universal has demanded that the site remove most clips of its material, other than a small set provided by NBC itself. Others, like CBS, have largely allowed their content to remain on YouTube. CBS has struck a deal to provide some clips to YouTube and share in the advertising revenue associated with it.

It was not clear yesterday how Viacom’s demand might affect the rest of the industry and whether other media companies would follow suit.

Andrew Butcher, a spokesman for the News Corporation, which owns the Fox television network and the social networking site MySpace, said his company supported Viacom’s move. “They’ve got every right to protect their content in whatever way they deem appropriate,” Mr. Butcher said. “So far we’ve been dealing with YouTube and others on a case-by-case basis.”

Reports have been circulating in the industry that Google had offered to pay $100 million a year for the use of Viacom’s programming.

Mr. Dauman of Viacom denied there had been a deal on the table. He said Viacom “never had any kind of an agreement with Google that it could say yes to,” adding: “There was not enough to be a detailed offer. They have shown no sense of urgency to enter into an agreement with anyone.”

Some analysts said the removal demand was simply a business tactic on Viacom’s part.

“This is a negotiating strategy to get paid, and I think both sides need a middle ground,” said Michael Nathanson, a media analyst at Sanford C. Bernstein & Company. “Both sides have clear needs in this negotiation. What they are arguing about is price.”

Viacom’s demand was “a risk worth taking,” Mr. Nathanson said. He and others pointed out that the music industry was once afraid to take a similarly aggressive stance when its product appeared on the Napster music-sharing service. “If content is available free and it is tolerated, it erodes your core business,” Mr. Nathanson said.

But others said the move could hurt Viacom if young YouTube users become angry when they upload clips to the site and realize that Viacom is insisting that they be removed. Yesterday, Google tried to position Viacom’s move as hostile toward YouTube users.

“The biggest feeling we have right now is regret that Viacom may miss out on the chance to interact with the YouTube community,” Mr. Eun said.

The effort to integrate old and new media has made some inroads. Just a few months ago, Viacom and Google were cozying up so successfully that Viacom struck a deal to have Google distribute clips from its shows on its Google Video service. The deal included an arrangement for the two companies to share revenue from adjacent advertising. Mr. Dauman characterized that deal yesterday as an “experiment.”

Richard Siklos contributed reporting.

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30295  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Afghanistan-Pakistan on: February 03, 2007, 06:12:17 AM
Afghan Town Is Overrun by Taliban
NY Times
Published: February 3, 2007

KABUL, Afghanistan, Feb. 2 — Taliban militants overran the town of Musa Qala in southern Afghanistan just three months after NATO troops had withdrawn and handed over control to a tribal council, officials said Friday. The insurgents detained police officers and tribal elders, seized weapons and government equipment and bulldozed part of the district offices, according to residents.

An Afghan’s Path From U.S. Ally to Drug Suspect (February 2, 2007) Residents fled in fear that the Taliban’s arrival would precipitate further fighting with NATO forces, according to one family. A spokesman for the Interior Ministry in Kabul, Zemarai Bashary, confirmed the attack, which took place on Thursday night, and said the Taliban had disarmed the police stationed there.

A provincial governor, Asadullah Wafa, told Agence France-Presse on Friday that the Taliban had left the town again and that the district offices were now empty. In a statement, NATO said that although the situation remained unclear, the town elders were safe in their homes. A NATO security force was monitoring the situation and ready to support the government and the elders of Musa Qala, it said.

The attack ended a British-brokered experiment aimed at bringing some control over remote regions and keeping Taliban insurgents at bay. Under the plan, British troops agreed to withdraw from the town, leaving a tribal council in charge with a locally recruited police force, and Taliban forces agreed to withdraw to nearby villages.

American officials in Afghanistan had opposed the agreement because it left the broader district of Musa Qala, a poppy-growing region of Helmand Province, open to the Taliban. But the British commander in Helmand at the time defended it as a way to release his men from a pointless and occasionally bloody siege of the town. Residents had welcomed the deal, brokered in October, because it brought a temporary peace to the badly damaged town. But some had warned at the time that it was handing a victory to the Taliban.

