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Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Iraq
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on: December 17, 2011, 07:22:35 PM
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Woof JDN, That is the genius behind the Lefts' political correctness. They can define anything, in part or as a whole, for any amount of time, as being some terrible thing. Political correctness is going to insure our ultimate defeat in any war we have to undertake if we don't secure the victory. And if you can find anywhere in the history of man where at least a short term form of occupation or form of imperialism wasn't used to successfully do it, I'd like you to name it. You completely ignored what I actually said and redefined it as being oil for blood. I said the Iraqi's should pay for what we have spent there, meaning the cost of their reconstruction, not the cost of our blood and treasure or for our profit and I clarified that in a follow up post which you ignored all together so you could continue your attack and add to it the asinine crap about Cuba just to further distort the debate and malign me personally; all the while not directly addressing me. That is a very disrespectful way of debate and verge's on being dishonest. However, time will tell as to what is going to be the out come in Iraq, the die has been cast, and I'm afraid it's going to be much worse than if we had kept at least a presence there. @JDN THERE WILL BE NO FURTHER DEBATE BETWEEN ME AND YOU ON THIS SUBJECT. P.C.
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102
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Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Iraq
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on: December 17, 2011, 04:54:47 PM
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We should be building more bases in Iraq, right in Iran's backyard, not shutting them down. Iraq should be paying us in oil for every cent we have spent there too. History has shown us that you must win a peace and that you cannot retreat your way to it. Retreats, most often end in massacre's. For you Liberal, so called, peace activist's out there that have facilitated this result, and are celebrating this as being the end of the Iraq war; the war there is just starting, thanks to you. P.C.
Sounds like Colonialism and Imperialism at it's finest. Woof JDN, I don't deny that, and I know those labels, just like being called Hitler or racist can be applied broadly enough to discredit any solution to any problem. Nothing happens in war without some pain but that doesn't mean the pain lasts forever. The reality is, one: Iraq should pay for it's own reconstruction because they can afford it, and it is they that benefit from it not us. I didn't say load up the ships then set fire to what's left or let's make a profit off the deal, but quite frankly we couldn't afford to do this on our own, and two: our enemies are going to grab the oil for themselves after we leave and they are going to set fire to the place. So short term name calling or long term failure. The President has picked failure. P.C.
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103
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Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Iraq
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on: December 17, 2011, 03:05:48 AM
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Woof, I said way back when, that we would give them a chance at a free society and in the end we would just walk away from it and leave them to their own designs. I also said that they didn't have a chance in hell of keeping it free after we left. I'm glad Saddam is gone, I'm glad we killed a lot of terrorist fighters there. I feel sorry for the Iraqi people that do want freedom. We should have done it like we did Japan, but there were too many people invested in it's failure back here at home to have had that kind of success. It takes commitment to do things right, unfortunately our News Media and Press are committed to an ideology that breeds failures like this then they will turn their back on the massacre to come and have no shame in saying they are not to blame, much like the million or so slaughtered after we pulled out of Vietnam. It won't come as immediate as Vietnam but in time it will.
The President was correct in not celebrating this as victory in Iraq, because it is not a victory, it's a retreat from the frontlines of the war on Western civilization by the Islamic Fascist's. We should be building more bases in Iraq, right in Iran's backyard, not shutting them down. Iraq should be paying us in oil for every cent we have spent there too. History has shown us that you must win a peace and that you cannot retreat your way to it. Retreats, most often end in massacre's. For you Liberal, so called, peace activist's out there that have facilitated this result, and are celebrating this as being the end of the Iraq war; the war there is just starting, thanks to you. P.C.
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Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Captured narco had arenal
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on: December 16, 2011, 09:38:29 PM
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Mexico says captured cartel leader had arsenal By E. EDUARDO CASTILLO | AP – Tue, Dec 13, 2011Email … MEXICO CITY (AP) — Mexican authorities said Tuesday that an alleged founder of the Zetas drug cartel had an arsenal of 169 weapons when he was captured Monday, and may have been linked to the abduction of nine Mexican marines.
Navy spokesman Jose Luis Vergara said suspect Raul Lucio Hernandez Lechuga oversaw Zetas operations around the Gulf coast state of Veracruz, where nine marines disappeared earlier this year.
Vergara said a suspect was killed and a marine wounded in a firefight that erupted during Hernandez Lechuga's capture Monday in the Veracruz state city of Cordoba. The bust was the result of a yearlong intelligence operation, Vergara said.
Marines found 133 rifles, five grenade launchers, 29 grenades and 36 pistols at the scene of the raid near a highway. Marines also found bulletproof vests with the letter "Z'', the zetas symbol, on the front.
Vergara said Hernandez Lechuga was one of Mexico's 37 most wanted drug traffickers, and that with his arrest, 22 of those 37 have either been killed or detained.
The Zetas have been linked to some of the apparent abductions of Mexican marines, but Vergara didn't say what specific evidence authorities had of Hernandez Lechuga's involvement in the cases.
The apparent abductions of Mexican navy personnel have been shrouded in mystery, with the navy previously acknowledging that three marines and a navy cadet were abducted by suspected drug cartel gunmen in August in Veracruz, the state's largest city.
Later that month, the navy said it had found four bodies in a pit on the outskirts of Veracruz city, and that the remains might be those of the missing marines, but it never publicly confirmed that was the case.
At a Tuesday news conference where Hernandez Lechuga and four alleged associates were paraded before the media, Vergara said a total of nine marines had disappeared, but didn't say whether any of them had been found.
Mexican drug cartels have kidnapped and killed military personnel before, but such incidents remain relatively rare.
Hernandez Lechuga was the leader of the Zetas in about 10 states, including Veracruz. The federal government had offered a reward of 15 million pesos, or about $1.2 million, for information leading to his arrest. Vergara said the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration was also offering a $1 million reward for Hernandez Lechuga, known by the nickname "Lucky."
The Zetas organization was formed by a small group of elite soldiers based in Tamaulipas state, across the border from Texas, who deserted to work for the Gulf drug cartel in the 1990s.
The Zetas split from their former allies in the Gulf cartel last year, setting off bloody fights throughout Mexico as they sought to expand south.
In Veracruz, the Zetas are believed to be locked in a bloody turf battle with groups allied with the Sinaloa cartel.
Also Tuesday, gunmen killed a town's deputy mayor and her bodyguard and wounded the town's police chief and his family while they were in the northern city of Chihuahua, authorities said.
Attackers opened fire on the two cars being used by the officials from the town of Gran Morelos, said the Chihuahua state prosecutors' spokesman, Carlos Gonzalez.
He said deputy mayor Idalia Ayala and her bodyguard died in one car. Police chief Miguel Gomez was in the second with his wife and two children, and all were wounded and taken to a hospital, Gonzalez said.
Gomez was named police chief after last month's arrest of Gran Morelos' top cop. Authorities said soldiers caught the police chief while he and police officers from the nearby town of Belisario Dominguez met with a boss for La Linea, a gang of hit men for the Juarez Cartel.
In neighboring Coahuila state, gunmen killed the director of the prison in the capital city of Saltillo, authorities said.
Serafin Pena Santos was ambushed Tuesday afternoon as he drove through a residential area of the northern city, state prosecutors said in a statement.
Prosecutors didn't give a motive in the killing, but said the assailants used automatic rifles, weapons commonly used by Mexico's drug traffickers.
___
Associated Press writers Ricardo Chavez in Ciudad Juarez and Oscar Villalba in Piedras Negras contributed to this report.
P.C.
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105
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Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Drone, tricked into landing
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on: December 16, 2011, 07:16:03 PM
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Exclusive: Iran hijacked US drone, says Iranian engineer In an exclusive interview, an engineer working to unlock the secrets of the captured RQ-170 Sentinel says they exploited a known vulnerability and tricked the US drone into landing in Iran. By Scott Peterson, Payam Faramarzi* | Christian Science Monitor – 11 hrs agoEmail
Iran guided the CIA's "lost" stealth drone to an intact landing inside hostile territory by exploiting a navigational weakness long-known to the US military, according to an Iranian engineer now working on the captured drone's systems inside Iran.
Iranian electronic warfare specialists were able to cut off communications links of the American bat-wing RQ-170 Sentinel, says the engineer, who works for one of many Iranian military and civilian teams currently trying to unravel the drone’s stealth and intelligence secrets, and who could not be named for his safety.
Using knowledge gleaned from previous downed American drones and a technique proudly claimed by Iranian commanders in September, the Iranian specialists then reconfigured the drone's GPS coordinates to make it land in Iran at what the drone thought was its actual home base in Afghanistan.
"The GPS navigation is the weakest point," the Iranian engineer told the Monitor, giving the most detailed description yet published of Iran's "electronic ambush" of the highly classified US drone. "By putting noise [jamming] on the communications, you force the bird into autopilot. This is where the bird loses its brain."
The “spoofing” technique that the Iranians used – which took into account precise landing altitudes, as well as latitudinal and longitudinal data – made the drone “land on its own where we wanted it to, without having to crack the remote-control signals and communications” from the US control center, says the engineer.
The revelations about Iran's apparent electronic prowess come as the US, Israel, and some European nations appear to be engaged in an ever-widening covert war with Iran, which has seen assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists, explosions at Iran's missile and industrial facilities, and the Stuxnet computer virus that set back Iran’s nuclear program.
Now this engineer’s account of how Iran took over one of America’s most sophisticated drones suggests Tehran has found a way to hit back. The techniques were developed from reverse-engineering several less sophisticated American drones captured or shot down in recent years, the engineer says, and by taking advantage of weak, easily manipulated GPS signals, which calculate location and speed from multiple satellites.
Western military experts and a number of published papers on GPS spoofing indicate that the scenario described by the Iranian engineer is plausible.
"Even modern combat-grade GPS [is] very susceptible” to manipulation, says former US Navy electronic warfare specialist Robert Densmore, adding that it is “certainly possible” to recalibrate the GPS on a drone so that it flies on a different course. “I wouldn't say it's easy, but the technology is there.”
In 2009, Iran-backed Shiite militants in Iraq were found to have downloaded live, unencrypted video streams from American Predator drones with inexpensive, off-the-shelf software. But Iran’s apparent ability now to actually take control of a drone is far more significant.
Iran asserted its ability to do this in September, as pressure mounted over its nuclear program.
Gen. Moharam Gholizadeh, the deputy for electronic warfare at the air defense headquarters of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), described to Fars News how Iran could alter the path of a GPS-guided missile – a tactic more easily applied to a slower-moving drone.
“We have a project on hand that is one step ahead of jamming, meaning ‘deception’ of the aggressive systems,” said Gholizadeh, such that “we can define our own desired information for it so the path of the missile would change to our desired destination.”
Gholizadeh said that “all the movements of these [enemy drones]” were being watched, and “obstructing” their work was “always on our agenda.”
That interview has since been pulled from Fars’ Persian-language website. And last month, the relatively young Gholizadeh died of a heart attack, which some Iranian news sites called suspicious – suggesting the electronic warfare expert may have been a casualty in the covert war against Iran.
Iran's growing electronic capabilities Iranian lawmakers say the drone capture is a "great epic" and claim to be "in the final steps of breaking into the aircraft's secret code."
Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta told Fox News on Dec. 13 that the US will "absolutely" continue the drone campaign over Iran, looking for evidence of any nuclear weapons work. But the stakes are higher for such surveillance, now that Iran can apparently disrupt the work of US drones.
US officials skeptical of Iran’s capabilities blame a malfunction, but so far can't explain how Iran acquired the drone intact. One American analyst ridiculed Iran’s capability, telling Defense News that the loss was “like dropping a Ferrari into an ox-cart technology culture.”
Yet Iran’s claims to the contrary resonate more in light of new details about how it brought down the drone – and other markers that signal growing electronic expertise.
A former senior Iranian official who asked not to be named said: "There are a lot of human resources in Iran.... Iran is not like Pakistan."
“Technologically, our distance from the Americans, the Zionists, and other advanced countries is not so far to make the downing of this plane seem like a dream for us … but it could be amazing for others,” deputy IRGC commander Gen. Hossein Salami said this week.
According to a European intelligence source, Iran shocked Western intelligence agencies in a previously unreported incident that took place sometime in the past two years, when it managed to “blind” a CIA spy satellite by “aiming a laser burst quite accurately.”
More recently, Iran was able to hack Google security certificates, says the engineer. In September, the Google accounts of 300,000 Iranians were made accessible by hackers. The targeted company said "circumstantial evidence" pointed to a "state-driven attack" coming from Iran, meant to snoop on users.
Cracking the protected GPS coordinates on the Sentinel drone was no more difficult, asserts the engineer.
US knew of GPS systems' vulnerability Use of drones has become more risky as adversaries like Iran hone countermeasures. The US military has reportedly been aware of vulnerabilities with pirating unencrypted drone data streams since the Bosnia campaign in the mid-1990s.
Top US officials said in 2009 that they were working to encrypt all drone data streams in Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan – after finding militant laptops loaded with days' worth of data in Iraq – and acknowledged that they were "subject to listening and exploitation."
Perhaps as easily exploited are the GPS navigational systems upon which so much of the modern military depends.
"GPS signals are weak and can be easily outpunched [overridden] by poorly controlled signals from television towers, devices such as laptops and MP3 players, or even mobile satellite services," Andrew Dempster, a professor from the University of New South Wales School of Surveying and Spatial Information Systems, told a March conference on GPS vulnerability in Australia.
"This is not only a significant hazard for military, industrial, and civilian transport and communication systems, but criminals have worked out how they can jam GPS," he says.
The US military has sought for years to fortify or find alternatives to the GPS system of satellites, which are used for both military and civilian purposes. In 2003, a “Vulnerability Assessment Team” at Los Alamos National Laboratory published research explaining how weak GPS signals were easily overwhelmed with a stronger local signal.
“A more pernicious attack involves feeding the GPS receiver fake GPS signals so that it believes it is located somewhere in space and time that it is not,” reads the Los Alamos report. “In a sophisticated spoofing attack, the adversary would send a false signal reporting the moving target’s true position and then gradually walk the target to a false position.”
The vulnerability remains unresolved, and a paper presented at a Chicago communications security conference in October laid out parameters for successful spoofing of both civilian and military GPS units to allow a "seamless takeover" of drones or other targets.
To “better cope with hostile electronic attacks,” the US Air Force in late September awarded two $47 million contracts to develop a "navigation warfare" system to replace GPS on aircraft and missiles, according to the Defense Update website.
Official US data on GPS describes "the ongoing GPS modernization program" for the Air Force, which "will enhance the jam resistance of the military GPS service, making it more robust."
Why the drone's underbelly was damaged Iran's drone-watching project began in 2007, says the Iranian engineer, and then was stepped up and became public in 2009 – the same year that the RQ-170 was first deployed in Afghanistan with what were then state-of-the-art surveillance systems.
In January, Iran said it had shot down two conventional (nonstealth) drones, and in July, Iran showed Russian experts several US drones – including one that had been watching over the underground uranium enrichment facility at Fordo, near the holy city of Qom.
In capturing the stealth drone this month at Kashmar, 140 miles inside northeast Iran, the Islamic Republic appears to have learned from two years of close observation.
Iran displayed the drone on state-run TV last week, with a dent in the left wing and the undercarriage and landing gear hidden by anti-American banners.
The Iranian engineer explains why: "If you look at the location where we made it land and the bird's home base, they both have [almost] the same altitude," says the Iranian engineer. "There was a problem [of a few meters] with the exact altitude so the bird's underbelly was damaged in landing; that's why it was covered in the broadcast footage."
Prior to the disappearance of the stealth drone earlier this month, Iran’s electronic warfare capabilities were largely unknown – and often dismissed.
"We all feel drunk [with happiness] now," says the Iranian engineer. "Have you ever had a new laptop? Imagine that excitement multiplied many-fold." When the Revolutionary Guard first recovered the drone, they were aware it might be rigged to self-destruct, but they "were so excited they could not stay away."
* Scott Peterson, the Monitor's Middle East correspondent, wrote this story with an Iranian journalist who publishes under the pen name Payam Faramarzi and cannot be further identified for security reasons.
P.C.
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106
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DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Re: Self Defense with Pistols
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on: December 16, 2011, 06:55:58 PM
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Interesting. I must add that conservatives are very invested in making sure you stay under the government thumb (police and many "law and order" types tend to identify with the conservative side), as well.
I do see how it probably will be impossible to see how the use of weapons breaks down. That is too bad, but I will keep reading.
I started thinking about this because it seems to me that a somewhat fit, somewhat trained person can manage almost everything, outside of the home with smarts, awareness and maybe a blade or impact weapon. However, it seems like home invasions would require firearms, simply because of the intention of the invader, the surprise factor and the isolation factor. These are only my thoughts and I am not a LEO and am only familiar with certain kinds of violence which may not even cover half of the things that happen to people. All this to say; I may have some illusions and need to get rid of them.
Woof dreatx, Certain members of our society are targeted by criminals because they can't fight back so well, and to use a knife or impact weapon you still need to be able to block blows and get around their blocks to make contact with the weapon. Often there are more than one attacker and while you're tied up with one of them going toe to toe, trying to stick your knife in him, his buddies are stabbing you to death or pull out their guns and shoot you. If you have your wife and family with you, what's happening to them while you are knife fighting, are you going to hold all them bad guys at knife point or worse stick point? One of them is going to grab your kid. There are other reasons why concealed firearms are needed for personal protection out on the street, but one that is often ignored is the deterrent factor. If the bad guys can't tell who's armed then even a little old lady doesn't look so helpless to them. P.C.
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107
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Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Drone tricked into landing?
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on: December 16, 2011, 06:17:34 PM
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Exclusive: Iran hijacked US drone, says Iranian engineer
In an exclusive interview, an engineer working to unlock the secrets of the captured RQ-170 Sentinel says they exploited a known vulnerability and tricked the US drone into landing in Iran. By Scott Peterson, Payam Faramarzi* | Christian Science Monitor – 11 hrs agoEmail Iran guided the CIA's "lost" stealth drone to an intact landing inside hostile territory by exploiting a navigational weakness long-known to the US military, according to an Iranian engineer now working on the captured drone's systems inside Iran.
Iranian electronic warfare specialists were able to cut off communications links of the American bat-wing RQ-170 Sentinel, says the engineer, who works for one of many Iranian military and civilian teams currently trying to unravel the drone’s stealth and intelligence secrets, and who could not be named for his safety.
Using knowledge gleaned from previous downed American drones and a technique proudly claimed by Iranian commanders in September, the Iranian specialists then reconfigured the drone's GPS coordinates to make it land in Iran at what the drone thought was its actual home base in Afghanistan.
"The GPS navigation is the weakest point," the Iranian engineer told the Monitor, giving the most detailed description yet published of Iran's "electronic ambush" of the highly classified US drone. "By putting noise [jamming] on the communications, you force the bird into autopilot. This is where the bird loses its brain."
The “spoofing” technique that the Iranians used – which took into account precise landing altitudes, as well as latitudinal and longitudinal data – made the drone “land on its own where we wanted it to, without having to crack the remote-control signals and communications” from the US control center, says the engineer.
The revelations about Iran's apparent electronic prowess come as the US, Israel, and some European nations appear to be engaged in an ever-widening covert war with Iran, which has seen assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists, explosions at Iran's missile and industrial facilities, and the Stuxnet computer virus that set back Iran’s nuclear program.
Now this engineer’s account of how Iran took over one of America’s most sophisticated drones suggests Tehran has found a way to hit back. The techniques were developed from reverse-engineering several less sophisticated American drones captured or shot down in recent years, the engineer says, and by taking advantage of weak, easily manipulated GPS signals, which calculate location and speed from multiple satellites.
Western military experts and a number of published papers on GPS spoofing indicate that the scenario described by the Iranian engineer is plausible.
"Even modern combat-grade GPS [is] very susceptible” to manipulation, says former US Navy electronic warfare specialist Robert Densmore, adding that it is “certainly possible” to recalibrate the GPS on a drone so that it flies on a different course. “I wouldn't say it's easy, but the technology is there.”
In 2009, Iran-backed Shiite militants in Iraq were found to have downloaded live, unencrypted video streams from American Predator drones with inexpensive, off-the-shelf software. But Iran’s apparent ability now to actually take control of a drone is far more significant.
Iran asserted its ability to do this in September, as pressure mounted over its nuclear program.
Gen. Moharam Gholizadeh, the deputy for electronic warfare at the air defense headquarters of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), described to Fars News how Iran could alter the path of a GPS-guided missile – a tactic more easily applied to a slower-moving drone.
“We have a project on hand that is one step ahead of jamming, meaning ‘deception’ of the aggressive systems,” said Gholizadeh, such that “we can define our own desired information for it so the path of the missile would change to our desired destination.”
Gholizadeh said that “all the movements of these [enemy drones]” were being watched, and “obstructing” their work was “always on our agenda.”
That interview has since been pulled from Fars’ Persian-language website. And last month, the relatively young Gholizadeh died of a heart attack, which some Iranian news sites called suspicious – suggesting the electronic warfare expert may have been a casualty in the covert war against Iran.
Iran's growing electronic capabilities Iranian lawmakers say the drone capture is a "great epic" and claim to be "in the final steps of breaking into the aircraft's secret code."
Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta told Fox News on Dec. 13 that the US will "absolutely" continue the drone campaign over Iran, looking for evidence of any nuclear weapons work. But the stakes are higher for such surveillance, now that Iran can apparently disrupt the work of US drones.
US officials skeptical of Iran’s capabilities blame a malfunction, but so far can't explain how Iran acquired the drone intact. One American analyst ridiculed Iran’s capability, telling Defense News that the loss was “like dropping a Ferrari into an ox-cart technology culture.”
Yet Iran’s claims to the contrary resonate more in light of new details about how it brought down the drone – and other markers that signal growing electronic expertise.
A former senior Iranian official who asked not to be named said: "There are a lot of human resources in Iran.... Iran is not like Pakistan."
“Technologically, our distance from the Americans, the Zionists, and other advanced countries is not so far to make the downing of this plane seem like a dream for us … but it could be amazing for others,” deputy IRGC commander Gen. Hossein Salami said this week.
According to a European intelligence source, Iran shocked Western intelligence agencies in a previously unreported incident that took place sometime in the past two years, when it managed to “blind” a CIA spy satellite by “aiming a laser burst quite accurately.”
More recently, Iran was able to hack Google security certificates, says the engineer. In September, the Google accounts of 300,000 Iranians were made accessible by hackers. The targeted company said "circumstantial evidence" pointed to a "state-driven attack" coming from Iran, meant to snoop on users.
Cracking the protected GPS coordinates on the Sentinel drone was no more difficult, asserts the engineer.
US knew of GPS systems' vulnerability Use of drones has become more risky as adversaries like Iran hone countermeasures. The US military has reportedly been aware of vulnerabilities with pirating unencrypted drone data streams since the Bosnia campaign in the mid-1990s.
Top US officials said in 2009 that they were working to encrypt all drone data streams in Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan – after finding militant laptops loaded with days' worth of data in Iraq – and acknowledged that they were "subject to listening and exploitation."
Perhaps as easily exploited are the GPS navigational systems upon which so much of the modern military depends.
"GPS signals are weak and can be easily outpunched [overridden] by poorly controlled signals from television towers, devices such as laptops and MP3 players, or even mobile satellite services," Andrew Dempster, a professor from the University of New South Wales School of Surveying and Spatial Information Systems, told a March conference on GPS vulnerability in Australia.
"This is not only a significant hazard for military, industrial, and civilian transport and communication systems, but criminals have worked out how they can jam GPS," he says.
The US military has sought for years to fortify or find alternatives to the GPS system of satellites, which are used for both military and civilian purposes. In 2003, a “Vulnerability Assessment Team” at Los Alamos National Laboratory published research explaining how weak GPS signals were easily overwhelmed with a stronger local signal.
“A more pernicious attack involves feeding the GPS receiver fake GPS signals so that it believes it is located somewhere in space and time that it is not,” reads the Los Alamos report. “In a sophisticated spoofing attack, the adversary would send a false signal reporting the moving target’s true position and then gradually walk the target to a false position.”
The vulnerability remains unresolved, and a paper presented at a Chicago communications security conference in October laid out parameters for successful spoofing of both civilian and military GPS units to allow a "seamless takeover" of drones or other targets.
To “better cope with hostile electronic attacks,” the US Air Force in late September awarded two $47 million contracts to develop a "navigation warfare" system to replace GPS on aircraft and missiles, according to the Defense Update website.
Official US data on GPS describes "the ongoing GPS modernization program" for the Air Force, which "will enhance the jam resistance of the military GPS service, making it more robust."
Why the drone's underbelly was damaged Iran's drone-watching project began in 2007, says the Iranian engineer, and then was stepped up and became public in 2009 – the same year that the RQ-170 was first deployed in Afghanistan with what were then state-of-the-art surveillance systems.
In January, Iran said it had shot down two conventional (nonstealth) drones, and in July, Iran showed Russian experts several US drones – including one that had been watching over the underground uranium enrichment facility at Fordo, near the holy city of Qom.
In capturing the stealth drone this month at Kashmar, 140 miles inside northeast Iran, the Islamic Republic appears to have learned from two years of close observation.
Iran displayed the drone on state-run TV last week, with a dent in the left wing and the undercarriage and landing gear hidden by anti-American banners.
The Iranian engineer explains why: "If you look at the location where we made it land and the bird's home base, they both have [almost] the same altitude," says the Iranian engineer. "There was a problem [of a few meters] with the exact altitude so the bird's underbelly was damaged in landing; that's why it was covered in the broadcast footage."
Prior to the disappearance of the stealth drone earlier this month, Iran’s electronic warfare capabilities were largely unknown – and often dismissed.
"We all feel drunk [with happiness] now," says the Iranian engineer. "Have you ever had a new laptop? Imagine that excitement multiplied many-fold." When the Revolutionary Guard first recovered the drone, they were aware it might be rigged to self-destruct, but they "were so excited they could not stay away."
* Scott Peterson, the Monitor's Middle East correspondent, wrote this story with an Iranian journalist who publishes under the pen name Payam Faramarzi and cannot be further identified for security reasons.
P.C.
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109
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DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Re: No, no one knows.
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on: December 16, 2011, 08:05:52 AM
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I am curious about something, and this seems to be the place for it: In my mind, it seems that it is likely that there have been more incidents of defense with a gun in the home, and more instances of defense with some other kind of weapon out in the world. Anyone know how that breaks down?
Woof dreatx, You will probably have trouble hashing the statistic's out on that one. Most private and government entities that are interested in such numbers usually only want to use them for political fodder, and since most big cities (where most of the crimes and deaths occur), are ran by Liberals, they are generally only interested in keeping records on gun deaths committed by violent criminals. They are not all that interested in how many people are stabbed or beaten to death and they are definitely not interested in how many people legally and successfully defend themselves against violence, by any method; gun or otherwise. You see if they started keeping those kinds of records then that would show how many innocent lives were potentially saved by the use of a weapon in the hands of a law abiding citizen. They are afraid of that number because then they wouldn't be able to justify their calls for more gun control. Why would they want more gun control that restricts law abiding citizens from having guns, when the crooks and murderer's just break those laws, leaving citizens defenseless? Well, they want you to need government protection, that way they can hire government employee's (cops, fire fighters, teachers, all unionized of course), that will also be dependant on a government check and benefits, then after they have wasted your tax dollars and need more, they can threaten you with taking the police off the street and let the riots, looting and burning begin. That's only half of it though; you see they need criminals to make this work, so they crowd millions of people into certain areas of these big liberal city's, make sure that all the jobs dry up or get sent overseas, then put a government roof over their head and give them just enough food stamps to keep them alive, make them angry at the world by telling them slavery from 200 hundred years ago put them there, then just set back and wait until the despair, depression, and hopelessness of their situation drives them to self medicate with illegal drugs and alcohol and turn to crime to get the money they need to buy the things they need and want. Of course drug users, attract drug dealers, and things get violent when they compete with each other, so they need gangs and the gangs raise the kids, because daddy is in jail and mom is stoned. You keep the borders wide open so the drugs keep coming and as a added benefit you get illegal immigrants and they fill any jobs left and also become depended on government handouts. You don't let prayer or the Ten Commandments in the schools because prayer might give them hope and the Commandments might contradict what they learn in the gangs. You know, all that 'thou shalt not kill' crap. Of course they won't be in school long anyway because most will drop out, which doesn't bother the teachers, so long as they get more pay and benefits and if they don't, they'll strike with the cops and fire fighters. Now the government has a nice little round robin, closed system, to manipulate and control, all for their own corrupt reasons and benefit. It's really a brilliant scheme because the elite in the government get all the power and money and then they blame all the problems on guns, or slavery from 200 hundred years ago, or greedy corporations, or global warming or guns (did I say guns twice?). They are really creative when it comes to finding something to blame while they keep accumulating power and control. Well, I got little off your question there but to answer it. No, no one knows how that breaks down. P.C.
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Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: We the Well-armed People (Gun rights stuff )
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on: December 15, 2011, 08:24:56 PM
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Woof JDN, First you claim that Americans aren't concerned about the thousands of murders taking place in Mexico and now you want Americans to ignore one of our government agency's that has help facilitate some of those deaths as well as the death of one of our Border Patrol agents. If it was a mistake, do you want it to happen again? If people do ignore it, that will almost guarantee it will happen again. If it was a legit sting that was botched by some kind of half ass political play and interference from the Administration, don't you think something like that should be ferreted out? Do you think people inside this Administration and the government are going to do that without any pressure from We the People? Of course not. You're an intelligent guy but some of your post's aren't congruent enough for anyone to nail down what your viewpoint is and they leave some of us feeling somewhat schizophrenic in trying to figure out how or even what to respond to. I think you are conflicted on various points of the issue and need to work those out for yourself. I'm not attacking you or telling you what to think but I believe you have some important points to make and once you reslove and more precisely define how you feel about them I think you'll find that you are not as embattled here by the other poster's as it seems right now. I think part of what you are saying is that you don't want this to turn into a political witchhunt if in fact it was just an operation they lost control of, and you also seem to be saying even if there was some failings by higher ups no one really has the moral high ground to beat them over the head with it because stuff like this happens all the time regardless of who's in office and there is little if any evidence of intentional wrong doing so far. On the other hand you accuse and lament that American's don't care about what happens in Mexico but at the same time they should ignore this story and not be concerned about the reasoning or motovations that went into this operation that violated Mexico's sovereignty and adds to the violence of the cartels against eachother and innocent citizens, then you say it's awful and terrible that this happened. So right now what I'm getting from all this is that: It's bad that this happened, American's are heartless, there's no evidence it was politically motivated even though it involved illegal guns being moved across the border, which is a political hot topic of this Administration and an issue they have been using as a reason for more gun control but none of that should be looked at, and no one should be held accountable if it was a mistake and American's shouldn't care if it was a mistake or not.  P.C.
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Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: We the Well-armed People (Gun rights stuff )
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on: December 15, 2011, 06:26:40 AM
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That said, frankly I don't understand why it would even affect gun control in America. I mean 10's of thousands of Mexicans have already been gunned down by the Cartels. What's a few hundred more guns that frankly/obviously given the death count, could have been bought elsewhere? Surely if it was a "false flag operation" to promote gun control in America they could have done better. Frankly, and sadly, no one cares in America about the huge death toll in Mexico. I truly doubt if it would even affect gun control in America one way or another.
Woof JDN, Really??? Come off it man. P.C.
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Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Cyberwar and American Freedom
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on: December 13, 2011, 02:30:55 AM
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Iran claims its experts almost done recovering data from captured US drone Nasser Karimi, The Associated Press Dec 12, 2011 13:45:00 PM 0
TEHRAN, Iran - Iranian experts are in the final stages of recovering data from the U.S. surveillance drone captured by the country's armed forces, state TV reported Monday. Tehran has flaunted the capture of the RQ-170 Sentinel, a top-secret aircraft with stealth technology, as a victory for Iran and a defeat for the United States in a complicated intelligence and technological battle. President Barack Obama said Monday that the U.S. was pressing Iran to return the aircraft, which U.S. officials say malfunctioned and was not brought down by Iran. But a senior commander of Iran's Revolutionary Guard said on Sunday that the country would not send it back, adding that "no one returns the symbol of aggression." Iranian lawmaker Parviz Sorouri, a member of the parliament's national security and foreign policy committee, said Monday the extracted information will be used to file a lawsuit against the United States for what he called the "invasion" by the unmanned aircraft. Sorouri also claimed that Iran has the capability to reproduce the drone through reverse engineering, but he did not elaborate. State TV broadcast images Thursday of Iranian military officials inspecting what it identified as the drone. Iranian state media have said the unmanned spy aircraft was detected and brought down over the country's east, near the border with Afghanistan. Officers in the Revolutionary Guard, Iran's most powerful military force, have claimed the country's armed forces brought down the surveillance aircraft with an electronic ambush, causing minimum damage to the drone. American officials have said that U.S. intelligence assessments indicate that Iran neither shot the drone down, nor used electronic or cybertechnology to force it from the sky. They contend the drone malfunctioned. The officials spoke anonymously in order to discuss the classified program. U.S. officials are concerned others may be able to reverse engineer the chemical composition of the drone's radar-deflecting paint or the aircraft's sophisticated optics technology that allows operators to positively identify terror suspects from tens of thousands of feet in the air. They are also worried adversaries may be able to hack into the drone's database, although it is not clear whether any data could be recovered. Some surveillance technologies allow video to stream through to operators on the ground but do not store much collected data. If they do, it is encrypted. Separately, in comments to the semi-official ISNA news agency, Sorouri said Iran would soon hold a navy drill to practice the closure of the strategic Strait of Hormuz at the mouth of the Persian Gulf, which is the passageway for about 40 per cent of the world's oil tanker traffic. Despite Sorouri's comments and past threats that Iran could seal off the waterway if the U.S. or Israel moved against Iranian nuclear facilities, no such exercise has been officially announced. "Iran will make the world unsafe" if the world attacks Iran, Sorouri said. Both the U.S. and Israel have not rule out military option against Iran's controversial nuclear program, which the West suspects is aimed at making atomic weapons. Iran denies the charge, saying its nuclear activities are geared toward peaceful purposes like power generation. In another sign of the increasing tensions between Iran and the U.S., Tehran said Monday it has asked Interpol to help seek the arrest of two former U.S. officials it accuses of supporting the assassinations of Iranian officials. Iran's state prosecutor, Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejehei, told reporters that Iran has filed charges against retired U.S. Army Gen. Jack Keane and former CIA agent Reuel Marc Gerecht. Ejehei said Iran sent a request to Interpol in Paris to help pursue the two Americans through its office in Washington. Iran says the two men urged the Obama administration to use covert action against Iran and kill some of its top officials, including Brig. Gen. Ghassem Soleimani commander of the Quds Force, the special foreign operations unit of the Revolutionary Guard.
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Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Cyberwar and American Freedom
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on: December 13, 2011, 02:27:48 AM
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Woof, This, along with a Sentinel stealth done losing it's satellite tether and gliding to a landing in Iran, might be of concern.
By Jason Ryan @JasonRyanABC Follow on Twitter Nov 16, 2011 8:11pm US Satellites Compromised by Malicious Cyber Activity On at least two occasions, hackers have taken over U.S. satellites and targeted their command-and-control systems, a report by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission revealed today. The incidents involved two Earth observation satellites. While it may be difficult to trace who hacked the satellites, U.S. officials acknowledged the incidents had to come from a nation power. U.S. officials cannot clearly trace the incidents to China, but the report released by the by congressionally mandated commission noted that Chinese military writings made reference to attacks on ground-based space communications facilities. “Chinese military writings advocate attacks on space-to ground communications links and ground-based satellite control facilities in the event of a conflict. Such facilities may be vulnerable,” the report noted, “In recent years, two U.S. government satellites have experienced interference apparently consistent with the cyber exploitation of their control facility.” The report noted that some of the malicious cyber activity targeting the satellites involved NASA’s Terra EOS satellite being targeted in June 2008 and again in October 2008. The June incident resulted in the satellite being interfered with for two minutes and the October incident lasted at least nine minutes. The report noted that in both instances, “The responsible party achieved all steps required to command the satellite but did not issue commands.” NASA confirmed in a separate statement: “NASA experienced two suspicious events with the Terra spacecraft in the summer and fall of 2008. We can confirm that there was no manipulation of data, no commands were successfully sent to the satellite, and no data was captured. NASA notified the Department of Defense, which is responsible for investigating any attempted interference with satellite operations.” The report noted that the Landsat-7 satellite operated by the U.S. Geological Survey experienced similar interference and events in 2007 and 2008 but added that the entity behind that incident did not achieve the ability to control the satellite.
Artist's rendering of the Terra Satellite (source: NASA)
The report mentions the serious implications the intrusions could have on the satellite systems, particularly if they were directed against more sensitive systems such as military or communications satellites. “If executed successfully, such interference has the potential to pose numerous threats, particularly if achieved against satellites with more sensitive functions. For example, access to a satellite’s controls could allow an attacker to damage or destroy the satellite,” the report read. “The attacker could also deny or degrade as well as forge or otherwise manipulate the satellite’s transmission,” the report added. “A high level of access could reveal the satellite’s capabilities or information, such as imagery, gained through its sensors. Opportunities may also exist to reconnoiter or compromise other terrestrial or space based networks used by the satellite.”
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Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Cyberwar and American Freedom
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on: December 13, 2011, 02:12:49 AM
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JEFF ST. JOHN: NOVEMBER 21, 2011 Reports Claim First-Ever Cyber Attack on US Utility The first cyber attack on utility infrastructure may have finally arrived via a hacked SCADA system and a broken-down water pump in rural Illinois.
We’ve been reporting for years how linking the internet to grid communications and control technology could open the country’s utilities to cyber attack. On Friday came reports of what may be the first such hack to cause physical damage to the country’s electric, water or gas infrastructure -- a burned-out water pump at a small utility in Illinois.
That’s not such a big deal in terms of damage caused. But if the report is true, it indicates that nefarious actors may have strung together several key stages of security vulnerabilities to infiltrate, then take control of, a piece of automated utility infrastructure -- and that could be a very big deal indeed.
Here’s the story. Earlier this month, workers at a small utility in central Illinois found a problem with the SCADA industrial controls that manage their water system, including a damaged water pump. An investigation by an IT services company found that the SCADA system had been hacked into by a computer in Russia, according to Joe Weiss, managing partner of cybersecurity firm Applied Control Solutions in Cupertino, Calif.
Weiss, who cited a report he said came from the Illinois Statewide Terrorism and Intelligence Center (ISTIC), said that unknown hackers had taken over control of the SCADA system and turned the pump on and off until it burned out. The hackers had apparently stolen entry credentials from a company that makes software to access the SCADA system -- and Weiss said the same hackers could be planning future attacks using the same means and methods.
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security has told multiple news agencies reporting on this matter that it has no evidence that indicates there is a risk to utilities or public safety. Still, DHS and the FBI are investigating the matter.
Breaking Down the Risks
We need to wait for more facts to emerge on this murky matter. But there’s no getting around the fact that security is a major challenge for utilities that are seeking to secure legacy control systems that are being hooked up to the internet for the first time. Let’s break down the alleged SCADA hack in Illinois, and see how it could have happened, taking as examples some of the cybersecurity problems that have been identified for utilities over the past few years.
First, where could potential attackers have found the credentials they needed to access a utility SCADA system? One significant possibility is that the hackers took advantage of poor human management of security by fooling employees into turning over critical passwords or other credential information that they could exploit. That kind of “social engineering” is still a key concern for utility security, and requires employee training as much as software expertise to prevent.
Human failures can also open newly networked utility systems to remote attacks. Tom Parker, vice president at computer security firm FusionX, showed at a Black Hat conference in August how he could use simple code and Google searches to theoretically take control of a water treatment facility’s remote terminal units (RTUs), particularly when the RTUs are protected by the password “1234” -- the easiest password to guess besides the word “password” itself.
Even if SCADA system operators aren’t using idiotic passwords and are taking proper measures to protect their security credentials, there are harder-to-prevent ways to pull access and security data out of them. One scary possibility is that the hackers had accessed the utility’s SCADA system for months beforehand, and are currently worming their way into others, using more sophisticated cyber-intrusion tools.
Worming Into SCADA Systems?
Take Duqu and Stuxnet -- two words that are probably meaningless to most people, but which strike fear into SCADA system operators around the world. First came Stuxnet, a virus that is believed to have been targeting Iran’s nuclear materials program by infecting Windows computers and thence infiltrating SCADA systems built by Siemens, all with the goal of causing malfunctions in uranium enrichment centrifuge equipment.
It was just about a year ago that cybersecurity experts first discovered Stuxnet, but it’s believed that the virus may have been introduced years beforehand -- meaning that SCADA systems around the world may be carrying a version of it right now. While the hope is that the virus was targeting only Iranian centrifuges, the idea that similar viruses could use the same techniques to do more damage remains high on the list of concerns for smart grid cybersecurity experts.
More recently, those concerns have refocused on a computer virus known as Duqu. Whether or not it’s related to Stuxnet remains a point of contention, but it appears to operate in a similar way, by exploiting a vulnerability in Windows to lodge itself inside servers and collect data passing through them, which could allow for espionage or gathering security data for further exploitation.
The Duqu virus has been shifting around the world, from India to Europe, Africa and Indonesia (and reportedly back to Iran), as security experts seek to track it down and eliminate it. While no exploitation has been found in the utility industry as of yet, its ability to infect Windows machines should give it access to almost any industry out there.
Using Controls to Wreak Havoc
Unfortunately, once hackers have gotten access to a SCADA system, there are plenty of actions they can take to damage the system they’ve hijacked. Back in 2007, reports emerged of a DHS experiment that showed how the control system of gas-fired generator at the Department of Energy’s Idaho National Lab could be hacked in a way that destroyed the generator, using a mock-up of a typical power plant’s control system.
The U.S. utility industry has had four years since that demonstration to try to fix any similar vulnerabilities in their power plant controls systems, but it’s unclear if they’ve made much progress. The North American Electricity Reliability Council (NERC), an industry group in charge of setting critical infrastructure protection (CIP) guidelines for U.S. and Canadian utilities, has just this year begun auditing utilities on the compliance they’ve been self-reporting over the past few years.
NERC recently held a grid security exercise for utilities seeking to comply with its “critical infrastructure protection” program, which might provide some examples of the security precautions that are being tackled.
While outside attacks are the subject of much of our recent worries, it was an inside job that gave the world a sense of just how much havoc a SCADA system takeover could wreak. In 2000, a disgruntled former employee of a Queensland, Australia water treatment plant decided to remotely access the system and release millions of gallons of sewage into nearby streams and parks. Though he served two years in jail for the act, that didn’t stop it from happening.
To guard against these kinds of attacks, experts recommend multiple layers of security to detect and prevent such unusual and knowingly self-destructive commands. Preventing intrusion is the first line of defense, but stopping an attack in progress will be equally important. After all, the IT industry’s experience with hackers has shown that it’s almost impossible to anticipate all the clever ways hackers are working on their next exploits.
There’s little doubt that U.S. national security officials are worried about the potential threats that could come from connecting SCADA systems to the internet. Will utilities decide to cope with the threat by unplugging those systems, thus essentially turning back the clock on the smart grid? Or will they be able to manage the new security challenges that come along with the benefits of networking and integrating the grid? Looks like we’ll be talking a lot more about these subjects, thanks to a broken-down water pump in Illinois.
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Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Immigration issues
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on: December 13, 2011, 02:07:40 AM
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Woof, Let's see if the State's are at the mercy of the distant, inept, and corrupt Federal government (exactly why the Revolutionary war was fought). The headline comes at the end: Kagan recluses herself!!!!
High court to review tough Arizona immigration law By MARK SHERMAN | AP – 8 hrs ago
WASHINGTON (AP) — The Supreme Court stepped into the fight Monday over a tough Arizona law that requires local police to help enforce federal immigration laws — pushing the court deeper into hot, partisan issues of the 2012 election campaign. The court's election-year docket now contains three politically charged disputes, including President Barack Obama's health care overhaul and Texas redistricting. The debate over immigration already is shaping presidential politics, and now the court is undertaking a review of an Arizona law that has spawned a host of copycat state laws targeting illegal immigrants. The court will review a federal appeals court ruling that blocked several provisions in the Arizona law. One of those requires that police, while enforcing other laws, question a person's immigration status if officers suspect he is in the country illegally. The case is the court's biggest foray into immigration law in decades, said Temple University law professor Peter Spiro, an expert in that area. The Obama administration challenged the Arizona law by arguing that regulating immigration is the job of the federal government, not states. Similar laws in Alabama, South Carolina and Utah also are facing administration lawsuits. Private groups are suing over immigration measures adopted in Georgia and Indiana. "This case is not just about Arizona. It's about every state grappling with the costs of illegal immigration," Arizona Gov. Jan Brewer, a Republican, said following the court's announcement Monday. Fifty-nine Republicans in Congress, including presidential candidate Michele Bachmann, filed a brief with the court backing the Arizona law. The immigration case, like the challenge to Obama's health care overhaul, pits Republican-led states against the Democratic administration in an argument about the reach of federal power. The redistricting case has a similarly partisan tinge to it, with Republicans who control the state government in Texas facing off against Democrats and minority groups that tend vote Democratic. In the immigration arena, the states say that the federal government isn't doing enough to address a major problem and that border states are suffering disproportionately. The issue has been widely discussed by the Republican candidates for president. They have mostly embraced a hard line to avoid accusations that they support any kind of "amnesty" for the some 12 million illegal immigrants estimated to be living in the U.S. Newt Gingrich was most recently criticized by his opponents for saying he would grant legal status to some with longstanding family and community ties, and Gingrich has since endorsed the South Carolina law that allows police to demand a person's immigration status. That law is among the four state laws that have been challenged by the administration. Brewer signed the Arizona immigration measure into law in April 2010. The administration sued three months later to block it from taking effect. In April, a three-judge panel of the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco upheld a federal judge's ruling halting enforcement of several provisions of the law. Among the blocked provisions: requiring all immigrants to obtain or carry immigration registration papers; making it a state criminal offense for an illegal immigrant to seek work or hold a job and allowing police to arrest suspected illegal immigrants without warrants. In October, the federal appeals court in Atlanta blocked parts of the Alabama law that forced public schools to check the immigration status of students and allowed police to file criminal charges against people who were unable to prove their citizenship. Lawsuits in South Carolina and Utah are not as far along. The administration argued that the justices should have waited to see how other courts ruled on the challenges to other laws before getting involved. Still, following the court's announcement Monday, White House spokesman Jay Carney said, "We look forward to arguing our point of view in that case when the time comes." Spiro, the Temple University immigration expert, said the court easily could have passed on the Arizona case for now. "They could have waited for the more extreme case to come from Alabama, which really outflanked the Arizona law," Spiro said. He predicted the court would uphold the police check of immigration status but perhaps not the measure making it a crime to be without immigration documents. Arguments probably will take place in late April, which would give the court roughly two months to decide the case Justice Elena Kagan will not take part case, presumably because of her work on the issue when she served in the Justice Department in the Obama administration. The case is Arizona v. U.S., 11-182.
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Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Corruption
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on: December 11, 2011, 07:25:34 PM
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Woof, It certainly shows how our News Media and Press have completely failed us. I guess they think this kind of information is just more than we can understand. I'm just an ol' country boy from Kentucky and even I can grasp the highlights of this accounting. We the People had better wake up to what's going on here, GM is absolutely correct. This is Rome at the end of the Republic. P.C.
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Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Original pdf file/Sold Out
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on: December 11, 2011, 04:57:46 PM
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Woof, This url leads to the PDF file of all the information of the previous post's, and is easy to read. I'm leaving the other post's in, even though the formatting is poor, because the visual effect of scrolling down the list of the millions, even billions of dollars paid out by these failed companies to our politicans is just stunning and if the original is taken down for some reason, we'll still have the info here. www.wallstreetwatch.org/reports/sold_out.pdf P.C.
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Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / For The Record/End
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on: December 11, 2011, 03:19:27 AM
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Woof, 13th Post;
2008 Appendix 218 Accounting Firms: KPMG LLP Decade-long campaign contribution total (1998-2008): $8,486,392 Decade-long lobbying expenditure total (1998-2008): $19,103,000 KPMG Campaign Contributions:277 2008 Top Recipients278 TOTAL: $1,746,293 1. Barack Obama (D) $67,500 2. Hillary Clinton (D) $40,900 3. John McCain (R) $22,490 4. Chris Dodd (D) $21,000 5. Elizabeth Dole (R) $12,300 6. Steve Chabot (R) $10,300 7. Jim Ryun (R) $10,300 8. Michele Marie Bachmann (R) $10,000 9. Melissa Bean (D) $10,000 9. Allen Boyd (D) $10,000 9. John Campbell (R) $10,000 9. Michael Castle (R) $10,000 9. James Clyburn (D) $10,000 9. Norm Coleman (R) $10,000 9. Susan Collins (R) $10,000 9. Mike Conaway (R) $10,000 9. John Cornyn (R) $10,000 9. Joseph Crowley (D) $10,000 9. Artur Davis (D) $10,000 277 Source: Center for Responsive Politics. Campaign contribution totals accessed February 2009. Individual recipient numbers do not include the 4th Quarter of 2008. 278 Based on highest 1,000 contributions and PAC money. 9. Lincoln Davis (D) $10,000 9. Barney Frank (D) $10,000 9. Jim Gerlach (R) $10,000 9. Jeb Hensarling (R) $10,000 9. Michael Johanns (R) $10,000 9. Paul Kanjorski (D) $10,000 9. Ron Kind (D) $10,000 9. Ron Klein (D) $10,000 9. Tim Mahoney (D) $10,000 9. Carolyn Maloney (D) $10,000 9. Jim Marshall (D) $10,000 9. Jim Matheson (D) $10,000 9. Dennis Moore (D) $10,000 9. Chris Murphy (D) $10,000 9. Steve Pearce (R) $10,000 9. Edwin Perlmutter (D) $10,000 9. Charles Rangel (D) $10,000 9. Harry Reid (D) $10,000 9. Peter Roskam (R) $10,000 9. Ed Royce (R) $10,000 9. Paul Ryan (R) $10,000 9. David Scott (D) $10,000 9. Christopher Shays (R) $10,000 9. Lamar Smith (R) $10,000 9. John Tanner (D) $10,000 9. Mike Thompson (D) $10,000 Appendix 219 9. Melvin Watt (D) $10,000 2006 Top Recipients279 TOTAL: $1,320,683 1. Heather Wilson (R) $15,000 2. Max Baucus (D) $13,233 3. Chris Dodd (D) $13,000 3. James Talent (R) $13,000 5. Rick Santorum (R) $11,200 6. Patrick McHenry (R) $10,704 7. Spencer Bachus (R) $10,000 7. Roy Blunt (R) $10,000 7. Conrad Burns (R) $10,000 7. Eric Cantor (R) $10,000 7. Hillary Clinton (D) $10,000 7. Bob Corker (R) $10,000 7. Michael Fitzpatrick (R) $10,000 7. Barney Frank (D) $10,000 7. Jeb Hensarling (R) $10,000 7. Jon Kyl (R) $10,000 7. Jim Matheson (D) $10,000 7. Raymond Meier (R) $10,000 7. Dennis Moore (D) $10,000 7. Marilyn Musgrave (R) $10,000 7. Rick O'Donnell (R) $10,000 7. Rick Renzi (R) $10,000 7. Tom Reynolds (R) $10,000 7. David Scott (D) $10,000 7. E Clay Shaw Jr (R) $10,000 7. Gordon Smith (R) $10,000 7. Patrick Tiberi (R) $10,000 279 Based on highest 1,000 contributions and PAC money. 2004 Top Recipients TOTAL: $1,459,303 1. Charles Schumer (D) $32,000 2. Richard Shelby (R) $25,000 3. John Kerry (D) $22,750 4. Chris Dodd (D) $19,000 5. Peter Coors (R) $18,000 6. Mike Conaway (R) $16,000 7. James DeMint (R) $15,201 8. Richard Baker (R) $15,000 8. Jeb Hensarling (R) $15,000 10. Christopher S 'Kit' Bond (R) $12,000 10. George W Bush (R) $12,000 12. Gresham Barrett (R) $11,500 13. Mel Martinez (R) $11,000 14. Spencer Bachus (R) $10,000 14. Bob Beauprez (R) $10,000 14. Roy Blunt (R) $10,000 14. Eric Cantor (R) $10,000 14. Shelley Moore Capito (R) $10,000 14. Vito Fossella (R) $10,000 14. Katherine Harris (R) $10,000 14. Bill Jones (R) $10,000 14. Sue Kelly (R) $10,000 14. Michael Oxley (R) $10,000 14. Jim Ryun (R) $10,000 2002 Top Recipients TOTAL: $1,740,139 1. Saxby Chambliss (R) $16,050 2. Mike Ferguson (R) $14,500 3. Norm Coleman (R) $12,500 3. Felix J Grucci Jr (R) $12,500 Appendix 220 5. Jim McCrery (R) $11,750 6. Phil Gramm (R) $11,000 7. Connie Morella (R) $10,450 8. Lamar Alexander (R) $10,250 8. Charles "Chip" Pickering Jr (R) $10,250 10. Roy Blunt (R) $10,000 10. Shelley Moore Capito (R) $10,000 10. Vito Fossella (R) $10,000 10. Robin Hayes (R) $10,000 10. Tim Hutchinson (R) $10,000 10. Chris John (D) $10,000 10. Sue Kelly (R) $10,000 10. Mark Kennedy (R) $10,000 10. Candice Miller (R) $10,000 10. Dennis Moore (D) $10,000 10. Michael Oxley (R) $10,000 10. Mike Rogers (R) $10,000 10. John Shadegg (R) $10,000 10. Rob Simmons (R) $10,000 10. John Sununu (R) $10,000 10. John Thune (R) $10,000 2000 Top Recipients TOTAL: $1,371,159 1. George W Bush (R) $89,567 2. Charles Schumer (D) $42,948 3. Spencer Abraham (R) $14,999 4. Rick Lazio (R) $14,550 5. Chris Dodd (D) $14,000 6. George Allen (R) $10,943 7. William Roth Jr (R) $10,500 8. John Ashcroft (R) $10,000 8. Slade Gorton (R) $10,000 8. Rod Grams (R) $10,000 11. Rick Santorum (R) $9,000 12. Rudy Giuliani (R) $8,999 13. Conrad Burns (R) $8,500 14. David Phelps (D) $8,000 15. John Ensign (R) $7,775 16. James Rogan (R) $7,725 17. Dick Armey (R) $7,500 18. Jane Harman (D) $7,400 19. Al Gore (D) $7,300 20. Heather Wilson (R) $7,225 1998 Top Recipients TOTAL: $848,815 1. Thomas Bliley Jr (R) $10,000 1. Billy Tauzin (R) $10,000 3. Barbara Mikulski (D) $8,219 4. Lauch Faircloth (R) $8,000 5. Ron Wyden (D) $7,795 6. Paul Coverdell (R) $7,500 7. Rick White (R) $6,225 8. Robert Bennett (R) $6,000 8. John Boehner (R) $6,000 8. Molly Bordonaro (R) $6,000 8. Heather Wilson (R) $6,000 12. Matt Fong (R) $5,750 13. Don Nickles (R) $5,500 14. Alfonse D'Amato (R) $5,300 15. Dick Armey (R) $5,000 15. Brian Bilbray (R) $5,000 15. Jim Bunning (R) $5,000 15. Christopher Cox (R) $5,000 15. Tom DeLay (R) $5,000 15. Peter Fitzgerald (R) $5,000 Appendix 221 15. Newt Gingrich (R) $5,000 15. Trent Lott (R) $5,000 15. Bill Redmond (R) $5,000 Appendix 222 KPMG Lobbying Expenses:280 2008 TOTAL: $2,985,000 KPMG LLP $2,525,000 KPMG LLP > $10,000* Velasquez Group $200,000 Public Strategies $130,000 Clark & Weinstock $80,000 Clark & Assoc $50,000 Mayer, Brown et al > $10,000* 2007 TOTAL: $2,590,000 KPMG LLP $2,130,000 KPMG LLP > $10,000* Velasquez Group $180,000 Public Strategies $120,000 Clark & Weinstock $80,000 Clark & Assoc $40,000 Mayer, Brown et al $40,000 2006 TOTAL: $2,190,000 KPMG LLP $1,650,000 KPMG LLP $40,000 Velasquez Group $180,000 Public Strategies $120,000 Mayer, Brown et al $80,000 Clark & Weinstock $80,000 Clark & Assoc $40,000 280 Source: Center for Responsive Politics. Lobbying amounts accessed February 2009. * Not included in totals 2005 TOTAL: $1,210,000 KPMG LLP $890,000 KPMG LLP $40,000 Public Strategies $120,000 Clark & Weinstock $80,000 Clark & Assoc $40,000 Velasquez Group $40,000 2004 TOTAL: $1,838,000 KPMG LPP $1,368,000 KPMG LPP $60,000 KPMG LPP > $10,000* Clark & Weinstock $200,000 Velasquez Group $140,000 Public Strategies $50,000 Clark & Assoc $20,000 2003 TOTAL: $1,575,000 KPMG LLP $925,000 KPMG LLP > $10,000* KPMG LLP $180,000 Clark & Weinstock $180,000 Velasquez Group $160,000 Public Strategies $90,000 McGovern & Smith $40,000 Clark & Assoc > $10,000* * Not included in totals Appendix 223 2002 TOTAL: $1,850,000 KPMG LLP $1,430,000 KPMG LLP $40,000 KPMG LLP $60,000 KPMG LLP $10,000 Public Strategies $160,000 Clark & Weinstock $100,000 McGovern & Smith $20,000 Capitol Tax Partners $20,000 Thelen, Reid et al $10,000 Clark & Assoc > $10,000* 2001 TOTAL: $1,455,000 KPMG LLP $1,175,000 KPMG LLP > $10,000* KPMG LLP $80,000 Public Strategies $120,000 Palmetto Group $80,000 2000 TOTAL: $1,580,000 KPMG LLP $1,340,000 KPMG LLP $80,000 Palmetto Group $100,000 Mayer, Brown et al $60,000 1999 TOTAL: $1,190,000 KPMG LLP $850,000 Palmetto Group $280,000 Mayer, Brown et al $40,000 * Not included in totals Spectrum Group $20,000 1998 TOTAL: $640,000 KPMG LLP $600,000 Mayer, Brown et al $40,000 Spectrum Group > $10,000* * Not included in totals Appendix 224 KPMG Covered Official Lobbyists:281 Firm / Name of Lobbyist Covered Official Position Year(s) Clark & Assoc. Sam Geduldig Dir of Coalitions, House Fin. Serv Comm. 2007-2008 Sr Advisor, Majority Whip Roy Blunt Clark & Weinstock Ed Kutler Asst, Office of Speaker, House of Reps 2007-2008 Asst, House Republican Whip Johathan Schwantes Gen Counsel, Senate Judiciary Comm 2007-2008 Sandra Stuart Asst Sec for Legislative Affairs, DoD 2008 Chief of Staff, Rep. Vic Fazio Vin Weber Member of Congress (MN) 2007-2008 Margaret McGlinch Chief of Staff, Rep. Tim Walz 2008 Legislative Dir, Rep. Richard Neal Legislative Counsel, Sen. Harry Reid Kent Bonham Policy Dir, Sen Chuck Hagel 2002-2003 Juleanna Glover Weiss Press Secretary, Vice President 2002-2003 Brian Bieron Policy Director, House Rulse Comm. 2002 Timothy Morrison Assoc Dir, Presidential Personnel 2002 Anne Urban Legislative Dir, Sen. Robert Kerrey 2002 Capital Tax Partners William Fant Deputy Asst Sc for Leg Affairs, Treasury 2002-2003 Joseph Mikrut Tax Legislative Counsel, Treasury 2002-2003 Jonathan Talisman Asst Treasury Secretary for Tax Policy 2002-2003 Public Strategies, Inc Wallace Henderson Counsel, Rep. Tauzin 2001-2002 Mayer, Brown & Platt Jeffrey Lewis Legislative Asst, Sen. Breaux 1999-2000 281Source: Senate Office of Public Records <http://soprweb.senate.gov/>. Accessed January 2009. Appendix 225 Accounting Firms: Pricewaterhouse Decade-long campaign contribution total (1998-2008): $10,800,772 Decade-long lobbying expenditure total (1998-2008): $44,291,084 Pricewaterhouse Campaign Contributions:282 2008 Top Recipients TOTAL: $2,652,971 1. Barack Obama (D) $205,318 2. Hillary Clinton (D) $190,200 3. John McCain (R) $166,970 4. Mitt Romney (R) $90,150 5. Chris Dodd (D) $64,800 6. Rudy Giuliani (R) $16,250 7. Susan M Collins (R) $16,100 8. Norm Coleman (R) $13,050 9. Elizabeth Dole (R) $12,000 10. Steny H Hoyer (D) $11,000 11. Dean F Andal (R) $10,500 11. Mike Conaway (R) $10,500 13. Keith S Fimian (R) $10,200 14. John Edwards (D) $10,100 15. Michele Marie Bachmann (R) $10,000 15. Spencer Bachus (R) $10,000 15. Max Baucus (D) $10,000 15. Melissa Bean (D) $10,000 15. Judy Biggert (R) $10,000 282 Source: Center for Responsive Politics. Campaign contribution totals accessed February 2009. Individual recipient numbers do not include the 4th Quarter of 2008. 15. John Boehner (R) $10,000 2006 Top Recipients TOTAL: $1,388,604 1. Tom Davis (R) $71,208 2. Mark Kennedy (R) $35,600 3. Rick Santorum (R) $23,546 4. Richard Baker (R) $23,488 5. Tom Carper (D) $20,499 6. Spencer Bachus (R) $20,000 7. Joe Lieberman (I) $17,000 8. Deborah Pryce (R) $14,750 9. Mike Ferguson (R) $14,150 10. George Allen (R) $13,850 11. James M Talent (R) $13,000 12. Mike DeWine (R) $11,600 13. Michael Fitzpatrick (R) $11,000 13. Jon Kyl (R) $11,000 15. Tom DeLay (R) $10,500 16. Barney Frank (D) $10,250 16. Nancy L Johnson (R) $10,250 16. Tom Reynolds (R) $10,250 16. Christopher Shays (R) $10,250 20. E Clay Shaw Jr (R) $10,204 Appendix 226 2004 Top Recipients TOTAL: $1,882,353 1. George W. Bush (R) $513,750 2. John Kerry (D) $73,000 3. Richard C Shelby (R) $61,250 4. Michael G Oxley (R) $50,550 5. Charles Schumer (D) $27,476 6. Mike Conaway (R) $17,000 7. James W DeMint (R) $12,500 8. Arlen Specter (R) $12,350 9. Chuck Grassley (R) $12,000 9. Scott Paterno (R) $12,000 9. John Thune (R) $12,000 12. Johnny Isakson (R) $11,000 13. Mark Kennedy (R) $10,500 14. Spencer Bachus (R) $10,000 14. Richard Baker (R) $10,000 14. Roy Blunt (R) $10,000 14. Max Burns (R) $10,000 18. Rick Renzi (R) $10,000 19. Richard Burr (R) $9,750 20. Eric Cantor (R) $9,500 2002 Top Recipients TOTAL: $1,357,480 1. Norm Coleman (R) $13,500 2. Roy Blunt (R) $11,000 3. Connie Morella (R) $10,750 4. John E Sununu (R) $10,500 5. Dennis Hastert (R) $10,000 5. Mark Kennedy (R) $10,000 5. Michael G Oxley (R) $10,000 8. James M Talent (R) $9,950 9. Elizabeth Dole (R) $9,500 9. John Thune (R) $9,500 11. Max Baucus (D) $9,000 12. Phil Crane (R) $8,566 13. Tim Hutchinson (R) $8,000 14. Ken Lucas (D) $7,950 15. Susan M Collins (R) $7,750 16. Wayne Allard (R) $7,500 16. Jim Mcrery (R) $7,500 16. Dennis Moore (D) $7,500 19. Robin Hayes (R) $7,000 19. William Jefferson (D) $7,000 2000 Top Recipients TOTAL: $1,868,674 1. George W Bush (R) $131,798 2. Rick A Lazio (R) $53,086 3. Bill Bradley (D) $51,550 4. Rudy Giuliani (R) $41,150 5. Charles Schumer (D) $33,974 6. Spencer Abraham (R) $29,550 7. Al Gore (D) $23,630 8. John McCain (R) $19,080 9. John Ashcroft(R) $12,500 10. Edward Kennedy (D) $12,250 11. James E Rogan (R) $11,950 11. William Roth Jr (R) $11,950 13. Chris Dodd (D) $11,750 14. Ernie Fletcher (R) $11,000 15. Steven Kuykendall (R) $10,750 16. E Clay Shaw Jr (R) $10,270 17. Rod Grams (R) $10,000 17. Dennis Hastert (R) $10,000 17. Billy Tauzin (R) $10,000 20. Sherrod Brown (D) $9,999 Appendix 227 1998 Top Recipients TOTAL: $1,650,690 1. Alfonse D'Amato (R) $25,970 2. Chris Dodd (D) $17,800 3. George Voinovich (R) $15,500 3. Billy Tauzin (R) $15,000 5. Lauch Faircloth (R) $14,000 5. Martin Frost (D) $14,000 7. Sherrod Brown (D) $13,948 8. Rick White (R) $13,825 9. Newt Gingrich (R) $13,800 10. Paul Coverdell (R) $13,500 10. Anna Eshoo(D) $13,500 10. Ron Wyden (D) $13,500 13. Robert F Bennett (R) $13,000 13. Matt Fong (R) $13,000 15. Thomas Bliley Jr. (R) $12,500 16. Michael Coles (D) $11,750 17. Christopher S 'Kit' Bond (R) $11,500 18. Don Nickles (R) $11,000 19. Harry Reid (D) $10,000 20. Christopher Cox (R) $9,111 Appendix 228 Pricewaterhouse Lobbying Expenditures:283 2008 TOTAL: $3,165,000 PriceWaterhouseCoopers $2,340,000 Quinn, Gillespie & Assoc $370,000 Rich Feuer Group $160,000 American Capitol Group $125,000 Clark & Weinstock $80,000 Clark & Assoc $50,000 Commonwealth Group > $10,000* Covington & Burling > $10,000* Donna McLean Assoc > $10,000* Mayer, Brown et al > $10,000* Patton Boggs LLP > $10,000* Cypress Advocacy $40,000 2007 TOTAL: $3,630,584 PriceWaterhouseCoopers $2,650,584 Quinn, Gillespie & Assoc $600,000 Rich Feuer Group $80,000 Clark & Weinstock $80,000 American Capitol Group $60,000 Clark & Assoc $40,000 Donna McLean Assoc $40,000 Mayer, Brown et al $40,000 Patton Boggs LLP $40,000 283 Source: Center for Responsive Politics. Lobbying amounts accessed February 2009. * Not included in totals 2006 TOTAL: $4,413,500 PriceWaterHouseCoopers $3,333,500 Quinn, Gillespie & Assoc $600,000 Patton Boggs LLP $240,000 Clark & Weinstock $80,000 Mayer, Brown et al $80,000 Clark & Assoc $40,000 Donna McLean Assoc $40,000 2005 TOTAL: $13,600,000 PriceWaterhouseCoopers $12,580,000 Quinn, Gillespie & Assoc $600,000 Patton Boggs LLP $200,000 Clark & Weinstock $80,000 Thelen, Redi & Priest $60,000 Donna McLean Assoc $40,000 Clark & Assoc $40,000 2004 TOTAL: $2,505,000 PriceWaterhouseCoopers $1,660,000 PriceWaterhouseCoopers > $10,000* Quinn, Gillespie & Assoc $580,000 Thelen, Reid & Priest $105,000 Clark & Weinstock $80,000 Public Strategies $40,000 Donna McLean Assoc $20,000 Clark & Assoc $20,000 * Not included in totals Appendix 229 2003 TOTAL: $2,390,000 PriceWaterhouseCoopers $1,680,000 PriceWaterhouseCoopers > $10,000* Quinn, Gillespie & Assoc $560,000 Clark & Weinstock $80,000 Thelen, Reid & Priest $70,000 Clark & Assoc > $10,000* 2002 TOTAL: $4,445,000 PriceWaterhouseCoopers $3,160,000 PriceWaterhouseCoopers $155,000 PriceWaterhouseCoopers $260,000 PriceWaterhouseCoopers > $10,000* Alcalde & Fay $200,000 Quinn, Gillespie & Assoc $540,000 Clark & Weinstock $100,000 Arnold & Porter $20,000 Thelen, Reid et al $10,000 Clark & Assoc > $10,000* 2001 TOTAL: $4,560,000 PriceWaterhouseCoopers $1,240,000 PriceWaterhouseCoopers $560,000 PriceWaterhouseCoopers $700,000 PriceWaterhouseCoopers $840,000 PriceWaterhouseCoopers $120,000 PriceWaterhouseCoopers $360,000 Alcalde & Fay $220,000 Quinn, Gillespie & Assoc $460,000 Cathy Abernathy Consult. $60,000 * Not included in totals 2000 TOTAL: $2,186,000 PriceWaterhouseCoopers $580,000 PriceWaterhouseCoopers $800,000 PriceWaterhouseCoopers $360,000 Quinn, Gillespie & Assoc $350,000 Mayer, Brown et al $60,000 Fleishman-Hillard Inc $36,000 Downey-McGrath Group > $10,000* Alcalde & Fay > $10,000* 1999 TOTAL: $2,316,000 PriceWaterhouseCoopers $1,220,000 PriceWaterhouseCoopers $1,000,000 Mayer, Brown et al. $40,000 Fleishman-Hillard Inc $36,000 McDonald, Jack H $20,000 Dierman, Wortley et al > $10,000* Downey McGrath Group > $10,000* 1998 TOTAL: $1,080,000 PriceWaterhouseCoopers $620,000 PriceWaterhouseCoopers $60,000 Coopers & Lybrand $340,000 Mayer, Brown et al $40,000 Downey Chandler Inc $20,000 * Not included in totals Appendix 230 Pricewaterhouse Covered Official Lobbyists:284 Firm / Name of Lobbyist Covered Official Position Year(s) PWC Leasing Corp. Barabara M. Angus Business Tax Counsel, Joint Committee on Taxation 1999 Kenneth J. Kies Chief of Staff, Joint Committee on Taxation 1999 Mayer, Brown, & Platt Jeffery Lewis Legislative Assitant to Senator Breaux 1999-2000 Quinn Gillespie Associates LLC John M. Quinn White House Counsel, Chief of Staff to VP 2000 Bruce Andrews Legislative Director, Rep. Tim Holden 2000 Section 170 Coalition Tim Hanford Tax Counsel, Committee on Ways and Means 2001 PwC Structured Finance Coalition Tim Hanford Tax Counsel, Committee on Ways and Means 2001 John Meager Special Counsel, Committee on Ways and Means 2001 PwC Leasing Coalition Tim Hanford Tax Counsel, Committee on Ways and Means 2001 Dierman, Wortley et al Norman D'Amours Chairman National Credit Union Admin 2002 Clark & Weinstock Brian Bieron Policy Director, House Rules Committee 2002 284 Source: Senate Office of Public Records <http://soprweb.senate.gov/>. Accessed January 2009. Appendix 231 Kent Bonham Policy Director for Sen. Chuck Hagel 2002-2003 Juleanna Glover Weiss Press Secretary to the Vice President 2002-2003 Jonathan Schwantes General Counsel, Senate Judiciary Committee 2007 Pricewaterhouse Coopers Beverly Bell Administrative Assistant, Rep. Don Johnson 2003 Amy Best Deputy Director of Public Affairs 2005-2006 Laura Cox Managing Executive External Affairs 2005-2006 Michael O'Brien Legislative Affairs Specialist 2005-2006 Donna Mclean Assoc. Donna Mclean US Dept. of Transportation, Asst Sec for Budeget & Programs & CFO 2004-2006 Quinn Gillespie Associates LLC Mike Hacker Communications Dir. (Rep. John Dingell) 2004-2005 Amy Cunniffe Special Asst. to the Pres for Leg. Affairs 2005-2006 Elizabeth Hogan Speical Asst, Dept of Commerce 2005-2006 Kevin Kayes Chief Counsel Senator Reid 2006-2007 Allison Giles Chief of Staff, House Ways and Means Committee 2007 Christopher Mccannell Chief of Staff, Congressman Joe Crowley 2007 Patton Boggs LLP Stephen Mchale Deputy Administrator, TSA 2005 Clark, Lytle, & Geduldig Sam Geduldig Dir of Coalitions, House Fin Serv Com 2007-2008 Sr Advisor, Majority Whip Roy Blunt 2007-2008Gr
I just wanted to get all this in the record. P.C.
