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 on: July 24, 2015, 07:22:02 AM 
Started by captainccs - Last post by Crafty_Dog
second post

By Paul McLeary with Adam Rawnsley

Change of heart. The week began with a vicious attack by a suicide bomber with suspected links to the Islamic State in the Turkish border town of Suruc, killing 32 people and wounding more than 100. And it’s ending with Turkey rushing soldiers to the Syrian border to engage in a cross-border firefight with the jihadists, agreeing to allow American warplanes to hit Syria from the the Incirlik air base in southern Turkey, and for the first time sending its own F-16 fighters to smack jihadists in Syria.

The reluctant ally in the fight against the Islamic State joins the coalition just as Kurdish forces have been making real gains in northern Syria -- alarming the Turks who have pledged not to allow a Kurdish state to spring up on its border -- and represents a major shift in Turkey’s willingness to allow the U.S. to use Incirlik. But events, and 1.5 million Syrian refugees straining Turkey’s ability to care for them, have been forcing Ankara’s hand, FP’s Dan De Luce writes, even if Washington continues to ignore Turkish proposals for establishing a no-fly zone over northern Syria.

Northern alliance. Defense Secretary Ash Carter continued his Iran and Islamic State-themed barnstorming through the Middle East on Friday, following up his visit with Iraqi officials in Baghdad with a hop over to the Kurdish city of Erbil in northern Iraq to meet with Masoud Barzani, president of the Kurdish regional government, and other Kurdish government and military officials. It’s a significant visit, since the Kurds -- and some members of the U.S. Congress -- have been pushing for the Pentagon to start directly arming Kurdish fighters, who have been holding the line against the Islamic State in Iraq’s north. The administration of President Barack Obama isn’t as eager as some others in Washington to start pushing weapons to the Kurds, which would antagonize both Baghdad and Ankara, instead preferring to go through the government in Baghdad.

It’s always sunny in Kurdistan. The Kurds remain the darling of the western media and politicians, who love the hard fighters who have scrapped for decades to try and carve out their own homeland along the ethnic faultlines for northern Iraq, Iran, and Syria. But now that they have the excuse to do so, are they pushing out Sunni Arabs in the guise of fighting against the Islamic State? FP contributor Sara Elizabeth Williams writes from northern Iraq that witnesses there say the Kurdish Peshmerga, the military force of Iraqi Kurdistan, “has an agenda that goes beyond fighting the Islamic State: establishing the boundaries of a future Kurdish state and moving the Arabs out.”

 on: July 24, 2015, 07:19:16 AM 
Started by Crafty_Dog - Last post by Crafty_Dog

 on: July 24, 2015, 07:12:59 AM 
Started by Crafty_Dog - Last post by Crafty_Dog

 on: July 24, 2015, 07:06:41 AM 
Started by Crafty_Dog - Last post by Crafty_Dog
 Approaching a Quantum Leap in Computing
July 24, 2015 | 09:01 GMT
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A D-Wave Systems chip designed to operate as a 128-qubit superconducting adiabatic quantum optimization processor. (D-Wave Systems, Inc.)

    The widespread use of quantum computers in industry is likely only a decade or two away.
    The United States will probably maintain its lead in the field, though China will be competitive.
    The countries and companies that first access quantum computers will enjoy a powerful advantage over their peers in areas that stand to gain from the technology.


Quantum computers, or computers based on the principles of quantum mechanics, stand to exponentially increase computing power within the next two decades. Though the scientific community is still fiercely debating the very nature of quantum mechanics itself, and numerous technical obstacles stand in the way of applying the principles of quantum mechanics to machines, the field is rapidly developing.

Now, the widespread use of quantum computers in industry is likely only a decade or two away. Such devices will be far more powerful than even the most powerful supercomputers seen today, carrying significant implications for national security, cyberwarfare and intelligence operations, among many other things. Just how powerful quantum computers can be — and how their adoption could lead to another revolution in computer-related technologies — becomes clear when we consider their computing power. Using a quantum computer to solve a problem can loosely be thought of as trying all possible solutions at once, whereas using a classical solution would mean trying them in sequential order. The expansion in computing power gained by incorporating quantum mechanics principles into computing could prove to be as revolutionary to computer science as research in physics and electromagnetism has proved to modern electronics.
Quantum Mechanics: A Primer

The field of quantum mechanics arose from German physicist Max Planck's attempts to describe the spectrum of light emitted by hot bodies. Specifically, he wondered what accounted for the shift in color from red to yellow to blue as the temperature of a flame increased. Planck devised an equation explaining what he had observed, based on the assumption that matter behaved differently at the atomic and subatomic levels.

Though even the great German physicist questioned this assumption, his research kicked off 30 years of scientific inquiry that yielded the theories and discoveries that form the basis of today's understanding of physics and chemistry. Albert Einstein introduced one of quantum mechanics' most famous and perplexing concepts just five years or so after Planck devised his equation, extending the latter's assumption by asserting that a quantum of light, or a photon, behaves as both a wave and a particle. This duality, along with the many other dualities embedded in quantum mechanics, became the bedrock of the field.

