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30901  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Libertarian themes on: November 13, 2003, 06:39:07 AM
U.S. foreign travelers
to be fingerprinted
Critics assail plan as ineffective,
serious threat to civil liberties

Posted: November 13, 2003
1:00 a.m. Eastern

By Sherrie Gossett
? 2003

Some 25 foreign nations are planning to require visiting Americans to be fingerprinted, according to a prominent biometrics expert and president of the company that produces the computerized desktop booking stations used by many law enforcement authorities.

The plans to screen American travelers represent a form of retaliation against new U.S. Department of Homeland Security requirements for foreign travelers entering the country, said Joseph J. Atick, president and chief executive officer of Identix, Inc., a biometrics company that won a five-year blanket purchase agreement for its TouchPrint 3000 line fingerprint biometric live scan booking stations and desktop systems, which will be provided to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services.

Atick made the statement at a recent Biometrics Consortium Conference in Virginia.

The CIS anticipates expanding the Application Support Centers Program in 2004 to worldwide operations on up to five continents. The overseas ASC Program will allow biometrics capture for background checks prior to an applicant entering the United States.

WND asked Identix spokesperson Meir Kahtan for a transcript of the address, which reportedly referenced the ?25 countries.? Kahtan responded that there was no transcript or audio record available. Dr. Atick?s powerpoint presentation foresees entry/exit systems throughout the world as an significant opportunity for identification management development.

Kahtan did not respond to other WND inquiries about Atick?s comments, including the time frame for implementation of the program and whether Identix was to be the lead provider of equipment for foreign efforts to fingerprint American travelers.

WND asked Nuala O?Connor Kelly, chief privacy officer for Homeland Security, to verify the report. Kelly deferred comment to the DHS press office, adding, ?The questions you're asking call for conjecture about activities that are beyond the scope of DHS's purview, but that are rather the activities of other countries, and so beyond the scope of my ability to answer.?

Nuala O?Connor Kelly was a moderator at the Biometrics 2003 convention.

On October 29, Homeland Security director Tom Ridge told a Berlin news conference that an agreement between America and Europe on ways to combine fingerprints and facial recognition in travel documents could lead to a global standard.

When asked whether DHS was aware of the plan, spokesman Dennis Murphy told WND, "I?m not personally aware of that," but added, "I?m not surprised. There's an ICAO standard for machine-readable passports that need to be linked to biometrics by October 2004. Optical finger scans will be linked to a database."

When asked whether data collected abroad, including Americans? travel itineraries and fingerprints, would be shared with U.S. agencies, Murphy deferred to the U.S. State Department, saying, "All that would have to go through State Department protocol and agreements as to which information comes back ? if so."

Atick?s PowerPoint slides from Biometrics 2003 reference "Building and linking databases to uncover identities that could pose a threat," and include a graphic of a smart-card information being routed through FBI and Interpol databases.

State Department spokesperson Joann Moore would not comment on whether her department or other federal agencies would be able to obtain the data from foreign countries.

About the plan to fingerprint American travelers abroad, Moore said, "Each country has its own regulations on how it processes travelers. That would be up to the countries," adding, "Maybe we'll know more when it happens."

When pressed for more details, Moore said the Bureau of Consular Affairs could give out no more information at this time, "about countries that are considering doing this."

Lee Tien, senior staff attorney for the Electronic Frontier Foundation, isn?t surprised Americans will be fingerprinted ? a procedure traditionally reserved for criminals ? and warns that employing biometric systems without sufficient attention to their dangers makes them likely to be used in a way that threatens civil liberties.

?When it comes to terrorism versus ordinary crime we have extremely sparse information on terrorism,? Tien said, ?There isn?t anything even remotely resembling a solid biometric list of known or suspected terrorists.?

Tien argues that such a system can facilitate the positive identification of someone who is not a terrorist, but adds, ?It?s no help with threat identification, where we have all the problems.?

That conclusion was also reached by the General Accounting Office.

Homeland Security's Murphy contends that biometrics ?back up the integrity? of travel documents and prevent alteration of machine-readable passports.

But the EFF argues that a terrorist with a fake passport would be issued a U.S. visa with his own biometric attached to the name on the phony passport.

?Unless the terrorist has already entered his biometrics into the database, and has garnered enough suspicion at the border to merit a full database search, biometrics won't stop him at the border,? said Tien.

Tien?s organization contends that biometrics do not represent a substitute for quality data about potential risks. No matter how accurately a person is identified, EFF argues, identification alone reveals nothing about whether a person is a terrorist. Such information is completely external to any biometric ID system.

The lack of a well-considered threat model has been a focus of the Electronic Frontier Foundation?s opposition to certain uses of biometrics.

Before deploying any such system on the national stage, EFF emphasizes that a realistic threat model must be obtained, specifying the categories of people such systems are supposed to target, and the threat they pose in light of their abilities, resources, motivations and goals.

?What if the terrorists don?t come in through the checkpoints?? asks Tien. ?How hard is it for a dedicated terrorist to get on shore if they want to??

He adds, that the notoriously porous Mexican border and the exemption of Canada from the program ?makes a mockery of the notion that this is for security.?

Although the excuse for exempting Canada was one of practicality vs. commerce concerns arising from feared traffic snarls, Tien chastised the government for failing to conduct adequate cost-benefit analyses.

Even Homeland Security's Murphy calls the press reports of potential traffic snarls and disrupted commerce along the Canadian border ?folklore.?

?It only adds about 4 seconds to processing time, since the document would be swiped as the border guard is asking questions they routinely ask anyway,? explained Murphy.

Ironically, Rep. John M. McHugh, R-NY, recently met with Delegate General Michel Robitaille of Quebec to discuss rising concerns about traffic snarls arising from the Canadian government?s apparent understaffing of New York border crossings, such as crossings at Champlain-Lacolle and Landsdowne.

At Champlain-Lacolle, a recent backlog of cars at the Canadian checkpoint can apparently be attributed to the availability of only one open inspection lane and the low number of Canadian inspection agents stationed at the border. The Canadian government is said to be planning significant upgrades at its border crossings, specifically in Lacolle

In addition to being ineffective and the Canadian-Mexican border leaks, Tien warns of the privacy threats of such a system.

?It becomes very easy to track innocent people,? he said. ?The government?s fragmented attempts to address physical security issues are resulting in ?solutions? that will be heavily sucking in data about people.?

Political pressure for increasing use of biometrics appears to be informed and driven more by marketing from the biometrics industry than by scientists, EFF asserts.

David Ray, spokesman for the Federation for American Immigration Reform, supports the program and the fingerprinting of Americans overseas.

?Visiting a country is a privilege, not a right,? Ray said, contending that such checks are a reasonable ?cost? of international travel.

Ray is also highly critical of the Canadian exemption though, calling it ?very risky.?

?Canada is known as a place where it?s easy to make asylum claims, and where persons with terrorist affiliations reside,? he said.

Asian smuggling rings operating in the Vancouver area, and the possibility of obtaining fake Canadian drivers? licenses were also cited as concerns.

?We?ve got 9 to 11 million illegal immigrants in the country that we know nothing about,? Ray said, ?There?s been no criminal background check of them, no running of their identities against a terrorist database. US officials are not very interested in detecting and deporting these people.?

?Iraq has more secure borders,? said Ray, ?That $87 billion should?ve gone to securing our borders before we spent a dime in Iraq.?

?We don?t seem to be able to lock our own back door. We?ll just be tracking people who want to play by the rules.?

At the Biometrics 2003 conference, Atick noted that the ?privacy pendulum? has shifted ?over the last two years,? and, that after Sept. 11, 80 percent of people polled supported biometrics and ID cards. He also noted the majority of privacy complaints were with the USA Patriot Act and its alteration of wire-tapping, subpoena and disclosure law.

Looking forward, Atick noted that building certain testing databases ?may require changes in law,? and he predicts that identity management with biometrics will keep the industry and government busy for the next decade.

Illustrating the close relationship between the biometrics industry and the U.S. government, Atick pointed out, ?Without NSA, DARPA, DOJ, NIST, etc. the biometric industry today would be a decade or two behind.?

So what does the biometrics industry expect from its relationship to government in the future?

According to Atick: ?Unwavering commitment to programs despite election-year politics.?
30902  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / WW3 on: November 12, 2003, 08:15:33 PM
Please feel free to send the Stratfor Weekly to a friend
or colleague.

12 November 2003

by Dr. George Friedman

The Iraq Dilemma: Frying Pan or Fire?


U.S. President George. W. Bush has hastily convened his war
council to decide strategies for the next phase of operations in Iraq. What first must be assessed are the nature, intent and capabilities of the Iraqi guerrilla forces. Imperfect
intelligence about this might force the Bush administration to
implement strategies based on worst-case-scenario assumptions.


A war council convened in Washington on Nov. 11, appropriately the same day as the U.S. Veteran's Day holiday. The war council clearly was not planned -- the U.S. administrator in Iraq Paul Bremer was hurriedly recalled to Washington. The White House meeting included all the major decision makers concerning U.S. strategic policy, including Colin Powell, Donald Rumsfeld and Condoleezza Rice. All the players were at the table; President Bush was dealing the cards.

Clearly, the strategic situation in Iraq was the driving issue.
Major guerrilla activity remains concentrated in the Sunni
triangle, north and west of Baghdad. In that sense, the
guerrilla's position has not improved. However, coinciding with the advent of Ramadan, the Iraqi guerrillas intensified their tempo of operations substantially, but not decisively. That is to say, the guerrilla activity increased, but its strategic
significance did not. The guerrillas are far from capable of
compelling a U.S. retreat from Iraq by force of arms. Indeed,
they are incapable of seizing and holding any territory, as their allies in Afghanistan are capable.

The military situation is relatively stable and, from a strictly
military standpoint, tolerable. However, the political situation
of the United States is not. There, the inability of the Bush
administration to either forecast the guerrilla war or
demonstrate a war-termination strategy has weakened the
administration, although far from decisively.

The most severe political damage the guerrillas have done has been in the Islamic world. In Iraq, the United States wanted to demonstrate its enormous and decisive military power to impose a sense of hopelessness on radical Islamists who were arguing that American power and will were vastly overrated. Whatever the reality of the guerrilla campaign, the perception that has been created in the Islamic world is precisely the opposite of the one the United States desired. Rather than imposing "shock and awe,"
the inability to suppress the guerrillas has confirmed to
Islamists their core perception -- that the United States can
defeat conventional forces but cannot deal with paramilitary and guerrilla forces. Therefore, the United States can be defeated over time if Islamists are prepared to be patient and absorb casualties.

This is not the message that the administration wants to send either to the Islamists or to Iowa. The administration's
assumption going into the war was that the collapse of Iraq's
conventional forces coupled with the fall of Baghdad would
terminate organized resistance. There was a core failure in U.S. intelligence that seemed not to realize that former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein had a follow-on strategy that he apparently learned from the Taliban.

Contrary to U.S. perception (more the media's than the
military's), the United States did not defeat the Taliban in the
winter of 2001-2002. The Taliban declined conventional combat in front of Afghanistan's cities and instead withdrew, dispersed and shifted to guerrilla operations. Hussein, realizing that he did not have the ability to defeat or even engage the United States with conventional forces, prepared a follow-on strategy. He prepared the ground in the Sunni triangle for extended guerrilla war. He hid supplies, created a command structure and detailed forces for extended resistance. Joined by foreign Islamists early in the campaign and reinforced later, this organization has managed to maintain operations against U.S. occupation forces,
increasing the tempo of operations in late October.

Intelligence failures are inevitable in war, but this failure has
created a serious dilemma for Bush's war council. The Ramadan offensive and its political consequences force the administration to craft a response. Standing pat is no longer an option. But there is a range of responses that might be made and choosing among them requires a clear intelligence estimate. At this point, no single, clear intelligence estimate is available. What is more, given the intelligence failure concerning the guerrillas, it isn't clear if the president can choose his course based on the intelligence given him.

The intelligence failure had its roots in a fundamental weakness in U.S. Iraqi intelligence that goes back to 1990s failures. Those weaknesses could not have been corrected in the past six months or so. Therefore, the president cannot regard the best estimate available as authoritative. Indeed, past record aside, the U.S. intelligence community has not clearly understood the guerrillas' command structure, their size and composition or the resources they have available. This is not to say that tactical intelligence improvements have not been made. It seems to us that piecemeal insights have been achieved concerning the operations of individual guerrilla units. But the fact is, on the broadest level, that U.S. intelligence seemingly lacks a clear, strategic sense of the enemy.

As best as we can tell, the guerrillas appear to consist of a
main body of Iraqi military trained for this mission and uniquely loyal. Its size is uncertain, but it doesn't seem to be
recruiting volunteers into the main group, although it is using
volunteers and paying others to carry out specific tasks. If the main force were recruiting, then matters would be simplified for the U.S. -- recruitment would provide opportunities for planting agents inside the guerrilla force.

The guerrillas understand this, which increases their opacity.
What augmentation they receive is coming from Islamists from outside Iraq. These Islamists cannot simply operate independently because they do not know the terrain sufficiently, but many are experienced fighters from other Islamist wars. Therefore, they seem to serve as a sort of special force, training and carrying out special operations like suicide attacks. If we assume 30 organized attacks a day, that each group can carry out one attack every three days, and that each unit contains about 20 men (based on the size of U.S. unit captures), then there would appear to be a main force of roughly 1,800 people and a few hundred foreign

President Bush is now facing the classic problem of political
leaders in war. He must make military and political decisions
about Iraq based on his estimate of the situation, yet he cannot completely rely on the best estimate of his intelligence people. In general, there are three possible views of the Iraq situation.

1. The guerrillas have increased their operations on a permanent basis and this is a steady upward curve.

2. The guerrillas have temporarily surged their operations during Ramadan and it will return to lower levels in December.

3. The guerrillas are facing disaster and have launched a
desperation attack during Ramadan in a last ditch attempt to
unbalance the United States into a foolish action.

It's difficult to believe that the guerillas can continue to
increase the operational tempo indefinitely. This would require a substantial reserve force available in the villages -- already trained and recruited -- that could dramatically increase the size of the present force. This isn't really possible unless the guerrillas are willing to accept potential intelligence penetration by the United States. A large reserve cannot be discounted, but given the presence of U.S. forces throughout the region, some intelligence would have indicated this before now, unless the community were entirely sealed shut. We assume that primarily foreign recruits would augment the guerrilla force -- not an insignificant pool but not a quantum leap either, given
infiltration constraints.

We also tend to disbelieve that the guerrillas are facing
disaster and are engaged in an Islamic Hail Mary. There haven't been enough contacts between U.S. forces and guerrillas to significantly thin their ranks, nor have there been the mass defections that one would see if a force were in the process of disintegrating. Therefore, in our view, scenario three is unlikely.

That leaves scenario two -- a temporary surge. Unless our numbers are widely off base --and that is certainly a possibility -- it is difficult for us to imagine the guerrillas maintaining this operational tempo indefinitely. The campaign began with Ramadan. It has been more intense than what went before, but the intensity indicates a force working overtime, not a surprisingly larger force. Given the politics and symbolism, the surge in operations is certainly understandable. It would also indicate the probability of an explosive culmination at the end of Ramadan. But if we were to bet, we would bet that this is a temporary surge.

But we aren't the president -- it's easy for us to make bets. He is playing the game for real, while we have the luxury of no responsibility for the decision. If he cannot rely on U.S.
intelligence, he cannot rely on us. Under those circumstances, he is obligated to assume the worst-case scenario -- scenario one. That is, the Iraqi guerrillas have permanently increased their operational tempo and may well increase it more down the road.

If we are right, then his best course is to wait until early
December, and then, while the guerrillas regroup and rest, hit
them hard with an offensive. Then, turn to the Iraqi Governance Council and dictate the terms of a transfer of power to them. If we are wrong, and the guerrillas are gaining in strength, then waiting would be disastrous. The U.S. will never be given a clear shot at a counteroffensive; the guerrilla attacks would intensify and the U.S. political situation inside of Iraq would deteriorate. Under that scenario, the longer the U.S. waits, the harder it will be to get the IGC to cut a political deal.

Under any circumstance, the United States needs an indigenous force to bear the brunt of the fighting. The IGC has little real legitimacy in Iraq as an institution and less appetite for serving the U.S. cause -- particularly if military events appear to be moving against the United States. Therefore, the IGC seems unlikely to be prepared to solve the U.S. problem, even if it could, which is dubious in the extreme.

Hence, the war council. Bush must make a decision about what to believe is going on. Having been poorly served by intelligence, particularly the optimistic briefs he was given in April and May, it will be enormously difficult for him to go with scenario two and wait things out. However, he is also unlikely to gain the cooperation he is hoping for from the IGC, unless scenario two is the case. Therefore, the war council must consider the abysmal possibility that scenario one is in play and that the IGC will not be helpful.

If true, then there are components of the IGC that might be
valuable on their own -- namely, the Shiites. The Shiites are as opposed to the Sunni guerrillas as the United States. The last thing they want is Hussein's return or a Wahabi-influenced government in Baghdad. On the other hand, they are certainly not prepared to create an Iraqi army out of the Shiite community and hand it over to U.S. command. They are seeking a Shiite-dominated Iraq -- meaning one that excludes the U.S. from long-term presence as well. On the whole, their goal is an Islamic republic generally based on the Iranian Shiite model. It is the last thing the U.S. wanted in May, but, this is November and what the U.S. wants and what it can have are very different things.

It would seem to us that there are two strategies on the table:

1. Assume that scenario two is at work, wait until December and then deal with the IGC from a position of relative strength.

2. Assume that scenario one is at work and lock in a deal with the Shiites before the situation gets any worse and the Shiite -- and Iranian -- price gets any higher.

Each scenario carries substantial risks and no intelligence
guidance available is sufficiently authoritative. The temptation
to wait and hope for the best is strong, but a miscalculation
could lead to an impossible situation in which the Shiites have
the Americans by the throat while the guerrillas are hitting
other parts of the body. Paying the Shiite price now, if
unnecessary, creates a long-term problem -- the Shiites will be charging a high price for their services.

The administration has toyed with this Shiite-Iranian alignment for months now without coming to a definitive decision, constantly hoping that things would get better. Now, the choice is only between things remaining the same or getting worse. Given the intelligence problems, we suspect that Bush needs to work from the worst-case scenario. That means he will bypass the IGC and work directly with Shiite leaders to lock in a deal quickly.

And now it becomes a question of whether the Shiites are feeling lucky.
30903  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / staying cutting edge on: November 12, 2003, 02:57:23 PM
Woof All:

  El J, nice quote from PG Edgar!

  G, although I thank you for your kind description of us as "on top", I prefer to see it simply as a matter of continuing to grow.  As we say in DBMA "If you ain't the lead sled dog, the view is all the same.  No one beats everyone.  Everyone looks at someone's ass sometimes-- so be not humble, be not proud.  Do if for yourself and not in reference to others."

That said, putting oneself on the line on a regular basis seems to be very useful to continued growth.  Dilemas -- which is written in Chinese by combining the characters for "danger" and "opportunity" I am told-- present themselves all the time and the search for answers is perennial Cool

One of the great advantages of being a student of Guro Inosanto is the vast network of superb people and systems with which he is connected-- for example my connection with Tuhon Chris and Sayoc Kali began due to his introduction.

That said, that is not necessarily enough-- it greatly helps if there is common thread.  For example the Sayoc system's understanding of what in DBMA is called "Snake Range" is very high.

Sometimes random luck and curiosity play a role.  I had briefly met GM Ramiro Estalilla of Kabaroan Eskrima in 1988 and in the late 90s attended a seminar of his that led to fruitful learning with common thread-- he too had a sense of snake range, as well as good material with large weapons which was a weak area.

Sometimes its just an itch (often provoked by Guro I.  wink ) in search of a scratch.  The awareness of the need for scientific grappling was provoked by Guro I around 1989 when he brought in Shootfighting, but it was through other channels that I found the Machado Brothers and brought the BJJ in to our fighting.  In this case I am very proud to have been able for once to return a favor to Guro Inosanto-- I am the one who introduced him to the Machados and persuaded him to start with them.

Mostly though it is a matter of always being on the lookout combined with honestly assessing oneself, one's students, and others for strengths and weaknesses.  Juan Matus spoke of hunting with intent-- something like that , , ,

Does this help?
Crafty Dog
30904  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / emptyhand vs stick on: November 12, 2003, 02:19:01 PM
Woof G:

  Tail wags for the kind words and sorry for the delay in my reply.

  DBMA has as its mission "to walk as a warrior for all one's days".  In no particular order, the main areas of the fighting portion of the system are:

1) Staff/Dos Manos
2) Double Stick
3) Single Stick (long & short is a subset thereof)
4) Knife
5) Empty hand.

Within Empty hand there are:

a) Ritual young male hierarchical fights such as MMA/NHB/Cagefighting
b) Total fights-- a.k.a. Kali  wink

a) Free Striking (i.e. unencumbered by trappling/clinching/grappling)
b) Clinch/Striking
c) Ground/Striking

II is filtered through the matrix of I.

IMHO one of the lessons of the UFC is that it is easy to fool oneself by saying "My art is too deadly for competition."  It may be true, but when it leads to lack of experience with the application of  one's skills in the altered state, then there can be a real problem.

When Top Dog and I, joined by Salty Dog, founded the Dog Brothers an important element of our motivation was to test the propositions of what we had been taught.

Similary with DBMA I look to test the proposition that the empty hand is "just like the weapons".  Although Kali is a war art and young male ritual hierarchical competition is not, I reject the notion that the difference between the two justifies the current absence of Kali from the cage.  The question "Why don't we see Kali in the Cage?"  must be answered I think-- i.e. there needs to be a subset to the system wherein in the context of martial sport the skills can be manifested.  If we can't do this, we must carefully ask ourselves why.

Within the logic of DBMA, doublestick plays an important role for several reasons-- amongst them for the bilateralism of triangular footwork we seek to develop.  With this skill set 'installed' (I like this Sayoc choice of word) the empty hand free striking game can be developed.

As a long-time student of Guro Inosanto, I have a vast repertoire of ideas from which to draw.  In DBMA the principle arts are Kali (I note that we see boxing as a subset of kali and employ the more complete fighting method of Panantukan) KK (of which Muay Thai is a subset) and Silat.

When we founded the Dog Brothers in 1988 I was still young enough to personally test and prove ideas.  Now, at 51, I am not.  What to do?

For several months now I have been working out in Rico Chiapparelli's Vale Tudo class at the RAW Gym 2-3 times a week.  This includes sparring.  Most of the members of the class are pro-fighters and often I am but the fat kid who gets picked last.  It is a quiet satisfaction of this "old man having a good time" when I can give some of these young studs a good sweat.  In turn, they do not overwhelm me with youth and superior conditioning.  

It is a blast!!!  I go out there waving my arms like two sticks (especially the first time I go with people I some get really strange looks  Shocked  ) and have a good time.  Often I go down in flames, but there are moments when certain ideas really come together.

It is in this context that I am testing and researching and developing the ideas that comprise the distinctive elements of the DBMA freestriking curriculum.  I then share them with my students and have been pleased with the results so far.  Lonely Dog manifests the material particularly well as does Jeff Brown and some others.

A similar process in involved with the ground/striking portion of the system, although the systems upon which we draw are a bit different.

Does this begin to answer your question?

Guro Crafty
30905  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / the titles of the teachers in the fillipino martial arts on: November 11, 2003, 03:18:36 PM
Woof All:

These things seem to have a certain circularity, so may I be forgiven if I repeat what I said earlier?


It seems to be a tradition in FMA to have terminology disputes with near religous fervor. To this American, it often seems analogous to an American and a Mexican over the word "negro". For one it is considered an unpleasant racial term, for the other it means "black". What an odd debate that would be!

Terminology is certainly not a forte of mine, , , , Concerning Kali, there seem to be many Filipinos of the opinion of our anonymous guest, and certainly its use is a minority one, but I am of the opinion that the term does have proper lineage. This point having been debated many, many, many times before I am uninterested to go into yet again. In that we use the term Kali, I merely note this diversity of opinion for your awareness.

, , ,

There are various reasons for the use of the term "Kali". Some are as described by the critics of the word. And some are not.

When used in the critical perjorative way against those who have other reasons, what communicates is a personally insulting tone/intent, and demands of proof can come across with a tone of "justify yourself to me" which tends to lead to "go fornicate yourself rejoinder" and Voila! -- a conversation devoid of forward purpose.

For the record, I believe the term to have historical merit. If you don't, I have no urge to persuade you.

But some of those that don't believe the term to be historically accurate, take an additional step and cast aspersions upon those who do.


The simple fact is that there is very little agreement about many, if not most things in Filipino history-- yet many seem determined to believe theirs as the one true version.

I've been around a while and I've heard countless times about Filipinos saying that the term is a fraud. Of course, the next stop in the syllogism is "How dare you, a euro-american, dare to disagree?!?"

OK, here's my teacher PG Edgar Sulite from an interview in Martial Arts presents "Filipino Martial Arts" (Graciella Casillas on cover)

ES: "In Mindanao, "kali" was the term used, but that doesn't mean it was the only one. , , , We must remember that according to the region where you live, the terms change and others apply such as 'estocada' and 'pagkalikali' and more"

Amongst the informed, the depth and breadth of PG ES's travels and trainings in the RP are well known, and many of these people may have heard of his book "Masters of Kali, Arnis and Eskrima", an amazing collection of interviews and essays on various masters of the arts from around the RP.
, , ,

So anyway, what are we to do? Have a duel?!? Oh whoops, we can't do that-- no one challenged/disrespected PG Edgar's or GM Villabrille's use of the term to their face while they were alive. Well then, how about a trial by compurgation to solve the discrepancies amongst the sundry Filipinos with opinions on this?!? That would really settle it. Oy vey.  

BTW, currently Roland Dantes writes of indigenous use of the term in the south. Go find him in Mindanao and tell him how and why he's wrong.

Like these people we think the term is historically valid, we like it and we use it. If you don't, it is perfectly OK by me and I have no need or interest in changing your mind-- but it really is beyond me how anyone, Filipino or not, can claim to speak authoritatively on matters linguistic throughout the entirety of the Philippine Archipelago-- and into Indonesia to boot!

If you want 'proof' I ain't the man to give it. Go elsewhere. But if you tell me this proves that there is no proof, , , ,


One of the ditties that I use in teaching is that "Intelligence is the amount of time it takes to forget a lesson."  By engaging in this conversation I have revealed a short memory. At first I was intrigued by QE's perspective and background, but unfortunately things have gone the way they usually seem to with all this.