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Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Corruption
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Woof, 12th Post;
190 Hedge Funds: Farallon Capital Management Decade-long campaign contribution total (1998-2008): $1,058,953 Decade-long lobbying expenditure total (1998-2008): $1,005,000 Farallon Campaign Contributions:261 2008 All Recipients TOTAL: $372,863 1. Hillary Clinton (D) $94,600 2. Barack Obama (D) $15,550 3. David Obey (D) $13,800 3. Chris Dodd (D) $13,800 4. Rahm Emanuel (D) $10,200 5. John McCain (R) $8,900 6. Howard Berman (D) $8,600 7. John Thune (R) $7,100 8. Tim Johnson (D) $4,600 8. Gary Trauner (D) $4,600 9. Mark Warner (D) $3,300 10. Donna Edwards (D) $2,000 11. Charles Rangel (D) $1,000 12. Allyson Schwartz (D) $500 13. Mitt Romney (R) $250 2006 All Recipients TOTAL: $328,890 1. Hillary Clinton (D) $33,190 2. Kent Conrad (D) $8,400 261 Source: Center for Responsive Politics. Campaign contribution totals accessed February 2009. Individual recipient numbers do not include the 4th Quarter of 2008. 3. Rahm Emanuel (D) $8,000 4. Evan Bayh (D) $6,300 5. John Thune (R) $4,400 6. Judy Aydelott (D) $4,200 6. John Hall (D) $4,200 8. Joe Sestak (D) $2,100 8. Ken Lucas (D) $2,100 8. Chris Carney (D) $2,100 8. Michael Arcuri (D) $2,100 8. Edwin Perlmutter (D) $2,100 8. Charles Brown (D) $2,100 8. Chris Murphy (D) $2,100 15. Dianne Feinstein (D) $1,000 15. Howard Berman (D) $1,000 16. Patrick Murphy (D) $500 2004 All Recipients TOTAL: $233,950 1. John Kerry (D) $14,000 2. Tom Daschle (D) $9,250 3. Russell Feingold (D) $4,000 3. Chris John (D) $4,000 3. Tony Knowles (D) $4,000 3. Brad Carson (D) $4,000 7. Lisa Quigley (D) $2,500 8. Erskine Bowles (D) $2,000 8. Howard Dean (D) $2,000 Appendix 191 8. Ken Salazar (D) $2,000 8. Inez Tenenbaum (D) $2,000 8. Joe Lieberman (D) $2,000 8. Harold Ford, Jr (D) $2,000 8. Betty Castor (D) $2,000 15. Rob Bishop (R) $1,200 16. Robert Bennett (R) $1,000 17. Jamie Metzl (D) $500 2002 All Recipients TOTAL: $97,250 1. John Kerry (D) $17,000 2. Tom Daschle (D) $7,500 3. John P Murtha (D) $4,000 4. Howard Berman (D) $2,500 5. Robert Bennett (R) $1,000 5. Rahm Emanuel (D) $1,000 5. Howard Berman (D) $1,000 5. John Thune (R) $1,000 9. Steven Peter Andreasen (D) $750 2000 All Recipients TOTAL: $18,500 1. Norm Dicks (D) $9,000 2. Bill Bradley (D) $5,000 3. John McCain (R) $1,000 3. Ed Bernstein (D) $1,000 3. Nancy Pelosi (D) $1,000 1998 All Recipients TOTAL: $7,500 1. John McCain (R) $1,000 1. Matt Fong (R) $1,000 3. Dick Lane (D) $750 4. Matt Fong (R) $250 Appendix 192 Farallon Lobbying Expenses:262 2004-2008 N/A 2003 TOTAL: $310,000 Timmons & Co. $310,000 2002 TOTAL: $335,000 Timmons & Co. $335,000 2001 TOTAL: $360,000 Fleischman & Walsh $40,000 Timmons & Co. $320,000 1998-2000 N/A 262 Source: Center for Responsive Politics. Lobbying amounts accessed February 2009. Appendix 193 Farallon Covered Official Lobbyists:263 Firm / Name of Lobbyist Covered Position Year(s) Fleischman & Walsh Louis Dupart Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust, Business Rights & Competition 2001, 2003-2005 Timmons & Co. Richard Tarplin Asst Secretary for Legislation, Dept of HHS 2001-2004 263 Source: Senate Office of Public Records <http://soprweb.senate.gov/>. Accessed January 2009. Appendix 194 Hedge Funds: Och-Ziff Capital Management Decade-long campaign contribution total (1998-2008): $338,552 Decade-long lobbying expenditure total (1998-2008): $200,000 Och-Ziff Campaign Contributions:264 2008 All Recipients TOTAL: $106,300 1. Mark Pryor (D) $11,500 2. Barack Obama (D) $7,900 3. Hillary Clinton (D) $6,800 4. John Thune (R) $4,600 5. Mitt Romney (R) $2,300 5. Eric Cantor (R) $2,300 7. Rahm Emanuel (D) $1,000 7. Norm Coleman (R) $1,000 7. Joe Biden (D) $1,000 2006 All Recipients TOTAL: $82,650 1. Sheldon Whitehouse (D) $3,000 2. Olympia Snowe (R) $2,000 2. James Talent (R) $2,000 2. George Allen (R) $2,000 5. Mitch McConnell (R) $1,000 5. Eric Cantor (R) $1,000 5. Rahm Emanuel (D) $1,000 5. Robert Menendez (D) $1,000 264 Source: Center for Responsive Politics. Campaign contribution totals accessed February 2009. Individual recipient numbers do not include the 4th Quarter of 2008. 5. Jon Kyl (R) $1,000 5. Bill Nelson (D) $1,000 11. Chris Shays (R) $250 2004 All Recipients TOTAL: $95,002 1. John Kerry (D) $14,802 2. Tom Daschle (D) $3,000 2. Charles Schumer (D) $3,000 4. Evan Bayh (D) $2,000 4. Steny Hoyer (D) $2,000 4. Charles Rangel (D) $2,000 4. Rahm Emanuel (D) $2,000 4. Barack Obama (D) $2,000 4. Joe Lieberman (D) $2,000 10. Patty Murray (D) $1,000 10. Barbara Boxer (D) $1,000 10. James DeMint (R) $1,000 10. John McCain (R) $1,000 10. Jamie Metzl (D) $1,000 10. Peter Deutsch (D) $1,000 10. Daniel Inouye (D) $1,000 10. Denise Majette (D) $1,000 Appendix 195 2002 All Recipients TOTAL: $26,600 1. Charles Schumer (D) $3,000 2. Denise Majette (D) $2,000 3. Tom Harkin (D) $1,000 3. Arlen Specter (R) $1,000 2000 All Recipients TOTAL: $26,000 1. Charles Schumer (D) $8,000 2. Hillary Clinton (D) $2,000 3. Conrad Burns (R) $1,000 1998 All Recipients TOTAL: $2,000 1. Charles Schumer (D) $1,000 1. Russell Feingold $1,000 Appendix 196 Och-Ziff Lobbying Expenses:265 2007-2008 N/A 2006 TOTAL: $40,000 Navigant Consulting $40,000 2005 TOTAL: $80,000 Navigant Consulting $80,000 2004 TOTAL: $60,000 Navigant Consulting $60,000 2003 TOTAL: $20,000 Navigant Consulting $20,000 1998-2002 N/A Och-Ziff Covered Official Lobbyists: N/A 265 Source: Center for Responsive Politics. Lobbying amounts accessed February 2009. Appendix 197 Hedge Funds: Renaissance Technologies Decade-long campaign contribution total (1998-2008): $1,560,895 Decade-long lobbying expenditure total (1998-2008): $740,000 Renaissance Campaign Contributions:266 2008 Top Recipients TOTAL: $721,250 1. Hillary Clinton (D) $59,600 2. Barack Obama (D) $39,250 3. Chris Dodd (D) $16,450 4. Timothy Bishop (D) $12,000 5. Tom McClintock (R) $6,900 6. Jeff Merkley (D) $6,100 7. John McCain (R) $5,100 8. Rudy Giuliani (R) $4,850 9. Nancy Pelosi (D) $4,600 9. Charles Rangel (D) $4,600 9. Sean Parnell (R) $4,600 9. Steve Pearce (R) $4,600 9. Steve Israel (D) $4,600 9. Gary Ackerman (D) $4,600 15. Scott Kleeb (D) $2,300 15. Jeanne Shaheen (D) $2,300 15. Gabrielle Giffords (D) $2,300 15. Harry Mitchell (D) $2,300 15. Bob Lord (D) $2,300 15. Ann Kirkpatrick (D) $2,300 266 Source: Center for Responsive Politics. Campaign contribution totals accessed February 2009. Individual recipient numbers do not include the 4th Quarter of 2008. 15. Dina Titus (D) $2,300 15. Bart Gordon (D) $2,300 15. Dan Maffei (D) $2,300 15. Jerry McNerney (D) $2,300 15. Rahm Emanuel (D) $2,300 15. Steve Buehrer (R) $2,300 15. Andy Harris (R) $2,300 15. Paul Broun Jr (R) $2,300 15. Bob Schaffer (R) $2,300 15. Charlie Ross (R) $2,300 15. Woody Jenkins (R) $2,300 15. Christopher L Hackett (R) $2,300 15. Kirsten Gillibrand (D) $2,300 2006 All Recipients TOTAL: $364,700 1. Hillary Clinton (D) $21,125 2. Timothy Bishop (D) $4,200 2. Chris Dodd (D) $4,200 2. Michael McGavick (R) $4,200 2. Ben Cardin (D) $4,200 6. Steve Israel (D) $4,100 7. John Yarmuth (D) $2,100 7. Michael Steele (R) $2,100 7. John Gard (R) $2,100 Appendix 198 7. Michael Bouchard (R) $2,100 7. Sharron Angle (R) $2,100 7. Adrian Smith (R) $2,100 7. Rick O'Donnell (R) $2,100 7. William Sali (R) $2,100 7. Chris Chocola (R) $2,100 16. John Sununu (R) $2,000 17. Francine Busby (D) $1,000 17. Claire McCaskill (D) $1,000 17. Debbie Stabenow (D) $1,000 20. Kirsten Gillibrand (D) $500 20. Scott Kleeb (D) $500 20. Tammy Duckworth (D) $500 2004 All Recipients TOTAL: $239,950 1. John Kerry (D) $8,200 2. Timothy Bishop (D) $7,500 2. Hillary Clinton (D) $7,500 4. George Bush (R) $4,000 5. Betty Castor (D) $2,000 5. Joe Lieberman (D) $2,000 5. Michael Oxley (R) $2,000 5. Steve Israel (D) $2,000 9. Stephanie Herseth (D) $1,000 9. Patricia Lamarch (3) $1,000 11. Howard Dean (D) $550 12. Inez Tenenbaum (D) $500 12. Daniel Montiardo (D) $500 12. Allyson Schwartz (D) $500 12. Tom Daschle (D) $500 2002 All Recipients TOTAL: $92,445 1. Charles Schumer (D) $15,000 2. Vivian Viloria-Fisher (D) $4,000 3. Steve Israel (D) $2,000 3. Denise Majette (D) $2,000 5. Hillary Clinton (D) $1,000 5. Frank Lautenberg (D) $1,000 7. Jill Long Thompson (D) $300 8. Martha Fuller Clark (D) $250 8. Carol Roberts (D) $250 8. Stephanie Herseth (D) $250 8. Jim Maloney (D) $250 8. Rick Larsen (D) $250 8. Rush Holt (D) $250 8. Jay Inslee (D) $250 2000 All Recipients TOTAL: $49,550 1. Hillary Clinton (D) $14,700 2. John McCain (R) $1,000 2. Bill Bradley (D) $1,000 1998 All Recipients TOTAL: $93,000 1. Charles Schumer (D) $4,000 Appendix 199 Renaissance Lobbying Expenditures:267 2008 TOTAL: >$10,000* E-Copernicus > $10,000* 2005-2006 N/A 2004 TOTAL: $200,000 Liz Robbins Assoc. $200,000 2003 TOTAL: $220,000 Liz Robbins Assoc. $220,000 2002 TOTAL: $220,000 Liz Robbins Assoc. $220,000 2001 TOTAL: $100,000 Liz Robbins Assoc. $100,000 1998-2000 N/A Renaissance Official Covered Lobbyists: N/A 267 Source: Center for Responsive Politics. Lobbying amounts accessed February 2009. * Not included in totals Appendix 200 Accounting Firms: Arthur Andersen Decade-long campaign contribution total (1998-2008): $3,324,175 Decade-long lobbying expenditure total (1998-2008): $1,900,000 Arthur Andersen Campaign Contributions:268 2006-2008 N/A 2004 Top Recipients TOTAL: $86,586 1. George W Bush (R) $12,950 2. John Edwards (D) $7,000 3. John Kerry (D) $6,750 4. George Allen (R) $1,000 4. Orrin G Hatch (R) $1,000 4. Paul Kanjorski (D) $1,000 4. Jim Moran (D) $1,000 4. David Vitter (R) $1,000 9. Bob Graham (D) $500 9. Nancy Johnson (R) $500 9. Pete Sessions (R) $500 12. Barack Obama (D) $300 13. Mike Ferguson (R) $250 13. Barbara Mikulski (D) $250 13. George Nethercutt Jr (R) $250 13. Earl Pomeroy (D) $250 13. David Scott (D) $250 268 Source: Center for Responsive Politics. Campaign contribution totals accessed February 2009. 2002 Top Recipients TOTAL: $705,263 1. Rahm Emanuel (D) $11,250 2. Billy Tauzin (R) $10,000 3. Tom Harkin (D) $9,000 4. Wayne Allard (R) $7,500 5. Ron Wyden (D) $7,050 6. Mike Ferguson (R) $6,950 7. Max Baucus (D) $6,500 7. Walter B Jones Jr (R) $6,500 9. Ken Bentsen (D) $6,250 10. Jim McCrery (R) $6,000 10. Charles "Chip" Pickering Jr (R) $6,000 12. Christopher Cox (R) $5,500 13. Dick Armey (R) $5,335 14. John Shadegg (R) $5,250 15. Martin Frost (D) $5,000 15. Dennis Hastert (R) $5,000 15. Jim Moran (D) $5,000 15. Harry Reid (D) $5,000 19. Dennis Moore (D) $4,750 20. Vito Fosella (R) $4,500 Appendix 201 2000 Top Recipients TOTAL: $1,564,270 1. George W Bush (R) $150,900 2. Rick A Lazio (R) $44,550 3. Charles Schumer (D) $34,334 4. Bill Bradley (D) $30,600 5. Jon Kyl (R) $20,101 6. Al Gore (D) $19,350 7. Spencer Abraham (R) $17,650 8. John Ensign (R) $17,000 9. John McCain (R) $14,750 10. John Ashcroft (R) $11,500 11. Chris Dodd (D) $10,500 12. Mel Carnahan (D) $9,000 12. Billy Tauzin (R) $9,000 14. E Clay Shaw Jr (R) $8,500 15. Rudy Giuliani (R) $8,250 16. Rod Grams (R) $8,199 17. Lamar Alexander (R) $8,000 17. Cal Dooley (D) $8,000 19. Peter Fitzgerald (R) $7,565 20. George Allen (R) $7,500 1998 Top Recipients TOTAL: $968,056 1. Alfonse D'Amato (R) $27,000 2. Evan Bayh (D) $13,750 3. Matt Fong (R) $13,536 4. Paul Coverdell (R) $10,700 5. Ron Wyden (D) $10,650 6. Carol Moseley Braun (D) $9,750 7. Peter Fitzgerald (R) $9,350 8. John Ensign (R) $8,350 9. George Voinovich (R) $8,250 10. Sherrod Brown (D) $8,187 11. Lauch Faircloth (R) $8,000 11. Billy Tauzin (R) $8,000 13. Robert F Bennett (R) $7,805 14. Joe Barton (R) $7,500 15. Fritz Holings (D) $7,460 16. Leslie Ann Touma (R) $7,250 17. Rick White (R) $7,200 18. Barbara Mikulski (D) $7,000 19. Jim Bunning (R) $6,874 20. Christopher S 'Kit' Bond (R) $6,250 Appendix 202 Arthur Andersen Lobbying Expenditures:269 1999-2008 N/A 1998 TOTAL: $1,900,000 Arthur Andersen & Co $1,600,000 Johnson, Madigan et al $120,000 Mayer, Brown et al $40,000 OB-C Group $140,000 269 Source: Center for Responsive Politics. Lobbying amounts accessed February 2009. Appendix 203 Arthur Andersen Covered Official Lobbyists:270 Firm / Name of Lobbyist Covered Official Position Year (s) Mayer, Brown et al Rothfeld, Charles A House Sub Comm on Select US Role/Iranian Arms Transfers to Croatia & Bosnia 1998 OB-C Group Mellody, Charles J Aide, House Ways & Means Comm. 1998 270 Source: Senate Office of Public Records <http://soprweb.senate.gov/>. Accessed January 2009. Appendix 204 Accounting Firms: Deloitte & Touche Decade-long campaign contribution total (1998-2008): $12,120,340 Decade-long lobbying expenditure total (1998-2008): $19,606,455 Deloitte Campaign Contributions:271 2008 Top Recipients TOTAL: $2,420,112 1. Barack Obama (D) $177,598 2. John McCain (R) $90,850 3. Hillary Clinton (D) $68,300 4. Mitt Romney (R) $58,550 5. Chris Dodd (D) $51,250 6. Norm Coleman (R) $26,750 7. Rudy Giuliani (R) $24,800 8. Christopher Shays (R) $21,800 9. Saxby Chambliss (R) $12,300 10. Max Baucus (D) $11,000 10. Barney Frank (D) $11,000 10. Michael McCaul (R) $11,000 13. Mike Conaway (R) $10,500 13. Vito Fossella (R) $10,500 15. Spencer Bachus (R) $10,000 15. Roy Blunt (R) $10,000 15. John Boehner (R) $10,000 15. Allen Boyd (D) $10,000 15. John Campbell (R) $10,000 15. Chris Cannon (R) $10,000 271 Source: Center for Responsive Politics. Campaign contribution totals accessed February 2009. Individual recipient numbers do not include the 4th Quarter of 2008. 2006 Top Recipients TOTAL: $2,180,294 1. Mark Kennedy (R) $42,100 2. Spencer Bachus (R) $32,500 3. Chris Dodd (D) $29,000 4. Christopher Shays (R) $22,900 5. Richard Baker (R) $20,921 6. Tom Price (R) $20,000 7. Sherrod Brown (D) $19,160 8. Vito Fossella (R) $18,400 9. Henry Bonilla (R) $18,000 10. Hillary Clinton (D) $17,970 11. Rick Santorum (R) $16,950 12. John Campbell (R) $16,500 13. Jon Kyl (R) $14,600 14. George Allen (R) $14,000 15. Joe Lieberman ( I) $13,500 16. Daniel K Akaka (D) $13,000 17. Deborah Pryce (R) $12,498 18. Eric Cantor (R) $12,000 18. David Dreier (R) $12,000 18. Ben Nelson (D) $12,000 Appendix 205 2004 Top Recipients TOTAL: $2,233,483 1. George W Bush (R) $290,450 2. John Kerry (D) $73,152 3. Charles Schumer (D) $39,999 4. Richard C Shelby (R) $28,500 5. Chris Dodd (D) $27,750 6. Vito Fossella (R) $23,300 7. Mark Kennedy (R) $19,700 8. John Thune (R) $15,450 9. Robert "Bob" Conaway (D) $15,000 10. James W DeMint (R) $13,850 11. Daniel K Inouye (D) $13,500 12. Eric Cantor (R) $13,000 13. Patty Murray (D) $12,050 14. Tom Latham (R) $12,000 15. Joseph Crowley (D) $11,000 15. David Vitter (R) $11,000 17. Richard Burr (R) $10,798 18. Tom Davis (R) $10,500 19. Erskine Bowles (D) $10,250 20. Spencer Bachus (R) $10,000 2002 Top Recipients TOTAL: $1,873,011 1. Mike Enzi (R) $44,249 2. Vito Fossella (R) $16,500 3. Connie Morella (R) $15,172 4. Mark Kennedy (R) $14,000 5. Eric Cantor (R) $12,999 6. Norm Coleman (R) $12,884 7. Elizabeth Dole (R) $12,750 8. Billy Tauzin (R) $12,000 9. John Thune (R) $11,800 10. Felix Grucci Jr (R) $11,200 11. James Talent (R) $11,000 12. Anne Northup (R) $10,500 13. Max Baucus (D) $10,000 13. Thad Cochran (R) $10,000 13. Susan Collins (R) $10,000 13. J D Hayworth (R) $10,000 13. Tim Hutchinson (R) $10,000 13. Dennis Moore (D) $10,000 13. Charles “Chip” Pickering Jr (R) $10,000 20. Sue Kelly (R) $9,999 2000 Top Recipients TOTAL: $1,982,826 1. George W Bush (R) $83,850 2. Charles Schumer (D) $48,500 3. Rick A Lazio (R) $48,250 4. Hillary Clinton (D) $40,750 5. Rudy Giuliani (R) $38,700 6. Spencer Abraham (R) $30,000 7. Bill Bradley (D) $25,000 8. John McCain (R) $18,200 9. Charles Rangel (D) $14,750 10. Chris Dodd (D) $14,500 11. Mike DeWine (R) $13,650 12. Vito Fossella (R) $12,750 13. Edolphus Towns (D) $11,000 14. E Clay Shaw, Jr (R) $10,800 15. James E Rogan (R) $10,724 16. Jim Maloney (D) $10,500 16. Brad Sherman (D) $10,500 18. John Ashcroft (R) $10,450 19. James M Jeffords (R) $10,000 19. Steven Kuykendall (R) $10,000 Appendix 206 1998 Top Recipients TOTAL: $1,430,614 1. Chris Dodd (D) $66,145 2. Alfonse D'Amato (R) $45,000 3. Charles Schumer (D) $28,450 4. Ron Wyden (D) $22,850 5. Vito Fossella (R) $20,050 6. Matt Fong (R) $13,050 7. Lauch Faircloth (R) $12,875 8. George Voinovich (R) $12,000 9. Chuck Grassley (R) $11,500 10. Anna Eshoo (D) $10,000 10. Rick White (R) $10,000 12. Don Nickles (R) $9,500 13. Christopher S 'Kit' Bond (R) $9,000 13. Collin C Peterson (D) $9,000 13. Heather Wilson (R) $9,000 16. Carol Moseley Braun (D) $8,800 17. Robert F Bennett (R) $8,000 17. Ben Nighthorse Campbell (R) $8,000 17. Trent Lott (R) $8,000 20. Paul Coverdell (R) $7,500 Appendix 207 Deloitte Lobbing Expenditures:272 2008 TOTAL: $1,140,000 Deloitte & Touche $650,000 Clark & Assoc $50,000 Clark & Weinstock $80,000 Johnson, Madigan et al $240,000 Mayer, Brown et al > $10,000* BGR Holding $120,000 2007 TOTAL: $2,220,000 Deloitte & Touche $440,000 Clark & Assoc $40,000 Clark & Weinstock $80,000 Deloitte LLP $1,060,000 Johnson, Madigan et al $240,000 Mayer, Brown et al $40,000 BGR Holding $120,000 Tew Cardenas $200,000 2006 TOTAL: $1,960,000 Deloitte & Touche $360,000 Clark & Assoc $40,000 Clark & Weinstock $80,000 Deloitte LLP $840,000 Johnson, Madigan et al $240,000 Mayer, Brown et al $80,000 MWW Group > $10,000* Barbour, Griffith & Rogers $120,000 272 Source: Center for Responsive Politics. Lobbying amounts accessed February 2009. * Not included in totals Tew Cardenas LLP $200,000 2005 TOTAL: $1,440,000 Clark & Assoc $20,000 Clark & Weinstock $80,000 Deloitte Tax $860,000 Johnson, Madigan et al $240,000 Barbour, Griffith & Rogers $120,000 Tew Cardenas LLP $120,000 2004 TOTAL: $1,520,000 Deloitte Tax $20,000 Barbour, Griffith & Rogers $120,000 Holland & Knight $100,000 Tew Cardenas LLP $60,000 Clark & Assoc $20,000 Clark & Weinstock $80,000 Deloitte Tax $840,000 Johnson, Madigan et al $240,000 Public Strategies $40,000 2003 TOTAL: $1,125,000 Deloitte Tax $660,000 Holland & Knight $145,000 Clark & Assoc $20,000 Clark & Weinstock $60,000 Johnson, Madigan et al $240,000 Appendix 208 2002 TOTAL: $1,677,455 Deloitte & Touche $1,107,455 Clark & Assoc $60,000 Clark & Weinstock $100,000 Thelen, Reid et al $10,000 Velasquez Group $240,000 Johnson, Madigan et al $160,000 2001 TOTAL: $2,625,000 Deloitte & Touche $300,000 Deloitte & Touche $160,000 Dewey Ballantine LLP $1,600,000 Ickes & Enright Group $25,000 Johnson, Madigan et al $320,000 Velasquez Group $220,000 2000 TOTAL: $4,609,000 Deloitte & Touche $2,524,000 Deloitte & Touche $240,000 Dewey Ballantne LLP $1,180,000 Greenberg Traurig LLP $60,000 Ickes & Enright Group $65,000 Johnson, Madigan et al $280,000 Clark & Weinstock $80,000 Mayer, Brown et al $60,000 Velasquez Group $120,000 1999 TOTAL: $870,000 Deloitte & Touche $440,000 Greenberg Traurig LLP $130,000 Ickes & Enright Group $20,000 Deloitte LLP $240,000 Mayer, Brown et al $40,000 1998 TOTAL: $420,000 Deloitte & Touche $360,000 Deloitte & Touche > $10,000* Latham & Watkins $20,000 Mayer, Brown et al $40,000 * Not included in totals Appendix 209 Deloitte Covered Official Lobbyists:273 Firm / Name of Lobbyist Covered Official Position Year(s) Clark & Assoc. Sam Geduldig Dir of Coalitions, House Fin. Serv. Comm 2008 Sr. Advisor, Majority Whip Roy Blunt Clark & Weinstock Ed Kutler Asst, Office of the Speaker, House of Reps 2006-2008 Asst, House Republic Whip Vin Weber Member of Congress (MN) 2006-2008 Jon Schwantes Gen. Counsel, Sen. Judiciary Comm. 2007-2008 Margaret McGlinch Chief of Staff, Rep. Tim Walz 2007-2008 Leg. Director, Rep. Richard Neal Leg. Counsel, Sen. Harry Reid Leg. Aide, Sen. Daniel Moynihan Sandra Stuart Asst Sec for Leg Affairs, Dept. of Defense 2006-2008 Chief of Staff, Rep. Vic Fazio Brian Bieron Policy Director, House Rules Comm. 2002 Kent Bonham Policy Director, Sen. Chuck Hagel 2002 Juleanna Glover Weiss Press Secretary to the Vice President 2003 Timothy Morrison Assoc. Dir, Presidential Personnel 2003 Clark Lytle & Geduldig Sam Geduldig Dir. Of Coalitions, House Fin. Serv Comm 2007 Sr Advisor, Majority Whip Roy Blunt Deloitte & Touche LLP Janet Hale Undersecretary for Mgt, DHS 2007 William Ezzell Partner 2007 Cindy Stevens Director 2007 Charles Heeter Principal 2007 273 Source: Senate Office of Public Records <http://soprweb.senate.gov/>. Accessed January 2009. Appendix 210 Holland & Knight Leigh A. Bradley Gen Counsel, Dept of Veterans Affairs 2003 Tillie Fowler Former U.S. Representative 2003 Chris DeLacy Leg. Aide, Sen. John Warner 2003 David Gilliland Chief of Staff, Rep. Tillie Fowelr 2003 Mayer, Brown et al Jeffrey Lewis Legislative Asst, Sen Breaux 2001-2000 Appendix 211 Accounting Firms: Ernst & Young Decade-long campaign contribution total (1998-2008): $12,482,407 Decade-long lobbying expenditure total (1998-2008): $25,108,536 Ernst & Young Campaign Contributions:274 2008 Top Recipients TOTAL: $2,170,392 1. Rudy Giuliani (R) $292,350 2. Hillary Clinton (D) $165,692 3. Barack Obama (D) $150,207 4. John McCain (R) $105,606 5. Chris Dodd (D) $70,750 6. Mitt Romney (R) $37,800 7. John Cornyn (R) $19,550 8. Max Baucus (D) $18,850 9. John Boehner (R) $13,500 9. Norm Coleman (R) $13,500 11. Susan M Collins (R) $13,300 12. Charles B Rangel (D) $13,287 13. Eric Cantor (R) $12,100 14. Chris Van Hollen (D) $11,000 15. Barney Frank (D) $10,900 16. Spencer Bachus (R) $10,000 16. Elizabeth Dole (R) $10,000 16. Steny H Hoyer (D) $10,000 16. Jay Rockefeller (D) $10,000 274 Source: Center for Responsive Politics. Campaign contribution totals accessed February 2009. Individual recipient numbers do not include the 4th Quarter of 2008. 16. David Scott (D) $10,000 2006 Top Recipients TOTAL: $1,592,550 1. Hillary Clinton (D) $81,500 2. Rudy Giuliani (R) $46,200 3. Ben Cardin (D) $23,003 4. Richard Baker (R) $20,250 5. Mike DeWine (R) $20,100 6. John Boehner (R) $19,300 7. Rick Santorum (R) $16,700 8. George Allen (R) $15,650 9. Mark Kennedy (R) $15,250 10. Deborah Pryce (R) $14,650 11. Joe Lieberman (I) $14,200 12. Jon Kyl (R) $13,500 13. Tom DeLay (R) $12,100 14. James M Talent (R) $11,999 15. Barney Frank (D) $11,750 16. Jim McCrery (R) $11,500 17. Eric Cantor (R) $11,200 18. John Campbell (R) $11,000 18. Anne Northrup (R) $11,000 20. Michael Fitzpatrick (R) $10,500 Appendix 212 2004 Top Recipients TOTAL: $2,140,864 1. George W. Bush (R) $305,140 2. John Kerry (D) $101,425 3. George Voinovich (R) $43,600 4. Charles Schumer (D) $38,250 5. Richard C Shelby (R) $33,700 6. Richard Burr (R) $24,061 7. Pete Sessions (R) $20,097 8. Michael G. Oxley (R) $19,800 9. Chris John (D) $17,978 10. Hillary Clinton (D) $16,500 11. Mel Martinez (R) $16,261 12. John Thune (R) $15,000 13. Tom Daschle (D) $14,000 14. Arlen Specter (R) $13,750 15. Christopher S 'Kit' Bond (R) $13,000 15. Lisa Murkowski (R) $13,000 17. Steny H Hoyer (D) $11,000 18. Evan Bayh (D) $10,500 18. James DeMint (R) $10,500 18. John Tanner (D) $10,500 2002 Top Recipients TOTAL: $2,012,978 1. Charles Schumer (D) $63,550 2. John Cornyn (R) $16,700 3. Max Baucus (D) $16,261 4. Jay Rockefeller (D) $12,550 5. Saxby Chambliss (R) $12,500 5. Norm Coleman (R) $12,500 7. Mary L Landrieu (D) $12,250 8. James M Talent (R) $12,000 9. John Thune (R) $11,300 10. Connie Morella (R) $10,999 11. Anna Eshoo (D) $10,500 11. Rob Portman (R) $10,500 13. Dennis Moore (D) $10,200 14. Susan M Collins (R) $10,169 15. Roy Blunt (R) $10,000 15. Mark Kennedy (R) $10,000 15. Michael G Oxley (R) $10,000 18. Jennifer Dunn (R) $9,916 19. E Clay Shaw, Jr (R) $9,750 20. Robert Torricelli (D) $9,250 2000 Top Recipients TOTAL: $2,845,336 1. George W. Bush (R) $181,949 2. Al Gore (D) $136,675 3. Bill Bradley (D) $67,750 4. Rick A Lazio (R) $30,850 5. Hillary Clinton (D) $30,450 6. Dianne Feinstein (D) $17,150 7. Mike DeWine (R) $15,750 8. John McCain (R) $14,525 9. George Allen (R) $14,450 10. Sherrod Brown (D) $14,000 10. Robert Torricelli (D) $14,000 12. John Ashcroft (R) $13,999 13. Spencer Abraham (R) $13,000 14. Bill Frist (R) $12,500 15. Charles S. Robb (D) $12,450 16. Chris Dodd (D) $12,250 17. Richard Gephardt (D) $12,000 17. Orrin G Hatch (R) $12,000 19. John R Kasich (R) $11,500 Appendix 213 20. E Clay Shaw, Jr. (R) $11,250 1998 Top Recipients TOTAL: $1,720,281 1. Charles Schumer (D) $26,700 2. Alfonse D'Amato (R) $13,750 3. Newt Gingrich (R) $12,000 4. Christopher S 'Kit' Bond (R) $11,750 4. John Linder (R) $11,750 6. George Voinovich (R) $11,450 6. Rick White (R) $11,450 8. Barbara Boxer (D) $11,000 9. Peter Fitzgerald (R) $10,500 10. John Breaux (D) $10,249 11. Evan Bayh (D) $10,000 11. Thomas Bliley Jr (R) $10,000 11. Paul Coverdell (R) $10,000 11. Tom DeLay (R) $10,000 11. Jennifer Dunn (R) $10,000 11. John Ensign (R) $10,000 11. Martin Frost (D) $10,000 11. Chuck Grassley (R) $10,000 11. Fritz Hollings (D) $10,000 20. Anna Eshoo (D) $9,999 Appendix 214 Ernst & Young Lobbying Expenditures:275 2008 TOTAL: $3,173,056 Ernst & Young $2,103,056 RR&G $240,000 Elmendrof Strategies $200,000 Glover Park Group $160,000 American Continental Group $120,000 Clark & Weinstock $80,000 Clark & Assoc $60,000 Mayer, Brown et al >$10,000* Jolly/Rissler $210,000 2007 TOTAL: $3,560,480 Ernst & Young $2,440,480 RR&G $240,000 Glover Park Group $200,000 Elmendorf Strategies $200,000 American Continental Group $120,000 Clark & Weinstock $80,000 Clark & Assoc $40,000 Mayer, Brown et al $40,000 Jolly/Rissler Inc $200,000 2006 TOTAL: $1,741,500 Ernst & Young $861,500 RR&G $160,000 275 Source: Center for Responsive Politics. Lobbying amounts accessed February 2009. * Not included in totals Glover Park Group $140,000 Alpine Group $140,000 American Continental Group $120,000 Mayer, Brown et al $80,000 Clark & Weinstock $80,000 Clark & Assoc $40,000 Jolly/Rissler Inc $120,000 2005 TOTAL: $2,549,640 Ernst & Young $1,749,640 Alpine Group $200,000 Glover Park Group $160,000 American Continental Group $120,000 Clark & Weinstock $80,000 Bryan Cave Strategies $40,000 Clark & Assoc $40,000 Thelen, Reid & Priest $20,000 Jolly/Rissler Inc $140,000 2004 TOTAL: $2,650,000 Ernst & Young $1,790,000 Alpine Group $220,000 Harbour Group $140,000 Clark & Weinstock $140,000 American Continental Group $120,000 Clark & Assoc $60,000 Public Strategies $40,000 Jolly/Rissler Inc $140,000 Appendix 215 2003 TOTAL: $2,880,000 Ernst & Young $1,980,000 Public Strategies $180,000 Clark & Weinstock $180,000 Alpine Group $160,000 American Continental Group $120,000 Clark & Assoc $80,000 Jolly/Rissler Inc $80,000 Harbour Group $60,000 Barrett, Michael F. Jr $40,000 2002 TOTAL: $2,573,860 Ernst & Young $2,343,860 American Continental Group $120,000 Clark & Weinstock $100,000 Thelen, Reid et al $10,000 Clark & Assoc > $10,000* 2001 TOTAL: $1,600,000 Ernst & Young $1,320,000 American Continental Group $80,000 Mayer, Brown et al $60,000 2000 TOTAL: $1,340,000 Ernst & Young $1,200,000 American Continental Group $80,000 Mayer, Brown et al $60,000 * Not included in totals 1999 TOTAL: $1,400,000 Ernst & Young $1,200,000 Fleishman-Hillard $100,000 Mayer, Brown et al $100,000 1998 TOTAL: $1,640,000 Ernst & Young $1,420,000 Fleishman-Hillard $180,000 Mayer, Brown et al $40,000 Appendix 216 Ernst & Young Covered Official Lobbyists:276 Firm / Name of Lobbyist Covered Official Position Year(s) Mayer, Brown, & Platt Jeffery Lewis Legislative Assitant to Senator Breaux 1999-2001 Clark and Weinstock Brian Bieron Policy Director, House Rules Committee 2002 Kent Bonham Policy Director for Sen. Chuck Hagel 2002-2003 Juleanna Glover Weiss Press Secretary to the Vice President 2002-2003 Jonathan Schwantes General Counsel, Senate Judiciary Committee 2007 Ed Kutler Assistant Office of the Speaker House of Reps 2008 Assistant, House Republic Whip Sandra Stuart Asst. Sec. for Leg Affairs, DoD 2008 Chief of Staff, Rep. Vic Fazio Vin Weber Member of Congress (MN) 2008 Margaret McGlinch Chief of Staff, Rep. Tim Walz, 2008 Leg. Director, Rep. Richard Neal Legislative Aide, Sen Daniel Moynihan Leg. Counsel, Sen Harry Reid Jolly/Rissler Inc. Thomas R. Jolly Chairman 2003-2004 Glover Park Group Joyce Brayboy Chief of Staff, Rep. Mel Watt 2007 Joel Johnson Chief of Staff, Sen. Howard Metzenbaum, 2008 Exec. Director, House Democratic Study Group Assistant Secretary of the Minority US Senate Staff Director, Democratic Leadership Committee, Special Assistant to the Presi- 276 Source: Senate Office of Public Records <http://soprweb.senate.gov/>. Accessed January 2009. Appendix 217 dent for Policy, Communications Susan Brophy Chief of Staff, Rep. Byron Dorgan 2008 Chief of Staff Senator Tim Wirth Deputy Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs Clark, Lytle, & Geduldig Sam Geduldig Dir of Coalitions, House Fin Serv Com, Sr Advisor, Majority Whip Roy Blunt
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Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Corruption
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Woof, 11th Post;
Appendix 165 Commercial Banks: JP Morgan Chase & Co. Decade-long campaign contribution total (1998-2008): $15,714,953 Decade-long lobbying expenditure total (1998-2008): $49,372,915 JP Morgan Campaign Contributions:243 2008 Top Recipients TOTAL: $4,247,991 1. Barack Obama (D) $559,210 2. Hillary Clinton (D) $272,694 3. John McCain (R) $205,657 4. Rudy Giuliani (R) $94,300 5. Mitt Romney (R) $78,250 6. Chris Dodd (D) $68,950 7. Harry Reid (D) $53,300 8. John Cornyn (R) $48,598 9. Charles B. Rangel (D) $47,900 10. Rahm Emanuel (D) $44,700 11. Mary L. Landrieu (D) $41,399 12. Steny H. Hoyer (D) $34,300 13. Spencer Bachus (R) $33,000 14. Richard C. Shelby (R) $31,500 15. Dave Camp (R) $30,500 16. Fred Thompson (R) $29,450 17. Jack Reed (D) $27,850 18. Norm Coleman (R) $26,900 19. Tim Johnson (D) $26,495 20. Eric Cantor (R) $24,000 243 Source: Center for Responsive Politics. Campaign contribution totals accessed February 2009. Individual recipient numbers do not include the 4th Quarter of 2008. 2006 Top Recipients TOTAL: $2,163,356 1. Hillary Clinton (D) $113,965 2. Richard Baker (R) $45,100 3. Tom Carper (D) $38,268 4. Michael G. Oxley (R) $35,100 5. Chris Dodd (D) $31,300 6. Mitch McConnell (R) $31,000 7. Mel Martinez (R) $30,600 8. Tim Johnson (D) $29,600 9. Steny H. Hoyer (D) $29,500 10. Harold E. Ford Jr. (D) $27,100 11. Max Baucus (D) $27,000 12. Kent Conrad (D) $25,000 13. Joe Lieberman (I) $23,901 14. Mike DeWine (R) $23,500 15. John E. Sununu (R) $22,500 16. Orrin G. Hatch (R) $21,000 17. Christopher Shays (R) $19,366 18. Melissa Bean (D) $18,542 19. David McSweeney (R) $17,950 20. Debbie Stabenow (D) $15,650 Appendix 166 2004 Top Recipients TOTAL: $3,042,399 1. John Kerry (D) $200,565 2. George W. Bush (R) $187,150 3. Erskine B. Bowles (D) $59,750 4. Jay Helvey (R) $54,750 5. Charles Schumer (D) $47,550 6. Barack Obama (D) $47,300 7. Michael G. Oxley (R) $36,250 8. Richard C. Shelby (R) $35,000 9. Chris Dodd (D) $30,500 10. Tom Daschle (D) $28,450 11. Spencer Bachus (R) $20,000 12. John Edwards (D) $19,750 13. Jeb Hensarling (R) $19,500 14. Tom Carper (D) $19,411 15. Blanche Lincoln (D) $18,357 16. Martin Frost (D) $17,250 17. Michael N. Castle (R) $17,000 18. Pete Sessions (R) $16,800 19. Richard Baker (R) $16,500 20. Howard Dean (D) $16,161 2002 Top Recipients TOTAL: $2,277,188 1. Charles Schumer (D) $160,000 2. Ron Kirk (D) $85,400 3. Max Baucus (D) $41,604 4. Erskine B. Bowles (D) $38,556 5. John Kerry (D) $37,000 6. Richard Baker (R) $24,000 7. Amo Houghton (R) $21,000 8. Wayne Allard (R) $20,000 8. Spencer Bachus (R) $20,000 10. Jim Maloney (D) $17,000 11. Mike Enzi (R) $16,000 11. Carolyn Maloney (D) $16,000 13. Ken Bentsen (D) $15,000 13. Phil English (R) $15,000 13. Bart Gordon (D) $15,000 13. Pat Toomey (R) $15,000 17. John Edwards (D) $14,500 18. Michael G. Oxley (R) $14,000 18. Rob Portman (R) $14,000 20. Tom Strickland (D) $13,146 2000 Top Recipients TOTAL: $2,502,414 1. Bill Bradley (D) $133,255 2. Rick A. Lazio (R) $122,361 3. George W. Bush (R) $101,205 4. Charles Schumer (D) $89,250 5. Hillary Clinton (D) $53,750 6. Phil Gramm (R) $36,250 7. Al Gore (D) $36,050 8. Rudy Giuliani (R) $24,850 9. John McCain (R) $24,703 10. Richard G. Lugar (R) $24,550 11. Peter Staub Wareing (R) $21,500 12. Spencer Abraham (R) $21,250 13. Kay Bailey Hutchison (R) $21,000 14. John J. LaFalce (D) $19,750 15. Richard Baker (R) $17,000 16. Tom Campbell (R) $14,250 17. Pat Toomey (R) $13,500 18. Martin Frost (D) $13,000 18. Marge Roukema (R) $13,000 Appendix 167 20. Bill McCollum (R) $12,500 1998 Top Reciepients TOTAL: $1,481,605 1. Alfonse D'Amato (R) $32,850 2. Charles Schumer (D) $27,650 3. Lauch Faircloth (R) $24,500 4. Rick A. Lazio (R) $19,350 5. Chris Dodd (D) $19,023 6. Kay Bailey Hutchison (R) $16,500 6. John J. LaFalce (D) $16,500 8. Christopher S. 'Kit' Bond (R) $13,000 8. Chuck Hagel (R) $13,000 10. Robert F. Bennett (R) $12,500 10. Tom Daschle (D) $12,500 12. Bill McCollum (R) $12,000 13. Martin Frost (D) $11,250 13. Pete King (R) $11,250 15. Richard Baker (R) $11,000 15. Bart Gordon (D) $11,000 17. Michael N. Castle (R) $10,550 17. Dick Armey (R) $10,500 19. Paul E. Gillmor (R) $10,000 19. Sue Kelly (R) $10,000 Appendix 168 JP Morgan Lobbying Expenses:244 2008 TOTAL: $6,336,000 JP Morgan Chase & Co $5,390,000 OB-C Group $240,000 Equale & Assoc $147,500 BKSH & Assoc $120,000 Richard F Hohlt $130,000 Triangle Assoc $88,000 Mayer, Brown et al $80,000 Walter Group $80,500 Fennel Consulting $50,000 David L Horne LLC $10,000 B&D Consulting > $10,000* 2007 TOTAL: $6,452,500 JP Morgan Chase & Co $5,440,000 OB-C Group $240,000 BKSH & Assoc $140,000 Richard F Hohit $95,500 Triangle Assoc $80,000 Mayer, Brown et al $80,000 David L Horne LLC $60,000 Equale & Assoc $60,000 Fennel Consulting $52,000 American Continental Group $40,000 Walter Group $40,000 Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering $40,000 B&D Consulting $20,000 244 Source: Center for Responsive Politics. Lobbying amounts accessed February 2009. * Not included in totals Bryan Cave LLP $20,000 Thaxton, Richard R $45,000 2006 TOTAL: $7,204,040 JP Morgan Chase & Co $6,120,000 American Continental Group $200,000 Tongour Simpson Group $140,000 BKSH & Assoc $120,000 Mayer, Brown et al $100,000 Triangle Assoc $80,000 Zeliff Enterprises $80,000 Richard F Hohlt $74,800 Private/Public Solutions $62,500 Angus & Nickerson $40,000 B&D Consulting $36,740 David L Horne LLC $20,000 Fennel Consulting $20,000 OB-C Group $20,000 Thaxton, Richard R $90,000 2005 TOTAL: $4,448,500 JP Morgan Chase & Co $3,540,000 Mayer, Brown et al $140,000 B&D Sagamore $120,000 BKSH & Assoc $120,000 Tongour Simpson Group $100,000 Richard F Hohit $83,500 Zeliff Enterprises $80,000 Triangle Assoc $70,000 Patton Boggs LLP $60,000 Angus & Nickerson $20,000 Appendix 169 Clark & Weinstock $20,000 Kerrigan & Assoc > $10,000* Thaxton, Richard R $95,000 2004 TOTAL: $5,072,500 JP Morgan Chase & Co $3,580,000 Bank One Corp $415,000 Clark & Weinstock $310,000 B&D Sagamore $140,000 Mayer, Brown et al $140,000 BKSH & Assoc $120,000 Zeliff Enterprises $80,000 Richard F Hohit $67,500 Patton Boggs LLP $60,000 Triangle Assoc $40,000 Kerrigan & Assoc $40,000 Covington & Burling > $10,000* Thaxton, Richard R $60,000 Brownstein, Hyatt et al $20,000 2003 TOTAL: $8,246,575 JP Morgan Chase & Co $6,706,575 BankOne Corp $720,000 Patton Boggs LLP $220,000 Williams & Jensen 140,000 BKSH & Assoc $120,000 B&D Sagamore $100,000 Richard F Hohit $80,000 Kerrigan & Assoc $40,000 Triangle Assoc > $10,000* Covington & Burling $40,000 * Not included in totals Thaxton, Richard R $60,000 Carmen Group $20,000 2002 TOTAL: $5,062,800 JP Morgan Chase & Co $4,700,000 B&D Sagamore $120,000 BKSH & Assoc $96,000 Williams & Jensen $80,000 Richard F Hohit $66,800 Triangle Assoc > $10,000* Kerrigan & Assoc > $10,000* 2001 TOTAL: $6,550,000 JP Morgan Chase & Co $6,300,000 BKSH & Assoc $88,000 Richard F Hohit $62,000 B&D Sagamore $60,000 Williams & Jensen $40,000 1998-2000 N/A * Not included in totals Appendix 170 JP Morgan Covered Official Lobbyists:245 Firm / Name of Lobbyist Covered Official Position Year(s) Carmen Group, Inc Hoitsma, Gary Press Secretary, Senator Inhofe 2003 Wassmer, Victoria Program Examiner, Transport Branch, OMB 2003 Clark & Wienstock Godes, Niles Chief of Staff to Sen. Byron Dorgan 2003 Lehman, Dirksen Spec. Asst. for Legal Affairs for the President 2003 Angus & Nickerson Angus, Barbara Tax Counsel, Committee on Ways and Means 2005-2006 Nickerson, Gregory International Tax Counsel, Dept. of Treasury 2005-2006 Zeliff Enterprises Zeliff, William H. Former member of Congress: NH 1991- 1997 2005-2006 OB-C Group LLC Stevenson, Robert Sen. Bill Frist Communications Director 2006 Private Public Solutions Moffett, Anthony J. Former Member of Congress 2006 BKSH & Associates Turner, Pam Asst. Sec for LA Homeland Security, 2003-2006 2008 Dep Asst to Pres for LA 82-89 245 Source: Senate Office of Public Records <http://soprweb.senate.gov/>. Accessed January 2009. Appendix 171 Fennel Consulting Fennel, Melody Assistant Secretary, HUD 2005-2008 Appendix 172 Commercial Banks: Wachovia Corp. Decade-long campaign contribution total (1998-2008): $3,946,727 Decade-long lobbying expenditure total (1998-2008): $11,996,752 Wachovia Campaign Contributions:246 2008 Top Recipients247 TOTAL: $934,381 1. Barack Obama (D) $178,382 2. John McCain (R) $155,658 3. Hillary Clinton (D) $77,000 4. Rudy Giuliani (R) $49,400 5. Mitt Romney (R) $36,550 6. Robin Hayes (R) $18,929 7. Eric Cantor (R) $17,750 8. Elizabeth Dole (R) $16,700 9. Mark Warner (D) $15,550 10. Lindsey Graham (R) $15,400 11. Patrick McHenry (R) $15,350 11. Sue Myrick (R) $15,350 13. James Clyburn (D) $13,500 14. Chris Dodd (D) $12,750 15. Melvin Watt (D) $12,500 16. Artur Davis (D) $10,250 16. Tim Johnson (D) $10,250 18. Spencer Bachus (R) $10,000 246 Source: Center for Responsive Politics. Campaign contribution totals accessed February 2009. Individual recipient numbers do not include the 4th Quarter of 2008. 247 Based on highest 1,000 contributions plus PAC contributions. 18. David Scott (D) $10,000 18. John Boehner (R) $10,000 2006 Top Recipients TOTAL: $742,384 1. George Allen (R) $30,650 2. Rick Santorum (R) $26,600 3. Robin Hayes (R) $21,470 4. Sue Myrick (R) $17,700 5. Eric Cantor (R) $16,700 6. Patrick McHenry (R) $15,250 7. Richard Burr (R) $13,250 8. Michael Fitzpatrick (R) $11,050 9. Michael Steele (R) $10,450 10. Vernon Buchanan (R) $10,100 11. Robert Menendez (D) $10,000 11. Deborah Pryce (R) $10,000 11. Jim McCrery (R) $10,000 11. David Dreier (R) $10,000 11. John Boehner (R) $10,000 11. Richard Baker (R) $10,000 11. Spencer Bachus (R) $10,000 18. Jon Kyl (R) $9,000 18. Mitch McConnell (R) $9,000 20. John Spratt Jr (D) $8,800 Appendix 173 2004 Top Recipients248 TOTAL: $1,237,468 1. George W Bush (R) $223,960 2. Erskine Bowles (D) $95,750 3. Richard Burr (R) $76,000 4. John Kerry (D) $33,850 5. Eric Cantor (R) $23,000 6. Robin Hayes (R) $18,750 7. Sue Myrick (R) $16,500 8. Melvin Watt (D) $15,550 9. Arlen Specter (R) $14,300 10. Elizabeth Dole (R) $13,250 10. Jay Helvey (R) $13,250 12. Charlie Condon (R) $12,200 13. Johnny Isakson (R) $10,070 14. Chris Dodd (D) $10,000 14. Tom Carper (D) $10,000 16. John Thune (R) $9,500 17. Mel Martinez (R) $8,700 18. Pete Sessions (R) $8,250 19. Howard Dean (D) $7,460 20. Jim McCrery (R) $7,250 2002 Top Recipients TOTAL: $790,969 1. Erskine Bowles (D) $77,200 2. Elizabeth Dole (R) $31,325 3. Robin Hayes (R) $19,470 4. Melvin Watt (D) $12,500 5. Richard Burr (R) $11,800 6. Saxby Chambliss (R) $10,500 7. Lindsey Graham (R) $10,250 8. Michael Oxley (R) $10,000 248 Based on highest 1,000 contributions plus PAC contributions. 8. Richard Baker (R) $10,000 8. Spencer Bachus (R) $10,000 11. Walter Jones Jr (R) $9,500 12. Ed Royce (R) $6,000 12. Eric Cantor (R) $6,000 12. Max Baucus (D) $6,000 15. Calder Clay (R) $5,900 16. Cass Ballenger (R) $5,000 16. Gregory Meeks (D) $5,000 16. Jim Maloney (D) $5,000 16. Sue Myrick (R) $5,000 16. Wayne Allard (R) $5,000 16. Pete King (R) $5,000 2000 Top Recipients TOTAL: $130,175 1. Elizabeth Dole (R) $9,450 2. Richard Burr (R) $8,450 3. Robin Hayes (R) $8,000 4. Walter Jones Jr (R) $6,500 5. John Edwards (D) $5,250 6. Zell Miller (D) $4,000 6. Sue Myrick (R) $4,000 8. Al Gore (D) $3,250 8. Bill McCullum (R) $3,250 10. Johnny Isakson (R) $3,000 10. Melvin Watt (D) $3,000 12. Lindsey Graham (R) $2,825 13. Bob Barr (R) $2,500 13. George W Bush (R) $2,500 13. Roger Kahn (D) $2,500 13. Trent Lott (R) $2,500 13. Floyd Spence (R) $2,500 18. Charles Norwood (R) $2,250 Appendix 174 19. Bill Bradley (D) $2,000 19. George Allen (R) $2,000 19. Jack Kingston (R) $2,000 19. John Linder (R) $2,000 19. Lamar Alexander (R) $2,000 19. Mack Mattingly (R) $2,000 19. Richard Baker (R) $2,000 19. Saxby Chambliss (R) $2,000 19. William Roth Jr (R) $2,000 19. Doug Haynes (R) $2,000 19. Mike McIntyre (D) $2,000 19. Charles Taylor (R) $2,000 1998 Top Recipients TOTAL: $102,350 1. Lauch Faircloth (R) $15,100 2. Richard Burr (R) $13,000 3. Max Cleland (D) $7,500 4. Paul Coverdell (R) $5,750 5. Frank Lautenberg (R) $5,000 6. Fritz Hollings (D) $4,600 7. Walter Jones Jr (R) $4,500 8. Michael Coles (D) $4,000 9. Robin Hayes (R) $3,500 9. Mike McIntyre (D) $3,500 11. Melvin Watt (D) $3,250 12. Bob Ethridge (D) $3,000 13. John Linder (R) $2,500 13. Sue Myrick (R) $2,500 15. Charles Taylor (R) $2,250 15. Johnny Isakson (R) $2,250 17. James Clyburn (D) $1,500 18. Bob Graham (D) $1,000 18. Ernest Hollings (D) $1,000 18. John Kasich (R) $1,000 18. Bob Barr (R) $1,000 18. David Price (D) $1,000 18. Dan Page (R) $1,000 18. Howard Coble (R) $1,000 18. Cass Ballenger (R) $1,000 18. Jesse Helms (R) $1,000 18. Michael Fair (R) $1,000 18. John Spratt Jr (D) $1,000 Appendix 175 Wachovia Lobbying Expenditures:249 2008 TOTAL: $2,561,000 Wachovia Corp $1,781,000 C2 Group $200,000 Angus & Nickerson $120,000 Porterfield & Lowenthal $120,000 Public Strategies $80,000 Dixon, Dan $60,000 Jenkins Hill Group $80,000 Capitol Hill Strategies $80,000 Cypress Advocacy $20,000 Barnett, Sivon & Natter $20,000 Sullivan & Cromwell > $10,000* 2007 TOTAL: $2,295,752 Wachovia Corp $1,360,000 Kilpatrick Stockton $365,752 C2 Group $240,000 Capitol Hill Strategies $120,000 Jenkins Hill Group $100,000 Dixon, Dan $40,000 Public Strategies $30,000 Angus & Nickerson $20,000 Cypress Advocacy $20,000 Sullivan & Cromwell > $10,000* 249 Source: Center for Responsive Politics. Lobbying amounts accessed February 2009. * Not counted in total 2006 TOTAL: $1,740,000 Wachovia Corp $900,000 Kilpatrick Stockton $400,000 C2 Group $240,000 Capitol Hill Strategies $100,000 Jenkins Hill Group $80,000 Cypress Advocacy $20,000 2005 TOTAL: $1,220,000 Wachovia Corp $840,000 C2 Group $240,000 Jenkins Hill Group $60,000 Kilpatrick Stockton $60,000 Capitol Hill Strategies $20,000 2004 TOTAL: $1,030,000 Wachovia Corp $720,000 C2 Group $240,000 Jenkins Hill Group $70,000 2003 TOTAL: $320,000 Wachovia Corp $220,000 C2 Group $100,000 Appendix 176 2002 TOTAL: $420,000 Wachovia Corp $120,000 Williams & Jensen $300,000 Sullivan & Cromwell > $10,000* 2001 TOTAL: $730,000 Wachovia Corp $10,000 Williams & Jensen $620,000 2000 TOTAL: $480,000 Wachovia Corp > $10,000* Williams & Jensen $460,000 Groom Law Group $20,000 1999 TOTAL: $600,000 Wachovia Corp $20,000 Williams & Jensen $440,000 Groom Law Group $140,000 Sullivan & Cromwell > $10,000* Bradley, Arant et al > $10,000* 1998 TOTAL: $600,000 Groom Law Group $20,000 Sullivan & Cromwell > $10,000* Williams & Jensen $580,000 * Not included in total Appendix 177 Wachovia Covered Official Lobbyists:250 Firm / Name of Lobbyist Covered Official Position Year(s) William & Jensen, PC Bechtel, Phillip General Counsel - Senate Banking Committee 1999-2002 Landers, David M. Legislative Counsel for Lauch Faircloth 1999-2002 McCarlle, Christine C. Special Assistant to Trent Lott 1999-2002 C2 Group, LLC Hanson, Michael Chief of Staff to Congressman Sam Johnson 2003-2008 Murray, Jefferies Chief of Staff to Congressman Bud Cramer 2003-2008 Litterst, Nelson Special Asst. to the President for Leg Affairs 2004-2008 Knight, Shahira Senior Advisor to Chair of Ways & Means Committee 2006-2008 Elliott, Lesley Deputy Chief of Staff, Secretary of the Senate 2007-2008 Golden West Financial Corp LaFalce, John Member of Congress 2005 Kilpatrick Stockton LLP Dekeyser, Armand C/S Sen. Jeff Sessions 2005-2007 Cypress Advocacy Cave, J. Patrick Deputy Asst. Sec./ Acting Asst. Sec., Treasury 2005-2008 250 Source: Senate Office of Public Records <http://soprweb.senate.gov/>. Accessed January 2009. Appendix 178 Commercial Banks: Wells Fargo Decade-long campaign contribution total (1998-2008): $5,330,022 Decade-long lobbying expenditure total (1998-2008): $16,637,740 Wells Fargo Campaign Contributions:251 2008 Top Recipients252 TOTAL: $1,448,197 1. Barack Obama (D) $160,089 2. Hillary Clinton (D) $103,322 3. John McCain (R) $42,436 4. Norm Coleman (R) $36,500 5. Mitt Romney (R) $33,200 6. Rudy Giuliani (R) $19,450 7. John Edwards (D) $16,950 8. Max Baucus (D) $14,700 9. Erik Paulsen (R) $12,700 10. Ed Royce (R) $12,300 10. Paul Kanjorski (D) $12,300 12. John Cornyn (R) $11,500 13. John Sununu (R) $11,000 13. Tom Latham (R) $11,000 15. Pete Sessions (R) $10,000 15. Collin Peterson (D) $10,000 15. Nancy Pelosi (D) $10,000 15. George Miller (D) $10,000 15. Steny Hoyer (D) $10,000 251 Source: Center for Responsive Politics. Campaign contribution totals accessed February 2009. Individual recipient numbers do not include the 4th Quarter of 2008. 252 Based on highest 1,000 contributions plus PAC contributions. 15. James Clyburn (D) $10,000 15. James Clyburn (D) $10,000 15. Spencer Bachus (R) $10,000 15. John Barrasso (R) $10,000 2006 Top Recipients TOTAL: $1,054,492 1. Dianne Feinstein (D) $21,750 2. Amy Klobuchar (D) $18,585 3. Rick Santorum (R) $14,750 4. Michael McGavick (R) $14,250 5. Orrin Hatch (R) $13,900 6. Richard Baker (R) $13,500 7. Ed Royce (R) $13,000 8. Jon Kyl (R) $11,250 9. Christopher Shays (R) $11,000 10. Jeffery Lamberti (R) $10,350 11. Deborah Pryce (R) $10,000 11. Nancy Pelosi (D) $10,000 11. Jim McCrery (R) $10,000 11. Robert Byrd (D) $10,000 11. Conrad Burns (R) $10,000 16. Tom Latham (R) $9,750 17. Joe Lieberman (I) $9,200 18. Earl Pomeroy (D) $9,000 18. Spencer Bachus (R) $9,000 Appendix 179 20. Ben Nelson (D) $8,650 2004 Top Recipients253 TOTAL: $1,190,226 1. John Kerry (D) $67,700 2. George W Bush (R) $63,735 3. Chuck Grassley (R) $21,250 4. Tom Daschle (D) $19,250 5. Nancy Pelosi (D) $16,000 6. Howard Dean (D) $13,750 7. Jim Bunning (R) $13,000 7. Randy Neugebauer (R) $13,000 7. Richard Baker (R) $13,000 10. Barney Frank (D) $11,800 11. Bob Beuprez (R) $11,000 12. Lisa Murkowski (R) $10,250 13. Robert Bennett (R) $10,000 13. Michael Oxley (R) $10,000 13. Spencer Bachus (R) $10,000 13. Pete Domenici (R) $10,000 17. Richard Shelby (R) $9,750 18. John Thune (R) $9,400 19. Jeb Hensarling (R) $9,000 20. Mark Kennedy (R) $8,250 2002 Top Recipients TOTAL: $613,262 1. Wayne Allard (R) $23,550 2. Norm Coleman (R) $18,500 3. John Thune (R) $16,500 4. Richard Baker (R) $12,000 5. Tim Johnson (D) $11,750 253 Based on highest 1,000 contributions plus PAC contributions. 6. Max Baucus (D) $9,000 7. John Cornyn (R) $8,950 8. Chuck Hagel (R) $8,000 9. Jim Ramstad (R) $6,750 10. Gordon Smith (R) $6,500 11. Larry Craig (R) $6,000 11. Mike Enzi (R) $6,000 11. Jack Reed (D) $6,000 14. Earl Pomeroy (D) $5,750 15. Dick Armey (R) $5,000 15. Chuck Grassley (R) $5,000 17. Mark Kennedy (R) $4,900 18. Nancy Pelosi (D) $4,750 19. Ron Kirk (D) $4,500 19. Silvestre Reyes (D) $4,500 19. Ted Stevens (R) $4,500 19. Michael Oxley (R) $4,500 19. Charlie Gonzalez (D) $4,500 2000 Top Recipients TOTAL: $676,676 1. Dianne Feinstein (D) $24,000 2. Jim Ramstad (R) $11,400 3. Bill Bradley (D) $10,500 3. Kent Conrad (D) $10,500 5. Jon Kyl (R) $10,250 6. George W Bush (R) $10,000 7. Rod Grams (R) $9,500 8. Bob Kerrey (D) $8,500 8. Bruce Vento (D) $8,500 8. Kay Bailey Hutchison (R) $8,250 11. Al Gore (D) $7,550 12. Conrad Burns (R) $7,250 12. John Ensign (R) $7,250 Appendix 180 14. Slade Gorton (R) $6,900 15. Jeff Bingaman (D) $6,750 15. Paul Sarbanes (D) $6,750 17. Hillary Clinton (D) $6,460 18. Charlie Gonzalez (D) $5,500 18. Max Baucus (D) $5,500 18. Rick Lazio (R) $5,500 18. Tom Carper (D) $5,500 1998 Top Recipients TOTAL: $347,169 1. Robert Bennet (R) $10,550 2. Chuck Grassley (R) $10,000 3. Chris Dodd (D) $8,000 4. Byron Dorgan (D) $7,500 5. Rod Grams (R) $6,500 6. Jeff Sessions (R) $6,000 7. Matt Fong (R) $5,500 8. Bill Clinton (D) $5,000 8. Bob Kerrey (D) $5,000 10. Bruce Vento (D) $4,750 12. Pete Sessions (R) $4,500 12. Steven Kuykendall (R) $4,000 12. Richard Baker (R) $4,000 12. Tom Daschle (D) $4,000 15. Buck McKeon (R) $3,500 15. Blanche Lincoln (D) $3,500 17. Robert Greenlee (R) $3,300 18. John McCain (R) $3,000 18. David Dreier (R) $3,000 18. Earl Pomeroy (D) $3,000 18. Scott McInnis (R) $3,000 18. Rick Lazio (R) $3,000 18. Ray LaHood (R) $3,000 18. Jerry Kleczka (D) $3,000 18. Armando Falcon (D) $3,000 18. Mark Baker (R) $3,000 18. Chuck Hagel (R) $3,000 Appendix 181 Wells Fargo Lobbying Expenditures:254 2008 TOTAL: $1,674,740 Wells Fargo $1,200,740 Doremus, Theodore A Jr $444,000 Chesapeake Enterprises $30,000 2007 TOTAL: $2,347,000 Wells Fargo $1,919,000 Doremus, Theodore A Jr $428,000 2006 TOTAL: $2,565,000 Wells Fargo $1,765,000 Doremus, Theodore A Jr $400,000 Kilpatrick Stockton $400,000 2005 TOTAL: $2,050,000 Wells Fargo $1,590,000 Doremus, Theodore A Jr $400,000 Kilpatrick Stockton $60,000 2004 TOTAL: $1,680,000 Wells Fargo $1,280,000 Doremus, Theodore A Jr $400,000 254 Source: Center for Responsive Politics. Lobbying amounts accessed February 2009. 2003 TOTAL: $1,560,000 Wells Fargo $960,000 Doremus, Theodore A Jr $400,000 Davis, Polk & Wardwell $200,000 2002 TOTAL: $820,000 Wells Fargo $620,000 Doremus, Theodore A Jr $200,000 2001 TOTAL: $870,000 Wells Fargo $650,000 HD Vest Financial Services $20,000 Davis, Pol & Wardwell $100,000 Doremus, Theodore A Jr $100,000 Kirkpatrick & Lockhart > $10,000* 2000 TOTAL: $800,000 Wells Fargo $720,000 Davis, Pol & Wardwell $80,000 1999 TOTAL: $671,000 Wells Fargo $471,000 Davis, Polk & Wardwell $200,000 * Not included in the total amount Appendix 182 1998 TOTAL: $1,600,000 Norwest Corp $1,180,000 Canfield & Assoc $20,000 Hogan & Hartson > $10,000* Davis, Polk & Wardwell $200,000 Miller & Chevalier $20,000 Vickers, Linda $180,000 * Not included in the total amount Appendix 183 Wells Fargo Covered Official Lobbyists:255 Firm / Name of Lobbyist Covered Official Position Year(s) Kilpatrick Stockton LLP Dekeyser, Armand C/S Sen. Jeff Sessions 2005-2006 255 Source: Senate Office of Public Records <http://soprweb.senate.gov/>. Accessed January 2009. Appendix 184 Hedge Funds: Bridgewater Associates Decade-long campaign contribution total (1998-2008): $274,650 Decade-long lobbying expenditure total (1998-2008): $855,000 Bridgewater Campaign Contributions:256 2008 All Recipients TOTAL: $239,400 1. John McCain (R) $69,050 2. Barack Obama (D) $13,700 3. David John Cappiello (R) $4,600 4. Rudolph Giuliani (R) $3,300 5. Mitt Romney (R) $2,300 5. Paul Hodes (D) $2,300 7. Christopher Shays (R) $2,000 8. Patrick Murphy $200 2006 All Recipients TOTAL: $8,750 1. Christopher Shays (D) $2,250 2. Ned Lamont (D) $1,250 3. Paul Hodes (D) $1,000 4. Jon Tester (D) $750 5. Diane Goss Farrell (D) $250 5. James Webb (D) $250 256 Source: Center for Responsive Politics. Campaign contribution totals accessed February 2009. Individual recipient numbers do not include the 4th Quarter of 2008. 2004 All Recipients TOTAL: $25,500 1. George W Bush (R) $250 1. Wesley Clark (D) $250 2002 N/A 2000 All Recipients TOTAL: $1,000 1. Stephanie Hunter Sanchez (D) $1,000 1998-1999 N/A Appendix 185 Bridgewater Lobbying Expenses:257 2008 TOTAL: $135,000 Rich Feuer Group $135,000 2007 TOTAL: $220,000 Quinn, Gillespie & Assoc. $60,000 Rich Feuer Group $160,000 2006 TOTAL: $440,000 Quinn, Gillespie & Assoc. $340,000 Rich Feuer Group $100,000 2005 TOTAL: $60,000 Rich Feuer Group $60,000 1998-2004 N/A Bridgewater Covered Official Lobbyists: N/A 257 Source: Center for Responsive Politics. Lobbying amounts accessed January 2009 and may not include 4th Quarter amounts. Appendix 186 Hedge Funds: DE Shaw Group Decade-long campaign contribution total (1998-2008): $3,100,255 Decade-long lobbying expenditure total (1998-2008): $680,000 DE Shaw Campaign Contributions:258 2008 All Recipients TOTAL: $841,541 1. Hillary Clinton (D) $18,650 2. Barack Obama (D) $13,320 3. Max Baucus (D) $3,250 4. Jeff Merkley (D) $2,700 5. Darcy Burner (D) $2,300 5. Kay Hagan (D) $2,300 5. Chellie Pingree (D) $2,300 5. Jerry McNerney (D) $2,300 5. Jeanne Shaheen (D) $2,300 5. Andrew Rice (D) $2,300 5. Jim Himes (D) $2,300 5. Mary Landrieu (D) $2,300 13. Bob Inglis (R) $2,000 13. Susan Collins (R) $2,000 14. Mitch McConnell (R) $2,000 15. Ron Klein (D) $1,500 16. Ron Paul (R) $1,100 17. Heather Wilson (R) $1,000 17. Steny Hoyer (D) $1,000 17. Roger Wicker (R) $1,000 17. James Risch (R) $1,000 17. Micahel Johanns (R) $1,000 258 Source: Center for Responsive Politics. Campaign contribution totals accessed February 2009. Individual recipient numbers do not include the 4th Quarter of 2008. 17. Norm Coleman (R) $1,000 2006 All Recipients TOTAL: $485,200 1. Bob Casey (D) $4,100 2. Maria Cantwell (D) $4,000 3. Robert Menendez (D) $3,600 4. Healther Wilson (R) $3,000 5. Tim Mahoney (D) $2,100 5. Ben Nelson (D) $2,100 5. Evan Bayh (D) $2,100 8. Jo Bonner (R) $2,000 8. Chet Edwards (D) $2,000 8. Joe Lieberman (I) $2,000 8. Mike Ferguson (R) $2,000 8. Clay Shaw (R) $2,000 8. Mark Pryor (D) $2,000 8. Baron Hill (D) $2,000 8. Darcy Burner (D) $2,000 8. Patricia Madrid (D) $2,000 17. Edwin Perlmutter (D) $1,000 17. Olympia Snowe (R) $1,000 17. Max Baucus (D) $1,000 17. Nancy Johnson (R) $1,000 Appendix 187 2004 All Recipients TOTAL: $256,250 1. John Kerry (D) $6,250 2. Blanche Lincoln (D) $4,000 2. Patty Murray (D) $4,000 4. Hillary Clinton (D) $2,000 5. Erskine Bowles (D) $1,000 5. Joseph Hoeffel (D) $1,000 5. Charles Rangel (D) $1,000 8. Joe Lieberman (D) $500 2002 All Recipients TOTAL: $769,296 1. Erskine Bowles (D) $1,000 1. Jeanne Shaheen $1,000 2000 TOTAL: $503,968 1. Richard Gephardt (D) $1,000 2. John McCain (R) $750 1998 TOTAL: $244,000 No contributions to individual candidates Appendix 188 DE Shaw Lobbying Expenses:259 2008 TOTAL: $20,000 Mehlman Vogel Castagnetti Inc $20,000 2007 N/A 2006 TOTAL: $70,000 Mehlman Vogel Castagnetti Inc $30,000 Navigant Consulting $40,000 2005 TOTAL: $110,000 Mehlman Vogel Castagnetti Inc $30,000 Navigant Consulting $80,000 2004 TOTAL: $80,000 Mehlman Vogel Castagnetti Inc $20,000 Navigant Consulting $60,000 2003 TOTAL: $20,000 Navigant Consulting $20,000 2002 N/A 259 Source: Center for Responsive Politics. Lobbying amounts accessed February 2009. 2001 TOTAL: $20,000 Commonwealth Group $20,000 2000 TOTAL: $160,000 DE Shaw & Co $120,000 Commonwealth Group $40,000 1999 TOTAL: $80,000 DE Shaw & Co $40,000 Commonwealth Group $40,000 1998 TOTAL: $120,000 DE Shaw & Co $80,000 Commonwealth Group $40,000 Appendix 189 DE Shaw Covered Official Lobbyists:260 Firm / Name of Lobbyist Covered Position Year(s) Mehlman Vogel Castagnetti Inc Kelly Bingel Chief of Staff, Sen. Blanche Lincoln 2005-2006 Elise Finley Pickering Chief of Staff, Rep. Shaddegg; Exec Director, RPC 2006 Dean Rosen Health Policy Director, Senate Majority Leader 2005-2006 David Thomas Chief of Staff, Rep. Zoe Lofgren 2006 C. Stewart Verdery Jr Asst Sec for Homeland Security 2005 Alex Vogel Chief Council, Senate Majority Leader 2005 260 Source: Senate Office of Public Records <http://soprweb.senate.gov/>. Accessed January 200a
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Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Corruption
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Woof, 10th Post;