A Taliban commander, Mullah Abdul Ghafoor, led the assault on the town Thursday in a rage, because his brother had been killed a few days before in a NATO airstrike, residents said. Leading a large group of armed men, he used a bulldozer to smash through the wall of the district office, said Abdul Razziq, a shopkeeper who said his family fled Musa Qala on Friday. Mullah Ghafoor ordered the elders to leave the compound, burned the government flag and hoisted the banner of the Taliban, Mr. Razziq said.
30296  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Science, Culture, & Humanities / Re: Legal issues on: February 03, 2007, 06:04:39 AM
An interesting read on some old Supreme Courst self-defense decisions:
30297  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Science, Culture, & Humanities / Re: Manly Christians on: February 03, 2007, 05:03:09 AM
30298  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Big Picture WW3: Who, when, where, why on: February 03, 2007, 04:21:41 AM
Second post of the night.


 January 29, 2007 -- LIKE plenty of other Americans, I wish we could just be done with the Middle East. Unfortunately, the Middle East isn't done with us. And the situation is going to get considerably worse before it shows a hint of getting better.
Thanks to abysmal policy errors (many pre-dating the current administration), we've caught ourselves between two irreconcilable sides - Sunni and Shia Muslims - whose enmity dates back 13 centuries. And we're now taking fire from every direction.

Dreaming that all Iraqis could get along, we alienated potential friends and empowered deadly enemies. Short of Mongol-quality savagery, the traditional way to win in the Middle East has been to select an ally and stick with him - while avoiding the folly of trying to play honest broker.

The administration has begun to realize that it has to make some hard choices. Yet our leaders still believe they can have it both ways. The result may be bad hard choices.

At the strategic level, Washington is lining up regional allies - Sunni Arab states - to face off with Iran. But in Iraq, the administration continues to tilt toward Shia parties - hoping that Iran can be excluded from a decisive role in Baghdad. (Note that we've been fighting hard on Baghdad's Sunni-populated Haifa Street, but we're still avoiding a showdown in Sadr City.)

For their part, our Sunni Arab "allies" support the Sunni insurgents and dread the prospect of a Shia-dominated democratic government or a partition of Iraq.

And now, in the worst American tradition, we're in danger of grabbing at short-term gains at an exorbitant strategic price: Defaulting to our old habit of backing hard-line regimes, we've dropped all pressure on the Saudis and Egyptians to reform their political systems.

Want to recruit more terrorists for another 9/11? Give Sunni Arab regimes a renewed blank check to shut down all opposition.

True, Shia terrorists have attacked us in the Middle East. But the Sunni terrorists attack us globally - and on our own soil. Shia extremists think regionally, while Sunni fanatics have universal ambitions.

Yes, Iran is the immediate strategic problem - but it's a far more complex matter than the kiss-the-Saudis'-sandals crowd accepts. A violent rogue with a nuclear-weapons program, Iran backs terrorists in Iraq, Lebanon and Afghanistan.

Yet Iran also happens to be America's natural ally in the region.

We're in a race against time. The Iranian people have tried religious rule - now they're sick and tired of it. They want to move on. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's allies lost the last round of elections and the mullahs are getting nervous about his excesses. Iranians want change, but don't know how to get it - and we can't impose it.

Could the Khomeinist regime fall before apocalyptic ayatollahs get the bomb? There's no more pressing strategic question.

If we find it necessary to attack Iran's nuclear program, it's going to be a long and messy process. A thorough effort would kill a lot of Iranians - alienating even the most liberal-minded members of a highly nationalistic population.

Stopping the bad Iranians would cost us the good Iranians. There's no good solution.

The tragedy here is that Iran is farther along in its political development than our Arab "friends." The states to which we're inclined to turn may still have Sunni versions of the Khomeini revolution ahead of them.

Fundamentalist, anti-American regimes could hatch in exactly the baskets where we're tempted to park our strategic eggs.