I thought by saying TWICE that no personal dig was intended that the simple, sincere transparency of my question about whether being a white mormon would affect his access would be apparent, but apparently it set off quite a stream of consciousness that as best as I could tell was more related to prior experiences in QE's life than to the spirit in which the question was asked.  

Oh well.

Moving on to the next point I'd like to address: perhaps when QE says "the difference with KALI is that it is arrogantly promoted as the historic title of the ancient art of the Philippines" we get to some of the reason for his emotion on this subject.

 Like I said in my earliest posts of this thread "There are various reasons for the use of the term "Kali". Some are as described by the critics of the word".  I thought it clear enough at the time, but perhaps this needs to be rephrased so that the point better communicates-- there is no disagreement here that the word Kali is sometimes used in a way which is unsound and braggadocious.  (In that we are dealing with the mad, merry world of FMA how rare is that?)

However, this does not mean that ALL use of "Kali" is such.

There seems to be more than a little heat in certain quarters-- displayed here in the references about Maphilindo, Majadpahit, Kali, certain grandmasters who've never been the to Philippines, etc-- aimed at Guro Inosanto.  I confess puzzlement at the ire of his use of the terms Maphilindo and Majadpahit-- the very point of the terms is to not lump non-Filipino arts in with FMA!   It seems that Guro I. is damned if he does, damned if he doesn't.

There have been repeated claims of "Prove it here and now!" on this thread with regard to "Kali".  

This kind of reminds me of some FMA tournament held in Bumf*ck, Delaware a few years back that was billed as a "World Championship".  Calling it such, didn't make it such and I say this even though my students won most categories (although a year after the fact, the promoter also reversed a ruling in one of my students favor in order to make himself World Champion.)  It wasn't a world championship because the best weren't on hand.

Similarly why call on me to make the case for "Kali"?

My knowledge of these things is such that I was trying to think of the name "Yambao" but was afraid I might confuse it with the samurai movie "Yojimbo" and so said nothing LOL  

Why not seek out those qualified to speak in this regard instead of me?  

I've seen the Villabrille people defend Kali well on the ED, my teacher PG Edgar Sulite thought it sound, GT Leo Gaje thinks it sound, Roland Dantes thinks it sound (my emails in this regard were vaporized along with three months of other emails-- big bummer sad((  ) Guro I., who studied with 26 FMA GMs/Manongs from around the RP , many of them born well before 1900 (including the well-travelled Manong LaCoste) thinks it sound.  

Concerning this last point, it may be worth noting that language changes-- especially in the Philippines.  The usages to which a Manong LaCoste was exposed in his travels in the late 1800s PROBABLY are different than current ones.  How dispositive can it be then that QE has not heard the term?

Next point:

"Bored" writes


"you are right, we do fundamentally agree, that the modern usage of kali is a modern phenomena with roots more likely in the US, rather than PI. My own feeling on the matter, is like any other historic claim. It is not the burden of the doubters to prove (sic) its validity, but those bringing up the claims. In much of the same vein in which the code of kalantiaw was disproven by Scott, without historic basis kali claims lack reality."


He may well be right-- unless the recording of the historic basis is cloudy.  In which case the claims would be true, but not really provable.

In closing, a brief statement of the use of terminology in this regard of Dog Brothers Martial Arts, of which I am the founder.

We use the following terms

1) Kali: because we like it, because in America it has come to be the most common term, because IMHO there are technical matters more suitably described as such than as eskrima or arnis, because of the reminder that there was a part of the Philippines which was not really conquered by Spain, because my teacher uses the term-- take your choice.

2) Kali-silat & others: because silat is a part of the system too.  Whether its Filipino Silat or Indonesian or Malaysian or whatever we're less clear.

3) FMA based:  Because there are substantial parts of the system which are not FMA, but we consider FMA to be the heart and soul of the system.

4) A Majadpahit system with some BJJ too:  Probably pretty precise although it understates the FMA role, but also pretty useless with anyone except the tiny handful of people who know the term Majadpahit.  The purpose is to communicate, not befuddle or trigger MEGO reactions (My Eyes Glaze Over)

If you tell me there are logical inconsistencies in this, I will agree.  I just use the term that best facilitates communication with the person with whom I am talking.  I don't do/discuss/debate history.

Allow me to close with a story, the point of which I leave up to you, dear readers.

I named my second Akita "Moro".  My intention was to equate the brave warrior spirit of the muslim resistance to the Spanish and then American rule with the brave warrior spirit of the Akita.  Then I was chastized on the Eskrima Digest for using a disparaging term equivalent to sounds-like "negro"-- the complete opposite of my intention.  "How could this be?" I asked.  "What about the MILF of today?"

Now at this moment those of you out there who occasionally skim porn spam  wink  may be puzzled.  Doesn't MILF stand for "Mothers I'd Like to Fornicate?"  Well yes it does, but it also stands for "Moro Islamic Liberation Front" too and my point was "How can it be wrong for me to use the term if they do?"

I confess to never understanding the answers I was given to this question (analogous to the rap band "NWA"-- "Negroes with Attitude"Huh)and puzzled over what to do.  After all, the dog was imprinted on thinking his name was "Moro".  Upon reflection I renamed him "Morro Bay" (a famous bay here on the California coast) and call him "Morro" for short and he still comes when called.

with this, it is my sincere hope to be outta here,
Crafty Dog
30906  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Howl of Respect to our Soldiers/Veterans on: November 11, 2003, 01:05:19 PM
A Profound Howl of Respect to our Veterans and Fighting Men:

Thank you for the freedoms we enjoy.  Thank you for what you do.

Marc "Crafty Dog" Denny

Here's just one tidbit from today's WSJ:

Why You've Heard
Of Jessica Lynch,
Not Zan Hornbuckle

As Sentiment About War
Evolves, Victims Grab
Attention, Not Fighters

When American troops were attacked on April 7 on a road to Baghdad, a battle broke out at a dot on the map Army commanders called "Objective Curly." Eighty U.S. soldiers, expecting little resistance, were met by 300 well-armed Iraqi and Syrian fighters. Grenades and bullets flew for eight hours.

The U.S. counterattack killed an estimated 200 enemy fighters, according to the commanding officer who oversaw the battle. The American team had never trained or fought together, but all its men got out alive. The team was headed by Capt. Harry Alexander Hornbuckle, a 29-year-old staff officer who had never been in combat before. He was later awarded the Bronze Star, with a V for valor, for his efforts that day.

Capt. Hornbuckle's name has never appeared in a newspaper or on television. He has received no book deals, no movie offers, no trips to Disneyland. In September, when he went to see his parents in Tifton, Ga., his mother called the local Holiday Inn and asked the manager to put her son's name -- he goes by Zan -- on the hotel marquee. That has been his most public recognition so far.

He is one of several soldiers who rose to extraordinary heights on the battlefield in Iraq, received honors from the military and returned home to anonymity. Instead, the best-known soldier of the Iraq War is Jessica Lynch, who suffered broken bones and other injuries when her maintenance convoy was attacked. She was rescued from an Iraqi hospital a week later.

The rescue and initial reports -- later discredited -- that the 19-year-old had survived bullet and stab wounds and continued fighting helped make her a celebrity. Stores in her hometown of Palestine, W.Va., sold T-shirts with her name on them. Volunteers planted a new garden in front of her house. Alfred A. Knopf, the publishing house, signed her to a $1 million book deal. "Saving Jessica Lynch," a TV movie about her plight, was broadcast Sunday.

Why did she become the individual celebrated in popular culture and not one of the other men and women who distinguished themselves in combat? The answer lies on the home front as much as on the battlefield.

In World War I, Cpl. Alvin York gained fame for killing 25 Germans and capturing 132. In World War II, Second Lt. Audie Murphy was credited with 240 kills and went on to star in the movie "To Hell and Back," which told the story of his bravery.

Military culture still celebrates the soldier who racks up a high body count. But since the Vietnam War, much of the country has tended to venerate survivors more than aggressors, the injured more than those who inflict injuries.

"People didn't want to view Vietnam vets as heroes," says Army Sgt. Scott Hansen, 56, who served as a helicopter-door gunner in Vietnam and won a Bronze Star with a V for valor for his conduct last year in Afghanistan. "I think people went there to survive -- put in their time and move on."

Many modern war memorials, most notably the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington, don't include guns at all. In the 1990s, Hasbro Inc. marketed some of its G.I. Joe action figures as "Eco-Warriors" who fought the destruction of the environment. These days, when Hollywood makes a war movie, it often focuses on saving American lives -- "Saving Private Ryan," "Black Hawk Down," "Behind Enemy Lines" -- not killing others.

Changed Image

New technology is also changing the image of the individual soldier. Particularly since the end of the Cold War, much of the military's fighting has been done with missiles and guns fired at great distances. Then came the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, followed by wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, which have involved more close combat.

"There are a lot of untold stories," says Capt. Hornbuckle's commanding officer, Lt. Col. Stephen M. Twitty, who received a Silver Star for his actions that day. "We don't mind not telling them ... . We know and we're proud of what we've done."

He nominated five of his soldiers for Silver Stars and 28 for Bronze Stars with Vs for valor. Capt. Hornbuckle "took on a challenge that most people would steer away from," says Col. Twitty. "He took a chaotic situation and got it under control."

Robert H. Scales, a retired major general who just co-wrote one of the first military histories of the Iraq War, goes even further. Granted special access by the Pentagon to situation reports and dozens of senior military leaders, staff officers and combat commanders, he contends that the battle at Curly was a pivotal one, and if one soldier deserves to be singled out in the Iraq war, "I'd choose Zan Hornbuckle."

But the military today has some discomfort with the stories of individual soldiers. Asked why the Army didn't do more to publicize Capt. Hornbuckle's feats, Richard Olson, a public-affairs officer for Capt. Hornbuckle's battalion, says the thought never occurred to him. "An aspect of a soldier is that he's trained to kill," he says. "And I don't know that the public is comfortable with that."

"There's a funny shift," says John A. Lynn, who teaches military history at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. "We want to fight wars but we don't want any of our people to die and we don't really want to hurt anybody else. So Pvt. Lynch, who suffers, is a hero even if she doesn't do much. She suffered for us."

Pieces in Place

As Capt. Hornbuckle and his team prepared for battle on the evening of April 6, all the pieces were in place for their story to become as well-known as that of Pvt. Lynch. Reporters and cameramen from NBC, the Washington Post and Army magazine were told to stay with Capt. Hornbuckle's unit, under the assumption it would be in a safer location than other units.

Soldiers attack the trenches

American forces already controlled much of Iraq, including its international airport, but there were still determined Fedayeen fighters in the capital. Iraq's foreign minister continued to predict that U.S. troops would be expelled. The American commanders decided to make a bold statement.

The plan was to send tanks into the center of Baghdad, securing Saddam Hussein's palaces and other important positions. Commanders were confident they could hold the city as long as they could keep the roads clear to supply troops. The job of securing the main road from the south went to the Army's Third Battalion, 15th Infantry, commanded by Col. Twitty.

Col. Twitty says he identified three intersections on Highway 8 where Iraqi soldiers were most likely to attack the convoys. One of his men, on a scouting mission, dubbed the intersections Larry, Moe and Curly. The nicknames stuck.

But Col. Twitty had only two companies available for the three objectives. He assigned more than 600 men to Larry and Moe, the northernmost points. To defend Curly, where he thought fighting would be lightest, he created an ad hoc team of 80, a group that had never trained or fought together. He asked Capt. Hornbuckle to lead them. The new group was dubbed "Team Zan."

Predictions that Team Zan would meet light resistance did nothing to help Capt. Hornbuckle relax.

"Oh, God, now I'm in charge of this fight," he recalls thinking. "Now I'm responsible for these 80 people and responsible to Col. Twitty for accomplishing the mission."

He hadn't been looking for a fight. Like many young men, Zan Hornbuckle didn't give a lot of thought to battlefield action when he graduated from Tift County High School in Georgia and decided on a career in the Army. Neither of his parents had served in the military. His father is an industrial mechanic at a Miller Brewing Co. plant. His mother, a former music instructor, now teaches adult education. At age 8, Zan took violin lessons. In high school, he worked for a veterinarian.

"Why on earth do you want to go into the Army?" Myric Hornbuckle recalls asking her son when he graduated from high school. "He said, 'Mama, there are people like you, good people who wouldn't hurt anyone, and there are people like Saddam' -- this is 10 years ago he said this -- who'll do anything to anyone. And there have to be people who will stand up and say 'no, you're not going to do that.' "

He enrolled at the Citadel, a military college in Charleston, S.C., splitting the cost of tuition with his parents. He graduated in 1996, married his high-school sweetheart, and joined the Army's Second Battalion, 187th Infantry. Their son Alex was born last year.

Most of his training since college has focused on battle. It became clear to him early, as he went through basic training for officers and Army Ranger school, that his work could be profoundly violent. Still, he says, he had no idea what it would be like to experience combat.

It was just past sunrise as the three companies rumbled up to objectives Larry, Moe and Curly, each about a mile apart. Looking out from the hatch of his Bradley tank, Col. Twitty spotted trenches dug beside the intersections. He picked up his radio to warn his soldiers: "They know we're coming," he said, according to an Army magazine article by embedded reporter Dennis Steele.

Capt. Hornbuckle bandages the leg of Sgt. Maj. Robert Gallagher

But when Capt. Hornbuckle first poked his head from the hatch of his Bradley and surveyed the intersection at Curly, it looked safe. "It was like driving into Atlanta," he says. "It looked like any big city."

There were two- and three-story apartment buildings, a huge factory with a peaked roof, a hotel and an office building. In the center of it all was a cloverleaf intersection, with ramps running up and down from Highway 8.

He ordered his team to encircle the cloverleaf to repel an assault from any direction. There were 22 vehicles in all -- five Bradleys, four armored Humvees, four mortar-firing vehicles and three ambulances. "Wow, that was easy," Capt. Hornbuckle recalls thinking during the first 30 seconds of silence.

Then came chaos: bullets pinging off trucks, grenades kicking up clouds of dirt and concrete, and, he says, noise louder than anything he imagined possible. The Fedayeen were firing rocket-propelled grenades from nearby buildings and driving pickup trucks with machine guns mounted at the back.

At Close Range

The biggest threat came from just beyond the circle of U.S. troops: The enemy soldiers had dug trenches under the highway overpass. The men in the trenches seemed invisible, and they were shooting at close range, Capt. Hornbuckle says. "It was like we kicked over an anthill."

Air support was out of the question. Any attempt to bomb the enemy from the sky would kill American soldiers, too. There would be no help from the forces at Larry and Moe, because they too were under heavy attack. This battle would be fought on the ground, the old-fashioned way, with guns, grenades and mortars.

For most of the morning, Capt. Hornbuckle says he remained atop his Bradley, firing a machine gun with one hand and holding his radio with the other. He was telling the gunner on his Bradley where to aim, coordinating fire among the rest of his team, and reporting to Col. Twitty, who was about a mile to the north.

Col. Twitty says he could tell from the sound of the gunfire coming across his radio, and the tone of Capt. Hornbuckle's voice, that Curly was under heavy attack.

"Can you hold?" Col. Twitty recalls shouting.

"Sir, I think I've got it," the captain shouted back.

But Capt. Hornbuckle was worried. If the enemy coordinated its attack, they would have a chance. By mid-morning, the air was white with smoke. The intersection, he says, smelled of gunpowder and engine fuel. It was 75 degrees. The U.S. soldiers, dressed in Kevlar vests and desert tan camouflage, were drenched with sweat.

"We might shoot on black today," Capt. Hornbuckle recalls one member of his team telling him, meaning that they might run out of ammunition.

Capt. Hornbuckle in battle

Capt. Hornbuckle's outfit wasn't built for heavy combat. Yet now he had a platoon firing mortar tubes in one direction and machine guns in another. Medics were firing rifles when they weren't applying bandages and intravenous drips to wounded soldiers. Even the chaplain was taking aim at enemy positions.

"Keep doing what you're doing," Capt. Hornbuckle recalls telling the men. "You're doing good. We knew we were gonna fight today."

Bullets kicked up dust at his feet as he ran between platoons. During one dash, he says an Iraqi soldier emerged from a trench, lifted his rifle and took aim. "He drew a bead on me and I drew a bead on him and dropped him," Capt. Hornbuckle says. "He was not going to stop me from going home."

A few hours into the battle, Col. Twitty called again to find out how Team Zan was doing. Both men recall the conversation this way: "It's getting serious," Capt. Hornbuckle told the colonel, "but they're not going to kick us off here."

The colonel later made a call to Sgt. Major Robert Gallagher, a 20-year veteran who had been wounded that morning when a shell fragment lodged in his left calf. He had propped himself against a Bradley to take the weight off the leg and continued shooting while Capt. Hornbuckle bandaged his leg.

Col. Twitty says the injured sergeant major told him: "Boss, we need reinforcements and we need them now." Sgt. Major Gallagher didn't return calls seeking comment.

The colonel ordered another company to bring every combat vehicle and all the supplies it could to Objective Curly. Two U.S. soldiers in that convoy were killed -- shot by Fedayeen soldiers. But the convoy got through, "like the cavalry come to save the day," says Capt. Hornbuckle, who immediately relinquished command to its leader, Capt. Ronny Johnson.

The Fedayeen made one more push and succeeded in blowing up five of the 20 newly arrived supply vehicles. Capt. Hornbuckle says he spotted a U.S. soldier firing on a trench filled with about six enemy fighters. The soldier was alone. Capt. Hornbuckle pulled the man away as he fired his rifle into the trenches. Capt. Hornbuckle never learned the soldier's name, but he believes the man would have been killed.

It occurred to him only later, when he replayed the incident in his mind, that he had shot another enemy fighter at close range. "At least I think I shot him," he says. "He didn't pop up anymore."

Capt. Chris Harris, who was at Curly, confirms Capt. Hornbuckle's account of the battle. Even though it was an ad hoc team, he says, everyone knew what to do when the situation grew tense. With no time to wait for detailed orders, soldiers relied on their training and instincts. "People knew what they were doing and didn't stop to ask, 'Is this OK?,' " he says.

Sgt. First Class Vincent Phillips, who led a small platoon of men into the trenches that day at Curly, says he saw a lot of heroes emerge. "We could have lost everything," he says. "There could have been all kinds of confusion about what was going on. But it just came together." He gives Capt. Hornbuckle much of the credit for coordinating the attack.

After an eight-hour fight, Curly was secured. Larry and Moe followed.

TV Images

Back home, two videotaped images became widely associated with the war: the rescue of Pvt. Lynch and the toppling of a Saddam Hussein statue in Baghdad. These pictures offered the clearest of messages: U.S. soldiers were safe; the war was over; democracy had triumphed.

Objective Curly wasn't ignored. The Washington Post ran a story inside its first section two weeks after the battle. Craig White, the NBC cameraman embedded with the soldiers at Curly, beamed footage back to New York, and the story appeared on several major network broadcasts.

Vicki Hornbuckle saw some of the fight on television -- "The Battle Under the Bridge," some stations dubbed it -- but had no idea her husband had been involved. All the soldiers looked the same. Mrs. Hornbuckle says it was probably just as well that she didn't recognize her husband because she only would have worried.

The public-affairs office at Fort Stewart brags about its heroes from wars past. Members of the Third Division have won 49 Medals of Honor, far more than any other division, spokesmen for the division say. Audie Murphy of the 15th Infantry, which is now based at Fort Stewart, is the most decorated soldier in U.S. military history, they point out.

The Army presented awards to Capt. Hornbuckle and other soldiers from his team in an impromptu ceremony in the Iraqi town of Falluja. The military didn't issue a news release about the event. Even Capt. Hornbuckle's hometown newspaper, the Tifton Gazette, circulation 9,000, failed to note that a local soldier had been honored. "I'm embarrassed to say I've never heard of the guy," says Managing Editor Chris Beckham. The Gazette did put on the front page a story about a local soldier who suffered a leg wound. That tip came from the soldier's parents.

The biggest war hero in Tifton remains Harold B. "Pinky" Durham, who was awarded a Medal of Honor after he was killed in combat in Vietnam. There's a stretch of highway in town named after him.

Paul Johnson, Tifton's mayor, says he had never heard of Capt. Hornbuckle either. "I wonder what we need to do to get the good word down here?" he asked. City manager Charlie Howell pledged to look into the oversight.

Reluctant Hero

Capt. Hornbuckle accepts some responsibility for his anonymity. Medal recipients are encouraged to provide personal information to the public-affairs office at Fort Stewart for press releases. He neglected to do so. When contacted for this article, he was initially reluctant to be interviewed. If he knew the battle in which he fought would receive attention, he says, he would have suggested naming the objectives after something more dramatic than the Three Stooges.

After the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, senior White House adviser Karl Rove went to Los Angeles to encourage film executives to "show the heroism of American armed forces." But movies that followed hardly treated U.S. soldiers as conquerors. In "Black Hawk Down," the mission in Somalia that left 18 U.S. soldiers and more than 1,000 Somalis dead was portrayed as a noble failure. "Behind Enemy Lines" had a good deal in common with "The Jessica Lynch Story"; it told the story of a U.S. pilot who escaped capture after he was shot down over Bosnia in 1995.

"I think it's tougher with modern warfare" to make movies, says director John Lee Hancock, now working on a movie for Disney about the battle at the Alamo. "Older wars were easier because they were more personal. It used to be you didn't fire until you saw the whites of their eyes. Now the only light is an infrared target."

Capt. Hornbuckle returned home in late August to a quiet welcome. His parents, his wife and his 18-month-old son met him at Fort Stewart. A few weeks later, his parents hosted a small party for him in Tifton. Several old high-school friends called to welcome him back.

And that was about the end of it.

"I'm not disappointed," he says. "In your heart of hearts, you know what you did or didn't do. Was it heroic? Yes, it was. But you see so many heroes and you're around them every day ... it keeps you from getting an expanded image of yourself."

Now Capt. Hornbuckle is training a new company at Fort Stewart. And he is readjusting to life at home, where his wife had been taking care of all the household chores he'd once been assigned.

"I've got trash detail now," he says.

Write to Jonathan Eig at

Updated November 11, 2003 7:52 a.m.
30907  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Wolves & Dogs on: November 10, 2003, 03:01:50 PM
False K-9 Records Land Marines in the Doghouse

Six are court-martialed and 11 receive other punishment for lying about the dogs' training.
By Tony Perry, Times Staff Writer

CAMP PENDLETON ? Scandal has taken a bite out of one of the Marine Corps' most celebrated units: the K-9 corps.

Six enlisted Marines here have been court-martialed for faking records involving the training of dogs assigned to security duty. Eleven other Marines have been punished.
The most senior of the Marines to stand trial, a staff sergeant, was sentenced Friday to six months in the brig and a bad-conduct discharge. The staff sergeant was also charged with keeping his personal dogs at the base kennel and smoking marijuana off-base. Another sergeant already had been booted out of the Corps in the case.

The Marines insisted that they faked the records because they were assigned too many other duties, such as putting on demonstrations at local schools, to complete the training of their dogs. The problems surfaced when a review last year found discrepancies in the dogs' files.

"These are very serious things," base spokesman Lt. Dan Rawson said. "This speaks directly to the security of the installation and the safety of the Marines here."

The dogs have been shipped back to Lackland Air Force Base in Texas, where the Department of Defense runs a dog boot-camp. The Marines have all been reassigned. Many were demoted and given extra duty.

New dogs ? German shepherd and Belgian Malinois ? were brought from other bases to act as guard dogs, bomb- and drug-sniffers, and to make perimeter patrols.

The number of dogs working at the sprawling base is classified.

Rawson said new procedures have been adopted to ensure that the dogs are getting continuous training to keep their skills sharp. At no time was security on the base compromised, he said.

Dogs and dog-training are a high priority in the Marines. While all military services employ dogs, none has taken canines to heart as vigorously as the Corps.

Outside the kennel here is a memorial to two longtime Marine Corps "working dogs." At the Navy base in Guam is a granite monument to 25 Marine dogs killed in the World War II battle for that island. Atop the monument is a bronze statue of Kurt, a Doberman credited with saving the lives of 250 Marines when he sniffed out an ambush.

Marines refer to each other as "Devil dogs," a holdover from World War I when German soldiers spoke admiringly of the Marines at the battle of Belleau Wood as having fought as tenaciously as "hounds of hell."

The English bulldog is the official symbol of the Marine Corps, and three bulldogs, including one at the Marine Corps Recruit Depot in San Diego, have official status, including identification cards, service numbers and uniforms.

When Marines from the Camp Pendleton-based 1st Marine Expeditionary Force deployed to Iraq, dogs were part of the force assigned to topple the regime in Baghdad.

"Dogs have a long tradition of service," Rawson said. "Those noses are very good. They have lots of capabilities that human beings don't."
30908  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / WW3 on: November 10, 2003, 01:25:03 PM
Geopolitical Diary: Monday, Nov. 10, 2003

Al Qaeda operatives continued to expand the offensive that began in Iraq at the start of Ramadan. This time, the target was in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. At the hour of this writing on Nov. 9, 11 people have been reported killed and 122 wounded in an attack on the Muhaya compound -- primarily housing non-Saudi Arabs. Reportedly, the attackers infiltrated the compound driving a police vehicle and dressed in Saudi security uniforms.

It's particularly interesting that a compound housing Americans or Europeans wasn't targeted. There are two possible explanations for this. First, security for such obvious targets has become so tight that mounting a successful operation has become too risky. Second, al Qaeda now regards itself in an all-out war with the Saudi government and is signaling other Arab nationals that continued collaboration with the Saudis is dangerous and should be terminated.

Both explanations are probably true, but on balance, we regard the second explanation as the most likely and significant. The Saudi government has begun aggressively attacking al Qaeda in the kingdom, thereby increasing collaboration with the United States. It has done so partly because it recognizes -- understanding the region well -- that current processes in Iraq likely will bring a Shiite government to power there. If Saudi Arabia opposes the United States, the royal family will face some very stiff historical winds. Resisting the rising Shiite tide and confronting the United States would not be easily survived. Accommodating the United States holds open the probability that the United States will limit Iranian expansionism. That isn't certain, but the Saudis know that if they don't make a serious down payment right now, they might not have an opportunity later. Hence, they have become substantially more aggressive toward al Qaeda.

This has set in motion two processes. First, there is a split within the
kingdom regarding the policy -- one that certainly cuts deep into the royal
family. Second, al Qaeda believes the Saudi royals have been hypocritical in their leadership -- saying the right things, but acting very differently. Now they can argue that the royals' true nature has been flushed out.

This means al Qaeda has a hard core of support in the kingdom, now that the opportunistic support of some of the royals has been forced to the other side. Al Qaeda needs to demonstrate that it can hit Saudi Arabia hard and as it chooses. It also must demonstrate to the rest of the Arab world that continued collaboration with the United States and Saudi Arabia itself will carry a heavy price.