Appendix 143 Investment Banks: Morgan Stanley Decade-long campaign contribution total (1998-2008): $14,367,857 Decade-long lobbying expenditure total (1998-2008): $20,835,000 Morgan Stanley Campaign Contributions:234 2008 Top Recipients TOTAL: $3,573,627 1. Barack Obama (D) $425,502 2. Hillary Clinton (D) $376,980 3. John McCain (R) $258,677 4. Mitt Romney (R) $165,750 5. Rudy Giuliani (R) $133,750 6. Chris Dodd (D) $69,400 7. Fred Thompson (R) $42,800 8. Max Baucus (D) $30,500 9. Mark Kirk (R) $23,850 10. Jack Reed (D) $21,350 11. Mark Warner (D) $19,450 12. Michael N Castle (R) $17,850 13. Niki Tsongas (D) $17,100 14. Rahm Emanuel (D) $16,200 15. Susan M Collins (R) $15,933 16. Bill Richardson (D) $14,900 17. John Boehner (R) $14,300 17. Al Franken (D) $14,300 19. Jim Himes (D) $13,200 19. Scott Kleeb (D) $13,200 234 Source: Center for Responsive Politics. Campaign contribution totals accessed February 2009. Individual recipient numbers do not include the 4th Quarter of 2008. 2006 Top Recipients TOTAL: $1,943,033 1. Hillary Clinton (D) $116,060 2. Harold Ford Jr (D) $43,650 3. Chris Dodd (D) $42,200 4. Joe Lieberman (I) $24,700 5. Rick Santorum (R) $19,250 6. Orrin G Hatch (R) $19,000 7. Jon Kyl (R) $17,100 8. Michael N Castle (R) $16,100 9. Mike DeWine (R) $15,600 10. Dennis Hastert (R) $14,100 11. Kathleen Troia McFarland (R) $14,000 12. Mark Kirk (R) $13,900 13. Thomas Kean Jr (R) $12,550 14. Christopher Shays (R) $12,350 15. Bob Corker (R) $12,200 16. Robert Menendez (D) $12,150 17. Tom Carper (D) $11,880 18. Ned Lamont (D) $11,850 19. Conrad Burns (R) $11,100 20. Scott Kleeb (D) $11,050 Appendix 144 2004 Top Recipients TOTAL: $3,286,484 1. George W Bush (R) $600,480 2. John Kerry (D) $180,979 3. Charles Schumer (D) $57,000 4. Chris Dodd (D) $46,000 5. Robert Bennett (R) $38,000 6. Dennis Hastert (R) $34,750 7. John Edwards (D) $33,050 8. Erskine Bowles (D) $32,750 9. Howard Dean (D) $29,350 10. Arlen Specter (R) $27,750 11. James DeMint (R) $20,750 12. Barack Obama (D) $20,250 13. Wesley Clark (D) $19,550 14. Tom Daschle (D) $18,000 15. Michael N Castle (R) $17,000 15. Andrew McKenna (R) $17,000 17. Richard Burr (R) $16,549 18. Christopher S 'Kit' Bond (R) $15,400 19. Evan Bayh (D) $15,000 19. Mel Martinez (R) $15,000 2002 Top Recipients TOTAL: $1,899,242 1. Charles Schumer (D) $52,500 2. Erskine Bowles (D) $27,000 3. Elizabeth Dole (R) $23,750 4. Rob Portman (R) $19,000 5. Frank Lautenberg (D) $18,150 6. Saxby Chambliss (R) $16,000 7. Max Baucus (D) $15,500 8. Norm Coleman (R) $15,450 9. Michael N Castle (R) $14,800 10. Evan Bayh (D) $14,450 11. Richard Baker (R) $14,000 11. Lindsey Graham (R) $14,000 13. James M Talent (R) $13,000 14. Mike Ferguson (R) $12,250 15. Billy Tauzin (R) $12,000 16. Roy Blunt (R) $11,000 17. Arlen Specter (R) $10,250 18. Mark Foley (R) $10,200 19. Wayne Allard (R) $10,000 19. Spencer Bachus (R) $10,000 2000 Top Recipients TOTAL: $2,656,627 1. George W Bush (R) $148,050 2. Rick A Lazio (R) $139,450 3. Charles Schumer (D) $126,000 4. Bill Bradley (D) $97,850 5. Al Gore (D) $52,300 6. Phil Gramm (R) $41,500 7. John McCain (R) $38,050 8. Hillary Clinton (D) $30,400 9. Tom Campbell (R) $24,500 10. Charles S Robb (D) $23,000 11. Bill McCollum (R) $18,700 12. Spencer Abraham (R) $16,050 13. Rudy Giuliani (R) $15,800 14. William Roth Jr (R) $14,700 15. John J LaFalce (D) $14,000 16. Kent Conrad (D) $13,000 17. Mark Kirk (R) $12,150 17. Carolyn Maloney (D) $12,000 19. Jon S Corzine (D) $11,500 Appendix 145 20. Bob Franks (R) $11,250 1998 Top Recipients TOTAL: $1,008,844 1. Lauch Faircloth (R) $48,100 2. Evan Bayh (D) $31,750 3. Charles Schumer (D) $31,500 4. Alfonse D'Amato (R) $30,500 5. Barbara Mikulski (D) $7,500 6. Robert Bennett (R) $7,000 7. Tom Daschle (D) $6,500 8. Jon D Fox (R) $6,250 8. Arlen Specter (R) $6,250 10. Michael N Castle (R) $5,750 11. Chris Dodd (D) $5,225 12. Phil Crane (R) $5,000 12. Edward Kennedy (D) $5,000 12. Rick A Lazio (R) $5,000 12. Trent Lott (R) $5,000 12. Michael G Oxley (R) $5,000 12. Larry Schneider (D) $5,000 12. Billy Tauzin (R) $5,000 19. Rick White (R) $4,800 20. John J LaFalce (D) $4,750 Appendix 146 Morgan Stanley Lobbying Expenditures235: 2008 TOTAL: $3,005,000 Morgan Stanley $2,500,000 Capitol Tax Partners $240,000 Eris Group $120,000 American Capitol Group $45,000 Baptista Group $60,000 Kate Moss Co $40,000 DCI Group > $10,000* 2007 TOTAL: $3,040,000 Morgan Stanley $2,360,000 Capitol Tax Partners $240,000 Eris Group $120,000 American Capitol Group $80,000 Baptista Group $80,000 James E Boland Jr $80,000 Kate Moss Co $40,000 Alston & Bird $40,000 DCI Group > $10,000* 2006 TOTAL: $3,360,000 Morgan Stanley $2,720,000 Capitol Tax Partners $240,000 James E Boland Jr $120,000 Bartlett & Bendall $60,000 Alston & Bird $60,000 Eris Group $60,000 235 Source: Center for Responsive Politics. Lobbying amounts accessed February 2009. * Not included in totals Kate Moss Co $40,000 American Capitol Group $40,000 Baptista Group $20,000 DCI Group > $10,000* 2005 TOTAL: $2,840,000 Morgan Stanley $2,280,000 Capitol Tax Partners $240,000 Bartlett & Bendall $120,000 James E Boland Jr $120,000 Kate Moss Co $40,000 Alston & Bird $40,000 2004 TOTAL: $2,750,000 Morgan Stanley $2,180,000 Capitol Tax Partners $240,000 Bartlett & Bendall $120,000 James E Boland Jr $120,000 Kate Moss Co $50,000 Alston & Bird $40,000 2003 TOTAL: $2,580,000 Morgan Stanley $2,000,000 Capitol Tax Partners $200,000 Bartlett & Bendall $120,000 James E Boland Jr $100,000 Alston & Bird $100,000 Kate Moss Co $60,000 * Not included in totals Appendix 147 2002 TOTAL: $1,960,000 Morgan Stanley $1,540,000 Capitol Tax Partners $200,000 Alston & Bird $80,000 James E Boland Jr $80,000 Kate Moss Co $60,000 2001 TOTAL: $1,300,000 Morgan Stanley $920,000 James E Boland Jr $80,000 Capitol Tax Partners $80,000 Kate Moss Co $80,000 Alston & Bird $70,000 Palmetto Group $40,000 George C Tagg $30,000 1998-2000 N/A Appendix 148 Morgan Stanley Covered Official Lobbyists:236 Firm / Name of Lobbyist Covered Official Position Year (s) Capitol Tax Partners Fant, William Deputy Asst Sec. (treasury) for legislative affairs 2001-2004 Mikrut, Joseph Tax Legislative Counsel - US Treasury 2001-2008 Talisman, Jonathan Assistant Treasury Secretary for Tax Policy 2001-2008 Wilcox, Lawrence Staff Director, Senate Republican Policy Committee 2006-2008 McKenny, William Chief of Staff, Rep. Amo Hougton 2004-2008 Grafmeyer, Richard Deputy Chief of Staff - JCT 2003-2008 Dennis, James Tax Counsel, Sen. Robb - Counsel, Sen. Bingaman 2008 Javens, Christopher Tax Counsel, Sen. Grassley, Sen. Finance Committee 2008 Bartlett & Bendall Amy D. Smith Deputy Assistant Secretary, US Treasury 2003 Gill, Shane Legislative Director, Rep. Spencer Bachus 2004-2005 2007 Alston & Bird Martino, Paul G Tax Counsel, Senate Finance Committee 2006 Eris Group Kadesh, Mark Chief of Staff, Sen. Feinstein 2006-2007 236 Source: Senate Office of Public Records <http://soprweb.senate.gov/>. Accessed January 2009. Appendix 149 Commercial Banks: Bank of America Decade-long campaign contribution total (1998-2008): $11,292,260 Decade-long lobbying expenditure total (1998-2008): $28,635,440 BOA Campaign Contributions:237 2008 Top Recipients TOTAL: $2,212,369 1. Barack Obama (D) $230,552 2. John McCain (R) $126,175 3. Hillary Clinton (D) $106,071 4. Rudy Giuliani (R) $69,050 5. Chris Dodd (D) $63,100 6. Mitt Romney (R) $52,550 7. Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D) $44,000 8. Michael N. Castle (R) $25,250 9. Dutch Ruppersberger (D) $17,200 10. Melissa Bean (D) $16,000 10. Rahm Emanuel (D) $16,000 12. Dick Durbin (D) $13,600 13. Melvin L. Watt (D) $13,500 14. Mark Warner (D) $12,800 15. Barney Frank (D) $12,750 16. Kay R. Hagen (D) $12,600 17. Peter Roskam (R) $11,500 18. Jack Reed (D) $11,321 19. James E. Clyburn (D) $11,000 20. John E. Sununu (R) $10,950 237 Source: Center for Responsive Politics. Campaign contribution totals accessed February 2009. Individual recipient numbers do not include the 4th Quarter of 2008. 2006 Top Recipients TOTAL: $2,098,533 1. John M. Spratt Jr. (D) $64,500 2. Hillary Clinton (D) $53,085 3. David McSweeney (R) $33,800 4. Harold E. Ford Jr. (D) $32,400 5. Michael N. Castle (R) $31,250 6. Rick Santorum (R) $21,250 7. Tom Carper (D) $20,130 8. Spencer Bachus (R) $18,500 9. Jack Reed (D) $17,828 10. Pete Sessions (R) $17,700 11. Patrick McHenry (R) $16,999 12. Dutch Ruppersberger (D) $16,450 13. Robert Menendez (D) $16,000 14. Melissa Bean (D) $15,130 15. Michael Fitzpatrick (R) $15,000 16. Sue Myrick (R) $14,900 17. John E. Sununu (R) $14,607 18. Olympia J. Snowe (R) $14,600 19. Joe Lieberman (I) $14,549 20. James M. Talent (R) $14,500 Appendix 150 2004 Top Recipients TOTAL: $2,360,786 1. George W. Bush (R) $195,761 2. John Kerry (D) $126,202 3. John M. Spratt Jr. (D) $50,700 4. Richard Burr (R) $44,100 5. Erskine B. Bowles (D) $43,800 6. Barack Obama (D) $28,500 7. Elizabeth Dole (R) $20,750 8. John Edwards (D) $18,050 9. Melvin L. Watt (D) $17,500 10. Richard Gephardt (D) $17,450 11. Sue Myrick (R) $16,500 12. Harold E. Ford Jr. (D) $16,000 13. Jay Helvey (R) $15,250 14. Michael G. Oxley (R) $15,000 15. Dennis Hastert (D) $14,500 16. Mike Ferguson (R) $13,000 17. David Vitter (R) $12,800 18. Pete Sessions (R) $11,065 19. Tim J. Michels (R) $10,950 20. Johnny Isakson (R) $10,700 2002 Top Recipients TOTAL: $1,193,660 1. Charles Schumer (D) $57,500 2. Erskine B. Bowles (D) $37,600 3. Elizabeth Dole (R) $22,150 4. John M. Spratt Jr. (D) $20,750 5. Max Baucus (D) $18,450 6. John Cornyn (R) $11,000 7. Spencer Bachus (R) $10,000 7. Martin Frost (D) $10,000 9. Sue Myrick (R) $9,250 10. David Dreier (R) $9,000 11. Michael G. Oxley (R) $8,500 12. Charlie Gonzalez (D) $8,000 12. Tim Johnson (D) $8,000 14. Lindsey Graham (R) $7,750 14. Richard Baker (R) $7,500 16. Richard Gephardt (D) $7,000 16. Robin Hayes (R) $7,000 16. John Linder (R) $7,000 19. Jerry Weller (R) $6,888 20. Ken Bentsen (D) $6,500 2000 Top Recipients TOTAL: $1,649,522 1. George W. Bush (R) $113,500 2. Bill Bradley (D) $56,450 3. John M. Spratt Jr. (D) $26,500 4. Phil Gramm (R) $25,500 5. Dianne Feinstein (D) $18,139 6. Sue Myrick (R) $16,850 7. Al Gore (D) $16,750 8. Martin Frost (D) $15,000 9. Rick A. Lazio (R) $13,550 10. Bill Nelson (D) $13,000 11. John McCain (R) $12,450 12. Bill McCollum (R) $11,500 13. Zell Miller (D) $11,000 14. David Dreier (R) $10,000 14. Richard Gephardt (D) $10,000 16. John Edwards (D) $9,750 17. Mel Carnahan (D) $8,150 18. Elizabeth Dole (R) $7,750 18. Charles S. Robb (D) $7,750 18. Ellen Tauscher (D) $7,750 Appendix 151 1998 Top Recipients TOTAL: $2,114,390 1. Lauch Faircloth (R) $56,000 2. Christopher S. 'Kit' Bond $21,900 3. Bill McCollum (R) $18,500 4. Bob Graham (D) $17,950 5. John McCain (R) $17,550 6. John M. Spratt Jr. (D) $17,500 7. Richard Baker (R) $17,000 8. Carol Moseley Braun (D) $16,050 9. Robert F. Bennett (R) $16,000 9. Tom Daschle (D) $16,000 11. John Linder (R) $15,000 12. Evan Bayh (D) $14,000 12. Martin Frost (D) $14,000 14. Matt Fong (R) $13,000 15. Paul Coverdell (R) $12,500 15. Alfonse D'Amato (R) $12,500 15. Richard Gephardt (D) $12,500 15. Rick A. Lazio (R) $12,500 19. Ellen Tauscher (D) $12,300 20. Dick Armey (R) $12,000 Appendix 152 BOA Lobbying Expenditures:238 2008 TOTAL: $5,755,000 Bank of America $4,090,000 King & Spalding $480,000 Quinn, Gillespie & Assoc $360,000 Smith-Free Group $250,000 Bryan Cave Strategies $160,000 Public Strategies $165,000 Clark Consulting Federal Policy group $100,000 Quadripoint Strategies $90,000 American Capitol Group $60,000 Covington & Burling > $10,000* 2007 TOTAL: $4,946,400 Bank of America $3,220,000 Quinn, Gillespie & Assoc $360,000 Kilpatrick Stockton $300,000 Clark Consulting Federal Policy group $300,000 Smith-Free Group $280,000 King & Spalding $180,000 Covington & Burling $100,000 Bryan Cave Strategies $100,000 Quadripoint Strategies $76,400 Public Strategies $30,000 238 Source: Center for Responsive Politics. Lobbying amounts accessed February 2009. * Not included in totals 2006 TOTAL: $3,486,014 Bank of America $1,986,014 Kilpatrick Stockton $400,000 Quinn, Gillespie & Assoc $360,000 Clark Consulting Federal Policy group $300,000 Smith-Free Group $240,000 Covington & Burling $120,000 Angus & Nickerson $40,000 Cypress Advocacy $20,000 Kate Moss Co $20,000 2005 TOTAL: $1,900,000 Bank of America $1,000,000 Clark Consulting Federal Policy group $300,000 Quinn, Gillespie & Assoc $240,000 Smith & Assoc $240,000 Kilpatrick Stockton $60,000 Angus & Nickerson $20,000 Covington & Burling $20,000 Kate Moss Co $20,000 Winston & Strawn > $10,000* * Not included in totals Appendix 153 2004 TOTAL: $1,020,000 Bank of America $660,000 Clark Consulting Federal Policy group $300,000 Kate Moss Co $40,000 Perkins, Smith & Cohen $20,000 Reed Smith LLP > $10,000* Covington & Burling > $10,000* 2003 TOTAL: $1,196,141 Bank of America $656,141 Clark Consulting Federal Policy group $300,000 Perkins, Smith & Cohen $160,000 Covington & Burling $40,000 Kate Moss Co $40,000 Reed Smith LLP > $10,000* 2002 TOTAL: $1,179,350 Bank of America $679,350 Clark Consulting Federal Policy group $200,000 PriceWaterhouseCoopers $140,000 O'Connor & Hannan $120,000 Kate Moss Co $40,000 2001 TOTAL: $1,932,204 Bank of America $1,552,204 PriceWaterhouseCoopers $240,000 O'Connor & Hannan $100,000 Kate Moss Co $40,000 Holmes, Weddle & Barcott > $10,000* 2000 TOTAL: $1,947,331 Bank of America $1,567,331 PriceWaterhouseCoopers $240,000 Beck, Edward A III $40,000 Kate Moss Co $40,000 O'Connor & Hannan $40,000 Hyjek & Fix $20,000 Winston & Strawn > $10,000* 1999 TOTAL: $340,000 Beck, Edward A III $20,000 Covington & Burling > $10,000* Hyjek & Fix $20,000 Kate Moss Co $40,000 PriceWaterhouseCoopers $260,000 Winston & Strawn > $10,000* 1998 TOTAL: $4,933,000 Bank of America $3,960,000 NationsBank $620,000 Bergner, Bockorny et al $140,000 Kate Moss Co $73,000 PriceWaterhouseCoopers $60,000 Beck, Edward A III $60,000 Covington & Burling > $10,000* Covington & Burling $20,000 * Not included in totals Appendix 154 BOA Covered Official Lobbyists:239 Firm / Name of Lobbyist Covered Official Position Year(s) American Capitol Group Nate Gatten Prof. Staff, Senate Banking Comm. 2008 Leg. Asst, Sen. Bennett Staff, Sen. Budget Comm. Brian Cave Strategies LLC Waldo McMillan Intern, Rep. Chaka Fattah 2008 Floor Asst, Counsel for Bus. Affairs, Sen. Harry Reid Federal Policy Group (Clark & Wamberg) Ken Kies Chief of Staff, Joint Comm on Taxation 2008 Matt Dolan Counsel, Sen. David Durenberger 2008 Pat Raffaniello Chief of Staff, Cong. Bill Brewster 2008 King & Spalding William Clarkson Legislative Asst, Sen. Susan Collins 2007-2008 Archibald Galloway III Sr. Defense Policy Advisor, Sen. Jeff Sessions 2008 Quinn Gillespie & Associates Jack Quinn Counsel, Pres. Clinton; Chief of Staff, VP Gore 2008 Dave Hoppe Staff Dir/CoS, Sen Lott; CoS Rep. Kemp and Coats 2008 Jeff Connaughton Special Asst to chair of Sen. Judiciary Comm 2008 Special Asst to White House Counsel Allison Giles Chief of Staff, Ways & Means Comm 2007-2008 Legislative Asst, Rep. Thomas Elizabeth Hogan Special Asst, Dept of Commerce 2005-2008 Assoc. Dir, EOP; Intern, Rep. McCrery Bonnie Hogue Duffy Staff, Sen. Comm on Aging 2008 239 Source: Senate Office of Public Records <http://soprweb.senate.gov/>. Accessed January 2009. Appendix 155 Legislative Asst, Sen. Reed Harriet James Melvin Prof. Staff, Rep Charles Hatcher 2008 Kevin Kayes Chief Counsel, Sen. Reid 2006-2008 Marc Lampkin Policy Dir, Sen Coverdell 2008 Nick Maduros Cloakroom assistant; Intern, Sen Lehman 2008 Christopher McCannell Chief of Staff, Cong. Crowley 2007-2008 Amy Jensen Cunniffee Special Asst to the Pres for Legal Affairs 2005-2006 Mike Hacker Comm Dir, Rep. Dingell 2005 Covington & Burling Holly Fechner Policy Dir, Sen. Edward Kennedy 2007 Angus & Nickerson Barbara Angus Int’l Tax Counsel, Dept of Treausry 2006 Gregory Nickerson Tax Counsel, Ways and Means Comm 2006 Cypress Advocacy Patrick Cave Asst Sec, Dept of Treasury 2006 Kilpatrick Stockton Armand Dekeyser Chief of Staff, Sen. Jeff Sessions 2005-2006 The Smith-Free Group Jon Deuser Chief of Staff, Sen. Bunning 2006 PricewaterhouseCoopers Tim Hanford Tax Counsel, Ways and Means Comm. 2001-2002 Kenneth Kies Chief of Staff, Joint Comm. on Taxation 2000-2001 Barbara Angus Business Tax Counsel, Joint Comm. on Taxation 2000-2001 Appendix 156 Commercial Banks: Citigroup Decade-long campaign contribution total (1998-2008): $19,778,382 Decade-long lobbying expenditure total (1998-2008): $88,460,000 Citigroup Campaign Contributions:240 2008 Top Recipients TOTAL: $4,270,678 1. Barack Obama (D) $543,430 2. Hillary Clinton (D) $423,417 3. John McCain (R) $301,301 4. Mitt Romney (R) $168,550 5. Chris Dodd (D) $157,244 6. Rudy Giuliani (R) $151,100 7. Charles B. Rangel (D) $61,450 8. John Edwards (D) $44,600 9. Saxby Chambliss (R) $40,350 10. Dick Durbin (D) $40,250 11. Spencer Bachus (R) $35,450 12. David Landrum (R) $30,450 13. Rahm Emanuel (D) $28,000 14. John E. Sununu (R) $26,850 15. Shelley Moore Capito (R) $25,700 16. Richard C. Shelby (R) $25,200 17. Max Baucus (D) $24,500 18. Chuck Hagel (R) $24,100 19. Joe Biden Jr. (D) $23,950 20. Jim Marshall (D) $23,050 240 Source: Center for Responsive Politics. Campaign contribution totals accessed February 2009. Individual recipient numbers do not include the 4th Quarter of 2008. 2006 Top Recipients TOTAL: $2,576,066 1. Hillary Clinton (D) $134,610 2. Christopher J. Dodd (D) $107,800 3. Joe Lieberman (I) $59,450 4. Tom Carper (D) $55,300 5. Kent Conrad (D) $36,000 6. John E. Sununu (R) $35,250 7. Jim McCrery (R) $34,300 8. Mitch McConnell (R) $33,700 9. Jon Kyl (R) $33,400 10. Rick Santorum (R) $29,850 11. Christopher Shays (R) $23,000 12. Mike DeWine (R) $21,850 13. Thomas H. Kean Jr. (R) $21,550 14. Harold E. Ford Jr. (D) $19,800 15. Robert Menendez (D) $19,550 16. Ben Nelson (D) $18,200 17. Doris O. Matsui (D) $18,050 18. Bob Corker (R) $17,250 19. David Yassky (D) $16,050 20. James M. Talent (R) $15,900 Appendix 157 2004 Top Recipients TOTAL: $3,003,758 1. George W. Bush (R) $315,820 2. John Kerry (D) $280,881 3. Hillary Clinton (D) $91,250 4. Charles Schumer (D) $80,800 5. Richard Shelby (R) $65,000 6. Tom Daschle (D) $56,700 7. Chris Dodd (D) $50,200 8. Michael G. Oxley (R) $40,550 9. Mike Crapo (R) $34,450 10. Harry Reid (D) $32,250 11. Wesley Clark (D) $30,650 12. Rob Portman (R) $30,000 13. Joe Lieberman (D) $29,000 14. Howard Dean (D) $26,886 15. Erskine B. Bowles (D) $25,550 16. Barack Obama (D) $21,350 17. Mel Martinez (R) $20,600 18. Evan Bayh (D) $17,543 19. Arlen Specter (R) $17,500 20. James W. DeMint (R) $17,250 2002 Top Recipients TOTAL: $3,021,725 1. Tim Johnson (D) $54,560 2. Chris Dodd (D) $41,550 3. Charles B. Rangel (D) $40,500 4. Jean Carnahan (D) $39,750 5. Charles Schumer (D) $30,750 6. Shelley Moore Capito (R) $17,448 7. Amo Houghton (R) $17,050 8. Max Baucus (D) $16,250 9. John E. Sununu (R) $15,750 10. Nancy L. Johnson (R) $15,250 10. Ron Kirk (D) $15,250 12. Max Cleland (D) $14,950 13. Rahm Emanuel (D) $14,250 14. Norm Coleman (R) $12,000 14. Elizabeth Dole (R) $12,000 16. Bill Janklow (R) $11,000 16. Jim Maloney (D) $11,000 16. Billy Tauzin (R) $11,000 19. Nita M. Lowey (D) $10,500 19. Carolyn Maloney (D) $10,500 2000 TOTAL: $4,157,926 1. Charles Schumer (D) $135,550 2. Bill Bradley (D) $127,500 3. Rick A. Lazio (R) $127,390 4. George W. Bush (R) $115,700 5. Al Gore (D) $115,500 6. Hillary Clinton (D) $99,650 7. Joe Lieberman (D) $55,296 8. John McCain (R) $42,700 9. Rudy. Giuliani (R) $37,015 10. Spencer Abraham (R) $29,750 11. Bob Franks (R) $28,208 12. Carolyn Maloney (D) $22,000 13. William Roth Jr. (R) $20,650 14. Charles S. Robb (D) $19,250 15. Tim Johnson (D) $18,500 16. Nita M. Lowey (D) $18,000 17. John J. LaFalce (D) $15,250 18. Bill Nelson (D) $14,750 19. Nancy L. Johnson (R) $14,050 20. Phil Gramm (R) $13,500 Appendix 158 1998 Top Recipients TOTAL: $2,748,229 1. Alfonse D'Amato (R) $105,914 2. Charles Schumer (D) $99,116 3. Chris Dodd (D) $40,250 4. Tom Daschle (D) $39,000 5. Nancy L. Johnson (D) $26,975 6. Geraldine Ferraro (D) $25,724 7. Charles B. Rangel (D) $25,500 8. Paul Coverdell (R) $19,964 9. Bob Graham (D) $19,857 10. Rick A. Lazio (R) $19,500 10. Nita M. Lowey (D) $19,500 12. Richard Gephardt (D) $18,000 13. Bob Kerrey (D) $16,500 14. Newt Gingrich (R) $16,000 15. Lauch Faircloth (R) $15,775 16. Carol Moseley Braun (D) $15,450 17. Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D) $14,949 18. Richard Baker (R) $14,000 19. Evan Bayh (D) $13,750 20. Tom Delay (R) $12,000 Appendix 159 Citigroup Lobbying Expenditures:241 2008 TOTAL: $7,875,000 Citigroup Management Corp $5,520,000 Avenue Solutions $100,000 Barnett, Sivon & Natter $260,000 Capitol Hill Strategies $240,000 Capitol Tax Partners $200,000 Cypress Advocacy $200,000 Ernst & Young $320,000 Ogilvy Government Relations $320,000 Elmendorf Strategies $140,000 BGR Holding $110,000 Roberti Assoc $225,000 Timmons & Co $240,000 2007 TOTAL: $10,640,000 Citigroup Inc $8,180,000 Ernst & Young $320,000 Barnett, Sivon & Natter $320,000 Ogilvy Government Relations $320,000 Kilpatrick Stockton $300,000 Capitol Hill Strategies $240,000 Avenue Solutions $240,000 Capitol Tax Partners $200,000 Cypress Advocacy $120,000 Dewey Square Group $40,000 Angus & Nickerson $40,000 King & Spalding $20,000 241 Source: Center for Responsive Politics. Lobbying amounts accessed February 2009. Timmons & Co $300,000 2006 TOTAL: $9,100,000 Citigroup Inc $6,760,000 Kilpatrick Stockton $400,000 Ernst & Young $340,000 Barnett, Sivon & Natter $340,000 Federalist Group $320,000 Avenue Solutions $170,000 O'Melveny & Myers $160,000 Capitol Hill Strategies $120,000 Cypress Advocacy $120,000 Capitol Tax Partners $110,000 Angus & Nickerson $60,000 Timmons & Co. $200,000 2005 TOTAL: $5,140,000 Citigroup Inc $3,600,000 Barnett, Sivon & Natter $360,000 Ogilvy Government Relations $240,000 Avenue Solutions $180,000 Ernst & Young $160,000 Cypress Advocacy $120,000 Capitol Hill Strategies $120,000 Capitol Tax Partners $120,000 Angus & Nickerson $80,000 Kilpatrick Stockton $60,000 Cleary, Gottlieb et al $100,000 Appendix 160 2004 TOTAL: $8,520,000 Citigroup Inc $7,200,000 Barnett, Sivon & Natter $360,000 Ernst & Young $280,000 Federalist Group $240,000 Avenue Solutions $180,000 Capitol Hill Strategies $120,000 Capitol Tax Partners $120,000 Walker, Lynda K > $10,000* Skadden, Arps et al $20,000 2003 TOTAL: $10,400,000 Citigroup Inc $7,800,000 Akin, Gump et al $960,000 Barnett, Sivon & Natter $360,000 Quinn, Gillespie & Assoc $240,000 Ernst & Young $200,000 Van Scoyoc Assoc $180,000 Barbour, Griffith & Rogers $160,000 Federalist Group $120,000 Avenue Solutions $90,000 Tonio Burgos & Assoc $50,000 Campbell-Crane & Assoc $40,000 Franzel, Brent S $40,000 Mayer, Brown et al $40,000 Capitol Tax Partners $120,000 2002 TOTAL: $7,730,000 Citigroup Inc $5,400,000 Akin, Gump et al $620,000 * Not included in totals Barnett, Sivon & Natter $400,000 Ernst & Young $240,000 Verner, Liipfert et al $220,000 Avenue Solutions $150,000 Barbour, Griffith & Rogers $120,000 Mayer, Brown et al $80,000 Baker & Hostetler $80,000 Campbell-Crane & Assoc $80,000 Franzel, Brent S $80,000 Thaxton, Richard R $70,000 Tonio Burgos & Assoc $50,000 Van Scoyoc Assoc $40,000 Venn Strategies $40,000 Hogan & Hartson $20,000 Heidepriem & Mager > $10,000* Capitol Tax Partners $40,000 2001 TOTAL: $5,930,000 Citigroup Inc $4,100,000 Barnett, Sivon & Natter $440,000 Verner, Liipfert et al $380,000 Baker & Hostetler $260,000 Ernst & Young $240,000 Mayer, Brown et al $100,000 PodestaMattoon $100,000 Campbell-Crane & Assoc $80,000 Thaxton, Richard R $60,000 Hogan & Hartson $40,000 Franzel, Brent S $40,000 Tonio Burgos & Assoc $30,000 Heidepriem & Mager $20,000 Rhoads Group $40,000 * Not included in totals Appendix 161 2000 TOTAL: $6,420,000 Citigroup Inc $4,120,000 Associates First Capital $300,000 Verner, Liipfert et al $560,000 Barnett, Sivon & Natter $480,000 Akin, Gump et al $120,000 Ernst & Young $120,000 Baker & Hostetler $120,000 Thaxton, Richard R $90,000 Mayer, Brown et al $80,000 Campbell-Crane & Assoc $80,000 Franzel, Brent S $60,000 Barrett, Michael F Jr $60,000 Walker, Lynda K $50,000 Arter & Hadden $40,000 Heidepriem & Mager > $10,000* Rhoads Group $120,000 Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering $20,000 1999 TOTAL: $7,570,000 Citigroup Inc $5,080,000 Associates First Capital $300,000 Barnett, Sivon & Natter $500,000 Verner, Liipfert et al $480,000 Baker & Hostetler $240,000 Walker, Lynda K $180,000 Akin, Gump et al $160,000 Arter & Hadden $140,000 Franzel, Brent S $100,000 Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering $80,000 * Not included in totals Campbell-Crane & Assoc $60,000 Silbey, Franklin R $40,000 Thaxton, Richard R $40,000 Barrett, Michael F Jr $30,000 Heidepriem & Mager $20,000 Rhoads Group $120,000 Cleary, Gottlieb et al > $10,000* 1998 TOTAL: $9,135,000 Citigroup Inc $7,290,000 Verner, Liipfert et al $420,000 Barnett, Sivon & Natter $320,000 Arter & Hadden $260,000 Baker & Hostetler $260,000 Akin, Gump et al $180,000 Walker, Lynda K $80,000 Campbell-Crane & Assoc $60,000 Franzel, Brent S $40,000 Callister, Nebeker & McCullough $40,000 Thaxton, Richard R $35,000 Silbey, Fanklin R $20,000 Ely & Co $20,000 Barrett, Michael F Jr $20,000 Davis & Harman > $10,000* Heidepriem & Mager > $10,000* Biklen, Stephen C > $10,000* Alston & Bird $30,000 Cleary, Gottlieb et al $60,000 * Not included in totals Appendix 162 Citigroup Covered Official Lobbyists:242 Firm / Name of Lobbyist Covered Official Position Year(s) Angus & Nickerson Angus, Barbara Tax Counsel, Committee on Ways and Means 2005-2007 Nickerson, Gregory International Tax Counsel, Dept. of Treasury 2005-2007 Avenue Solutions Tejral, Amy Legislative Director, Senator Ben Nelson 2007 Baker & Hostetler Kennelly, Barbara Assoc. Commissioner - Social Securty Admin. 2001 Barnett, Sivon & Natter Barnett, Robert E. President (Attorney) 1999 Sivon, James C. VP/ Secretary (Attorney) 1999 Rivas, Jose S. Legislative/Regulatory Specialist 1999 Capitol Tax Partners Fant, William Deputy Asst. Secr (Treasury) for Legislative Afrs 2002-2008 Mikrut, Joseph Tax Legislative Counsel - US Treasury 2002-2008 Talisman, Johnathan Assistant Treasury Secretary for Tax Policy 2002-2008 Grafmeyer, Rick Deputy Chief of Staff - JCT 2002-2008 McKenney, William Chief of Staff - Rep. Amo Houghton 2002-2008 Willcox, Lawrence G. Staff Director, Senate Republican Policy Committee 2006-2008 Dennis, James Tax Counsel, Sen. Robb - Counsel, Sen. Bingaman 2008 Javens, Christopher Tax Counsel, Sen. Grassley, Sen. Finance Committee 2008 Cypress Advocacy Cave, J. Patrick Deputy Asst. Sec./Acting Asst. Sec, Treasury 2005-2007 242 Source: Senate Office of Public Records <http://soprweb.senate.gov/>. Accessed January 2009. Appendix 163 Ernst & Young Badger, Doug Chief of Staff, Office of Senator Nickles 2000-2002 Conklin, Brian Special Assistant to the President 2004 Federalist Group LLC Cave, J. Patrick Deputy Asst. Sec./ Acting Asst. Sec., Treasury 2003-2004 Dammann, Julie Chief of Staff, Senator Christopher S. Bond 2006 Sternhall, Alexander Deputy Staff Director, Sen. Banking Comm. 2008 Hogan & Hartson Kyle, Robert D. Associate Director, OMB 2001 Kilpatrick Stockton Dekeyser, Armand C/S Senator Jeff Sessions 2005-2006 King & Spalding LLP Clarkson, William Legislative Assistant, Sen. Susan Collins 2007-2008 Ogilvy Government Relations Dammann, Julie Chief of Staff, Senator Christopher S. Bond 2007-2008 PodestaMattoon Clark, Bill Executive Office of POTUS - Office of Personnel 2001 Tornquist, David Office of Management and Budget 2001 PriceWaterhouseCoopers Angus, Barbara Business Tax Counsel, JCT 1999-2000 Kies, Kenneth J. Chief of Staff, JCT 1999, 2000 Timmons & Co Shapiro, Daniel Deputy Cos - Office of Sen. Bill Nelson 2007-2008 Paone, Martin Secretary for the Majority, US Senate 2008 Appendix 164 Van Scoyoc Assoc Porterfield, Lendell Maj. Econ. US Committee on Banking 2002
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Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Corruption
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Woof, 9th Post;
116 Investment Banks: Bear Stearns Decade-long campaign contribution total (1998-2008): $6,355,737 Decade-long lobbying expenditure total (1998-2008): $9,550,000 Bear Stearns Campaign Contributions:219 2008 Top Recipients TOTAL: $1,241,290 1. Rudy Giuliani (R) $130,091 2. Hillary Clinton (D) $127,460 3. John McCain $98,200 4. Barack Obama (D) $60,503 5. Christopher Dodd (D) $48,700 6. Mitt Romney (R) $31,550 7. Nita Lowey (D) $12,200 8. Frank Lautenberg (D) $11,600 9. Paul Kanjorski (D) $7,500 9. Elizabeth Dole (R) $7,500 11. Charles Rangel (D) $7,300 12. John Edwards (D) $6,850 13. Kirsten Gillibrand (D) $6,600 14. Dick Durbin (D) $6,400 15. Steny Hoyer (D) $6,000 16. Bill Richardson (D) $5,250 17. Tim Johnson (D) $5,000 17. Spencer Bachus (R) $5,000 17. Barney Frank (D) $5,000 20. Christopher Shays (R) $4,800 219 Source: Center for Responsive Politics. Campaign contribution totals accessed February 2009. Individual recipient numbers do not include the 4th Quarter of 2008. 2006 Top Recipients TOTAL: $938,619 1. Chris Dodd (D) $67,850 2. Joe Lieberman (I) $49,610 3. Martha Rainville (R) $14,800 4. Hillary Clinton (D) $13,575 5. Deborah Pryce (R) $13,000 6. Spencer Bachus (R) $10,000 7. Rick Santorum (R) $8,700 8. Richard Baker (R) $7,500 8. Jim McCrery (R) $7,500 10. Paul Kanjorski (D) $6,500 11. Rudy Giuliani (R) $6,300 12. Christopher Shays (R) $6,165 13. Barney Frank (D) $5,500 13. Pete Sessions (R) $5,500 15. Evan Bayh (D) $5,000 15. Mike Crapo (RD) $5,000 15. Michael Oxley (R) $5,000 15. Bill Thomas (R) $5,000 15. Patrick Tiberi (R) $5,000 20. Mike Ferguson (R) $4,600 Appendix 117 2004 Top Recipients220 TOTAL: $1,458,005 1. George W Bush (R) $198,200 2. John Kerry (D) $65,400 3. Wesley Clark (D) $41,000 4. Rick Santorum (R) $20,500 5. Charles Schumer (D) $18,000 6. Richard Gephardt (D) $13,500 7. John Peterson (R) $12,000 8. Charles Wieder Dent (R) $11,080 9. Pete Sessions (R) $10,580 10. Lowey, Nita M (D) $10,000 11. Erskine Bowles (D) $8,080 12. Tom Daschle (D) $8,000 12. James DeMint (R) $8,000 12. John Thun, (R) $8,000 12. David Vitter (R) $8,000 16. Rahm Emanuel (D) $7,000 16. Luis Fortuno (3) $7,000 18. John Edwards (D) $6,250 19. Charles Boustany Jr (R) $6,080 20. Timothy Bishop (D) $5,500 2002 Top Recipients TOTAL: $661,838 1. Charles Schumer (D) $94,900 2. Christopher Dodd (D) $92,900 3. Chuck Grassley (R) $16,000 4. Jack reed (R) $13,000 5. Nita Lowey (D) $11,250 6. Jack Conway (D) $7,750 220 Based on highest 1,000 contributions and PAC money. 7. John Kerry (D) $7,000 8. Ron Kirk (D) $6,990 9. Tim Johnson (D) $6,000 9. Pete Domenici (R) $6,000 9. Michael Oxley (R) $6,000 9. Charles Rangel (D) $6,000 13. Artur Davis (D) $5,400 14. Denise Majette (D) $5,250 15. Paul Kanjorski (D) $5,000 16. Max Baucus (D) $4,500 16. Pat Toomey (R) $4,000 16. Bill Thomas (R) $4,000 19. Deborah Pryce (R) $3,500 20. Joe Biden (D) $3,250 2000 Top Recipients TOTAL: $1,243,379 1. Rick Lazio (R) $40,000 2. Jon Corzine (D) $23,250 3. Spencer Abraham (R) $18,500 4. Hillary Clinton (D) $15,500 5. Vito Fossella (R) $11,000 6. Al Gore (D) $10,000 7. Charles Schumer (D) $9,500 8. George W Bush $7,000 9. Charles Rangel (D) $5,811 10. Orrin Hatch (R) $5,500 10. David Lawther Johnson (D) $5,500 12. Edolphus Towns (D) $5,000 13. Tom Harkin (D) $3,000 13. Marge Roukema (R) $3,000 13. Howard Berman (D) $3,000 13. George Allen (R) $3,000 17. Richard Neal (D) $2,500 Appendix 118 18. Steve Forbes (R) $2,250 18. John McCain (R) $2,250 20. William Roth (R) $2,000 20. Trent Lott (R) $2,000 20. Rod Grams (R) $2,000 20. Robert Torricelli (D) $2,000 20. Richard Lugar (R) $2,000 20. Phil Gramm (R) $2,000 20. Phil Crane (R) $2,000 20. Paul Sarbanes (D) $2,000 20. Kent Conrad (D) $2,000 20. John Kerry (D) $2,000 20. Jim Maloney (D) $2,000 20. E Clay Shaw (R) $2,000 20. Deborah Pryce (R) $2,000 20. Dan Quayle (R) $2,000 20. Christopher Dodd (D) $2,000 20. Bill McCollum (R) $2,000 20. Amo Houghton (R) $2,000 1998 Top Recipients TOTAL: $812,606 1. Alfonse D'Amato (R) $38,950 2. Charles Rangel (D) $7,050 3. Blanche Lambert Lincoln (D) $7,000 3. John Edwards (D) $7,000 5. Tom Daschle (D) $6,250 6. Scotty Baesler (D) $6,000 7. Rick Lazio (R) $5,800 8. Evan Bayh (D) $5,000 9. John Breaux (D) $4,000 10. Carol Moseley-Braun (D) $3,000 10. John Kerry (D) $3,000 10. Newt Gingrich (R) $3,000 13. Rick White (R) $2,550 14. Jerry Weller (R) $2,500 15. Billy Tauzin (R) $2,050 15. Thomas Manton (D) $2,050 17. Amo Houghton (R) $2,000 17. Bob Graham (D) $2,000 17. Charles Grassley (R) $2,000 17. Christopher Bond (R) $2,000 17. Fritz Hollings (D) $2,000 17. Jerry Kleczka (D) $2,000 17. John Ensign (R) $2,000 17. John LaFalce (D) $2,000 17. Robert Bennett (R) $2,000 Appendix 119 Bear Stearns Lobbying Expenditures221: 2008 TOTAL: $460,000 Bear Stearns $420,000 Steptoe & Johnson $40,000 Venable LLP > $10,000* 2007 TOTAL: $1,120,000 Bear Stearns $900,000 Steptoe & Johnson $200,000 Venable LLP $20,000 2006 TOTAL: $1,200,000 Bear Stearns $780,000 Venable LLP $220,000 Steptoe & Johnson $160,000 Angus & Nickerson $40,000 2005 TOTAL: $820,000 Bear Stearns $540,000 Steptoe & Johnson $180,000 Venable LLP $60,000 Angus & Nickerson $40,000 221 Source: Center for Responsive Politics. Lobbying amounts accessed February 2009. * Not included in totals 2004 TOTAL: $900,000 Bear Stearns $680,000 Steptoe & Johnson $220,000 Venable LLP > $10,000* 2003 TOTAL: $920,000 Bear Stearns $620,000 Steptoe & Johnson $240,000 Venable LLP $60,000 2002 TOTAL: $800,000 Bear Stearns $520,000 Steptoe & Johnson $200,000 Venable LLP $80,000 2001 TOTAL: $960,000 Bear Stearns $640,000 Steptoe & Johnson $200,000 Venable LLP $80,000 O'Connor & Hannan $40,000 2000 TOTAL: $750,000 Bear Stearns $440,000 Steptoe & Johnson $190,000 O'Connor & Hannan $120,000 Appendix 120 1999 TOTAL: $760,000 Bear Stearns $500,000 Steptoe & Johnson $140,000 O'Connor & Hannan $120,000 1998 TOTAL: $860,000 Bear Stearns $560,000 Steptoe & Johnson $160,000 O'Connor & Hannan $140,000 Appendix 121 Bear Stearns Covered Official Lobbyists:222 Firm / Name of Lobbyist Covered Official Position Year(s) Bear Stearns Dombo III, Fred Counsel, Office of Congressman Michael Forbes 1999-2000 Venable LLP Olchyk, Sam Joint Committee on Taxation Staff 2004-2008 Beeman, E. Ray Legislative Counsel, Joint Committee on Taxation Staff 2006-2008 222 Source: Senate Office of Public Records <http://soprweb.senate.gov/>. Accessed January 2009. Appendix 122 Investment Banks: Goldman Sachs Decade-long campaign contribution total (1998-2008): $25,445,983 Decade-long lobbying expenditure total (1998-2008): $21,637,530 Goldman Sachs Campaign Contributions223 2008 Top Recipients TOTAL: $5,635,501 1. Barack Obama (D) $884,907 2. Hillary Clinton (D) $405,475 3. John McCain (R) $229,695 4. Mitt Romney (R) $229,675 5. Jim Himes (D) $140,448 6. Chris Dodd (D) $110,000 7. Rudy Giuliani (R) $109,450 8. John Edwards (D) $66,450 9. Arlen Specter (R) $47,600 10. Rahm Emanuel (D) $35,250 11. John Sununu (R) $31,400 12. Jack Reed (D) $30,100 13. Max Baucus (D) $26,000 14. Tom Harkin (D) $24,580 15. Frank Lautenberg (D) $24,100 16. Michael Peter Skelly (D) $23,364 17. Susan M Collins (R) $21,900 18. Mark Warner (D) $21,800 19. Mary L Landrieu (D) $20,700 20. Norm Coleman (R) $19,200 223 Source: Center for Responsive Politics. Campaign contribution totals accessed February 2009. Individual recipient numbers do not include the 4th Quarter of 2008. 2006 Top Recipients TOTAL: $3,502,866 1. Hillary Clinton (D) $138,570 2. Robert Menendez (D) $80,500 3. Harold E Ford Jr (D) $80,497 4. Evan Bayh (D) $52,750 5. Sherrod Brown (D) $42,600 6. Maria Cantwell (D) $39,800 7. Joe Lieberman (I) $33,950 8. Ben Cardin (D) $33,150 9. Kent Conrad (D) $30,600 10. Thomas H Kean Jr (R) $29,500 11. Rick Santorum (R) $27,000 12. Bill Nelson (D) $25,400 13. Sheldon Whitehouse (D) $24,600 14. Mike DeWine (R) $23,500 15. Eric Cantor (R) $23,300 16. Kay Bailey Hutchison (R) $22,500 17. Richard Baker (R) $22,400 18. Max Baucus (D) $21,900 19. Rahm Emanuel (D) $18,800 20. George Allen (R) $17,800 Appendix 123 2004 Top Recipients TOTAL: $6,426,438 1. George W Bush (R) $390,600 2. John Kerry (D) $303,250 3. Jack Ryan (R) $218,161 4. Tom Daschle (D) $143,500 5. John Edwards (D) $102,300 6. Evan Bayh (D) $72,000 7. Charles Schumer (D) $58,040 8. Chris Dodd (D) $58,000 8. Barack Obama (D) $58,000 10. Hillary Clinton (D) $55,000 11. Arlen Specter (R) $51,000 12. Erskine Bowles (D) $37,250 13. Tony Knowles (D) $34,050 14. Joe Lieberman (D) $34,000 15. Dylan C Glenn (R) $33,000 16. Wesley Clark (D) $32,500 17. Howard Dean (D) $30,500 18. Robert Menendez (D) $30,000 19. Richard Burr (R) $29,496 20. John McCain (R) $29,000 2002 Top Recipients TOTAL: $3,510,035 1. Charles Schumer (D) $124,550 2. Jon Corzine (D) $47,970 3. John Edwards (D) $41,000 4. Robert Torricelli (D) $34,750 5. Tom Strickland (D) $34,000 6. Arlen Specter (R) $30,000 7. Tim Johnson (D) $28,980 8. Erskine Bowles (D) $28,000 9. Max Baucus (D) $26,000 10. Tom Harkin (D) $21,355 11. Lamar Alexander (R) $20,500 12. John E Sununu (R) $20,250 13. Robert Menendez (D) $18,500 14. Jean Carnahan (D) $18,355 15. Max Cleland (D) $18,230 16. John Cornyn (R) $18,000 16. John Kerry (D) $18,000 18. Norm Coleman (R) $15,500 19. Saxby Chambliss (R) $15,250 20. Maria Cantwell (D) $14,250 2000 Top Recipients TOTAL: $4,432,977 1. Jon S Corzine (D) $554,900 2. Bill Bradley (D) $271,200 3. Rick A Lazio (R) $175,300 4. George W Bush (R) $137,499 5. Charles Schumer (D) $99,500 6. Al Gore (D) $95,050 7. Hillary Clinton (D) $88,170 8. John McCain (R) $67,320 9. Dick Zimmer (R) $53,200 10. Rudolph Giuliani (R) $40,000 11. Phil Gramm (R) $29,000 12. Rush Holt (D) $26,000 13. Frank Pallone Jr (D) $19,000 14. Nita M Lowey (D) $18,000 15. Brian David Schweitzer (D) $16,250 16. Dylan C Glenn (R) $15,500 17. Kay Bailey Hutchison (R) $15,000 17. Bill McCollum (R) $15,000 19. Eliot L Engel (D) $14,000 Appendix 124 19. Edolphus Towns (D) $14,000 1998 Top Recipients TOTAL: $1,938,166 1. Charles Schumer (D) $107,550 2. Alfonse D'Amato (R) $70,050 3. Evan Bayh (D) $33,500 4. Chris Dodd (D) $21,000 5. Bob Kerrey (D) $17,495 6. Shawn D Terry (R) $15,000 7. Rick A Lazio (R) $14,500 8. John Breaux (D) $14,158 9. Kay Bailey Hutchison (R) $14,000 10. Geraldine Ferraro (D) $11,750 11. Amo Houghton (R) $11,500 12. Check Hagel (R) $11,000 13. John McCain (R) $10,400 14. Daniel Patrick Moynihan (R) $10,000 15. Jay R Pritzker (D) $9,200 16. Arlen Specter (R) $9,000 17. Nita M Lowey (D) $8,500 18. Paul Coverdell (R) $8,375 19. Lauch Faircloth (R) $8,000 19. Bob Graham (D) $8,000 Appendix 125 Goldman Sachs Lobbying Expenditures224: 2008 TOTAL: $5,210,000 Goldman Sachs $3,280,000 Duberstein Group $400,000 ML Strategies $280,000 Baptista Group $270,000 Capitol Tax Partners $240,000 Williams & Jensen $160,000 Rich Feuer Group $130,000 Angus & Nickerson $120,000 RR&G $80,000 Bingham McCutchen LLP $50,000 Law Offices of John T O’Rourke $60,000 Sullivan & Cromwell $30,000 Vinson & Elkins $40,000 Mattox Woolfolk LLC > $10,000* Gephardt Group $70,000 2007 TOTAL: $4,610,000 Goldman Sachs $2,720,000 Baptista Group $280,000 Duberstein Group $260,000 Vinson & Elkins $160,000 ML Strategies $140,000 DLA Piper $140,000 Angus & Nickerson $120,000 Bigham McCutchen LLP $120,000 Rich Feuer Group $120,000 224 Source: Center for Responsive Politics. Lobbying amounts accessed February 2009. * Not included in totals Sullivan & Cromwell $120,000 RR&G $90,000 Williams & Jensen $80,000 Law Offices of John T O'Rourke $80,000 Maddox Strategies $60,000 Capitol Tax Partners $60,000 Clark & Weinstock $60,000 2006 TOTAL: $3,651,250 Goldman Sachs $2,620,000 Baptista Group $200,000 DLA Piper $160,000 Rich Feuer Group $120,000 Angus & Nickerson $120,000 RR&G $110,000 Duberstein Group $100,000 Law Offices of John T O'Rourke $81,250 Vinson & Elkins $80,000 Williams & Jensen $60,000 Clark & Assoc > $10,000* 2005 TOTAL: $1,712,000 Goldman Sachs $600,000 Clark Consulting Federal Policy Group $140,000 Vinson & Elkins $140,000 Thelen, Reid & Priest $120,000 Law Offices of John T O'Rourke $102,000 Rich Feuer Group $100,000 * Not included in totals Appendix 126 DCI Group $100,000 Mattox Woolfolk LLC $90,000 Duberstein Group $80,000 Angus & Nickerson $80,000 Clark & Assoc $80,000 Williams & Jensen $80,000 2004 TOTAL: $1,230,000 Clark & Assoc $60,000 Clark Consulting Federal Policy Group $260,000 DCI Group $100,000 Duberstein Group $40,000 Law Offices of John T O'Rourke $200,000 Mattox Woolfolk LLC $90,000 Rich Feuer Group $60,000 Thelen, Reid & Priest $240,000 Vinson & Elkins $160,000 Williams & Jensen $20,000 2003 TOTAL: $1,030,000 Clark & Assoc $100,000 Clark Consulting Federal Policy Group $240,000 Duberstein Group $80,000 Law Offices of John T O'Rourke $80,000 Mattox Woolfolk LLC $70,000 Thelen, Reid & Priest $240,000 Vinson & Elkins $100,000 Williams & Jensen $40,000 Wilmer, Culter & Pickering $60,000 Winning Strategies Wash. $20,000 2002 TOTAL: $910,000 Clark & Assoc. > $10,000* Clark Consulting Federal Policy Group $200,000 Duberstein Group $220,000 Johnson, Madigan et al $120,000 Law Offices of John T O'Rourke $110,000 PriceWaterhouseCoopers $40,000 Sullivan & Cromwell > $10,000* Verner, Liipfert et al $40,000 Vinson & Elkins $120,000 Williams & Jensen $20,000 Winning Strategies Washington $40,000 2001 TOTAL: $810,000 Duberstein Group $100,000 Johnson, Madigan et al $80,000 Law Offices of John T O'Rourke $30,000 PriceWaterhouseCoopers $240,000 Verner, Liipfert et al $260,000 Vinson & Elkins $100,000 2000 TOTAL: $500,000 Duberstein Group $80,000 Law Offices of John T O'Rourke $40,000 Morgan, Lewis & Bockius $20,000 PriceWaterhouseCoopers $240,000 Verner, Liipfert et al $40,000 * Not included in totals Appendix 127 Vinson & Elkins $80,000 1999 TOTAL: $1,264,000 Duberstein Group $140,000 Law Offices of John T O'Rourke $32,000 Morgan, Lewis & Bockius > $10,000* PriceWaterhouseCoopers $240,000 Sullivan & Cromwell > $10,000* Verner, Liipfert et al $60,000 Vinson & Elkins $160,000 1998 TOTAL: $710,280 Duberstein Group $140,000 Law Offices of John T O'Rourke $115,000 PriceWaterhouseCoopers > $10,000* Sullivan & Cromwell > $10,000* Verner, Liipfert et al $80,000 Vinson & Elkins $120,000 Washington Counsel $40,000 * Not included in totals Appendix 128 Goldman Sachs Covered Official Lobbyists:225 Firm / Name of Lobbyist Covered Official Position Year(s) PriceWaterhouseCoopers Angus, Barbara Business Tax Counsel, Committee on Taxation 1999- 2000 Kies, Kenneth Chief of Staff, Committee on Taxation 1999- 2000 Hanford, Tim Tax Counsel, Counsel on Ways and Means 2001 Verner, Liipfert et al Hawley, Noelle M. Legislative Director, Rep. Bill Archer 1999 Jones, Brian C. Investigator, Perm. Subcommittee on Investigations 2002 Madigan, Johnson et al English, James Staff Director, Senate Appropriations, Min Staff 2001- 2002 Griffin, Patrick J. Director of Legal Affairs, White House 2001- 2002 Winning Strategies Washington Mullins, Donna Chief of Staff, Rep. Frelinghuysen 2002-2003 Angus & Nickerson Angus, Barbara Tax Counsel, Committee on Ways and Means 2005-2008, Nickerson, Gregory International Tax Counsel, Dept. of Treasury 2005- 2008 Capitol Tax Partners LLP Talisman, Johnathan Assistant Treasury Secretary for Tax Policy 2008 Grafmeyer, Richard Deputy Chief of Staff, JCT 2008 Mikrut, Joseph Tax Legislative Counsel - US Treasury 2008 McKenney, William Staff Director, Ways and Means Over Subcommittee 2008 225 Source: Senate Office of Public Records <http://soprweb.senate.gov/>. Accessed January 2009. Appendix 129 Wilcox, Lawrence Staff Director, Senate Republican Policy Committee 2008 Dennis, James Tax Counsel, Sen. Robb - Counsel, Sen Bingaman 2008 Javens, Christopher Tax Counsel, Sen. Grassley, Senate Finance Committee 2008 The Goldman Sachs Group. Inc Connolly, Ken S.A. Director of Office of Environmental Policy; LD, 2008 Sen. Jeffords; LD, CEPW Shirzad, Faryar Dept. Nat’l Security Adv. For Int’l Econ. Affairs 2008 Appendix 130 Investment Banks: Lehman Brothers Decade-long campaign contribution total (1998-2008): $6,704,574 Decade-long lobbying expenditure total (1998-2008): $8,660,000 Lehman Campaign Contributions:226 2008 Top Recipients227 TOTAL: $2,211,761 1. Barack Obama (D) $288,538 2. Hillary Clinton (D) $227,150 3. Rudy Giuliani (R) $140,000 4. John McCain (R) $116,907 5. Mitt Romney (R) $96,200 6. Chris Dodd (D) $31,400 7. Rahm Emanuel (D) $23,000 8. Jack Reed (D) $21,600 9. Joseph Biden Jr (D) $21,100 10. John Edwards (D) $20,400 11. Bill Richardson (D) $13,800 12. Charles Rangel (D) $11,900 13. Steny Hoyer (D) $9,300 14. Jim Himes (D) $8,100 15. Mark Warner (D) $7,600 16. Lee Terry (R) $7,100 17. Steve Israel (D) $6,600 18. Jerrold Nadler (D) $5,600 19. Norm Coleman (R) $5,300 226 Source: Center for Responsive Politics. Campaign contribution totals accessed February 2009. Individual recipient numbers do not include the 4th Quarter of 2008. 227 Based on highest 1,000 contributions plus PAC money. 19. Arlen Specter (R) $5,300 2006 Top Recipients TOTAL: $917,414 1. Joe Lieberman (I) $82,900 2. Hillary Clinton (D) $54,190 3. Pete Ricketts (R) $13,600 4. Rick Santorum (R) $10,500 5. Harold Ford Jr (D) $9,600 6. Frank Lautenberg (D) $9,000 7. Robert Menendez (D) $8,900 8. Bill Nelson (D) $7,300 9. Ron Klein (D) $6,800 10. Rudy Giuliani (R) $6,300 11. Mike Crapo (R) $5,300 12. Dianne Feinstein (D) $5,100 13. Michael Oxley (R) $5,000 13. Orrin Hatch (R) $5,000 13. Dennis Hastert (R) $5,000 13. Barney Frank (D) $5,000 13. Vito Fossella (R-NY) $5,000 18. Claire McCaskill (D) $4,500 18. Jon Kyl (R) $4,500 18. Richard Baker (R) $4,500 Appendix 131 2004 Top Recipients TOTAL: $1,985,718 1. George Bush (R) $237,650 2. John Kerry (D) $92,312 3. Chris Dodd (D) $55,000 4. Joe Lieberman (D) $35,950 5. Charles Schumer (D) $35,250 6. Wesley Clark (D) $28,500 7. Richard Gephardt (D) $19,500 8. John Edwards (D) $18,650 9. Tom Daschle (D) $16,970 10. Erskine Bowles (D) $10,000 10. Nancy Pelosi (D) $10,000 12. Barack Obama (D) $9,062 13. John Spratt Jr (D) $9,000 14. Arlen Specter (R) $8,812 15. Mel Martinez (R) $8,500 16. Alcee Hastings (D) $7,500 17. Richard Baker (R) $7,000 17. James Stork (D) $7,000 19. Joseph Edward Driscoll (D) $6,500 20. Judd Gregg (R) $6,000 2002 Top Recipients TOTAL: $231,970228 1. Charles Schumer (D) $14,500 2. Robert Torricelli (D) $14,250 3. Max Baucus (D) $11,000 4. Michael Castle (R) $10,000 4. Michael Oxley (R) $10,000 6. Tom Strickland (D) $8,000 7. Max Cleland (D) $7,000 8. Dan Wofford (D) $5,550 228 Based only on campaign contributions 9. Richard Baker (R) $5,000 9. Billy Tauzin (R) $5,000 11. Lamar Alexander (R) $4,000 11. Erskine Bowles (D) $4,000 11. Nita Lowey (D) $4,000 14. Timothy Carden (D) $3,250 14. Ron Kirk (D) $3,250 16. Rick Boucher (D) $3,000 16. Chris Dodd (D) $3,000 16. Vito Fossella (R) $3,000 16. Tom Harkin (D) $3,000 16. Dennis Hastert (R) $3,000 16. Amo Houghton (R) $3,000 16. Tim Johnson (D) $3,000 16. Mary Landrieu (D) $3,000 16. Carolyn Maloney (D) $3,000 16. Jay Rockefeller (D) $3,000 16. John Spratt Jr (D) $3,000 2000 Top Recipients TOTAL: $929,780 1. Bill Bradley (D) $51,800 2. Brendan Thomas Byrne Jr (D) $31,300 3. Jon Corzine (D) $20,200 4. Rick Lazio (R) $19,750 5. George W Bush (R) $11,000 6. Hillary Clinton (D) $10,550 7. Dianne Feinstein (D) $10,500 8. Charles Schumer (D) $10,000 9. Michael Oxley (R) $9,250 10. William Roth Jr (R) $9,000 11. Michael Castle (R) $8,000 11. Chris Dodd (D) $8,000 13. Spencer Abraham (R) $6,000 Appendix 132 13. Bob Kerrey (D) $6,000 15. Dennis Hastert (R) $5,500 16. Charles Rangel (D) $4,500 16. Edolphus Towns (D) $4,500 18. Richard Lugar (R) $4,000 19. Rick Boucher (D) $3,500 19. Rod Grams (R) $3,500 19. Joe Lieberman (D) $3,500 1998 Top Recipients TOTAL: $427,931 1. Charles Schumer (D) $10,200 2. Chris Dodd (D) $9,500 3. Tom Daschle (D) $7,500 4. Alfonse D'Amato (R) $7,400 5. Rick Lazio (R) $6,000 6. Charles Rangel (D) $5,500 7. Brendan Thomas Byrne Jr (D) $5,000 8. John Breaux (D) $4,000 9. Bob Kerrey (D) $3,500 10. Christopher Bond (R) $3,000 11. Rick White (R) $2,550 11. Jerry Weller (R) $2,500 13. Thomas Manton (D) $2,050 13. Billy Tauzin (R) $2,050 15. Robert Bennett (R) $2,000 15. John Ensign (R) $2,000 15. Newt Gingrich (R) $2,000 15. Bob Graham (D) $2,000 15. Fritz Hollings (D) $2,000 15. Amo Houghton (R) $2,000 15. Jerry Kleczka (D) $2,000 15. John LaFalce (D) $2,000 Appendix 133 Lehman Lobbying Expenditures:229 2008 TOTAL: $720,000 Lehman Brothers $590,000 O'Neill, Athy & Casey $60,000 DLA Piper $70,000 2007 TOTAL: $840,000 Lehman Brothers $720,000 O'Neill, Athy & Casey $80,000 DLA Piper $40,000 2006 TOTAL: $1,140,000 Lehman Brothers $920,000 American Continental Group $100,000 O'Neill, Athy & Casey $80,000 DLA Piper $40,000 2005 TOTAL: $1,080,000 Lehman Brothers $820,000 American Continental Group $140,000 O'Neill, Athy & Casey $80,000 DLA Piper $40,000 229 Source: Center for Responsive Politics. Lobbying amounts accessed February 2009. 2004 TOTAL: $740,000 Lehman Brothers $620,000 O'Neill, Athy & Casey $80,000 Piper Rudnick LLP $40,000 2003 TOTAL: $660,000 Lehman Brothers $540,000 O'Neill, Athy & Casey $80,000 Piper Rudnick LLP $40,000 2002 TOTAL: $660,000 Lehman Brothers $540,000 O'Neill, Athy & Casey $80,000 Verner, Liipfert et al $40,000 Piper Rudnick LLP > $10,000* 2001 TOTAL: $600,000 Lehman Brothers $320,000 Verner, Liipfert et al $200,000 O'Neill, Athy & Casey $80,000 2000 TOTAL: $560,000 Lehman Brothers $280,000 Verner, Liipfert et al $200,000 O'Neill, Athy & Casey $80,000 * Not included in totals Appendix 134 1999 TOTAL: $860,000 Lehman Brothers $580,000 Verner, Liipfert et al $200,000 O'Neill, Athy & Casey $80,000 1998 TOTAL: $800,000 Lehman Brothers $560,000 Verner, Liipfert et al $140,000 O'Neill, Athy & Casey $80,000 Palmetto Group $20,000 Appendix 135 Lehman Covered Official Lobbyists:230 Firm / Name of Lobbyist Covered Official Position Year(s) Verner, Liipfert et al Hawley, Noelle M. Legislative Director, Rep. Bill Archer 1999-2001 Krasow, Cristina L. Sr. Cloakroom Asst., Sen. Dem. Cloakroom 1999-2000 230 Source: Senate Office of Public Records <http://soprweb.senate.gov/>. Accessed January 2009. Appendix 136 Investment Banks: Merrill Lynch Decade-long campaign contribution total (1998-2008): $9,977,724 Decade-long lobbying expenditure total (1998-2008): $59,076,760 Merrill Lynch Campaign Contributions:231 2008 Top Recipients TOTAL: $2,780,347 1. John McCain (R) $360,620 2. Barack Obama (D) $264,720 3. Rudy Giuliani (R) $210,275 4. Hillary Clinton (D) $202,568 5. Mitt Romney (R) $172,025 6. Chris Dodd (D) $67,300 7. Mitch McConnell (R) $31,600 8. Mark Pryor (D) $23,900 9. Debbie Stabenow (D) $23,850 10. Rahm Emanuel (D) $20,800 11. John Edwards (D) $19,075 12. Max Baucus (D) $17,800 13. Joseph Biden (D) $15,900 14. Christopher Shays (R) $14,675 15. Jack Reed (D) $10,500 16. Linda Ketner (D) $10,200 17. Chuck Hagel (R) $10,000 18. Gregory Meeks (D) $9,600 19. Tim Ryan (D) $9,200 20. Ron Paul (R) $9,001 231 Source: Center for Responsive Politics. Campaign contribution totals accessed February 2009. Individual recipient numbers do not include the 4th Quarter of 2008. 2006 Top Recipients TOTAL: $1,153,733 1. Chris Dodd (D) $61,650 2. Harold E Ford Jr (D) $50,450 3. Hillary Clinton (D) $49,510 4. Bob Corker (R) $33,900 5. Mike DeWine (R) $30,000 6. Robert Menendez $28,450 7. Ben Nelson (D) $18,200 8. Chuck Hagel (R) $17,300 9. Rick Santorum (R) $16,800 10. George Allen (R) $14,050 11. Mike Ferguson (R) $12,400 12. Jim Matheson (D) $11,500 13. Christopher Shays (R) $10,450 14. Joe Lieberman (/I) $10,400 15. Sheldon Whitehouse (D) $10,200 16. Thomas Kean Jr (R) $10,150 17. Michael McGavick (R) $9,900 18. Ed Royce (R) $9,000 19. Geoff Davis (R) $8,700 20. David Dreier (R) $8,300 Appendix 137 2004 Top Recipients TOTAL: $2,187,763 1. George W Bush (R) $580,004 2. David M Beasley (R) $118,500 3. John Kerry (D) $111,526 4. Charles Schumer (D) $50,250 5. Scott Paterno (R) $41,000 6. Arlen Specter (R) $29,600 7. Joe Lieberman (D) $27,900 8. Barack Obama (D) $21,000 9. Rick Santorum (R) $17,500 10. Tom Daschle (D) $13,000 11. Wesley Clark (D) $11,750 12. Richard C Shelby (R) $11,000 13. Howard Dean (D) $10,400 14. Christopher s 'Kit' Bond (R) $9,000 15. Christopher Shays (R) $8,200 16. Jay Helvey (R) $8,150 17. Christopher Cox (R) $7,675 18. Jim Bunning (R) $7,500 19. Lamar Alexander (R) $7,000 20. Michael R Turner (R) $6,750 2002 Top Recipients TOTAL: $955,306 1. Charles Schumer (D) $76,750 2. Robert Torricelli (D) $13,500 3. Erskine Bowles (D) $12,000 4. Arlen Specter (R) $10,700 5. Lamar Alexander (R) $9,750 6. Elizabeth Dole (R) $9,200 7. Christopher Shays (R) $9,000 8. John Kerry (D) $7,250 9. Douglas Forrester (R) $6,750 10. Chellie Pingree (D) $6,250 11. Wayne Allard (R) $6,000 11. Hillary Clinton (D) $6,000 13. Rob Simmons (R) $5,500 14. Suzanne Terrell (R) $5,000 15. James M Talent (R) $4,700 16. David Howard Fink (D) $4,500 17. Jim Marshall (D) $4,250 17. Tom Strickland (D) $4,250 19. Max Baucus (D) $4,200 19. Norm Coleman (R) $4,200 2000 Top Recipients TOTAL: $1,873,044 1. George W Bush (R) $132,425 2. Bill Bradley (D) $87,780 3. John McCain (R) $69,400 4. Rick A Lazio (R) $63,550 5. Al Gore (D) $28,500 6. Jon S Corzine (D) $24,250 7. Hillary Clinton (D) $22,925 8. Charles Schumer (D) $20,000 9. Spencer Abraham (R) $19,000 10. Phil Gramm (R) $17,000 11. Rudy Giuliani (R) $15,350 12. Dick Zimmer (R) $14,000 13. George Allen (R) $10,242 14. Orrin Hatch (R) $8,750 15. William Gormley (R) $8,500 16. Kent Conrad (D) $8,000 17. William Roth Jr (R) $7,250 18. Joe Lieberman (D) $7,000 18. Paul S Sarbanes (D) $7,000 Appendix 138 18. Robert Torricelli (D) $7,000 1998 Top Recipients TOTAL: $1,027,531 1. Alfonse D'Amato (R) $53,200 2. Charles Schumer (D) $31,150 3. Carol Moseley Braun (D) $17,750 4. Bob Kerrey (D) $16,000 5. Chris Dodd (D) $14,250 6. Geraldine Ferraro (D) $10,500 7. Lauch Faircloth (R) $10,400 8. Evan Bayh (D) $10,300 9. Daniel Patrick Moynihan (R) $10,000 10. James M Casso (D) $9,000 10. Paul Coverdell (R) $9,000 12. Tom Daschle (D) $7,450 13. Gary A Franks (R) $6,750 13. Christopher Shays (R) $6,750 15. Spencer Abraham (R) $6,500 15. Michael Coles (D) $6,500 17. Ben Nighthorse Campbell (R) $6,000 18. David Wu (D) $5,750 19. Matt Fong (R) $5,500 19. Ellen Tauscher (D) $5,500 Appendix 139 Merrill Lynch Lobbying Expenditures:232 2008 TOTAL: $6,174,000 Merrill Lynch $4,700,000 Ernst & Young $604,000 Johnson, Madigan et al $240,000 Mayer, Brown et al $150,000 DLA Piper $210,000 Brownstein, Hyatt et al $120,000 Davis & Harman $80,000 Baptista Group $60,000 John Kelly Consulting $10,000 2007 TOTAL: $6,000,000 Merrill Lynch $4,420,000 Ernst & Young $600,000 DLA Piper $340,000 Mayer, Brown et al $160,000 Brownstein, Hyatt et al $120,000 Davis & Harman $120,000 Baptista Group $80,000 James E Boland Jr $80,000 John Kelly Consulting $80,000 2006 TOTAL: $6,397,760 Merrill Lynch $3,952,760 Mayer, Brown et al $1,100,000 Ernst & Young $605,000 DLA Piper $300,000 Davis & Harman $140,000 232 Source: Center for Responsive Politics. Lobbying amounts accessed February 2009. Brownstein, Hyatt et al $120,000 James E Boland Jr $80,000 John Kelly Consulting $80,000 Baptista Group $20,000 2005 TOTAL: $5,480,000 Merrill Lynch $4,160,000 Ernst & Young $600,000 DLA Piper $200,000 Brownstein, Hyatt et al $140,000 Davis & Harman $140,000 Deloitte Tax $120,000 James E Boland Jr $80,000 John Kelly Consulting $40,000 Seward & Kissel > $10,000* 2004 TOTAL: $5,770,000 Merrill Lynch $4,210,000 Ernst & Young $600,000 Piper Rudnick LLP $380,000 Deloitte Tax $240,000 Brownstein, Hyatt et al $140,000 Davis & Harman $120,000 James E Boland Jr $80,000 Seward & Kissel > $10,000* 2003 TOTAL: $4,825,000 Merrill Lynch $3,300,000 Ernst & Young $600,000 * Not included in totals Appendix 140 Piper Rudnick LLP $460,000 Deloitte Tax $240,000 Davis & Harman $140,000 James E Boland Jr $65,000 Brownstein, Hyatt et al $20,000 Seward & Kissel > $10,000* 2002 TOTAL: $4,960,000 Merrill Lynch $3,100,000 Ernst & Young $600,000 Verner, Liipfert et al $580,000 Piper Rudnick LLP $320,000 Davis & Harman $160,000 James E Boland Jr $80,000 Seward & Kissel $60,000 Deloitte & Touche $40,000 Capitol Tax Partners $20,000 2001 TOTAL: $4,160,000 Merrill Lynch $2,940,000 Ernst & Young $620,000 Verner, Liipfert et al $300,000 Davis & Harman $140,000 OB-C Group $80,000 James E Boland Jr $60,000 Seward & Kissel $20,000 2000 TOTAL: $4,400,000 Merrill Lynch $3,660,000 * Not included in totals Verner, Liipfert et al $240,000 Davis & Harman $200,000 OB-C Group $160,000 Ernst & Young $140,000 Swidler, Berlin et al > $10,000* Wilmer, Culter & Pickering > $10,000* 1999 TOTAL: $5,400,000 Merrill Lynch $3,580,000 Ernst & Young $600,000 Swidler, Berlin et al $460,000 Verner, Liipfert et al $300,000 Davis & Harman $200,000 Rhoads Group $180,000 Seward & Kissel $40,000 George C Tagg $40,000 OB-C Group > $10,000* 1998 TOTAL: $5,510,000 Merrill Lynch $3,800,000 Washington Counsel $480,000 Swidler, Berlin et al $300,000 Verner, Liipfert et al $260,000 Rhoads Group $200,000 OB-C Group $160,000 Davis & Harman $160,000 Seward & Kissell $100,000 George C Tagg $50,000 * Not included in totals Appendix 141 Merrill Lynch Covered Official Lobbyists:233 Firm / Name of Lobbyist Covered Official Position Year(s) Ernst & Young Badger, Doug Chief of Staff, Senate Majority Whip 12/98 1999-2002 Giordano, Nick Minority Chief, Tax Counsel, Senate Committee on Finance 1999-2000 2003-2008 Conklin, Brian Special Assistant to the President 2004 Merrill Lynch & Co, Inc Thompson Jr, Bruce E. Vice President, Director of Government Relations 1999-2008 Kelly, John F. Vice President, Government Relations 1999-2005 Costantino Jr, Louis A. Director, Government Relations 2003-2008 Goldstein, Lon N. Director, Government Relations 2008 Micali, Mark A. Director, Government Relations 2008 Thibau, Janelle C. M. Director, Government Relations 2007-2008 Berry, Steven K. Managing Director, Government Relations 2008 Verner, Liipfert et al Krasow, Cristina L. Sr. Cloakroom Assistant, Sen. Dem. Cloakroom 1999 Hyland, James E. Legislative Director, Senator Kay Bailey 2003 Hutchison OB-C Group Calio, Nicholas E. Assistant to the President 2000-2005 Capitol Tax Partners, LLP Fant, William Dep. Asst. Secretary for Legislative Affairs - Treasury 2002 Mikrut, Joseph Tax Legislative Counsel - US Treasury 2002 Talisman, Johnathan Asst. Treasury Secretary for Tax Policy 2002 233 Source: Senate Office of Public Records <http://soprweb.senate.gov/>. Accessed January 2009. Appendix 142 Piper Rudnick, LLP Hyland, James E. Legislative Director, Senator Hutchison 2002-2004 Brownstein Hyatt & Farber, P.C. Mottur, Alfred Sr. Telecommunications Counsel - Commerce Committee 2003-2008 Chube, Ellen Sr. Legislative Asst. - Cong. Harold Ford, Jr. Whonder, Carmencita Staff Director - Subcommittee on House Transport and 2008 Commercial Development; Min Stf Dir - Subcomm on Econ. Policy; Legislative Corresp. - Office of Sen. Charles Schumer Johnson, Madigan et al Murphy, Sheila LD, Senator Klobuchar 2008
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Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Corruption
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Woof, 8th Post 98 SOLD OUT Part II: Wall Street’s Washington Investment SOLD OUT 99 Wall Street’s Campaign Contributions and Lobbyist Expenditures The financial sector invested more than $5 billion in political influence purchasing in the United States over the last decade. The entire financial sector (finance, insurance, real estate) drowned political candidates in campaign contributions, spending more than $1.738 billion in federal elections from 1998-2008. Primarily reflecting the balance of power over the decade, about 55 percent went to Republicans and 45 percent to Democrats. Democrats took just more than half of the financial sector’s 2008 election cycle contributions. The industry spent even more — topping $3.3 billion — on officially registered lobbyists during the same period. This total certainly underestimates by a considerable amount what the industry spent to influence policymaking. U.S. reporting rules require that lobby firms and individual lobbyists disclose how much they have been paid for lobbying activity, but lobbying activity is defined to include direct contacts with key government officials, or work in preparation for meeting with key government officials. Public relations efforts and various kinds of indirect lobbying are not covered by the reporting rules. During the decade-long period: • Commercial banks spent more than $154 million on campaign contributions, while investing $383 million in officially registered lobbying; • Accounting firms spent $81 million on campaign contributions and $122 million on lobbying; • Insurance companies donated more than $220 million and spent more than $1.1 billion on lobbying; and • Securities firms invested more than $512 million in campaign contributions, and an additional nearly $600 million in lobbying. Hedge funds, a subcategory of the securities industry, spent $34 million on campaign contributions (about half in the 2008 election cycle); and $20 million on lobbying. Private equity firms, a subcategory of the securities industry, contributed $58 million to federal candidates and spent $43 million on lobbying. Individual firms spent tens of millions of dollars each. During the decade-long period: • Goldman Sachs spent more than $46 million on political influence buying; • Merrill Lynch spent more than $68 million; 100 SOLD OUT • Citigroup spent more than $108 million; • Bank of America devoted more than $39 million; • JPMorgan Chase invested more than $65 million; and • Accounting giants Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG and Pricewaterhouse spent, respectively, $32 million, $37 million, $27 million and $55 million. The number of people working to advance the financial sector’s political objectives is startling. In 2007,211 the financial sector employed a staggering 2,996 separate lobbyists to influence federal policy making, more than five for each Member of Congress. This figure only counts officially registered lobbyists. That means it does not count those who offered “strategic advice” or helped mount policy-related PR campaigns for financial sector companies. The figure counts those lobbying at the federal level; it does not take into account lobbyists at state houses across the country. To be clear, the 2,996 figure represents the number of separate individuals employed by the financial sector as lobbyists in 2007. We do not double count individuals who lobby for more than one company; the total number of financial sector lobby hires in 2007 was a 211 We chose 2007 as the most recent year for which full data was available at the time we conducted our research. whopping 6,738. Within the financial sector, industry groups deployed legions of lobbyists. In 2007:212 • Accounting firms employed 178 lobbyists; • Insurance companies had 1,219 lobbyists working for them; • Real estate interests hired 1,142 lobbyists; • Finance and credit companies employed 415 lobbyists; • Credit unions maintained 96 lobbyists; • Commercial banks employed 421 lobbyists; • Securities and investment firms maintained 1,023 lobbyists; and • Miscellaneous other financial companies employed 134 lobbyists. A great many of those lobbyists entered and exited through the revolving door connecting the lobbying world with government. Surveying only 20 leading firms in the financial sector (none from the insurance industry or real estate), we found that 142 212 These figures do not double count within the industry group, but total more than the figure for the entire financial sector because we did not eliminate overlaps between industry sectors. Thus, for these totals, if John Smith works as a lobbyist for two accounting firms, he counts as only one lobbyist for the accounting industry. If he works as a lobbyist for an accounting firm and an insurance company, he counts as one for the accounting industry and one for the insurance industry. SOLD OUT 101 industry lobbyists during the period 1998- 2008 had formerly worked as “covered officials” in the government. “Covered officials” are top officials in the executive branch (most political appointees, from members of the cabinet to directors of bureaus embedded in agencies), Members of Congress, and congressional staff. Nothing evidences the revolving door — or Wall Street’s direct influence over policymaking — more than the stream of Goldman Sachs expatriates who left the Wall Street goliath, spun through the revolving door, and emerged to hold top regulatory positions. Topping the list, of course, are former Treasury Secretaries Robert Rubin and Henry Paulson, both of whom had served as chair of Goldman Sachs before entering government. In the charts that follow in this part, we detail campaign contributions and lobby expenditures from 1998-2008 for the overall financial sector and for the industry components of the sector. We also provide aggregated information on number of industry lobbyists and number of industry lobbyists circling through the revolving door. In the appendix to this report, we provide extensive information on the campaign contributions and lobbyists of 20 leading companies in the financial sector — five each from commercial banking, securities, accounting and hedge fund industries. For each profiled company, we identify the top 20 recipients of their campaign contributions for each election cycle over the last decade; the lobby firms they employed each year, and the amount paid to those firms; and covered official lobbyists they employed (i.e., lobbyists formerly employed as top officials in the executive branch, or as former Members of Congress or congressional staff). Methodological Note Our information on campaign contributions and lobby expenditures comes from mandated public filings, and the enormously helpful data provided by the Center for Responsive Politics. Our figures on total and annual sector, industry and firm campaign contributions and lobby expenditures are drawn from the Center for Responsive Politics. Our campaign contribution data is organized by biannual Congressional election cycles. Thus the total for 1998 also includes contributions made in 1997. Our data on total number of official lobbyists is compiled from data prepared by the Center for Responsive Politics. The Center for Responsive Politics lobbyist database lists all individual lobbyists reporting to the Senate Office of Public Records. We tallied up totals from that database. Our data on number of covered official 102 SOLD OUT lobbyists is drawn from the original disclosure statements filed with the Senate Office of Public Records. Our listing of the top 20 biannual recipients of campaign contributions from our 20 profiled firms uses data compiled from the Center for Responsive Politics where possible. In four cases where the Center had not compiled the data, we compiled the information using the Center’s raw data on individual campaign contributors and information on the company’s political action committee (PAC) contributions. That is, we tracked donations from every person with, for example, Lehman Brothers as an employer, 213 compiled them into a database; added in the Lehman Brothers PAC contributions; and then list the top 20 recipients. We compiled donations for Lehman Brothers, Wachovia, Wells Fargo and KPMG. 213 Our compilation is based only on the top 1,000 largest contributors affiliated with each company. SOLD OUT 103 Financial Sector Campaign Contributions and Lobbying Expenditures Finance, Insurance, Real Estate $5,178,835,253 Decade-long campaign contribution total (1998-2008): $1,738,284,032 Decade-long lobbying expenditure total (1998-2008): $3,440,551,221 Campaign Contributions 2008 $442,535,157 2006 $259,023,355 2004 $339,840,847 2002 $233,156,722 2000 $308,638,091 1998 $155,089,860 Lobbying Expenditures 2008 $454,879,133 2007 $417,401,740 2006 $374,698,174 2005 $371,576,173 2004 $338,173,874 2003 $324,865,802 2002 $268,886,799 2001 $235,129,868 2000 $231,218,026 1999 $213,921,725 1998 $209,799,907 Source: Center for Responsive Politics, < www.opensecrets.org>. 104 SOLD OUT Financial Sector Official Lobbyists Finance, Insurance, Real Estate 2007 total official lobbyists for financial sector: 2,996 Covered official lobbyists for 20 profiled firms, Decade-long total (1998-2008): 142 Source: Center for Responsive Politics, < www.opensecrets.org>. SOLD OUT 105 Securities Firms Decade-long campaign contribution industry total (1998-2008): $512,816,632 Decade-long lobbying expenditure industry total (1998-2008): $599,955,649 Campaign Contributions for 5 Leading Firms Bear Stearns $6,355,737 Goldman Sachs $25,445,983 Lehman Brothers $6,704,574 Merrill Lynch $9,977,724 Morgan Stanley $14,367,857 Lobbying Expenditures for 5 Leading Firms Bear Stearns $9,550,000 Goldman Sachs $21,637,530 Lehman Brothers $8,660,000 Merrill Lynch $59,076,760 Morgan Stanley $20,835,000 Source: Center for Responsive Politics, < www.opensecrets.org>. 106 SOLD OUT Commercial Banks Decade-long campaign contribution industry total (1998-2008): $154,868,392 Decade-long lobbying expenditure industry total (1998-2008): $382,943,342 Campaign Contributions for 5 Leading Firms Bank of America $11,629,260 Citigroup $19,778,382 JP Morgan Chase & Co $15,714,953 Wachovia Corp. $3,946,727 Wells Fargo $5,330,022 Lobbying Expenditures for 5 Leading Firms Bank of America $28,635,440 Citigroup $88,460,000 JP Morgan Chase & Co $49,372,915 Wachovia Corp. $11,996,752 Wells Fargo $16,637,740 Source: Center for Responsive Politics, < www.opensecrets.org>. SOLD OUT 107 Hedge Funds* Decade-long campaign contribution industry total (1998-2008): $33,742,815 Decade-long lobbying expenditure industry total (1998-2008): $20,252,000 Campaign Contributions for 5 Leading Firms Bridgewater Associates $274,650 DE Shaw Group $3,100,255 Farallon Capital Management $1,058,953 Och-Ziff Capital Management $338,552 Renaissance Technologies $1,560,895 Lobbying Expenditures for 5 Leading Firms Bridgewater Associates $855,000 DE Shaw Group $680,000 Farallon Capital Management $1,005,000 Och-Ziff Capital Management $200,000 Renaissance Technologies $740,000 * Hedge fund contributions are included in the overall securities campaign contributions and lobbying expenditure totals. Source: Center for Responsive Politics, < www.opensecrets.org>. 108 SOLD OUT Accounting Firms Decade-long campaign contribution industry total (1998-2008): $81,469,000 Decade-long lobbying expenditure industry total (1998-2008): $121,658,156 Campaign Contributions for 5 Leading Firms Arthur Andersen $3,324,175 Deloitte & Touche $12,120,340 Ernst & Young $12,482,407 KPMG LLP $8,486,392 Pricewaterhouse $10,800,772 Lobbying Expenditures for 5 Leading Firms Arthur Andersen $1,900,000 Deloitte & Touche $19,606,455 Ernst & Young $25,108,536 KPMG LLP $19,103,000 Pricewaterhouse $44,291,084 Source: Center for Responsive Politics, < www.opensecrets.org>. SOLD OUT 109 Conclusion and Recommendations: Principles for a New Financial Regulatory Architecture For more than 25 years, regulatory control over the financial sector has steadily eroded. This deregulatory trend accelerated in the last decade: In 1999, Congress, with the support of the Clinton White House passed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, removing the firewalls between commercial banking on the one hand and investment banking and insurance on the other; federal agencies declined to regulate financial derivatives and Congress then enshrined this head-in-the-sand policy as law; federal regulators rationalized the subprime lending boom as good housing policy rather than the ticking time bomb that it self-evidently was; and federal officials collaborated with Wall Street to permit extraordinary increases in the amount of money firms could lend or borrow for every dollar of their own capital. All of these deregulatory moves created the conditions for the current financial implosion. The dangers inherent in these policies were evident to any careful observer. Consumer groups, some investor advocates, independent economists and analysts, and some regulators all sounded the alarm as each of the actions chronicled in this report were first proposed. Those warnings were ignored, however. They were drowned out by the cacophony of well-paid lobbyists and the jingle of cash registers opening and closing as Wall Street handed out hundreds of millions in political contributions. Now, after the trillions of dollars in taxpayer money has been spent, there is widespread agreement that deregulation went too far, and that new regulatory initiatives are required. But as with each of the twelve steps on the road to financial ruin, the financial industry is resisting meaningful reforms. The repeal of Glass-Steagall and the bank mergers already authorized cannot easily be undone, but both those issues require very careful scrutiny. The leading independent investment banks have all merged into commercial banks or converted themselves into bank holding companies; the very severe risk is that the investment bank culture will again influence traditional banking operations, and encourage dangerous and unsustainable risk-taking. The bank merger trend is actually escalating as a consequence of the financial crisis, as fed110 SOLD OUT eral regulators bless shot-gun marriages in order to avoid committing still more taxpayer money to making depositors whole. But much more care should taken in authorizing additional mergers. Also, as Bert Foer of the American Antitrust Institute points out, many of the recently consummated mergers are almost certain to fail. Policymakers need to take a comprehensive assessment of banking concentration; for if the existing high levels of concentration are to be permitted, regulatory review must be much more intensive, and controls on big bank activity much more extensive. Beyond undoing the deregulatory maneuvers documented in this report, an affirmative regulatory agenda must establish a new framework for financial sector regulation. It should aim to reduce the size of the financial sector, reduce reliance on overly complicated financial instruments, and provide robust and multi-faceted protections for consumers. We, and many others, will be proposing specific regulatory reforms over the course of the next year. Here, we concluded with overarching premises that should guide the new financial regulatory architecture. 