Click to enlarge
Quantum Theories

Today, scientists still debate how to interpret quantum mechanics. Perhaps the most widely held approach is called the Copenhagen interpretation, which holds that every quantum particle, known as a "cat," exists in all of its possible states at once until it is measured; only when it is observed does the particle exist in one state. This concept has become known as the principle of superposition.

The superposition principle is one of the fundamental features of "quantum bits" or "qubits," the quantum computer's equivalent to the bits of classical computers. Classical computing relies on data comprising numerous individual bits that can only exist in one of two states, 0 or 1. Computers process data composed of long ordered strings of 0s and 1s. Today's computer chips are made up of millions of transistors and capacitors that can only exist as a 0 or 1; while switching these states now takes a mere fraction of a millisecond (a period that is shrinking every day), there are still natural limits to how fast data can be processed and how small transistors and capacitors can be shrunk.

A qubit has the advantage of being able to be a 0, a 1, and a superposition of both 0 and 1 — that is, it can exist in all possible states. This allows quantum computers to exist simultaneously in all possible states, whereas a classical computer could only exist in them sequentially. This means that a quantum computer can perform vast numbers of calculations at the same time, and that the power of a quantum computer increases exponentially as the number of qubits increases.

An additional boost to the potential power of quantum computers comes from the concept of "quantum entanglement," which Einstein famously described as "spooky action at a distance." Quantum entanglement is the principle that some quantum systems' states cannot be described by the states of their individual elements alone because those elements may be "entangled;" in other words, different elements' states are related to one another in some way, meaning that what happens to one will affect the other, no matter how vast the distance separating the two. Among other things, quantum entanglement can be used to create "super-dense" coding in which two classical bits can be encoded and transmitted via one qubit.
Potential Applications

Though quantum computers will have a broad impact on society, the most obvious areas that stand to benefit are the ones that supercomputers dominate today: cryptography, research and military applications. The most well-known capability quantum computers could unlock would be the use of what is known as Shor's algorithm, something classical computers cannot do and a tool of significant interest to the National Security Agency, CIA and the Chinese government.

In short, Shor's algorithm would enable the breaking of complex codes by speeding up the search for a given number's prime factors, the backbone of modern-day encryption methods. The gains that would be made by using a quantum computer to break a code over a classical computer are gigantic: A quantum computer can do in minutes or hours what a classical computer would take years or much longer to do. Of course, the floodgates of stored data will not suddenly open once Shor's algorithm comes into play; quantum computers could also be use to encrypt information far more securely than is possible with classical computers, something already under intense study.

Outside of the military and intelligence spheres, quantum computers would greatly expand data processing and permit the simulation of almost every natural phenomenon. They would also lead to outcomes such as the faster development of new drugs and more accurate weather forecasting, as well as those as exotic as the search for extraterrestrial life and the development of artificial intelligence.

Quantum computing would have important implications for the development of artificial intelligence because it would expand machine-learning algorithms. Today's algorithms rely on pattern recognition; with quantum computing, machines could adapt to anomalous situations. A highly refined machine-learning algorithm would help automated systems handle non-routine tasks, an area that has been lacking in the automation and digitization of jobs and that would improve upon the current research on autonomous cars, robots and drones. 
Developing Quantum Computers

Building a quantum computer is no easy task. Still, the past five years have seen significant progress toward the development of an economical quantum computing machine and its components, though the industry remains in its infancy. The problem of preserving and storing qubits lies at the heart of the challenge: A qubit in a superposition state is quite fragile. Its interaction with other particles (whether qubits or otherwise) essentially forces it to collapse into one state or the other (e.g., a 0 or a 1).

Physicists have tried to preserve qubits by supercooling their environment to temperatures just above absolute zero (-273.15 degrees Celsius) and using them in a vacuum. But for nearly all practical purposes outside of research environments and possibly a few government agencies, quantum computers would need to exist at ambient temperatures. The record for storing quantum data at room temperature, set in 2013, is a mere 39 minutes (an improvement upon the previous record of 2 seconds). Even with its prodigious computing power, a qubit needs more time than that to perform meaningful calculations. Of course, classical computers once faced similar challenges. Like today's quantum computers, the classical computers of the 1950s filled rooms, and the idea of shrinking them down to the size of the device you are using to read this article was a distant prospect.

All challenges aside, there has been no shortage of interest in researching technologies for quantum computers. Established technology firms, defense contractors, intelligence agencies and startups, among many others, are pursuing them. In fact, Canadian startup D-Wave Systems, Inc. has already begun selling the first commercial quantum computer, unveiling a 1,000-qubit version of the D-Wave Two in June. The company is collaborating with Google, Lockheed Martin and NASA to develop quantum computers further.