The U.S. solution in Iraq and the complex relationship with the Shiites and
the Iranian government pose serious problems for al Qaeda in Iraq; but they also open opportunities for al Qaeda in the rest of the non-Shiite world. Al Qaeda can now argue that the issue is not solely the United States, nor the Christian-Hindu-Jewish alliance. Rather, the most fundamental threat is the internal enemy -- the Shias. Al Qaeda can exploit this very effectively, particularly in the Sunni Arab world -- where they delivered an important message Nov. 9.

It is interesting to note that this was the same day the Israeli Cabinet
authorized a prisoner exchange with Hezbollah. Too much should not be made of this. There are many obstacles to consummation and this, by itself, doesn't mean much. Nevertheless, Hezbollah is a creature of the Iranians and one of the outstanding questions has been the relationship between Iran and Israel under the new U.S.-Iran system of quiet collaboration. The pivot of that question is, of course, Hezbollah. Therefore, the evolution of the prisoner exchange program between Israel and Hezbollah is of great interest as part of the next steps.
30909  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / the titles of the teachers in the fillipino martial arts on: November 06, 2003, 06:50:35 PM

I will have more to say later but for now found this, from a well-travelled Filipino teacher, in my files.


Crafty Dog

A. Kali is authenticated as follows:

Kali is found in the language of the filipino
alphabets. In the first four Alibata or Babayin the
original filipino language: A ba (ka )da. Open the
yahoo search for Alibata and you see the explanation.

Meaning the filipino language is full of meaning and
the two letters as spelled KA =a prefix for verbs in
filipino words: As Ka-lipay or happiness, Ka-lisod for
sadness, Ka-libutan for the world, Ka-limutan to
forget, ka-lirungan meaning, knowldege and etc.

KA-IS WORD FOR RESPECT for Sir, your highness,your
excellency,your honor.

All persons in the early days were addressed as
Ka-pedro or Ka Jose or Ka Juan. As Ka-Marc. Ka Dan or
Ka leo.The word KA is a word to address the head of
the Iglesia ni Kristo , a religious group in the
Philippines with more than 5 million members. The head
of the Church is KA FERDIE MANALO.

The rebel group in the Philippines( NPA) they address
their leaders as KA like Ka Roger. This word Ka must
be express with sincerity and greast respect.

Ka- is found in the flag of the first katipunan group
who revolted against Spain. The Ka-tipuneros or the
revolutionarios against the Spaniards in 1800 use the
sign K in their hats and all the flags displayed
during the assaults.

Kali was more of a Philosophy of the early filipinos.
This philosophy was a major drive in the filipinos
bravery  using the bolos charging  against the
Spaniards guns and spanish blades that demoralizes
every assualts surprised the Spanish officers and the
whole Spanish regime in the Philippines. Spain lost
the revolution selling the filipinos at $ 3.00 dollars
per head in the treaty of Paris in 1889.

Kali found its landmark in Panay Island where the
first constitution of the land was established by Datu
Kalantiaw: The Code of Kalantiaw and the Code of
Maragtas.The influence of kali as a Philosophy were
found among the natives of Panay and the arrival of
Ten Datus from Borneo established the gathering of the
early inhabitants at KALIBO now the captial of Aklan
province where the famous Boracay White Beach Resort
is found, an international well known beach resort
found in Panay.Another remarkable place as a landmark
of Kali is the town of KALINOG- where every year the
celebration of the festival called PINTADOS is held to
celebrate the famous battle in Kalinog-meaning
earthquake where the filipinos rebels painted their
faces as disguised to infiltrate the Spanish garrison.
In northern Luzon province of Kalinga Apayao , a place
where the Kalimen settled in the north and today the
natives practice Kali in form of PIKA_PIKA.

To check the working Philosophy of Kali, known as
distinct bravery, during the Marocs time, the Army
soldiers that fought in Mindanao against the Muslim
rebellion were all the Ilongos soldiers from Panay and
Negros, other tribes like the Ilocanos and Tagalogs
were moved out to Manila. The only group of tribes in
the Philippines that the Muslim in MIndanao resepcts
is the Ilongo. Even in the Marines now, only the
Ilongo marines can infiltrate Muslim rebels.

KALI as a art is accepted by the Armed forces of the
Philippines recognized by the President of the
Philippines, Former President Ramos, Secretary of
National Defense and the Present President ( open ) check the blackboard.

Every year the town of Salvador Benedicto in Negros
celebrates the kali-kalihan festival.

 Kali is blade oriented fighting discipline. No
disarming, no blocking, no kata no judo throws no
aikido or jujitsui nor kicks is applied during the
30910  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / An Army of 1 --and 1 in the oven on: November 06, 2003, 06:31:21 PM
Jessica Lynch: I was raped
POW shares brutal details of experience in biography

Posted: November 6, 2003
4:19 p.m. Eastern

By Diana Lynne
? 2003

Advance press of former POW Jessica Lynch's biography includes the shocking revelation the 19-year-old Army supply clerk was raped and sodomized by her Iraqi captors.

In "I Am a Soldier, Too," the authorized biography written by best-selling author Rick Bragg, Lynch offers for the first time brutal details of her treatment as a prisoner of war following the ambush of her 507th Maintenance Company convoy in Nasiriyah on March 23 and before the heroic Special Ops rescue operation that swept her out of harm's way in the middle of the night a week later.

Jessica Lynch

"Jessi lost three hours," Bragg wrote, according to the New York Daily News, who obtained a copy of the book. "She lost them in the snapping bones, in the crash of the Humvee, in the torment her enemies inflicted on her after she was pulled from it."

According to Bragg, Lynch's medical records indicate she was anally raped.

"The records do not tell whether her captors assaulted her almost lifeless, broken body after she was lifted from the wreckage, or if they assaulted her and then broke her bones into splinters until she was almost dead," the Daily News quotes from the book.

Lynch and her parents also shared the grim details of her ordeal in an interview with ABC News' Diane Sawyer, which will air on a special edition of "Primetime" Tuesday. The parents say they rejected any notion of being selective about revealing the details because they want the book to accurately reflect what happened.

WorldNetDaily reported Lynch's father, Greg Lynch alluded to a gag order apparently placed on the family during a press conference outside their Palestine, W.Va., home.

"We're really not supposed to talk about that subject. It's still under investigation," he said when asked what Jessica had relayed to them about her POW experience.

Lynch's 207-page book, published by Knopf, is scheduled to be released Tuesday, which is Veteran's Day.

Pulitzer Prize winning Bragg has written several books, including the memoir "All Over but the Shoutin'." He resigned from the New York Times in May following his suspension over a story that carried his byline but was reported largely by a freelance writer.

News of the assault disturbs military advocate Elaine Donnelly, who has pressed the Pentagon for such details to no avail.

"I'm kind of surprised that the news of rape is coming out so late. We should have learned about this sooner," Donnelly told WorldNetDaily, adding she suspected Lynch was brutalized after hearing reports that her dogtags were found on the nightstand of one of Saddam Hussein's Fedayeen fighters.

"I'm so sorry about what happened to Jessica Lynch and my heart goes out to her. I don't like to be right on these things, but I feared this happened," Donnelly said.

Donnelly, who heads the Center for Military Readiness, an independent public-policy organization that specializes in military personnel issues, and is a member of WND's Speakers Bureau, blames Lynch's tragic experience on what she calls "social engineering" policies instituted in the military over the last decade by "Pentagon feminists" seeking to advance the careers of servicewomen at the cost, she says, of military morale, efficiency and readiness.

Donnelly has called on Commander in Chief Bush to give direction to the Pentagon to roll back Clinton-era policies such as females serving in combat roles, gender quotas, co-ed basic training, the deployment of single mothers and pregnant servicewomen and "overly generous pregnancy policies that subsidize and therefore increase single parenthood."

Donnelly's CMR launched a petition drive to gather electronic signatures of like-minded supporters. More than 15,000 people have signed so far. Donnelly hopes to present the petition in a personal meeting with President Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. No meeting is yet scheduled.

Meanwhile, Army spokesperson Martha Rudd scoffs at the idea the American public should have been told about the rape.

"It's her business. If you were raped, would you want us to put out a press release?" asked Rudd, after noting Lynch was "free to talk about her experience."

"We're very careful here about protecting soldiers who have been injured," Rudd continued, explaining officials only release information if the injured soldier has given consent. Rudd could not say whether Lynch had specifically declined consent to the release of the rape details by military officials or whether she had consented to the release of other information about her medical condition that surfaced shortly after her rescue.

WorldNetDaily has reported the Washington Post, citing an unnamed Pentagon official, erroneously reported Lynch "sustained multiple gunshot wounds" and also was stabbed while she "fought fiercely and shot several enemy soldiers ... firing her weapon until she ran out of ammunition." The paper quoted this official as describing her "fighting to the death."

Nearly two weeks after its initial report, the Post essentially retracted this story, this time quoting a physician at the Iraqi hospital in Nasiriyah as saying Lynch had sustained a head injury and arm and leg fractures, but "there were no bullets or shrapnel or anything like that."

In her book, Lynch sets the record straight, saying she never fired a shot because her M-16 jammed.

"I didn't kill nobody," she said.

At the time of the false report, Donnelly suspected military officials were spinning the Jessica Lynch story to head off criticism for placing Lynch in a combat-support position in which she became a POW.

Donnelly argues that once Lynch was captured, she became a public figure plastered all over television sets around the world. She maintains that the issue of whether war crimes have been committed carries policy implications.

"If the Pentagon puts a happy face on the situation and describes her injuries as only being broken bones, they're not being honest with the American public and with women recruits."

Col. Denise Dailey, spokesperson for DACOWITS, the advisory committee on women in the military for the Department of Defense, was not available for comment on Lynch's revelation and associated policy implications.

This is not the first time the assault of a female POW in the Iraqi theater of war was kept under wraps. Flight surgeon Rhonda Cornum was sexually assaulted after being taken prisoner in the Persian Gulf War, but didn't admit it until a year later, despite giving repeated interviews and testifying before a congressional panel. During the time of her silence, the role of women in combat was being debated. By the time she confessed the depths of her torture, the Department of Defense had eliminated the "Risk Rule," which held that women could not be placed in combat-support units that had "significant risk of capture."

Rhonda Cornum (Courtesy: Stars and Stripes)

For Cornum's part, she accepts the added element of risk facing women in combat as "just another bad thing that can happen to you."

In an interview with the women's news network, WeNews, Cornum downplays her rape.

"While I was subjected to an unpleasant episode of sexual abuse during my captivity," she said, "it did not represent a threat to life, limb or chance of being released, and therefore occupied a much lower level of concern than it might have under other circumstances."

Cornum offers pre-deployment advice for female soldiers, recommending birth-control methods such as the IUD or implants and suggests they be commenced before deployment "to avoid problems for monogamous women whose spouses might not understand the risk issue."

Donnelly and other military advocates question the nonchalance afforded to the sexual assault of female soldiers.

"This is an opportunity to search our souls as a nation and determine whether we want this to continue," she said.

Related articles:

Israeli women won't see combat

Just say 'no' to pregnant soldiers?

Real Jessica story coming out?
30911  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Current Events: Philippines on: November 05, 2003, 08:51:20 PM

A new political crisis is simmering in the Philippines. The
nation's judicial and legislative branches are embroiled in a
battle that is dragging President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo's
government down. Not only will the latest turmoil hurt the
president's chances for re-election in 2004, it also will
undermine efforts to negotiate a peace settlement in Mindanao --
a situation that could hurt the U.S. strategic position in
Southeast Asia.


A constitutional crisis is brewing in the Philippines over
efforts by lawmakers to impeach the country's chief justice. The
standoff between the judiciary and the legislature has divided
the government and the population, prompting heated political
infighting and public demonstrations.

President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo has put the armed forces on red
alert to guard against another military rebellion or attacks by
militants seeking to exploit Manila's instability. This new
political crisis bodes ill for the president, who runs for re-
election in May 2004. It also could undermine efforts to
negotiate a peace settlement in Mindanao, hurting the U.S.
strategic standing in Southeast Asia.

Nearly one-third of the members of the Philippine House of
Representatives -- 78 in total -- signed a motion Oct. 23 to
impeach Chief Justice Hilario Davide Jr. for allegedly
mismanaging public funds. Davide rejected the allegations and
refused to allow a congressional review of the judiciary's books,
claiming the legislature has no authority to impose control over
the judiciary branch. The Supreme Court issued a writ against the
impeachment during the week of Oct. 20.

The complaint is the second impeachment attempt against Davide by
lawmakers in 2003, and likely is politically motivated. Former
President Joseph Estrada and his supporters launched the first
impeachment case, which alleged that Davide and other justices
violated the constitution when they swore in then-Vice President
Arroyo after a military-backed popular coup in January 2001. The
House of Representatives committee threw out the charges after
the majority of its members voted that they did not have
sufficient evidence.

Congressional leaders abruptly adjourned the house for two weeks
on Oct. 28 in an effort to block the impeachment proceedings,
giving the government an opportunity to resolve the crisis. The
House of Representatives resumes its session Nov. 10 and will
decide either to withdraw the complaint or transfer the motion to
the Senate, where Davide would face a trial and potentially be
removed from office.

The impeachment case cuts across many political lines in the
Philippines and is discrediting Arroyo's administration ahead of
an election year. Most of the lawmakers backing the impeachment
effort are in or allied with the nationalist People's Coalition
Party (NPC) and its leader Eduardo Cojuangco -- a potential 2004
presidential candidate and business tycoon who has a number of
cases before Davide's court. In addition, allies of Estrada --
who was the subject of an impeachment trial Davide presided over
-- are rallying popular support in favor of the impeachment.

Davide, however, has the backing of the Roman Catholic Church --
including influential former Manila Archbishop Cardinal Jaime Sin
-- and former President Corazon Aquino.

Because of her own political considerations, Arroyo initially
tried to remain above the fray between the two warring branches
of the government. Her Lakas Party is aligned with the NPC, and
the president probably hoped the issue would be settled before
she had to take a side in the dispute.

Arroyo has asked Davide and House Speaker Jose de Venecia to sign
a covenant with her that they will break the impasse caused by
the impeachment complaint. Both Davide and de Venecia reportedly
have agreed to the executive offer. The covenant seeks a
"principled solution" to end the standoff: It would reiterate
judiciary's authority to interpret the constitution and emphasize
the need for checks and balances among the equal branches of
government. It is unclear whether the covenant will require
Davide to open the judiciary's books -- if not, the covenant is
unlikely to sway the chief justice's opponents.

During the political wrangling among Philippine government
leaders, the nation's security environment has fallen into
serious doubt. Still wary after the July 29 uprising, Arroyo on
Oct. 31 ordered division commanders of the armed forces to
account for all of their men to guard against those who would use
the political crisis as an excuse to launch another military
rebellion. On Nov. 4, Philippine troops were placed on red alert
-- the nation's highest alert level -- and more than 400 riot
police have been put on standby to guard against violent

Even if the constitutional crisis ends relatively peacefully in
the coming days or weeks, the damage to Arroyo's presidency has
been done. Arroyo emerged triumphant after the aborted military
coup last summer, but her popularity is eroding as the year drags
painfully on. Sen. Panfilo Lacson, also a presidential candidate,
smeared Arroyo's image in recent months with allegations that she
was laundering millions of dollars in campaign funds through
secret bank accounts held by her husband. In the wake of Lacson's
allegations, the president's overall approval rating dropped 10
points to 41 percent. Continued political instability, especially
if sustained, likely will keep Arroyo's standing in the polls

A recent survey by independent Philippine pollster Ibon revealed
that the president has dropped to fourth place among next year's
candidates: Only 7.8 percent of 1,300 respondents support her. It
is a long way to the May 2004 elections, but things do not look
good for the president.

Arroyo's increasingly untenable situation also raises questions
about Philippine security and U.S. strategic concerns. Manila is
preparing to renew peace talks with the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF) to end the long rebellion on the southern island of
Mindanao. Fearing Arroyo might not be able to make good on her
pledges during negotiations, MILF leaders might prefer to wait
for a new government to come to power in Manila.

Since Sept. 11, 2001, peace in Mindanao has been a concern not
only for the Philippines and its neighbors, but also for the
United States. As the so-called "second front" in the war on
terrorism, Southeast Asia is pivotal in U.S. strategy, and
Mindanao is an important operational theater. Suffering from
decades of conflict, Mindanao has become a breeding ground and
haven for militants. The United States has sent troops, hardware
and money to the Philippines in an effort to mitigate the danger
on the island. Any progress in securing peace and security in
Mindanao probably will be hampered if Arroyo is perceived as a
lame duck and the rebels become intransigent.
30912  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / the titles of the teachers in the fillipino martial arts on: November 05, 2003, 04:49:25 AM
Thank you for the interesting posts QE.

A couple of questions and/or observations:

1) Like I've said, there's more than one reason for the use of the term and more than one theory as to its origin.  Sun Helmet has his reasons and that they do not include a historical basis, does not mean that there is not one.

2)  Allow me to repeat and underline what I have said from the beginning of this thread: I am not the man to make the historical case and that I have not done so proves nothing.  I have not sought to do so.  I have only directed you to other sources and challenged the assertion made here that the case against kali had been closed.  It has not.

3) I am not "exoticizing" diddly.  I've given sources, which I regard as worthy for those of you who want to follow up on it.  

4)  Concerning your analysis of the Villabrille use of the term, you mention the Illustrisimo clan.  Are you familiar with the portion of Tatang's Ilustrisimo's life spent with the Muslims and its importance to his art?

4)  Can you explain for us the repeated appearance of "kali"  in various FMA names from various dialects?  I understand your point that the term may have been imported and your theory that it may all have been brought back from 1970s California and diffused to the boondocks of the Philippines.   I confess this seems to me to be a bit of a stretch.  Are all of these terms of less than 30 years use?  Is there anyone out there who can comment upon all these terms?

5)  Any theories as to why Edgar Sulite (of whom I was a private student during all of his years in the US btw) saw the term as historically valid?  I assure you, he wasn't 'exoticizing' it.  

6)  Any theories as to why Roland Dantes, who has/does live in the south states that the term is indigenous?  Or is he exoticizing it too?

7) GT Leo Gaje of Pekiti Tirsia Kali uses the term.  Don't tell me he used to use the term "Arnis"-- I know that-- but feel free to contact him and ask him why he now uses 'Kali' and what he believes to be the historical basis of the term.  

Cool No dig here QE, but the question must be asked: what sense do you have that being a white mormon may have affected your exposure to indigenous arts in Mindanao?  How much exposure did you have?  Again, no personal dig.

For those of you looking for "proof", my sense of it is that there is much in the history of the Philippines that cannot be "proved".  We know of sophisiticated ancient Filipino alphabets, yet have virtually no record of them or what they were used to write.  We know that the Spaniards sought to destroy much in this regard.  We know who wrote most of the history we do have and gave them the name of their art.  

This leaves oral tradition-- and the Filipino tradition of arguing about language and terminology.   Smiley

Crafty Dog
30913  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / WW3 on: November 04, 2003, 12:27:24 PM
On Hating the Jews
by Natan Sharansky

November 2003

NO HATRED has as rich and as lethal a history as anti-Semitism?"the longest hatred," as the historian Robert Wistrich has dubbed it. Over the millennia, anti-Semitism has infected a multitude of peoples, religions, and civilizations, in the process inflicting a host of terrors on its Jewish victims. But while there is no disputing the impressive reach of the phenomenon, there is surprisingly little agreement about its cause or causes.

Indeed, finding a single cause would seem too daunting a task?the incidence of anti-Semitism is too frequent, the time span too broad, the locales too numerous, the circumstances too varied. No doubt that is why some scholars have come to regard every outbreak as essentially unique, denying that a straight line can be drawn from the anti-Semitism of the ancient world to that of today. Whether it is the attack on the Jews of Alexandria in 38 c.e. or the ones that took place 200 years earlier in ancient Jerusalem, whether it is the Dreyfus affair in 1890?s France or Kristallnacht in late-1930?s Germany?each incident is seen as the outcome of a distinctive mix of political, social, economic, cultural, and religious forces that preclude the possibility of a deeper or recurring cause.

A less extreme version of this same approach identifies certain patterns of anti-Semitism, but only within individual and discrete "eras." In particular, a distinction is drawn between the religiously based hatred of the Middle Ages and the racially based hatred of the modern era. Responsibility for the anti-Semitic waves that engulfed Europe from the age of Constantine to the dawn of the Enlightenment is laid largely at the foot of the Church and its offshoots, while the convulsions that erupted over the course of the next three centuries are viewed as the byproduct of the rise of virulent nationalism.

Obviously, separating out incidents or eras has its advantages, enabling researchers to focus more intensively on specific circumstances and to examine individual outbreaks from start to finish. But what such analyses may gain in local explanatory power they sacrifice in comprehensiveness. Besides, if every incident or era of anti-Semitism is largely distinct from every other, how to explain the cumulative ferocity of the phenomenon?

As if in response to this question, some scholars have attempted to offer more sweeping, trans-historical explanations. Perhaps the two best known are the "scapegoat" theory, according to which tensions within society are regulated and released by blaming a weaker group, often the Jews, for whatever is troubling the majority, and the "demonization" theory, according to which Jews have been cast into the role of the "other" by the seemingly perennial need to reject those who are ethnically, religiously, or racially different.

Clearly, in this sociological approach, anti-Semitism emerges as a Jewish phenomenon in name only. Rather, it is but one variant in a family of hatreds that include racism and xenophobia. Thus, the specifically anti-Jewish violence in Russia at the turn of the 20th century has as much in common with the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia at the turn of the 21st as it does with the massacres of Jews in the Ukraine in the mid-1600?s. Taken to its logical conclusion, this theory would redefine the Holocaust?at the hands of some scholars, it has redefined the Holocaust?as humanity?s most destructive act of racism rather than as the most murderous campaign ever directed against the Jews.

Reacting to such universalizing tendencies a half-century ago, Hannah Arendt cited a piece of dialogue from "a joke which was told after the first World War":

An anti-Semite claimed that the Jews had caused the war; the reply was: Yes, the Jews and the bicyclists. Why the bicyclists? asks the one. Why the Jews? asks the other.

George Orwell offered a similar observation in 1944: "However true the scapegoat theory may be in general terms, it does not explain why the Jews rather than some other minority group are picked on, nor does it make clear what they are the scapegoat for."

WHATEVER THE shortcomings of these approaches may be, I have to admit that my own track record as a theorist is no better.

Three decades ago, as a young dissident in the Soviet Union, I compiled underground reports on anti-Semitism for foreign journalists and Western diplomats. At the time, I firmly believed that the cause of the "disease" was totalitarianism, and that democracy was the way to cure it. Once the Soviet regime came to be replaced by democratic rule, I figured, anti-Semitism was bound to wither away. In the struggle toward that goal, the free world, which in the aftermath of the Holocaust appeared to have inoculated itself against a recurrence of murderous anti-Jewish hatred, was our natural ally, the one political entity with both the means and the will to combat the great evil.

Today I know better. This year, following publication of a report by an Israeli government forum charged with addressing the issue of anti-Semitism, I invited to my office the ambassadors of the two countries that have outpaced all others in the frequency and intensity of anti-Jewish attacks within their borders. The emissaries were from France and Belgium?two mature democracies in the heart of Western Europe. It was in these ostensible bastions of enlightenment and tolerance that Jewish cemeteries were being desecrated, children assaulted, synagogues scorched.

To be sure, the anti-Semitism now pervasive in Western Europe is very different from the anti-Semitism I encountered a generation ago in the Soviet Union. In the latter, it was nurtured by systematic, government-imposed discrimination against Jews. In the former, it has largely been condemned and opposed by governments (though far less vigilantly than it should be). But this only makes anti-Semitism in the democracies more disturbing, shattering the illusion?which was hardly mine alone?that representative governance is an infallible antidote to active hatred of Jews.

Another shattered illusion is even more pertinent to our search. Shocked by the visceral anti-Semitism he witnessed at the Dreyfus trial in supposedly enlightened France, Theodor Herzl, the founder of modern Zionism, became convinced that the primary cause of anti-Semitism was the anomalous condition of the Jews: a people without a polity of its own. In his seminal work, The Jewish State (1896), published two years after the trial, Herzl envisioned the creation of such a Jewish polity and predicted that a mass emigration to it of European Jews would spell the end of anti-Semitism. Although his seemingly utopian political treatise would turn out to be one of the 20th century?s most prescient books, on this point history has not been kind to Herzl; no one would seriously argue today that anti-Semitism came to a halt with the founding of the state of Israel. To the contrary, this particular illusion has come full circle: while Herzl and most Zionists after him believed that the emergence of a Jewish state would end anti-Semitism, an increasing number of people today, including some Jews, are convinced that anti-Semitism will end only with the disappearance of the Jewish state.

I first encountered this idea quite a long time ago, in the Soviet Union. In the period before, during, and after the Six-Day war of June 1967?a time when I and many others were experiencing a heady reawakening of our Jewish identity?the Soviet press was filled with scathing attacks on Israel and Zionism, and a wave of official anti-Semitism was unleashed to accompany them. To quite a few Soviet Jews who had been trying their best to melt into Soviet life, Israel suddenly became a jarring reminder of their true status in the "workers? paradise": trapped in a world where they were free neither to live openly as Jews nor to escape the stigma of their Jewishness. To these Jews, Israel came to seem part of the problem, not (as it was for me and others) part of the solution. Expressing what was no doubt a shared sentiment, a distant relative of mine quipped: "If only Israel didn?t exist, everything would be all right."

In the decades since, and especially over the last three years, the notion that Israel is one of the primary causes of anti-Semitism, if not the primary cause, has gained much wider currency. The world, we are told by friend and foe alike, increasingly hates Jews because it increasingly hates Israel. Surely this is what the Belgian ambassador had in mind when he informed me during his visit that anti-Semitism in his country would cease once Belgians no longer had to watch pictures on television of Israeli Jews oppressing Palestinian Arabs.

OBVIOUSLY, THE state of Israel cannot be the cause of a phenomenon that predates it by over 2,000 years. But might it be properly regarded as the cause of contemporary anti-Semitism? What is certain is that, everywhere one looks, the Jewish state does appear to be at the center of the anti-Semitic storm?and nowhere more so, of course, than in the Middle East.

The rise in viciously anti-Semitic content disseminated through state-run Arab media is quite staggering, and has been thoroughly documented. Arab propagandists, journalists, and scholars now regularly employ the methods and the vocabulary used to demonize European Jews for centuries?calling Jews Christ-killers, charging them with poisoning non-Jews, fabricating blood libels, and the like. In a region where the Christian faith has few adherents, a lurid and time-worn Christian anti-Semitism boasts an enormous following.