If we line up with the Sunni Arab autocracies again, we lose Iran - and perhaps the entire region in the long run. But tolerating the rise of radical Shia power in the near-term threatens Israel, genocidal conflict in Iraq and beyond, and global economic pain.

In all-too-real a sense, backing either side, Sunni or Shia, is just betting on black or red at the roulette wheel - knowing that the house always wins in the end. And the house is the collapsed and vengeful civilization of the Middle East.

But we're locked in the casino; we have to make our bet. So here are the fundamental questions the administration has to ask itself before pushing the chips across the table:

* How do we defeat Iran's government without alienating the Iranian people?

* Do our long-term interests truly coincide with repressive Sunni Arab regimes?

* Are we once again in danger of starting a fight we lack the guts to finish? The administration's less-than-half-hearted military policy in Iraq and Israel's disastrous loss to Hezbollah last summer aren't encouraging models.

* By reinvigorating our "alliance" with Saudi Arabia and other repressive Sunni states, are we just setting ourselves up for another round of "let's you and him fight," with American blood defending Arab oil wealth? Are we still the Saudi royal family's whores?

If our troops do wind up dying to save the House of Saud yet again, we need to recognize that we, not they, are in the power seat. We should demand that they really open the oil taps to bankrupt Iran (and Venezuela's Hugo Chavez), and that they publicly recognize Israel's right to exist.

We're paying a terrible price - and may pay yet a higher one - for the bipartisan failure of one administration after another (and of successive Congresses) to pursue a serious alternative-energy program. Now we're stuck in the kill zone.

There's no easy fix and there are no solid answers to our problems in the Middle East. The region's future has never been so unpredictable and could evolve in a number of startling ways - not all of them bad.

Only one thing is certain: A return to yesteryear's destructive policies and faulty alliances won't solve our long-term problems.

Iraq? That's the easy one.

Ralph Peters' latest book is "Never Quit The Fight."

30299  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Big Picture WW3: Who, when, where, why on: February 03, 2007, 03:12:37 AM
Pipe's speech defining the war as not a clash of civilizations, but of Radical Islam vs Civilization.

Radical Islam vs. Civilization
By Daniel Pipes | February 1, 2007

Text of a talk presented by Daniel Pipes on January 20, 2007, in London in a debate with the mayor of London, Ken Livingstone, as transcribed by the 910 Group with the help of others. The original posting of the video can be seen at YouTube; for a single clip version, see the posting at the Global Defense Group. For accounts of the debate, see the bibliography at “My Debate with London Mayor Ken Livingstone.”

Thank you so much. I’d like to begin by thanking Mayor Livingstone for his kind invitation to join you today and I thank the Greater London Authority for the hard work it put into what is obviously a successful event. I am delighted by the interest that you, the audience, has shown. And I’m grateful to my supporters who have come from four different countries to be with me today.

The Mayor is an optimistic man. I’m generally invited to bring along some gloom, and I will, true to form, provide some for you. [audience laughter]

Let me start with my position on the question of world civilization or clash of civilizations. One: I am for world civilization, and I reject the ‘clash of civilization’ argument. Two: The problem is not so much a clash of civilizations, but a clash of civilization and barbarism.

I’d like to begin by looking at Samuel Huntington’s idea. He argued that cultural differences, in his 1993 article, are paramount. “The fundamental source of conflict … will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural.” And in all he finds seven or eight set civilizations, namely, “Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and possibly African.”

My response is that civilization is useful as a cultural concept but not as a political one. There are three problems with seeing civilizations as actors in the way that Huntington suggests. It can’t account for tensions within a single civilization, it can’t account for agreement across civilizations, and it doesn’t account for change over time. Let me give you three quick examples. I’ll take them from the area that I have studied, which is the Muslim world.

First, it cannot account for Muslim-on-Muslim violence, of which there is a great deal: We have the civil war in Lebanon, the Iraq-Iran war, the Islamist insurgency in Algeria, the Sunnis vs. Shi‘is in Iraq at present, the near civil war in the Palestinian Authority, the Sudanese government against the people of Darfur. This cannot be accounted for in civilizational terms.