1. The financial sector should serve and be subordinate to the real economy. From 2004-2007, financial sector profits amounted to more than a third of overall corporate profits. This is — and should have been treated as — conclusive evidence of a financial system out of control, one that was beginning to devour rather than serve the real economy. There should be no deference shown to Wall Street interests complaining that a new regulatory regime will hurt their profitability. The Wall Street operators have destroyed their own institutions, and their earlier profits are now revealed to be only the froth from a bubble economy and financial sleight-of-hand. In any case, the American economy cannot be based on finance and the trading of paper. Looking back, we see that the financial economy did not increase America’s true wealth, but just the opposite: Wall Street siphoned profits from the real economy, and from the checking accounts of consumers, workers and investors, until the system collapsed, and consumer, workers and investors were asked to foot the bill. 2. Hedge funds and financial derivatives must be regulated. What is a hedge fund? As a legal matter, the term references investment funds that escape Securities and Exchange Commission regulatory authority on the grounds that they serve sophisticated investors. But the evidence is once again overwhelming that sophisticated investors cannot be trusted to protect their own interests (see Bernard Madoff). But more important, these nonregulated entities pose systemic risks to the SOLD OUT 111 financial sector, not just to the wealthy. Cities, states, colleges, non-profit organizations, and every American turned out to be at risk from the machinations of the socalled sophisticated financial sector. All investment vehicles must be subjected to the same regulatory requirements — and those standards must be elevated dramatically. Finally, not all financial derivatives should be permitted to continue to trade. But those for which a legitimate purpose can be shown must be brought into the regulatory system, with guarantees of transparency, restrictions on leverage and requirements for “skin in the game.” 3. Enhanced standards of transparency. Hedge funds, investment banks, insurance companies and commercial banks have engaged in such complicated and intertwined transactions that no one could track who owes what, to whom. AIG apparently didn't even know who it had insured, and on what terms, through the credit default swaps it participated in. Moreover, the packaging and re-packaging of mortgages into various esoteric securities undermined the ability of the financial markets to correctly value these financial instruments. Baseline transparency requirements must include an end to off-thebooks transactions, detailed reporting of holdings by all investment funds, and selling and trading of all permitted financial derivatives on regulated and public exchanges. Other mechanisms will enhance transparency and simplify some overly complicated financial instruments: these include “skin in the game” requirements and prohibitions on certain practices (for example, tranching of securities214) that add complexity and confusion, but no social value. 4. Prohibit certain financial instruments. Wall Street has proved Warren Buffett right in labeling financial derivatives “weapons of financial destruction.” Synthetic collateralized debt obligations — a kind of credit default swap215 — are among the worst abuses of the current system, enabling legalized, large-scale betting by entities not party to the underlying transaction. Whatever hypothetical benefit such instruments have for establishing a market price for credit default swaps is vastly outweighed by the actual and demonstrable damage they have done to the real economy. They should 214 For further discussion of the case for prohibiting tranching, see Robert Kuttner, “Financial Regulation: After the Fall,” Demos, January 2009, available at: <http://www.demos.org/publication.cfm?cur rentpublicationID=B8B65B84%2D3FF4%2 D6C82%2D5F3F750B53E44E1B>. 215 See also this helpful discussion explaining synthetic CDOs from Portfolio’s Felix Salmon, available at: <http://www.portfolio.com/views/blogs/mar ket-movers/2008/11/28/understandingsynthetics>. Essential, synthetic CDOs involve the creation of insurance on a bond (someone pays for the insurance, and someone agrees to insure against failure of the bond), with one important condition: neither party actually holds the bond. 112 SOLD OUT be prohibited. 5. Adopt the precautionary principle216 for exotic financial instruments. The burden should be placed on those urging the creation or trade of exotic financial instruments — existing and those yet to be invented — to show why they should be permitted. They should be required to show the affirmative, social benefit of the new instrument, and prove why these benefits outweigh risks. They should be specifically required to explain why the instrument does not worsen financial systemic risk, taking into account recent experience where purported diversification of risk led to its spread and exponential increase. Regulators should maintain a strong bias against complicated new instruments, recognizing that complexity both introduces inherent uncertainty and is often used to obscure dangers, risks and bad investments.217 216 The precautionary principle is a term most frequently used in the environmental context. It suggests that, for example, before a chemical can be introduced on the market, it must be shown to be safe. This approach stands against the notion that a new chemical is presumed safe and permitted on the market, until regulators can prove that it is not. 217 See “Plunge: How Banks Aim to Obscure Their Losses,” An Interview with Lynn Turner, Multinational Monitor, November/December 2008, available at: <http://www.multinationalmonitor.org/mm2 008/112008/interview-turner.html> (“Wall Street typically designs these things so that they hide something from the public or their investors. So when you have the CDOs 6. Limit leverage. High flyers like leveraged investments because they offer the possibility of very high returns. But, as we have seen, they also enable extremely risky investments that can vastly exceed an investor's actual assets. This degree of leverage turns the financial system into a game of musical chairs — those left standing when the music stops are wiped out. The entire financial system is presently at risk because the amount of leverage far exceeded the assets needed to back it up once investors sought to convert their holdings to cash. There should be stringent restrictions on the use of leverage by all players in the financial system. These include enhanced capital requirements for banks and investment banks (and especially the build-up of capital in good times); and increased margin requirements, so that parties buying securities, futures or options must put up more collateral. 7. Impose a financial transactions tax. A small tax on each financial transaction218 [collateralized debt obligations] built on top of the other CDOs, they hide what the underlying assets are really like, or what the underlying mortgages are really like. In some of the off-balance sheet special purpose entities, like with Enron, it was to hide their financing.”) 218 Pollin, Baker and Schaberg suggest a .5 percent tax on stock trades, and comparable burdens on other transactions (for example, this works out to .01 percent for each remaining year of maturity on a bond.) See Robert Pollin, Dean Baker, and Marc SOLD OUT 113 would discourage speculation, curb the turbulence in the markets, and, generally, slow things down. It would give realeconomy businesses more space to operate without worrying about how today's decisions will affect their stock price tomorrow, or the next hour. And it would be a steeply progressive tax that could raise substantial sums for useful public purposes. 8. Crack down on excessive pay and the Wall Street bonus culture. Wall Street salaries and bonuses are out of control. The first and most simple demand is to ensure no bonus payments for firms receiving governmental bailout funds. If they had to be bailed out, why does anyone in the firm deserve a bonus? Even more importantly, bonus payments with taxpayer money is an outrageous misuse of public funds. Beyond the bailouts, however, there is a need to address the Wall Street bonus culture. Paid on a yearly basis, Wall Street bonuses can be 10 or 20 times base salary, and commonly represent as much as four fifths of employees' pay. In this context, it makes sense to take huge risks. The payoffs from benefiting from risky investments or a bubble are dramatic, and there’s no reward Schaberg, “Financial Transactions Taxes for the U.S. Economy,” 2002, Political Economy Research Institute, available at: <http://www.peri.umass.edu/236/hash/aef97 d8d65/publication/172>. for staying out. Wall Street compensation should be lowered overall, but most important is imposing legal requirements that compensation be tied to long-term performance. If employees had to live with the longterm consequences of their investment decisions, they would employ very different strategies. 9. Adopt a financial consumer protection agenda. Commercial banks and Wall Street backers have, to a considerable extent, built their business model around abusive lending practices. Predatory mortgage lenders, credit card companies, student loan corporations — all pushed unsustainable levels of credit, on onerous terms frequently indecipherable to borrowers, and with outrageous hidden fees and charges. A new financial consumer protection agency should be established; interest rates, fees and charges should all be capped (especially now that Americans who are in effect borrowing their own money from banks and credit card companies who received bailout funds). Impediments to legal accountability for fraud and other unlawful conduct, such as the holder in due course rule, preemption of state laws, and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act should be withdrawn or repealed. 114 SOLD OUT 10. Give consumers the tools to organize themselves. Federal law should empower consumers to organize into independent financial consumers associations. Lenders should be required to facilitate such organization by their borrowers (through mailings to borrowers, on behalf of independent consumer organizations), as should corporations to their shareholders. With independent organizations funded by small voluntary fees, consumers could hire their own independent representatives to review financial players’ activities, scour their books, and advocate for appropriate public policies. Is this agenda politically feasible? It has the advantage of being necessary: Recent years' experience shows beyond any reasonable argument that a deregulated and unrestrained financial sector will destroy itself — and threaten the U.S. and global economies in the process. The deregulatory decisions profiled in this report were not made on their merits. At almost every step, public interest advocates and independent-minded regulators and Members of Congress cautioned about the hazards that lay ahead — and they were proven wrong only in underestimating how severe would be the consequences of deregulation. Good arguments could not compete with the combination of political influence and a reckless and fanatical zeal for deregulation. $5 billion buys a lot of friends. In one sense, this report can be considered a case study in the need for the elimination of special interest money from American politics, but Congress will address financial re-regulation this year, and reform of our political process does not appear on the horizon. The emergent consensus on the imperative to re-regulate the financial sector demonstrates that, in the wake of the financial meltdown, the prevailing regulatory paradigm has shifted. Whether the forces that brought America’s economy to the precipice can be forced to accede to that shift — whether the public interest will prevail — remains to be seen. Appendix 115 Appendix: Leading Financial Firm Profiles of Campaign Contributions and Lobbying Expenditures Securities Firms .……………………………………………………. 115 1. Bear Stearns ………………………………………………...…...………….. 115 2. Goldman Sachs ……………………………………………………………… 121 3. Lehman Brothers …......................................................................................... 129 4. Merrill Lynch ….............................................................................................. 135 5. Morgan Stanley …………………………………………………...……….... 142 Commercial Banks …………………………………………………. 148 1. Bank of America ...…….…………………………………...…...…………... 148 2. Citigroup ........………….…………………………………………………… 155 3. JP Morgan Chase & Co................................................................................... 164 4. Wachovia Corp. .............................................................................................. 171 5. Wells Fargo .....…………………………………………………...……….... 177 Hedge Funds …………………………………………….......……… 183 1. Bridgewater Associates ..…………………………………...…...…………... 183 2. DE Shaw Group ..…………………………………………………………… 185 3. Farallon Capital Management ......................................................................... 189 4. Och-Ziff Capital Management ........................................................................ 193 5. Renaissance Technologies ...……………………………………...……….... 196 Accounting Firms …………………………………………………… 199 1. Arthur Andersen .…………………………………………...…...…………... 199 2. Deloitte & Touche ...……………………………………………………….... 203 3. Ernst & Young ...…......................................................................................... 210 4. KPMG LLG ..….............................................................................................. 217 5. Pricewaterhouse ……...…………………………………………...……….... 224
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Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Corruption
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Woof, 7th Post; 80 SOLD OUT FANNIE AND FREDDIE ENTER THE SUBPRIME MARKET The Federal National Mortgage Association was created in 1938, during Franklin D. Roosevelt’s administration, as a federal government agency to address the lack of a consistent supply of mortgage funds. Fannie Mae, as it is popularly known, became a private, shareholder-owned corporation in 1968.144 As a “government sponsored enterprise” (GSE) chartered by Congress, Fannie Mae’s purpose is to purchase mortgages from private bankers and other lenders so that they have additional funds to continue originating new mortgages. Fannie Mae does not issue or originate new loans, but private lenders seek to sell their loans to Fannie, which maintains specific dollar value ceilings for the repurchasing of single and multi-family loans and does not purchase high-end loans (i.e., loans for expensive homes). Because many private lenders hope to sell their mortgages to Fannie, its loan purchasing criteria have a substantial influence on the prudence of the mortgages that lenders issue. The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, or Freddie Mac,145 was established by Congress in 1970 as a private shareholder-owned corporation to take on the same role as Fannie Mae and prevent Fannie from exercising a monopoly. As with Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac does not issue or originate new loans. Instead, Freddie buys loans from private lenders in order to provide added liquidity to fund America’s housing needs.146 144 12 U.S.C. § 1716b et seq. (1968). 145 Emergency Home Finance Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1401 (1970). 146 Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation 10 IN THIS SECTION: At the peak of the housing boom, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were dominant purchasers in the subprime secondary market. The Government-Sponsored Enterprises were followers, not leaders, but they did end up taking on substantial subprime assets — at least $57 billion. The purchase of subprime assets was a break from prior practice, justified by theories of expanded access to homeownership for low-income families and rationalized by mathematical models allegedly able to identify and assess risk to newer levels of precision. In fact, the motivation was the for-profit nature of the institutions and their particular executive incentive schemes. Massive lobbying — including especially but not only of Democratic friends of the institutions — enabled them to divert from their traditional exclusive focus on prime loans. Fannie and Freddie are not responsible for the financial crisis. They are responsible for their own demise, and the resultant massive taxpayer liability. SOLD OUT 81 Fannie Mae began converting mortgages it acquired into mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) in 1970.147 An MBS is created by pooling thousands of purchased mortgages into a single security for trade on Wall Street. By selling MBSs to investors, Fannie obtains additional funds to buy increasing numbers of mortgages from private lenders who, in turn, use the added liquidity (cash) to originate new home loans. By purchasing mortgages from private lenders, however, Fannie Mae incurs all the risk of default by borrowers, providing an incentive for lenders to make risky loans,148 and making it vital that Fannie exercise care in determining which loans it acquires. Traditionally, Fannie only purchased high quality loans that conform to relatively stringent standards, including that the borrower provided a 20 percent down payment. Even after it sells MBSs, Fannie guarantees payment to buyers of the MBSs — effectively providing insurance on the securities. The laws establishing Fannie Mae and website, “Frequently Asked Questions About Freddie Mac,” undated, available at: <http://www.freddiemac.com/corporate/com pany_profile/faqs/index.html>. 147 Federal National Mortgage Association website, “About Fannie Mae,” October 7, 2008, available at: <http://www.fanniemae.com/aboutfm/index. jhtml;jsessionid=XUMTTVZMCQYSHJ2F QSISFGA?p=About+Fannie+Mae>. 148 Ivo Welch, “Corporate Finance: An Introduction,” Prentice-Hall, 2008, available at: <http://welch.econ.brown.edu/oped/finsyste m.html>. Freddie Mac provide no explicit guarantee of their debt obligations. Nonetheless, investors throughout the world assumed that because the entities are so intertwined with the U.S. government and so central to U.S. housing policy, the federal government would never to allow Fannie or Freddie to default on its debt. Because they were considered quasi-governmental, Fannie and Freddie enjoyed the highest-graded rating (Triple-A) from independent ratings firms, despite holding little capital in reserve as against the scale of their outstanding loans.149 In 1992, Congress passed and President George H.W. Bush signed into law the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act. This law established “risk-based and minimum capital standards”150 for the two GSEs and also established the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) to oversee and regulate the activities of Fannie and Freddie. OFHEO, however, had limited authority. The legislation also required Fannie and Freddie to devote a minimum percentage of their lending to support affordable housing. 149 Ivo Welch, “Corporate Finance: An Introduction,” Prentice-Hall, 2008, available at: <http://welch.econ.brown.edu/oped/finsyste m.html>. 150 “About Fannie Mae: Our Charter,” Fannie Mae website, October 29, 2008, available at: <http://www.fanniemae.com/aboutfm/charte r.jhtml>. 82 SOLD OUT In 1999, Fannie Mae softened the standards it required of loans that it purchased. The move came in response to pressure from the banking and thrift industries, which wanted to extend subprime lending (and wanted Fannie Mae to agree to purchase subprime loans), and from federal officials who wanted Fannie and Freddie to buy more private industry mortgages made to low and moderateincome families.151 As the housing bubble inflated starting in 2001, banks and especially non-bank lenders made an increasing number of subprime loans, peaking in the years 2004-2006. Fannie and Freddie were major players in the “secondary market,” buying up bundles of subprime loans that were traded on Wall Street. They purchased 44 percent of subprime securities on the secondary market in 2004, 33 percent in 2005 and 20 percent in 2006.152 151 Steven A. Holmes, “Fannie Mae Eases Credit to Aid Mortgage Lending,” New York Times, September 30, 1999, available at: <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html ?res=9c0de7db153ef933a0575ac0a96f95826 0&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all>. 152 Carol D. Leonnig, “How HUD Mortgage Policy Fed the Crisis,” Washington Post, June 10, 2008, available at: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/ content/article/2008/06/09/AR20080609 02626_pf.html>. But Fannie and Freddie were not buying subprime mortgages directly in significant quantities, in part because the most predatory subprime loans did not meet their lending standards. The two firms purchased just 3 percent of all subprime loans issued from 2004 through 2007, most of that in 2007 alone.153 Subprime loans represented 2 percent of Fannie Mae’s singlefamily mortgage credit book of business at the end of 2006, and 3 percent at the end of 2005.154 Fannie and Freddie’s large-scale purchases of subprime mortgage-back securities on the secondary market may have facilitated greater subprime lending than otherwise would have occurred, but to a considerable extent the companies were victims rather than perpetrators of the subprime crisis. That is, they were not driving the market, so much as getting stuck with bad products already placed on the market. 153 Ronald Campbell, “Most Subprime Lenders Weren’t Subject to Federal Lending Law,” Orange County Register, November 16, 2008, available at: <http://www.ocregister.com/articles/loanssubprime- banks-2228728-law-lenders>. 154 Fannie Mae form 10-K, for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2006, pF-78. Fannie and Freddie’s largescale purchases of subprime mortgage-back securities on the secondary market may have facilitated greater subprime lending than otherwise would have occurred. SOLD OUT 83 The two companies also trailed the market, entering into the subprime arena because they felt at a competitive disadvantage as against other housing market players. Internal Fannie memos obtained by the House Oversight Committee show the company was very concerned that it was rapidly losing market share to Wall Street securitizers. “Our pricing is uncompetitive. According to our models, market participants today are not pricing legitimately for risks,” noted a top-level memo.155 The same memo noted the risks of pursuing more aggressive strategies — noting that Fannie had a “lack of knowledge of the credit risks”156 — and urged that the company “stay the course.” Numerous other internal sources echoed this recommendation.157 Yet 155 “Single Family Guaranty Business: Facing Strategic Crossroads,” June 27, 2005, p. 18, available at: <http://oversight.house.gov/documents/2008 1209103003.pdf>. 156 “Single Family Guaranty Business: Facing Strategic Crossroads,” June 27, 2205, p. 9, available at: <http://oversight.house.gov/documents/2008 1209103003.pdf>. 157 See Opening Statement of Rep. Henry A. Waxman, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, “The Role of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the Financial Crisis,” December 9, 2008, available at: Fannie increased its direct investment in riskier loans despite these cautionary warnings — and even as the housing bubble was coming to an end. Today, Freddie and Fannie own or guarantee more than $5 trillion in mortgages158 and regularly issue MBSs. Fannie itself is the largest issuer and guarantor of MBSs. Both agencies were purchasing risky subprime loans on the secondary market from 2004 to 2007, but they were not required to report mortgage losses on the balance sheet. As a result, both investors and regulators were unaware of the extent of their growing mortgage problems. The companies’ significant investments in the riskiest elements of the market would bring their demise in Fall 2008, when the federal government placed them in conservatorship to prevent them from collapsing altogether.159 The federal government has infused <http://oversight.house.gov/story.asp?ID=22 52>. 158 “Freddie Mac lobbied against regulation bill,” Associated Press, October 19, 2008, available at: <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/27266607/ >. 159 See statement by Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, September 7, 2008, and related materials, available at: <http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp11 29.htm>. Perceived as quasigovernmental agencies, Fannie and Freddie were in fact subjected to government regulation — but the regulators’ hands were tied by a Congress heavily lobbied by Fannie and Freddie. 84 SOLD OUT $200 billion into Fannie and Freddie, and more will follow. Even if Fannie and Freddie did not create the financial crisis, their reckless decisions are now forcing a mammoth drain of taxpayer resources. Perceived as quasi-governmental agencies, Fannie and Freddie were in fact subjected to government regulation — but the regulators’ hands were tied by a Congress lobbied by Fannie and Freddie. The companies lobbied heavily to avoid requirements for larger capital reserves, stronger government oversight, or to limit their acquisition of packages of risky loans. In general, Democrats were far more protective of Fannie and Freddie than Republicans, many of whom were hostile to the GSEs’ government ties. Many Democrats sought to protect Fannie and Freddie from stringent regulatory oversight and capital reserve requirements, but Republicans were heavily lobbied as well. In 2005, for example, Freddie Mac paid $2 million to Republican lobbying firm DCI Inc. to defeat legislation sponsored by Senator Chuck Hagel, R-Nebraska, that would have imposed tougher regulations on Freddie’s loan repurchase activities.160 The legislation languished in the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee 160 “Freddie Mac Lobbied Against Regulation Bill,” Associated Press, October 19, 2008, available at: <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/27266607/ >. with all Republican committee members supporting it and all Democratic members opposed. Hagel and 25 other Republican senators pleaded unsuccessfully with Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist, R-Tennessee, to allow a vote on the bill. “If effective regulatory reform legislation ... is not enacted this year, American taxpayers will continue to be exposed to the enormous risk that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac pose to the housing market, the overall financial system and the economy as a whole,” the senators wrote in a letter.161 The Associated Press reported, “In the end, there was not enough Republican support for Hagel’s bill to warrant bringing it up for a vote because Democrats also opposed it and the votes of some would be needed for passage.”162 The former chair of the House Financial Services Committee, Michael Oxley, R-Ohio, complained that efforts to regulate Fannie and Freddie were blocked by the Bush administration, the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve. “What did we get from the White House? We got a one-finger salute,” Oxley 161 “Freddie Mac Lobbied Against Regulation Bill,” Associated Press, October 19, 2008, available at: <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/27266607/ >. 162 “Freddie Mac Lobbied Against Regulation Bill,” Associated Press, October 19, 2008, available at: <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/27266607/ >. SOLD OUT 85 would recall in 2008.163 Democrats believed in Fannie and Freddie as ways to expand credit to low- and middle-income communities, but they were also responsive to massive lobbying efforts. From 1998 to 2008, Fannie Mae spent $80.53 million on federally registered lobbyists. During the same period, Freddie Mac spent $96.16 million on lobbyists.164 163 Greg Farrell, “Oxley Hits Back at Ideologues,” Financial Times, September 9, 2008. <http://thinkprogress.org/2008/09/15/barney -frank-mccain-reform/>. 164 Totals compiled from annual data available from the Center for Responsive Politics, < www.opensecrets.org>. 86 SOLD OUT Community Reinvestment Act: Not Guilty Congress passed and President Jimmy Carter signed the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) into law in 1977. The purpose of this law was to encourage banks to increase their very limited lending in low- and moderate- income and minority neighborhoods and more generally to low- and moderateincome and minority borrowers.165 Congress passed this law in large part because too many lenders were discriminating against minority and low- and moderateincome neighborhoods. “Redlining” was the name given to the practice by banks of literally drawing a red line around minority areas and then proceeding to deny loans to people within the red border even if they were otherwise qualified. The CRA has been in place for 30 years, but some corporate-backed and libertarian think tanks and policy groups, as well as some Republican members of Congress, now claim CRA is responsible for the current financial disaster. Nothing in the CRA requires banks to make risky loans.166 Leading regulators agree that CRA was not responsible for predatory lending, let 165 Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council website, “Community Reinvestment Act: Background & Purpose,” Undated, available at: <http://www.ffiec.gov/cra/history.htm>. 166 Federal Reserve Board website, “Community Reinvestment Act,” Undated, available at: <http://www.federalreserve.gov/dcca/cra/>. alone the broader financial crisis. John Dugan, Comptroller of the Currency said, “CRA is not the culprit behind the subprime mortgage lending abuses, or the broader credit quality issues in the marketplace.”167 Federal Reserve Board Governor Randall S. Kroszner said he has not seen any evidence that “CRA has contributed to the erosion of safe and sound lending practices.”168 FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair said, “I think we can agree that a complex interplay of risky behaviors by lenders, borrowers, and investors led to the current financial storm. To be sure, there’s plenty of blame to go around. However, I want to give you my verdict on CRA: NOT guilty.”169 Most predatory loans were issued by non-bank lenders that were not subject to CRA requirements. 167 Reuters, “U.S. financial system in better shape-OCC’s Dugan,” November 19, 2008, available at: <http://www.reuters.com/article/regulatoryN ewsFinancialServicesAndRealEstate/ idUSN1946588420081119>. 168 Remarks of Randall S. Kroszner, Governor of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Confronting Concentrated Poverty Policy Forum,” December 3, 2008, available at: <http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/s peech/kroszner20081203a.htm>. 169 Remarks by Sheila Bair, Chairperson of the FDIC, Before the New America Foundation, December 17, 2008, available at: <http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/ar chives/2008/chairman/spdec1708.html>. SOLD OUT 87 MERGER MANIA Merger mania in the financial industry has been all the rage for more than 25 years. “Bigger is indeed better,” proclaimed the CEO of Bank of America in announcing its merger with NationsBank in 1998.170 In the United States, about 11,500 bank mergers took place from 1980 through 2005, 170 Dean Foust, “BofA: A Megabank in the Making,” BusinessWeek, September 13, 1999, available at: <http://www.businessweek.com/archives/19 99/b3646163.arc.htm>. an average of about 440 mergers per year.171 The size of the mergers has increased to phenomenal levels in recent years: In 2003, Bank of America became a $1.4 trillion financial behemoth after it bought FleetBoston, making it the second-largest U.S. bank holding company in terms of assets.172 In 2004, JPMorgan Chase agreed to buy Bank One, creating a $1.1 trillion bank holding company.173 From 1975 to 1985, the number of commercial banks was relatively stable at about 14,000. By 2005 that number stood at 7,500, a nearly 50 percent decline.174 171 Loretta J. Mester, Senior Vice President and Director of Research at the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, “Some Thoughts on the Evolution of the Banking System and the Process of Financial Intermediation,” Economic Review, First & Second Quarters, 2007, available at: <http://www.frbatlanta.org/filelegacydocs/er q107_Mester.pdf >. 172 Loretta J. Mester, Senior Vice President and Director of Research at the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, “Some Thoughts on the Evolution of the Banking System and the Process of Financial Intermediation,” Economic Review, First & Second Quarters, 2007, available at: <http://www.frbatlanta.org/filelegacydocs/er q107_Mester.pdf >. 173 Loretta J. Mester, Senior Vice President and Director of Research at the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, “Some Thoughts on the Evolution of the Banking System and the Process of Financial Intermediation,” Economic Review, First & Second Quarters, 2007, available at: <http://www.frbatlanta.org/filelegacydocs/er q107_Mester.pdf >. 174 Loretta J. Mester, Senior Vice President and Director of Research at the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, “Some Thoughts on the Evolution of the Banking System and the Process of Financial Intermediation,” Eco- 11 IN THIS SECTION: The effective abandonment of antitrust and related regulatory principles over the last two decades has enabled a remarkable concentration in the banking sector, even in advance of recent moves to combine firms as a means to preserve the functioning of the financial system. The megabanks achieved too-big-to-fail status. While this should have meant they be treated as public utilities requiring heightened regulation and risk control, other deregulatory maneuvers (including repeal of Glass-Steagall) enabled these gigantic institutions to benefit from explicit and implicit federal guarantees, even as they pursued reckless high-risk investments. 88 SOLD OUT By mid-2008 — before a rash of mergers consummated amidst the financial crash — the top 5 banks held more than half the assets controlled by the top 150.175 Regulators rarely challenged bank mergers and acquisitions as stock prices skyrocketed and the financial party on Wall Street drowned out the critics. But many argued that “bigger is not better” because it raised the specter that any one individual bank could become “too big to fail” (TBTF) or at least “too big to discipline adequately” by regulators. The current financial crisis has confirmed these fears. In the modern era, “TBTF” reared its head in 1984, when the federal government contributed $1 billion to save Continental Illinois Bank from default. As the seventh largest bank in the United States, Continental held large amounts of deposits from hundreds of smaller banks throughout the Midwest. The failure of such a large institution could have forced many smaller banks into default. As a result, the U.S. Comptroller of the Currency orchestrated an unprecedented rescue of the bank, including its shareholders. During congressional hearings on the matter, Representative Stewart B. McKinney, R-Connecticut, pointedly observed, “We have a new kind of bank. It is nomic Review, First & Second Quarters, 2007, available at: <http://www.frbatlanta.org/filelegacydocs/er q107_Mester.pdf >. 175 Based on data from American Banker. called too big to fail, TBTF, and it is a wonderful bank.”176 The Comptroller of the Currency agreed that the eleven largest U.S. banks were “too big to fail,” implying they would be rescued regardless of how much risk they took on. Seven years later, U.S. banking law recognized TBTF with passage of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA). The Act authorizes federal regulators to rescue uninsured depositors in large failing banks if such action is needed to prevent “serious adverse effects on economic conditions or financial stability.” FDICIA effectively implies that any bank whose failure poses a serious risk to the stability of the U.S. banking system (i.e. “systemic risk”) is exempt from going bankrupt and thus qualifies for a taxpayer-financed rescue. It constitutes a significant exception to the FDICIA’s general rule prohibiting the rescue of uninsured depositors. The FDICIA also acts as an implicit insurance program for large financial institutions and an incentive for banks to gain TBTF status by growing larger through merger and acquisition. In 1999, economists within the Federal Reserve System warned that “some institutions may try to increase the value of their access to the government’s financial safety net (including deposit insur- 176 Hearings before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions, 1984. SOLD OUT 89 ance, discount window access, payments system guarantees) through consolidation. If financial market participants perceive very large organizations to be ‘too big to fail’ — i.e., that explicit or implicit government guarantees will protect debtholders or shareholders of these organizations — there may be incentives to increase size through consolidation....” 177 International comparisons over a 100- year period show that changes in the structure and strength of safety net guarantees may incentivize additional financial institution risk-taking, and by extension, the motive to consolidate to increase the value of access to the safety net.178 Studies have shown that compared to smaller banks, large banks take on greater risk in the form of lower capital ratios (i.e. 177 Allen N. Berger, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and Rebecca S. Demsetz and Philip E. Strahan of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “The Consolidation of the Financial Services Industry: Causes, Consequences, and Implications for the Future,” J. Banking & Finance, Vol. 23, 1999, available at: <http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/1 998/199846/199846pap.pdf>. 178 Allen N. Berger, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and Rebecca S. Demsetz and Philip E. Strahan of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “The Consolidation of the Financial Services Industry: Causes, Consequences, and Implications for the Future,” J. Banking & Finance, Vol. 23, 1999, available at: <http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/1 998/199846/199846pap.pdf> (citing A. Saunders and B.K. Wilson, “Bank capital and bank structure: A comparative analysis of the U.S., U.K., and Canada,” J. Banking & Finance, 1999). increased leverage),179 more investments in derivatives,180 higher percentages of uninsured deposits, lower levels of core deposits, 181 higher percentages of loans,182 and lower levels of cash and marketable securities. TBTF policy effectively operates as a government subsidy — and worse, an incentive — for this kind of risk-taking, thereby increasing the vulnerability of the entire banking system and the likelihood of massive taxpayer-funded bailouts. Federal Reserve economists found that the banking crisis of the late 1980s occurred because “large banks adopted a riskier stance, be- 179 Rebecca S. Demsetz and Philip E. Strahan, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Research Paper 9506, April 1995, available at: <http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_ reports/research_papers/9506.pdf>. See also Arnold Danielson, “Getting Ready for the 21st Century: A Look at Recent Banking Trends,” Banking Pol'y Rep., March 15, 1999. (Banks larger than $50 billion had an average capital ratio of seven percent while banks between $100 million to $2 billion in size had an average capital ratio of just over nine percent). 180 Rebecca S. Demsetz and Philip E. Strahan, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Research Paper 9506, April 1995, available at: <http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_ reports/research_papers/9506.pdf>. 181 Ron J. Feldman and Jason Schmidt, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, “Increased use of uninsured deposits: Implications for market discipline,” March 2001. Available at: <http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publication s_papers/pub_display.cfm?id=2178>. 182 Ron J. Feldman and Jason Schmidt, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, “Increased use of uninsured deposits: Implications for market discipline,” March 2001. Available at: <http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publication s_papers/pub_display.cfm?id=2178>. 90 SOLD OUT yond what could sensibly be explained by scale economies.”183 Supporters of bank consolidation argue that bigger banks create greater efficiencies because of their larger economies of scale. But several studies have shown that large bank mergers during the 1980s and 1990s failed to improve overall efficiency or profitability.184 Indeed, most studies found that post-merger cost increases and revenue losses offset any savings that the resulting banks accrued from cutting staff or closing branches.185 183 John H. Boyd and Mark Gertler, “The Role of Large Banks in the Recent U.S. Banking Crisis,” 18 Fed. Res. Bank of Minneapolis Q. Rev. 1, Winter 1994, available at: <http://www.minneapolisfed.org/research/Q R/QR1811.pdf>. 184 Allen N. Berger and David B. Humphrey, “The Dominance of Inefficiencies Over Scale and Product Mix Economies in Banking,” J. Monetary Econ., 117-48, August 28, 1991; Allen N. Berger & David B. Humphrey, “Megamergers in Banking and the Use of Cost Efficiency as an Antitrust Defense,” 37 Antitrust Bull. 541, 554-65 (1992); Simon Kwan & Robert A. Eisenbeis, “Mergers of Publicly Traded Banking Organizations Revisited,” Fed. Res. Bank of Atlanta, Econ. Rev., 4th Qtr. 1999; Jane C. Linder & Dwight B. Crane, “Bank Mergers: Integration and Profitability,” 7 J. Fin. Servs. Res. 35, 40-52 (1992); Stavros Peristiani, “Do Mergers Improve the XEfficiency and Scale Efficiency of U.S. Banks? Evidence from the 1980s,” 29 J. Money, Credit & Banking 326, 329-33, 336- 37 (1997); Steven J. Pilloff, “Performance Changes and Shareholder Wealth Creation Associated with Mergers of Publicly Traded Banking Institutions,” 28 J. Money, Credit & Banking 294, 297-98, 301, 308-09 (1996). 185 Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., “The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 1975-2000: Competition, Consolidation and Evidence indicates executive compensation plays a central role in the quest for larger banks. This “empire-building,” as Federal Reserve economists put it, occurs because compensation tends to increase with firm size, “so managers may hope to achieve personal financial gains by engaging in [mergers and acquisitions].”186 George Washington University banking law professor Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr. agrees. “Not surprisingly,” he said, “studies have shown that managerial self-interest plays a major role in determining the frequency of mergers among both corporations and banks.”187 In words that appear prescient today, Professor Wilmarth aptly observed in 2002 that “the quest by big banks for TBTF status — like their pursuit of market power — should be viewed as a dangerous flight from discipline that will likely produce inefficient growth and greater risk.” Reliance on finan- Increased Risks” 2002 U. Ill. L. Rev. 2 215 (2002), available at: <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abs tract_id=315345>. 186 Allen N. Berger, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and Rebecca S. Demsetz and Philip E. Strahan of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “The Consolidation of the Financial Services Industry: Causes, Consequences, and Implications for the Future,” Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 23, 1999, available at: <http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/1 998/199846/199846pap.pdf>. 187 Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., “The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 1975-2000: Competition, Consolidation and Increased Risks” 2002 U. Ill. L. Rev. 2 215 (2002), available at: <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abs tract_id=315345>. SOLD OUT 91 cial derivatives, for example, is extremely concentrated among the largest commercial banks (the five largest commercial banks own 97 percent of the total amount of notional derivatives), and limited almost entirely to the biggest 25.188 All of these banks are of a size — and most the product of mergers — that regulators and antitrust enforcers would not have tolerated a quarter century ago. Taxpayers are now footing the bill for the financial industry’s investment in risky, overleveraged and poorly understood financial schemes. By the end of 2008, the federal government pledged $8.5 trillion in economic assistance for financial institutions,189 primarily large commercial banks, that the federal government says were TBTF. 190 188 Comptroller of the Currency, “OCC's Quarterly Report on Bank Trading and Derivatives Activities, Second Quarter 2008,” available at: <http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2008- 115a.pdf>. 189 Kathleen Pender, “Government bailout hits $8.5 trillion,” San Francisco Chronicle, November 26, 2008, available at: <http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/ article.cgi?file=/c/a/2008/11/26/MNVN1 4C8QR.DTL>. 190 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Troubled Asset Relief Program Transaction Report, December 9, 2008, available at: Although the early consolidation of banks, including related to the authorization of interstate banking, had some support among public interest advocates as a means to create competition in very localized markets,191 the intensive consolidation of the last 25 years goes far beyond whatever might have been needed to enhance competition. Yet regulators averted their eyes from the well-known risks of banking consolidation.192 As banking regulators fell under the spell of industry lobbyists and propagandists who alleged that bigger banks would be more efficient, so too did antitrust enforcement agencies fail to act to slow banking consolidation. As with the erosion of effective banking regulation, the corrosion of antitrust enforcement traces back more than three <http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/eesa/tra nsactions.shtml>. 191 See “The Centralization of Financial Power: Unintended Consequences of Government- Assisted Bank Mergers, “An Interview with Bert Foer,” Multinational Monitor, November/ December 2008, available at: < www.multinationalmonitor.org/mm2008/112008/interview-foer.html>. 192 Jake Lewis, “The Making of the Banking Behemoths,” Multinational Monitor, June 1996, available at: <http://www.multinationalmonitor.org/hype r/mm0696.04.html>. As banking regulators fell under the spell of industry lobbyists and propagandists who alleged that bigger banks would be more efficient, so too did antitrust enforcement agencies fail to act to slow banking consolidation. 92 SOLD OUT decades, the victim of industry lobbies and laissez-faire ideology. In the case of antitrust, a conservative, corporate-backed campaign began in the 1970s to overturn many common-sense insights on the costs of mergers. The “law-and-economics” movement came to dominate law schools, scholarly writing and, eventually, the thinking of the federal judiciary. Its principles became the guiding doctrine for the Reagan-Bush Justice Department and Federal Trade Commission, the two U.S. agencies charged with enforcing the nation's antitrust laws. Based on a theoretical understanding of market efficiency, law-and-economics holds that many outlawed or undesirable anticompetitive practices are irrational, and therefore should never occur, or are possible only in extreme and unlikely situations. Antitrust enforcers operating under these premises confined themselves to addressing extreme abuses, like overt pricefixing and hard-core cartels. Although the Clinton administration moved away from a hard-line law-and-economics approach, it watched over a period of industry consolidation that had seen no parallel since the merger wave at the start of the 20th century. 193 The great banking mergers of the last 193 See Walter Adams and James Brock, “The Bigness Complex: Industry, Labor, and Government in the American Economy,” Palo Alto: Stanford Economics and Finance, 2004. quarter century were generally permitted with little quarrel from the Department of Justice, which typically mandated only the sell-off of a few overlapping banking branches.194 194 See James Brock, “Merger Mania and Its Discontents: The Price of Corporate Consolidation,” Multinational Monitor, July/August 2005, available at: <http://www.multinationalmonitor.org/mm2 005/072005/brock.html>. (In a brief review of mergers through 2005, Brock writes, “Banking and finance has witnessed the same scene of cumulative consolidation: Through two decades of ever-larger acquisitions, NationsBank became one of the country’s largest commercial banking concerns, absorbing C&S/Sovran (itself a merged entity), Boatmen’s Bancshares ($9.7 billion deal), BankSouth and Barnett Bank ($14.8 billion acquisition). Then, in 1998, Nations- Bank struck a spectacular $60 billion merger with the huge Bank of America, which itself had been busily acquiring other major banks. The merger between NationsBank and B of A created a financial colossus controlling nearly $600 billion in assets, with 5,000 branch offices and nearly 15,000 ATMs. Bank of America then proceeded to acquire Fleet Boston — which had just completed its own multi-billion dollar acquisitions of Bank Boston, Bay Bank, Fleet Financial, Shawmut, Summit Bancorp and NatWest. Giants Banc One and First Chicago NBD — their size the product of numerous serial acquisitions — merged, and the combined entity was subsequently absorbed by J.P. Morgan which, in turn, had just acquired Chase, after the latter had merged with Manufacturers Hanover and Chemical Bank in the financial business of underwriting stocks and bonds. Other megamergers include the $73 billion combination of Citicorp and Travelers Group in 1998, as well as the acquisition of leading brokerage firms by big banks, including Morgan Stanley’s ill-fated acquisition of Dean Witter.”) SOLD OUT 93 RAMPANT CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: CREDIT RATINGS FIRMS’ FAILURE The stability and safety of mortgage-related assets are ostensibly monitored by private credit rating companies — overwhelmingly the three top firms, Moody’s Investors Service, Standard & Poor’s and Fitch Ratings Ltd.195 Each is supposed to issue independent, objective analysis on the financial soundness of mortgages and other debt traded on Wall Street. Millions of investors rely on the analyses in deciding whether to buy debt instruments like mortgage-backed securities (MBSs). As home prices skyrocketed from 2004 to 2007, each agency issued the highest quality ratings on billions of dollars in what is now unambiguously recognized as low-quality debt, including subprime-related mortgage-backed securities. 196 As a result, millions of investors lost billions of dollars after purchasing (directly or through investment funds) highly rated MBSs that were, in reality, low quality, high risk and prone to default. The phenomenal losses had many wondering how the credit rating firms could have gotten it so wrong. The answer lies in the cozy relationship between the rating companies and the financial institutions whose mortgage assets they rate. Specifi- 195 Often labeled “credit ratings agencies,” these are private, for-profit corporations. 196 Edmund L. Andrews, “U.S. Treasury Secretary Calls for Stronger Regulation on Housing Finance,” International Herald Tribune, March 13, 2008, available at: <http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/03/13/bu siness/credit.php>. 12 IN THIS SECTION: Credit ratings are a key link in the financial crisis story. With Wall Street combining mortgage loans into pools of securitized assets and then slicing them up into tranches, the resultant financial instruments were attractive to many buyers because they promised high returns. But pension funds and other investors could only enter the game if the securities were highly rated. The credit rating firms enabled these investors to enter the game, by attaching high ratings to securities that actually were high risk — as subsequent events have revealed. The credit ratings firms have a bias to offering favorable ratings to new instruments because of their complex relationships with issuers, and their desire to maintain and obtain other business dealings with issuers. This institutional failure and conflict of interest might and should have been forestalled by the SEC, but the Credit Rating Agencies Reform Act of 2006 gave the SEC insufficient oversight authority. In fact, the SEC must give an approval rating to credit ratings agencies if they are adhering to their own standards — even if the SEC knows those standards to be flawed. 94 SOLD OUT cally, financial institutions that issue mortgage and other debt had been paying the three firms for credit ratings. In effect, the “referees” were being paid by the “players.” One rating analyst observed, “This egregious conflict of interest may be the single greatest cause of the present global economic crisis ... . With enormous fees at stake, it is not hard to see how these [credit rating] companies may have been induced, at the very least, to gloss over the possibilities of default or, at the worst, knowingly provide inflated ratings.”197 A Moody’s employee stated in a private company e-mail that “we had blinders on and never questioned the information we were given [by the institutions Moody was rating].” The CEO of Moody’s reported in a confidential presentation that his company is “continually ‘pitched’ by bankers” for the purpose of receiving high credit ratings and that sometimes “we ‘drink the kool-aid.’”198 A former managing director of credit policy at Moody’s testified before Congress that, 197 Testimony of Sean J. Eagan, before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives, October 22, 2008, available at: <http://oversight.house.gov/documents/2008 1022102906.pdf>. 198 Opening Statement of Rep. Henry Waxman, Chairman, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives, October 22, 2008, available at: <http://oversight.house.gov/documents/2008 1022102221.pdf> (quoting a confidential presentation made by Moody’s CEO Ray McDaniel to the board of directors in October 2007). “Originators of structured securities [e.g. banks] typically chose the agency with the lowest standards,”199 allowing banks to engage in “rating shopping” until a desired credit rating was achieved. The agencies made millions on MBS ratings and, as one Member of Congress said, “sold their independence to the highest bidder.”200 Banks paid large sums to the ratings companies for advice on how to achieve the maximum, highest quality rating. “Let’s hope we are all wealthy and retired by the time this house of cards falters,” a Standard & Poor’s employee candidly revealed in an internal email obtained by congressional investigators. 201 Other evidence shows that the firms adjusted ratings out of fear of losing customers. For example, an internal e-mail between senior business managers at one of the three ratings companies calls for a “meeting” to 199Testimony of Jerome S. Fons, Former Managing Director of Credit Policy, Moody’s, Before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives, October 22, 2008, available at: <http://oversight.house.gov/documents/2008 1022102726.pdf>. 200 Rep. Christopher Shays, Before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives, October 22, 2008, available at: <http://oversight.house.gov/documents/2008 1023162631.pdf>. 201 Opening Statement of Rep. Henry Waxman, Chairman, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives, October 22, 2008, available at: <http://oversight.house.gov/documents/2008 1022102221.pdf> (quoting a confidential email from an S&P employee). SOLD OUT 95 “discuss adjusting criteria for rating CDOs [collateralized debt obligations] of real estate assets this week because of the ongoing threat of losing deals.”202 In another e-mail, following a discussion of a competitor’s share of the ratings market, an employee of the same firm states that aspects of the firm’s ratings methodology would have to be revisited in order to recapture market share from the competing firm.203 The credit rating business was spectacularly profitable, as the firms increasingly focused in the first part of this decade on structured finance and new complex debt products, particularly credit derivatives (complicated instruments providing a kind of insurance on mortgages and other loans). Moody’s had the highest profit margin of any company in the S&P 500 for five years in a row.204 Its ratings on 202 “Summary Report of Issues Identified in the Commission Staff’s Examinations of Select Credit Rating Agencies,” Securities and Exchange Commission, July 2008, available at: <http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2008/cra examination070808.pdf>. 203 “Summary Report of Issues Identified in the Commission Staff’s Examinations of Select Credit Rating Agencies,” Securities and Exchange Commission, July 2008, available at: <http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2008/cra examination070808.pdf>. 204Opening Statement of Rep. Henry A. Wax- MBSs and CDOs — heavily weighted with toxic subprime mortgages — contributed to more than half of the company’s ratings revenue by 2006.205 Although the ratings firms are for-profit companies, they perform a quasi-public function. Their failure alone could be considered a regulatory failure. But the credit rating failure has a much more direct public connection. Government agencies explicitly relied on private credit rating firms to regulate all kinds of public and private activities. And, following the failure of the credit ratings firms in the Enron and related scandals, Congress passed legislation giving the SEC regulatory power, of a sort, over the firms. However, the 2006 legislation prohibited the SEC from actually regulating the credit ratings process. The Securities and Exchange Commission was the first government agency to man, Before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, October 22, 2008, available at: <http://oversight.house.gov/documents/2008 1022102221.pdf>. 205 Rep. Jackie Speier, Before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives, October 22, 2008, available at: <http://oversight.house.gov/documents/2008 1023162631.pdf>. “With enormous fees at stake, it is not hard to see how these [credit rating] companies may have been induced, at the very least, to gloss over the possibilities of default or, at the worst, knowingly provide inflated ratings.” 96 SOLD OUT incorporate credit rating requirements directly into its regulations. In response to the credit crisis of the early 1970s, the SEC promulgated Rule 15c3-1 (the net capital rule) which formally approved the use of credit rating firms as National Recognized Statistical Ratings Organizations (NRSROs).206 Rule 15c3-1 requires investment banks to set aside certain amounts of capital whenever they purchase a bond from a corporation or government. By requiring “capital set asides,” a financial “cushion” is created on which investment banks can fall in the event of bond default. The amount of capital required to be set aside depends on the risk assessment of each bond by the credit rating firms. Purchasing bonds that have a high risk of default, as determined by one of the credit rating companies, requires a larger capital set asides than bonds that are assessed to present a low risk of default. The “risk” or probability of default is determined for each bond by a credit rating company hired by the issuer of the bond. Since the SEC’s adoption of the net capital rule, credit ratings have been incorporated into hundreds of government regulations in areas including securities, pensions, banking, real estate, and insurance. For example, Moody’s Investor Service 206 Arthur R. Pinto, “Section III: Commercial and Labor Law: Control and Responsibility of Credit Rating Agencies in the United States,” American Journal of Comparative Law, 54 Am. J. Comp. L. 341, Supplement, Fall 2006. gives a rank of “C” for the lowest rated (i.e. high risk) bonds and a rank of “Aaa” — “triple A” — for bonds that are low risk and earn its highest rating. Examples of highly rated bonds include those issued by wellcapitalized corporations, while bonds issued by corporations with a history of financial problems earn a low rating. If a bank begins experiencing financial problems, Moody’s may downgrade the bank’s bonds. It might downgrade from a high grade of “Aaa” to a medium grade of “Baa” or even the dreaded “C,” depending on the severity of the bank’s financial problems. Downgrading bonds can trigger a requirement imposed by regulations or private contracts that require the corporation to immediately raise capital to protect its business. Banks might be forced to raise capital by selling securities or even the real estate it owns. Evidence of falling home values began emerging in late 2006, but there were no downgrades of subprime mortgage-related securities by credit rating agencies until June 2007.207 Indeed, the credit ratings firms had 207 Testimony of Jerome S. Fons, Former Managing Director of Credit Policy, Moody's, Before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives, October 22, 2008, available at: <http://oversight.house.gov/documents/2008 1022102726.pdf> (citing Gary Gorton, 2008, “The Panic of 2007,” NBER working paper #14358); but see Gretchen Moregenson, “Investors in mortgage-backed securities fail to react to market plunge,” International Herald Tribune, February 18, SOLD OUT 97 failed to recognize the housing bubble, and the inevitability that when the enormous bubble burst, it would lead to massive mortgage defaults and the severe depreciation in value of mortgage-backed securities. The firms also failed to consider that many mortgage-backed securities were based on dubious subprime and exploitative predatory loans that could not conceivably be repaid. The current financial crisis is not the first time credit rating companies dropped the ball. During the dot-com bubble of the late 1990s, they were the “last ones to react, in every case” and “downgraded companies only after all the bad news was in, frequently just days before a bankruptcy filing.” 208 In addition, the firms were criticized in 2003 for failing to alert investors to the impending collapse of Enron and World- Com. As a result, Congress passed the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006209 which requires disclosure to the SEC of a general description of each firm’s procedures and methodologies for determining credit ratings, including historical downgrade and default rates within each of its credit rating categories. It also grants the 2007, available at: <http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/02/18/yo urmoney/morgenson.php>. (Moody’s “downgraded only 277 subprime home equity loan tranches [in 2006], just 2 percent of the home equity securities rated by the agency.”) 208 Frank Partnoy, Infectious Greed: How Deceit and Risk Corrupted the Financial Markets 352, New York: Times Books (2003). 209 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7. SEC broad authority to examine all books and records of the companies. However, intense lobbying by the rating firms blocked further reforms, and the law expressly states that the SEC has no authority to regulate the “substance of the credit ratings or the procedures and methodologies” by which any firm determines credit ratings. In 2007, SEC Chair Christopher Cox said, “it is not our role to second-guess the quality of the rating agencies’ ratings.”210 In the highly deregulated financial markets of the last few decades, the credit rating firms were supposed to be the independent watchdogs that carefully scrutinized corporations and the financial products that they offered to investors. Like the federal agencies and Congress, the credit rating companies failed to protect the public. 210 Testimony of SEC Chairman Christopher Cox, Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, September 26, 2007, available at: <http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2007/t s092607cc.htm>.³