To take only one example: this past February, the Egyptian government, formally at peace with Israel, saw fit to broadcast on its state-run television a 41-part series based on the infamous Czarist forgery about a global Jewish conspiracy to dominate humanity, the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. To ensure the highest ratings, the show was first aired, in prime time, just as millions of families were breaking their traditional Ramadan fast; Arab satellite television then rebroadcast the series to tens of millions more throughout the Middle East.

In Europe, the connection between Israel and anti-Semitism is equally conspicuous. For one thing, the timing and nature of the attacks on European Jews, whether physical or verbal, have all revolved around Israel, and the anti-Semitic wave itself, which began soon after the Palestinians launched their terrorist campaign against the Jewish state in September 2000, reached a peak (so far) when Israel initiated Operation Defensive Shield at the end of March 2002, a month in which 125 Israelis had been killed by terrorists.

Though most of the physical attacks in Europe were perpetrated by Muslims, most of the verbal and cultural assaults came from European elites. Thus, the Italian newspaper La Stampa published a cartoon of an infant Jesus lying at the foot of an Israeli tank, pleading, "Don?t tell me they want to kill me again." The frequent comparisons of Ariel Sha ron to Adolf Hitler, of Israelis to Nazis, and of Palestinians to the Jewish victims of the Holocaust were not the work of hooligans spray-painting graffiti on the wall of a synagogue but of university educators and sophisticated columnists. As the Nobel Prize-winning author JosE9 Saramago declared of Israel?s treatment of the Palestinians: "We can compare it with what happened at Auschwitz."

The centrality of Israel to the revival of a more generalized anti-Semitism is also evident in the international arena. Almost a year after the current round of Palestinian violence began, and after hundreds of Israelis had already been killed in buses, discos, and pizzerias, a so-called "World Conference against Racism" was held under the auspices of the United Nations in Durban, South Africa. It turned into an anti-Semitic circus, with the Jewish state being accused of everything from racism and apartheid to crimes against humanity and genocide. In this theater of the absurd, the Jews themselves were turned into perpetrators of anti-Semitism, as Israel was denounced for its "Zionist practices against Semitism"?the Semitism, that is to say, of the Palestinian Arabs.

Naturally, then, in searching for the "root cause" of anti-Semitism, the Jewish state would appear to be the prime suspect. But Israel, it should be clear, is not guilty. The Jewish state is no more the cause of anti-Semitism today than the absence of a Jewish state was its cause a century ago.

To see why, we must first appreciate that the always specious line between anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism has now become completely blurred: Israel has effectively become the world?s Jew. From Middle Eastern mosques, the bloodcurdling cry is not "Death to the Israelis," but "Death to the Jews." In more civilized circles, a columnist for the London Observer proudly announces that he does not read published letters in support of Israel that are signed by Jews. (That the complaints commission for the British press found nothing amiss in this statement only goes to show how far things have changed since Orwell wrote of Britain in 1945 that "it is not at present possible, indeed, that anti-Semitism should become respectable.") When discussion at fashionable European dinner parties turns to the Middle East, the air, we have been reliably informed, turns blue with old-fashioned anti-Semitism.

No less revealing is what might be called the mechanics of the discussion. For centuries, a clear sign of the anti-Semitic impulse at work has been the use of the double standard: social behavior that in others passes without comment or with the mildest questioning becomes, when exhibited by Jews, a pretext for wholesale group denunciation. Such double standards are applied just as recklessly today to the Jewish state. It is democratic Israel, not any of the dozens of tyrannies represented in the United Nations General Assembly, that that body singles out for condemnation in over two dozen resolutions each year; it is against Israel?not Cuba, North Korea, China, or Iran?that the UN human-rights commission, chaired recently by a lily-pure Libya, directs nearly a third of its official ire; it is Israel whose alleged misbehavior provoked the only joint session ever held by the signatories to the Geneva Convention; it is Israel, alone among nations, that has lately been targeted by Western campaigns of divestment; it is Israel?s Magen David Adom, alone among ambulance services in the world, that is denied membership in the International Red Cross; it is Israeli scholars, alone among academics in the world, who are denied grants and prevented from publishing articles in prestigious journals. The list goes on and on.

The idea that Israel has become the world?s Jew and that anti-Zionism is a substitute for anti-Semitism is certainly not new. Years ago, Norman Podhoretz observed that the Jewish state "has become the touchstone of attitudes toward the Jewish people, and anti-Zionism has become the most relevant form of anti-Semitism." And well before that, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. was even more unequivocal:

You declare, my friend, that you do not hate the Jews, you are merely "anti-Zionist." And I say, let the truth ring forth from the high mountain tops, let it echo through the valleys of God?s green earth; when people criticize Zionism, they mean Jews?this is God?s own truth.

But if Israel is indeed nothing more than the world?s Jew, then to say that the world increasingly hates Jews because the world increasingly hates Israel means as much, or as little, as saying that the world hates Jews because the world hates Jews. We still need to know: why?

THIS MAY be a good juncture to let the anti-Semites speak for themselves.

Here is the reasoning invoked by Haman, the infamous viceroy of Persia in the biblical book of Esther, to convince his king to order the annihilation of the Jews:

There is a certain people scattered and dispersed among the people in all the provinces of your kingdom, and their laws are different from those of other peoples, and the king?s laws they do not keep, so that it is of no benefit for the king to tolerate them. If it please the king, let it be written that they be destroyed. [emphasis added]

This is hardly the only ancient source pointing to the Jews? incorrigible separateness, or their rejection of the majority?s customs and moral concepts, as the reason for hostility toward them. Centuries after Hellenistic values had spread throughout and beyond the Mediterranean, the Roman historian Tacitus had this to say:

Among the Jews, all things are profane that we hold sacred; on the other hand, they regard as permissible what seems to us immoral. . . . The rest of the world they confront with the hatred reserved for enemies. They will not feed or intermarry with gentiles. . . . They have introduced circumcision to show that they are different from others. . . . It is a crime among them to kill any newly born infant.

Philostratus, a Greek writer who lived a century later, offered a similar analysis:

For the Jews have long been in revolt not only against the Romans, but against humanity; and a race that has made its own life apart and irreconcilable, that cannot share with the rest of mankind in the pleasures of the table, nor join in their libations or prayers or sacrifices, are separated from ourselves by a greater gulf than divides us from Sura or Bactra of the more distant Indies.

Did the Jews actually reject the values that were dominant in the ancient world, or was this simply a fantasy of their enemies? While many of the allegations leveled at Jews were spurious?they did not ritually slaughter non-Jews, as the Greek writer Apion claimed?some were obviously based on true facts. The Jews did oppose intermarriage. They did refuse to sacrifice to foreign gods. And they did emphatically consider killing a newborn infant to be a crime.

Some, perhaps many, individual Jews in those days opted to join the (alluring) Hellenist stream; most did not. Even more important, the Jews were the only people seriously to challenge the moral system of the Greeks. They were not an "other" in the ancient world; they were the "other"?an other, moreover, steadfast in the conviction that Judaism represented not only a different way of life but, in a word, the truth. Jewish tradition claims that Abraham was chosen as the patriarch of what was to become the Jewish nation only after he had smashed the idols in his father?s home. His descendants would continue to defy the pagan world around them, championing the idea of the one God and, unlike other peoples of antiquity, refusing to subordinate their beliefs to those of their conquerors.

THE (BY and large correct) perception of the Jews as rejecting the prevailing value system of the ancient world hardly justifies the anti-Semitism directed against them; but it does take anti-Semitism out of the realm of fantasy, turning it into a genuine clash of ideals and of values. With the arrival of Christianity on the world stage, that same clash, based once again on the charge of Jewish rejectionism, would intensify a thousandfold. The refusal of the people of the "old covenant" to accept the new came to be defined as a threat to the very legitimacy of Christianity, and one that required a mobilized response.

Branding the Jews "Christ killers" and "sons of devils," the Church launched a systematic campaign to denigrate Christianity?s parent religion and its adherents. Accusations of desecrating the host, ritual murder, and poisoning wells would be added over the centuries, creating an ever larger powder keg of hatred. With the growing power of the Church and the global spread of Christianity, these potentially explosive sentiments were carried to the far corners of the world, bringing anti-Semitism to places where no Jewish foot had ever trod.

According to some Christian thinkers, persecution of the powerless Jews was justified as a kind of divine payback for the Jewish rejection of Jesus. This heavenly stamp of approval would be invoked many times through the centuries, especially by those who had tried and failed to convince the Jews to acknowledge the superior truth of Christianity. The most famous case may be that of Martin Luther: at first extremely friendly toward Jews?as a young man he had complained about their mistreatment by the Church?Luther turned into one of their bitterest enemies as soon as he realized that his efforts to woo them to his new form of Christianity would never bear fruit.

Nor was this pattern unique to the Christian religion. Muhammad, too, had hoped to attract the Jewish communities of Arabia, and to this end he initially incorporated elements of Judaism into his new faith (directing prayer toward Jerusalem, fasting on Yom Kippur, and the like). When, however, the Jews refused to accept his code of law, Muhammad wheeled upon them with a vengeance, cursing them in words strikingly reminiscent of the early Church fathers: "Humiliation and wretchedness were stamped upon them, and they were visited with the wrath of Allah. That was because they disbelieved in Allah?s revelation and slew the prophets wrongfully."

IN THESE cases, too, we might ask whether the perception of Jewish rejectionism was accurate. Of course the Jews did not drain the blood of children, poison wells, attempt to mutilate the body of Christ, or commit any of the other wild crimes of which the Church accused them. Moreover, since many teachings of Christianity and Islam stemmed directly from Jewish ones, Jews could hardly be said to have denied them. But if rejecting the Christian or Islamic world meant rejecting the Christian or Islamic creed, then Jews who clung to their own separate faith and way of life were, certainly, rejectionist.

This brings us to an apparent point of difference between pre-modern and modern anti-Semitism. For many Jews over the course of two millennia, there was, in theory at least, a way out of institutionalized discrimination and persecution: the Greco-Roman, Christian, and Muslim worlds were only too happy to embrace converts to their way of life. In the modern era, this choice often proved illusory. Both assimilated and non-assimilated Jews, both religious and secular Jews, were equally victimized by pogroms, persecutions, and genocide. In fact, the terrors directed at the assimilated Jews of Western Europe have led some to conclude that far from ending anti-Semitism, assimilation actually contributed to arousing it.

What accounts for this? In the pre-modern world, Jews and Gentiles were largely in agreement as to what defined Jewish rejectionism, and therefore what would constitute a reprieve from it: it was mostly a matter of beliefs and moral concepts, and of the social behavior that flowed from them. In the modern world, although the question of whether a Jew ate the food or worshiped the God of his neighbors remained relevant, it was less relevant than before. Instead, the modern Jew was seen as being born into a Jewish nation or race whose collective values were deeply embedded in the very fabric of his being. Assimilation, with or without conversion to the majority faith, might succeed in masking this bedrock taint; it could not expunge it.

While such views were not entirely absent in earlier periods, the burden of proof faced by the modern Jew to convince others that he could transcend his "Jewishness" was much greater than the one faced by his forebears. Despite the increasing secularism and openness of European society, which should have smoothed the prospects of assimilation, many modern Jews would find it more difficult to become real Frenchmen or true Germans than their ancestors would have found it to become Greeks or Romans, Christians or Muslims.

The novelty of modern anti-Semitism is thus not that the Jews were seen as the enemies of mankind. Indeed, Hitler?s observation in Mein Kampf that "wherever I went, I began to see Jews, and the more I saw, the more sharply they became distinguished in my eyes from the rest of humanity" sounds no different from the one penned by Philostratus 1,700 years earlier. No, the novelty of modern anti-Semitism is only that it was far more difficult?and sometimes impossible?for the Jew to stop being an enemy of mankind.

ON CLOSER inspection, then, modern anti-Semitism begins to look quite continuous with pre-modern anti-Semitism, only worse. Modern Jews may not have believed they were rejecting the prevailing order around them, but that did not necessarily mean their enemies agreed with them. When it came to the Jews, indeed, European nationalism of the blood-and-soil variety only added another and even more murderous layer of hatred to the foundation built by age-old religious prejudice. Just as in the ancient world, the Jews in the modern world remained the other?inveterate rejectionists, no matter how separate, no matter how assimilated.

Was there any kernel of factual truth to this charge? It is demeaning to have to point out that, wherever and whenever they were given the chance, most modern Jews strove to become model citizens and showed, if anything, an exemplary talent for acculturation; the idea that by virtue of their birth, race, or religion they were implacable enemies of the state or nation was preposterous. So, too, with other modern libels directed against the Jews, which displayed about as much or as little truth content as ancient ones. The Jews did not and do not control the banks. They did not and do not control the media of communication. They did not and do not control governments. And they are not plotting to take over anything.

What some of them have indeed done, in various places and under specific circumstances, is to demonstrate?with an ardor and tenacity redolent perhaps of their long national experience?an attachment to great causes of one stripe or another, including, at times, the cause of their own people. This has had the effect (not everywhere, of course, but notably in highly stratified and/or intolerant societies) of putting them in a visibly adversary position to prevailing values or ideologies, and thereby awakening the never dormant dragon of anti-Semitism. Particularly instructive in this regard is the case of Soviet Jewry.

What makes the Soviet case instructive is, in no small measure, the fact that the professed purpose of Communism was to abolish all nations, peoples, and religions?those great engines of exclusion?on the road to the creation of a new world and a new man. As is well known, quite a few Jews, hoping to emancipate humanity and to "normalize" their own condition in the process, hitched their fates to this ideology and to the movements associated with it. After the Bolshevik revolution, these Jews proved to be among the most devoted servants of the Soviet regime.

Once again, however, the perception of ineradicable Jewish otherness proved as lethal as any reality. In the eyes of Stalin and his henchmen, the Jews, starting with the loyal Communists among them, were always suspect?"ideological immigrants," in the telling phrase. But the animosity went beyond Jewish Communists. The Soviet regime declared war on the over 100 nationalities and religions under its boot; whole peoples were deported, entire classes destroyed, millions starved to death, and tens of millions killed. Everybody suffered, not only Jews. But, decades later, long after Stalin?s repression had given way to Khrushchev?s "thaw," only one national language, Hebrew, was still banned in the Soviet Union; only one group, the Jews, was not permitted to establish schools for its children; only in the case of one group, the Jews, did the term "fifth line," referring to the space reserved for nationality on a Soviet citizen?s identification papers, become a code for licensed discrimination.

Clearly, then, Jews were suspect in the Soviet Union as were no other group. Try as they might to conform, it turned out that joining the mainstream of humanity through the medium of the great socialist cause in the East was no easier than joining the nation-state in the West. But that is not the whole story, either. To scant the rest of it is not only to do an injustice to Soviet Jews as historical actors in their own right but to miss something essential about anti-Semitism, which, even as it operates in accordance with its own twisted definitions and its own mad logic, proceeds almost always by reference to some genuine quality in its chosen victims.

As it happens, although Jews were disproportionately represented in the ranks of the early Bolsheviks, the majority of Russian Jews were far from being Bolsheviks, or even Bolshevik sympathizers. More importantly, Jews would also, in time, come to play a disproportionate role in Communism?s demise. In the middle of the 1960?s, by which time their overall share of the country?s population had dwindled dramatically, Soviet Jews made up a significant element in the "democratic opposition." A visitor to the Gulag in those years would have discovered that Jews were also prominent among political dissidents and those convicted of so-called "economic crimes." Even more revealing, in the 1970?s the Jews were the first to challenge the Soviet regime as a national group, and to do so publicly, en masse, with tens of thousands openly demanding to leave the totalitarian state.

To that degree, then, the claim of Soviet anti-Semites that "Jewish thoughts" and "Jewish values" were in opposition to prevailing norms was not entirely unfounded. And, to that degree, Soviet anti-Semitism partook of the essential characteristic of all anti-Semitism. This hardly makes its expression any the less monstrous; it merely, once again, takes it out of the realm of fantasy.

AND SO we arrive back at today, and at the hatred that takes as its focus the state of Israel. That state?the world?s Jew?has the distinction of challenging two separate political/moral orders simultaneously: the order of the Arab and Muslim Middle East, and the order that prevails in Western Europe. The Middle Eastern case is the easier to grasp; the Western European one may be the more ominous.

The values ascendant in today?s Middle East are shaped by two forces: Islamic fundamentalism and state authoritarianism. In the eyes of the former, any non-Muslim sovereign power in the region?for that matter, any secular Muslim power?is anathema. Particularly galling is Jewish sovereignty in an area delineated as dar al-Islam, the realm where Islam is destined to enjoy exclusive dominance. Such a violation cannot be compromised with; nothing will suffice but its extirpation.

In the eyes of the secular Arab regimes, the Jews of Israel are similarly an affront, but not so much on theological grounds as on account of the society they have built: free, productive, democratic, a living rebuke to the corrupt, autocratic regimes surrounding it. In short, the Jewish state is the ultimate freedom fighter?an embodiment of the subversive liberties that threaten Islamic civilization and autocratic Arab rule alike. It is for this reason that, in the state-controlled Arab media as in the mosques, Jews have been turned into a symbol of all that is menacing in the democratic, materialist West as a whole, and are confidently reputed to be the insidious force manipulating the United States into a confrontation with Islam.

The particular dynamic of anti-Semitism in the Middle East orbit today may help explain why?unlike, as we shall see, in Europe?there was no drop in the level of anti-Jewish incitement in the region after the inception of the Oslo peace process. Quite the contrary. And the reason is plain: to the degree that Oslo were to have succeeded in bringing about a real reconciliation with Israel or in facilitating the spread of political freedom, to that degree it would have frustrated the overarching aim of eradicating the Jewish "evil" from the heart of the Middle East and/or preserving the autocratic power of the Arab regimes.

And so, while in the 1990?s the democratic world, including the democratic society of Israel, was (deludedly, as it turned out) celebrating the promise of a new dawn in the Middle East, the schools in Gaza, the textbooks in Ramallah, the newspapers in Egypt, and the television channels in Saudi Arabia were projecting a truer picture of the state of feeling in the Arab world. It should come as no surprise that, in Egypt, pirated copies of Shimon Peres?s A New Middle East, a book heralding a messianic era of free markets and free ideas, were printed with an introduction in Arabic claiming that what this bible of Middle East peacemaking proved was the veracity of everything written in the Protocols of the Elders of Zion about a Jewish plot to rule the world.

As for Western Europe, there the reputation of Israel and of the Jews has undergone a number of ups and downs over the decades. Before 1967, the shadow of the Holocaust and the perception of Israel as a small state struggling for its existence in the face of Arab aggression combined to ensure, if not the favor of the European political classes, at least a certain dispensation from harsh criticism. But all this changed in June 1967, when the truncated Jewish state achieved a seemingly miraculous victory against its massed Arab enemies in the Six-Day war, and the erstwhile victim was overnight transformed into an aggressor. A possibly apocryphal story about Jean-Paul Sartre encapsulates the shift in the European mood. Before the war, as Israel lay diplomatically isolated and Arab leaders were already trumpeting its certain demise, the famous French philosopher signed a statement in support of the Jewish state. After the war, he reproached the man who had solicited his signature: "But you assured me they would lose."

Decades before "occupation" became a household word, the mood in European chancelleries and on the Left turned decidedly hostile. There were, to be sure, venal interests at stake, from the perceived need to curry favor with the oil-producing nations of the Arab world to, in later years, the perceived need to pander to the growing Muslim populations in Western Europe itself. But other currents were also at work, as anti-Western, anti-"imperialist," pacifist, and pro-liberationist sentiments, fanned and often subsidized by the USSR, took over the advanced political culture both of Europe and of international diplomacy. Behind the new hostility to Israel lay the new ideological orthodoxy, according to whose categories the Jewish state had emerged on the world scene as a certified "colonial" and "imperialist" power, a "hegemon," and an "oppressor."

Before 1967, anti-Zionist resolutions sponsored by the Arabs and their Soviet patrons in the United Nations garnered little or no support among the democracies. After 1967, more and more Western countries joined the chorus of castigation. By 1974, Yasir Arafat, whose organization openly embraced both terrorism and the destruction of a UN member state, was invited to address the General Assembly. The next year, that same body passed the infamous "Zionism-is-racism" resolution. In 1981, Israel?s strike against Iraq?s nuclear reactor was condemned by the entire world, including the United States.

Then, in the 1990?s, things began to change again. Despite the constant flow of biased UN resolutions, despite the continuing double standard, there were a number of positive developments as well: the Zionism-is-racism resolution was repealed, and over 65 member states either established or renewed diplomatic relations with Israel.

What had happened? Had Arab oil dried up? Had Muslims suddenly become a less potent political force on the European continent? Hardly. What changed was that, at Madrid and then at Oslo, Israel had agreed, first reluctantly and later with self-induced optimism, to conform to the ascendant ethos of international politics. Extending its hand to a terrorist organization still committed to its destruction, Israel agreed to the establishment of a dictatorial and repressive regime on its very doorstep, sustaining its commitment to the so-called peace process no matter how many innocent Jews were killed and wounded in its fraudulent name.

The rewards for thus conforming to the template of the world?s moralizers, cosmetic and temporary though they proved to be, flowed predictably not just to Israel but to the Jewish people as a whole. Sure enough, worldwide indices of anti-Semitismin the 1990?s dropped to their lowest point since the Holocaust. As the world?s Jews benefited from the increasing tolerance extended to the world?s Jew, Western organizations devoted to fighting the anti-Semitic scourge began cautiously to declare victory and to refocus their efforts on other parts of the Jewish communal agenda.

But of course it would not last. In the summer of 2000, at Camp David, Ehud Barak offered the Palestinians nearly everything their leadership was thought to be demanding. The offer was summarily rejected, Arafat started his "uprising," Israel undertook to defend itself?and Europe ceased to applaud. For many Jews at the time, this seemed utterly incomprehensible: had not Israel taken every last step for peace? But it was all too comprehensible. Europe was staying true to form; it was the world?s Jew, by refusing to accept its share of blame for the "cycle of violence," that was out of line. And so were the world?s Jews, who by definition, and whether they supported Israel or not, came rapidly to be associated with the Jewish state in its effrontery.

TO AMERICANS, the process I have been describing may sound eerily familiar. It should: Americans, too, have had numerous opportunities to see their nation in the dock of world opinion over recent years for the crime of rejecting the values of the so-called international community, and never more so than during the widespread hysteria that greeted President Bush?s announced plan to dismantle the tyrannical regime of Saddam Hussein. In dozens of countries, protesters streamed into the streets to voice their fury at this refusal of the United States to conform to what "everybody" knew to be required of it. To judge from the placards on display at these rallies, President Bush, the leader of the free world, was a worse enemy of mankind than the butcher of Baghdad.

At first glance, this too must have seemed incomprehensible. Saddam Hussein was one of the world?s most brutal dictators, a man who had gassed his own citizens, invaded his neighbors, defied Security Council resolutions, and was widely believed to possess weapons of mass destruction. But no matter: the protests were less about Iraqi virtue than about American vice, and the grievances aired by the assorted anti-capitalists, anti-globalists, radical environmentalists, self-styled anti-imperialists, and many others who assembled to decry the war had little to do with the possible drawbacks of a military operation in Iraq. They had to do, rather, with a genuine clash of values.

Insofar as the clash is between the United States and Europe?there is a large "European" body of opinion within the United States as well?it has been well diagnosed by Robert Kagan in his best-selling book, Of Paradise and Power. For our purposes, it is sufficient to remark on how quickly the initial "why-do-they-hate-us" debate in the wake of September 11, focusing on anti-American sentiment in the Muslim world, came to be overtaken by a "why-do-they-hate-us" debate centered on anti-American sentiment in "Old Europe." Generally, the two hatreds have been seen to emanate from divergent impulses, in the one case a perception of the threat posed by Western freedoms to Islamic civilization, in the other a perception of the threat posed by a self-confident and powerful America to the postmodern European idea of a world regulated not by force but by reason, compromise, and nonjudgmentalism. In today?s Europe?professedly pacifist, postnationalist, anti-hegemonic?an expression like "axis of evil" wins few friends, and the idea of actually confronting the axis of evil still fewer.

Despite the differences between them, however, anti-Americanism in the Islamic world and anti-Americanism in Europe are in fact linked, and both bear an uncanny resemblance to anti-Semitism. It is, after all, with some reason that the United States is loathed and feared by the despots and fundamentalists of the Islamic world as well as by many Europeans. Like Israel, but in a much more powerful way, America embodies a different?a non-conforming?idea of the good, and refuses to aban don its moral clarity about the objective worth of that idea or of the free habits and institutions to which it has given birth. To the contrary, in undertaking their war against the evil of terrorism, the American people have demonstrated their determination not only to fight to preserve the blessings of liberty for themselves and their posterity, but to carry them to regions of the world that have proved most resistant to their benign influence.

IN THIS, positive sense as well, Israel and the Jewish people share something essential with the United States. The Jews, after all, have long held that they were chosen to play a special role in history, to be what their prophets called "a light unto the nations." What precisely is meant by that phrase has always been a matter of debate, and I would be the last to deny the mischief that has sometimes been done, including to the best interests of the Jews, by some who have raised it as their banner. Nevertheless, over four millennia, the universal vision and moral precepts of the Jews have not only worked to secure the survival of the Jewish people themselves but have constituted a powerful force for good in the world, inspiring myriads to fight for the right even as in others they have aroused rivalry, enmity, and unappeasable resentment.

It is similar with the United States?a nation that has long regarded itself as entrusted with a mission to be what John Winthrop in the 17th century called a "city on a hill" and Ronald Reagan in the 20th parsed as a "shining city on a hill." What precisely is meant by that phrase is likewise a matter of debate, but Americans who see their country in such terms certainly regard the advance of American values as central to American purpose. And, though the United States is still a very young nation, there can be no disputing that those values have likewise constituted an immense force for good in the world?even as they have earned America the enmity and resentment of many.

In resolving to face down enmity and hatred, an important source of strength is the lesson to be gained from contemplating the example of others. From Socrates to Churchill to Sakharov, there have been individuals whose voices and whose personal heroism have reinforced in others the resolve to stand firm for the good. But history has also been generous enough to offer, in the Jews, the example of an ancient people fired by the message of human freedom under God and, in the Americans, the example of a modern people who over the past century alone, acting in fidelity with their inmost beliefs, have confronted and defeated the greatest tyrannies ever known to man.