Second, it ignores the agreement across civilizations. I’d like to take a UK-based example, namely the edict of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989 against Salman Rushdie, who at that time was living in London. It appeared, at first glance, to be a question of Muslims on one side and Westerners on the other. Muslims were burning The Satanic Verses novel, there was violence in India, etc. But a closer look showed that in fact it was quite something different, it was far more complex. There were plenty of Westerners who were against Rushdie and plenty of Muslims who supported him.

Let me give you just a couple of quotes. The foreign secretary of Britain at that time, Sir Geoffrey Howe, said “the British government, the British people do not have any affection for Rushdie’s book.” On the other hand, the Egyptian foreign minister said “Khomeini had no right to sentence Rushdie to death.” And another Egyptian minister said “Khomeini is a dog, no, that is too good for him, he is a pig.” [audience laughter]

Third point, Huntington in his analysis can’t account for change over time. And I can best illustrate this by giving you a quote from his 1993 article, He said “The economic issues between the United States and Europe are no less serious than those between the United States and Japan, but they do not have the same political salience and emotional intensity because the differences between American culture and European culture are so much less than those between American civilization and Japanese civilization.”

Well that was true enough in 1993, but it sounds pretty silly in 2007 where there are virtually no tensions between the United States and Japan and I’m sure you are aware there are tensions between the United States and Europe. The vituperation is far more severe across the Atlantic than the Pacific.

What Huntington did was to take an incident of the moment and turn them into something civilizational and it didn’t work. In short the clash of civilization idea fails, it does not fit the facts, it is not a good way to understand the world.

What about then a world civilization? Can it exist? If one defines it as Huntington does, as a culture, basically then, no, it can’t. As he puts it, correctly, “for the relevant future there will be no universal civilization but instead a world of different civilizations, each of which will have to learn to coexist with the others.” I don’t think there is anyone who would dispute that.

But yes, there can be a world civilization if one defines it differently. Civilization can be the opposite of barbarism. And civilization in this sense has a long history. In the Bible, there is a passage, “And ye shall… proclaim liberty throughout all the lands and unto all the inhabitants thereof.” In the Koran, “you are the best community ever raised among mankind, you advocate righteousness and forbid evil, and believe in God.” The American byword is ‘the pursuit of happiness’, the French is “Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité “ Winston Churchill in 1898, writing about the Sudan, said that civilization is “sympathetic, merciful, tolerant, ready to discuss or argue, eager to avoid violence, to submit to law, to effect compromise.”

So the question is, can this state of being, of being civilized, can it exist on a world level?

It can, in so far as those who are civilized confront those who are not civilized. The world civilization exists of civilized elements in every culture banding together to protect ethics, liberty and mutual respect. The real clash is between them and the barbarians.

Now what do I mean by barbarians? I do not mean people who are of lower economic stature. What I mean by barbarians – and I think all of us mean by barbarians in the past two centuries – are ideological barbarians. This is what emerged in the French revolution in the late 18th century. And the great examples of ideological barbarism are fascism and Marxist Leninism – they, in their course of their histories have killed tens of millions of people.

But today it’s a third, a third totalitarian movement, a third barbarian movement, namely that of radical Islam. It is an extremist utopian version of Islam. I am not speaking of Islam the religion, I am speaking of a very unusual and modern reading of Islam. It has inflicted misery (as I mentioned Algeria and Darfur, before), there is suicide terrorism, tyrannical and brutal governments, there is the oppression of women, and non-Muslims.

It threatens the whole world:. Morocco, Turkey, Palestinian Authority, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, you name it, Afghanistan, Tunisia, and not just the traditional Muslim world, but also Russia, France, Sweden, and I dare say, the United Kingdom.

The great question of our time is how to prevent this movement, akin to fascism and communism, from growing stronger.

Now, I believe the mayor and I agree on the need to withstand this menace, but we disagree on the means of how to do it. He looks to multiculturalism, and I to winning the war. He wants everyone to get along; I want to defeat a terrible enemy.