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Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Corruption
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Woof 6th Post
58 SOLD OUT FAILURE TO PREVENT PREDATORY LENDING Subprime loans are those made to persons who ostensibly have a poor credit history. Predatory loans are, to a significant extent, a subset of subprime loans.103 A bank is engaged in predatory lending when it gtak[es] advantage of a borrowerfs lack of sophistication to give them a loan whose rates and terms may not be beneficial to the borrower.h104 Common predatory terms 103 Non-prime mortgages known as Alt-A . with riskier borrower profiles than prime mortgages but less so than subprime . also often contain predatory terms. 104 gThe Foreclosure Epidemic: The Costs to Families and Communities of the Predictable Mortgage Meltdown,h An interview include high fees and charges associated with the loan; low teaser interest rates, which skyrocket after an initial grace period; and negative amortization loans, which require, for a time, monthly payments less than the interest due. These are, typically, unaffordable loans. The real-world examples of predatory lending are shocking. In one lawsuit, Albert Zacholl, a 74-year-old man living in Southern California, alleges that Countrywide and a pair of mortgage brokers gcold-called and aggressively baitedh him. They promised him $30,000 cash, a mortgage that would replace his previous mortgage (which was leaving him owing more each month) and a monthly payment that would not exceed $1,700. Zacholl told the brokers that his income consisted of a pension of $350 a month and Social Security payments of $958, and that with help from his son, he could afford a mortgage up to $1,700. According to the lawsuit, the broker falsified his loan application by putting down an income of $7,000 a month, and then arranged for a high-interest mortgage that required him to pay more than $3,000 a month (and failed to deliver the $30,000 cash payment). The motivation for the scam, according to the lawsuit, was to collect with Allen Fishbein, Consumer Federation of America, Multinational Monitor, May/June 2007, available at: <http://www.multinationalmonitor.org/mm2 007/052007/interview-fishbein.html>. 7 IN THIS SECTION: Even in a deregulated environment, the banking regulators retained authority to crack down on predatory lending abuses. Such enforcement activity would have protected homeowners, and lessened though not prevented the current financial crisis. But the regulators sat on their hands. The Federal Reserve took three formal actions against subprime lenders from 2002 to 2007. The Office of Comptroller of the Currency, which has authority over almost 1,800 banks, took three consumer-protection enforcement actions from 2004 to 2006. SOLD OUT 59 $13,000 in fees. In court papers, the Center for Responsible Lending reports, Countrywide responded that Zacholl gconsented to the terms of the transactionh and that any problems were the result of his own gnegligence and carelessness.h105 Preventing predatory lending practices would not have prevented the housing bubble and the subsequent financial meltdown, but it would have taken some air out of the bubble and softened the economic crisis . and it would have saved millions of families and communities across the country from economic ruin. Unlike the housing bubble itself, predatory lending was easily avoidable through sound regulation. But federal regulators were asleep at the switch, lulled into somnolence by cozy relationships with banks and Wall Street and a haze-inducing deregulatory ideology. Regulators were warned at the outset of the housing bubble about the growth in predatory lending, and public interest advocates pleaded with them to take action. They declined, refusing either to issue appropriate regulatory rules or to take enforcement actions against predatory lenders. (Congress similarly failed to act in response to the 105 Center for Responsible Lending, gUnfair and Unsafe: How Countrywidefs irresponsible practices have harmed borrowers and shareholders,h February 2008, available at: <http://www.responsiblelending.org/issues/ mortgage/countrywide-watch/unfair-andunsafe. html>. alarm bells sounded by public interest advocates.) Reviewing the record of the past seven years shows that: 1. Federal regulators . and Members of Congress . were warned at the outset of the housing bubble about the growth in predatory lending, and public interest advocates pleaded with them to take action. 2. Federal regulators . and Congress . refused to issue appropriate regulatory rules to stem predatory lending. 3. Action at the state level showed that predatory lending rules could limit abusive loans. 4. Federal regulators failed to take enforcement actions against predatory lenders. 5. After the housing bubble had popped, and the subprime lending industry collapsed, federal regulators in 2008 issued new rules to limit predatory practices. While highly imperfect, the new rules evidence what might have been done in 2001 to prevent abuses. Early Warnings on Predatory Lending Yield No Regulatory Action There are only limited federal substantive statutory requirements regarding predatory lending. These are established in the Home 60 SOLD OUT Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA), which was adopted in 1994. HOEPA effectively put an end to certain predatory practices, but only for loans containing upfront fees or charges of more than 8 percent of the loan amount, or interest rates above a varying, but very high threshold. Predatory lenders easily devised ways to work around these limitations. In 2000 and 2001, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Federal Reserve and the Office of Thrift Supervision, among other federal agencies, adopted or considered rules to further restrict predatory lending. The adopted binding rules, issued by the Federal Reserve pursuant to HOEPA, however, focused very narrowly on certain egregious practices.106 More expansive statements on predatory lending were issued only as non-binding guidelines. The reliance on non-binding guidelines continued through the decade. As regulators were issuing non-binding guidelines, public interest advocates were praising their recognition of the problem . but urging that more forceful action be 106 12 C.F.R. 226 (Regulation Z; Docket No. R- 1090), 66 Fed. Reg. 245, 65604-65622 (2001) (adjusting the price trigger for coverage under HOEPA and prohibiting certain acts). taken. gClearly, the FDIC recognizes that there is a grave problem throughout the U.S., particularly affecting low income and minority households and neighborhoods,h wrote the National Consumer Law Center and the Consumer Federation of America in January 2001 comments submitted to the FDIC. gWhile many regulators recognize the gravity of the predatory lending problem, the appropriate . and politically feasible . method of addressing the problem still appears elusive.h107 What was needed, the consumer groups argued, was binding regulation. gAll agencies should adopt a bold, comprehensive and specific series of regulations to change the mortgage marketplace,h the groups wrote, so that gpredatory mortgage practices are either specifically prohibited, or are so costly to the mortgage lender that they are not economically feasibleh while ensuring that gnecessary credit is made available with appropriate rates and terms to all Ameri- 107 National Consumer Law Center and the Consumer Federation of America, gHow to Avoid Purchasing or Investing in Predatory Mortgage Loans,h January 31, 2001, available at: <http://www.nclc.org/issues/predatory_mort gage/fdic.shtml>. Unlike the housing bubble itself, predatory lending was easily avoidable through sound regulation. But federal regulators were asleep at the switch. SOLD OUT 61 cans.h108 Public interest groups would repeat this advice again and again over the subsequent years, pointing to growing abuses and proposing specific remedies. But federal agencies, operating under the prevailing laissez-faire ideology of the Bush Administration, declined to issue any binding regulations in response to mushrooming predatory lending. They did issue additional guidance statements, but these were non-binding and consistently behind the curve of evolving lender abuses. Not surprisingly, they failed to curtail predatory lending practices. A Failure to Enforce Federal regulators also failed to enforce the rules that were on the books. From 2003 through the start of 2007, the Federal Reserve, which has jurisdiction over the entire banking industry, took a mere three formal enforcement actions109 to stop 108 National Consumer Law Center and the Consumer Federation of America, gHow to Avoid Purchasing or Investing in Predatory Mortgage Loans,h January 31, 2001, available at: <http://www.nclc.org/issues/predatory_mort gage/fdic.shtml>. 109 gGenerally, the Federal Reserve takes formal enforcement actions against [banks] for violations of laws, rules, or regulations, unsafe or unsound practices, breaches of fiduciary duty, and violations of final orders. Formal enforcement actions include cease and desist orders, written agreements, removal and prohibition orders, and orders assessing civil money penalties.h The Federal Reserve Board, gEnforcement Actions,h available at: predatory lending.110 The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), which has regulatory authority over roughly 1,800 nationally chartered banks, similarly took three public enforcement actions from 2004 to 2006.111 These numbers reflect a startling regulatory failure during the peak period of abusive subprime lending. Subprime loans made up between one-in-six and one-in-five home mortgage loans in 2004, 2005 and 2006.112 Although Federal Reserve officials now acknowledge that they should have done more, the OCC says it took appropriate action. Both agencies insist that they also addressed abuses on an informal, bank-bybank basis, ordering improved practices in connection with the agencyfs routine examinations of individual banks. The informal and non-public nature of this approach <http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/e nforcement>. 110 James Tyson, Craig Torres and Alison Vekshin, gFed Says It Could Have Acted Sooner on Subprime Rout,h Bloomberg, March 22, 2007, available at: <http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid =20601087&sid=a1.KbcMbvIiA&refer=ho me>. 111 Craig Torres and Alison Vekshin, gFed, OCC Publicly Chastised Few Lenders During Boom,h Bloomberg, March 14, 2007, available at: <http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid =20601103&sid=a6WTZifUUH7g&refer=u s>. 112 Chris Mayer and Karen Pence, gSubprime Mortgages: What, Where and to Whom,h Figure 1B, Federal Reserve, 2008, available at: <http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2 008/200829/200829pap.pdf>. 62 SOLD OUT means that Fed and OCCfs claims cannot be easily verified. Even if there were extensive private enforcement actions or conversations, such moves fail to perform important public functions. They do not signal appropriate behavior and clear rules to other lenders; and they do not provide information to victimized borrowers, thereby depriving them of an opportunity to initiate follow-on litigation to recover for harms perpetrated against them. State Action Shows What Could Have Been Done While federal regulators sat on their hands, some states adopted meaningful antipredatory lending laws and brought enforcement actions against abusive lenders. This report does not explore state regulatory successes and failures, but the ability of states to regulate and address abusive lender behavior demonstrates what federal regulators might have done. A comprehensive review of subprime loans conducted by the Center for Responsible Lending found that aggressive state regulatory action greatly reduced the number of predatory loans, without affecting borrowers access to subprime credit. gStates with anti-predatory lending laws reduced the proportion of loans with targeted [predatory] terms by 30 percentage points,h the study determined. Even this number masked the superior performance of those with the toughest laws. gStates with the strongest laws . Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, and West Virginia . are generally associated with the largest declines in targeted terms relative to states without significant protections,h the study found.113 The Center for Responsible Lending study also concluded that lending continued at a constant rate in states with antipredatory lending laws, and that gstate laws have not increased interest rates and, in some cases, borrowers actually paid lower rates for subprime mortgages after their state laws became effective compared to borrowers in states without significant protections.h In other words, eliminating abusive fees did not translate into higher interest rates.114 113 Wei Li and Keith S. Ernst, gThe Best Value in the Subprime Market: State Predatory Lending Reforms,h Center for Responsible Lending, February, 23, 2006, available at: <http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/rr0 10-State_Effects-0206.pdf>. 114 Wei Li and Keith S. Ernst, gThe Best Value in the Subprime Market: State Predatory Federal agencies, operating under the prevailing laissezfaire ideology of the Bush Administration, declined to issue any binding regulations in response to mushrooming predatory lending. SOLD OUT 63 Partially Closing the Barn Door (after the horses left and a foreclosure sign is posted) After years of inaction, and confronted with signs of the economic meltdown to come, the Federal Reserve in January 2008 finally proposed binding regulations that would apply to all lenders, not just nationally chartered banks. The Federal Reserve proposal noted the growth of subprime mortgages, claimed the expansion of subprime credit meaningfully contributed to increases in home ownership rates (a gain quickly unraveling due to the subprime-related foreclosure epidemic) and modestly suggested that g[r]ecently, however, some of this benefit has eroded. In the last two years, delinquencies and foreclosure starts have increased dramatically and reached exceptionally high levels as house price growth has slowed or prices have declined in some areas.h115 With slight modification, the Fed adopted these rules in July.116 The new regulations establish a new category of ghigher-priced mortgagesh intended to include virtually all subprime loans. The regulations prohibit a number of abusive practices in connection with these newly Lending Reforms,h Center for Responsible Lending, February, 23, 2006, available at: <http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/rr0 10-State_Effects-0206.pdf>. 115 Federal Reserve System, Truth In Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 6, 1673-74 (2008). 116 Federal Reserve System, 12 C.F.R. ˜ 226, [Regulation Z; Docket No. R-1305], 73 Fed. Reg. 147, 44521-614 (2008). defined ghigher-priced mortgages.h117 They also apply some measures . such as specified deceptive advertising practices . for all loans, regardless of whether they are subprime.118 117 Key elements of these regulations: . Prohibit a lender from engaging in a pattern or practice of making loans without considering the borrowersf ability to repay the loans from sources other than the homefs value. . Prohibit a lender from making a loan by relying on income or assets that it does not verify. . Restrict prepayment penalties only to loans that meet certain conditions, including the condition that the penalty expire at least sixty days before any possible increase in the loan payment. . Require that the lender establish an escrow account for the payment of property taxes and homeownersf insurance. The lender may only offer the borrower the opportunity to opt out of the escrow account after one year. 118 These regulatory provisions, applying to all mortgages, regardless of whether they are subprime: . Prohibit certain servicing practices, such as failing to credit a payment to a consumerfs account when the servicer receives it, failing to provide a payoff statement within a reasonable period of time, and gpyramidingh late fees. . Prohibit a creditor or broker from coercing or encouraging an appraiser to misrepresent the value of a home. . Prohibit seven misleading or deceptive advertising practices for closed-end loans; for example, using the term gfixedh to describe a rate that is not truly fixed. It would also require that all applicable rates or payments be disclosed in advertisements with equal prominence as advertised introductory or gteaserh rates. . Require truth-in-lending disclosures to borrowers early enough to use while shopping for a mortgage. Lenders could not charge fees until after the consumer receives the disclosures, except a fee to 64 SOLD OUT These measures are not inconsequential. They show the kind of action the Federal Reserve could have taken at the start of this decade . moves that could have dramatically altered the subsequent course of events. But the 2008 regulations remain inadequate, as a coalition of consumer and housing groups has specified in great detail,119 because they fail to break with longstanding deregulatory nostrums. The Fed continues to emphasize the importance of enabling lenders to make credit available to minority and lower-income communities . historically, a deep-rooted concern . while failing to acknowledge that the overriding problem has become lenders willing to make credit available, but on abusive terms. gThe proposed regulations continue to be most protective of the flawed concept that access to credit should be the guiding principle for credit regulation. These regulations need to be significantly strengthened in order for consumers to be adequately proobtain a credit report. 119 National Consumer Law Center, Consumer Action, Consumer Federation of America, Consumers Union, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, National Association of Consumer Advocates, National Fair Housing Alliance, and the Empire Justice Center (gNational Consumer Law Center et. al.h), gComments to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Regarding Proposed Regulations Relating to Unfair Trade Practices In Connection with Mortgage Lending,h April 2008, available at: <http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/HOEPA _comments_NCLC_final.pdf>. tected,h argue the consumer and housing groups. They provide an extensive list of needed revisions to the proposed regulations, including that the regulations: . Cover all loans, including prime loans; . Require an gability to repayh analysis for each loan; . Ban prepayment penalties; . Address lender and originator incentives for appraisal fraud; and . Provide effective private litigation remedies for victimized borrowers. 120 120 National Consumer Law Center, et. al., gComments to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Regarding Proposed Regulations Relating to Unfair Trade Practices In Connection with Mortgage Lending,h April 2008, available at: <http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/HOEPA _comments_NCLC_final.pdf>. SOLD OUT 65 ORIGINS OF THE HOUSING BUBBLE The housing bubble can be traced to a series of inter-related developments in the macro-economy, themselves due in significant part to political choices. First, the Federal Reserve lowered interest rates to historically low levels in response to the economic downturn that followed the collapse of the stock market bubble of the 1990s and the additional economic slowdown after 9/11. Low interest rates had beneficial effects in spurring economic activity, but they also created the conditions for the housing bubble, as cheap credit made mortgage financing an attractive proposition for home buyers. Cheap credit was not a result only of Fed interest rate decisions. A second contributing factor to the housing bubble was the massive influx of capital into the United States from China. Chinafs capital surplus was the mirror image of the U.S. trade deficit . U.S. corporations were sending dollars to China in exchange for goods sold to U.S. consumers. China then reinvested much of that surplus in the U.S. bond market, with the effect of keeping U.S. interest rates low. Cheap credit did not automatically mean there would be a housing bubble. Crucially, government officials failed to intervene to pop the housing bubble. As economists Dean Baker and Mark Weisbrot of the Center for Economic and Policy Research insisted at the time, simply by identifying the bubble . and adjusting public perception of the future of the housing market . Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan could have prevented or at least contained the bubble. He declined, and even denied the existence of a bubble. There were reasons why Greenspan and other top officials did not act to pop the bubble. They advanced expanded home ownership as an ideological goal. While this objective is broadly shared across the political spectrum, the Bush administration and Greenspanfs ideological commitment to the goal biased them to embrace growing home buying uncritically . without regard to whether new buyers could afford the homes they were buying, or the loans they were getting. Perhaps more importantly, the housing bubble was the engine of an 66 SOLD OUT economy that otherwise was stalled. Rising home prices contributed to the huge growth of the construction industry; Wall Street grew rich on mortgagerelated securities and exotic financial instruments; and people borrowed en masse against the rising value of their homes to spend more and keep the economy functioning. The toxic stew of financial deregulation and the housing bubble created the circumstances in which aggressive lenders were nearly certain to abuse vulnerable borrowers through predatory lending terms. The terms of your loan donft matter, they effectively purred to borrowers, so long as the value of your house is going up. They duped borrowers into conditions they could not possibly satisfy, making the current rash of defaults and foreclosures on subprime loans inevitable. Effective regulation of lending practices could have prevented the abusive loans. SOLD OUT 67 FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE CONSUMER PROTECTION LAWS In 2003, the Comptroller of the Currency, John D. Hawke, Jr., announced that he was preempting state predatory lending laws. This ruling meant that nationally chartered banks . which include the largest U.S. banks . would be subject to federal banking standards, but not the more stringent consumer protection rules adopted by many states. The Comptrollerfs decision was a direct response to a request from the nationfs biggest banks. It was prompted by a petition from Cleveland-based National City Bank, which challenged the application of the Georgia Fair Lending Act to its operations in Georgia. The Comptroller agreed with National Cityfs contention that the federal banking laws, the history of federal regulation of national banks and relevant legislative history all supported the conclusion that federal regulatory authority should supersede and override any state regulation regarding predatory lending.121 In its petition, National City argued that the effect of the Georgia law gis to limit National Cityfs ability to originate and to establish the terms of credit on residential real estate loans and lines of credit, including loans or lines of credit submitted by a third party mortgage broker. GFLA [the Georgia Fair Lending Act] has significantly impaired National Cityfs ability to originate residential real estate loans in Georgia.h It is instructive to identify the provisions of the Georgia law, a path breaking anti-predatory lending initiative, to which National City objected. The Georgia law included a wide range of consumer protections that consumer groups applauded but which National City complained would interfere with its freedom to operate: GFLA establishes specific and burdensome limitations on mortgage.secured loans and lines of credit that significantly interfere with National Cityfs ability to 121 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency [Docket No. 03-17] Preemption Determination and Order, august 5, 2003, Federal Register, Vol. 688. No. 150, 46264.) 8 IN THIS SECTION: When the states sought to fill the vacuum created by federal nonenforcement of consumer protection laws against predatory lenders, the feds jumped to stop them. gIn 2003,h as Eliot Spitzer recounted, gduring the height of the predatory lending crisis, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency invoked a clause from the 1863 National Bank Act to issue formal opinions preempting all state predatory lending laws, thereby rendering them inoperative. The OCC also promulgated new rules that prevented states from enforcing any of their own consumer protection laws against national banks.h 68 SOLD OUT make these loans. All Home Loans are subject to restrictions on the terms of credit and certain loan related fees, including the prohibition of financing of credit insurance, debt cancellation and suspension coverage, and limiting late charges and prohibiting payoff and release fees. If the loan or line of credit is a Covered Home Loan which refinances a Home Loan which was closed within the previous five years, National City is restricted from originating it unless the refinanced transaction meets standards established by GFLA. If the loan or line of credit is a High Cost Home Loan, GFLA does not permit National City to originate it unless the borrower has received advance counseling with respect to the advisability of the transaction from a third party nonprofit organization. GFLA regulates National Cityfs ability to determine the borrowerfs ability to repay the High Cost Home Loan. GFLA restricts, and in some cases prohibits, the imposition by National City of certain credit terms or servicing fees on High Cost Home Loans, including: prepayment penalties, balloon payments, advance loan payments, acceleration in the lenderfs discretion, negative amortization, post-default interest and fees to modify, renew, amend or extend the loan or defer a payment. Any High Cost Home Loan must contain a specific disclosure that it is subject to special rules, including purchaser and assignee liability, under GFLA. Finally, GFLA imposes preforeclosure requirements. GFLA currently creates strict assignee liability for all subsequent holders of a home loan. GFLA provides a private right of action for borrowers against lenders, mortgage brokers, assignees and servicers for injunctive and declaratory relief as well as actual damages, including incidental and consequential damages, statutory damages equal to forfeiture of all interest or twice the interest paid, punitive damages, attorneysf fees and costs. In addition, the Georgia Attorney General, district attorneys, the Commissioner of Banking and Finance and, with respect to the insurance provisions, the Commissioner of Insurance has the jurisdiction to enforce GFLA through their general state regulatory powers and civil process. Criminal penalties are also available. 122 The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) 2003 preemption decision was the latest in a long series of actions by the agency to preempt state laws. Following passage of the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, the OCC had by regulation specifically preempted a number of state law consumer protections, including the minimum requirements for down payments, loan repayment schedules and minimum periods of time for loans. These state rules afforded consumers greater protection than federal statutes. The 2003 decision concluded that Georgiafs rules transgressed some of these longstanding regulatory preemptions, but then went further and preempted the Georgia rules entirely, as they applied to national banks. In conjunction with the OCCfs announcement on the Georgia case, it launched a rulemaking on the general issue of federal preemption of all state regulation of national banks. In January 2004, it issued rules preempting all state regulation of national banks.123 The OCC also announced rules 122 Letter from Thomas Plant to Julie Williams (National Cityfs Request for OCC preemption of the Georgia Fair Lending Act), February 11, 2003, appendix to Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Docket No. 03-04, Notice of Request for preemption Determination and Order. 123 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 12 CFR Parts 7 and 34, [Docket No. 04-xx], RIN 1557-AC73. SOLD OUT 69 prohibiting state regulators from exercising gvisitorial powersh . meaning inspection, supervision and oversight . of national banks.124 The stated rationale for these preemptive moves was that differing state standards subjected national banks to extra costs and reduced the availability of credit. gToday,h said Hawke in announcing the new rules, gas a result of technology and our mobile society, many aspects of the financial services business are unrelated to geography or jurisdictional boundaries, and efforts to apply restrictions and directives that differ based on a geographic source increase the costs of offering products or result in a reduction in their availability, or both. In this environment, the ability of national banks to operate under consistent, uniform national standards administered by the OCC will be a crucial factor in their business future.h125 Hawke 124 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 12 CFR Part 7, [Docket No. 04-xx], RIN 1557- AC78. 125 Statement of Comptroller of the Currency John Hawke, Jr., Regarding the Issuance of argued that national banks were not engaged in predatory lending on any scale of consequence; that federal regulation was sufficient; and that federal guidance on predatory lending . issued in conjunction with the preemptive moves . provided additional and satisfactory guarantees for consumers. Former New York State Attorney General (and former Governor) Eliot Spitzer put these actions in perspective in a February 2008 opinion column in the Washington Post.126 gPredatory lending was widely understood [earlier in the decade] to present a looming national crisis,h Spitzer wrote. gThis threat was so clear that as New York attorney general, I joined with colleagues in the other 49 states in attempting to fill the void left by the federal government. Indi- Regulations Concerning Preemption and Visitorial Powers, January 7, 2004, available at: <http://occ.gov/newrules.htm>. 126 Eliot Spitzer, gPredatory Lendersf Partner in Crime How the Bush Administration Stopped the States From Stepping In to Help Consumers,h Washington Post, February 14, 2008, available at: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/ content/article/2008/02/13/AR20080213 02783.html>. Referring to the OCCfs preemptive measures, Spitzer wrote, gNot only did the Bush administration do nothing to protect consumers, it embarked on an aggressive and unprecedented campaign to prevent states from protecting their residents from the very problems to which the federal government was turning a blind eye.h 70 SOLD OUT vidually, and together, state attorneys general of both parties brought litigation or entered into settlements with many subprime lenders that were engaged in predatory lending practices. Several state legislatures, including New Yorkfs, enacted laws aimed at curbing such practices.h Referring to the OCCfs preemptive measures, Spitzer wrote, gNot only did the Bush administration do nothing to protect consumers, it embarked on an aggressive and unprecedented campaign to prevent states from protecting their residents from the very problems to which the federal government was turning a blind eye. c The federal governmentfs actions were so egregious and so unprecedented that all 50 state attorneys general, and all 50 state banking superintendents, actively fought the new rules.h gBut the unanimous opposition of the 50 states did not deter, or even slow, the Bush administration in its goal of protecting the banks,h Spitzer noted. When state law enforcement agencies tried to crack down on predatory lending in their midst, the OCC intervened to stop them. Wrote Spitzer, gIn fact, when my office opened an investigation of possible discrimination in mortgage lending by a number of banks, the OCC filed a federal lawsuit to stop the investigation.h John Hawkefs successor as Comptroller John Dugan, denies Spitzerfs assertions. gThe OCC established strong protections against predatory lending practices years ago, and has applied those standards through examinations of every national bank,h he said. gAs a result, predatory mortgage lenders have avoided national banks like the plague. The abuses consumers have complained about most . such as loan flipping and equity stripping . are not tolerated in the national banking system. And the looser lending practices of the subprime market simply have not gravitated to national banks: They originated just 10 percent of subprime loans in 2006, when underwriting standards were weakest, and delinquency rates on those loans are well below the national average.h127 Even if it is true that federal banks originated fewer abusive loans, they clearly financed predatory subprime loans through bank intermediaries, securitized predatory subprime loans and held them in great quantities. In any case, the scale of federal bank financing of predatory loans was still substantial. Alys Cohen of the National Consumer Law Center notes that Wachovia was a national bank that collapsed in significant part because of the unaffordable mortgage loans it originated. 127 John Dugan, gComptroller Dugan Responds to Governor Spitzer,h news release, February 14, 2008, available at: <http://www.occ.gov/ftp/release/2008- 16.htm>. SOLD OUT 71 Cohen of the National Consumer Law Center notes as well that the OCCfs preemptive actions protected federal banks from three distinct set of consumer protections. First, they were immunized from state banking laws that offered consumers greater protection than the OCCfs standards. Second, the national banks were protected from private lawsuits brought under state law to enforce consumer rights. As noted above, federal voluntary standards made it difficult for victimized borrowers to file suit. Third, the OCC preempted the application of general state consumer protection law (as distinct from banking-specific rules) to national banks. This includes even basic contract and tort law. Finally, Cohen emphasizes that the OCC preemptive measures applied not just to the national banks themselves, but to their non-supervised affiliates and agents. Meanwhile, the federal agency responsible for regulating federally chartered savings and loans, the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), adopted parallel preemptive actions. In 2003, OTS announced its determination that New York and Georgiafs antipredatory lending laws did not apply to federal thrifts. Like OCC, OTS took an aggressive posture, arguing that it goccupied the fieldh for regulation of federally chartered institutions. OTS was explicit that it wanted to preserve gmaximum flexibilityh for thrifts to design loans. The agency said its objective was to genable federal savings associations to conduct their operations in accordance with best practices by efficiently delivering low-cost credit to the public free from undue regulatory duplication and burden.h128 gFederal law authorizes OTS to provide federal savings associations with a uniform national regulatory environment for their lending operations,h said OTS Director James E. Gilleran in announcing the preemptive decision. gThis enables and encourages federal thrifts to provide low-cost credit safely and soundly on a nationwide basis. By requiring federal thrifts to treat custom- 128 Letter from Carolyn J. Buck, Chief Counsel, Office of Thrift Supervision, January 30, 2003, available at: <http://www.ots.gov/index.cfm?p=PressRel eases&ContentRecord_id=f8613720-2c1d- 42f4-8608- f6362c04b6e2&ContentType_id=4c12f337- b5b6-4c87-b45c- 838958422bf3&YearDisplay=2003>. Even if it is true that federal banks originated fewer abusive loans, they clearly financed predatory subprime loans through bank intermediaries, securitized predatory subprime loans and held them in great quantities. 72 SOLD OUT ers in New York differently, the New York law would impose increased costs and an undue regulatory burden.h129 The federal governmentfs regulatory approach ultimately boomeranged on the regulated institutions. With the popping of the housing bubble, predatory loans proved a disaster not just for borrowers but for lenders or those banks that purchased subprime mortgage contracts. IndyMac and Washington Mutual are two federal thrifts that collapsed as a result of the bad subprime mortgage loans that they administered. 129 gOTS Says New York Law Doesnft Apply To Federal Thrifts,h news release, January 30, 2003, available at: <http://www.ots.gov/index.cfm?p=PressRel eases&ContentRecord_id=f8613720-2c1d- 42f4-8608- f6362c04b6e2&ContentType_id=4c12f337- b5b6-4c87-b45c- 838958422bf3&YearDisplay=2003>. SOLD OUT 73 ESCAPING ACCOUNTABILITY: ASSIGNEE LIABILITY gAssignee liabilityh is the principle that legal responsibility for wrongdoing in issuing a loan extends to a third party that acquires a loan. Thus, if a mortgage bank issues a predatory loan and then sells the loan to another bank, assignee liability would hold the second bank liable for any legal claims that the borrower might be able to bring against the original lender. Competing in the law with assignee liability is the gholder-in-due-courseh doctrine, which establishes that a third party purchasing a debt instrument is not liable for problems with the debt instrument, so long as those problems are not apparent on the face of the instrument. Under the holder-indue- course-doctrine, a second bank acquiring a predatory loan is not liable for claims that may be brought by the borrower against the original lender, so long as those potential claims are not obvious. The Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA),130 the key federal protection against predatory loans, attempted to reconcile these conflicting principles. Passed in 1994, HOEPA does establish assignee liability, but it only applies to a limited category of very high-cost loans (i.e., loans with very high interest rates and/or fees). For those loans, a borrower may sue an assignee of a mortgage that violates HOEPAfs anti-predatory lending terms, seeking either damages or rescission (meaning all fees and interest payments will be applied to pay down the principle of the loan, after which the borrower could refinance with a non-predatory loan). For all 130 The Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994 amended the Truth-in-Lending Act by adding Section 129 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. ˜ 1639. It is implemented by Sections 226.31 and 226.32 of Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. ˜˜ 226.31 and 226.32. 9 IN THIS SECTION: Under existing federal law, only the original mortgage lender is liable for any predatory and illegal features of a mortgage . even if the mortgage is transferred to another party. This arrangement effectively immunized acquirers of the mortgage (gassigneesh) for any problems with the initial loan, and relieved them of any duty to investigate the terms of the loan. Wall Street interests could purchase, bundle and securitize subprime loans . including many with pernicious, predatory terms . without fear of liability for illegal loan terms. The arrangement left victimized borrowers with no cause of action against any but the original lender, and typically with no defenses against being foreclosed upon. Representative Bob Ney, ROhio . a close friend of Wall Street who subsequently went to prison in connection with the Abramoff scandal . was the leading opponent of a fair assignee liability regime. 74 SOLD OUT other mortgage loans, federal law applies the holder in due course doctrine.131 The rapid and extensive transfer of subprime loans, including abusive predatory loans, among varying parties was central to the rapid proliferation of subprime lending. Commonly, mortgage brokers worked out deals with borrowers, who then obtained a mortgage from an initial mortgage lender (often a non-bank lender, such as Countrywide, with which the broker worked). The mortgage lender would then sell the loan to a larger bank with which it maintained relations. Ultimately, such mortgages were pooled with others into a mortgage-backed security, sold by a large commercial bank or investment bank. Under existing federal law, none but the original mortgage lender is liable for any predatory and illegal features of the mortgage (so long as it is not a high-cost loan covered by HOEPA). This arrangement relieved acquirers of the mortgage of any duty to investigate the terms of the loan and effectively immunized them from liability for the initial loan.132 It also left the borrow- 131 Lisa Keyfetz, gThe Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994: Extending Liability for Predatory Subprime Loans to Secondary Mortgage Market Participants,h 18 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 2, 151 (2005). 132 See Eric Nalder, gPoliticians, lobbyists shielded financiers: Lack of liability laws fueled firms' avarice,h Seattle Post- Intelligencer, October 10, 2008, available at: <http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/business/382 707_mortgagecrisis09.html>. (gA principle known as assignee liability would have alers with no cause of action against any but the original lender. In many cases, this lender no longer exists as a legal entity. And, even where the initial lender still exists, while it can pay damages, it no longer has the ability to cure problems with the mortgage itself; only the current holder of the mortgage can modify it. Thus, a borrower could not exercise a potential rescission remedy, or take other action during the course of litigation to prevent the holder of his or her mortgage from foreclosing upon him or her or demanding unfair payments. A hypothetical recovery of damages from the original lender long after the home is foreclosed upon is of little solace to the homeowner. The severe consequences of not applying assignee liability in the mortgage context have long been recognized. Consumer advocates highlighted the problem early in the 2000fs boom in predatory lending. Margot Saunders of the National Consumer Law Center explained the problem in testimony to the House of Representativesf Financial Services Committee in 2003. lowed borrowers to sue anyone holding paper on their loan, from the originators who sold it to them to the Wall Street investment bankers who ultimately funded it. Without the measure in place, Wall Street increased by eightfold its financing of subprime and nontraditional loans between 2001 and 2006, including mortgages in which borrowers with no proof of income, jobs or assets were encouraged by brokers to take out loans, according to statistics provided by mortgage trackers.h) SOLD OUT 75 gTake, for example, the situation where homeowners sign a loan and mortgage for home improvements secured by their home. The documents do not include the required FTC Notice of Preservation of Claims and Defenses, and the contact information provided by the home improvement contractor is useless. The home improvement work turns out to be shoddy and useless, but the assignee of the loan claims to have no knowledge of the status of the work, instead claiming it is an innocent third party assignee that merely wants its monthly payments. When the homeowners refuse to pay, the assignee claims the rights of a holder in due course and begins foreclosure proceedings.h The absence of assignee liability enabled Wall Street interests to bundle subprime loans . including many with pernicious, predatory terms . and securitize them, without fear of facing liability for unconscionable terms in the loans. Had a regime of assignee liability been in place, securitizers and others up the lending chain would have been impelled to impose better systems of control on brokers and initial mortgage lenders, because otherwise they would have faced liability themselves. For community development and consumer advocates, the case for expanded assignee liability has long been clear. Argued Saunders in her 2003 testimony, gMost importantly consider the question of who should bear the risk in a faulty transaction. Assume 1) an innocent consumer (victim of an illegal loan), 2) an originator guilty of violating the law and profiting from the making of an illegal loan, and 3) an innocent holder of the illegal note. As between the two innocent parties . the consumer and the holder . who is best able to protect against the risk of loss associated with the making of an illegal loan? It is clear that the innocent party who is best able to protect itself from loss resulting from the illegality of another is not the consumer, but the corporate assignee.h 133 133 Margot Saunders, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Housing and Community Opportunity & Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of the Financial Services Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, gProtecting Homeowners: Preventing Abusive Lending While Preserving Access to Credit,h November 5, 2003, available at: <http://financialservices.house.gov/media/p df/110503ms.pdf>. Had a regime of assignee liability been in place, securitizers and others up the lending chain would have been impelled to impose better systems of control on brokers and initial mortgage lenders, because otherwise they would have faced liability themselves. 76 SOLD OUT Making the case even more clear, players in the secondary market . the acquirers of mortgages . were not innocent parties. They were often directly involved in enabling predatory lending by mortgage brokers, and were well aware of the widespread abuses in the subprime market. Explain reporters Paul Muolo and Mathew Padilla, authors of Chain of Blame: How Wall Street Caused the Mortgage and Credit Crisis, gBrokers wouldnft even exist without wholesalers, and wholesalers wouldnft be able to fund loans unless Wall Street was buying. It wasnft the loan brokersf job to approve the customerfs application and check all the financial information; that was the wholesalerfs job, or at least it was supposed to be. Brokers didnft design the loans, either. The wholesalers and Wall Street did that. If Wall Street wouldnft buy, then there would be no loan to fund.h134 The securitizers had a counterargument against calls for assignee liability. They claimed that assignee liability would impose unrealistic monitoring duties on purchasers of mortgage loans, and would therefore freeze up markets for securitized loans. The result, they said, would be less credit for homebuyers, especially those with imperfect credit histories. Lenders and securitizers opposed pro- 134 Paul Muolo and Mathew Padilla, Chain of Blame: How Wall Street Caused the Mortgage and Credit Crisis, New York: Wiley, 2008. 295. posals to require subsequent purchasers of mortgage debt to bear legal responsibility. gLegislators must be extremely cautious in making changes that upset secondary market dynamics,h warned Steve Nadon, chair of the industry group the Coalition for Fair and Affordable Lending (CFAL) and Chief Operating Officer of Option One Mortgage, an H&R Block subsidiary, in 2003 congressional testimony, gbecause unfettered access to the capital markets is largely responsible for having dramatically increased nonprime credit availability and for lowering costs for millions of Americans. Lenders and secondary market purchasers believe that it is very unfair to impose liability when there is no reasonable way that the loan or securities holder could have known of the violation. In any case, we feel that liability generally should apply only if the assignee by reasonable due diligence knew or should have known of a violation of the law based on what is evident on the face of the loan documents.h135 gPredatory lending is harmful and 135 Testimony of Steve Nadon, chair of the Coalition for Fair and Affordable Lending (CFAL) and chief operating officer of Option One Mortgage on gProtecting Homeowners: Preventing Abusive Lending While Preserving Access to Credith before the Subcommittees on Housing and Community Opportunity & Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of the Financial Services Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, November 5, 2003, available at: <http://financialservices.house.gov/media/p df/110503sn.pdf>. SOLD OUT 77 needs to be stopped. Imposing open-ended liability on secondary market participants for the actions of lenders, however, will ultimately have the effect of limiting credit for those who need it most,h echoed Micah Green, president of The Bond Market Association, two years later.136 (Proponents of assignee liability emphasize they have sought not openended liability, but the kind of measurable liability that applies under HOEPA.) Securitizers not only defended the default federal application of the holder in due course doctrine for non-HOEPA loans, they supported legislation introduced by Representative Bob Ney, R-Ohio . who subsequently went to prison in connection with the Jack Abramoff corruption scandal137 . that would have preempted state rules applying assignee liability.138 gUsing any- 136 gThe Bond Market Association and the American Securitization Forum Applaud Responsible Lending Act,h news release, March 15, 2005, available at: <http://www.americansecuritization.com/sto ry.aspx?id=264>. 137 Philip Shenon, gNey Is Sentenced to 2 1.2 Years in Abramoff Case,h New York Times, January 20, 2007, available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/20/washi ngton/20ney.html?_r=>. 138 Diana B. Henriques with Jonathan Fuerbringer, gBankers Opposing New State Curbs on Unfair Loans,h New York Times, February 14, 2003, available at: <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html ?res=9405E2D7153AF937A25751C0A9659 thing but a single set of objective and readily detectable standards to determine whether an assignee has liability is a regulatory approach that threatens to undermine many of the benefits of the secondary market,h Green testified before the House Financial Services Committee in 2005. gFaced with this type of environment, secondary market participants may find it less attractive to purchase and repackage subprime loans.h139 In a 2004 statement submitted to the House Financial Services Committee, the Housing Policy Council, made up of 17 of the largest U.S. mortgage finance companies, argued that diverse state standards relating to assignee liability were unfairly impinging on lenders and undermining access to credit among poor communities. gIn the absence of a national law, lenders face growing problems: (1) a number of states, and even cities and counties, pass C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all>. 139 Testimony of Micah Green, president, The Bond Market Association, on gLegislative Solution to Abusive Market Lending Practices,h before the Financial Services Committee, Subcommittee on Housing and Community Opportunity and Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit, U.S. House of Representatives, May 24, 2005, available at: <http://financialservices.house.gov/media/p df/052405msg.pdf>. Securitizers continue to defend their position on assignee liability, even though it encourages the practices that helped fuel the subprime mess. 78 SOLD OUT widely different legislation that causes a variety of administrative and legal problems. What is permitted in some locales is not in others, sometimes even within the same state; (2) states and subdivisions begin competing to devise new restrictions; (3) because of the lack of uniformity and great variety of differences between jurisdictions the chances of honest mistakes are compounded and the possibility of litigation is magnified; (4) litigation adversely impacts the reputations of lenders, and (5) lenders decide that making loans in states and municipalities with broad and vague statutes is no longer worth the risk to their reputations, and assignees decide that buying or lending against these loans is also not worth the risk for them. The end result is actually less credit for borrowers.h140 Further, the Housing Policy Council asserted, under a national standard, assignee liability should only apply where an assignee had actual knowledge that a loan was flawed, or intentionally failed to use due diligence (itself a weak standard). 141 140 Statement of the Housing Policy Council of the Financial Services Roundtable, before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit and the Subcommittee on Housing and Community Opportunity, gPromoting Homeownership by Ensuring Liquidity in the Subprime Mortgage Market,h June 23, 2004, available at: <http://financialservices.house.gov/media/p df/062304hpc.pdf>. 141 Statement of the Housing Policy Council of the Financial Services Roundtable, Before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions Neyfs preemptive legislation regarding assignee liability never became law, but it helped frame the debate so that the mortgage lenders, banks and Wall Street were on the offensive . demanding even reduced standards of assignee liability, rather than a legal standard that would place responsibility on securitizers (the banks and investment banks that bundled loans into mortgagebacked securities) for predatory loans and give predatory loan victims a timely opportunity in court to prevent foreclosure. Securitizers continue to defend their position on assignee liability, even though it encourages the practices that helped fuel the subprime mess. In a June 2007 paper, the American Securitization Forum (ASF) argued that, gIn addition to being largely unnecessary, any federal legislation that would expose secondary market participants to assignee liability that is very high or unquantifiable would have severe repercussions.h The ASF repeats the arguments of yesterday: that securitization has increased capital available and Consumer Credit and the Subcommittee on Housing and Community Opportunity, gPromoting Homeownership by Ensuring Liquidity in the Subprime Mortgage Market,h June 23, 2004, available at: <http://financialservices.house.gov/media/p df/062304hpc.pdf>. gActions and defenses,h asserted the Housing Policy Council, gmust be limited to those that are based on actual knowledge of the assignee of the existence of the violations in the loans assigned to them, or intentional failure to use appropriate due diligence in reviewing the loans assigned.h SOLD OUT 79 to subprime markets and helped expand homeownership; that assignees have an economic incentive to ensure acquired loans that are unlikely to default; that it is unreasonable to ask assignees to investigate all securitized loans; and that assignee liability would dry up the secondary loan market with dire consequences.142 Asserted the ASF, gThe imposition of overly burdensome and potentially unquantifiable liability on the secondary market . for abusive origination practices of which assignees have no knowledge and which were committed by parties over whom they have no control . would therefore severely affect the willingness of investors and other entities to extend the capital necessary to fund subprime mortgage lending. As a result, at precisely the time when increased liquidity is essential to ensuring the financial health of the housing market, schemes imposing overly burdensome assignee liability threaten to cause a contraction and deleterious repricing of mortgage credit.h143 142 American Securitization Forum, gAssignee Liability in the Secondary Mortgage Market: Position Paper of the American Securitization Forum,h June 2007, available at: <http://www.americansecuritization.com/upl oaded- Files/Assignee%20Liability%20Final%20V ersion_060507.pdf>. 143 American Securitization Forum, gAssignee Liability in the Secondary Mortgage Market: Position Paper of the American Securitization Forum,h June 2007, available at: <http://www.americansecuritization.com/upl oaded- Files/Assignee%20Liability%20Final%20V That these arguments are overblown and misplaced was clear at the start of the subprime boom. They are now utterly implausible. As a fairness matter, assignees will often be the only party able to offer relief to victims of predatory loans, and victims often need to be able to bring claims against assignees in order to prevent unjust foreclosures; the hypothetical incentives for assignees to avoid loans that could not be paid off proved illusory; assignees have ample capacity to police the loans they acquire, including by hiring third-party investigators or by contractual arrangement with mortgage originators; and the overarching problem for lower-income families and communities since 2001 has not been too little credit, but too much poor quality credit. ersion_060507.pdf>.
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Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Corruption
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on: December 11, 2011, 02:46:35 AM