Fortunately for America, and fortunately for the world, the United States has been blessed by providence with the power to match its ideals. The Jewish state, by contrast, is a tiny island in an exceedingly dangerous sea, and its citizens will need every particle of strength they can muster for the trials ahead. It is their own people?s astounding perseverance, despite centuries of suffering at the hands of faiths, ideologies, peoples, and individuals who have hated them and set out to do them in, that inspires one with confidence that the Jews will once again outlast their enemies.


NATAN SHARANSKY, the former Soviet dissident and political prisoner, now serves in the government of Israel as minister for Jerusalem and Diaspora affairs. This article draws in part on ideas presented at a conference on anti-Semitism in Paris in May and at the World Forum of the American Enterprise Institute in June. Mr. Sharansky thanks Ron Dermer for help in developing the arguments and in preparing the manuscript.
30914  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / the titles of the teachers in the fillipino martial arts on: November 03, 2003, 05:58:26 PM
Woof All:

  There are various reasons for the use of the term "Kali".  Some are as described by the critics of the word.  And some are not.  

When used in the critical perjorative way against those who have other reasons, what communicates is a personally insulting tone/intent, and demands of proof can come across with a tone of "justify yourself to me" which tends to lead to "go fornicate yourself rejoinder" and Voila! -- a conversation devoid of forward purpose.

For the record, I believe the term to have historical merit.  If you don't, I have no urge to persuade you.  

But some of those that don't believe the term to be historically accurate, take an additional step and cast aspersions upon those who do.  


The simple fact is that there is very little agreement about many, if not most things in Filipino history-- yet many seem determined to believe theirs as the one true version.    

I've been around a while and I've heard countless times about Filipinos saying that the term is a fraud.  Of course, the next stop in the syllogism is "How dare you, a euro-american, dare to disagree?!?"

OK, here's my teacher PG Edgar Sulite from an interview in Martial Arts presents "Filipino Martial Arts" (Graciella Casillas on cover)

ES: "In Mindanao, "kali" was the term used, but that doesn't mean it was the only one. , , , We must remember that according to the region where you live, the terms change and others apply such as 'estocada' and 'pagkalikali' and more"  

Amongst the informed, the depth and breadth of PG ES's travels and trainings in the RP are well known, and many of these people may have heard of his book "Masters of Kali, Arnis and Eskrima", an amazing collection of interviews and essays on various masters of the arts from around the RP.

You want to research?  Don't ask me to do your work for you-- I've been down this road too many times and found it lead too often to exactly where some would take this thread right now--  go find and read the book yourself!

The Villabrille-Largusa people use the term Kali from a historical base.   (see e.g. Tuhon Largusa in "DBMA#1: The Grandfathers Speak") and have vigorously defended its use over the internet, see e.g. various threads over the years on Ray Terry's "Eskrima Digest").  Get in touch with them if you like.

So anyway, what are we to do?  Have a duel?!?  Oh whoops, we can't do that-- no one challenged/disrespected PG Edgar's or GM Villabrille's use of the term to their face while they were alive.  Well then, how about a trial by compurgation to solve the discrepancies amongst the sundry Filipinos with opinions on this?!? That would really settle it.  Oy vey.  rolleyes

BTW, Currently Roland Dantes writes of indigenous use of the term in the south.  Go find him in Mindanao and tell him how and why he's wrong.

Like these people we think the term is historically valid, we like it and we use it.   If you don't, it is perfectly OK by me and I have no need or interest in changing your mind-- but it really is beyond me how anyone, Filipino or not, can claim to speak authoritatively on matters linguistic throughout the entirety of the Philippine Archipelago-- and into Indonesia to boot!

If you want 'proof' I ain't the man to give it.  Go elsewhere.  But if you tell me this proves that there is no proof, what comes across is that you are telling me that I am either a fool or a bullexcrementer and with that comes the predictable rejoinder , , ,

Crafty Dog
30915  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / the titles of the teachers in the fillipino martial arts on: November 03, 2003, 06:57:52 AM
Woof Folks:

  Let's play nice now please , , ,

30916  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / We the Well-armed People on: November 03, 2003, 06:30:06 AM
Buz Grover, a fellow contributor to the Eskrima Digest, got this letter published in Letters to the Editor of the meta-liberal Washington Post:
The Democrats and Gun Control

Monday, November 3, 2003; Page A18

Democratic presidential candidates are distancing themselves from gun control issues for political reasons, an Oct. 26 article suggests ["Democratic Hopefuls Play Down Gun Control," front page]. Citing the party's past embrace of gun control as a factor in numerous electoral losses, the story notes there are large numbers of gun owners in many 2004 swing states. The fear seems to be that sticking to one's political guns, so to speak, would lead to further losses at the polls.

Perhaps the more moderate position most Democratic candidates have adopted is indeed inspired by political calculus and little more. It would be nice to think, however, that facts and principle had something to do with it. Maybe the candidates became aware of the estimated annual 2.5 million instances of defensive firearms use in the United States, or perhaps they read the Centers for Disease Control report that found gun control laws had little effect on crime, or maybe they researched the growing body of constitutional scholarship that demonstrates the country's founders sought to preserve an individual right to keep and bear arms. Possibly the candidates came to see that abrogating the second tenth of the Bill of Rights by extraconstitutional means threatens every right enshrined in the document, or perhaps they realized the way gun control adherents and many media outlets frame the debate is fundamentally unfair.

Regardless of whether raw politics or facts and ideals motivate this more moderate tone, the prospect of a presidential election season without shrill calls for further gun control is certainly something to savor.


30917  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Political Rants on: November 01, 2003, 11:00:09 AM
"Those Jews"

If only Israel and its supporters would disappear.

There are certain predictable symptoms to watch when a widespread amorality begins to infect a postmodern society: cultural relativism, atheism, socialism, utopian pacifism. Another sign, of course, is fashionable anti-Semitism among the educated, or the idea that some imaginary cabal, or some stealthy agenda - certainly not our own weakness - is conspiring to threaten our good life.

Well apart from the spooky placards (stars of David juxtaposed with
swastikas, posters calling for the West Bank to be expanded to "the sea")
that we are accustomed to seeing at the marches of the supposedly ethical antiwar movement, we have also heard some examples of Jew-baiting and hissing in the last two weeks that had nothing to do with the old crazies. Indeed, such is the nature of the new anti-Semitism that everyone can now play at it - as long as it is cloaked in third-world chauvinism, progressive thinking, and identity politics.

The latest lunatic rantings from Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohamad are nothing new, and we should not be surprised by his mindless blabbering about Jews and his fourth-grade understanding of World War II and the present Middle East. But what was fascinating was the reaction to his madness: silence from the Arab intelligentsia, praise from Middle Eastern leaders ("A brilliant speech," gushed Iran's "president" Mohammad Khatami), and worry from France and Greece about an EU proclamation against the slander. Most American pundits were far more concerned about the private, over-the-top comments of Gen. Boykin than about the public viciousness of a
head of state. Paul Krugman, for example, expressed the general mushiness of the Left when he wrote a column trying to put Mahathir Mohamad's hatred in a sympathetic context, something he would never do for a Christian zealot who slurred Muslims.

Much has been written about the usually circumspect Greg Easterbrook's
bizarre ranting about "Jewish executives" who profit from Quentin
Tarantino's latest bloody production. But, again, the problem is not so much the initial slips and slurs as it is the more calculated and measured
"explanation." Easterbrook's mea culpa cited his prior criticism of Mel
Gibson, as if the supposed hypocrisy of a devout and public Christian's
having trafficked in filmed violence were commensurate with the dealings of two ordinary businessmen who do not publicly embrace religion. Michael Eisner and Harvey Weinstein simply happen to be movie executives, with no stake in producing Jewish movies or public-morality films, but - like most in Hollywood - with a stake in making money from films. That they are Jewish has absolutely no bearing on their purported lack of morality - unless, of course, one seeks to invent some wider pathology, evoking historical paranoia about profiteering, cabals, and "the Jews."

Recently, Joseph Lieberman was hissed by an Arab-American audience in
Dearborn, Mich. when he briefly explained Israel's defensive wall in terms not unlike those used by Howard Dean and other candidates. What earned him the special public rebuke not accorded to others was apparently nothing other than being Jewish - the problem was not what he said, but who he was. No real apology followed, and the usually judicious and sober David Broder wrote an interesting column praising the new political acumen of the Arab-American community.

Tony Judt, writing in The New York Review of Books, has published one of the most valuable and revealing articles about the Middle East to appear in the last 20 years. There has always been the suspicion that European intellectuals favored the dismantling of Israel as we know it through the merging of this uniquely democratic and liberal state with West Bank neighbors who have a horrific record of human-rights abuses, autocracy, and mass murder. After all, for all too many Europeans, how else but with the end of present-day Israel will the messy Middle East and its attendant problems - oil, terrorism, anti-Semitism, worries over unassimilated Muslim populations in Europe, anti-Americanism, and postcolonial guilt - become less bothersome? Moreover, who now knows or cares much about what happened to Jews residing under Arab governments - the over half-million or so who, in the last half-century, have been ethnically cleansed from (and sometimes murdered in) Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus, and almost every Jewish community in
the Arab Middle East?

And what is the value of the only democratic government in a sea of
autocracy if its existence butts up against notions of third-world
victimhood and causes so much difficulty for the Western intelligentsia?
Still, few intellectuals were silly enough to dress up that insane idea
under the pretext of a serious argument (an unhinged Vidal, Chomsky, or Said does not count). Judt did, and now he has confirmed what most of us knew for years - namely, that there is an entrenched and ever-bolder school of European thought that favors the de facto elimination of what is now a democratic Jewish state.

What links all these people - a Muslim head of state, a rude crowd in
Michigan, an experienced magazine contributor, and a European public
intellectual - besides their having articulated a spreading anger against
the "Jews"? Perhaps a growing unease with hard questions that won't go away and thus beg for easy, cheap answers.

A Malaysian official and his apologists must realize that gender apartheid,
statism, tribalism, and the anti-democratic tendencies of the Middle East
cause its poverty and frustration despite a plethora of natural resources
(far more impressive assets than the non-petroleum-bearing rocks beneath parched Israel). But why call for introspection when the one-syllable slur "Jews" suffices instead?

And why would an Arab-American audience - itself composed of many who fled the tyranny and economic stagnation of Arab societies for the freedom and opportunity of a liberal United States - wish to hear a reasoned explanation of the complexities of the Israeli-Palestinian war when it was so much easier to hiss and moan, especially when mainstream observers would ignore their anti-Semitism and be impressed instead with the cadre of candidates who flock to Michigan?

How do you explain to an audience that Quentin Tarantino appeals both to teens and to empty-headed critics precisely because something is terribly amiss in America, when affluent and leisured suburbanites are drawn to scenes of raw killing as long as it is dressed up with "art" and "meaning"?

How could a Tony Judt write a reasoned and balanced account of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict when to do so would either alienate or bore the

So they all, whether by design or laxity, take the easier way out -
especially when slurring "Israel" or "the Jews" involves none of the risks
of incurring progressive odium that similarly clumsy attacks against blacks, women, Palestinians, or homosexuals might draw, requires no real thinking, and seems to find an increasingly receptive audience.

You see, in our mixed-up world those Jewish are not a "people of color." And if there really is such a mythical monolithic entity in America as the
"Jews," they (much like the Cubans) are not easily stereotyped as
impoverished victims needing largesse or condescension, and much less are they eligible under any of the current myriad of rubrics that count for
public support. Israel is a successful Western state, not a failed
third-world despotism. Against terrible oppression and overt anti-Semitism, the Jewish community here and abroad found success - proof that hard work, character, education, and personal discipline can trump both natural and human adversity. In short, the story of American Jewry and Israel resonates not at all with the heartstrings of a modern therapeutic society, which is quick to show envy for the successful and cheap concern for the struggling.

This fashionable anti-Semitism and anti-Israelism - especially among
purported intellectuals of the Left - reveals a deep-seated, scary pathology that is growing geometrically both in and outside the West. For a Europe that is disarmed, plagued by a demographic nightmare of negative population growth and unsustainable entitlements, filled with unassimilated immigrants, and deeply angry about the power and presence of the United States, the Jews and their Israel provide momentary relief on the cheap. So expect that more crazy thoughts of Israel's destruction dressed up as peace plans will be as common as gravestone and synagogue smashing.

For the Muslim world that must confront the power of the patriarch, mullah, tribe, and autocrat if it is ever to share the freedom and prosperity of the rest of the world, the Jews offer a much easier target. So expect even more raving madness as the misery of Islamic society grows and its state-run media hunker down amid widespread unrest. Anticipate, also, more sick posters at C-SPAN broadcast marches, more slips by reasonable writers, and more anti-Israeli denunciations from the "liberals."

These are weird, weird times, and before we win this messy war against
Islamic fascism and its sponsors, count on things to get even uglier. Don't expect any reasoned military analysis that puts the post-9/11 destruction of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein's evil regime, along with the liberation of 50 million at the cost of 300 American lives, in any sort of historical context. After all, in the current presidential race, a retired general now caricatures U.S. efforts in Iraq and quotes Al Sharpton.

Do not look for the Islamic community here to acknowledge that the United States, in little over a decade, freed Kuwait, saved most of the Bosnians and Kosovars, tried to feed Somalis, urged the Russians not to kill Chechnyans, belatedly ensured that no longer were Shiites and Kurds to be slaughtered in Iraq, spoke out against Kuwait's ethnic cleansing of a third of a million Palestinians - and now is spending $87 billion to make Iraqis free.

That the Arab world would appreciate billions of dollars in past American
aid to Jordan, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority, or thank America for
its help in Kuwait and Kosovo, or be grateful to America for freeing Iraq -
all this is about as plausible as the idea that Western Europeans would
acknowledge their past salvation from Nazism and Soviet Communism, or be grateful for the role the United States plays to promote democracy in Panama, Haiti, the Balkans, or the Middle East.

No, in this depressing age, the real problem is apparently our support for
democratic Israel and all those pesky Jews worldwide, who seem to crop up everywhere as sly war makers, grasping film executives, conspiratorial politicians, and greedy colonialists, and thus make life so difficult for the rest of us.

30918  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Use of range in single, double stick, empty hands on: October 31, 2003, 01:44:51 PM

"I'm sure the bravery or confidence issue plays a significant part."

Good point by LG Dog Russ.

"My question regarding empty hands in relation to single vs. double stick, was, can the same concepts be applied in single and double stick fighting? How much more difficult, if at all, is it to apply these concepts to double stick? And, does an empty hand fight resemble a double stick match more than a single stick match? If empty hands is closer to double than single stick (Huh) what implications does that have?"

It depends  cheesy

" , , , Take a drill like hubud...when the number one angle comes in, you stop, pass, press, and return. I'm aware that this is just a training method, and that you could easily strike as you stop, pass, or press, enter, or do any other number of things.

"If the "attacker" is trying to hit you with the butt of his stick, and if he is concentrated on his stick, maybe you could actually stop, then pass to put him in a worse position, then attack. But, in an empty hand situation, or possibly in a double stick situation, if you stoped the angle one as you could possibly in single stick, you would most likely get cracked with the other hand, or punyo."

Said in a friendly respectful way: You are thinking in terms of static range and absent footwork and angling.  That is, you are thinking like most people train these methods  wink

"So, how does this effect the way you fight double in relation to single stick, or single stick in relation to empty hands (where there are more than two weapons...since the opponent will most likely not be concentrating on one primary weapon)?"

In DBMA this question is solved with the theory of 7 ranges, the triangle from the third dimension and our footwork matrix.

"The fact that most people reveal a particular "style" or structure in double stick, and that that structure can be exploited is a good point. And, the fact that most people will concentrate on a dominant hand even in double stick, is also a good point. But, my question is, how do the principles learned in drills such as hubud, sombrada, attacking blocks, etc. apply when more than one weapon is allowed? Do you guys feel they apply to a lesser extent?"

T'aint the drills, its the skills and understandings acquired-- or not.  If hubud is trained bilaterally with triangular footwork, ditto sombrada, attacking blocks etc then they apply more, not less.  If these drills are trained without the fighter's understanding they can impart certain skills but the absence of the fighter's understanding (which can shared to surprising extend by a good teacher or are acquired through experience/observation) then they may well apply less.

That's probably as far as we can go in a public forum David, if you want to come on by and go into it further, we'd be glad to help as best we can.

Excellent questions.

Guro Crafty
30919  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / We the Unorganized Militia on: October 31, 2003, 12:44:11 PM
Milt, you beat me to it with that one!

And this from Tampa FL:

 Confronted with an armed intruder in their home, two women plied  him with a ham sandwich and rum until he became groggy and passed out.

Police arrived and arrested Alfred Joesph Sweet, 52, to end the 5 hour episode.  Cathy Ord, 60 and Rose Bucher 63, said they tried to befriend the man after he burst through their kitchen window with a sawed-off shotgun Tuesday night.
30920  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / the titles of the teachers in the fillipino martial arts on: October 31, 2003, 01:32:19 AM
Woof All:

I am thoroughly jet-lagged and if I growl a bit in what follows, , , ,

My dad taught me that if you repeat yourself, you teach people not to listen.  

Please forgive me, but I have been through this so many times, that I am done with it.  EVERYTHING said in this thread I have seen many times before and has been thoroughly responded to many times over the years.

Yes of course some use it for marketing, and yes many FMA people in the Philippines have never heard of it.  So what?  This does not disprove excrement.  IMHO, not lightly formed, the term "Kali" has legitimate roots.

I am not about the theology of terminology and have better things to do with my day.

Crafty Dog
30921  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / grandfathers speak on: October 27, 2003, 06:54:26 PM
Hi Bobi:

 Sorry for the long delay in my reply.

 This video was a real labor of love.  Its not been a big seller but that does not matter.  What does matter is that for those who care that there is this record of this moment in time.  

There is some other footage we have that someday may see the light of day.  Right now we are working on an action only DVD for the general public-- perhaps some of this footage would be good to give the general public an idea of the origins of what we do.

Crafty Dog
30922  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / We the Well-armed People on: October 22, 2003, 02:49:41 PM
Woof Alex:

 Fair questions both, but at the moment I may be leaving unexpectedly a day early for Rome and all is chaos here.

So, changing subject completely:


October 22, 2003, 9:11 a.m.
A Light Goes on at the CDC
No escaping gun-control reality.

By Timothy Wheeler

In a marvelous moment of candor, a federal Centers for Disease Control (CDC) committee has reported that it cannot find any evidence that gun-control laws reduce violent crime. American gun owners spent most of the 1990s telling the CDC that gun control is ineffective at best and harmful at worst. So it's gratifying that the lesson is finally sinking in.

A task force convened by the CDC issued its report after two years of poring over 51 scientific studies of gun laws. The group considered only research papers that met strict criteria for scientific soundness. The CDC distances itself with a disclaimer, but it's pretty clear that it supports the task force's conclusions. The report contains no dissenting position or minority view from CDC managers.

Covered in the review were gun-ban laws, restrictions on acquiring a gun, waiting periods for buying a gun, firearm-registration laws, firearm-owner licensing laws, concealed-carry permit laws, zero-tolerance laws, and various combinations of firearm laws. Most Americans who haven't tried to buy a gun lately are blissfully unaware of just how many laws there are. In Washington, D.C., for example, it's impossible for a regular citizen to legally own a firearm (although criminals seem to have no problem getting one). In other cities the legal hoops a gun buyer must jump through are almost as much a barrier to ownership as an outright ban.

One would think that at least some good would come from all these laws. Researchers should be able to prove that the laws prevent at least a few murders, rapes, and robberies. Amazingly, they can't. And even more amazingly, they have admitted that they can't.

But what about the violent crimes that gun-control laws have allowed by preventing victims from defending themselves? This well-known downside to gun-control laws keeps showing itself over and over again. For example, during the 1992 Los Angeles riots, frantic Angelenos rushed to gun stores to arm themselves against marauding thugs. Many were outraged to discover California's 15-day waiting period for buying a gun.

A woman stalked by a homicidal ex-husband is left completely vulnerable by waiting-period laws. These supposedly provide a "cooling off" period for impulsive people who would buy a gun and in the heat of passion, commit a crime with it. Such a patronizing law cruelly imperils a stalked woman, who desperately needs the protection that only a firearm can give her.

And looking at Washington, D.C.'s reputation as the violent-crime capital, how could we think that its gun ban law was ever worth anything? Does anyone really believe that justice is served by disarming good citizens when violent criminals so obviously ignore the ban? Barring gun ownership by good people is worse than useless. It perverts justice by enabling violent felons while turning into outlaws people who dare to own a gun for legitimate self-protection.

America has laws that ban handguns. We have laws that ban big, expensive guns and other laws that ban small, cheap guns. We have laws that condemn some guns as illegal simply on the basis of their appearance. Other laws force average people to be fingerprinted to carry a firearm for self-protection, even though years of experience show such demeaning measures to be unnecessary.

The laws are so numerous and so dauntingly complex that in some cases even law enforcement authorities can't figure out what they mean. Such a confusing web of legal traps can easily ensnare an honest citizen.

In all, America has 20,000 laws that endanger, humiliate, criminalize, or otherwise burden good citizens who exercise their constitutional right to own a gun. Now the CDC, a government agency not known for its friendliness to gun owners, reports that it cannot find any evidence that the laws are effective.

We should take warning from the closing comments of the CDC task force's report. They are reminiscent of the agency's glory days of gun-control advocacy. America is described as an "outlier" in gun-crime rates among industrialized nations. The report insists "research should continue on the effectiveness of firearms laws as one approach to the prevention or reduction of firearms violence and firearms injury." In other words, keep researching until we find the conclusion we prefer ? guns are bad and they should be banned.

Liberal reformers who would curb the freedom of others are obliged to prove the efficacy of gun-control laws. They have failed to do so. Gun owners have always known that gun-control laws aimed at them instead of criminals are futile and unjust. Now that everybody else is finally getting it, perhaps it's time for a moratorium on new gun laws.

? Timothy Wheeler, M.D. is director of Doctors for Responsible Gun Ownership, a project of the Claremont Institute.
30923  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Crafty Dog Warwick UK seminar 18/19 Oct on: October 22, 2003, 11:38:46 AM
Woof Mike and Lenos:

  Tail wags for the kind words.  It was my pleasure to be hosted by Krishna once again and to meet new friends.

  Tomorrow I leave for Italy!

Crafty Dog

PS:  I'm trying to talk Krishna into coming to the Gathering in November!  He's thinking about it  Cheesy
30924  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Guro Crafty/Spain Stabbing on: October 21, 2003, 10:03:25 PM
Thanks Enganyo.

Those who read Spanish may be interested to read the other articles on the same incident which I've posted on our Spanish forum.  Some of the details vary.
30925  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Challenging Statements on: October 21, 2003, 06:31:45 PM
Woof Ringo et al:

  Tail wags for those words of support!

  I cruised by there to take a look.  What can one say?  I am reminded of a quote on one of the thread's here recently from one George Silver to the effect of "Don't bother to throw rocks at every barking dog."

  But the thread does raise some matters that may be of interest here.

Concerning the personal aspersions:

  Do I get tapped?  Sure, lots of people make me tap-- especially in Rico's Vale Tudo class at RAW.  I'm 51 and the class over time has people like Vladamir Matyushenko, Frank Trigg, Walid Ismael, Fernando Vasconcelos and other world class fighters -- these guys I don't even bother with sparring-- and Rico himself who has been a great help to me (also thanks to FT for help on unmatched lead, VM for clinch) -- etc.  Virtually everyone in there is an active MMA fighter.  In such company I am often like the fat kid who gets picked last.   And occasionally I have moments where it all comes together , , ,

Many of the guys that I do train with could overwhelm me with their superior youth, conditioning etc. but as real fighters they do not find the need to engage their ego in sessions with me and they simply match my level of physicality.   This allows them to develop their stuff and I mine.  

The Kali-silat applications I am developing in this context I then share with my students.  For example Lonely Dog sparred in Rico's class this past summer using this material and was well-regarded for his performance.  

Concerning the comments about the Dog Brothers--  Counting live audiences and our videos, I think it safe to say that many tens of thousands of people have seen us fight.  It is natural that not everyone agree about what it is or isn't.   Is there anything I can say that could or should make a difference?

Concerning the derision expressed about our nicknames in the thread on the other forum, the same principle applies.  We think it is fun and funny, others think it is silly.  Whatever.  What they think of us is none of our business.

When I had the vision for the Dog Brothers, a lot of people thought I was weird, crazy, etc.  Now I have an idea that kali-silat can really be applied in the cage and as I wave my arms around like two sticks I get a similar reaction from some-- especially when I crash and burn.  It goes with the territory.  Unlike stickfighting, which I was young enough to begin testing my ideas, now I am too old. Like I tell the young ones the first time I spar with them-- "I'm just an old man having a good time."  

So I research a bit and share with my students.  I think we are beginning to manifest results, but time will tell.

The adventure continues,
Crafty Dog
30926  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Current Events: Philippines on: October 21, 2003, 03:38:33 PM
Oct 20, 2003, 11:33 GMT - PHILIPPINES: Philippine security officials found what they believe are traces of a "tetanus virus-carrying chemical" after raiding a suspected Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) hideout Oct. 19 in the southern city of Cotabato. However, authorities still are awaiting confirmation regarding the substance. Along with the suspicious residue, authorities found a "bio-terror manual," bomb-making materials and documents on assembling rocket-propelled grenades. No arrests were made in the raid; the eight local and foreign JI fighters already had left the home.
30927  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Guro Crafty/Spain Stabbing on: October 21, 2003, 02:48:27 PM
My efforts at translation follow.  Assistance, corrections, etc welcomed.-- Crafty Dog

7 de octubre de 2003, 21h31
October 7, 2003 9:31PM

    El magreb? acuchillado en Madrid contaba con numerosos antecedentes por robo con fuerza y delitos contra la salud

The Morrocan stabbed in Madrid had a long record of robbery by force and crimes against health (drug use crimes?)


 Hambri Nassereldin, el joven de 22 a?os y nacionalidad magreb? que la pasada noche falleci? acuchillado en la boca de Metro de la estaci?n de Lavapi?s, contaba con numerosos antecedentes penales, principalmente por robo con fuerza y delitos contra la salud.

Hambri Nassereldin, the youth of 22 years old and of Morrocan nationality who died last night from knifing wounds received in the entry of the Lavapies station, had a long criminal record, prinicipally robbery by force and crimes against health.

No obstante, estos antecedentes corresponden a un nombre falso o alias que sol?a utilizar el joven, Bin Manri Nasser, seg?n inform? a Europa Press un portavoz de la Jefatura Superior de Polic?a de Madrid.