The mayor defines multiculturalism as “the right to pursue different cultural values subject only to the restriction that they should not interfere with the similar right for others.” And he argues, as you just heard, that it works, that London is a successful city. I won’t dispute his specifics, but I do see the multicultural impulse creating disaster by ignoring a dangerous and growing presence of radical Islam in London.

One evocative sign of this danger is that citizens in your country have become a threat for the rest of the world. In 2003, Home Secretary David Blunkett presented a dossier to a Special Immigration Appeals Commission in which he “admits that Britain was a safe haven for supporters of worldwide terrorism” and in which he said Britain remains a “significant base’” for supporting terrorism.

Indeed, British-based terrorists have carried out operations in at least fifteen countries. Going from east to west, they include Pakistan, Afghanistan, Kenya, Tanzania, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Iraq, Jordan, Israel, Algeria, Morocco, Russia, France, Spain, and the United States. I’ll give you one example, from the United States: it was Richard Reid, the shoe bomber, who I am primarily thinking of, but there is also the [End of clip #3; Start of clip #4] British involvement in 9/11 and in the Millennium Plot that did not take place in Los Angeles.

In frustration, Egypt’s President Husni Mubarak publicly denounced the UK for “protecting killers.” After the August 10th thwarted Heathrow airline mega-plot, of a few months ago, two American authors argued in The New Republic, that from an American point of view, “it can now be argued that the biggest threat to U.S. security emanates not from Iran or Iraq or Afghanistan—but rather from Great Britain.”

And I believe this is the tip of the iceberg. I believe it refutes Mr. Livingstone’s opposing view - that there isn’t a problem.  This is the problem, the problem is radical Islam, also known as fundamentalist Islam, political Islam, Islamism. It is not, again, Islam the religion, it is radical Islam, the ideology.

Let us focus on three aspects of it. The essence of radical Islam is the complete adherence to the Shari’a, to the law of Islam. And it is extending the Shari‘a into areas that never existed before.

Second, it is based very deeply on a clash of civilizations ideology. It divides the world into two parts, the moral and the immoral, the good and the bad. Here is one quote from a British-based Islamist by the name of Abdullah el-Faisal, who was convicted and is now in jail. “There are two religions in the world today - the right one and the wrong one. Islam versus the rest of the world.” You don’t get a more basic clash-of-civilization orientation than that. There is a hatred of the outside world, of the non-Muslim world, and the West in particular. There is the intent to reject as much as possible of outside influence.

The third feature is that this is totalitarian in nature. It turns Islam from a personal faith into an ideology, into an ism. It is the transformation of a personal faith into a system for ordering power and wealth. Radical Islam derives from Islam but is an anti-modern, millenarian, misanthropic, misogynist, anti-Christian, anti-Semitic, triumphalist, jihadistic, terroristic, and suicidal version of it. It is Islamic-flavored totalitarianism.

Like fascism and communism, radical Islam is a compelling way of seeing the world in a way that can absorb an intelligent person – to show him or her a whole new way of seeing life. It is radically utopian and takes the mundane qualities of everyday life and turns them into something grand and glistening.

There is an attempt to take over states. There is the use of the state for coercive purposes, and an attempt to dominate all of life, every aspect of it. It is an aggression against neighbors, and finally it is a cosmic confrontation with the West. As Tony Blair put it in August of 2006, “We are fighting a war, but not just against terrorism but about how the world should govern itself in the early 21st century, about global values.”

Now how does one respond to this?

The mayor is a man of the Left, and I am a classical liberal. We can agree that neither of us personally wishes to be subjected to the Shari‘a. I will assume, you [looking at Ken Livingstone] will correct me if I am wrong [short sporadic applause] that neither of us want this as part of our personal life.

But our views diverge sharply as to how to respond to this phenomenon. Those of my political outlook are alarmed by Islamism’s advances in the West.  Much of the Left approaches the topic in a far more relaxed fashion.

Why this difference? Why generally is the right alarmed, and the left much more sanguine? There are many differences, there are many reasons, but I’d like to focus on two.

One is a sense of shared opponents between the Islamists and those on the left. George Galloway explained in 2005, “the progressive movement around the world and the Muslims have the same enemies,” which he then went on to indicate were Israel, the United States, and Great Britain.