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Woof, 5th Post; SOLD OUT 39 THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH REJECTS FINANCIAL DERIVATIVE REGULATION Over-the-counter financial derivatives are unregulated. By all accounts, this has been a disaster. As Warren Buffett warned in 2003, financial derivatives represent “weapons of mass financial destruction” because “[l]arge amounts of risk, particularly credit risk, have become concentrated in the hands of relatively few derivatives dealers” so that “[t]he troubles of one could quickly infect the others” and “trigger serious systemic problems.” 48 A financial derivative is a financial instrument whose value is determined by the value of an underlying financial asset, such as a mortgage contract, stock or bond, or by financial conditions, such as interest rates or currency values. The value of the contract is determined by fluctuations in the price of the underlying asset. Most derivatives are characterized by high leverage, meaning they are bought with enormous amounts of borrowed money. Derivatives are not a recent invention. 48 Warren Buffett, Chairman, Berkshire Hathaway, Report to Shareholders, February 21, 2003. Wrote Buffet: “Another problem about derivatives is that they can exacerbate trouble that a corporation has run into for completely unrelated reasons. This pile-on effect occurs because many derivatives contracts require that a company suffering a credit downgrade immediately supply collateral to counterparties. Imagine, then, that a company is downgraded because of general adversity and that its derivatives instantly kick in with their requirement, imposing an unexpected and enormous demand for cash collateral on the company. The need to meet this demand can then throw the company into a liquidity crisis that may, in some cases, trigger still more downgrades. It all becomes a spiral that can lead to a corporate meltdown.” Available at: <http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/ 2002pdf.pdf>. 3 IN THIS SECTION: Financial derivatives are unregulated. By all accounts this has been a disaster, as Warren Buffet’s warning that they represent “weapons of mass financial destruction” has proven prescient. Financial derivatives have amplified the financial crisis far beyond the unavoidable troubles connected to the popping of the housing bubble. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) has jurisdiction over futures, options and other derivatives connected to commodities. During the Clinton administration, the CFTC sought to exert regulatory control over financial derivatives. The agency was quashed by opposition from Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin and, above all, Fed Chair Alan Greenspan. They challenged the agency’s jurisdictional authority; and insisted that CFTC regulation might imperil existing financial activity that was already at considerable scale (though nowhere near present levels). Then-Deputy Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers told Congress that CFTC proposals “cas[t] a shadow of regulatory uncertainty over an otherwise thriving market.” 40 SOLD OUT Traditional, non-financial derivatives include futures contracts traded on exchanges such as the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, and regulated by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. A traditional futures contract might include, for example, futures on oranges, where buyers and sellers agree to deliver or accept delivery of a specified number of oranges at some point in the future, at a price determined now, irrespective of the price for oranges at that future time. This kind of futures contract can help farmers and others gain some price certainty for commodities whose value fluctuates in uncertain ways. Over-the-counter (OTC) financial derivatives, by contrast, are negotiated and traded privately (not on public exchanges) and are not subjected to public disclosure, government supervision or other requirements applicable to those traded on exchanges. Derivatives and the current financial crisis In the 1990s, the financial industry began to develop increasingly esoteric types of derivatives. One over-the-counter derivative that has exacerbated the current financial crisis is the credit default swap (CDS). CDSs were invented by major banks in the mid-1990s as a way to insure against possible default by debtors (including mortgage holders). Investment banks that hold mortgage debt, including mortgage-backed securities, can purchase a CDS from a seller, such as an insurance company like AIG, which agrees to become liable for all the debt in the event of a default in the mortgage- backed securities. Wall Street wunderkinds with backgrounds in complex mathematics and statistics developed algorithms that they claimed allowed them to correctly price the risk and the CDSs.49 Banks and hedge funds also began to sell CDSs and even trade them on Wall Street. Billions in these “insurance policies” were traded every day, with traders essentially betting on the likelihood of default on mortgage-backed securities. CDS traders with no financial interest in the underlying mortgages received enormous profits from buying and selling CDS contracts and thus speculating on the likelihood of default. The current financial crisis has exposed how poorly the sellers and the buyers understood the value of the derivatives they were trading. Once home values stopped rising in 2006 and mortgage default became more commonplace, the value of the packages of mortgages known as mortgage-backed securities plunged. At that point, the CDS agreements called for the sellers of the CDSs to reimburse the purchasers for the losses in the mortgage-backed securities. 49 Lewis Braham, “Credit Default Swaps: Is Your Fund at Risk?” BusinessWeek, February 21, 2008, available at: <http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/c ontent/08_09/b4073074480603.htm>. SOLD OUT 41 Firms that had sold CDS contracts, like AIG, became responsible for posting billions of dollars in collateral or paying the purchasers. The global market value of CDS contracts (“notional value”) reached over $60 trillion in 2007, surpassing the gross domestic product of every country in the world combined. The value of the entire global derivatives market reached $683 trillion by mid- 2008, more than 20 times the total value of the U.S. stock market.50 The total dollars actively at risk from CDSs is a staggering $3.1 trillion.51 The amount at risk is far less than $60 trillion because most investors were simultaneously “on both sides” of the CDS trade. For example, banks and hedge funds would buy CDS protection on the one hand and then sell CDS protection on the same security to someone else at the same time.52 When a mortgage-backed security defaulted, the 50 Bureau of International Settlements, Table 19: Amounts Outstanding of Over-the-counter Derivatives, available at: < www.bis.org/statistics/derstats.htm>. 51 Bureau of International Settlements, Table 19: Amounts Outstanding of Over-the-counter Derivatives, available at: < www.bis.org/statistics/derstats.htm>. 52 Adam Davidson, “How AIG fell apart,” Reuters, September 18, 2008, available at: <http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/id USMAR85972720080918>. banks might have to pay some money out, but they would also be getting money back in. So, while the total value of each CDS buy and sell order equaled $60 trillion in 2007, the actual value at risk was a fraction of that — but still large enough to rock the financial markets. The insurance giant AIG, however, did not buy CDS contracts — it only sold them. AIG issued $440 billion53 worth of such contracts, making it liable for loan defaults, including billions in mortgage-backed securities that went bad after the housing bubble burst. In addition, the company’s debt rating was downgraded by credit rating firms, a move that triggered a clause in its CDS contracts that required AIG to put up more collateral to guarantee its ability to pay. Eventually, AIG was unable to provide enough collateral or pay its obligations from the CDS contracts. Its stock price tumbled, making it impossible for the firm to attract investors. Many banks throughout the world were at risk because they had bought CDS contracts from AIG. The financial spiral downward ultimately required a taxpayerfinanced bailout by the Federal Reserve, which committed $152.5 billion to the com- 53 Adam Davidson, “How AIG fell apart,” Reuters, September 18, 2008, available at: <http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/id USMAR85972720080918>. The value of the entire global derivatives market reached $683 trillion by mid-2008, more than 20 times the total value of the U.S. stock market. 42 SOLD OUT pany in 2008, in order to minimize “disruption to the financial markets.”54 Federal Agencies Reject Regulation of Financial Derivatives. Some industry observers warned of the dangers of over-the-counter derivatives. But acceding to political pressure from the powerful financial industry, the federal agencies with the responsibility to safeguard the integrity of the financial system refused to permit regulation of financial derivatives, 55 especially the credit default swaps that have exacerbated the current financial meltdown. In 1996, President Clinton appointed Brooksley Born chair of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).56 The CFTC is an independent federal agency with the mandate to regulate commodity futures and option markets in the United States. Born was outspoken and adamant about the need to regulate the quickly growing but largely opaque area of financial derivatives. She found fierce opposition in SEC Chair 54 Erik Holm, “AIG Sells Mortgage-Backed Securities to Fed Vehicle,” Bloomberg.com, December 15, 2008. 55 Exchange-traded and agricultural derivatives are generally regulated by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). Overthe- counter financial derivatives — not traded on an exchange — were and are not subject to CFTC jurisdiction. This report primarily uses the shorthand term “financial derivative” to reference over-the-counter financial derivatives. 56 <http://www.cftc.gov/anr/anrcomm98.htm> Arthur Levitt, Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin and Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan, all of whom felt that the financial industry was capable of regulating itself. An April 1998 meeting of the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, which consisted of Levitt, Greenspan, Rubin and Born, turned into a standoff between the three men and Born. The men were determined to derail her efforts to regulate derivatives, but left the meeting without any assurances.57 Pressing back against her critics, Born published a CFTC concept paper in 1998 describing how the derivatives sector might be regulated. Born framed the CFTC’s interest in mild terms: “The substantial changes in the OTC derivatives market over the past few years require the Commission to review its regulations,” said Born. “The Commission is not entering into this process with preconceived results in mind. We are reaching out to learn the views of the public, the industry and our fellow regulators on the appropriate regulatory approach to today’s OTC derivatives marketplace.”58 57 Anthony Faiola, Ellen Nakashima and Jill Drew, “The Crash: What Went Wrong,” The Washington Post, October 15, 2008, available at: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/ content/story/2008/10/14/ST200810140 3344.html>. 58 CFTC Issues Concept Release Concerning Over-the-Counter Derivatives Market, May 7, 1998, available at: <http://www.cftc.gov/opa/press98/opa4142- 98.htm>. SOLD OUT 43 The publication described the growth of derivatives trading (“Use of OTC derivatives has grown at very substantial rates over the past few years,” to a notional value of more than $28 trillion) and raised questions about financial derivatives rather than proposed specific regulatory initiatives. But the concept paper was clear that the CFTC view was that the unrestrained growth of financial derivatives trading posed serious risks to the financial system, and its probing questions suggested a range of meaningful regulatory measures — measures which, if they had been adopted, likely would have reduced the severity of the present crisis. “While OTC derivatives serve important economic functions, these products, like any complex financial instrument, can present significant risks if misused or misunderstood by market participants,” the CFTC noted.59 “The explosive growth in the OTC market in recent years has been accompanied by an increase in the number and size of losses even among large and sophisticated users which purport to be trying to hedge price risk in the underlying cash markets.”60 59 Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Concept Release: Over-the-Counter Derivatives, May 7, 1998, available at: <http://www.cftc.gov/opa/press98/opamntn. htm#issues_for_comment>. 60 Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Concept Release: Over-the-Counter Derivatives, May 7, 1998, available at: <http://www.cftc.gov/opa/press98/opamntn. htm#issues_for_comment>. Among the proposals floated in the concept paper were the following measures:61 • Narrow or eliminate exemptions for financial derivatives from the regulations that applied to exchangetraded derivatives (such as for agricultural commodities); • Require financial derivatives to be traded over a regulated exchange; • Require registration of person or entities trading financial derivatives; • Impose capital requirements on those engaging in financial derivatives trading (so that they would be required to set aside capital against the risk of loss, and to avoid excessive use of borrowed money); and • Require issuers of derivatives to disclose the risks accompanying those instruments. The uproar from the financial industry was immediate. During the next two months, industry lobbyists met with CFTC commissioners at least 13 times.62 Meanwhile, Born faced off against Greenspan and others in 61 Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Concept Release: Over-the-Counter Derivatives, May 7, 1998, available at: <http://www.cftc.gov/opa/press98/opamntn. htm#issues_for_comment>. 62 Sharona Coutts and Jake Bernstein, “Former Clinton Official Says Democrats, Obama Advisers Share Blame for Market Meltdown,” ProPublica, October 9, 2008, available at: <http://www.propublica.org/feature/formerclinton- official-says-democrats-obamaadvisers- share-blame-for-marke/>. 44 SOLD OUT numerous antagonistic congressional hearings. Senator Richard Lugar, R-Indiana, chair of the Senate Agricultural Committee, stepped into the fray. Lugar, who received nearly $250,000 in campaign contributions from securities and investment firms in 1998,63 extended an ultimatum to Born: cease the campaign or Congress would pass a Treasury-backed bill that would put a moratorium on any further CFTC action.64 The stalemate continued. The Treasury Department weighed in with its view that derivatives should remain unregulated. President Clinton’s then-Deputy Treasury Secretary, Lawrence H. Summers (now head of the Obama administration’s National Economic Council), complained that Born’s proposal “cast the shadow of regulatory uncertainty over an otherwise 63 Center for Responsive Politics, <http://www.opensecrets.org/politicians/ind ustries.php?cycle=1998&cid=N00001764>. 64 Senator Richard Lugar, “Regulation of Over the Counter (OTC) Derivatives and Derivatives Markets,” Hearing of the Senate Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry Committee, July 30, 1998 (“ t is essential that the government not create legal uncertainty for swaps. I hope it will not be necessary, but there are circumstances that could compel Congress to act preemptively in the near term.”) For a full account of the dispute, see: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/ content/story/2008/10/14/ST200810140 3344.html>. thriving market “65 Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan echoed the Treasury Department view, arguing that regulation would be both unnecessary and harmful. “Regulation of derivatives transactions that are privately negotiated by professionals is unnecessary. Regulation that serves no useful purpose hinders the efficiency of markets to enlarge standards of living.” 66 In September 1998, Long Term Capital Management, a hedge fund heavily focused on derivatives, informed the Fed it was on the brink of collapse, and couldn’t cover $4 billion in losses.67 The New York Federal Reserve quickly recruited 14 private banks to bail out Long Term Capital by investing $3.6 billion.68 65 Lawrence H. Summers, Testimony Before the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, July 30, 1998, available at: <http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/rr26 16.htm>. 66 Alan Greenspan, “Regulation of Over the Counter (OTC) Derivatives and Derivatives Markets,” Hearing of the Senate Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry Committee, July 30, 1998. 67 Anthony Faiola, Ellen Nakashima and Jill Drew, “The Crash: What Went Wrong,” The Washington Post, October 15, 2008, available at: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/ content/story/2008/10/14/ST200810140 3344.html>. 68 Sharona Coutts and Jake Bernstein, “Former Lawrence Summers complained that a proposal to regulate derivatives “cast a shadow of regulatory uncertainty over an otherwise thriving market.” SOLD OUT 45 “This episode should serve as a wake-up call about the unknown risks that the overthe- counter derivatives market may pose to the U.S. economy and to financial stability around the world,” Born told the House Banking Committee two days later. “It has highlighted an immediate and pressing need to address whether there are unacceptable regulatory gaps relating to hedge funds and other large OTC derivatives market participants.” 69 But what should have been a moment of vindication for Born was swept aside by her adversaries, and Congress enacted a six-month moratorium on any CFTC action regarding derivatives or the swaps market.70 (Permanent congressional action would soon follow, as the next section details.) In May 1999, Born resigned in frustration. Born’s replacement, William Rainer, went along with Greenspan, Summers Clinton Official Says Democrats, Obama Advisers Share Blame for Market Meltdown,” ProPublica, October 9, 2008, available at: <http://www.propublica.org/feature/formerclinton- official-says-democrats-obamaadvisers- share-blame-for-marke/>. 69 Brooksley Born, CFTC Chair, Testimony Before the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services, October 1, 1998, available at: <http://financialservices.house.gov/banking/ 10198bor.pdf>. 70 Anthony Faiola, Ellen Nakashima and Jill Drew, “The Crash: What Went Wrong,” The Washington Post, October 15, 2008, available at: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/ content/story/2008/10/14/ST200810140 3344.html>. (whom Clinton had appointed Treasury Secretary) and Levitt’s campaign to block any CFTC regulation. In November 1999, the inter-agency President’s Working Group on Financial Markets released a new report on derivatives recommending no regulation, saying it would “perpetuate legal uncertainty or impose unnecessary regulatory burdens and constraints upon the development of these markets in the United States.”71 Among other rationalizations for this nonregulatory posture, the report argued, “the sophisticated counterparties that use OTC derivatives simply do not require the same protections” as retail investors.72 The report briefly touched upon, but did not take seriously, the idea that financial derivatives posed overall financial systemic risk. To the extent that such risk exists, the report concluded, it was well addressed by private parties: “private counterparty discipline currently is the primary mechanism relied upon for achieving the public policy objective of reducing systemic risk. Government regulation should serve to supplement, rather than substitute for, private market 71 The President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, “Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets and the Commodity Exchange Act,” November 1999, available at: <http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports /otcact.pdf>. 72 The President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, “Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets and the Commodity Exchange Act,” November 1999, available at: <http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports /otcact.pdf>. 46 SOLD OUT discipline. In general, private counterparty credit risk management has been employed effectively by both regulated and unregulated dealers of OTC derivatives, and the tools required by federal regulators already exist.”73 73 The President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, “Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets and the Commodity Exchange Act,” November 1999, available at: <http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports /otcact.pdf>. SOLD OUT 47 CONGRESS BLOCKS FINANCIAL DERIVATIVE REGULATION Long before financial derivatives became the darlings of Wall Street, there were some in Congress who believed that the federal government should be given greater power to regulate derivatives. In 1994, Senator Donald Riegle, DMichigan, and Representative Henry Gonzalez, D-Texas, introduced separate bills calling for derivatives regulation;74 both went nowhere.75 Opposing regulation was a 74 The Derivatives Supervision Act of 1994, in the Senate; the Derivatives Safety and Soundness Supervision Act of 1994, in the House. 75 Anthony Faiola, Ellen Nakashima and Jill Drew, “The Crash: What Went Wrong,” The Washington Post, October 15, 2008, available at: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/ content/story/2008/10/14/ST200810140 3344.html>. bipartisan affair and inaction ruled the day.76 In 2000, a year after the outspoken Brooksley Born left the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), Congress and President Clinton codified regulatory inaction with passage of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act (CFMA).77 The legislation included an “Enron loophole,” which prohibited regulation of energy futures contracts and thereby contributed to the collapse of scandal-ridden Enron in 2001. CFMA formally exempted financial derivatives, including the now infamous credit default swaps, from regulation and federal government oversight. One Wall Street analyst later noted that the CFMA “was slipped into the [budget] bill in the dead of night by our old friend Senator Phil Gramm of Texas — now Vice Chairman of [Swiss investment bank] UBS.”78 Gramm led the congressional effort to block federal agencies from regulating derivatives, complaining that “anks are already heavily regulated institutions.”79 Gramm predicted 76 The action that Congress did take — the sixmonth moratorium on CFTC regulation described in the previous section — cut against the need for regulation. 77 Pub. L. No. 106-554, Appendix E, amending the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1 et. seq. 78 Dirk van Dijk, “Credit Default Swaps Explained,” Zacks Investment Research, September 24, 2008, available at: <http://www.zacks.com/stock/news/14884/ Credit+Default+Swaps+Explained>. 79 Sen. Phil Gramm, 106th Congress, 2nd Session, 146 Cong. Rec. S. 11867, December 15, 2000, available at: 4 IN THIS SECTION: The deregulation — or non-regulation — of financial derivatives was sealed in 2000, with the Commodities Futures Modernization Act (CFMA), passage of which was engineered by then-Senator Phil Gramm, RTexas. The Commodities Futures Modernization Act exempts financial derivatives, including credit default swaps, from regulation and helped create the current financial crisis. 48 SOLD OUT CFMA “will be noted as a major achievement” and “as a watershed, where we turned away from the outmoded, Depression-era approach to financial regulation.”80 He said the legislation “protects financial institutions from over-regulation, and provides legal certainty for the $60 trillion market in swaps”81 — in other words, it offered a guarantee that they would not be regulated. By 2008, Gramm’s UBS was reeling from the global financial crisis he had helped create. The firm declared nearly $50 billion in credit losses and write-downs, prompting a $60 billion bailout by the Swiss government.82 Senator Gramm remains defiant today, telling the New York Times, “There is this idea afloat that if you had more regulation you would have fewer mistakes. I don’t see any evidence in our history or anybody <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/ getpage.cgi?position=all&page=S11867 &dbname=2000_record>. 80 Sen. Phil Gramm, 106th Congress, 2nd Session, 146 Cong. Rec. S. 11868, December 15, 2000, available at: <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/ getpage.cgi?position=all&page=S11868 &dbname=2000_record>. 81 106th Congress, 2nd Session, 146 Cong. Rec. S. 11866, Dec. 15, 2000, available at: <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/ getpage.cgi?position=all&page=S11866 &dbname=2000_record>. 82 Eric Lipton and Stephen Labaton, “The Reckoning: Deregulator Looks Back, Unswayed,” New York Times, November 16, 2008, available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/17/busin ess/economy/ 17gramm.html?_r=1&pagewanted=1& em>. else’s to substantiate it. … The markets have worked better than you might have thought.”83 Others have a more reality-based view. Former SEC Commissioner Harvey J. Goldschmid, conceded that “in hindsight, there’s no question that we would have been better off if we had been regulating derivatives.” 84 While credit default swaps are not the underlying cause of the financial crisis, they dramatically exacerbated it. As mortgages and mortgage-backed securities plummeted in value from declining real estate values, big financial firms were unable to meet their insurance obligations under their credit default swaps. Another action by Congress must be mentioned here. In 1995, bowing to the financial lobby after years of lobbying, Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act.85 The measure greatly restricted the rights of investors to sue Wall Street trading, accounting and investment firms for securities fraud. The author of the legislation was Representative 83 Eric Lipton and Stephen Labaton, “Deregulator Looks Back, Unswayed,” New York Times, November 16, 2008, available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/17/busin ess/economy/17gramm.html?pagewanted=al l> 84 “The Crash: What Went Wrong?” Washington Post website, Undated, available at: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/ business/risk/index.html?hpid=topnews> . 85 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4. SOLD OUT 49 Christopher Cox, R-California, who President Bush later appointed Chair of the Securities and Exchange Commission. In the debate over the bill in the House of Representatives, Representative Ed Markey, D-Massachusetts, proposed an amendment that would have exempted financial derivatives from the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act.86 Markey anticipated many of the problems that would explode a decade later: “All of these products have now been sent out into the American marketplace, in many instances with the promise that they are quite safe for a municipality to purchase. … The objective of the Markey amendment out here is to ensure that investors are protected when they are misled into products of this nature, which by their very personality cannot possibly be understood by ordinary, unsophisticated investors. By that, I mean the town treasurers, the country treasurers, the ordinary individual that thinks that they are sophisticated, but they are not so sophisticated that they can understand an algorithm that stretches out for half a mile and was constructed only inside of the mind of this 26- or 28-year-old summa cum laude in mathematics from Cal Tech or from MIT who constructed it. No one else in the firm un- 86 Rep. Edward Markey, 104th Congress 1st Session, 141 Cong. Rec. H. 2826, March 8, 1995, available at: <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/ getpage.cgi?dbname=1995_record&pag e=H2826&position=all>. derstands it. The lesson that we are learning is that the heads of these firms turn a blind eye, because the profits are so great from these products that, in fact, the CEOs of the companies do not even want to know how it happens until the crash.” Representative Cox led the opposition to the Markey amendment. He was able to cite the opposition of Alan Greenspan, chair of the Federal Reserve, and President Clinton’s SEC Chair Arthur Levitt. He quoted Greenspan saying that “singling out derivative instruments for special regulatory treatment” would be a “serious mistake.” He also quoted Levitt, who warned, “It would be a grave error to demonize derivatives.”87 The amendment was rejected. The specter of litigation is a powerful deterrent to wrongdoing. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act weakened that deterrent — including for derivatives — and today makes it more difficult for defrauded investors to seek compensation for their losses. 87 Rep. Christopher Cox, 104th Congress 1st Session, 141 Cong. Rec. H. 2828, March 8, 1995, available at: <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/ getpage.cgi?position=all&page=H2828 &dbname=1995_record>. 50 SOLD OUT THE SEC’S VOLUNTARY REGULATION REGIME FOR INVESTMENT BANKS Until the current financial crisis, investment banks regularly borrowed funds to purchase securities and debt instruments. A “highly leveraged” financial institution is one that owns financial assets that it acquired with substantial amounts of borrowed money. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) prohibited broker-dealers (i.e. stock brokers and investment banks) from exceeding established limits on the amount of borrowed money used for buying securities. Investment banks that accrued more than 12 dollars in debt for every dollar in bank capital (their “net capital ratio”) were prohibited from trading in the stock market.88 As a result, the five major Wall Street investment banks maintained net capital ratios far below the 12 to 1 limit. The rule also required broker-dealers to maintain a designated amount of set-aside capital based on the riskiness of their investments; the riskier the investment, the more they would need to set aside. This limitation on accruing debt was designed to protect the assets of customers with funds held or managed by the stock broker or investment bank, and to ensure that the broker or investment bank could meet its contractual obligations to other firms.89 The rule was adopted by the 88 17 C.F.R. § 240, 15c3-1. 89 “Toxic Waste Build Up: How Regulatory Changes Let Wall Street Make Bigger Risky Bets,” An Interview with Lee Pickard, Multinational Monitor, November/December 2008, available at: <http://www.multinationalmonitor.org/mm2 5 IN THIS SECTION: In 1975, the SEC’s trading and markets division promulgated a rule requiring investment banks to maintain a debt-to-netcapital ratio of less than 12 to 1. It forbid trading in securities if the ratio reached or exceeded 12 to 1, so most companies maintained a ratio far below it. In 2004, however, the SEC succumbed to a push from the big investment banks — led by Goldman Sachs, and its then-chair, Henry Paulson — and authorized investment banks to develop their own net capital requirements in accordance with standards published by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. This essentially involved complicated mathematical formulas that imposed no real limits, and was voluntarily administered. With this new freedom, investment banks pushed borrowing ratios to as high as 40 to 1, as in the case of Merrill Lynch. This super-leverage not only made the investment banks more vulnerable when the housing bubble popped, it enabled the banks to create a more tangled mess of derivative investments — so that their individual failures, or the potential of failure, became systemic crises. Former SEC Chair Chris Cox has acknowledged that the voluntary regulation was a complete failure. SOLD OUT 51 SEC under the general regulatory authority granted by Congress when it established the SEC to regulate the financial industry in 1934 as a key reform in the aftermath of the 1929 crash. In 2004, the SEC abolished its 19-year old “debt-to-net-capital rule” in favor of a voluntary system that allowed investment banks to formulate their own “rule.”90 Under this new scheme, large investment banks would assess their level of risk based on their own risk management computer models. The SEC acted at the urging of the big investment banks led by Goldman Sachs, which was then headed by Henry M. Paulson Jr., who would become Treasury secretary two years later, and was the architect of the Bush administration’s response to the current financial debacle: the unprecedented taxpayer bailout of banks, investment firms, insurers and others. After a 55-minute discussion, the SEC voted unanimously to abolish the rule.91 008/112008/interview-pickard.html>. 90 Final Rule: Alternative Net Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers that are Part of Consolidated Entities, 17 C.F.R. §§ 200 and 240 (2004). Available at: <www.sec.gov/rules/final/34.49830.htm>. 91 Stephen Labaton, “Agency’s ’04 Rule Let The SEC’s new policy, foreseeably, enabled investment banks to make much greater use of borrowed funds. The top five investment banks participated in the SEC’s voluntary program: Bear Steams, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch and Lehman Brothers. By 2008, these firms had borrowed 20, 30 and 40 dollars for each dollar in capital, far exceeding the standard 12 to 1 ratio. Much of the borrowed funds were used to purchase billions of dollars in subprime-related and other mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) and their associated derivatives, including credit default swaps. The securities were purchased at a time when real estate values were skyrocketing and few predicted an end to the financial party. As late as the March 2008 collapse of Bear Stearns, SEC Chair Christopher Cox continued to support the voluntary program: “We have a good deal of comfort about the capital cushions at these firms at the moment,” he said.92 Banks Pile Up New Debt,” New York Times, October 2, 2008, available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/03/busin ess/03sec.html?_r=1>. 92 Stephen Labaton, “Agency’s ’04 Rule Let Banks Pile Up New Debt,” New York Times, October 2, 2008, available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/03/busin The SEC’s Inspector General concluded that “it is undisputable” that the SEC “failed to carry out its mission in its oversight of Bear Stearns,” which collapsed in 2008 under massive mortgage-backed securities losses. 52 SOLD OUT The SEC had abolished the net capital rule with the caveat that it would continue monitoring the banks for financial or operational weaknesses. But a 2008 investigation by the SEC’s Inspector General (IG) found that the agency had neglected its oversight responsibilities. The IG concluded that “it is undisputable” that the SEC “failed to carry out its mission in its oversight of Bear Stearns,” which collapsed in 2008 under massive mortgage-backed securities losses, leading the Federal Reserve to intervene with taxpayer dollars “to prevent significant harm to the broader financial system.” The IG said the SEC “became aware of numerous potential red flags prior to Bear Stearns’ collapse,” including its concentration of mortgage securities and high leverage, “but did not take actions to limit these risk factors.” Moreover, concluded the IG, the SEC “was aware ... that Bear Stearns’ concentration of mortgage securities was increasing for several years and was beyond its internal limits.” Nevertheless, it “did not make any efforts to limit Bear Stearns’ mortgage securities concentration.” The IG said the SEC was “aware that Bear Stearns’ leverage was high;” but made no effort to require the firm to reduce leverage “despite some authoritative sources describing a linkage between leverage and liquidity risk.” Furthermore, the SEC “became aware that risk management of mortgages at Bear Stearns ess/03sec.html?_r=1>. had numerous shortcomings, including lack of expertise by risk managers in mortgagebacked securities” and “persistent understaffing; a proximity of risk managers to traders suggesting a lack of independence; turnover of key personnel during times of crisis; and the inability or unwillingness to update models to reflect changing circumstances.” Notwithstanding this knowledge, the SEC “missed opportunities to push Bear Steams aggressively to address these identified concerns.” The much-lauded computer models and risk management software that investment banks used in recent years to calculate risk and net capital ratios under the SEC’s voluntary program had been overwhelmed by human error, overly optimistic assumptions, including that the housing bubble would not burst, and a failure to contemplate systemwide asset deflation. Similar computer models failed to prevent the demise of Long-Term Capital Management, a heavily leveraged hedge fund that collapsed in 1998, and the stock market crash of October 1987.93 The editors at Scientific American magazine lambasted the SEC and the investment banks for their “financial software crafted by physics and 93 Stephen Labaton, “Agency’s ’04 Rule Let Banks Pile Up New Debt,” New York Times, October 2, 2008 (citing Leonard D. Bole, software consultant), available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/03/busin ess/03sec.html?_r=1>. SOLD OUT 53 math Ph.D.s.”94 By the fall of 2008, the number of major investment banks on Wall Street dropped from five to zero. All five securities grants either disappeared or became bank holding companies in order to avail themselves of taxpayer bailout money. JP Morgan bought Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy protection, Bank of America announced its rescue of Merrill Lynch by purchasing it, while Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley became bank holding companies with the Federal Reserve as their new principal regulator. On September 26, 2008, as the crisis became a financial meltdown of epic proportions, SEC Chair Cox, who spent his entire public career as a deregulator, conceded “the last six months have made it abundantly clear that voluntary regulation does not work.”95 94 The Editors, “After the Crash: How Software Models Doomed the Markets,” Scientific American, November 2008, available at: <http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?id=after -the-crash>. 95 Anthony Faiola, Ellen Nakashima and Jill Drew, “The Crash: What Went Wrong,” The Washington Post, October 15, 2008, available at: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/ content/story/2008/10/14/ST200810140 3344.html>. 54 SOLD OUT BANK SELF-REGULATION GOES GLOBAL: PREPARING TO REPEAT THE MELTDOWN? Banks are inherently highly leveraged institutions, meaning they hold large amounts of debt compared to their net worth (or equity). As a result, their debt-to-equity (or debt-to-capital) ratios are generally higher than for other types of corporations. Regulators have therefore required banks to maintain an adequate cushion of capital to protect against unexpected losses, especially losses generated on highly leveraged investments. Generally, banks are required to keep higher capital amounts in reserve in order to hold assets with higher risks and, inversely, lower capital for lower risk assets. In other words, banks with riskier credit exposures are required to retain more capital to back the bank’s obligations. In 1988, national bank regulators from the largest industrial countries adopted a set of international banking guidelines known as the Basel Accords. The Basel Accords determine how much capital a bank must hold as a cushion. Ultimately, the purpose of the Basel Accords is to prevent banks from creating a “systemic risk,” or a risk to the financial health of the entire banking system. The idea of an international agreement was to level the playing field for capital regulation as among banks based in different countries. The first Basel Accords, known as Basel I, did not well distinguish between loans involving different levels of risk. This gave rise to two sets of problems. Banks had an incentive to make riskier (and potentially higher return) loans, because the riskier loans within a given category did not require more set-aside capital. For example, Basel I categorized all commercial loans into the 8 percent capital category — meaning 8 percent of a bank’s capital must be set aside to hold commercial loans — even though not all commercial loans are equivalently risky. The Basel I rules also gave banks an 6 IN THIS SECTION: In 1988, global bank regulators adopted a set of rules known as Basel I, to impose a minimum global standard of capital adequacy for banks. Complicated financial maneuvering made it hard to determine compliance, however, which led to negotiations over a new set of regulations. Basel II, heavily influenced by the banks themselves, establishes varying capital reserve requirements, based on subjective factors of agency ratings and the banks’ own internal riskassessment models. The SEC experience with Basel II principles illustrates their fatal flaws. Commercial banks in the United States are supposed to be compliant with aspects of Basel II as of April 2008, but complications and intra-industry disputes have slowed implementation. SOLD OUT 55 incentive to engage in “regulatory capital arbitrage,” whereby a bank maneuvers the accounting classification of a loan so that it is classified under Basel I rules as requiring less set-aside capital — even though the bank’s overall risk has not diminished. Securitization is the main method used by banks to engage in regulatory capital arbitrage. Securitized loans are listed on a bank’s “trading account,” which requires less set-aside capital than the “banking book,” where loans are maintained.96 To address these problems, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision agreed in 2004 to an updated bank capital accord (Basel II), formally known as the “International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: a Revised Framework.” The Committee’s members come from Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States; the United States Federal Reserve serves as a participating member. Rather than dealing directly with the issue of differentiated levels of risk within categories and the problem of regulatory 96 David Jones and John Mingo, “Industry Practices in Credit Risk Modeling and Internal Capital Allocations: Implications for a Models-Based Regulatory Capital Standard,” 4 FRBNY Econ. Pol’y Rev. 3, 53 (1998), available at: <http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/epr/9 8v04n3/9810jone.pdf>. arbitrage by establishing updated and more granular capital standards, Basel II authorized banks to use their own internal models for assessing “risk.” Critics say that under this system, banks will be able to employ their internal risk models to transform highrisk assets into “low risk.” For example, where Basel I categorized all commercial loans into the 8 percent capital category, internal bank models would have allowed for capital allocations on commercial loans that vary from 1 percent to 30 percent, depending on the loan’s estimated risk. The revised framework under Basel II gives banks the leeway to lump commercial loans into these differing capital adequacy requirements, depending on risk as estimated by banks, not the regulators. Basel II rules appear set to reduce the overall capital requirements for banks.97 U.S. federal financial regulatory agencies — the Federal Reserve, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Office of Thrift Supervision — have struggled to find an operationally satisfactory means to implement Basel II. It now appears U.S. application will be limited to large commercial banks only, with some Basel II 97 Testimony of Daniel K. Tarullo, “Hearing on the Development of the New Basel Capital Accords,” Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, November, 10 2005, available at: <http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/taru llo.pdf>. 56 SOLD OUT requirements coming into effect via regulation as of April 2008.98 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) imposed parallel requirements on Wall Street investment banks in 2004. According to the Federal Reserve, Basel II is supposed to “improve the consistency of capital regulations internationally, make regulatory capital more risk sensitive, and promote enhanced riskmanagement practices among large, internationally active banking organizations.”99 But the SEC’s experience with the Basel II approach reveals a fundamental flaw in allowing banks to make their own risk assessments. Investment bank Bear Stearns collapsed in 2008 even though its own risk analysis showed it to be a sound institution. SEC Chairman Christopher Cox said “the rapid collapse of Bear Stearns ... challenged the fundamental assumptions behind the Basel standards and the other program metrics. At the time of its nearfailure, Bear Stearns had a capital cushion 98 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, “Basel II Advanced Approaches and Basel II Standardized Approach,” undated, available at: <http://www.occ.treas.gov/law/basel.htm>. 99 Basel II Capital Accord, Basel I Initiatives, and Other Basel-Related Matters, Federal Reserve Board, August 28, 2008, available at: <http://www.federalreserve.gov/GeneralInfo /basel2/>. well above what is required to meet supervisory standards calculated using the Basel framework and the Federal Reserve’s ‘wellcapitalized’ standard for bank holding companies.”100 In other words, Bear Stearns had been complying with the relaxed Basel II framework and it still failed. Proponents of Basel II argue that internal risk assessments will not be cause for abuse because regulators will be heavily involved via added oversight and disclosure. Five years before the 2008 financial crisis, John D. Hawke, Jr., then U.S. Comptroller of the Currency, lauded the Basel II standards, arguing that “some have viewed the new Basel II approach as leaving it up to the banks to determine their own minimum capital — putting the fox in charge of the chicken coop. This is categorically not the case. While a bank’s internal models and risk assessment systems will be the starting point for the calculation of capital, bank supervisors will be heavily involved at every stage of the process.”101 100 Chairman Christopher Cox, Before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives, October 23, 2008, available at: <http://oversight.house.gov/documents/2008 1023100525.pdf>. 101 John D. Hawke, Jr., Comptroller of the Currency, Before the Committee on Bank- The SEC’s experience with the Basel II approach reveals a fundamental flaw in allowing banks to make their own risk assessments. SOLD OUT 57 But the Comptroller’s claim is not supported by the SEC’s experience. The SEC’s Inspector General (IG) found that regulators were anything but “heavily involved” in oversight of Bear Stearns in the years before its collapse. As noted above (Part I.5), the IG concluded that “it is undisputable” that the SEC “failed to carry out its mission in its oversight of Bear Stearns.” The banks’ internal risk models performed horribly in the housing bubble and subsequent meltdown. It’s hard to see the logic of a system that would embed those models into regulatory requirements for setaside capital.102 ing, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, June 18, 2003, available at: <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/ getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_senate_hearing s&docid=f:94514.pdf>. 102 Steven Sloan, “Another Reason to Disagree Over Basel,” American Banker, January 6, 2009, available at: <http://www.aba.com/aba/documents/ICAA P_WG/Sloan_AB_090106.pdf>. (“‘I am most concerned that any institution that tends to underestimate its risk exposure — as many recently have — will be just as likely to underestimate its capital needs if allowed to operate a risk-based capital standard, such as Basel II,’ Mr. Hoenig [the president and chief executive of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City] said. ‘Riskbased capital standards may also encourage institutions to lower their capital, instead of build it up, in the prosperous times that typically precede a crisis.’”)s
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Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Corruption
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on: December 11, 2011, 02:42:34 AM
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Woof, 4th Post; SOLD OUT 29 million,26 in considerable part to support Glass-Steagall repeal, now marketed under a new and deceptive name, “Financial Modernization.” The Clinton administration supported the push for deregulation. Clinton’s Treasury Secretary, Robert Rubin, who had run Goldman Sachs, enthusiastically promoted the legislation. In 1995 testimony before the House Banking Committee, for example, Rubin had argued that “the banking industry is fundamentally different from what it was two decades ago, let alone in 1933. … U.S. banks generally engage in a broader range of securities activities abroad than is permitted domestically. Even domestically, the separation of investment banking and commercial banking envisioned by Glass-Steagall has eroded significantly.” Remarkably, he claimed that Glass-Steagall could “conceivably impede safety and soundness by limiting revenue diversification.” 27 At times, the Clinton administration even toyed with the idea of allowing a total blurring of the lines between banking and 26 Data from the Center for Responsive Politics. < www.opensecrets.org>. 27 “Rubin Calls for Modernization Through Reform of Glass-Steagall Act,” Journal of Accountancy, May 1, 1995, available at: <http://www.allbusiness.com/government/b usiness-regulations/500983-1.html>. commerce (meaning non-financial businesses), but was forced to back away from such a radical move after criticism from former Federal Reserve Chair Paul Volcker and key Members of Congress. 28 Rubin played a key role in obtaining approval of legislation to repeal Glass-Steagall, as both Treasury Secretary and in his subsequent private sector role. A handful of other personalities were instrumental in the effort. Senator Phil Gramm, RTexas, the truest of true believers in deregulation, was chair of the Senate Banking Committee, and drove the repeal legislation. He was assisted by Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan, an avid proponent of deregulation who was also eager to support provisions of the proposed Financial Services Modernization Act that gave the Fed enhanced jurisdictional authority at the expense of other federal banking regulatory agencies. Notes Jake Lewis, formerly a professional staff member of the House Banking Committee, “When the legislation became snagged on controversial provisions, 28 Jake Lewis, “Monster Banks: The Political and Economic Costs of Banking and Financial Consolidation,” Multinational Monitor, January/February 2005, available at: <http://www.multinationalmonitor.org/mm2 005/012005/lewis.html>. The Clinton administration was winding down, and the finance industries were becoming increasingly nervous that the legislation to repeal Glass-Steagall would not pass. 30 SOLD OUT Greenspan would invariably draft a letter or present testimony supporting Gramm’s position on the volatile points. It was a classic back-scratching deal that satisfied both players — Greenspan got the dominant regulatory role and Gramm used Greenspan’s wise words of support to mute opposition and to help assure a friendly press would grease passage.”29 Also playing a central role were the CEOs of Citicorp and Travelers Group. In 1998, the two companies announced they were merging. Such a combination of banking and insurance companies was illegal under the Bank Holding Company Act, but was excused due to a loophole in the BHCA which provided a two-year review period of proposed mergers. Travelers CEO Sandy Weill met with Greenspan prior to the announcement of the merger, and said Greenspan had a “positive response” to the audacious proposal.30 Citigroup’s co-chairs Sandy Weill and John Reed, along with lead lobbyist Roger Levy, led a swarm of industry executives 29 Jake Lewis, “Monster Banks: The Political and Economic Costs of Banking and Financial Consolidation,” Multinational Monitor, January/February 2005, available at: <http://www.multinationalmonitor.org/mm2 005/012005/lewis.html>. 30 Peter Pae, “Bank, Insurance Giants Set Merger: Citicorp, Travelers in $82 Billion Deal,” Washington Post, April 7, 1988. and lobbyists who badgered the administration and pounded the halls of Congress until the final details of a deal were hammered out. Top Citigroup officials vetted drafts of the legislation before they were formally introduced. 31 As the deal-making on the bill moved into its final phase in Fall 1999 — and with fears running high that the entire exercise would collapse — Robert Rubin stepped into the breach. Having recently resigned as Treasury Secretary, Rubin was at the time negotiating the terms of his next job as an executive at Citigroup. But this was not public knowledge at the time. Deploying the credibility built up as part of what the media had labeled “The Committee to Save the World” (Rubin, Greenspan and then-Deputy Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers, so named for their interventions in addressing the Asian financial crisis in 1997), Rubin helped broker the final deal. The Financial Services Modernization Act, also known as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, formally repealed Glass- Steagall. The new law authorized banks, 31 Russell Mokhiber, “The 10 Worst Corporations of 1999,” Multinational Monitor, December 1999, available at: <http://www.multinationalmonitor.org/mm1 999/mm9912.05.html>. The Depression-era conflicts and consequences that Glass-Steagall was intended to prevent re-emerged once the Act was repealed. SOLD OUT 31 securities firms and insurance companies to combine under one corporate umbrella. A new clause was inserted into the Bank Holding Company Act allowing one entity to own a separate financial holding company that can conduct a variety of financial activities, regardless of the parent corporation’s main functions. In the congressional debate over the Financial Services Modernization Act, Senator Gramm declared, “Glass- Steagall, in the midst of the Great Depression, thought government was the answer. In this period of economic growth and prosperity, we believe freedom is the answer.” The chief economist of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency supported the legislation because of “the increasingly persuasive evidence from academic studies of the pre- Glass-Steagall era.”32 Impact of Repeal The gradual evisceration of Glass-Steagall over 30 years, culminating in its repeal in 1999, opened the door for banks to enter the highly lucrative practice of packaging multiple home mortgage loans into securities for trade on Wall Street. Repeal of Glass-Steagall created a climate and culture 32 James R. Barth, R. Dan Brumbaugh Jr. and James A. Wilcox, “The Repeal of Glass- Steagall and the Advent of Broad Banking,” Economic and Policy Analysis Working Paper 2000-5, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, April 2000, available at: <http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/workpaper/w p2000-5.pdf>. where aggressive deal-making became the norm. The practice of “securitization” had virtually disappeared after it contributed to the 1929 crash, but had made a comeback in the 1970s as Glass-Steagall was being dismantled. Economic analyst Robert Kuttner testified in 2007 that trading loans on Wall Street “was the core technique that made possible the dangerous practices of the 1920s. Banks would originate and repackage highly speculative loans, market them as securities through their retail networks, using the prestigious brand name of the bank — e.g. Morgan or Chase — as a proxy for the soundness of the security. It was this practice, and the ensuing collapse when so much of the paper went bad, that led Congress to enact the Glass-Steagall Act”33 that separated banks and securities trading. Whereas bank deposits had been a centerpiece of the 1929 crash, mortgage loans — and the securities connected to them — are at the center of the present financial crisis. There is mounting evidence that the repeal of Glass-Steagall contributed to a high-flying culture that led to disaster. The banks suspended careful scrutiny of loans they originated because they knew that the loans would be rapidly packaged into mort- 33 Testimony of Robert Kuttner before the Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, October 2, 2007, available at: <http://financialservices.house.gov/hearing1 10/testimony_-_kuttner.pdf>. 32 SOLD OUT gage-backed securities and sold off to third parties. Since the banks weren’t going to hold the mortgages in their own portfolios, they had little incentive to review the borrowers’ qualifications carefully.34 But the banks did not in fact escape exposure to the mortgage market. It appears that, as they packaged mortgages into securities and then sold them off into “tranches,” the banks often kept portions of the least desirable tranches in their own portfolios, or those of off-balance-sheet affiliates. They also seemed to have maintained liability in some cases where securitized mortgages went bad. As banks lost billions on mortgage- backed securities in 2008, they stopped making new loans in order to conserve their assets. Instead of issuing new loans with hundreds of billions of dollars in taxpayerfooted bailout money given for the purpose of jump-starting frozen credit markets, the banks used the money to offset losses on their mortgage securities investments. Banks and insurance companies were saddled with billions more in losses from esoteric “credit default swaps” created to insure against 34 See Liz Rappaport and Carrick Mollenkamp, “Banks May Keep Skin in the Game,” Wall Street Journal, February 9, 2009, available at: <http://sec.online.wsj.com/article/SB123422 980301065999.html>; “Before That, They Made A Lot of Money: Steps to Financial Collapse,” An Interview with Nomi Prins, Multinational Monitor, November/ December 2008, available at: <http://www.multinationalmonitor.org/mm2 008/112008/interview-prins.html>. mortgage defaults and themselves traded on Wall Street. In short, the Depression-era conflicts and consequences that Glass-Steagall was intended to prevent re-emerged once the Act was repealed. The once staid commercial banking sector quickly evolved to emulate the risk-taking attitude and practices of investment banks, with disastrous results. Notes economist Joseph Stiglitz, “The most important consequence of the repeal of Glass-Steagall was indirect — it lay in the way repeal changed an entire culture. Commercial banks are not supposed to be highrisk ventures; they are supposed to manage other people’s money very conservatively. It is with this understanding that the government agrees to pick up the tab should they fail. Investment banks, on the other hand, have traditionally managed rich people’s money — people who can take bigger risks in order to get bigger returns. When repeal of Glass-Steagall brought investment and commercial banks together, the investmentbank culture came out on top. There was a demand for the kind of high returns that could be obtained only through high leverage and big risk taking.”35 35 Joseph Stiglitz, “Capitalist Fools,” Vanity Fair, January 2009, available at: <http://www.vanityfair.com/magazine/2009/ 01/stiglitz200901>. SOLD OUT 33 HIDING LIABILITIES: OFF-BALANCE SHEET ACCOUNTING A business’s balance sheet is supposed to report honestly on a firm’s financial state by listing its assets and liabilities. If a company can move money-losing assets off of its balance sheet, it will appear to be in greater financial health. But if it is still incurring losses from the asset taken off the balance sheet, then the apparent improvement in financial health is illusory. Thanks to the exploitation of loopholes in accounting rules, commercial banks were able to undertake exactly this sort of deceptive financial shuffling in recent years. Even in good times, placing securitized mortgage loans off balance sheet had important advantages for banks, enabling them to expand lending without setting aside more reserve-loss capital (money set aside to protect against loans that might not be repaid).36 As they made and securitized more loans shunted off into off-balance sheet entities, the banks’ financial vulnerability kept increasing — they had increased lingering obligations related to securitized loans, without commensurate reserve-loss capital. Then, when bad times hit, off-balance sheet accounting let banks hide their losses from investors and regulators. This allowed their condition to grow still more acute, ultimately imposing massive losses on investors and threatening the viability of the financial system. 36 Wall Street recognized this immediately after the adoption of the relevant accounting rule, known as FASB 140 (see text below for more explanation). “How the sponsors and their lawyers and accountants address FASB 140 may have an impact on the continuing viability of this market,” said Gail Sussman, a managing director at Moody's. “If they have to keep these bonds on their balance sheet, they have to reserve against them. It may eat into the profit of these products [securitized loans].” Michael McDonald, “Derivatives Hit the Wall - Sector Found Wary Investors in 2001,” The Bond Buyer, March 15, 2002. 2 IN THIS SECTION: Holding assets off the balance sheet generally allows companies to exclude “toxic” or money-losing assets from financial disclosures to investors in order to make the company appear more valuable than it is. Banks used off-balance sheet operations — special purpose entities (SPEs), or special purpose vehicles (SPVs) — to hold securitized mortgages. Because the securitized mortgages were held by an off-balance sheet entity, however, the banks did not have to hold capital reserves as against the risk of default — thus leaving them so vulnerable. Off-balance sheet operations are permitted by Financial Accounting Standards Board rules installed at the urging of big banks. The Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association and the American Securitization Forum are among the lobby interests now blocking efforts to get this rule reformed. 34 SOLD OUT The scale of banks’ off-balance sheet assets is enormous — 15.9 times the amount on the balance sheets in 2007. This ratio represents a massive surge over the last decade and half: “During the period 1992- 2007, on-balance sheet assets grew by 200 percent, while off-balance sheet asset grew by a whopping 1,518 [percent].”37 One Wall Street executive described off-balance sheet accounting “as a bit of a magic trick”38 because losses disappear from the balance sheet, making lenders appear more financially stable than they really are. A former SEC official called it “nothing more than just a scam.”39 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has statutory authority to establish financial accounting and reporting standards, but it delegates this 37 Joseph Mason, “Off-balance Sheet Accounting and Monetary Policy Ineffectiveness,” RGE Monitor, December 17, 2008, available at: <http://www.rgemonitor.com/financemarket s-monitor/254797/offbalance_ sheet_accounting_and_monetary_p olicy_ineffectiveness>. 38 Alan Katz and Ian Katz, “Greenspan Slept as Off-Books Debt Escaped Scrutiny,” Bloomberg.com, October 30, 2008, available at: <http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid =20601170&refer=home&sid=aYJZOB_gZi 0I> (quoting Pauline Wallace, partner at PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP and team leader in London for financial instruments). 39 “Plunge: How Banks Aim to Obscure Their Losses,” An Interview with Lynn Turner, former SEC chief accountant, Multinational Monitor, November/December 2008, available at: <http://www.multinationalmonitor.org/mm2 008/112008/interview-turner.html>. authority to the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). The FASB is an independent, private sector organization whose purpose is to establish financial accounting standards, including the standards that govern the preparation of financial reports. FASB’s Statement 140 establishes rules relevant to securitization of loans (packaging large numbers of loans resold to other parties) and how securitized loans may be moved off a company’s balance sheet. Pursuant to Statement 140, a lender may sell blocks of its mortgages to separate trusts or companies known as Qualified Special Purpose Entities (QSPEs), or “special investment vehicles” (SIVs), created by the lender. As long as the mortgages are sold to the QSPE, the lender is authorized not to report the mortgages on its balance sheet. The theory is that the lender no longer has control or responsibility for the mortgages. The Statement 140 test of whether a lender has severed responsibility for mortgages is to ask whether a “true sale” has taken place. But whether a true sale of the mortgages has occurred is often unclear because of the complexities of mortgage securitization. Lenders often retain some control over the mortgages even after their sale to a QSPE. So, while the sale results in moving mortgages off the balance sheet, the lender may still be liable for mortgage SOLD OUT 35 defaults. This retained liability is concealed from the public by virtue of moving the assets off the balance sheet. Under Statement 140, a “sale” of mortgages to a QSPE occurs when the mortgages are put “beyond the reach of the transferor [i.e. the lender] and its creditors.” This is a “true sale” because the lender relinquishes control of the mortgages to the QSPE. But the current financial crisis has revealed that while lenders claimed to have relinquished control, and thus moved the mortgages off the balance sheet, they had actually retained control in violation of Statement 140. A considerable portion of the banks’ mortgage-related losses remain off the books, however, contributing to the continuing uncertainty about the scale of the banks’ losses. The problems with QSPEs became clear in 2007 when homeowners defaulted in record numbers and lenders were forced to renegotiate or modify mortgages held in the QSPEs. The defaults revealed that the mortgages were not actually put “beyond the reach” of the lender after the QSPE bought them. As such, they should have been included on the lender’s balance sheet pursuant to Statement 140. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was forced to clarify its rules on the matter to allow lenders to renegotiate loans without losing off-balance sheet status. Former SEC Chair Christopher Cox announced to Congress in 2007 that loan restructuring or modification activities, when default is reasonably foreseeable, does not preclude continued off-balance sheet treatment under Statement 140.40 The problems with off-balance sheet accounting are a matter of common sense. If there was any doubt, however, the deleterious impact of off-balance sheet accounting was vividly illustrated by the notorious collapse of Enron in December 2001. Enron established off-balance sheet partnerships whose purpose was to borrow from banks to finance the company’s growth. The partnerships, also known as special purpose entities (SPEs), borrowed heavily by using Enron stock as collateral. The debt incurred by the SPEs was kept off Enron’s balance sheet so that Wall Street 40 (Chairman Christopher Cox, in a letter to Rep. Barney Frank, Chairman, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, July 24, 2007, available at: <http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/finan cialsvcs_dem/sec_response072507.pdf>.) The SEC's Office of the Chief Accountant agreed with Chairman Cox in a staff letter to industry in 2008. (SEC Office of the Chief Accountant, in a staff letter to Arnold Hanish, Financial Executives International, January 8, 2008, available at: <http://www.sec.gov/info/accountants/staffl etters/hanish010808.pdf>). A former SEC official called off-balance sheet accounting “nothing more than just a scam.” 36 SOLD OUT and regulators were unaware of it. Credit rating firms consistently gave Enron high debt ratings as they were unaware of the enormous off-balance sheet liabilities. Investors pushing Enron’s stock price to sky-high levels were oblivious to the enormous amount of debt incurred to finance the company’s growth. The skyrocketing stock price allowed Enron to borrow even more funds while using its own stock as collateral. At the time of bankruptcy, the company’s on-balance sheet debt was $13.15 billion, but the company had a roughly equal amount of offbalance sheet liabilities. In the fallout of the Enron scandal, the FASB adopted a policy to address offbalance sheet arrangements. Under its FIN 46R guidance, a company must include any SPE on the balance sheet if the company is entitled to the majority of the SPE’s risks or rewards, regardless of whether a true sale occurred. But the guidance has one caveat: QSPEs holding securitized assets may still be excluded from the balance sheet. The caveat, known as the “scope exception,” means that many financial institutions are not subject to the heightened requirements provided under FIN 46R. The lessons of Enron were thus ignored for financial institutions, setting the stage for the current financial crisis. The Enron fiasco got the attention of Congress, which soon began considering systemic accounting reforms. The Sarbanes- Oxley Act, passed in 2002, attempted to shine more light on the murky underworld of off-balance sheet assets, but the final measure was a watereddown compromise; more far-reaching demands were defeated by the financial lobby. Sarbanes-Oxley requires that companies make some disclosures about their QSPEs, even if they are not required to include them on the balance sheet. Specifically, it requires disclosure of the existence of off-balancesheet arrangements, including QSPEs, if they are reasonably likely to have a “material” impact on the company’s financial condition. But lenders have sole discretion to determine whether a QSPE will have a “material” impact. Moreover, disclosures have often been made in such a general way as to be meaningless. “After Enron, with Sarbanes-Oxley, we tried legislatively to make it clear that there has to be some transparency with regard to offbalance sheet entities,” Senator Jack Reed of Rhode Island, the chair of the Securities, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, passed in 2002, attempted to shine more light on the murky underworld of offbalance sheet assets, but the final measure was a watered-down compromise. SOLD OUT 37 Insurance and Investment subcommittee of the Senate Banking Committee, said in early 2008 as the financial crisis was unfolding.41 “We thought that was already corrected and the rules were clear and we would not be discovering new things every day,” he said. The FASB has recognized for years that Statement 140 is flawed, concluding in 2006 that the rule was “irretrievably broken.”42 The merits of the “true sale” theory of Statement 140 notwithstanding, its detailed and complicated rules created sufficient loopholes and exceptions to enable financial institutions to circumvent its purported logic as a matter of course.43 FASB Chairman Robert Herz likened off-balance sheet accounting to “spiking the punch bowl.” “Unfortunately,” he said, “it seems that some folks used [QSPEs] like a punch bowl to get off-balance sheet treatment while spiking the punch. That has led us to conclude that now it’s time to take away the punch bowl. And so we are proposing eliminating the concept of a 41 Floyd Norris, “Off-the-balance-sheet mysteries,” International Herald Tribune, February. 28, 2008, available at: <http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/02/28/bu siness/norris29.php>. 42 FASB and International Accounting Standards Board, “Information for Observers,” April 21, 2008, available at: < www.iasplus.com/resource/0804j03obs.pdf>. 43 See Thomas Selling, “FAS 140: Let’s Call the Whole Thing Off,” August 11, 2008, available at: <http://accountingonion.typepad.com/theacc ountingonion/2008/08/fas-140-letsca. html>. QSPE from the U.S. accounting literature.”44 It is not, however, a certainty that the FASB will succeed in its effort. The Board has repeatedly tried to rein in off-balance sheet accounting, but failed in the face of financial industry pressure.45 The commercial banking industry and Wall Street are waging a major effort to water down the rule and delay adoption and implementation.46 Ironically, the banking 44 FASB Chairman Bob Herz, “Lessons Learned, Relearned, and Relearned Again from the Credit Crisis — Accounting and Beyond,” September 18, 2008, available at: <http://www.fasb.org/articles&reports/12- 08-08_herz_speech.pdf>. 45 “Plunge: How Banks Aim to Obscure Their Losses,” An Interview with Lynn Turner, former SEC chief accountant, Multinational Monitor, November/December 2008, available at: <http://www.multinationalmonitor.org/mm2 008/112008/interview-turner.html>. 46 See “FAS Amendments,” American Securitization Forum, available at: <http://www.americansecuritization.com/sto ry.aspx?id=76>. (“Throughout this process [consideration of revisions of Statement 140], representatives of the ASF have met on numerous occasions with FASB board members and staff, as well as accounting staff of the SEC and the bank regulatory agencies, to present industry views and recommendations concerning these proposed accounting standards and their impact on securitization market activities.”); George P. Miller, Executive Director, American Securitization Forum, and Randy Snook, Senior Managing Director, Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, letter to Financial Accounting Standards Board, July 16, 2008, available at: <http://www.americansecuritization.com/sto ry.aspx?id=2906>. (Arguing for delay of new rules until 2010, and contending that “It is also important to remember that too much consolidation of SPEs can be just as confusing to users of financial statements as 38 SOLD OUT industry and Wall Street lobbyists argue that disclosure of too much information will confuse investors. These lobby efforts are meeting with success,47 in part because of the likelihood that forcing banks to recognize their off-balance sheet losses will reveal them to be insolvent. too little.”); John A. Courson, Chief Operating Officer, Mortgage Bankers Association, letter to Financial Accounting Standards Board, October 31, 2008, available at: <http://www.mbaa.org/files/Advocacy/Testi monyandCommentLetters/MBACommentLe tter-10-31-2008- AmendmentstoFASBInterpretationNo.46R.p df>. (“MBA believes the proposed disclosures would result in providing readers of financial statements with an unnecessary volume of data that would obfuscate important and meaningful information in the financial statements.”) 47 Jody Shenn and Ian Katz, “FASB Postpones Off-Balance-Sheet Rule for a Year,” Bloomberg, July 30, 2008, available at: <http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid =20601009&sid=a4O4VjK.fX5Q&>. (“The Financial Accounting Standards Board postponed a measure, opposed by Citigroup Inc. and the securities industry, forcing banks to bring off-balance-sheet assets such as mortgages and credit-card receivables back onto their books. FASB, the Norwalk, Connecticut-based panel that sets U.S. accounting standards, voted 5-0 today to delay the rule change until fiscal years starting after