Naturally, D-Wave has found the technical challenges it faces daunting. Its computers have come under heavy criticism for their inflexibility: The D-Wave processor is designed to perform optimization tasks and little else. More fundamentally, some have questioned whether the D-Wave system actually relies on quantum mechanics. Some physicists and IBM have argued that classical computers are capable of performing the same functions and tasks that D-Wave's system does.

For its part, IBM has made its own recent breakthroughs in quantum computer development. In April, IBM researchers published a paper describing a method of simultaneously detecting both an error common to all computers and an error unique to quantum computers. The first is a "bit-flip error," where a 0 accidentally flips to a 1, or vice versa, while the second is a "sign-flip error," where the relationship between 0 and 1 flips. Previous research attempts could not detect both errors at the same time.

Though other countries share the United States' keen interest in developing quantum computers, none appears able to supplant the United States as the global leader in the field. China is likely the only other country with the financial power as well as the military and national security motivations to explore quantum computers and their properties, and Beijing has dedicated significant funds to such research. The Chinese have already shown the ability to perform as well as their American counterparts in developing supercomputers, though China has lagged behind the United States in the commercialization of domestically developed and designed classical computers and their components. But with commercially available quantum computers still decades away, China's interest in the technology, at this point, is mainly strategic. With its successes in supercomputing, China could conceivably develop a fully functioning quantum computer before the United States, though whether it could develop a commercially viable model before U.S. companies do is more doubtful.

Despite the extensive interest quantum computers are generating worldwide, they will not replace classical computers anytime soon; even their adoption among niche customers remains at least a decade away, if not two. Instead, the spread of quantum computers will likely occur in the same sort of slow, methodical manner seen with the adoption of classical computers.

Today's quantum computers, the D-Wave One and the D-Wave Two, are highly refined machines that have been designed to perform one task only: optimization. The development of similarly specialized machines that focus on solving a single problem, whether factorization, simulations or moving traffic efficiently, will continue. These quantum computers will compete with the supercomputers that are currently being developed and optimized to perform similar specific tasks. Government agencies, as well as companies involved in relevant security-related applications such as cryptography, will be satisfied with quantum computers that can perform only one task, just as they are satisfied with supercomputers that are likewise specialized.

However, the development and possible commercialization of a more practical and universal quantum computer remains a distant goal, even though companies like Google are aiming for it now. The adoption of single-task (and, later, universal) quantum computers will be linear rather than exponential, and some industries will adopt them more quickly than others. But just as oil supermajors will use their powers of simulation to unlock more oil reserves, the countries and companies that are the first to access quantum computers will enjoy a powerful advantage over their competitors in areas that can make use of the technology.

 on: July 24, 2015, 07:01:50 AM 
Started by Crafty Dog - Last post by Crafty_Dog

By Fred Burton

Editor's Note: The following piece is part of an occasional series in which Fred Burton, our vice president of intelligence, reflects on his storied experience as a counterterrorism agent for the U.S. State Department.

After decades of hostility, the United States and Cuba finally seem to be reconciling. On July 1, U.S. President Barack Obama announced that Washington will reopen its embassy in Havana. For the first time since 1961, when the two countries severed ties, U.S. diplomats and staff will fill the embassy and the surrounding city streets, as will a U.S. Marine detachment working security detail.

But even as the embassy in Havana now stands as a monument to improved U.S.-Cuban relations, it will make the United States much more vulnerable to monitoring and infiltration by Cuban intelligence agencies. And today foreign spies pose as real and immediate a threat to U.S. interests as they did during the Cold War.
A History of Espionage

In the 1970s and 1980s, counterterrorism agents like myself witnessed the United States gear its entire national security apparatus toward countering Soviet influence. Looking back, I believe our fixation on the Soviet Union actually caused us to underestimate other countries' agencies. We believed Cuba's Directorate of Intelligence, trained by Moscow though it may have been, was significantly less effective than Russia's KGB.

Indeed, our preoccupation with the Soviet Union blinded us to the fact that Cuba quietly operated assets inside the United States. Among the many spies they recruited were Kendall Myers and his wife, Gwendolyn Steingraber Myers. When the Cubans first recruited the Myerses in 1979, Kendall Myers was a part-time instructor at the State Department's Foreign Service Institute, where U.S. diplomats and other professionals train before they receive their overseas assignments. He later became a senior analyst at the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). From my own time in the intelligence business, I know that INR analysts have access to highly classified information from virtually every government agency — and since Myers was working for Havana, so, too, did Cuban intelligence.

The Myerses were finally discovered and put on trial in 2006. But as we would learn four years after the trial, the Cubans had someone with even more insight into the United States' national security apparatus: Ana Montes, a double agent who worked as an analyst at the Defense Intelligence Agency. Cuban intelligence turned her in 1985, and she passed classified information to Havana for years thereafter.

In the 1980s, when Montes was spying for Cuba, I worked in the burgeoning counterterrorism arm of the Department of State's Diplomatic Security Service. I was far more concerned with Libya and Iran than with Cuba, since so many of my cases involved Soviet actors and KGB agents. Like the rest of the U.S. intelligence community, I saw the Soviet Union as the primary threat. But all along, despite all our efforts to defend U.S. intelligence and assets, our national security agencies were being repeatedly infiltrated by Cuban intelligence.