And if you listen to the words that are spoken about, say the United States, you can see that this is in fact the case.  Howard Pinter has described America as “a country run by a bunch of criminal lunatics.” [big applause and shouts] And Osama Bin Laden [stops … ] I’ll do what I can to get an applause line. [laughter] And, get ready for this one: Osama Bin Laden called the United States, “unjust, criminal, and tyrannical.” [applause]

Noam Chomsky termed America “a leading terrorist state”. And Hafiz Hussain Ahmed, a leading Pakistani political leader, called it the “biggest terrorist state.” [scattered applause]

Such common ground makes it tempting for those on the Left to make common cause with Islamists, and the symbol of this would be the [huge, anti-war in Iraq] demonstrations in Hyde Park, on the 16th of February 2003, called by a coalition of leftist and Islamist organizations.

At other times, the Left feels a kinship with Islamist attacks on the West, forgiving, understanding why these would happen. A couple of notorious quotes make this point. The German composer, Karlheinz Stockhausen termed the 9/11 attacks “the greatest work of art for the whole cosmos,” while American novelist Norman Mailer, commented that “the people who did this were brilliant.”

Such attitudes tempt the Left not to take seriously the Islamist threat to the West.  With John Kerry, a former aspirant to the [U.S.] presidency, they dismiss terrorism as a mere “nuisance.”

That is one reason; the bonds between the two camps. The second is that on the Left one finds a tendency to focus on terrorism – not on Islamism, not on radical Islam. Terrorism is blamed on such problems as Western colonialism of the past century, Western “neo-imperialism” of the present day, Western policies—particularly in places like Iraq and the Palestinian Authority – or from unemployment, poverty, desperation.

I would contend that it actually results in an aggressive ideology. I respect the role of ideas, and I believe that not to respect, to dismiss them, to pay them no attention, is to patronize, and to possibly even to be racist.  There is no way to appease this ideology. It is serious, there is no amount of money that can solve it, there is no change of foreign policy that make it can go away.

I would argue to you, ladies and gentlemen, it must be fought and must be defeated as in 1945 and 1991, [applause] as the German and the Soviet threats were defeated. Our goal must be, in this case, the emergence of Islam that is modern, moderate, democratic, humane, liberal, and good neighborly and that it is respectful of women, homosexuals, atheists, whoever else – one that grants non-Muslims equal rights with Muslims.

In conclusion, Mr. Mayor, whether Muslim or non-Muslim, on the Left or on the Right, I think you will agree with me on the importance of working together to attain such an Islam. I suggest that this can be achieved not via the get-along multiculturalism that you propose, but by standing firm with our civilized allies around the globe, especially with liberal voices in the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, with Iranian dissidents, and with reformers in Afghanistan.

I also propose standing with their counterparts in the west, with such individuals as Ayaan Hirsi Ali [applause], … formerly a Dutch legislator and now in exile in the United States; with Irshad Manji, the Canadian author; [applause] with Wafa Sultan, the Syrian in exile in the United States who made her phenomenal appearance on Al-Jazeera. Individuals like Magdi Allam, an Egyptian who is now a leading Italian journalist; Naser Khader, a parliamentarian in Denmark; Salim Mansur, a professor and author in Canada, and Irfan Al-Alawi, here in Britain. [applause]

Conversely, if we do not stand with these individuals, but instead if we stand with those who would torment them, with the Islamists, with, I might say, someone like Yusuf al- Qaradawi [applause] we are then standing with those who justify suicide bombings, who defend the most oppressive forms of Islamic practice, who espouse the clash of civilizations [notion that] we ourselves reject.

To the extent that we all work together, against the barbarism of radical Islam, a world civilization does indeed exist – one that transcends skin colour, poverty, geography, politics, and religion.

I hope that you and I Mr. Mayor can agree here and now to cooperate on such a program.
30300  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Science, Culture, & Humanities / Re: Particular Stocks on: February 03, 2007, 02:42:50 AM

David Gordon makes some new calls:
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