Nevertheless, these corresponded to a false name and aliases that the youth, Bin Manri Nasser, used to use according to a police spokesman.

 Renato S.A., de 52 a?os y nacionalidad filipina, detenido como presunto autor material del apu?alamiento, ocurrido sobre las doce menos cuarto de la noche del lunes, declar? hoy ante los agentes encargados del caso que los hechos ocurrieron cuando "varios" individuos intentaron atracarle cuando sal?a de una tienda de telefon?a m?vil cercana a la boca del metro.

Renato S.A., a 52 year old Filipino, was detained as the presumed author of the stabbing, which occurred at 11:45PM Monday.  Renato stated today to agents in charge of the case that the deeds occurred when "various" individuals tried to rob him when he left a mobile phone store near the entry to the metro train station.

En ese momento, el ciudadano filipino portaba una bolsa con su uniforme de trabajo, una cartera con su documentaci?n y 100 euros.

In this moment, the Filipino citizen carried a bag with his work uniform, a wallet with his documentation, and 100 Euros (approx $110US)


 La v?ctima del atraco logr? arrebatar a uno de los j?venes el cuchillo con el que pretend?an intimidarle auque, seg?n su declaraci?n, no lo utiliz? contra ninguno de ellos.

The victim of the hold-up managed to disarm the knife from one of the youths which was being used to intimidate him.  According to his statement he did not use it against any of them.

En un momento dado, Renato propin? varias pu?aladas a dos j?venes magreb?es -el fallecido, de 22 a?os, y un joven de 17 a?os-.

In a given moment, Renato gave various stabs to two Morrocan youths, the deceased, of 22 years, and a youth of 17 years.

En ese momento pasaba por la zona un coche patrulla de la Polic?a Municipal, que vio lo sucedido y emprendi? la persecuci?n del agresor consiguiendo detenerle.

In that moment a passing police patrol saw what was happening and began a chase which succeeded in detaining him (Renato)

El joven de 20 a?os presentaba una herida con arma blanca en el hemit?rax izquierdo, que le provoc? una gran p?rdida de sangre, adem?s de otra herida de menor importancia en la mu?eca izquierda.

The youth of 20  (should read 22 years?) years presented a knife wound to the left "hemitorax" (?) which caused him a great loss of blood, as well as another wound of less importance to the left wrist.

 Adem?s, entr? en parada cardiorrespiratoria, de la que no pudo ser recuperado, por lo que finalmente falleci?.

Then he entered into cardiac arrest, from which he could not be recovered and from which he died.

Por su parte, el de 17 a?os presentaba una herida con arma blanca en la regi?n superior del abdomen y fue trasladado, con pron?stico reservado, a la Cl?nica de la Concepci?n.

The youth of 17 years was cut upon the abdomen and was taken, with guarded condition, to the Clinic of the Immaculate Conception.

30928  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / An Army of 1 --and 1 in the oven on: October 21, 2003, 02:20:20 PM
This article addresses some aspects of this:


Israeli women won't see combat
Study finds females can't lift as much, march as far as males

Posted: October 20, 2003
2:55 p.m. Eastern
? 2003

A military study conducted by the Israeli army has concluded women are a weaker sex, which means they will continue to be barred from most combat duties.

According to the study's findings reported in the Washington Times, women safely can carry 40 percent of their body weight compared with 55 percent for men. Because military-age women weigh 33 pounds less than men on average, the total weight-lifting disparity between the sexes amounts to 44 pounds on average.

In terms of endurance, the study found while men could handle 55-mile marches, any trek longer than 32 miles was found to be too arduous for women. Researchers attributed this to the fact that the amount of oxygen-carrying hemoglobin in women's blood was more than 10 percent lower than in men's blood.

The Times reports Israeli army doctors assessing these limitations recommend women not serve in front-line infantry positions, artillery units or tank crews.

This comes as the Israeli government has called up 10 battalions of reserve soldiers to handle the escalating violence in the region.
The army study mirrors the earlier findings of Israeli scholar Martin van Creveld, a specialist in international conflict and author of the book "Men, Women and War," who found that women lacked the physical strength needed for fighting at close quarters and that their relative weakness could, in some cases, put themselves and their comrades in unjustifiable danger.

Van Creveld concluded sending women into frontline combat units would reduce efficiency, increase costs and could prove "criminal." His opinion largely swayed British officials in their 2001 decision not to lift the ban on women in combat.

The Israeli army study also fuels the long-simmering debate over the role of female servicewomen in the U.S. military. Proponents of women in combat historically point to the experience of Israeli servicewomen who fought alongside men in the 1948 independence war as an example to be emulated.

Retired Navy Capt. Lory Manning, director of the Center for Women in Uniform for the Women's Research and Education Institute, argues some women are strong enough and physically capable of serving in infantry and Special Forces and that, given training, those who aren't can make up for their weaknesses.

Manning cites British studies in which women were called upon to run six miles carrying 55 pounds on their back. After approximately three months of special conditioning, they could do it.

"The only difference between men and women is that you have to invest more time and training for women," Manning told WorldNetDaily.
Citing anecdotal evidence, van Creveld calls the lore of female "Amazon" soldiers myths.

"There is no more reason to believe they ever existed any more than Barbarella or Wonderwoman," he told the London Sunday Telegraph.
Van Creveld, who has studied the historical experiences of women in the military dating back to the Roman era, works to "explode the myth" about Israeli women in combat serving as ably as men. During the 1948 independence war, for example, women only served a brief couple of weeks on the frontlines before a group was ambushed and the desecration of their bodies prompted officials to sideline women warriors.
Israel is the only country in the world to have compulsory military service for women. While men must serve three years in the Israel Defense Forces, all women are required to serve 21 months.
Despite a 1995 Israeli court ruling that struck down the "men-only" rule for combat units, women have not served in combat since 1948, and integration into combat-support platoons has been slow. According to IDF statistics, 84 percent of female soldiers still serve in administrative roles with only 1 percent training for combat roles, and 82 percent of female soldiers have had no weapons training.

Israeli servicewomen point to their sisters-in-arms in America to push for further integration in Israeli forces. Since the elimination in 1994 of the United States Department of Defense "Risk Rule," which held that women could not be placed in combat-support units that had "significant risk of capture," American servicewomen have been serving among combat-engineer companies on the ground, populating combatant ships and sitting in the cockpits of jets, bombers and Apache attack helicopters.
"In the U.S. Army, you see the girls going everywhere and doing all things," a 20-year-old Israeli trooper told the Austin American-Statesman. "I know it sounds bad, but one day I hope they'll transfer us to the hot places, too. I want to have a chance to prove myself and show everyone what I've learned."

"We are a nation that has to take war seriously," van Creveld testified in 1992 for a U.S. presidential commission studying the ramifications of allowing women in combat. "We are proud of the fact that we have not had women serve in combat [since 1948] even in the most desperate of times."

Military advocates opposed to women serving in combat in the U.S. welcome the Israeli army study as additional ammunition for their fight.
Elaine Donnelly, president of the Center for Military Readiness, an independent public-policy organization that specializes in military personnel issues, and a member of WND's Speakers Bureau, said the disparity in physical strength between men and women matters. She pointed to the Army's fielding of a new rucksack for soldiers estimated to weigh 120 pounds when loaded to full capacity.

Operation Iraqi Freedom was the first combat test for the new Modular Lightweight Load-bearing Equipment, or MOLLE. The Army Times reported the excessive weight of the rucksack hampered a 101st Airborne Division air assault in May as "infantrymen staggered under the load."

"If women can't carry their own backpacks, then men must carry them, which adds to their burden. The physical limitations are practical realities," Donnelly told WorldNetDaily.

Donnelly recently launched a petition drive calling on President George W. Bush to roll back Clinton-era "social-engineering policies" she says undermine readiness, discipline and morale.

The "Americans for the Military" petition, which has gained approximately 15,000 signatures, asks Bush to direct Pentagon officials to "objectively review and revise social policies" such as:

?Assignments of female soldiers in or near land combat units with a high risk of capture;

?Admittedly inefficient co-ed basic training;

?Prolonged family separations and pregnancy policies that detract from readiness;

?Gender-based recruiting "goals" and quotas that hurt morale and increase costs.

Donnelly hopes to present the petition in a personal meeting with Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. While she has met with White House officials, no meeting is yet scheduled.
30929  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Libertarian themes on: October 21, 2003, 02:16:09 PM
2600 Virginia Avenue, NW, Suite 100
Washington DC 20037
World Wide Web: ====================================
For release: October 16, 2003 ====================================
For additional information:
George Getz, Communications Director
Phone: (202) 333-0008

America owes talk host Rush Limbaugh a debt of gratitude, Libertarians say


WASHINGTON, DC -- The entire nation owes radio broadcaster Rush
Limbaugh a debt of gratitude, Libertarians say, because his ordeal has
exposed every drug warrior in America as a rank hypocrite.

"One thing we don't hear from American politicians very often is
silence," said Joe Seehusen, Libertarian Party executive director. "By
refusing to criticize Rush Limbaugh, every drug warrior has just been
exposed as a shameless, despicable hypocrite. And that's good news,
because the next time they do speak up, there'll be no reason for
anyone to listen."

The revelation that Limbaugh had become addicted to painkillers --
drugs he is accused of procuring illegally from his housekeeper  -- has
caused a media sensation ever since the megastar's shocking, on-air
confession last week.  

As the Limbaugh saga continues, here's an important question for
Americans to ask, Libertarians say: Why are all the drug warriors
suddenly so silent?

"Republican and Democratic politicians have written laws that have
condemned more than 400,000 Americans to prison for committing the same 'crime' as Rush Limbaugh," Seehusen pointed out. "If this pill-popping pontificator deserves a get-out-of-jail-free card, these drug warriors had better explain why."

Given their longstanding support for the Drug War, it's fair to ask:

Why haven't President George Bush or his tough-on-crime attorney
general, John Ashcroft, uttered a word criticizing Limbaugh's law- breaking?

Why aren't drug czar John P. Walters or his predecessor, Barry
McCaffrey, lambasting Limbaugh as a menace to society and a threat to
"our children?"

Why aren't federal DEA agents storming Limbaugh's $30 million Florida
mansion in a frantic search for criminal evidence?

Why haven't federal, state, and local police agencies seized the
celebrity's homes and luxury cars under asset-forfeiture laws?

Finally, why aren't bloviating blabbermouths like William Bennett
publicly explaining how America would be better off if Limbaugh were
prosecuted, locked in a steel cage and forced to abandon his wife, his
friends, and his career?

The answer is obvious, Seehusen said: "America's drug warriors are
shameless hypocrites who believe in one standard of justice for
ordinary Americans and another for themselves, their families and their
political allies.

"That alone should completely discredit them."

But there's an even more disturbing possibility, Seehusen said: that
the people who are prosecuting the Drug War don't even believe in its
central premise -- which is that public safety requires that drug users
be jailed.

"The Bushes and Ashcrofts and McCaffreys of the world may believe,
correctly, that individuals fighting a drug addiction deserve medical,
not criminal treatment," he said. "That would explain why they're not
demanding that Limbaugh be jailed.

"But if that's the case, these politicians have spent decades tearing
apart American families for their own political gain. And that's an
unforgivable crime."

The Libertarian Party                      
2600 Virginia Ave. NW, Suite 100                    voice: 202-333-0008
Washington DC 20037                                   fax: 202-333-0072
30930  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Challenging Statements on: October 21, 2003, 09:04:29 AM
Woof Ringo:

  Just back from business travel and went to take a look but could not find it.  Which of the forums is it in? Do you have a specific URL?

Crafty Dog
30931  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Weird and/or silly on: October 16, 2003, 10:23:24 AM
Court flips middle-finger verdict
Man found guilty for 'shooting the bird' has conviction overturned

Posted: October 16, 2003
1:00 a.m. Eastern

? 2003

A Texas man feels like he's No. 1 now that his conviction for "shooting the bird" has been flipped.

Robert Coggin, 34, had been found guilty of disorderly conduct for making an obscene gesture with his middle finger in a road-rage style incident in the town of Lockhart two years ago.

But an appeals court has overturned the verdict, saying while the gesture may be rude, it does not necessarily rise to the level of disorderly conduct.

According to the Houston Chronicle, Coggin flashed his lights to pass a slow-moving vehicle driven by John Pastrano, a Caldwell County jailer.

Thinking he was being pulled over by a police officer, Pastrano moved to the right lane. As Coggin then passed Pastrano, he allegedly used the finger gesture many consider obscene.

Pastrano called 9-1-1, and Coggin was subsequently issued a citation for a Class C misdemeanor.

The Chronicle reports Coggin was charged under an obscure law that says "a person commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly makes an offensive gesture or display in a public place, and the gesture or display tends to incite an immediate breach of the peace."

Coggin denied he ever flipped the bird, but was fined $250 upon his conviction. He also spent $15,000 fighting the charge.

The 3rd Court of Appeals in Austin not only ordered Coggin's acquittal, but it offered some historical context, quoting a Merriam-Webster definition of the "bird" as "an obscene gesture of contempt made by pointing the middle finger up while keeping the other fingers down."

According to the Chronicle, jurists further explained that "the middle finger jerk was so popular among the Romans that they even gave a special name to the middle digit, calling it the impudent finger: digitus impudicus.

"It was also known as the obscene finger, or the infamous finger, and there are a number of references to its use in the writings of classical authors. ... " the jurists continued. "The middle-finger jerk has survived for over 2,000 years and is still current in many parts of the world, especially in the United States."
30932  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / WW3 on: October 14, 2003, 10:42:48 AM
Geopolitical Diary: Tuesday, Oct. 14, 2003

Last week saw an interesting evolution in the U.S.-Islamist war, an
evolution that revealed itself over the past 48 hours. The initial purpose
of the Iraq campaign was to position the United States to bring pressure on the countries surrounding Iraq -- particularly Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia. Indeed, in the immediate aftermath of the campaign, terrific pressure was brought on all three countries. The unexpected emergence of a guerrilla campaign in Iraq seemed to constrain the United States in projecting its power. As the reality of the guerrilla campaign set in, the United States focused inside Iraq, creating a situation in which the war in Iraq had no end beyond Iraq.

U.S. pressure was not without consequence. Saudi Arabia, in particular,
moved to comply with U.S. wishes concerning the destruction of al Qaeda
inside the kingdom. Iran proved willing to accommodate the United States, albeit at a price. However, Syria appeared to read the situation in Iraq as a quagmire that limited any threat from the United States. After initially seeming to move toward an accommodation with the United States, Syria shifted its policy by last summer, clearly calculating that the United States would be in no position to threaten Syria while the Iraqi campaign festered.

There is little question but that U.S. momentum in the war declined as the
guerrilla war set in. However, it appears to us that, over the past week or
so, the United States has moved toward regaining momentum and is reasserting pressure, particularly toward Syria, and to a lesser extent, Iran. Indeed, Syria currently finds itself locked in a massive crisis that it did not expect. Reports say that Syria is mobilizing its military, but -- mobilized or not -- it has few military options. It has been trapped by the sudden reversal of U.S. energy.

Essentially, the United States appears to have decided that the guerrilla
war won't be over for a while, so waiting until the war's end to exploit the
occupation of Iraq would mean waiting for a long time. Therefore, the United States has launched a strategic offensive while the guerrilla campaign continued unabated -- accepting the minimal risk the war posed to its rear.

Two pieces were put into place to squeeze the Iraqis. The first was
approving Israel's strike into Syria and using Israel's nuclear arsenal as a
threat to Syria -- and Iran. The second was reaching an agreement with
Turkey over the use of its troops in Iraq. This moved Turkey away from
neutrality and back toward its traditional pro-U.S. and pro-Israel stance.
With the United States on Syria's eastern frontier, Syria was trapped.
Seriously provoked by Israel's air raid, it has the choice of doing nothing,
or using Hezbollah to attack Israel -- triggering a massive response from
Israel. The pressure on Syria to shut down Palestinian and Islamist groups is intense. The internal political consequences of shutting them down also would be intense. Damascus is caught between a rock and a hard place -- right where Washington wants it.

Iran's case is much more complex. The United States and Iran share a common interest in preventing the victory of the Saddam Hussein-Islamist guerrilla force -- but that's not really a threat. The issue is not its victory but its defeat, and for this, the United States needs a highly motivated indigenous force. The Iraqi Shiite community -- so far, fairly quiet and tacitly accepting of U.S. occupation -- has been indispensable to that occupation. Without it, the U.S. position would be enormously more
difficult. Iran wants a sphere of influence in Iraq and the United States
might provide it -- depending on how badly the United States needs Iran. If Syria were to crumble, Iran's position would be far weaker -- and the price for its help lower.

At issue has been the price the United States would pay for Iran not
becoming a nuclear power. Over the weekend, the United States tried to
demonstrate -- with the reference to Israel's nuclear triad -- that Iran is
not going to become a nuclear power under any circumstance. The message to Iran was that it could either negotiate away its capability at a reasonable price, or lose that capability to an Israeli first strike. Israel cannot risk an Iranian nuclear device and will destroy it before it becomes
operational. Iran, of course, knows that. The United States has now told
Iran that it knows it, too. Iran is now trapped between two facts: First,
the device isn't operational -- and Israel won't let it become so. Second,
the United States won't stand in the way of Israel. That leaves Iran, like
Syria, with relatively few strategic options.

The interesting part of all this is that the United States increasingly
relies on partners to support its strategic maneuvers. The three countries
it now turns to are Israel, above all, but also Turkey and India. The United
States has depended on all three since the beginning of the war, but now its relationship with Israel is becoming much more open. This appears to be a strategic decision on the part of the United States. It needs to break out of the bind it finds itself in Iraq; it needs to make something happen to move the war along. The United States understands the price of playing the Israeli card. It also understands that it needs help where it can get it.
30933  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / WW3 on: October 13, 2003, 01:39:29 AM
One way or the other, we are determined to deny Iraq the capacity to
develop weapons of mass destruction and the missiles to deliver them. That is our bottom line."
  - President Clinton, Feb. 4, 1998

  "If Saddam rejects peace and we have to use force, our purpose is clear. We want to seriously diminish the threat posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program."
     - President Clinton, Feb. 17, 1998

  "Iraq is a long way from [here], but what happens there matters a great deal here.  For the risks that the leaders of a rogue state will use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons against us or our allies is the greatest security threat we face."
     - Madeline Albright, Feb 18, 1998

  "He will use those weapons of mass destruction again, as he has ten times since 1983."  Sandy Berger, Clinton National Security Adviser, Feb, 18, 1998

  "[W]e urge you, after consulting with Congress, and consistent with the U.S. Constitution and laws, to take necessary actions (including, if appropriate, air and missile strikes on suspect Iraqi sites) to respond effectively to the threat posed by Iraq's refusal to end its weapons of mass destruction programs."
     - Letter to President Clinton, signed by Sens. Carl Levin, Tom Daschle, John Kerry, and others Oct. 9, 1998

  "Saddam Hussein has been engaged in the development of weapons of mass destruction technology which is a threat to countries in the region and he has made a mockery of the weapons inspection process."
- Rep. Nancy Pelosi (D, CA), Dec. 16, 1998

"Hussein has ... chosen to spend his money on building weapons of mass  destruction and palaces for his cronies."
     - Madeline Albright, Clinton Secretary of State, Nov. 10, 1999

"There is no doubt that ... Saddam Hussein has invigorated his weapons
programs.  Reports indicate that biological, chemical and nuclear programs continue apace and may be back to pre-Gulf War status.  In addition, Saddam continues to redefine delivery systems and is doubtless using the cover of a licit missile program to develop longer-range missiles that will threaten the United States and our allies."
     - Letter to President Bush, Signed by Sen. Bob Graham (D, FL,) and others, December 5, 2001

"We begin with the common belief that Saddam Hussein is a tyrant and a
threat to the peace and stability of the region.  He has ignored the
mandated of the United Nations and is building weapons of mass destructionand the means of delivering them."
     - Sen. Carl Levin (D, MI), Sept. 19, 2002

"We know that he has stored secret supplies of biological and chemical
weapons throughout his country."
  - Al Gore, Sept. 23, 2002

"Iraq's search for weapons of mass destruction has proven impossible to
deter and we should assume that it will continue for as long as Saddam is in power."
     - Al Gore, Sept. 23, 2002

  "We have known for many years that Saddam Hussein is seeking and developing weapons of mass destruction."
     - Sen. Ted Kennedy (D, MA), Sept. 27, 2002

"The last UN weapons inspectors left Iraq in October of 1998.  We are
confident that Saddam Hussein retains some stockpiles of chemical and
biological weapons, and that he has since embarked on a crash course to
build up his chemical and biological warfare capabilities.  Intelligence
reports indicate that he is seeking nuclear weapons..."
     - Sen. Robert Byrd (D, WV), Oct. 3, 2002

"I will be voting to give the President of the United States the authority
to use force-- if necessary-- to disarm Saddam Hussein because I believe
that a deadly arsenal of weapons of mass destruction in his hands is a real and grave threat to our security."
     - Sen. John F. Kerry (D, MA), Oct. 9, 2002

  "There is unmistakable evidence that Saddam Hussein is working aggressively to develop nuclear weapons and will likely have nuclear weapons within the next five years ... We also should remember we have always underestimated the progress Saddam has made in development of weapons of mass destruction."
     - Sen. Jay Rockefeller (D, WV), Oct 10, 2002

  "He has systematically violated, over the course of the past 11 years, every significant UN resolution that has demanded that he disarm and destroy his chemical and biological weapons, and any nuclear capacity.  This he has refused to do"  Rep.
     - Henry Waxman (D, CA), Oct. 10, 2002

  "In the four years since the inspectors left, intelligence reports show that
Saddam Hussein has worked to rebuild his chemical and biological weap ons stock, his missile delivery capability, and his nuclear program.  He has also given aid, comfort, and sanctuary to terrorists, including al Qaeda members.. It is clear, however, that if left unchecked, Saddam Hussein will continue to increase his capacity to wage biological and chemical warfare, and will keep trying to develop nuclear weapons."
     - Sen. Hillary Clinton (D, NY), Oct 10, 2002

  "We are in possession of what I think to be compelling evidence that Saddam n bsp;    Hussein has, and has had for a number of years, a developing capacity for the production and storage of weapons of mass destruction."
     - Sen. Bob Graham (D, FL), Dec. 8, 2002

  "Without question, we need to disarm Saddam Hussein.  He is a brutal,
murderous dictator, leading an oppressive regime ... He presents a
particularly grievous threat because he is so consistently prone to
miscalculation ... And now he is miscalculating America's response to his continued deceit and his consistent grasp for weapons of mass destruction
... So the threat of Saddam Hussein with weapons of mass destruction is real..."
     - Sen. John F. Kerry (D, MA), Jan. 23. 2003
30934  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Black Eagle Society in england on: October 11, 2003, 11:29:58 AM
Woof Arzh:

  I had some email correspondence with Pat several years ago, but that is it.  There is no connection.  

Crafty Dog
30935  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Political Rants on: October 10, 2003, 02:18:03 PM
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October 10, 2003, 8:42 a.m.
Legends of the Fall
More myths about the current war.

?The war is against 'terror'." As a number of astute observers have reminded us, terror is a method, not an enemy. And we are no more in a war against it than we were once fighting the scourge of Zeros or the plague of Soviet MiGs.


Such vague, loose nomenclature is reassuring, of course, in our therapeutic society. It ensures that we are not really angry at any one person or nation, but rather at an abstraction ? as if somewhere there were soldiers with caps embroidered, " Republic of Terror," or crowds chanting "Up with Terror, Down with the USA," or perhaps thuggish leaders in sunglasses and khaki who beat their shoes at the U.N. and warn, "Terrorism will bury you."

In fact, those who employ terror of the type that culminated (rather than began) on September 11 are real people with real government backing. They cannot operate without money, havens, and at least passive complicity. Who are they? Aside from the deposed Taliban, al Qaeda, of course; but also Hezbollah and its sponsors in Iran ? as well as Islamofascist groups funded and abetted by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. After 9/11, any autocratic country in the Middle East that had recently gone to war with the United States and cumulatively required 350,000 American air sorties, twelve years, $20 billion of policing, and occupation of two-thirds of its airspace to prevent genocide was an enemy, both de facto and ? given Iraq's violation of the armistice accords of 1991 ? de jure. That Abu Abbas and Abu Nidal were in Baghdad before the war, and al Qaeda afterward, is the expected calculus of the Hussein regime and its noxious fumes.

While we may be in various stages of bellicosity with differing states, the fact is that after September 11 we will either accept defeat and stay within our borders to fight a defensive war of hosing down fires, bulldozing rubble, arresting terrorist cells, and hoping to appease or buy off our enemies abroad ? or we will eventually have to confront Syria, Lebanon's Bekka Valley, Saudi Arabia, and Iran with a clear request to change and come over to civilization, or join the Taliban and Saddam Hussein.

Of course, a single dead American soldier is a tragedy, both for the nation and for the aggrieved family. But, by any historical measure, what strikes students of this war so far in its first two years is the amazing degree to which the United States has hurt its enemies without incurring enormous casualties and costs. So far there have been five theaters of conflict: Washington, New York, Pennsylvania, Afghanistan, and Iraq. After suffering about 3,000 dead, $100 billion in direct material damage in Manhattan and D.C., and perhaps another $1 trillion hit to the economy at large in areas as diverse as airline losses, increased security expenditures, and tourist and travel drop-offs, the United States has lost under 400 soldiers in defeating the Taliban and Saddam Hussein, and probably spent roughly $100 billion in direct military expenditures, with another $100 billion in slated reconstruction costs.

In terms of American military history, this is a staggering paradox. Usually the initial attacks that have prompted past American wars were relatively mild, while the subsequent reaction was costly ? in the manner that Fort Sumter paled in comparison with Shiloh, or Tonkin was not Hue, or Pearl Harbor was nothing like Iwo Jima. But 9/11 itself was much more deadly than all of the subsequent campaigns that have followed in the last two years. Unlike other wars, our present offensives going into the third year of fighting have cost far fewer lives than the first 25 months of any major conflict in American history ? the Revolutionary War, the Civil War, World War I, or World War II. But then, to see the logic of this anomaly, one must first accept the initial premise that we are currently in a war ? and millions of Americans apparently do not.

Of course, we cringe in despair at Americans killed and billions of dollars in costs to rebuild Iraq. But what is truly strange about the opposition to military efforts since 9/11 is the absence of a serious alternative strategy. It is easy to quibble about going into Iraq or the problems of sniping, bombing, or power and water in Baghdad; but so far the opponents of the war have not advocated any of the measures that their spiritual forerunners in Vietnam found so successful in ending hostilities ? from sit-ins, daily demonstrations, and teach-ins, to military resistance and the cut-off of funding.