Hidden Threats

Now, with the U.S. Embassy opening in Havana, Cuba will monitor and attempt to recruit U.S. employees as actively as it did during the Cold War. Cuban intelligence will build case files on every American official who travels in country. It will surveil diplomatic staffers as it looks for potential recruits and as it tries to identify U.S. agents.

Cuban intelligence will do so using techniques new and old alike. In the past, the Cuban Directorate of Intelligence employed tactics it learned from the Soviet KGB to collect information and communicate with its operatives. Spies such as Myers and Montes received encrypted radio messages from their Cuban handlers and passed information using dead drops, in which agents leave information at a secret location, and brush passes, in which they physically hand over material in a brief encounter.

Havana will also likely plant listening devices in hotel rooms, taxis and rental cars to monitor on the U.S. diplomatic mission. Operatives will take photographs of the embassy staff as they come and go, locate employees' homes and even plan honeypots and male raven operations, during which an undercover agent acts like a love interest to collect intelligence. In short, with a reopening embassy, the Cubans will have ample opportunity to undermine U.S. national security.

U.S. intelligence agencies are well aware of the Cuban threat. As the embassy opens in Havana, CIA and FBI agents will constantly be briefing State Department staff on situational awareness and counterintelligence. Those who are unaware of long history of espionage may call the countless warnings excessive and deem Washington's intelligence community over-cautious. But the threat is real, regardless of whether embassy workers heed the warnings. As those in the intelligence business often say, the Cold War, in a sense, never really ended. Foreign policy can change at a moment's notice. Strategic alliances never mean absolute trust. And in a world full of hidden threats, there is no such thing as a friendly intelligence service.

 on: July 24, 2015, 06:59:33 AM 
Started by Crafty_Dog - Last post by Crafty_Dog
 The Turkish Enigma
Geopolitical Weekly
July 21, 2015 | 08:00 GMT
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By George Friedman

In my "Net Assessment of the World," I argued that four major segments of the European and Asian landmass were in crisis: Europe, Russia, the Middle East (from the Levant to Iran) and China. Each crisis was different; each was at a different stage of development. Collectively the crises threatened to destabilize the Eurasian landmass, the Eastern Hemisphere, and potentially generate a global crisis. They do not have to merge into a single crisis to be dangerous. Four simultaneous crises in the center of humanity's geopolitical gravity would be destabilizing by itself. However, if they began to merge and interact, the risks would multiply. Containing each crisis by itself would be a daunting task. Managing crises that were interlocked would press the limits of manageability and even push beyond.

These four crises are already interacting to some extent. The crisis of the European Union intersects with the parallel issue of Ukraine and Europe's relation to Russia. The crisis in the Middle East intersects with the European concern over managing immigration as well as balancing relations with Europe's Muslim community. The Russians have been involved in Syria, and appear to have played a significant role in the recent negotiations with Iran. In addition there is a potential intersection in Chechnya and Dagestan. The Russians and Chinese have been advancing discussions about military and economic cooperation. None of these interactions threaten to break down regional boundaries. Indeed, none are particularly serious. Nor is some sort of inter-regional crisis unimaginable.

Sitting at the center of these crisis zones is a country that until a few years ago maintained a policy of having no problems with its neighbors. Today, however, Turkey's entire periphery is on fire. There is fighting in Syria and Iraq to the south, fighting to the north in Ukraine and an increasingly tense situation in the Black Sea. To the west, Greece is in deep crisis (along with the EU) and is a historic antagonist of Turkey. The Mediterranean has quieted down, but the Cyprus situation has not been fully resolved and tension with Israel has subsided but not disappeared. Anywhere Turkey looks there are problems. As important, there are three regions of Eurasia that Turkey touches: Europe, the Middle East and the former Soviet Union.

I have argued two things in the past. The first was that Turkey was an emerging regional power that would ultimately be the major power in its locale. The second was that this is a region that, ever since the decline and fall of the Ottomans in the first quarter of the 20th century, has been kept stable by outside powers. The decision of the United States to take a secondary role after the destabilization that began with the 2003 invasion of Iraq has left a vacuum Turkey will eventually be forced to fill. But Turkey is not ready to fill that vacuum. That has created a situation in which there is a balancing of power underway, particularly among Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia.
A Proximate Danger

The most violent and the most immediate crisis for Ankara is the area stretching from the Mediterranean to Iran, and from Turkey to Yemen. The main problem for Turkey is that Syria and Iraq have become contiguous battlegrounds featuring a range of forces, including Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish elements. These battles take place in a cauldron formed by four regional powers: Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel and Turkey. This quadrangle emerged logically from the mayhem caught between them.