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Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / For The Record/Begin
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Woof, 3rd Post; Yes, our government is corrupt, both Party's, top to bottom and they've got us pointing fingers at eachother while they screw all of us. Sold Out How Wall Street and Washington Betrayed America March 2009 Essential Information * Consumer Education Foundation www.wallstreetwatch.org2 SOLD OUT SOLD OUT 3 Sold Out How Wall Street and Washington Betrayed America March 2009 Essential Information * Consumer Education Foundation www.wallstreetwatch.org4 SOLD OUT Primary authors of this report are Robert Weissman and James Donahue. Harvey Rosenfield, Jennifer Wedekind, Marcia Carroll, Charlie Cray, Peter Maybarduk, Tom Bollier and Paulo Barbone assisted with writing and research. Essential Information PO Box 19405 Washington, DC 20036 202.387.8030 info@essential.orgwww.essential.orgConsumer Education Foundation PO Box 1855 Studio City, CA 91604 cefus@mac.comSOLD OUT 5 www.wallstreetwatch.orgTable of Contents Introduction: A Call to Arms, by Harvey Rosenfield ..ccccc. 6 Executive Summary cccccccccccccccccc... 14 Part I: 12 Deregulatory Steps to Financial Meltdown ....................... 21 1. Repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act and the Rise of the Culture of cccc.. 22 Recklessness 2. Hiding Liabilities: Off-Balance Sheet Accounting cccccccccc 33 3. The Executive Branch Rejects Financial Derivative Regulation cccc.. 39 4. Congress Blocks Financial Derivative Regulation cccccccccc 47 5. The SECfs Voluntary Regulation Regime for Investment Banks cccc. 50 6. Bank Self-Regulation Goes Global: Preparing to Repeat the Meltdown? c 54 7. Failure to Prevent Predatory Lending ccccccccccccccc 58 8. Federal Preemption of State Consumer Protection Laws ccccccc.. 67 9. Escaping Accountability: Assignee Liability cccccccccccc 73 10. Fannie and Freddie Enter the Subprime Market ccccccccccc 80 11. Merger Mania cccccccccccccccccccccccc 87 12. Rampant Conflicts of Interest: Credit Ratings Firmsf Failure ccccc.. 93 Part II: Wall Streetfs Washington Investment ..cccccccc. 98 Conclusion and Recommendations: Principles for a New Financial Regulatory Architecture ..cc... 109 Appendix: Leading Financial Firm Profiles of Campaign Contributions and Lobbying Expenditures ...cccccccc 115 6 SOLD OUT Introduction: A Call to Arms by Harvey Rosenfield* Americafs economy is in tatters, and the situation grows dire by the day. Nearly 600,000 Americans lost their jobs in January, for a total of 1.8 million over the last three months. Millions more will lose theirs over the next year no matter what happens. Students can no longer pursue a college education. Families cannot afford to see a doctor. Many Americans owe more on their homes than they are worth. Those lucky enough to have had pensions or retirement funds have watched helplessly as 25 percent of their value evaporated in 2008. What caused this catastrophe? As this report chronicles in gruesome detail, over the last decade, Wall Street showered Washington with over $1.7 billion in what are prettily described as gcampaign contributions.h This money went into the political coffers of everyone from the lowliest mem- * President, Consumer Education Foundation 1 Source: Center for Responsive Politics, < www.opensecrets.org>. ber of Congress to the President of the United States. The Money Industry spent another $3.4 billion on lobbyists whose job it was to press for deregulation . Wall Streetfs license to steal from every American. In return for the investment of more than $5.1 billion, the Money Industry was able to get rid of many of the reforms enacted after the Great Depression and to operate, for most of the last ten years, without any effective rules or restraints whatsoever. The report, prepared by Essential Information and the Consumer Education Foundation, details step-by-step many of the events that led to the financial debacle. Here are the ghighlightsh of our economic downfall: . Beginning in 1983 with the Reagan Administration, the U.S. government acquiesced in accounting rules adopted by the financial industry that allowed banks and other corporations to take money-losing assets off their balance sheets in order to hide them from investors and the public. . Between 1998 and 2000, Congress and the Clinton Administration repeatedly blocked efforts to regulate Industry1 $ to Politicians $ to Lobbyists Securities $512 million $600 million Commercial Banks $155 million $383 million Insurance Cos. $221 million $1002 million Accounting $81 million $122 million SOLD OUT 7 gfinancial derivativesh . including the mortgage-related credit default swaps that became the basis of trillions of dollars in speculation. . In 1999, Congress repealed the Depression- era law that barred banks from offering investment and insurance services, and vice versa, enabling these firms to engage in speculation by investing money from checking and savings accounts into financial gderivativesh and other schemes understood by only a handful of individuals. . Taking advantage of historically low interest rates in the early part of this decade, shady mortgage brokers and bankers began offering mortgages on egregious terms to purchasers who were not qualified. When these predatory lending practices were brought to the attention of federal agencies, they refused to take serious action. Worse, when states stepped into the vacuum by passing laws requiring protections against dirty loans, the Bush Administration went to court to invalidate those reforms, on the ground that the inaction of federal agencies superseded state laws. . The financial industryfs friends in Congress made sure that those who speculate in mortgages would not be legally liable for fraud or other illegalities that occurred when the mortgage was made. . Egged on by Wall Street, two government- sponsored corporations, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, started buying large numbers of subprime loans from private banks as well as packages of mortgages known as gmortgage-backed securities.h . In 2004, the top cop on the Wall Street beat in Washington . the Securities and Exchange Commission . now operating under the radical deregulatory ideology of the Bush Administration, authorized investment banks to decide for themselves how much money they were required to set aside as rainy day reserves. Some firms then entered into $40 worth of speculative trading for every $1 they held. . With the compensation of CEOs increasingly tied to the value of the firmfs total assets, a tidal wave of mergers and acquisitions in the financial world . 11,500 between 1980 and 2005 . led to the predominance of just a relative handful banks in the U.S. financial system. Successive administrations failed to enforce antitrust laws to block these mergers. The result: less competi8 SOLD OUT tion, higher fees and charges for consumers, and a financial system vulnerable to collapse if any single one of the banks ran into trouble. . Investors and even government authorities relied on private gcredit ratingh firms to review corporate balance sheets and proposed investments and report to potential investors about their quality and safety. But the credit rating companies had a grave conflict of interest: they are paid by the financial firms to issue the ratings. Not surprisingly, they gave the highest ratings to the investments issued by the firms that paid them, even as it became clear that the ratings were inflated and the companies were in precarious condition. The financial lobby made sure that regulation of the credit ratings firms would not solve these problems. None of these milestones on the road to economic ruin were kept secret. The dangers posed by unregulated, greed-driven financial speculation were readily apparent to any astute observer of the financial system. But few of those entrusted with the responsibility to police the marketplace were willing to do so. And as the report explains, those officials in government who dared to propose stronger protections for investors and consumers consistently met with hostility and defeat. The power of the Money Industry overcame all opposition, on a bipartisan basis. Itfs not like our elected leaders in Washington had no warning: The California energy crisis in 2000, and the subsequent collapse of Enron . at the time unprecedented . was an early warning that the nationfs system of laws and regulations was inadequate to meet the conniving and trickery of the financial industry. The California crisis turned out to be a foreshock of the financial catastrophe that our country is in today. It began with the deregulation of electricity prices by the state legislature. Greased with millions in campaign contributions from Wall Street and the energy industry, the legislation was approved on a bipartisan basis without a dissenting vote. Once deregulation took effect, Wall Street began trading electricity and the private energy companies boosted prices through the roof. Within a few weeks, the utility companies . unable because of a loophole in the law to pass through the higher prices to consumers . simply stopped paying for the power. Blackouts ensued. At the time, Californians were chastised for having caused the shortages through gover-consumption.h But the energy shortages were orchestrated by Wall Street rating firms, investment banks and energy companies, in order to force Californiafs taxpayers to bail out the utility companies. SOLD OUT 9 Californiafs political leadership and utility regulators largely succumbed to the blackmail, and $11 billion in public money was used to pay for electricity at prices that proved to be artificially manipulated by c Wall Street traders. The state of California was forced to increase utility rates and borrow over $19 billion . through Wall Street firms . to cover these debts. Its electricity trading activities under investigation, Enronfs vast accounting shenanigans, including massive losses hidden in off-balance sheet corporate entities, came to light, and the company collapsed within a matter of days. It looked at the time as though the California deregulation disaster and the Enron scandal would lead to stronger regulation and corporate accountability. But then 9/11 occurred. And for most of the last decade, the American people have been told that our greatest enemy lived in a cave. The subsequent focus on external threats, real and imagined, distracted attention from deepening problems at home. As Franklin Roosevelt observed seventy years ago, gour enemies of today are the forces of privilege and greed within our own borders.h Today, the enemies of American consumers, taxpayers and small investors live in multimillion-dollar palaces and pull down seven-, eight- or even nine-figure annual paychecks. Their weapons of mass destruction, as Warren Buffett famously put it, were derivatives: pieces of paper that were backed by other pieces of paper that were backed by packages of mortgages, student loans and credit card debt, the complexity and value of which only a few understood. Meanwhile, the lessons of Enron were cast aside after a few insignificant measures . the tougher reforms killed by the Money Industry . and Wall Street went back to business as usual. Last fall, the house of cards finally collapsed. For those who might have heard the gblame the victimh propaganda emanating from the free marketers whose philosophy lies in a smoldering ruin alongside the economy, the report sets the record straight: consumers are not to blame for this debacle. Not those of us who used credit in an attempt to have a decent quality of life (as opposed to the tiny fraction of people in our country who truly got ahead over the last decade). Nor can we blame the Americans who were offered amazing terms for mortgages but forgot to bring a Ph.D. and a lawyer to their gclosing,h and later found out that they had been misled and could not afford the loan at the real interest rate buried in the fine print. Rather, Americafs economic system is at or beyond the verge of depression today because gambling became the financial sectorfs principal preoccupation, and the pile of chips grew so big that the Money Industry displaced real businesses that provided real 10 SOLD OUT goods, services and jobs. By that time, the amount of financial derivatives in circulation around the world . $683 trillion by one estimate . was more than ten times the actual value of all the goods and services produced by the entire planet. When all the speculators tried to cash out, starting in 2007, there really wasnft enough money to cover all the bets. If we Americans are to blame for anything, itfs for allowing Wall Street to do what it calls a gleveraged buy outh of our political system by spending a relatively small amount of capital in the Capitol in order to seize control of our economy. Of course, the moment the Money Industry realized that the casino had closed, it turned . as it always does . to Washington, this time for the mother of all favors: a $700 billion bailout of the biggest financial speculators in the country. Thatfs correct: the people who lost hundreds of billions of dollars of investorsf money were given hundreds of billions of dollars more. The bailout was quickly extended to insurance companies, credit card companies, auto manufacturers and even car rental firms. In addition to cash infusions, the government has blown open the federal bank vaults to offer the Money Industry a feast of discount loans, loan guarantees and other taxpayer subsidies. The total tally so far? At least $8 trillion. Panicked by Wall Streetfs threat to pull the plug on credit, Congress rebuffed efforts to include safeguards on how taxpayer money would be spent and accounted for. Thatfs why many of the details of the bailout remain a secret, hiding the fact that no one really knows why certain companies were given our money, or how it has been spent. Bankers used it pay bonuses, to buy back their own bank stock, or to build their empires by purchasing other banks. But very little of the money has been used for the purpose it was ostensibly given: to make loans. One thing is certain: this last Washington giveaway . the Greatest Wall Street Giveaway of all time . has not fixed the economy. Meanwhile, at this very moment of national threat, the banks, hedge funds and other parasite firms that crippled our economy are pouring money into Washington to preserve their privileges at the expense of the rest of us. The only thing that has changed is that many of these firms are using taxpayer money . our money . to do so. Thatfs why you wonft hear anyone in the Washington establishment suggest that Americans be given a seat on the Board of Directors of every company that receives bailout money. Or that Americafs economic security is intolerably jeopardized when pushing paper around constitutes a quarter or more of our economy. Or that credit default swaps and other derivatives should SOLD OUT 11 be prohibited, or limited just like slot machines, roulette wheels and other forms of gambling. In most of the United States, you can go to jail for stealing a loaf of bread. But if you have paid off Washington, you can steal the life-savings, livelihoods, homes and dreams of an entire nation, and you will be allowed to live in the fancy homes you own, drive multiple cars, throw multi-million dollar birthday parties. Punishment? You might not be able to get your bonus this year or, worst come to worst, if you are one of the very unlucky few unable to take advantage of the loopholes in the plan announced by the Treasury Secretary Geithner, you may end up having to live off your past riches because you can only earn a measly $500,000 while you are on the dole. (More good news for corporate thieves: this flea-bitten proposal is not retroactive . it does not apply to all the taxpayer money already handed out). Like their predecessors, Presidentelected Obamafs key appointments to the Treasury, the SEC and other agencies are veterans of the Money Industry. They are unlikely to challenge the narrow boundaries of the debate that has characterized Washingtonfs response to the crisis. So long as the Money Industry remains in charge of the federal agencies and keeps our elected officials in its deep pockets, nothing will change. Here are seven basic principles that Americans should insist upon. Relief. Itfs been only five months since Congress authorized $700 billion to bail out the speculators. Congress was told that the bailout would alleviate the gcredit crunchh and encourage banks to lend money to consumers and small businesses. But the banks have hoarded the money, or misspent it. If the banks arenft going to keep their end of the bargain, the government should use its power of eminent domain to take control of the banks, or seize the money and let the banks go bankrupt. On top of the $700 billion bailout, the Federal Reserve has been loaning public money to Wall Street firms money at as little as .25 percent. These companies are then turning around and charging Americans interest rates of 4 percent to 30 percent for mortgages and credit cards. There should be a cap on what banks and credit card companies can charge us when we borrow our own money back from them. Similarly, transfers of taxpayer money should be conditioned on acceptance of other terms that would help the public, such as an agreement to waive late fees, and an agreement not to lobby the government. And, Americans should be appointed to sit on the boards of directors of these firms in order to have a say on what these companies do with our money . to keep them from wasting it and to make sure they repay it. 12 SOLD OUT Restitution. Companies that get taxpayer money must be required to repay it on terms that are fair to taxpayers. When Warren Buffett acquired preferred shares in Goldman Sachs, he demanded that Goldman Sachs pay 10 percent interest; taxpayers are only getting back 5 percent. The Congressional Oversight Panel estimates that taxpayers received preferred shares worth about two-thirds of what was given to the initial bailout recipients. Even worse are the taxpayer loan guarantees offered to Citigroup. For a $20 billion cash injection plus taxpayer guarantees on $306 billion in toxic assets . likely to impose massive liabilities on the public purse . the government received $27 billion in preferred shares, paying 8 percent interest. Now the Obama administration has suggested that it might offer a dramatically expanded guarantee program for toxic assets, putting the taxpayer on the hook for hundreds of billions more. Regulation. The grand experiment in letting Wall Street regulate itself under the assumption that free market forces will police the marketplace has failed catastrophically. Wall Street needs to operate under rules that will contain their excessive greed. Derivatives should be prohibited unless it can be shown that they serve a useful purpose in our economy; those that are authorized should be traded on exchanges subject to full disclosure. Further mergers of financial industry titans should be barred under the antitrust laws, and the current monopolistic industry should be broken up once the country has recovered. Reform. It is clear that the original $700 billion bailout was a rush job so poorly constructed that it has largely failed and much of the money wasted. The federal government should revise the last bailout and establish new terms for oversight and disclosure of which companies are getting federal money and what they are doing with it. Responsibility. Americans are tired of watching corporate criminals get off with a slap on the wrist when they plunder and loot. Accountability is necessary to maintain not only the honesty of the marketplace but the integrity of American democracy. Corporate officials who acted recklessly with stockholder and public money should be prosecuted and sentenced to jail time under the same rules applicable to street thugs. State and local law enforcement agencies, with the assistance of the federal government, should join to build a national network for the investigation and prosecution of the corporate crooks. Return . to a real economy. In 2007, more than a quarter of all corporate profits came SOLD OUT 13 from the Money Industry, largely based on speculation by corporations operating in international markets and whose actions call into question their loyalty to the best interests of America. To recover, America must return to the principles that made it great . hard work, creativity, and innovation . and both government and business must serve that end. The spectacle of so many large corporations lining up for government assistance puts to rest the argument made by the corporate-funded think tanks and talking heads over the last three decades that government is gthe problem, not the solution.h In fact, as this report shows, government has been the solution for the Money Industry all along. Now Washington must serve America, not Wall Street. Massive government intervention is not only appropriate when it is necessary to save banks and insurance companies. For the $20 billion in taxpayer money that the government gave Citigroup in November, we could have bought the company lock, stock and barrel, and then we would have our own credit card, student loan and mortgage company, run on careful business principles but without the need to turn an enormous profit. Think of the assistance that that would offer to Main Street, not to mention the competitive effect it would have on the market. And massive government intervention is whatfs really needed in the health care system, which private enterprise has plundered and then for so many Americans abandoned. Revolt. Things will not change so long as Americans acquiesce to business as usual in Washington. Itfs time for Americans to make their voices heard. 14 SOLD OUT Executive Summary Blame Wall Street for the current financial crisis. Investment banks, hedge funds and commercial banks made reckless bets using borrowed money. They created and trafficked in exotic investment vehicles that even top Wall Street executives . not to mention firm directors . did not understand. They hid risky investments in offbalance- sheet vehicles or capitalized on their legal status to cloak investments altogether. They engaged in unconscionable predatory lending that offered huge profits for a time, but led to dire consequences when the loans proved unpayable. And they created, maintained and justified a housing bubble, the bursting of which has thrown the United States and the world into a deep recession, resulted in a foreclosure epidemic ripping apart communities across the country. But while Wall Street is culpable for the financial crisis and global recession, others do share responsibility.2 For the last three decades, financial regulators, Congress and the executive branch have steadily eroded the regulatory system that restrained the financial sector from acting on its own worst tendencies. The post-Depression regulatory system 2 This report uses the term gWall Streeth in the colloquial sense of standing for the big players in the financial sector, not just those located in New Yorkfs financial district. aimed to force disclosure of publicly relevant financial information; established limits on the use of leverage; drew bright lines between different kinds of financial activity and protected regulated commercial banking from investment bank-style risk taking; enforced meaningful limits on economic concentration, especially in the banking sector; provided meaningful consumer protections (including restrictions on usurious interest rates); and contained the financial sector so that it remained subordinate to the real economy. This hodge-podge regulatory system was, of course, highly imperfect, including because it too often failed to deliver on its promises. But it was not its imperfections that led to the erosion and collapse of that regulatory system. It was a concerted effort by Wall Street, steadily gaining momentum until it reached fever pitch in the late 1990s and continued right through the first half of 2008. Even now, Wall Street continues to defend many of its worst practices. Though it bows to the political reality that new regulation is coming, it aims to reduce the scope and importance of that regulation and, if possible, use the guise of regulation to further remove public controls over its operations. This report has one overriding message: financial deregulation led directly to the financial meltdown. It also has two other, top-tier messages. SOLD OUT 15 First, the details matter. The report documents a dozen specific deregulatory steps (including failures to regulate and failures to enforce existing regulations) that enabled Wall Street to crash the financial system. Second, Wall Street didnft obtain these regulatory abeyances based on the force of its arguments. At every step, critics warned of the dangers of further deregulation. Their evidence-based claims could not offset the political and economic muscle of Wall Street. The financial sector showered campaign contributions on politicians from both parties, invested heavily in a legion of lobbyists, paid academics and think tanks to justify their preferred policy positions, and cultivated a pliant media . especially a cheerleading business media complex. Part I of this report presents 12 Deregulatory Steps to Financial Meltdown. For each deregulatory move, we aim to explain the deregulatory action taken (or regulatory move avoided), its consequence, and the process by which big financial firms and their political allies maneuvered to achieve their deregulatory objective. In Part II, we present data on financial firmsf campaign contributions and disclosed lobbying investments. The aggregate data are startling: The financial sector invested more than $5.1 billion in political influence purchasing over the last decade. The entire financial sector (finance, insurance, real estate) drowned political candidates in campaign contributions over the past decade, spending more than $1.7 billion in federal elections from 1998-2008. Primarily reflecting the balance of power over the decade, about 55 percent went to Republicans and 45 percent to Democrats. Democrats took just more than half of the financial sectorfs 2008 election cycle contributions. The industry spent even more . topping $3.4 billion . on officially registered lobbying of federal officials during the same period. During the period 1998-2008: . Accounting firms spent $81 million on campaign contributions and $122 million on lobbying; . Commercial banks spent more than $155 million on campaign contributions, while investing nearly $383 million in officially registered lobbying; . Insurance companies donated more than $220 million and spent more than $1.1 billion on lobbying; . Securities firms invested nearly $513 million in campaign contributions, and an additional $600 million in lobbying. All this money went to hire legions of lobbyists. The financial sector employed 2,996 lobbyists in 2007. Financial firms employed an extraordinary number of former government officials as lobbyists. 16 SOLD OUT This report finds 142 of the lobbyists employed by the financial sector from 1998- 2008 were previously high-ranking officials or employees in the Executive Branch or Congress. These are the 12 Deregulatory Steps to Financial Meltdown: 1. Repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act and the Rise of the Culture of Recklessness The Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 formally repealed the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 (also known as the Banking Act of 1933) and related laws, which prohibited commercial banks from offering investment banking and insurance services. In a form of corporate civil disobedience, Citibank and insurance giant Travelers Group merged in 1998 . a move that was illegal at the time, but for which they were given a two-year forbearance . on the assumption that they would be able to force a change in the relevant law at a future date. They did. The 1999 repeal of Glass-Steagall helped create the conditions in which banks invested monies from checking and savings accounts into creative financial instruments such as mortgage-backed securities and credit default swaps, investment gambles that rocked the financial markets in 2008. 2. Hiding Liabilities: Off-Balance Sheet Accounting Holding assets off the balance sheet generally allows companies to exclude gtoxich or money-losing assets from financial disclosures to investors in order to make the company appear more valuable than it is. Banks used off-balance sheet operations . special purpose entities (SPEs), or special purpose vehicles (SPVs) . to hold securitized mortgages. Because the securitized mortgages were held by an off-balance sheet entity, however, the banks did not have to hold capital reserves as against the risk of default . thus leaving them so vulnerable. Off-balance sheet operations are permitted by Financial Accounting Standards Board rules installed at the urging of big banks. The Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association and the American Securitization Forum are among the lobby interests now blocking efforts to get this rule reformed. 3. The Executive Branch Rejects Financial Derivative Regulation Financial derivatives are unregulated. By all accounts this has been a disaster, as Warren Buffetfs warning that they represent gweapons of mass financial destructionh has proven prescient.3 Financial derivatives have 3 Warren Buffett, Chairman, Berkshire Hathaway, Report to Shareholders, February 21, 2003. Available at: <http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/ SOLD OUT 17 amplified the financial crisis far beyond the unavoidable troubles connected to the popping of the housing bubble. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) has jurisdiction over futures, options and other derivatives connected to commodities. During the Clinton administration, the CFTC sought to exert regulatory control over financial derivatives. The agency was quashed by opposition from Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin and, above all, Fed Chair Alan Greenspan. They challenged the agencyfs jurisdictional authority; and insisted that CFTC regulation might imperil existing financial activity that was already at considerable scale (though nowhere near present levels). Then-Deputy Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers told Congress that CFTC proposals gcas[t] a shadow of regulatory uncertainty over an otherwise thriving market.h 4. Congress Blocks Financial Derivative Regulation The deregulation . or non-regulation . of financial derivatives was sealed in 2000, with the Commodities Futures Modernization Act (CFMA), passage of which was engineered by then-Senator Phil Gramm, RTexas. The Commodities Futures Modernization Act exempts financial derivatives, including credit default swaps, from regulation and helped create the current financial 2002pdf.pdf>. crisis. 5. The SECfs Voluntary Regulation Regime for Investment Banks In 1975, the SECfs trading and markets division promulgated a rule requiring investment banks to maintain a debt-to-netcapital ratio of less than 12 to 1. It forbid trading in securities if the ratio reached or exceeded 12 to 1, so most companies maintained a ratio far below it. In 2004, however, the SEC succumbed to a push from the big investment banks . led by Goldman Sachs, and its then-chair, Henry Paulson . and authorized investment banks to develop their own net capital requirements in accordance with standards published by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. This essentially involved complicated mathematical formulas that imposed no real limits, and was voluntarily administered. With this new freedom, investment banks pushed borrowing ratios to as high as 40 to 1, as in the case of Merrill Lynch. This superleverage not only made the investment banks more vulnerable when the housing bubble popped, it enabled the banks to create a more tangled mess of derivative investments . so that their individual failures, or the potential of failure, became systemic crises. Former SEC Chair Chris Cox has acknowledged that the voluntary regulation was a complete failure. 18 SOLD OUT 6. Bank Self-Regulation Goes Global: Preparing to Repeat the Meltdown? In 1988, global bank regulators adopted a set of rules known as Basel I, to impose a minimum global standard of capital adequacy for banks. Complicated financial maneuvering made it hard to determine compliance, however, which led to negotiations over a new set of regulations. Basel II, heavily influenced by the banks themselves, establishes varying capital reserve requirements, based on subjective factors of agency ratings and the banksf own internal riskassessment models. The SEC experience with Basel II principles illustrates their fatal flaws. Commercial banks in the United States are supposed to be compliant with aspects of Basel II as of April 2008, but complications and intra-industry disputes have slowed implementation. 7. Failure to Prevent Predatory Lending Even in a deregulated environment, the banking regulators retained authority to crack down on predatory lending abuses. Such enforcement activity would have protected homeowners, and lessened though not prevented the current financial crisis. But the regulators sat on their hands. The Federal Reserve took three formal actions against subprime lenders from 2002 to 2007. The Office of Comptroller of the Currency, which has authority over almost 1,800 banks, took three consumer-protection enforcement actions from 2004 to 2006. 8. Federal Preemption of State Consumer Protection Laws When the states sought to fill the vacuum created by federal nonenforcement of consumer protection laws against predatory lenders, the feds jumped to stop them. gIn 2003,h as Eliot Spitzer recounted, gduring the height of the predatory lending crisis, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency invoked a clause from the 1863 National Bank Act to issue formal opinions preempting all state predatory lending laws, thereby rendering them inoperative. The OCC also promulgated new rules that prevented states from enforcing any of their own consumer protection laws against national banks.h 9. Escaping Accountability: Assignee Liability Under existing federal law, with only limited exceptions, only the original mortgage lender is liable for any predatory and illegal features of a mortgage . even if the mortgage is transferred to another party. This arrangement effectively immunized acquirers of the mortgage (gassigneesh) for any problems with the initial loan, and relieved them of any duty to investigate the terms of the loan. Wall Street interests could purchase, bundle and securitize subprime loans . including many with pernicious, predatory terms . without fear of liability for SOLD OUT 19 illegal loan terms. The arrangement left victimized borrowers with no cause of action against any but the original lender, and typically with no defenses against being foreclosed upon. Representative Bob Ney, R-Ohio . a close friend of Wall Street who subsequently went to prison in connection with the Abramoff scandal . was the leading opponent of a fair assignee liability regime. 10. Fannie and Freddie Enter the Subprime Market At the peak of the housing boom, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were dominant purchasers in the subprime secondary market. The Government-Sponsored Enterprises were followers, not leaders, but they did end up taking on substantial subprime assets . at least $57 billion. The purchase of subprime assets was a break from prior practice, justified by theories of expanded access to homeownership for low-income families and rationalized by mathematical models allegedly able to identify and assess risk to newer levels of precision. In fact, the motivation was the for-profit nature of the institutions and their particular executive incentive schemes. Massive lobbying . including especially but not only of Democratic friends of the institutions . enabled them to divert from their traditional exclusive focus on prime loans. Fannie and Freddie are not responsible for the financial crisis. They are responsible for their own demise, and the resultant massive taxpayer liability. 11. Merger Mania The effective abandonment of antitrust and related regulatory principles over the last two decades has enabled a remarkable concentration in the banking sector, even in advance of recent moves to combine firms as a means to preserve the functioning of the financial system. The megabanks achieved too-big-to-fail status. While this should have meant they be treated as public utilities requiring heightened regulation and risk control, other deregulatory maneuvers (including repeal of Glass-Steagall) enabled these gigantic institutions to benefit from explicit and implicit federal guarantees, even as they pursued reckless high-risk investments. 12. Rampant Conflicts of Interest: Credit Ratings Firmsf Failure Credit ratings are a key link in the financial crisis story. With Wall Street combining mortgage loans into pools of securitized assets and then slicing them up into tranches, the resultant financial instruments were attractive to many buyers because they promised high returns. But pension funds and other investors could only enter the game if the securities were highly rated. The credit rating firms enabled these 20 SOLD OUT investors to enter the game, by attaching high ratings to securities that actually were high risk . as subsequent events have revealed. The credit ratings firms have a bias to offering favorable ratings to new instruments because of their complex relationships with issuers, and their desire to maintain and obtain other business dealings with issuers. This institutional failure and conflict of interest might and should have been forestalled by the SEC, but the Credit Rating Agencies Reform Act of 2006 gave the SEC insufficient oversight authority. In fact, the SEC must give an approval rating to credit ratings agencies if they are adhering to their own standards . even if the SEC knows those standards to be flawed. Wall Street is presently humbled, but not prostrate. Despite siphoning trillions of dollars from the public purse, Wall Street executives continue to warn about the perils of restricting gfinancial innovationh . even though it was these very innovations that led to the crisis. And they are scheming to use the coming Congressional focus on financial regulation to centralize authority with industry- friendly agencies. If we are to see the meaningful regulation we need, Congress must adopt the view that Wall Street has no legitimate seat at the table. With Wall Street having destroyed the system that enriched its high flyers, and plunged the global economy into deep recession, itfs time for Congress to tell Wall Street that its political investments have also gone bad. This time, legislating must be to control Wall Street, not further Wall Streetfs control. This reportfs conclusion offers guiding principles for a new financial regulatory architecture. SOLD OUT 21 Part I: 12 Deregulatory Steps to Financial Meltdown 22 SOLD OUT REPEAL OF THE GLASSSTEAGALL ACT AND THE RISE OF THE CULTURE OF RECKLESSNESS Perhaps the signature deregulatory move of the last quarter century was the repeal of the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act4 and related legislation. 5 The repeal removed the legal prohibi- 4 Glass-Steagall repealed at Pub. L. 106.102, title I, ˜ 101(a), Nov. 12, 1999, 113 Stat. 1341. 5 See amendments to the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. ˜˜ 1841-1850, 1994 & Supp. II 1997 (amended 1999). tion on combinations between commercial banks on the one hand, and investment banks and other financial services companies on the other. Glass-Steagallfs strict rules originated in the U.S. Governmentfs response to the Depression and reflected the learned experience of the severe dangers to consumers and the overall financial system of permitting giant financial institutions to combine commercial banking with other financial operations. Glass-Steagall and related laws advanced the core public objectives of protecting depositors and avoiding excessive risk for the banking system by defining industry structure: banks could not maintain investment banking or insurance affiliates (nor affiliates in non-financial commercial activity). As banks eyed the higher profits in higher risk activity, however, they began to breach the regulatory walls between commercial banking and other financial services. Starting in the 1980s, responding to a steady drumbeat of requests, regulators began to weaken the strict prohibition on crossownership. In 1999, after a long industry campaign, Congress tore down the legal walls altogether. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act6 removed the remaining legal restrictions on combined banking and financial service firms, and ushered in the current hyper-deregulated era. 6 Pub. L. No. 106-102. 1 IN THIS SECTION: The Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 formally repealed the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 (also known as the Banking Act of 1933) and related laws, which prohibited commercial banks from offering investment banking and insurance services. In a form of corporate civil disobedience, Citibank and insurance giant Travelers Group merged in 1998 . a move that was illegal at the time, but for which they were given a two-year forbearance . on the assumption that they would be able to force a change in the relevant law at a future date. They did. The 1999 repeal of Glass-Steagall helped create the conditions in which banks invested monies from checking and savings accounts into creative financial instruments such as mortgage-backed securities and credit default swaps, investment gambles that rocked the financial markets in 2008. SOLD OUT 23 The overwhelming direct damage inflicted by Glass-Steagall repeal was the infusion of investment banking culture into the conservative culture of commercial banking. After repeal, commercial banks sought high returns in risky ventures and exotic financial instruments, with disastrous results. Origins Banking involves the collection of funds from depositors with the promise that the funds will be available when the depositor wishes to withdraw them. Banks keep only a specified fraction of deposits in their vaults. They lend the rest out to borrowers or invest the deposits to generate income. Depositors depend on the bankfs stability, and communities and businesses depend on banks to provide credit on reasonable terms. The difficulties faced by depositors in judging the quality of bank assets has required government regulation to protect the safety of depositorsf money and the well being of the banking system. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, the Supreme Court prohibited commercial banks from engaging directly in securities activities, 7 but bank affiliates . subsidiaries of a 7 See California Bank v. Kennedy, 167 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1897) (holding that national bank may neither purchase nor subscribe to stock of another corporation); Logan County Natfl Bank v. Townsend, 139 U.S. 67, 78 (1891) (holding that national bank may be liable as shareholder while in possession of bonds holding company that also owns banks . were not subject to the prohibition. As a result, commercial bank affiliates regularly traded customer deposits in the stock market, often investing in highly speculative activities and dubious companies and derivatives. The Pecora Hearings The economic collapse that began with the 1929 stock market crash hit Americans hard. By the time the bottom arrived, in 1932, the Dow Jones Industrial Average was down 89 percent from its 1929 peak.8 An estimated 15 million workers . almost 25 percent9 of the workforce . were unemployed, real output in the United States fell nearly 30 percent and prices fell at a rate of nearly 10 percent per year.10 obtained under contract made absent legal authority); National Bank v. Case, 99 U.S. 628, 633 (1878) (holding that national bank may be liable for stock held in another bank). 8 Floyd Norris, gLooking Back at the Crash of f29,h New York Times on the web, 1999, available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/library/financial/i ndex-1929-crash.html>. 9 Remarks by Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben S. Bernanke, gMoney, Gold, and the Great Depression,h March 2, 2004, available at: <http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/s peeches/2004/200403022/default.htm>. 10 Remarks by Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben S. Bernanke, gMoney, Gold, and the Great Depression,h March 2, 2004, available at: <http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/s peeches/2004/200403022/default.htm>. 24 SOLD OUT The 1932-34 Pecora Hearings,11 held by the Senate Banking and Currency Committee and named after its chief counsel Ferdinand Pecora, investigated the causes of the 1929 crash. The committee uncovered blatant conflicts of interest and self-dealing by commercial banks and their investment affiliates. For example, commercial banks had misrepresented to their depositors the quality of securities that their investment banks were underwriting and promoting, leading the depositors to be overly confident in commercial banksf stability. First National City Bank (now Citigroup) and its securities affiliate, the National City Company, had 2,000 brokers selling securities. 12 Those brokers had repackaged the bankfs Latin American loans and sold them to investors as new securities (today, this is known as gsecuritizationh) without disclosing to customers the bankfs confidential findings that the loans posed an adverse 11 The Pecora hearings, formally titled gStock Exchange Practices: Hearings Before the Senate Banking Committee,h were authorized by S. Res. No. 84, 72d Cong., 1st Session (1931). The hearings were convened in the 72d and 73d Congresses (1932-1934). 12 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation website, gThe Roaring 20s,h Undated, available at: <http://www.fdic.gov/about/learn/learning/ when/1920s.html>. risk.13 Peruvian government bonds were sold even though the bankfs staff had internally warned that gno further national loan can be safely madeh to Peru. The Senate committee found conflicts when commercial banks were able to garner confidential insider information about their corporate customersf deposits and use it to benefit the bankfs investment affiliates. In addition, commercial banks would routinely purchase the stock of firms that were customers of the bank, as opposed to firms that were most financially stable. The Pecora hearings concluded that common ownership of commercial banks and investment banks created several distinct problems, among them: 1) jeopardizing depositors by investing their funds in the stock market; 2) loss of the publicfs confidence in the banks, which led to panic withdrawals; 3) the making of unsound loans; and 4) an inability to provide honest investment advice to depositors because banks were conflicted by their underwriting relationship with companies.14 13 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation website, gThe Roaring 20s,h Undated, available at: <http://www.fdic.gov/about/learn/learning/ when/1920s.html>. 14 Joan M. LeGraw and Stacey L. Davidson, gGlass-Steagall and the eSubtle Hazardsf of The Pecora hearings concluded that common ownership of commercial banks and investment banks created several distinct problems. SOLD OUT 25 Congress Acts The Glass-Steagall Act consisted of four provisions to address the conflicts of interest that the Congress concluded had helped trigger the 1929 crash: . Section 16 restricted commercial national banks from engaging in most investment banking activities;15 . Section 21 prohibited investment banks from engaging in any commercial banking activities;16 . Section 20 prohibited any Federal Reserve-member bank from affiliating with an investment bank or other company gengaged principallyh in securities trading;17 and Judicial Activism,h 24 New Eng. L. Rev. 225, Fall 1989. 15 12 U.S.C. ˜ 24, Seventh (1933) (provided that a national bank gshall not underwrite any issue of securities or stockh ). 16 12 U.S.C. ˜ 378(a) (1933) (git shall be unlawful - (1) For any person, firm, corporation, association, business trust, or other similar organization, engaged in the business of issuing, underwriting, selling, or distributing, at wholesale or retail, or through syndicate participation, stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or other securities, to engage at the same time to any extent whatever in the business of [deposit banking].h 17 12 U.S.C. ˜ 377 (1933) (prohibited affiliations between banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System and organizations gengaged principally in the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution at wholesale or retail or through syndicate participation of stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or other securities.....h). Federal Reserve member banks include all national banks and some state-chartered banks and are subject to regulations of the Federal Reserve System, often referred to as the . Section 32 prohibited individuals from serving simultaneously with a commercial bank and an investment bank as a director, officer, employee, or principal.18 One exception in Section 20 permitted securities activities by banks in limited circumstances, such as the trading of municipal general obligation bonds, U.S. government bonds, and real estate bonds. It also permitted banks to help private companies issue gcommercial paperh for the purpose of obtaining short-term loans. (Commercial paper is a debt instrument or bond equivalent to a short-term loan; companies issue gcommercial paperh to fund daily (i.e., short-term) operations, including payments Federal Reserve or simply gthe Fed.h The Fed, created in 1913, is the central bank of the United States comprised of a central, governmental agency . the Board of Governors . in Washington, D.C., and twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks, located in major cities throughout the nation. The Fed supervises thousands of its member banks and controls the total supply of money in the economy by establishing the rate of interest it charges banks to borrow. It is considered an independent central bank because its decisions do not have to be ratified by the President and Congress. Federal Reserve member banks must comply with the Fed's minimum capital requirements. (See gThe Structure of the Federal Reserve System,h Federal Reserve, available at: <http://federalreserve.gov/pubs/frseries/frser i.htm>.) 18 12 U.S.C. ˜ 78 (1933) (provided that no officer, director, or employee of a bank in the Federal Reserve System may serve at the same time as officer, director, or employee of an association primarily engaged in the activity described in section 20). 26 SOLD OUT to employees and financing inventories. Most commercial paper has a maturity of 30 days or less. Companies issue commercial paper as an alternative to taking out a loan from a bank.) Glass-Steagall was a key element of the Roosevelt administrationfs response to the Depression and considered essential both to restoring public confidence in a financial system that had failed and to protecting the nation against another profound economic collapse. While the financial industry was cowed by the Depression, it did not fully embrace the New Deal, and almost immediately sought to maneuver around Glass-Steagall. A legal construct known as a gbank holding companyh was not subject to the Glass-Steagall restrictions. Under the Federal Reserve System, bank holding companies are gpaperh or gshellh companies whose sole purpose is to own two or more banks. Despite the prohibitions in Glass-Steagall, a single company could own both commercial and investment banking interests if those interests were held as separate subsidiaries by a bank holding company. Bank holding companies became a popular way for financial institutions and other corporations to subvert the Glass-Steagall wall separating commercial and investment banking. In response, Congress enacted the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (BHCA) to prohibit bank holding companies from acquiring gnon-banksh or engaging in gactivities that are not closely related to banking.h Depository institutions were considered gbanksh while investment banks (e.g. those that trade stock on Wall Street) were deemed gnonbanksh under the law. As with Glass-Steagall, Congress expressed its intent to separate customer deposits in banks from risky investments in securities. Importantly, the BHCA also mandated the separation of banking from insurance and non-financial commercial activities. The BHCA also required bank holding companies to divest all their holdings in non-banking assets and forbade acquisition of banks across state lines. But the BHCA contained a loophole sought by the financial industry. It allowed bank holding companies to acquire nonbanks if the Fed determined that the nonbank activities were gclosely related to banking.h The Fed was given wide latitude Glass-Steagall was a key element of the Roosevelt administrationfs response to the Depression and considered essential both to restoring public confidence in a financial system that had failed and to protecting the nation against another profound economic collapse. SOLD OUT 27 under the Bank Holding Company Act to approve or deny such requests. In the decades that followed passage of the BHCA, the Federal Reserve frequently invoked its broad authority to approve bank holding company acquisitions of investment banking firms, thereby weakening the wall separating customer deposits from riskier trading activities. Deference to regulators In furtherance of the Fedfs authority under BHCA, the Supreme Court in 1971 ruled that courts should defer to regulatory decisions involving bank holding company applications to acquire non-bank entities under the BHCA loophole. As long as a Federal Reserve Board interpretation of the BHCA is greasonableh and gexpressly articulated,h judges should not intervene, the court concluded.19 The ruling was a victory for opponents of Glass Steagall because it increased the power of bank-friendly regulators. It substantially freed bank regulators to authorize bank holding companies to conduct new non-banking activities without judicial interference,20 rendering a significant blow to Glass-Steagall. As a result, banks whose primary business was managing customer deposits and making loans began using their bank holding companies to 19 Investment Company Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971). 20 Jonathan Zubrow Cohen, 8 Admin. L.J. Am. U. 335, Summer 1994. buy securities firms. For example, Bank- America purchased stock brokerage firm Charles Schwab in 1984.21 The Federal Reserve had decided that Schwabfs service of executing buy and sell stock orders for retail investors was gclosely related to bankingh and thus satisfied requirements of the BHCA. In December 1986, the Fed reinterpreted the phrase gengaged principally,h in Section 20 of the BHCA, which prohibited banks from affiliating with companies engaged principally in securities trading. The Fed decided that up to 5 percent of a bankfs gross revenues could come from investment banking without running afoul of the ban.22 Just a few months later, in the spring of 1987, the Fed entertained proposals from Citicorp, J.P Morgan and Bankers Trust to loosen Glass-Steagall regulations further by allowing banks to become involved with commercial paper, municipal revenue bonds and mortgage-backed securities. The Federal Reserve approved the proposals in a 3-2 vote.23 One of the dissenters, then-Chair Paul Volcker, was soon replaced by Alan 21 Securities Industry Association v. Federal Reserve System, 468 U.S. 207 (1984). 22 gThe Long Demise of Glass-Steagall,h PBS Frontline, May 8, 2003, available at: <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/s hows/wallstreet/weill/demise.html>. 23 gThe Long Demise of Glass-Steagall,h PBS Frontline, May 8, 2003, available at: <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/s hows/wallstreet/weill/demise.html>. 28 SOLD OUT Greenspan, a strong proponent of deregulation. In 1989, the Fed enlarged the BHCA loophole again, at the request of J.P. Morgan, Chase Manhattan, Bankers Trust and Citicorp, permitting banks to generate up to 10 percent of their revenue from investment banking activity. In 1993, the Fed approved an acquisition by a bank holding company, in this case Mellon Bank, of TBC Advisors, an administrator and advisor of stock mutual funds. By acquiring TBC, Mellon Bank was authorized to provide investment advisory services to mutual funds. By the early 1990s, the Fed had authorized commercial bank holding companies to own and operate full service brokerages and offer investment advisory services. Glass Steagall was withering at the hands of industry-friendly regulators whose free market ideology conflicted with the Depression- era reforms. The Financial Services Modernization Act While the Fed had been progressively undermining Glass-Steagall through deregulatory interpretations of existing laws, the financial industry was simultaneously lobbying Congress to repeal Glass-Steagall altogether. Members of Congress introduced major deregulation legislation in 1982, 1988, 1991, 1995 and 1998. Big banks, securities firms and insurance companies24 spent lavishly in support of the legislation in the late 1990s. During the 1997-1998 Congress, the thre
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Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Corruption
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on: December 11, 2011, 01:10:23 AM
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SECOND POST:
Woof, I bet it's just those evil Repub's doing this stuff!! Ha!