The Senate, which voted overwhelming to give President Bush the authority to fight in Iraq, has few voices who wish either to rescind that legal prerogative or to deny funds for it. Our supposed European enemies have organized no real counterbalance to pressure us to leave; even Sweden has not yet recalled its ambassador. French newspapers may blare, "The slowly rotting situation in Iraq, the Mideast and Afghanistan has destroyed the myth American omnipotence," but they don't tell us how removing the Taliban and Saddam Hussein is worse than selling weapons to them ? or why and how France lost 30 times more of its own citizens to heat in a month than we lost soldiers in battle in two years. Apparently French apartments are far more deadly places than the Pakistani border or the Sunni Triangle.

Here at home, the campuses are relatively quiet. The most recently announced Democratic presidential candidate, Gen. Clark, is on record praising the present administration for arresting the drift of prior years. And for all of Howard Dean's invective, he is no Eugene McCarthy, and thus has offered no proposals to end the appropriations for Iraq in lieu of empty slurs and smug criticisms.

Why? Besides the obvious fact that fewer American soldiers have been killed in two years of fighting than often were lost in one week in Vietnam, it is hard to rescind a war that has made the United States more secure and 26 million people freer ? and taken out the most odious fascist in the Middle East, who was once bombed by Bill Clinton without either Senate or U.N. approval. So when Wesley Clark in May 2001 applauded the Bush team for its efforts to restore deterrence, and most of the serious Democratic candidates supported the Clinton administration in its past bombing to prevent the spread of Saddam's WMDs, it is tricky now simply to convince anyone that the entire thing was cooked up in Texas.

Americans may be angry, but most of them are irritated with the Iraqis, for not assuming responsibility for their own fate and showing some gratitude for their liberation ? as well as the Arab world in general, whose "moderate" journalists and intellectuals are more critical of the new democratic council in Baghdad than the corrupt autocracies in Cairo, Damascus, and on the West Bank.

Which countries have become hostile to the United States in the wake of the Iraqi war? The United Kingdom? Australia? Spain? Italy? Have even India, Russia, or China turned away or threatened us? Have Jordan and Egypt thrown up their hands and joined the enemy?

Besides North Korea, Syria, and Iran, those states peeved at recent events are, in fact, a handful of countries ? Germany, France, Belgium, Sweden, Greece, Syria, Palestine, Algeria, and a few other Arab states. Many of them, as we speak, are still engaged in some sort of military relationship with the United States ? NATO coordination, Mediterranean patrolling, hosting of United States troops ? joint operations all subject to sudden cancellation at the pleasure of any of these governments. European elites might harp at GPS bombs, but the masses quietly at home, far away from the coffeehouses, acknowledge that the use of such precision weapons during the last decade ? whether in Belgrade, Kabul, or Baghdad ? hinged on one salient characteristic: They were intended to distinguish fascists from the victims of their state-sanctioned murder.

Ex post facto, all presidents are blamed for getting Americans into wars ? from Wilson in World War I to Reagan in Grenada, as incidents like Pearl Harbor, Tonkin, and the captive students in Grenada were all said to have been concocted. Did Lincoln, Wilson, Roosevelt, Johnson, and Reagan all lie, misjudge, or overreact to draw us into wars?

But, in contrast, this war was predicated on a variety of immediate reasons ? so much so that antebellum critics complained that the Bush administration was using a shot-gun approach in advancing too many causes for war: the broken agreements of 1991; twelve years of no-fly zones that were legal acts of war; Saddam's past invasions or attacks against four countries; genocide against the Kurds; violation of U.N. accords; the harboring of terrorists in a post-9/11 world; and a host of others. The WMD charge was also predicated on the Clinton administration's bombing and perhaps killing 1,000 Iraqis to take out Saddam's WMD capability; thus, according to popular belief here and abroad, these weapons once existed, and yet the bombing offered no proof of their destruction.

There is, however, a political crisis. Critics of the near-flawless military campaign of three weeks were stymied when none of their bleak scenarios came to pass: thousands killed; millions of refugees; governments toppled; terrorist attacks in the United States; mass starvation; and hundreds of U.N. camps. Thus in a frenzied election year they have turned to two backup positions: reconstruction as "quagmire" and WMDs as the sole (and fraudulent) reason for war. Both strategies are risky because they presuppose that a year from now Iraq will be worse, not better, and that there will be no forthcoming textual or eyewitness reports that such weapons in fact were hidden, exported, or secretly dismantled as some goofy gambit of an unhinged dictator.

Finally, rogue states like Iran and North Korea will soon emulate the strategy of Saddam Hussein ? but learning the critical lesson of first finishing their bombs before invading neighbors or confronting the United States. Thus the irony of this phony debate is that, in the future, an exasperated United States, in an act of unilateral defense, will reluctantly shy away from the thankless task of policing such regimes, and instead press on with its own military preparedness and missile defense ? allowing the more circumspect and purportedly sober EU and U.N. to pay blackmail or pass empty resolutions to deal with these new rogue nuclear states.

Good luck to them both.
30936  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Guro Crafty/Spain Stabbing on: October 10, 2003, 01:10:20 AM
Woof Enganyo:

  Thank you very much-- it is the one I had in mind.  

  There were a couple of things I didn't understand:

1) Does "atracar" mean "atacar" or something else?

2)  What does "arrebatar" mean?

3)  What does "propino'" mean?  I would have guessed "tipped" as in "he tipped the waiter" (propina, propinar) but that does not seem very logical here wink

4) What does "arma blanca" mean?  The literal "White weapon" does not seem to make much sense.

Thank you,
Crafty Dog
30937  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Weird and/or silly on: October 09, 2003, 01:32:07 PM
30938  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Current Events: Philippines on: October 09, 2003, 08:56:43 AM
1138 GMT - PHILIPPINES: Philippine authorities have recaptured suspected Muslim militant Omar Opik Lasal, who escaped from prison in July with convicted bomber Fathur Rohman al Ghozi, at a checkpoint in Zamboanga del Sur in the southern Philippines, officials say. Lasal is believed to be a member of the militant group Abu Sayyaf, and al Ghozi is a self-proclaimed member of al Qaeda-affiliated Jemaah Islamiyah. Al Ghozi remains at large.
30939  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / WW3 on: October 08, 2003, 12:55:11 PM

Geopolitical Diary, Wednesday, Oct. 8, 2003

The Turkish Parliament has voted to send troops to Iraq to support the U.S. occupation. Many of the details are blurry, particularly the timing of the insertion of troops. However, it appears that the Turks have agreed to send about 10,000 troops, nearly a division, that will deploy in the Sunni triangle -- the heart of the guerrilla war in Iraq.

Turkey's reversal of its noninvolvement policy is a major achievement for
the United States. In fact, it is the first major shift in the United
States' favor in a long while. The United States needs a cohesive force to
engage in operations in the Sunni region. That is to say, it does not really
need more international divisions whose various elements can't speak to each other. Moreover, the United States needs the active support of Islamic countries. The Turkish government is moderately Islamic, even if the regime is institutionally secular.

The Turks lend political cover to the United States -- globally and in the
Islamic world. The cover is hardly comprehensive, but it's more than the
United States had yesterday. The United States also needs troops to share the burden. Obviously, a price will have to be paid. Some of the cost is already visible, and some is not.

The visible cost is with the Kurds. Turkey vehemently opposes the creation of an independent Kurdish state, and doesn't particularly want to see Kurdish autonomy even in Iraq. The Kurds are one of the United States' firmest assets in Iraq. Kurdish forces are patrolling the Iraq-Iran
frontier, as well as conducting other operations in the northeast. Unless
the Kurds and Turks have accepted some sort of prior understanding, the
United States and the Kurds will have some real issues.

This also raises a question that we have been discussing for quite a
while -- the affect on the evolution of U.S. relations with the Shiites and
Iran. Clearly, the decision to keep the Turks in Sunni areas is conditioned
by military reality. It is also affected by political reality. The United
States is shifting responsibility in the south to the Shiite community. They
can probably live with the Turks in the north, so long as they don't come

The real mystery is why Turkey shifted its position. Part of the answer
concerns geopolitical reality. For all the stress and strain, the reality is
that the United States occupies Iraq and is the dominant military power in
the region. Turkey has interests in Iraq and cannot afford to be frozen out
of U.S. planning for the region. Another part concerns internal politics.
The Turkish military is secular and pro-United States. The government is
Islamic and has mixed feelings about the United States. The military is
institutionally the guardian of the secular character of the regime. In
plain English, that means that the military can stage a coup if it wants. A
coup wasn't near, but any Turkish government tries to take military
sensibilities into account. Still, the United States promised something
beyond money to Turkey. Turkey's decision is a godsend to the United States and the Turks know it. There is a price, as yet undisclosed.

It should be noted that Syria had a really bad day today. The Israelis hit
it from the air and massed on the Lebanese border. The Americans probed along its eastern frontier. And apart from all this, the Turkey-U.S. deal creates a major threat from the north. Syrian-Turkish relations have not been the warmest, to say the least. Renewing cooperation with the United States puts Turkey into play to Syria's north. Apart from everything else, Damascus is feeling the heat.

In a way, this puts the U.S. core strategy back on track: first, occupy
Iraq; second, bring pressure to bear on surrounding countries. Turkey's
decision bolsters the U.S. position in Iraq. It also massively increases the
pressure on, and isolation of, Syria. It goes without saying that it also
increases the likelihood of al Qaeda striking Turkey at the first practical
30940  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Weird and/or silly on: October 07, 2003, 11:26:13 AM
Updated: 10-06-2003 12:39:05 PM

Backfire Ignites Dog, Dog Sets Grass Fire in Idaho

CULDESAC, Idaho (AP) -- This dog was having a bad fur day. The dog, whose coat caught fire when the owner's vehicle backfired, ignited a grass fire just off U.S. Highway 95.

Firefighters doused the grass fire and reported the dog was unhurt, only smelling of burnt hair.

``I have been in firefighting for many years, but I have never seen anything like this happen,'' Culdesac Fire Chief Gary Gilliam said.

It happened Saturday when a motorist who ran out of fuel put gas in the tank and then primed the carburetor. On restarting, the van backfired, throwing sparks into the cab and igniting the dog's fur.

A passenger let the dog out, and it rolled in dry grass, putting out the flames on its coat but setting the grass afire.
30941  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / WW3 on: October 06, 2003, 07:23:48 PM
Please feel free to send the Stratfor Weekly to a friend
or colleague.

06 October 2003
by Dr. George Friedman

The Dangers of Overconfidence


The 1973 Arab-Israeli War redefined the Arab-Israeli conflict,
the shape of the Arab world and the international economic order -- given that the war triggered the Arab oil embargo. It was a significant event in 20th century history. Its origins were in Israel's victory in 1967 and its overconfidence about its ability to read the Arab mind. Like the Sept. 11 attacks, Oct. 6, 1973, began as a massive intelligence failure. Moreover, the Israeli intelligence failure shaped Arab thinking about the nature of war and the role of intelligence in it. They learned that managing the enemy's intelligence process compensated for military weakness. It is a lesson that is still very much with us.


Oct. 6, 2003, marks the 30th anniversary of what the Israelis call the Yom Kippur War and the Arabs call the Ramadan War. That war represented the end of the first phase of the Arab-Israeli conflict, which we might call the era of conventional warfare. It opened up the second phase, which we might call the era of unconventional warfare. In one sense, the 1973 war changed everything by precluding the resumption of conventional warfare. In another sense, it changed nothing, leaving the fundamental issues unresolved. For 30 years the world has lived with the results of the 1973 war. As evidenced by the Israeli strike against a training camp in Syria on Oct. 5, the permanence of the post-1973 situation remains intact.

Everything in the Middle East must be understood in terms of what went before, but it's an infinite regression that always returns to the starting point: a deadlock. The same is true for the 1973 war. Israel carried out a full peripheral attack in June 1967.  Whether the war was triggered by Egypt's expulsion of U.N. advisers, closing the Straits of Tirana and mobilization in the Sinai -- or whether it was hardwired into Israeli strategy from the beginning -- is one of those infinite regressions. Suffice that it did happen, and that Israel occupied the Sinai, the West Bank and the Golan Heights.

Israel assumed that its victory in 1967 had improved its national security. First, it provided Israel with strategic depth, which it never had before. An attack by its neighbors, particularly Egypt and Syria, would first be fought outside of Israel. That gave the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) room to retreat and maneuver. Second, the Israeli defeat of the Egyptian army was so devastating that analysts assumed it would take a generation for the Egyptians to recover. Israel came out of 1967 feeling that it had pushed the boundaries of space and time sufficiently to give Israel a generation of peace. Israel also believed, sincerely in our view, that 1967 would set the stage for negotiations that would trade land for peace -- how much land and how much peace were left undetermined.

The Arab perception of the defeat paralleled that of the
Israelis. They understood that they had suffered a humiliating
defeat, but they concluded that the humiliation made peace
impossible. For the Arabs, any peace built on the 1967 foundation would represent a permanent capitulation to helplessness. Therefore, when Arab leaders met in Khartoum shortly after the war, they did two things. First, they issued their famous "three no's" -- no negotiation, no recognition, no peace. Second, they formally acknowledged the existence of a Palestinian nation independent of Jordan or Syria and outside the conceptual confines of the Arab nation. Palestine became a nation in its own right.

Thus, the Palestine Liberation Organization, under Yasser Arafat, became the effective government of the Palestinian national movement, and that movement came to be seen in the Arab world as ultimately autonomous. The Arabs effectively decided that there had to be another war, the purpose of which would not be so much to reverse the geographical outcome of the 1967 war as to reverse
its psychological outcome. The decision was to validate a
Palestinian national movement -- the same that dominates the landscape today -- coupled with another conventional war.

The Israelis were driven by a basic view of the Arabs as
incapable of mounting modern military operations. There was no question about the bravery of individual Arab soldiers; the only ones who sneered at their courage had never fought them. But the complexities of mastering advanced technologies, and more important, the difficulties of mastering the enormous organizational challenges involved in mobile warfare, undermined the Arabs' ability to fight a conventional war. The IDF and most observers thought this was a permanent condition. Therefore, the decisions made in Khartoum were viewed as unfortunate, but subcritical. If the Arabs did not want to make peace in 1967, then the Israelis would occupy the conquered territories until they changed their mind. There was no question for the Israelis about whether the Arabs could reverse 1967 by force of arms.

The issue was this: No matter how dominant Israel was on the battlefield, geography and demography precluded a definitive defeat like the United States had dealt Japan. Israel could extend its borders, but it could not render the Arabs permanently incapable of resistance. Arab states did not have a problem obtaining weapons -- the Soviets were happy to provide them. Nor did they lack manpower. Their problem was cultural: training a largely peasant army to use modern technology within a contemporary military organization. Since the Israelis thought the latter impossible, the former did not bother them too much.

For the Arabs, therefore, demonstrating an ability to transform their military culture became the center of gravity of the problem. No political evolution was conceivable -- or permissible -- while the Arabs were militarily helpless. Therefore, the Egyptians in particular began a program not only to rearm their military, but also to reorganize it culturally, intellectually and morally. The goal was the regeneration of the Egyptian army and, therefore, the resurrection of Egyptian foreign policy.

From the Israeli point of view, the Egyptians were the only real issue. If the Egyptians did not or could not fight, the Israelis easily could manage Syria and Jordan, either militarily or politically. However, if Egypt did fight, and if Syria for
example joined the fight, then Israeli forces, on the defensive, would be in danger of being drawn into the one kind of war they could not win: a war of attrition. Israel's strategic doctrine was built around one thing: fighting pre-emptive wars to avoid having to fight simultaneously on multiple fronts at the time and choosing of their enemies.

The Egyptians understood the Israeli strategic problem and
defined a strategy to take advantage of it. Under superb security arrangements, they did not hide their preparations. They simply allowed Israeli intelligence to draw the wrong conclusions. Knowing that Israel had reached the conclusion that Egypt and Syria were incapable of mounting a complex, multidivision assault that involved multinational coordination, they took advantage of Israeli preconceptions to organize, practice and finally launch simultaneous assaults across the Suez Canal into the Sinai and on the Golan Heights.

In the end, the Israelis were able to contain the assaults,
although during the initial 24 hours it appeared that Israel was facing military catastrophe. It readied a nuclear option. After containment, Israel carried out counterattacks on both fronts that defeated Egypt and Syria militarily.

The military defeat, however, was coupled with a psychological triumph. First, Egypt and Syria had demonstrated that they were capable of modern warfare. Israel realized that it could not take Arab military incompetence for granted any longer. Israel retained military superiority, but could no longer assume that that superiority would be a permanent condition. More important, the Israelis realized that the foundation of their pre-emptive strategy depended on strategic intelligence. Pre-emption cannot
exist without foreknowledge of enemy intentions. The intelligence failure stunned the Israelis more than their military difficulties. If their intelligence could not recognize the
threat posed by hundreds of thousands of troops massed a few miles away, then Israel's first line of defense was an illusion, and Israeli national strategy was in jeopardy. The next time, the Egyptians might not halt under their SAM umbrella, but move forward.

It is at this point that Egyptian and Israeli grand strategy
converged. The Israelis could not reach a settlement over the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The emergence of the PLO and other related groups had created a situation in which Israeli withdrawal became more difficult to imagine. Nor could Israel maintain the occupation while also preparing for and fighting high-intensity conflicts along its frontiers. If Egypt remained hostile, Israel's security problem became nearly unmanageable. Israel needed to take Egypt out of the equation, and it did not have an easy military option to do so. Israel needed a political solution.

Egypt also had reached the conclusion that it needed to revise its political situation. Its relationship with the Soviet Union had led to disaster. First, it had been excluded from the U.S.-dominated trading system, with devastating effects on its economy. Second, the abyss between Israel and the Soviet Union meant that the Soviets could not broker a settlement with Israel, leaving Egypt in a permanent state of war. Third, the 1973 oil embargo had shifted the balance of power in the Arab world away from the radicals and toward the oil-rich conservatives. The wind was blowing from the right, and Egypt wanted to tack with the wind.

The net result was the Camp David peace accords, which ended the state of war between Egypt and Israel and neutralized the Sinai desert, leaving a symbolic contingent of American peacekeepers in the center and creating a large buffer zone between the two armies. Most important, in taking Egypt out of the military equation, it ended the possibility of an Arab-initiated conventional war against Israel. That was no longer a possibility. Therefore, it ended any hope on the part of the Palestinians that conventional force from other Arab countries might liberate them. The Israeli-Egyptian treaty in essence abandoned the Palestinians to their fate.

The Palestinians at that point had two choices. One was to accept Israeli political terms, which over the years of Arab rejection had shifted from a simple land-for-peace formula to a more aggressive plan to retain the West Bank in particular while making limited autonomy possible for the Palestinians. In effect, the Israelis felt they were under no pressure to yield to Palestinian demands for an independent state -- nor did they want to yield. The creation of a Palestinian state was conceivable only if the Israeli-Egyptian peace was irreversible. Otherwise, a Palestinian state coupled with an Egyptian reversal would recreate the pre-1967 reality.

Worse, it would create the geographical reality in a new military context. The Israelis had discovered that easy assumptions about Arab military capabilities were not reasonable. The evolution of the Egyptian army from 1967 to 1973 was stunning; the assumption that it would evolve no further had no basis. Therefore, a Palestinian state followed by a new Egyptian policy could threaten Israel's survival. Since no one could guarantee the future, Israeli policy was to oppose a Palestinian state.

Since the Palestinians could not accept permanent domination by the Israelis, particularly one in which Israeli land policy in the territories became increasingly oriented toward settlements, the Palestinians chose a path of resistance, both on Israel's periphery, in the occupied territories and, ultimately, inside Israel itself. This was not a new strategy, but until Camp David, it was only one strand of a broader strategy. The 1978 agreement made resistance the Palestinians' only strategy.

The Palestinians had two problems with their only available
option. The first was how to escalate violence to the point that it would become intolerable to the Israelis, forcing them to make political accommodations. The second, which followed the first, was to master the arts of security, counterintelligence and intelligence to keep the Israelis from destroying their war-making capabilities. The Palestinians knew that whatever the Israelis could see, they could destroy. The foundation of their war was not the suicide bombers, but the ability to organize suicide bombing without Israeli intelligence knowing how it was organized.

This is the point at which the lessons of 1973 and the lessons of 2003 come together. Intelligence is the foundation of all warfare. However, in modern warfare -- both in 1973 and 2003 -- intelligence reaches a transcendent point. In 1973, the very survival of Israel was brought into question because of the failure of the Israeli intelligence community to recognize the threat. In 2003, the sanity, if not the survival, of Israel was put in jeopardy by its inability to overcome Palestinian defenses against Israeli intelligence.

The 1973 war taught the Arabs the value of security and the
limits of intelligence. The lessons of 1973 were indelibly marked on the Palestinian mind. They knew that Egyptian success depended on counterintelligence. They knew that their success depended on counterintelligence. They learned that military weakness can be compensated for by blinding the enemy.

This lesson was not lost on al Qaeda. Like the Egyptians and
Palestinians, it understood that its military force was a
fraction of the United States'. It understood that it had to
develop that force, but al Qaeda also knew that the real force multiplier was in blinding the Americans -- in cloaking al
Qaeda's actions from the eyes of the United States. This lesson has been continually pounded home ever since 1973 in the Arab world. It is the ability to blind the enemy's intelligence services that is the precondition for any operational capability. What the enemy can see, he can destroy. Therefore, in operating from a position of weakness, blinding the enemy is the key.

The teaching of Anwar Sadat was simple: The best way to blind the Israelis is to allow them to blind themselves. He used Israel's inability to take Egypt seriously as a military power to blind the Israelis to what was right in front of them. Israel's greatest weakness was contempt for its enemy and an overestimation of its ability to know what the enemy was
thinking. The Palestinians learned this lesson from the
Egyptians, and al Qaeda has learned from the Palestinians.

The greatest danger in war is underestimating the enemy and overestimating oneself.
30942  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / We the Well-armed People on: October 01, 2003, 03:12:11 PM
Woof Burnsson:

Thank you very much for that informative reply.

Staying with the European theme, the cover story on this month's NRA magazine "America's First Freedom"  is on the notorious Tony Martin case in England.  I tried finding it online at the NRA site without luck, but emailed them to see if I could get in electronically.  Until then, this from the NRA site.  The excerpts are from the Brit newspaper online "Daily Telegraph".  I couldn't get the complete articles without signing up.

Crafty Dog
Martin is refused parole as 'danger to burglars'
By David Sapsted
(Filed: 17/01/2003) (That's January 17 written the Euro way folks-Crafty)

Tony Martin, the farmer jailed for shooting dead a teenage burglar, had his application for parole rejected yesterday.

The three members of the Parole Board, who met in London to review his case, gave no reason for turning him down.

A friend of Martin's claimed that it was because a probation report branded the 58-year-old "a danger to burglars".

Others suggested that a primary reason was Martin's refusal to express remorse for shooting 16-year-old Fred Barras when he and another burglar raided his remote Norfolk house at night in August, 1999.

Martin, who will automatically qualify for release on licence in July after serving two-thirds of his five-year sentence for manslaughter, was said to have been resigned to the decision.

Malcom Starr, a friend and leading supporter who visited Martin in Highpoint Prison, Suffolk, called the decision "an absolute disgrace".

He said: "These people on the Parole Board are completely out of touch with public opinion. "All right-thinking people agree that Mr Martin should be released immediately."

Mr Starr, a Cambridgeshire businessman, said Martin told him a Probation Service report to the board criticised the farmer for "not being up to speed with the 21st century and of thinking things were better 40 years ago".

Mr Starr added: "A lot of prisoners lie and say they are sorry about something when they are not. He was not prepared to lie. It is not a question of 'does he feel sorry'. He feels he should never have been intruded on and he acted in self defence."

Richard Portham, another friend, said: "He told me that the Norfolk probation service was recommending that he should not get parole because they considered him a danger to burglars.

"I suppose the attitude came across in this report that he would do it again."

The shotgun Martin used on Barras, from Newark, Nottinghamshire, was illegally held. He had lost his licence after an incident when he fired on a car trespassing on his farm.
Feb 2003

A thief shot by the farmer Tony Martin during an attempted burglary was jailed for 18 months on drugs charges yesterday. Brendon Fearon, 32, tried to burgle Martin's Norfolk farmhouse in 1999, was convicted at Nottingham Crown Court of supplying heroin.

May 6, 2003

British Government Says Burglars Need Protection

Government lawyers trying to keep the Norfolk farmer Tony Martin behind bars will tell a High Court judge that burglars are members of the public who must be protected from violent householders. The case could help hundreds of criminals bring claims for damages for injury suffered while committing offences. In legal papers seen by The Independent, Home Office lawyers dispute Martin's contention that he poses no risk to the public, because he only represents a threat to burglars and other criminals who trespass on his property.
May 8

Home Office Suppressed Tony Martin Report

The British Home Office suppressed a report that showed the jailed farmer Tony Martin was suitable for early release, a High Court judge was told May 6.

June 16, 2003

Tony Martin To Be Sued By Burglar He Shot

The burglar Brendon Fearon, who was shot and injured by Tony Martin, won the right yesterday to sue the jailed farmer for damages. A judge at Nottingham County Court overturned an earlier decision that had thrown out his claim.


30943  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Guro Crafty in Bern Switzerland this weekend on: October 01, 2003, 02:21:20 PM
Yeaah, that was a great weekend!!  Thank you, Marc.
I'm enthusiastic about the "Single triques loop". I think thats a really great drill.

I'm looking forward to see you soon in Rome.

Lonely Dog
30944  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / WW3 on: October 01, 2003, 12:51:10 PM

Inside the Islamic Mafia
Bernard-Henri L?vy exposes Daniel Pearl's killers.
By Christopher Hitchens
Posted Thursday, September 25, 2003, at 10:18 AM PT

I remember laughing out loud, in what was admittedly a mirthless fashion, when Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, one of Osama Bin Laden's most heavy-duty deputies, was arrested in Rawalpindi, Pakistan. Straining to think of an apt comparison, I fail badly. But what if, say, the Unabomber had been found hiding out in the environs of West Point or Fort Bragg? Rawalpindi is to the Pakistani military elite what Sandhurst is to the British, or St Cyr used to be to the French. It's not some boiling slum: It's the manicured and well-patrolled suburb of the officer class, very handy for the capital city of Islamabad if you want to mount a coup, and the site of Flashman's Hotel if you are one of those who enjoys the incomparable imperial adventure-stories of George MacDonald Fraser. Who, seeking to evade capture, would find a safe house in such a citadel?