Each major power has differing strategic interests. Iran's primary interest is the survival of the establishment and in assuring that an aggressive Sunni polity does not arise in Iraq to replicate the situation Tehran faced with Saddam Hussein. Iran's strategy is to support anti-Sunni forces in the region. This support ranges from bolstering Hezbollah in Lebanon, propping up the minority Alawite establishment in Syria led — for the moment — by Bashar al Assad, and assisting the Iraqi army, itself controlled by Shiites and Iraq's Shiite militias. The United States sees Iran as aligned with American interests for the moment, since both countries oppose the Islamic State and Tehran is important when it comes to containing the militant group. The reality on the ground has made this the most important issue between Iran and the United States, which frames the recent accord on nuclear weapons.

Saudi Arabia sees Iran as its primary enemy. Riyadh also views the Islamic State as a threat but at the same time fears that an Iraq and Syria dominated by Iran could present an existential threat to the House of Saud. The Saudis consider events in Yemen from a similar perspective. Also in this context, Riyadh perceives a common interest with Israel in containing Iranian militant proxies as well as the Islamic State. Who exactly the Saudis are supporting in Syria and Iraq is somewhat murky, but the kingdom has no choice but to play a tactical and opportunistic game.

The Israelis are in a similar position to the Saudis. They oppose the Iranians, but their main concern must be to make certain that the Hashemites in Jordan don't lose control of the country, opening the door to an Islamic State move on the Jordan River. Jordan appears stable for the moment and Israel and the Saudis see this as a main point of their collaboration. In the meantime, Israel is playing a wait-and-see game with Syria. Al Assad is no friend to the Israelis, but a weak al Assad is better than a strong Islamic State rule. The current situation in Syria suits Israel because a civil war limits immediate threats. But the conflict is itself out of control and the risk is that someone will win. Israel must favor al Assad and that aligns them on some level with Iran, even as Israel works with Sunni players like Saudi Arabia to contain Iranian militant proxies. Ironies abound.

It is in this context that the Turks have refused to make a clear commitment, either to traditional allies in the West or to the new potential allies that are yet emerging. Partly this is because no one's commitments — except the Iranians' — are clear and irrevocable, and partly because the Turks don't have to commit unless they want to. They are deeply opposed to the al Assad regime in Syria, and logic would have it that they are supporting the Islamic State, which also opposes the Syrian regime. As I have said before, there are endless rumors in the region that the Turks are favoring and aiding the Islamic State. These are rumors that Turkey has responded to by visibly and seriously cracking down on the Islamic State in recent weeks with significant border activity and widespread raids. The Turks know that the militants, no matter what the currently confrontational relationship might be, could transition from being a primarily Arab platform to being a threat to Turkey. There are some who say that the Turks see the Islamic State as creating the justification for a Turkish intervention in Syria. The weakness of this argument is that there has been ample justification that Ankara has declined, even as its posture toward the Islamic State becomes more aggressive.

This shows in Turkey's complex relations with the United States, still formally its major ally. In 2003 the Turks refused to allow U.S. forces to invade Iraq from Turkey. Since then the relationship with the United States has been complex and troubled. The Turks have made U.S. assistance in defeating al Assad a condition for extensive cooperation in Syria. Washington, concerned about an Islamic State government in Syria, and with little confidence in the non-Islamic State militancy as a long-term alternative, has refused to accept this. Therefore, while the Turks are now allowing some use of the NATO air base at Incirlik for operations against the Islamic State, they have not made a general commitment. Nor have they cooperated comprehensively with Sunni Saudi Arabia.

The Turkish problem is this: There are no low-risk moves. While Ankara has a large army on paper, it is untried in battle outside of Turkey's 30-year insurgency in its southeast. Turkey has also observed the outcome of U.S. conventional forces intervening in the region and doesn't want to run the same risk. There are domestic considerations as well. Turkey is divided between secular and Islamist factions. The secularists suspect the Islamists of being secretly aligned with radical Islam — and are the source of many of the rumors floating about. The ruling Sunni-dominated Justice and Development Party, better known by its Turkish acronym, AKP, was seriously weakened in the last election. Its ability to launch the only attack it wants — an attack to topple al Assad — would appear to be a religious war to the secularists and would not be welcomed by the party's base, setting in motion rifts that could bring down the AKP. An attack on the Sunnis, however radical, complicates relations with the rebel factions in northern Syria that Turkey is already sponsoring. It also would risk the backlash of reviving anti-Turkish feelings in an adjacent Arab country that remembers Turkish rule only a century ago.

Therefore Turkey, while incrementally changing — as evidenced by the recent accord to allow U.S. Predator drones to fly from Incirlik — is constrained if not paralyzed. From a strategic point of view, there appears to be more risk than reward. Its position resembles Israel's: watch, wait and hopefully avoid needing to do anything. From the political point of view, there is no firm base of support for either intervening directly or providing support for American airstrikes.