By Newsmax Wires
Former Speaker Nancy Pelosi bought stock in initial public offerings (IPOs) that earned hefty returns while she had access to insider information that would have been illegal for an average citizen to trade with – even though it’s perfectly legal for elected officials, CBS’s "60 Minutes" reported Sunday night.
In a piece relying on data collected from the conservative Hoover Institution, "60 Minutes" revealed that elected officials like Pelosi are exempt from insider trading laws – regulations that carry hefty prison sentences and fines for any other citizen who trades stocks with private information on companies that can affect their stock price.
In the case of elected officials – this secret information ranges from timely details on lucrative federal contracts to legislation that can cause companies’ stocks to rise and fall dramatically.
How do they get away with it? Lawmakers have exempted themselves from the laws that govern every other citizen.
Pelosi, D-Calif., and her husband have participated in at least eight IPOs while having access to information directly relating to the companies involved. One of those came in 2008, from Visa, just as a troublesome piece of legislation that would have hurt credit card companies, began making its way through the House.
“Undisturbed by a potential conflict of interest the Pelosis purchased 5,000 shares of Visa at the initial price of $44 dollars. Two days later it was trading at $64. The credit card legislation never made it to the floor of the House,” Steve Kroft of "60 Minutes" reported.
Kroft confronted Pelosi at a regular press conference after she declined an interview.
Kroft: Madam Leader, I wanted to ask you why you and your husband back in March of 2008 accepted and participated in a very large IPO deal from Visa at a time there was major legislation affecting the credit card companies making its way through the —through the House.
Nancy Pelosi: But —
Kroft: And did you consider that to be a conflict of interest?
Pelosi: The — y — I — I don't know what your point is of your question. Is there some point that you want to make with that?
Kroft: Well, I — I — I guess what I'm asking is do you think it's all right for a speaker to accept a very preferential, favorable stock deal?
Pelosi: Well, we didn't.
Kroft: You participated in the IPO. And at the time you were speaker of the House. You don't think it was a conflict of interest or had the appearance--
Pelosi: No, it was not —
Kroft: — of a conflict of interest?
Pelosi: —it doesn't — it only has appearance if you decide that you're going to have — elaborate on a false premise. But it — it — it's not true and that's that.
Kroft: I don't understand what part's not true.
Pelosi: Yes sir. That — that I would act upon an investment.
The Hoover Institution’s Peter Schweizer stressed that what Pelosi did was completely legal.
“There are all sorts of forms of honest grafts that congressmen engage in that allow them to become very, very wealthy. So it's not illegal, but I think it's highly unethical, I think it's highly offensive, and wrong,” he told Kroft.
“… Insider trading on the stock market. If you are a member of Congress, those laws are deemed not to apply,” Schweizer added. “The fact is, if you sit on a healthcare committee and you know that Medicare, for example, is — is considering not reimbursing for a certain drug that's market moving information. And if you can trade stock on — off of that information and do so legally, that's a great profit making opportunity. And that sort of behavior goes on.”
Pelosi’s office issued a statement Sunday saying, “It is very troubling that ‘60 Minutes’ would base their reporting off of an already-discredited conservative author who has made a career out of attacking Democrats.”
Schweizer’s books include “Do as I Say (Not as I Do): Profiles in Liberal Hypocrisy,” and “Architects of Ruin,” according to Schweizer’s page on the Hoover Institution website.
P.C.
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Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Corruption
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on: December 11, 2011, 01:02:13 AM
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Woof, 1st post; Congress members can do things legally that others get put in jail for. Now is that fair? www.cbsnews.com/8301-18560_162-57323527/congress-trading-stock-on-inside-information/ CBSNews.com| Steve Kroft reports that members of Congress can legally trade stock based on non-public information from Capitol Hill. Web Extras Congress: Trading stock on inside information?What counts as "inside information"?Keeping Congress clean(CBS News) Editor's Note: The report "Insiders" received quite a reaction the week after it aired. Democratic Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi's office called the report a "right-wing smear." While Republican Speaker John Boehner's office called his inclusion in the story "idiotic." But now, at least 93 members of Congress have signed on as cosponsors of the Stock Act, and for the first time the bill has been introduced in the Senate. Washington, D.C. is a town that runs on inside information - but should our elected officials be able to use that information to pad their own pockets? As Steve Kroft reports, members of Congress and their aides have regular access to powerful political intelligence, and many have made well-timed stock market trades in the very industries they regulate. For now, the practice is perfectly legal, but some say it's time for the law to change. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The following is a script of "Insiders" which aired on Nov. 13, 2011. Steve Kroft is correspondent, Ira Rosen and Gabrielle Schonder, producers. The next national election is now less than a year away and congressmen and senators are expending much of their time and their energy raising the millions of dollars in campaign funds they'll need just to hold onto a job that pays $174,000 a year. Few of them are doing it for the salary and all of them will say they are doing it to serve the public. But there are other benefits: Power, prestige, and the opportunity to become a Washington insider with access to information and connections that no one else has, in an environment of privilege where rules that govern the rest of the country, don't always apply to them. Questioning Pelosi: Steve Kroft heads to D.C. When Nancy Pelosi, John Boehner, and other lawmakers wouldn't answer Steve Kroft's questions, he headed to Washington to get some answers about their stock trades. Most former congressmen and senators manage to leave Washington - if they ever leave Washington - with more money in their pockets than they had when they arrived, and as you are about to see, the biggest challenge is often avoiding temptation. Peter Schweizer: This is a venture opportunity. This is an opportunity to leverage your position in public service and use that position to enrich yourself, your friends, and your family. Peter Schweizer is a fellow at the Hoover Institution, a conservative think tank at Stanford University. A year ago he began working on a book about soft corruption in Washington with a team of eight student researchers, who reviewed financial disclosure records. It became a jumping off point for our own story, and we have independently verified the material we've used. Schweizer says he wanted to know why some congressmen and senators managed to accumulate significant wealth beyond their salaries, and proved particularly adept at buying and selling stocks. Schweizer: There are all sorts of forms of honest grafts that congressmen engage in that allow them to become very, very wealthy. So it's not illegal, but I think it's highly unethical, I think it's highly offensive, and wrong. Steve Kroft: What do you mean honest graft? Schweizer: For example insider trading on the stock market. If you are a member of Congress, those laws are deemed not to apply. Kroft: So congressman get a pass on insider trading? Schweizer: They do. The fact is, if you sit on a healthcare committee and you know that Medicare, for example, is-- is considering not reimbursing for a certain drug that's market moving information. And if you can trade stock on-- off of that information and do so legally, that's a great profit making opportunity. And that sort of behavior goes on. Kroft: Why does Congress get a pass on this? Schweizer: It's really the way the rules have been defined. And the people who make the rules are the political class in Washington. And they've conveniently written them in such a way that they don't apply to themselves. The buying and selling of stock by corporate insiders who have access to non-public information that could affect the stock price can be a criminal offense, just ask hedge fund manager Raj Rajaratnam who recently got 11 years in prison for doing it. But, congressional lawmakers have no corporate responsibilities and have long been considered exempt from insider trading laws, even though they have daily access to non-public information and plenty of opportunities to trade on it. Schweizer: We know that during the health care debate people were trading health care stocks. We know that during the financial crisis of 2008 they were getting out of the market before the rest of America really knew what was going on. In mid September 2008 with the Dow Jones Industrial average still above ten thousand, Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson and Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke were holding closed door briefings with congressional leaders, and privately warning them that a global financial meltdown could occur within a few days. One of those attending was Alabama Representative Spencer Bachus, then the ranking Republican member on the House Financial Services Committee and now its chairman. Schweizer: These meetings were so sensitive-- that they would actually confiscate cell phones and Blackberries going into those meetings. What we know is that those meetings were held one day and literally the next day Congressman Bachus would engage in buying stock options based on apocalyptic briefings he had the day before from the Fed chairman and treasury secretary. I mean, talk about a stock tip. While Congressman Bachus was publicly trying to keep the economy from cratering, he was privately betting that it would, buying option funds that would go up in value if the market went down. He would make a variety of trades and profited at a time when most Americans were losing their shirts. Congressman Bachus declined to talk to us, so we went to his office and ran into his Press Secretary Tim Johnson. (CBS News) Kroft: Look we're not alleging that Congressman Bachus has violated any laws. All...the only thing we're interested in talking to him is about his trades. Tim Johnson: Ok...Ok that's a fair enough request. What we got was a statement from Congressman Bachus' office that he never trades on non-public information, or financial services stock. However, his financial disclosure forms seem to indicate otherwise. Bachus made money trading General Electric stock during the crisis, and a third of GE's business is in financial services. During the healthcare debate of 2009, members of Congress were trading health care stocks, including House Minority Leader John Boehner, who led the opposition against the so-called public option, government funded insurance that would compete with private companies. Just days before the provision was finally killed off, Boehner bought health insurance stocks, all of which went up. Now speaker of the House, Congressman Boehner also declined to be interviewed, so we tracked him down at his weekly press conference. Kroft: You made a number of trades going back to the health care debate. You bought some insurance stock. Did you make those trades based on non-public information? John Boehner: I have not made any decisions on day-to-day trading activities in my account. And haven't for years. I don't-- I do not do it, haven't done it and wouldn't do it. Later Boehner's spokesman told us that the health care trades were made by the speaker's financial adviser, who he only consults with about once a year. [Peter Schweizer: We need to find out whether they're part of a blind trust or not.] Peter Schweizer thinks the timing is suspicious, and believes congressional leaders should have their stock funds in blind trusts. Schweizer: Whether it's uh-- $15,000 or $150,000, the principle in my mind is that it's simply wrong and it shouldn't take place. But there is a long history of self-dealing in Washington. And it doesn't always involve stock trades. Congressmen and senators also seem to have a special knack for land and real estate deals. When Illinois Congressman Dennis Hastert became speaker of the House in 1999, he was worth a few hundred thousand dollars. He left the job eight years later a multi-millionaire. Jan Strasma: The road that Hastert wants to build will go through these farm fields right here. In 2005, Speaker Hastert got a $207 million federal earmark to build the Prairie Parkway through these cornfields near his home. What Jan Strasma and his neighbors didn't know was that Hastert had also bought some land adjacent to where the highway is supposed to go. Strasma: And five months after this earmark went through he sold that land and made a bundle of money. Kroft: How much? Strasma: Two million dollars. Kroft: What do you think of it? Strasma: It stinks. We stopped by the former speaker's farm, to ask him about the land deal, but he was off in Washington where he now works as a lobbyist. His office told us that property values in the area began to appreciate even before the earmark and that the Hastert land was several miles from the nearest exit. But the same good fortune befell former New Hampshire Senator Judd Gregg, who helped steer nearly $70 million dollars in government funds towards redeveloping this defunct Air Force base, which he and his brother both had a commercial interest in. Gregg has said that he violated no congressional rules. It's but one more example of good things happening to powerful members of Congress. Another is the access to initial public stock offerings, the opportunity to buy a new stock at insider prices just as it goes on the market. They can be incredibly lucrative and hard to get. (CBS News) Schweizer: If you were a senator, Steve, and I gave you $10,000 cash, one or both of us is probably gonna go to jail. But if I'm a corporate executive and you're a senator, and I give you IPO shares in stock and over the course of one day that stock nets you $100,000, that's completely legal. And former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and her husband have participated in at least eight IPOs. One of those came in 2008, from Visa, just as a troublesome piece of legislation that would have hurt credit card companies, began making its way through the House. Undisturbed by a potential conflict of interest the Pelosis purchased 5,000 shares of Visa at the initial price of $44 dollars. Two days later it was trading at $64. The credit card legislation never made it to the floor of the House. Congresswoman Pelosi also declined our request for an interview, but agreed to call on us if we attended a news conference. Kroft: Madam Leader, I wanted to ask you why you and your husband back in March of 2008 accepted and participated in a very large IPO deal from Visa at a time there was major legislation affecting the credit card companies making its way through the-- through the House. Nancy Pelosi: But-- Kroft: And did you consider that to be a conflict of interest? Pelosi: The-- y-- I-- I don't know what your point is of your question. Is there some point that you want to make with that? Kroft: Well, I-- I-- I guess what I'm asking is do you think it's all right for a speaker to accept a very preferential, favorable stock deal? Pelosi: Well, we didn't. Kroft: You participated in the IPO. And at the time you were speaker of the House. You don't think it was a conflict of interest or had the appearance-- Pelosi: No, it was not-- Kroft: --of a conflict of interest? Pelosi: --it doesn't-- it only has appearance if you decide that you're going to have-- elaborate on a false premise. But it-- it-- it's not true and that's that. Kroft: I don't understand what part's not true. Pelosi: Yes sir. That-- that I would act upon an investment. Congresswoman Pelosi pointed out that the tough credit card legislation eventually passed, but it was two years later and was initiated in the Senate. Pelosi: I will hold my record in terms of fighting the credit card companies as speaker of the House or as a member of Congress up against anyone. Corporate executives, members of the executive branch and all federal judges are subject to strict conflict of interest rules. But not the people who write the laws. Schweizer: If you are a member of Congress and you sit on the defense committee, you are free to trade defense stock as much as you want to if you're on the Senate banking committee you can trade bank stock as much as you want and that regularly goes on-- in-- in all these committees. Brian Baird: There should only be one thing in your mind when you're drafting legislation, 'Is this good for the United States of America?' That's it. If you're starting to say to yourself 'how's this going to affect my investments,' you've got-- you've got a mixed agenda and a mixed purpose for being there. (CBS News) Brian Baird is a former congressman from Washington state who served six terms in the house before retiring last year. He spent half of those 12 years trying to get his colleagues to prohibit insider trading in Congress and establish some rules governing conflicts of interest. Baird: One line in a bill in Congress can be worth millions and millions of dollars. There was one night, we had a late, late night caucus and you could kind of tell how a vote was going to go the next day. I literally walked home and I thought, 'Man, if you-- if you went online and made-- some significant trades, you could make a lot of money on this.' You-- you could just see it. You could see the potential here. So in 2004, Baird and Congresswoman Louise Slaughter introduced the Stock Act which would make it illegal for members of Congress to trade stocks on non-public information and require them to report their stock trades every 90 days instead of once a year. Kroft: How far did you get with this? Baird: We didn't get anywhere. Just flat died. Went nowhere. Kroft: How many cosponsors did you get? Baird: I think we got six. Kroft: Six doesn't sound like a very big amount. Baird: It's not, Steve. You-- you could have-- 'National Cherry Pie Week' and get 100 cosponsors. When Baird finally managed to get a congressional hearing on the Stock Act, almost no one showed up. It's reintroduced every session, but is buried so deep in the Capitol we had trouble finding congressmen who had even heard of it. Kroft: Have you ever heard of the Stock Act? Steve Palazzo: The what? Kroft: The Stock Act. Do you know anything about it? Congressman: No. Kroft: Congressman. Congressman. Congressman. Congressman Quayle: I haven't heard about that one yet. Kroft: Have you ever heard of something called the Stock Act? Congressman Watt: No. Male voice: I've heard about, but not. I can't say it's an issue I've spent a lot of time on. Male voice: I would have no problem with that. Kroft: Okay. Male voice: But then again I am a big fan of, you know, instant disclosure on almost everything. Kroft: They're looking for co-sponsors. (Male voice) Yet I've never heard of it. (CBS News) Baird: When you have a bill like this that makes so much sense and you can't get the co-sponsorships, you can't get the leadership to move it, it gets tremendously frustrating. Set aside that it's the right thing to do, it's good politics. People want their Congress to function well. It still baffles me. But what baffles Baird even more is that the situation has gotten worse. In the past few years a whole new totally unregulated, $100 million dollar industry has grown up in Washington called political intelligence. It employs former congressmen and former staffers to scour the halls of the Capitol gathering valuable non-public information then selling it to hedge funds and traders on Wall Street who can trade on it. Baird: Now if you're a political intel guy. And you get that information. Long before it's public. Long before somebody wakes up the next morning and reads or watches the television or whatever, you've got it. And you can make real-- real-time trades before anybody else. Baird says its taken what would be a criminal enterprise anyplace else in the country and turned it into a profitable business model. Baird: The town is all about people saying-- what do you know that I don't know. This is the currency of Washington, D.C. And it's that kind of informational currency that translates into real currency. Maybe it's over drinks maybe somebody picks up a phone. And says you know just to let you know it's in the bill. Trades happen. Can't trace 'em. If you can trace 'em, it's not illegal. It's a pretty great system. You feel like an idiot to not take advantage of it. P.C.
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Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Science, Culture, & Humanities / Re: Movies
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on: December 10, 2011, 11:12:48 PM
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Woof, Oh come off it ccp, Repub's don't like crooks in business anymore than anyone else does and they go after them all the time. Bernie Madoff ripped off anyone that gave him money and there were plenty of Repub's taken in just like Dem's. Besides that, this is not a political thread. P.C.
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Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Ditch the 17th Amendment!
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on: December 10, 2011, 09:14:24 PM
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Section 3 Constitution of the United States of America The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six Years; and each Senator shall have one Vote. Each state has two senators, regardless of the size of its population. Originally, senators were chosen by state legislatures. In 1913 the 17th amendment provided that senators would be directly elected by the people. Immediately after they shall be assembled in Consequence of the first Election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into three Classes. The Seats of the Senators of the first Class shall be vacated at the Expiration of the second Year, of the second Class at the Expiration of the fourth Year, and of the third Class at the Expiration of the sixth Year, so that one third may be chosen every second Year; and if Vacancies happen by Resignation, or otherwise, during the Recess of the Legislature of any State, the Executive thereof may make temporary Appointments until the next Meeting of the Legislature, which shall then fill such Vacancies My thought is that the 17th amendment should be repealed and the original Section 3 of the Constitution, should by default be reinstated. This would help curb the power of the Federal government over state governments, which was the intent of section 3 in the first place. Senators would be appointed by state governments ensuring their loyalty to the state they represent, not some special interest group or Party. The House of Representatives is the body of government that was intended to directly be voted into office by the people. It's because of the 17th amendment that the Federal government has been able to gain increasing power over States rights, and is a major reason for the political deadlock between Party's, constant campaigning, corruption and career politicans out of touch with their State's needs. I don't know what group of idiot's in 1913 thought they were smarter than the guy's that penned the final draft of the Constitution and the States that ratified it but they were idiot's and the cause of much of what ails us today. I could keep going but then my thought would undeniably be a rant then. Just a thought or a rant, whatever.  P.C.
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Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: Afpakia: Afghanistan-Pakistan
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on: December 10, 2011, 08:10:55 PM
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Woof, Not a friendly move on Pakistan's part. http://worldnews.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2011/12/10/9352886-pakistan-says-us-drones-in-its-air-space-will-be-shot-down Pakistan says U.S. drones in its air space will be shot downBy NBC News, msnbc.com staff and news service reports Updated at 8 p.m. EST ISLAMABAD -- Pakistan will shoot down any U.S. drone that intrudes its air space per new directives, a senior Pakistani official told NBC News on Saturday. Pakistani security personnel examine a crashed US surveillance drone inside Pakistan in August. According to the new Pakistani defense policy, "Any object entering into our air space, including U.S. drones, will be treated as hostile and be shot down," a senior Pakistani military official told NBC News. The policy change comes just weeks after a deadly NATO attack on Pakistani military checkpoints accidentally killed 24 Pakistani soldiers, prompting Pakistani officials to order all U.S. personnel out of a remote airfield in Pakistan. Pakistan told the U.S. to vacate Shamsi Air Base by December 11. A senior military official from Quetta, Pakistan, confirmed to NBC News on Saturday that the evacuation of the base, used for staging classified drone flights directed against militants, “will be completed tomorrow,” according to NBC’s Fakhar ur Rehman. Pakistan's Frontier Corps security forces took control of the base Saturday evening after most U.S. military personnel left, Xinhua news agency reported. Civil aviation officials also moved in Saturday, Xinhua said. Pakistani Military Chief Gen Ashfaq Pervez Kayani had issued multiple directives since the Nov. 26 NATO attack, which included orders to shoot down U.S. drones, senior military officials confirmed to NBC News on Saturday. It was unclear Saturday whether orders to fire upon incoming U.S. drones was part of the initial orders. Supporters of opposition political party Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf (Movement of Justice) carry a mock US drone as they listen to a speech by the party founder Imran Khan, during a protest rally against the United States drones attacks. The Pakistani airbase had been used by U.S. forces, including the CIA, to stage elements of a clandestine U.S. counter-terrorism operation to attack militants linked to al-Qaida, the Taliban and Pakistan's home-grown Haqqani network, using unmanned drone aircraft armed with missiles. President Barack Obama stepped up the drone campaign after he took office. U.S. officials say it has produced major successes in decimating the central leadership of al-Qaida and putting associated militant groups on the defensive. Since 2004, U.S. drones have carried out more than 300 attacks inside Pakistan. Pakistani authorities started threatening U.S. personnel with eviction from the Shamsi base in the wake of the raid last May in which U.S. commandos killed Osama bin Laden at his hide-out near Islamabad without notifying Pakistani officials in advance. NBC News' Fakhar ur Rehman, msnbc.com's Sevil Omer and Reuters contributed to this report P.C.
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Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Velvet Elvis
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on: December 10, 2011, 01:04:37 AM
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Woof, Legalizing all drugs would cause all kinds of problems, not just for the users but for employers and society at large. Problems that could have worse consequences than the prohibition. Hard drug use generally leads people to do nothing but use drugs. They can't make an honest living so they turn to crime or they become dependant on the state to take care of them. I think we should make that as rare as possible and besides our drunks don't need any competition. Legalizing Mary Jane on the other hand might not be such a bad trade off but we still shouldn't think that it won't cause any problems. It will, but as Guro Craftydog said it will take a lot of money out of cartel hands and hopefully our corrupt politicans won't spend it all on velvet paintings of Elvis and whores. I don't know, there's no doubt that the cartels would be better stewarts of the cash,  if we could just get them to stop killing people. Maybe if our government stopped supplying them with guns? We live in interesting times, don't we. P.C.
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Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / The Mexicanization of American Law Enforcement.
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on: December 09, 2011, 10:24:49 PM
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Woof,
Judith Miller The Mexicanization of American Law Enforcement The drug cartels extend their corrupting influence northward.
Customs and Border Protection agents have been bought off by drug dealers.Beheadings and amputations. Iraqi-style brutality, bribery, extortion, kidnapping, and murder. More than 7,200 dead—almost double last year’s tally—in shoot-outs between federales and often better-armed drug cartels. This is modern Mexico, whose president, Felipe Calderón, has been struggling since 2006 to wrest his country from the grip of four powerful cartels and their estimated 100,000 foot soldiers.
But chillingly, there are signs that one of the worst features of Mexico’s war on drugs—law enforcement officials on the take from drug lords—is becoming an American problem as well. Most press accounts focus on the drug-related violence that has migrated north into the United States. Far less widely reported is the infiltration and corruption of American law enforcement, according to Robert Killebrew, a retired U.S. Army colonel and senior fellow at the Washington-based Center for a New American Security. “This is a national security problem that does not yet have a name,” he wrote last fall in The National Strategy Forum Review. The drug lords, he tells me, are seeking to “hollow out our institutions, just as they have in Mexico.”
Corruption indictments and convictions linked to drug-trafficking organizations, known in police parlance as DTOs, are popping up in FBI press releases with disturbing frequency. In April, for instance, the U.S. Attorney’s office in the Southern District of Texas announced that Sergio Lopez Hernandez, a 40-year-old Customs and Border Protection inspector, had been convicted of drug trafficking, alien smuggling, and bribery. Hernandez pleaded guilty to accepting over $150,000 in bribes and to conspiring to sell cocaine and bring illegal aliens into the country.
Or consider the case of border inspector Margarita Crispin—“precisely the kind of border corruption case that alarms us,” says William Abbott, an assistant special agent in charge of the FBI’s criminal branch in El Paso, Texas. In 2005, he says, a federal informant tipped off the Bureau that Crispin was deliberately ignoring traffickers who moved drugs and other contraband through her border post. Then, in the spring of 2006, a van that had just gone through Crispin’s lane sputtered out of gas. The driver abandoned the vehicle and fled back across the border into Mexico—and when other inspectors opened the van’s doors, they found nearly 6,000 pounds of marijuana in plain sight. Crispin couldn’t explain why she hadn’t noticed the stash when she had examined the vehicle, according to an FBI press release on the case and an official who worked on it.
Another year of surveillance uncovered evidence of Crispin’s drug-cartel connections. Though she lived simply in El Paso, she socialized with known drug traffickers in Mexico and had bought two expensive homes and several luxury vehicles there through straw purchasers. Crispin was then arrested. After pleading guilty in 2008 to conspiring to import drugs and abusing the public trust, she was sentenced to 20 years in prison and ordered to forfeit $5 million in assets she was estimated to have stolen.
Government investigators believe that Crispin had been working for the cartels for at least a year before she applied to become an inspector. In other words, federal screening failed to detect that, at the time she applied for her job, the cartels had already recruited her to facilitate their cross-border trafficking. At one point, federal investigators say, Crispin claimed to have wanted out of her arrangement with the cartels. “But we think she was kidnapped and forcibly taken back to Mexico to remind her of whom she was working for,” Abbott says. Having family in both Juárez and El Paso, cities within sight of each other across the border, Crispin found herself trapped.
Abbott says that the Crispin case is atypical. But the potential damage, he stresses, is huge. “You have the mule: an illegal immigrant who carries five pounds of marijuana in his backpack across the border through the desert. Compare that with the border inspector who waves through five completely loaded vans, as she did.”
Experts disagree about how deep this rot runs. Some try to downplay the phenomenon, dismissing the law enforcement officials who have succumbed to bribes or intimidation from the drug cartels as a few bad apples. Peter Nuñez, a former U.S. attorney who lectures at the University of San Diego, says he does not believe that there has been a noticeable surge of cartel-related corruption along the border, partly because the FBI, which has been historically less corrupt than its state and local counterparts, has significantly ratcheted up its presence there. “It’s harder to be as corrupt today as locals were in the 1970s, when there wasn’t a federal agent around for hundreds of miles,” he says.
But Jason Ackleson, an associate professor of government at New Mexico State University, disagrees. “U.S. Customs and Border Protection is very alert to the problem,” he tells me. “Their internal investigations caseload is going up, and there are other cases that are not being publicized.” While corruption is not widespread, “if you increase the overall number of law enforcement officers as dramatically as we have”—from 9,000 border agents and inspectors prior to 9/11 to a planned 20,000 by the end of 2009—“you increase the possibility of corruption due to the larger number of people exposed to it and tempted by it.” Note, too, that Drug Enforcement Agency data suggest that Mexican cartels are operating in at least 230 American cities.
Washington is taking no chances. In recent months, the FBI’s Criminal Division has created seven multiagency task forces and assigned 120 agents to investigate public corruption, drug-related and otherwise, in the Southwest border region, says Debbie Weierman of the FBI’s public-affairs office in Washington. Meanwhile, Customs and Border Protection, the largest U.S. law enforcement agency, has increased the number of its internal investigators over three years from five to 220.
And David Shirk, director of the San Diego–based Trans-Border Institute and a political scientist at the University of San Diego, says that recent years have seen an “alarming” increase in the number of Department of Homeland Security personnel being investigated for possible corruption. “The number of cases filed against DHS agents in recent years is in the hundreds,” says Shirk. “And that, obviously, is a potentially huge problem.” An August 2009 investigation by the Associated Press supports his assessment. Based on records obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, court records, and interviews with sentenced agents, the AP concluded that more than 80 federal, state, and local border-control officials had been convicted of corruption-related crimes since 2007, soon after President Calderón launched his war on the cartels. Over the previous ten months, the AP data showed, 20 Customs and Border Protection agents alone had been charged with a corruption-related crime. If that pace continued, the reporters concluded, “the organization will set a new record for in-house corruption.”
While the FBI task forces focus mainly on corruption along the border, cartel-related vice has spread much deeper into the American heartland. Consider New Mexico’s San Juan County, some 450 miles north of the border, where the U.S. Attorney’s office has recently prosecuted a startling corruption case that may be a portent of things to come.
Back in 1994, Ken Christesen was a detective in the Four Corners, the region where the borders of Colorado, Arizona, Utah, and New Mexico meet. That was the year that one Miguel Tarango was convicted of murdering a member of a rival drug gang in a territorial dispute. The conviction made Christesen realize that the Tarango family was “far more significant than we had initially thought” in the local drug trade, he tells me over coffee at Donna Kay’s, a popular café in Bloomfield, New Mexico.
Even in a county where 80 to 90 percent of all serious crimes are linked to drugs—an area where “you can’t swing a dead cat without hitting a drug dealer”—the Tarangos stood out. The family was locally based but had ties to Mexico’s Sinaloa and Juárez cartels, and it had big ideas about controlling the lucrative trade in methamphetamine and other illicit drugs in San Juan County. The clan’s rising star was Daniel Tarango, Jr., a short, slim, American-born hipster with a pencil-thin mustache, a fondness for black T-shirts, and no visible means of support. After his father and uncle were convicted of heavy-duty meth trafficking, sent to federal prison, and deported, Danny, known to local cops as “the Runt,” took charge of the family business.
By 2002, Christesen had become a lieutenant in the San Juan County sheriff’s office, where he participated in Operation Farmland, an effort run by a federal, state, and local alliance called the Region II Narcotics Task Force. The operation, which targeted meth sales in the Four Corners, ended in 2003 with 250 people charged, among them Mike Marshall, a former sheriff’s deputy sentenced to five years in federal prison for distributing drugs. Christesen happened to know that Marshall and Danny Tarango had often been seen together. If Tarango had befriended Marshall, Christesen reasoned, might he also be trying to get inside information from active cops about the task force itself?
The hero of Operation Farmland was Levi Countryman, then a San Juan County sheriff’s deputy who had gotten many of the tips and intelligence that led to the massive arrests. Despite Countryman’s ostensibly heroic role in Farmland, Christesen was suspicious. Farmland hadn’t fingered a single member of the Tarango clan, despite its growing prominence in the county drug trade. And despite Farmland’s apparent success, methamphetamine still flowed freely into Farmington, Bloomfield, Shiprock, Aztec, and other forlorn, trailer-strewn desert towns in the Four Corners.
Christesen concluded that Danny Tarango and Levi Countryman were working together—that “we made the arrests, Levi became a hero, and Danny got rich by eliminating his competition,” Christesen recalls. But he had no proof. Nevertheless, when he took over the Narcotics Task Force in October 2004, he quietly put Levi Countryman at the top of his target list.
Christesen’s suspicions about Countryman had been reinforced in the spring of 2004, when officers searching one of Danny Tarango’s many houses found an all-terrain vehicle registered in Countryman’s name. What was Countryman’s ATV doing in the Runt’s garage? Under intense scrutiny, Countryman resigned as deputy sheriff and told friends that he would enter the private sector as a stock trader.
But sensitive task-force information kept leaking out to the Tarangos, much to Christesen’s frustration. Every time Christesen got close to persuading someone to talk or testify in a drug-related case, the inquiry would fall apart. A parade of witnesses who had agreed to testify would suddenly change their minds. One potential witness in a drug case against Josh Tarango, Danny’s younger brother, refused to testify in 2006 after her daughter’s car was burned on her front lawn. “Every time we got close to tying Tarango to Countryman,” Christesen recalls, “an informant would be burned”—intimidated, that is. “I began to think that our own building was bugged. I even asked the FBI to do a sweep.” Tired of waiting for federal help, “we finally bought old equipment and did it ourselves.” The sweep turned up nothing. Meanwhile, violence in San Juan County kept escalating, much of it apparently tied to Danny Tarango.
In January 2007, the FBI finally responded to Christesen’s repeated appeals and quietly opened an investigation into whether the task force’s operations were being compromised from within. Because everyone on the task force was potentially a suspect, the FBI agents told no one in local law enforcement—not even Christesen—precisely what they were doing and whom they were targeting. But after wiretapping Danny Tarango’s cell-phone calls, they discovered that information about the task force was still being provided by Countryman. Christesen’s suspicions were all too true: Countryman was getting his information from a state police officer named Keith Salazar, one of the unit’s most trusted, experienced members. Countryman and Tarango even referred to Salazar by the code name “Candy” because the information he provided was so “sweet.”
In court, Salazar later argued that he had been forced to betray his fellow officers—that Countryman had threatened, if Salazar refused to cooperate, not only to expose the fact that he had skimmed funds from the task force’s kitty, but also to harm him and his family. But the cell-phone conversations that prosecutor Reeve Swainston played in court made a mockery of that claim. Calling each other several times a day, referring to each other as “bro,” joking and swearing like fraternity brothers staging college pranks, Salazar and Countryman were obviously close friends who enjoyed their dirty work. Salazar eagerly provided Countryman with the names of his fellow officers, even those serving undercover. He gave Countryman pictures he had taken of them, their home addresses, their birth dates and Social Security numbers, and detailed descriptions of their cars and license-plate numbers. He also disclosed the identity of confidential informants; the dates, times, and locations of impending search warrants; the nature of ongoing antidrug investigations in New Mexico and Colorado; and other material that Countryman requested. And he did all this for just $1,000 a month from Tarango.
For his part, Countryman was the perfect middleman. As soon as he got sensitive information from “Candy,” he would call Tarango and pass it along. As a result, Salazar never had to talk to Tarango or meet with him, insulating him from scrutiny. All three men used cell phones specifically dedicated to their double-dealing, creating what Swainston called in his indictment a “compartmentalized line of communication.” But Countryman was more than a go-between; he also distributed some of the methamphetamine he received from Tarango, street profits from which supplemented the $8,000 a month that Tarango routinely paid him.
Christesen suspected that Tarango had turned other law enforcement officers and local and state officials, and he hoped that the FBI’s investigation would uncover them. But the FBI had to cut short its investigation and move against the three men in December 2007, after agents overheard Tarango and Countryman discussing ways to intimidate and possibly harm a deputy sheriff. Among the tactics they discussed were following the deputy’s wife around town, taking photos of her and her children, leaving a photo of her on her car, throwing hypodermic needles on her lawn, delivering a box filled with dying rats to the family’s home, and leaving a pig’s head on the front porch. They agreed that this might send her a message that “her husband needs to back off,” a court document states, quoting part of an intercepted conversation between Tarango and Countryman. Further, the FBI overheard Tarango telling Countryman that he had watched the family’s home at various hours, and Countryman telling Tarango that this deputy’s “ass needed to be whacked.”
Tarango vetoed the proposal, but the FBI had heard enough. Arrest warrants for all three men were promptly issued. But before Tarango could be served, he escaped to Mexico. When the police arrested Countryman at a Denny’s restaurant in Farmington, the county seat, they found a handgun in his truck. In a safe at his home were 13 more firearms, $18,000 in cash, and almost eight pounds of marijuana.
In a sentencing memorandum, Countryman said that his heavy drinking had “clouded” his judgment and asked to be enrolled in a substance-abuse program. Countryman and Salazar pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute drugs and were each sentenced to six years in prison. Their attorneys argued successfully in court for lighter sentences because of their post-arrest cooperation with law enforcement. And this past June, for reasons that remain murky, Danny Tarango returned from Mexico. His trial is expected to begin soon.
Christesen, who is now running for sheriff in San Juan County, still fears that Danny Tarango’s web of corruption may have been far broader than the public has been told. In the wake of the Countryman and Salazar arrests, the New Mexico state police’s narcotics division was quietly disbanded and reorganized. The fact that the state said so little about its actions leads Christesen and others to believe that the conspiracy may have involved other, still-unnamed, corrupt cops, border patrol agents, and public officials.
But “law enforcement and the communities they serve have been irreversibly damaged” merely by the information that Salazar and Countryman gave Tarango and his Mexican associates, Christesen wrote in a statement that he gave to prosecutor Swainston. In his own statement, Swainston asserted that nine separate law enforcement agencies in New Mexico and six in Colorado had been damaged by Salazar’s betrayal. “It is hard to imagine anything more frightening for a law enforcement officer than to find out after the fact that those upon whom you just executed a . . . search warrant knew you were coming because one of your own told them so,” Swainston wrote in an impassioned 47-page sentencing memorandum.
“Cops hate these cases, hate to investigate and prosecute them, because it shows we’re not perfect, that we’re vulnerable to corruption like other human beings,” Christesen says. “A Salazar looks bad for all of us. But how many other counties like ours are there in the Southwest? How can we be sure that our law enforcement system isn’t being Mexicanized? I’m worried that they’ll start with bribes, and end as they have in Mexico, with intimidation and murder.”
Michael Hayden, director of the Central Intelligence Agency under President George W. Bush, called the prospect of a narco-state in Mexico one of the gravest threats to American national security, second only to al-Qaida and on par with a nuclear-armed Iran. But the threat to American law enforcement is still often underestimated, say Christesen and other law enforcement officials.
Last year, FBI officials tell me, the Bureau worked on nearly 2,500 public corruption cases and convicted more than 700 dishonest public servants throughout the nation. Most of them were unrelated to the cartels, and Special Agent Abbott, of the FBI’s criminal branch in El Paso, says that only 15 to 30 of his region’s cases so far have involved drug-related corruption among law enforcement officials. “But given the damage that can be done by just one corrupt officer or inspector,” he adds, “this is an important vulnerability. We know it.”
Judith Miller is a contributing editor of City Journal, an adjunct fellow at the Manhattan Institute.
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Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Grenade Walking
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on: December 09, 2011, 10:17:48 PM
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Woof,
October 14, 2011 8:19 AM PrintText "Grenade-walking" part of "Gunwalker" scandal
(CBS News) There's a new twist in the government's "gunwalking" scandal involving an even more dangerous weapon: grenades.
"Gunwalking" subpoena for AG Holder imminent
CBS News investigative correspondent Sharyl Attkisson, who has reported on this story from the beginning, said on "The Early Show" that the investigation into the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF)'s so-called "Fast and Furious" operation branches out to a case involving grenades. Sources tell her a suspect was left to traffic and manufacture them for Mexican drug cartels.
Police say Jean Baptiste Kingery, a U.S. citizen, was a veritable grenade machine. He's accused of smuggling parts for as many as 2,000 grenades into Mexico for killer drug cartels -- sometimes under the direct watch of U.S. law enforcement.
For more on this investigation, visit CBS Investigates.
Law enforcement sources say Kingery could have been prosecuted in the U.S. twice for violating export control laws, but that, each time, prosecutors in Arizona refused to make a case.
Grenades are weapons-of-choice for the cartels. An attack on Aug. 25 in a Monterrey, Mexico casino killed 53 people.
Sources tell CBS News that, in January 2010, ATF had Kingery under surveillance after he bought about 50 grenade bodies and headed to Mexico. But they say prosecutors wouldn't agree to make a case. So, as ATF agents looked on, Kingery and the grenade parts crossed the border -- and simply disappeared.
Six months later, Kingery allegedly got caught leaving the U.S. for Mexico with 114 disassembled grenades in a tire. One ATF agent told investigators he literally begged prosecutors to keep Kingery in custody this time, fearing he was supplying narco-terrorists, but was again ordered to let Kingery go.
The prosecutors -- already the target of controversy for overseeing "Fast and Furious," wouldn't comment on the grenades case. U.S. Attorney Dennis Burke recently resigned and his assistant, Emory Hurley, has been transferred. Sources say Hurley is the one who let Kingery go, saying grenade parts are "novelty items" and the case "lacked jury appeal."
Attkisson added on "The Early Show" that, in August, Mexican authorities raided Kingery's stash house and factory, finding materials for 1,000 grenades. He was charged with trafficking and allegedly admitted not only to making grenades, but also to teaching cartels how to make them, as well as helping cartel members convert semi-automatic rifles to fully-automatic. As one source put it: There's no telling how much damage Kingery did in the year-and-a-half since he was first let go. The Justice Department inspector general is now investigating this, along with "Fast and Furious."
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Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: We the Well-armed People (Gun rights stuff )
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on: December 09, 2011, 07:24:13 PM
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Woof, Upon futher reflection on the hearings I think there needs to be a new law. Since it is a felony to lie to Congress, shouldn't it be a felony for a setting member of Congress to lie to the American public? When someone tells a big fat lie such as referring to 'unregulated' gunshows during one of these hearings, shouldn't they go to jail? Gun shows are subject to and are regulated by all U.S. gun laws. If you are a gun dealer at your store or a gun show, you are required to have a Federal Firearms license and you must run a background check on any buyer through the F.B.I. system. If you are an individual making a private sale to another individual all Federal gun laws apply to that sale, regardless of whether you are in your livingroom at home or at a gun show. If you sell a firearm to someone you know is a felon, then you have broken the law. If a felon buys a firearm from an individual but lies and tells them that they can legally own a gun, then the felon is breaking the law. It's up to law enforcement to investigate and prosecute these crimes, no matter where they take place.These anti gun Congress members are deceiving the public on two counts. One is that gun shows are unregulated and the other is hiding their true agenda which is to make it illegal for a private citizen to sell a gun to another private citizen or hand down a weapon from one family member to the next generation. Actually there is a third reason they brought this up during the hearing, they don't want to address the real issue of a dead Border Patrol Agent murdered by a gun not sold at a gun show, but instead by one that was allowed to 'walk'. They don't want to talk about that at all. P.C.
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Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities / Politics & Religion / Re: We the Well-armed People (Gun rights stuff )
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on: December 09, 2011, 05:03:35 AM
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Ouch?  The subject is guns; a subject near and dear to many on this site. Guns are legal here; I, including most on this site support the right to own arms. We even "suggest" that people buy guns. Never do we blame the manufacturer or gun store/salesperson if someone dies. We blame the shooter. Explosive devices? Hmmm bombs, WMD, rockets, missiles, tanks, etc. are illegal here; the analogy is irrelevant on many levels. Guns are a legal product. If Mexico manufactured and shipped guns to LA; then thereafter, let's assume that these guns were then purchased by bad guys at gun shops. Would we blame Mexico? Of course not. Austria and Germany make some good guns; they ship thousands here every year. We don't blame them for our homicides. Or the store owner. FnF was a stupid idea; probably not the last time stupid ideas are tried out. The coverup, if there is one, is inexcusable. But the only "blood" is on the hands of the shooter. Not the manufacturer or distributor of the gun. Woof JDN, You are using a false analogy here or rather an inaccurate comparison. True, someone that lawfully transfers a gun to someone else in a business transaction, and has no knowledge of or reason to suspect that the person will use it for wrong doing, can't be held accountable or even thought of as being responsible for the illegal acts of others. This situation is nothing like that. First, any law enforcement agency conducting a sting operation must ensure that their own officers and the public aren't put at undue risk. Secondly, they cannot commit illegal acts and break international laws in the process. Yes, they can lie and deceive but they can't aid and abet the smuggling of illegal arms into another country without the full cooperation and knowledge of the other nation. On top of that there is no evidence that these weapons where being tracked after they came into the hands of the cartels and many don't seem to have been tracked even after they left the gun store. Thirdly they knew without a doubt that these weapons were going to be put into the hands of violent cartels that had been murdering people by the thousands. Then finally, where are the arrests? At what point were they going to recover the guns and get the bad guys? You know, what was the end game, what was the point of the operation in the first place? If it wasn't to make arrests and put the people who were running guns in jail, then what the F was it for? There is more to this than just covering up a little mistake, because none of this was a mistake. You don't accidentally put together an operation like this. They did this intentionally and it's not fully clear what their intent was or who all was involved in it's planning and execution. The American public, Mexico and the family of Brian Terry deserve to know every little detail. Our government agencies and the people put in charge of overseeing them have got to be held accountable for any wrongdoing or negligence of leadership on their watch. We entrust them with a great deal of power (our power), and it's up to us to make sure it's not used for their own corrupt purposes or mismanaged. This was not a business transaction, nor was it even a legitimate law enforcement sting operation. This was something else, and whatever it was, negligence or abuse of power, the people that put it together and their bosses are responsible for the consequences of the operation, even the unintended ones, so yes the blood is on their hands. However, as I have said before, I think there is little chance of justice actually being served because our Federal government has never been so corrupt and the powerful on both the Left and Right are going to protect eachother. They will fuss and fume and make a great noise while posturing in front of the cameras, then soon as something else grabs the publics attention they'll superficially investigate and come to prefabricated deadends, then payoff Mexico. There might be a head to roll, someone that will take the fall, but the real culprit's will skate as usual. P.C.
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DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Handgun Laws of all 50 States
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on: December 03, 2011, 04:56:52 AM
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Woof, Here is another very useful site for gun laws of the 50 states and conceal carry reg's that may vary from state to state. Remember that you have to comply with the other state's laws even if they have a reciprocal agreement to honor you state's conceal carry permit. Some states allow you to enter a bar or restaurant that serves alcohol if you have a permit and others will charge you with a felony for doing that. So you can see why it's important to know the other states law before you hit the road. Not only that, you should print out those laws and take them with you on your trip. There are a lot of laws out there, and a lot of cops out there that don't know what their laws are on conceal weapons, and they change fairly often. Tennessee for example just changed their law in 2010 to you can't drink and carry but now you can enter a bar with your weapon. If a cop missed that little update it might help if you could hand him the statute, it could save you a trip to jail and working things out through a lawyer.  www.handgunlaw.us P.C.
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DBMA Martial Arts Forum / Martial Arts Topics / Re: Self Defense with Pistols
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on: December 02, 2011, 04:59:34 AM
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Woof, This site has valuable legal info for both those that carry concealed weapons and anyone that might have to defend themselves with empty hand skills. They also are setup to help you with legal matters in court; expert witnesses and the whole deal. Good to keep as a reference.
www.armedcitizensnetwork.org
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