Yet, in the general relief at the arrest of this outstanding thug, that aspect of the matter drew insufficient attention. Many words of praise were uttered, in official American circles, for the exemplary cooperation displayed by our gallant Pakistani allies. But what else do these allies have to trade, except al-Qaida and Taliban suspects, in return for the enormous stipend they receive from the U.S. treasury? Could it be that, every now and then, a small trade is made in order to keep the larger trade going?

One hesitates to utter thoughts like these, but they recur continually as one reads Bernard-Henri L?vy's latest book: Who Killed Daniel Pearl? Everybody remembers-don't they?- the ghastly video put out on the Web by Pearl's kidnappers and torturers. It's the only live-action footage we possess of the ritual slaughter of a Jew, preceded for effect by his coerced confession of his Jewishness. Pearl was lured into a trap by the promise of a meeting with a senior religious demagogue, who might or might not have shed light on the life of the notorious "shoe-bomber," because of whom millions of us must take off our footwear at American airports every day, as if performing the pieties required for entering a mosque.

What a sick joke all this is, if you study L?vy's book with care. If you ever suspected that the Pakistani ISI (or Interservices Intelligence) was in a shady relationship with the Taliban and al-Qaida forces, this book materializes the suspicion and makes the very strong suggestion that Pearl was murdered because he was doing his job too well, not because he was a naive idealist who got into the wrong car at the wrong time. His inquiries had at least the potential for exposing the Pakistani collusion and double-dealing with jihad forces, in much the same pattern the Saudi Arabian authorities have been shown to follow?by keeping two sets of books, in other words, and by exhibiting only one set to Americans.

Like a number of those who take a moral stand on this, Bernard-Henri L?vy was a strong defender of Bosnia's right to exist, at a time when that right was being menaced directly by Serbian and Croatian fascists. It was a simplification to say that Bosnia was "Muslim," but it would also have been a simplification to say that the Bosnians were not Muslims. The best resolution of this paradox was to assert that Bosnia-Herzegovina stood for ethnic and cultural pluralism, and to say that one could defend Islam from persecution while upholding some other important values at the same time. I agree with M. L?vy that it was a disgrace at the time, and a tragedy in retrospect, that so few Western governments took this opportunity.

But now we hear, from those who were indifferent to that massacre of Muslims, or who still protest the measures that were taken to stop the massacre, that it is above all necessary for the West to be aware of Islamic susceptibilities. This plea is not made on behalf of the pluralistic citizens of Sarajevo, but in mitigation of Hamas and Hezbollah and Saddam Hussein. One of the many pleasures of L?vy's book is the care he takes to show the utter cynicism of the godfathers of all this. He quotes by name a Saudi lawyer who specializes in financial transactions:

"Islamism is a business," he explains to me with a big smile. "I don't say that because it's my job, or because I see proof of it in my office ten times a day, but because it's a fact. People hide behind Islamism. They use it like a screen saying 'Allah Akbar! Allah Akbar!' But we know that here. We see the deals and the movements behind the curtain. In one way or another, it all passes through our hands. We do the paperwork. We write the contracts. And I can tell you that most of them couldn't care less about Allah. They enter Islamism because it's nothing other than a source of power and wealth, especially in Pakistan. ? Take the young ones in the madrassas. They see the high rollers in their SUVs having five wives and sending their children to good schools, much better than the madrassas. They have your Pearl's killer, Omar Sheikh, right in front of their eyes. When he gets out of the Indian prisons and returns to Lahore, what do the neighbors see? He's very well-dressed. He has a Land Cruiser. He gets married and the city's big-shots come to his wedding."

Everything we know about al-Qaida's operations, as of those of Saddam Hussein, suggests that they combine the culture of a crime family or cartel with the worst habits of a bent multinational corporation. Yet the purist critics of "globalization" tend to assume that the spiritual or nationalistic claims of such forces still deserve to be taken at their own valuation, lest Western "insensitivity" be allowed to triumph.

And this in turn suggests another latent connection, which L?vy does not stress at all though he does dwell upon one of its obvious symptoms. The most toxic and devotional rhetoric of these Islamic gangsters is anti-Semitism. And what does anti-Semitism traditionally emphasize? Why, the moving of secret money between covert elites in order to achieve world domination! The crazed maps of future Muslim conquest that are pictured by the propaganda of jihad and that show the whole world falling to future Muslim conquest are drawn in shady finance-houses and hideaways of stolen gold and portable currency, in the capital cities of paranoid states, and are if anything emulations of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion rather than negations of them. L?vy's reformulation of an old term?"neo-anti-Judaism" instead of the worn-out phrase "anti-Semitism"--is harder on the tongue but more accurate as regards the corrupt and vicious foe with which we are actually dealing. His book was finished before it became clear that the "resistance" in Iraq was also being financed by an extensive mafia, which offers different bonuses for different kamikaze tactics, as it was already doing in Palestine and Kashmir.

In a recent conversation, M. L?vy said to me carefully that he doubts the conventional wisdom of the Western liberal, who believes that a settlement in Palestine will remove the inflammation that produces jihad. A settlement in Palestine would be a good thing in itself, to be sure. But those who believe in its generally healing power, he said, have not been following events in Kashmir. Indeed, it is from the Pakistani-Saudi periphery that the core challenge comes. I don't think that anyone who follows L?vy's inquiry into corruption and fanaticism, and the intimate bond between them, will ever listen patiently to any facile argument again.
30945  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / WW3 on: October 01, 2003, 08:59:35 AM
A friend writes:


The war IS against the radical islamists. Unfortunately, this radical islamic "nation" will not be pacified by pacifying Iraq alone (which we may or may not accomplish in either the short or long term). This radical islamic "nation", as I believe Dr. Friedman et al have pointed out earlier in Stratfor briefings, stirs across nation-state boundaries, and not just in islamic countries, but wherever muslims live, i.e. in every country.

This war is against those governments that use Islamist groups as a deniable front to foment unrest and instability in order to carry out their own hegemonic and/or monetary aims.  Iran, Iraq and Syria have long sought to dominate the Middle East.  All of them used and still use Islamist groups as a fifth column to fight their wars.  Ba'athism is nothing more than socialist pan-Arabism.  The Iranian mullahs seek Shi'a dominance through their version of the caliphate.  Elements of the Saudi royal family seek to buy Wahabbism into dominance.

Al Qaida could not have existed without support from various governments.  From 1991 - 1996, it received sanctuary in Sudan.  From 1996-2001, Afghanistan gave it sanctuary.  From 1991-2003, it received assistance (monetary and otherwise) from Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Libya and the PLO.  Indirectly, it received assistance from Pakistan through the Taliban and Saudi Arabia through its funding of Wahabbi madrassas and charities.

By viewing Islamists as an independent grassroots movement, the US permitted its influence to grow throughout the Islamic world.  Now, terror has influence in Southeast Asia because these government sponsored groups from the Middle East have linked up with indigenous Muslim rebels in places like the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia.  Since 1967, every major terror episode comning from the Islamic world - especially the Middle East - occurs because of government support.  Initially, the USSR was the source of that support.  Later, the former allies of the USSR, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, pre-Sadat Egypt, post Shah Iran, North Korea, Sudan all provided money and training to everyone from Abu Nidal to Usama bin Laden.

After 9-11, the US and its allies have reversed course.  They have recognized that without the assistance of governments, these terror groups cannot flourish.  Thus, the overthrow of Saddam is brilliant.  Geopolitically, it cuts the old silk road in half.  It isolates Syria, Iran and Saudi Arabia with one stroke.

Ba'athist Iraq was a major supporter of al Qaida, Hamas and Islamic Jihad.  Why do you think that these groups have become much more openly vitriolic?  Their sugar daddy is on the run and his two sons are dead.  Nevertheless, these groups and a lot more permutations of them still have sufficient remaining resources to do damage for several years.  And their penchant for patience and secrecy should not allow us to relax our guard.

The reason that pacifying Iraq alone will not pacify the "Islamic nation" is because Iran, Syria and other disrupters still exist.  When we succeed in Iraq, their days will be numbered.
30946  Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / WW3 on: September 30, 2003, 10:27:07 AM
Please feel free to send the Stratfor Weekly to a friend
or colleague.

29 September 2003
by Dr. George Friedman

The Unpredictability of War and Force Structure


In the United States' open-ended war against al Qaeda and
militant Islam, two factors are driving up requirements for the
size of the U.S. military. One is the unpredictability
surrounding the number of theaters in which this war will be
waged in the next two years, and the second is the type of
warfare in which the United States is compelled to engage, which
can swallow up huge numbers of troops in defensive operations.
However, for several reasons, U.S. defense personnel policies
have not yet adjusted to this reality.


Prior to the beginning of the Iraq campaign, U.S. Defense
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was asked how long the war would last.
His response was both wise and true: He said that he didn't know,
because the enemy got to vote. Much of the discussion about the
length, cost and requirements of U.S. military operations in Iraq
should be answered the same way -- there is no answer because the
other side gets to vote. The Iraqi command decided to abandon
conventional warfare and shift to guerrilla warfare. It is as
unreasonable to ask how long this will last and how much it will
cost as it would have been to ask Abraham Lincoln in 1862 when
the Civil War would end and how much it would cost. It is an
unanswerable question.

War is extremely predictable, with 20-20 hindsight. It is easy to
say now that the Soviets would defeat the Germans in World War
II. All of us know now that the North Vietnamese had the
advantage in Vietnam. We all know now that the Normandy invasion
would work. That's the easy part of military analysis; predicting
the future is the hard part. It is possible to glimpse the
outlines of the general forces that are engaged and to measure
their relative strength, but the finer the granularity sought,
the harder prediction is. The only certainty to be found is that
all wars end eventually, and that the war you are fighting is
only occasionally the war you expected to fight.

No one, therefore, knows the course of the U.S.-militant Islamist
war. The CIA has produced no secret papers nor uncovered any
hidden plans in the caves of Afghanistan that reveal the truth.
War is about the difference between plans and events: Nothing
goes according to plan, partly because of unexpected failures
among the planners and partly because the enemy gets a vote. Carl
von Clausewitz, the father of modern military theory, had a word
for that: friction. The friction of war creates an ever-widening
gap between plans and reality.

That means that the first and most important principle of
military planning is to plan for the worst. No general was ever
condemned for winning a war with too many troops. Many generals -
- and political leaders -- are reviled for not using enough
troops. Sometimes the manpower is simply not available;
demographics limit the number of troops available. But the lowest
ring of the military inferno must be reserved for leaders who
take a nation to war, having access to massive force but choosing
to mobilize the least numbers they think they can get by with,
rather than leaving a healthy -- even unreasonable -- margin to
make up for the friction of war. Calibrating force to expected
requirements is almost always going to lead to disaster, because
as we all know, everything comes in late and over-budget.

Washington is engaged with the question of what constitutes
sufficient force structure. As one might imagine, the debate cuts
to the heart of everything the United States is doing; the
availability of force will determine the success or failure of
its war. And here, it appears to us, the administration has
chosen a radical course -- one of maintaining a narrow margin of
error on force structure, based on plans that do not necessarily
take into account that al Qaeda gets to vote.

Last week, while speaking at the National Defense University,
Rumsfeld repeated his conviction that the United States had
deployed sufficient force in Iraq and that with additional
deployments it would be able to contain the situation there. Last
week, U.S. officials announced the mobilization of additional
reserve and National Guard units for 18 months of duty.

The reality is this: The United States went to war on Sept. 11,
2001, and since that date, it has not increased the aggregate
size of its armed forces in any strategically significant way. It
has raised the effectively available force by reaching into its
reserve and National Guard units. That short-term solution has
served well for the first two years of the war. However,
deployment requirements tend to increase over the course of a
war, so the needs in the first year were relatively light and
increased progressively as additional theaters of operation were

The problem with this structure of forces is simple. People can
choose to leave the military and its reserve and National Guard
components -- and they will. Following extensive deployments, or
anticipating such deployments, many will leave the active force
as their terms expire or leave the reserve components when they
can. In order to replace these forces, the pipeline should be
full of recruits. This is not World War II. The requirements for
all specialties, including combat arms, will not be filled by
basic training and a quick advanced course. Even in the simplest
specialties, it will take nearly a year to develop the required
expertise -- not just to be deployed, but to be deployed and
effective. For more complex specialties, the timeline lengthens.

U.S. leaders appear to be giving some attention to maintaining
the force at its current size, although we think the expectations
on retention in all components are optimistic. But even if they
are dead on, the loss of personnel will be most devastating among
field-grade officers and senior noncommissioned officers -- who
form the backbone of the military. These are men and women in
their 30s and 40s who have families and mortgages -- none of
which might survive the stress of a manpower plan designed in a
way that imposes maximum unpredictability and disruption on
mature lives. The net result is that the military might keep its
current size but become thin-waisted: lots of young people, lots
of gray hair, not nearly enough in between.

The problem, however, is that keeping the force stable is not
enough by a long shot. The United States is involved in two
significant conflicts, in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is also
operating in smaller deployments throughout and on the periphery
of the Islamic world. Added to this are immediate and potential
requirements for homeland security, should al Qaeda strike again,
as the U.S. government consistently predicts is likely. When
these requirements are added up and compared to the kind of force
planning and expectations that were being discussed prior to
Sept. 11, it is obvious that the U.S. force is at its limit, even
assuming that the complexities of reserve units weren't added to
the mix.

The strategic problem is that there is absolutely no reason to
believe that the demands on the current force represent the
maximum. The force level is decided by the administration; the
force requirement is decided by a committee composed of senior
Pentagon officials, Congress and al Qaeda. And on this committee,
al Qaeda has the decisive vote.

Al Qaeda's strategy is to expand the conflict as broadly as
possible. It wants to disperse U.S. forces, but it also wants
U.S. forces to intrude as deeply into the Islamic world as
possible in order to trigger an uprising not only against the
United States, but also against governments allied with the
United States. There is a simple-minded answer to this, which is
to refuse to intervene. The flaw in that answer is that it would
serve al Qaeda's purpose just as well, by proving that the United
States is weak and vulnerable. Intervention carries the same cost
as non-intervention, but with the upside that it might produce

Therefore, the United States cannot easily decline combat when it
is offered. Al Qaeda intends to offer as much combat as possible.
From the Philippines to Morocco, from central Asia to central
Africa, the scope -- if not the tempo -- of operations remains in
al Qaeda's hands. Should Indonesia blow sky high or Egypt
destabilize, both of which are obviously among al Qaeda's hopes,
U.S. forces will be required to respond.

There is another aspect to this. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the
United States is engaged in guerrilla wars. The force required to
combat a guerrilla army is not determined by the size of the
guerrilla forces, but rather by defensive requirements. A very
small guerrilla force can menace a large number of targets, even
if it cannot hit them all. Those targets must be protected for
military or political reasons. Pacification cannot take place
when the population is exposed to guerrilla forces at the will of
the guerrillas. A narrow defensive posture, as has been adopted
in Afghanistan, cedes pacification. In Iraq, where ceding
pacification is not a political option, the size of the force is
determined not by the enemy's force, but by the target set that
must be protected.

Two factors, therefore, are driving up requirements for the size
of the U.S. armed forces. First, no one can define the number of
theaters in which the United States will be deployed over the
next two years. Second, the type of warfare in which the United
States is compelled to engage after the initial assault is
carried out is a force hog: It can swallow up huge numbers of
troops in duties that are both necessary and parasitic -- such as
patrolling 15 bridges, none of which might ever be attacked
during the war, but all of which must be defended.

Rumsfeld's reassurances that there are enough forces in Iraq miss
the key question: Are there enough troops available and in the
pipeline to deal with unexpected events in two years? Iraq might
be under control by then, or it might not. Rumsfeld doesn't know
that, Iraqi National Congress leader Ahmed Chalabi doesn't, Osama
bin Laden doesn't. No one knows whether that is true. Nor does
anyone know whether the United States will be engaged in three or
four other theaters of operations by that time. It is certainly
al Qaeda's intention to make that happen, and so far al Qaeda's
record in drawing the United States into difficult situations
should not be discounted.

The problem is that on the one hand, the Defense Department is in
the process of running off critically needed troops with
unpredictable and spasmodic call-ups. Second, the number of men
and women in the training pipeline has not taken a quantum leap
forward in the course of the war. The United States is engaged in
a global war, but its personnel policies have not adjusted to
that reality. This is the first major war in American history
that has not included a large expansion of the armed forces.

There are a number of reasons for this. At the beginning of the
war, the administration envisioned it as a primarily covert war
involving special forces and some air power. Officials did not
see this war as a division-level conflict. They were wrong. They
did not count on their enemy's ability to resort to effective
guerrilla warfare. They did not expect the old manpower hog to
raise its ugly head. In general, Rumsfeld believed that
technology could substitute for manpower, and that large
conventional formations were not necessary. He was right in every
case but one: large-scale guerrilla warfare. Or more precisely,
the one thing the United States didn't want to be involved in is
the one thing the enemy dealt up. When you think about it, that
makes sense.

The assumption on which this war began was that there was ample
U.S. force structure for the requirements. At this point, that is
true only if one assumes there are no further surprises pending.
Since this war has been all about surprises, any force structure
built on that assumption is completely irresponsible.

We suspect that Rumsfeld and his people are aware of this issue.
The problem is that the Bush administration is in an election
year, and increasing the force by 50 percent or doubling it is
not something officials want to do now. It cannot be done by
conscription. Not only are the mechanisms for large-scale
conscriptions missing, but a conscript army is the last thing
needed: The U.S. military requires a level of technical
proficiency and commitment that draftees don't bring to bear.

To keep the force at its current size, Congress must allocate a
large amount of money for personnel retention. A father of three
with a mortgage payment based on his civilian income cannot live
on military pay. Military pay must not be permitted to rise; it
must be forced to soar. This is not only to retain the current
force size but to increase it. In addition to bringing in raw
recruits and training them, this also means, as in World War II,
bringing back trained personnel who have left the service and --
something the military will gag over -- bringing in trained
professionals from outside, directly into the chain of command
and not just as civilian employees.

Thinking out of the box is something Washington always talks
about but usually does by putting a box of corn flakes on top of
their heads. That's all right in peacetime -- but this is war,
and war is a matter of life and death. In the end, this is the
problem: While American men and women fight and die on foreign
land, the Pentagon's personnel officers are acting like this is
peacetime. The fault lies with a series of unexpected events and
Rumsfeld's tendency to behave as if nothing comes as a surprise.

The defense secretary needs to understand that in war, being
surprised is not a failure -- it is the natural commission. The
measure of a good command is not that one anticipates everything,
but that one quickly adjusts and responds to the unexpected. No
one expected this type of guerrilla war in Iraq, although perhaps
in retrospect, everyone should have. But it is here, and next
year will bring even more surprises. The Army speaks of "A Force
of One." We prefer "The Force Ready for the Unexpected." The
current U.S. force is not.

Geopolitical Diary: Monday, Sept. 29, 2003

One of the delights of our business is that we get to see surrealism without having to visit an art museum. Sometimes it's as if Salvador Dali painted a canvas just for us. It seemed that way today, when both U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice went on the Sunday news shows to reassert that the United States did have solid intelligence that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Here's what happened. Members -- one Republican, one Democrat -- of a
congressional intelligence oversight committee went public with this claim
about the Bush administration's intelligence on Iraq's WMD: "The assessment that Iraq continued to pursue chemical and biological weapons remained constant and static over the past 10 years." Put simply, the intelligence community had arrived at a conclusion and didn't re-examine it.

Rice countered the congressmen by saying, " was very clear that this
(WMD development) continued and it was a gathering danger. Yes, I think I ould call it new information and it was certainly enriching the case in the same direction." Powell weighed in with, "There was every reason to believe -- and I still believe -- that there were weapons of mass
detruction and weapons programs to develop weapons of mass destruction." A CIA spokesman said, "The notion that our community does not challenge standing judgments is absurd."

What we have is this. Two congressmen have charged that the Bush
administration was wrong on Iraq's WMD program because it did not re-examine the intelligence. The administration and the CIA are deeply insulted. Their position is that they continually gathered the best intelligence that they could, and that this is the reason they were wrong. The great debate here is not whether the administration was wrong, but whether they were wrong because they either failed to challenge their old assumptions -- or the fresh intelligence they gathered was inaccurate.

This is not a trivial question. Understanding the origins of intelligence
failure is something every intelligence organization, including Stratfor,
has to do. It matters whether the failure was one of analysis, rooted in the Directorate of Intelligence, or of collection, rooted in the Directorate of Operations. If the White House overrode the intelligence, that matters even more. These things need to be understood. But the indignation with which the State Department, the National Security Council and the CIA are responding to congressional charges misses the point: Someone clearly screwed up, and if it wasn't a failure to challenge premises, then it was something else. Neither Powell nor Rice nor the CIA came close to offering an alternate explanation, as if one weren't needed.

Powell came closest of any to making sense when he said that getting rid of former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein was the important thing. At least that is a policy. Our view has always been that the invasion of Iraq was undertaken because of strategic considerations, not WMD -- that was just a basis for building a coalition with Europeans. However, the administration clearly thought it would find WMD -- otherwise it would have created another excuse.

This brings us back to the intelligence failure. One way or another, there
was either a massive intelligence failure, or the WMD are still out there
with the guerrillas. We think that to be marginally possible. But barring
that, the fact is, someone was dead wrong. We don't think anyone lied,
because that would be too stupid and unnecessary. Eventually they would wind up where they are now, and there was no need for that.

Therefore, there was an intelligence failure, and if the origins of that
failure were not in a fixed, unexamined set of assumptions, then it is time
for Powell, Rice and the intelligence community to cough up another
explanation. While they're at it, they might explain whether the CIA
predicted the guerrilla war that the United States currently has on its
hands, or whether this was another intelligence failure.

Intelligence failures happen. Alternatively, intelligence estimates are
sometimes overruled by customers who order up something more suitable to their political needs. All of this is understandable and part of the business. But the Bush administration's unending attempts to shoot down plausible explanations for intelligence failures without offering its own is bizarre.

If we are to believe the administration, the intelligence process worked
perfectly. The mere fact that it came up with the wrong answer should not be permitted to undermine the perfection of the process.

Gee, we wish we could get away with that.
30947  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Guro Crafty in Bern Switzerland this weekend on: September 27, 2003, 09:04:39 PM
Wuff All:

  Jet lag has caused me to wake up in the wee hours (a little after 3:00 A; local time) so until the valium kicks in here I am.

  As always with Lonely Dog and his wonderful Cornelia and son Robyn, I am made at home.  The seminar is about two thirds returning players and we are quite the international group- seven countires are represented:  Switzerland, Germany, Framce, Holland, Italy, Poland, Canada, and the US.

Yesterday after opening with "the Prison Riot" training, we did the recently named "Single Triques loop" and then went into "Los Triques Double stick", working particular on the blocks of material known as "the bat" and "the redondo variations."  

Guro Crafty
30948  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / An Army of 1 --and 1 in the oven on: September 26, 2003, 05:37:42 PM
Hi Lynda:

  I am in Switzerland right now getting ready fpr bed before doing a seminar right now.  It would be great fun to go off into the Venutian range of questions you raise, but forgive my Martian self for asking that we stay with the subject matter at hand for the moment.  ie pregnancy rates in combat situations and whether this is good or bad for military morale and discipline.

Now that you have had a chance to look up what his quoted sources were with regard to the data I gave, would you share with us what they were?

30949  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Guro Crafty in Bern Switzerland this weekend on: September 25, 2003, 01:11:48 PM
Wuff All:

  I'll be in Bern with my good friend Guro Benjamin "Lonely Dog" this weekend.

Wuff (German spelling)
Guro Crafty
30950  DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Current Events: Philippines on: September 24, 2003, 10:10:08 PM
Philippines: Will Arroyo's Standing Hurt U.S. Footing in Region?
Sep 24, 2003


Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo's approval ratings have sunk to record lows amid scandal and economic troubles, and Arroyo has become heavily dependent on upcoming peace talks with separatist rebels to help boost her popularity before the 2004 election season hits full gear. If the peace talks fail and she falls farther behind in the polls, the United States' strategic footing in southeast Asia could slip.


Approval ratings for Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo have plunged to record lows, a Pulse Asia, Inc., survey shows. Performance ratings in categories such as fighting poverty, improving the economy and combating terrorism and crime all slumped, bringing her overall approval rating is 41 percent, down from 51 percent in August. Facing an election in 2004, Arroyo needs successful results from upcoming negotiations with separatist rebels to boost public confidence in her presidency. If the October peace talks fail and Arroyo's numbers fall further, Washington's new strategic alliance with Manila, mostly fostered under the current president, could be in jeopardy.

The drop in Arroyo's popularity follows an upswing in August that stemmed from her perceived deft handling of a military mutiny at the end of July. However, a number of factors have contributed to hurt Arroyo's standing, both recently and over the past year.

In August, the administration was besieged by the "Jose Pidal" scandal: Philippine senate committees opened an investigation into First Gentleman Jose Miguel Arroyo after opposition senator and possible presidential candidate Panfilo Lacson said that the president's husband had laundered hundreds of millions of dollars of presidential campaign contributions and hid the funds in a bank account under the name "Jose Pidal." Presidential spokesman Ignacio Bunye has said Lacson's charges were baseless and politically motivated, but investigations are still under way.

In addition to political troubles, the administration has been hurt by the underwhelming performance of the Philippine economy. The country barely avoided a recession in second-quarter 2003, when gross domestic product rose by a mere 0.1 percent from the previous quarter. Political instability drove away investors, contributing to the 63 percent plunge in foreign direct investment in the first half of 2003. According to polls, 53 percent of respondents in August said they were "worse off than before," and the slightly lower number in September of 43 percent is nevertheless fairly high.

Arroyo likely is counting on expected peace talks with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in Kuala Lumpur in October to help improve her image. If the president can engineer peace in war-torn Mindanao, it is likely her numbers will rise significantly just in time for the campaign season to shift into full gear for the May 2004 election. However, the opposite is equally true: If the negotiations fail and the delicate cease-fire gives way to violence, Arroyo will be highly vulnerable. Strategic planners in Washington would not like to see that happen.

If Arroyo lost the presidency, the strategic alliance between the United States and the Philippines could falter. From the U.S. perspective, a new president taking office in Manila at best would delay further cooperation against militant Islamist groups in southeast Asia while the new administration reviews the current terms of bilateral collaboration. At worst for Washington, a complete reversal could occur. Vice President Teofisto Guingona Jr. is a popular political figure and a vocal opponent of the U.S. military presence in the Philippines. He is not alone in this sentiment -- anti-colonial feelings linger in the country, and this could be used against the president during the campaign season.
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