The problem is that the worst-case scenario for Turkey is the creation of an independent Kurdish republic in Syria or Iraq. That would risk lighting a touchpaper among Kurds in southeastern Turkey, and regardless of current agreements, could destabilize everything. This is the one thing that would force Turkey's hand. However, the United States has historically had some measure of influence among the Kurds in Iraq and also in Syria. While this influence can be overstated, and while Washington is dependent on the Kurdish peshmerga militias for ground support as it battles the Islamic State from the air, it is an important factor. If the situation grew out of control, Ankara would expect the United States to control the situation. If Washington could and would, the price would be Turkish support for U.S. operations in the region. The Turks would have to pay that price or risk intervention. That is the lever that would get Ankara involved.
Added Complications

The Turks are far less entangled in the Russian crisis than in the Middle East, but they are still involved, and potentially in a way that can pyramid. There are three dimensions to this. The first is the Black Sea and Turkey's role in it. The second is the Bosporus and the third is allowing the United States to operate from its air base in Incirlik in the event of increased Russian military involvement in Ukraine.

The crisis in Ukraine necessarily involves the Black Sea. Crimea's Sevastopol is a Russian Base on the Black Sea. In this potential conflict, the Black Sea becomes a vital theater of operations. First, in any movement westward by the Russians, the Black Sea is their right flank. Second, the Black Sea is a vital corridor for trade by the Russians, and an attempt by its enemies to shut down that corridor would have to be addressed by Russian naval forces. Finally, the U.S./NATO strategy in addressing the Ukrainian crisis has been to increase cooperation with Romania. Romania is on the Black Sea and the United States has indicated that it intends to work with Bucharest in strengthening its Black Sea capabilities. Therefore, events in the Black Sea can rapidly escalate under certain circumstances, posing threats to Turkish interests that Ankara cannot ignore.

The Black Sea issue is compounded by the question of the Bosporus, which is a narrow strait that, along with the Dardanelles, connects the Black Sea with the Mediterranean. The Bosporus is the only passage from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. For the Russians, this is a critical trade route and the only means for Russian ships passing into the Mediterranean. In the event of a conflict, the United States and NATO would likely want to send naval forces into the Black Sea to support operations around its perimeter.

Under the Montreux Convention, an agreement signed in 1936, the Bosporus is under Turkish control. However the convention also places certain restrictions on traffic in the Bosporus. Access is guaranteed to all commercial traffic, however, Ankara is authorized to refuse transit to countries at war with Turkey. All countries with coasts on the Black Sea are free to operate militarily in the Black Sea. Non-Black Sea nations, however, suffer restrictions. Only warships under 15,000 tones may be sent, and no more than nine at any one time, with a total tonnage of 30,000 tons. And then they are only permitted to stay for 21 days or less.

This limits the ability of the United States to project forces into the Black Sea — American carrier battle groups, key components of U.S. naval power, are unable to pass through. Turkey is, under international law, the guarantor of the convention and it has over time expressed a desire to be freed from it so Ankara can exercise complete sovereignty over the Bosporus Straits. But it has also been comforted by knowing that refusal to allow warships to pass can be referred to international law, instead of being Turkish responsibility.

However, in the event of a conflict with Russia, that can no longer be discounted: Turkey is a member of NATO. If NATO were to formally participate in such a conflict, Ankara would have to choose whether the Montreaux Convention or its alliance obligations take precedence. The same can be said of air operations out of Incirlik. Does Turkey's relationship with NATO and the United States take precedence or will Ankara use the convention to control conflict in the Black Sea? Even prior to its own involvement in any conflict with Russia, there would be a potentially dangerous diplomatic crisis.

To complicate matters, Turkey receives a great deal of oil and natural gas from Russia through the Black Sea. Energy relations shift. There are economic circumstances on which the seller is primarily dependent on the sale, and circumstances on which the buyer is dependent. It depends on the room for maneuver. While oil prices were over $100, Russia had the financial option to stop shipping energy. Under current pricing, Russia's ability to do this has decreased dramatically. During the Ukrainian crisis, using energy cut-offs in Europe would have been a rational response to sanctions. The Russians did not do it because they could not afford the cost. The prior obsession with the fragility of the flow of energy from Russia is no longer there, and Turkey, a major consumer, has reduced its vulnerability, at least during the diplomatic phase.

The United States is constructing an alliance system that includes the Baltics, Poland and Romania that is designed to contain any potential Russian advance westward. Turkey is the logical southern anchor for this alliance structure. The Turks have been more involved than is already visible — conducting exercises with the Romanians and Americans in the Black Sea. But as in the Middle East, Ankara has carefully avoided any commitment to the alliance and has remained unclear on its Black Sea Strategy. While the Middle East is more enigmatic, the Russian situation is potentially more dangerous, though Turkish ambiguity remains identical.

Similarly, Turkey has long demanded membership in the European Union. Yet Ankara's economic performance over the last 10 years indicates that Turkey has benefitted from not being a member. Nevertheless, the secularists in particular have been adamant about membership because they felt that joining the union would guarantee the secular nature of Turkish society. The AKP has been more ambiguous. The party continues to ask for membership, but it has been quite content to remain outside. It did not want the EU strictures secularists wanted, nor did it want to share in the European economic crisis.

Turkey is nevertheless drawn in two directions. First, Ankara has inevitable economic ties in Europe that are effected by crises, ironically focused on its erstwhile enemy Greece. More important at the moment is the immigration and Islamic terrorism crisis in Europe. Many of the Muslims living in Germany, for example, are Turks and the treatment of overseas Turks is a significant political issue in Turkey. While Ankara has wanted to be part of Europe, neither economic reality nor the treatment of Turks and other Muslims in Europe argue for that relationship.

There is a growing breach with Europe in an attempt to avoid absorption of economic problems. However in southeastern Europe discussions of Turkish investments and trade are commonplace. Put into perspective, as Europe fragments, Turkey — a long-term economic power, understanding of what the short-term problems are — draws southeastern Europe into its economic center of gravity. In a way it becomes another force of fragmentation, simply by being an alternate economic benefactor for the poorer countries in the southeast.

The potential interaction of Turkey in the Middle East is an immediate question. The mid-term involvement with Russia is a longer question. Its relation to Europe is the longest question. And its relationship with the United States is the single question that intersects all of these. For all these concerns, Turkey has no clear answer. It is following a strategy designed to avoid involvement and maintain maximum options. Ankara relies on a multi-level strategy in which it is formally allied with some powers and quietly open to relations with powers hostile to its allies. This multi-hued doctrine is designed to avoid premature involvement; premature meaning before having achieved a level of strategic maturity and capability that allows it to define itself, with attendant risks.

In one sense, Turkish policy parallels American policy. U.S. policies in all three regions are designed to allow the regional balance of power to maintain itself, with Washington involving itself selectively and with limited force. The Turks are paralleling the United States in principle, and with even less exposure. The problem the Turks have is that geography binds them to the role of pivot for three regions. For the United States this role is optional. The Turks cannot make coherent decisions, but they must. So Ankara's strategy is to be consistently ambiguous, an enigma. This will work until outside powers make it impossible to work.

 on: July 24, 2015, 06:53:08 AM 
Started by captainccs - Last post by Crafty_Dog
Turkey to Let U.S. Military Use Its Base to Launch Strikes Against Islamic State
By Dion Nissenbaum in Washington, Emre Peker and Ayla Albayrak in Istanbul
Updated July 23, 2015 8:28 p.m. ET

Turkey agreed to allow the U.S. to use air bases there to launch strikes against Islamic State forces in neighboring Syria, a major shift long sought by Washington and sealed hours before a deadly clash between Turkish forces and militants across the border.

After months of tense negotiations, reluctant Turkish leaders agreed to U.S. requests to use the Incirlik Air Base in southern Turkey to send fighter jets and armed drones to attack fighters based in Syria and Iraq, U.S. defense officials said.

Incirlik is a U.S. base about 60 miles from the Syrian border, giving U.S. jets and unmanned drones vastly improved logistics for daily attacks on the radical group compared with other sites across the region now in use. Military officials said the agreement also opens up other bases in Turkey for potential use in the campaign against Islamic State.

“This is a significant shift,” said a U.S. military official. “It’s a big deal.”

The decision to more closely ally with the U.S. also exposes Turkey to a heightened risk of attack by extremists. Thursday’s clash highlighted the dangers Islamic State, also known by the acronyms ISIS and ISIL, already poses to Turkey, which has long served as the primary lifeline connecting the group’s de facto capital in Syria with the outside world.

“This is a threat at their doorstep,” said a senior U.S. defense official. “In the end, it’s in their self-interest to let us use the base to strike ISIL.”

The broad outlines of the deal were settled in a phone call Wednesday night between President Barack Obama and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, hours before Islamic State forces in Syria opened fire on a border outpost, killing one Turkish soldier and dragging the country even deeper into the chaotic regional conflict.

Turkey has long been accused of aiding Islamic State’s rise by allowing its fighters to freely cross its borders—something its leaders have vehemently denied. The country resisted American pressure to do more in the 60-member international coalition battling Islamic State ever since a bombing campaign started last year. Ankara’s hesitation was due partly to differences with Washington over strategy.

Until now, Turkey has only allowed the U.S. to fly unarmed surveillance drones out of Incirlik. But persistent American pressure, combined with increasing threats from Islamic State forces to turn their weapons on Turkey, finally convinced Turkish leaders to take more decisive steps to fight the militants, officials said.

“In the end, we too have become the target for the ISIS,” said a Turkish official at the Syrian border near Kilis—site of Thursday’s cross-border clash. “There’s a growing nervousness along the border.”

Turkey has pushed the U.S. to focus more attention on driving Syrian President Bashar al-Assad from power and establishing a no-fly zone in northern Syria. But the Obama administration has steadfastly opposed the no-fly zone idea, which would require intensive use of American air power to enforce and could draw the U.S. into a direct confrontation with the Assad regime.

Since the U.S. launched its war against Islamic State last fall, Turkey’s government has engaged in a high-stakes policy gambit: opting to sporadically crack down on the jihadists, but avoiding overt confrontation to limit the risk of retaliatory attacks on Turkish soil.

Declining to open Incirlik base to U.S. warplanes was long seen as a centerpiece of that strategy, allowing Ankara to distance itself from other Western and Muslim nations taking part in airstrikes against Islamic State strongholds in Syria and Iraq.

The decision to open the base appears to move Turkey more definitively into the U.S. camp—and a more direct confrontation with the militants, with uncertain but potentially profound implications for Turkish security.

As the Islamic State threat has grown, Turkish leaders have slowly agreed to play a more active role in battling the group. Turkey has stepped up efforts to choke off the flow of fighters moving in and out of the country and cracked down on the organization in the country by arresting more than 100 suspected militants in recent weeks.

It has also started allowing the U.S. to train moderate Syrian rebels expected to serve as the ground forces battling Islamic State for control of the fractured country.

Turkey’s policy reversal comes as Ankara finds itself increasingly vulnerable to violence from within and beyond its borders. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization member has also been losing its regional prominence as the leading Western security ally over the past year, with Kurdish militants in Syria and Iraq emerging as key forces in the fight against Islamic State.

Turkey blamed Islamic State for a suicide bombing Monday that killed 32 people in the Kurdish town of Suruç on the Syrian border, though the group hasn’t claimed responsibility for it.

If confirmed, it would be a sign that a long-dormant risk to Turkey is turning into an active conflict. It would also add to the regional policy challenges facing Ankara as Kurdish insurgents at home ramp up attacks against security forces, disrupting a two-year-old truce and threatening to derail peace talks.

Escalating violence within and across its southeastern borders increase the risk of civil strife in Turkey, where major security threats are all materializing just as a leadership struggle roils Ankara amid an effort to establish the country’s first coalition government since 2002.

The new danger Islamic State poses to Turkey became clear early Thursday when five militants attacked the Turkish military border post from an Islamic State-controlled area opposite a small border town called Elbeyli, possibly as they were prevented from trying to cross into Turkey, officials said. One soldier was killed and two were wounded, Turkey’s military said.

Turkish soldiers and tanks returned fire, killing one Islamic State fighter in what is believed to be the first direct clash between the rival forces.

Turkey is also facing new threats from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, known as the PKK, which claimed responsibility for killing two Turkish police officers this week in separate attacks.

The PKK said it killed the two policemen for cooperating with Islamic State, and in retribution for the Monday suicide attack, which targeted volunteers preparing to cross into Syria to help rebuild the Syrian Kurdish town of Kobani.

Syrian Kurdish militants affiliated with the PKK defeated Islamic State in Kobani after a four-month fight that ended in January.

The PKK is listed as a terrorist organization by Ankara, Washington and the European Union. The group has been fighting for autonomy in southeastern Turkey since 1984 in a conflict that killed 40,000 people.

The U.S. cooperates with the PKK’s Syrian affiliate against Islamic State, aiding the Kurdish militants with airstrikes—a policy that has caused friction between Washington and Ankara.

“It’s a very complex situation on the ground, with multiple enemies,” said Salih Akyurek, a former Turkish army colonel who is now a researcher at the Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies in Ankara.

Write to Dion Nissenbaum at, Emre Peker at and Ayla Albayrak at

 on: July 24, 2015, 06:34:53 AM 
Started by Crafty_Dog - Last post by Crafty_Dog
Mission to Purge Syria of Chemical Weapons Comes Up Short
By Adam Entous and Naftali Bendavid
Updated July 23, 2015 8:31 p.m. ET

In May of last year, a small team of international weapons inspectors gained entry to one of Syria’s most closely guarded laboratories. Western nations had long suspected that the Damascus facility was being used to develop chemical weapons.

Inside, Syrian scientists showed them rooms with test tubes, Bunsen burners and desktop computers, according to inspectors. The Syrians gave a PowerPoint presentation detailing the medical and agricultural research they said went on there. A Syrian general insisted that the Assad regime had nothing to hide.

As the international inspectors suspected back then, it was a ruse, part of a chain of misrepresentations by President Bashar al-Assad’s regime to hide the extent of its chemical-weapons work. One year after the West celebrated the removal of Syria’s arsenal as a foreign-policy success, U.S. intelligence agencies have concluded that the regime didn’t give up all of the chemical weapons it was supposed to.

An examination of last year’s international effort to rid Syria of chemical weapons, based on interviews with many of the inspectors and U.S. and European officials who were involved, shows the extent to which the Syrian regime controlled where inspectors went, what they saw and, in turn, what they accomplished. That happened in large part because of the ground rules under which the inspectors were allowed into the country, according to the inspectors and officials.

The West was unable, for example, to prevent Mr. Assad from continuing to operate weapons-research facilities, including the one in Damascus visited by inspectors, making it easier for the regime to develop a new type of chemical munition using chlorine. And the regime never had to account for the types of short-range rockets that United Nations investigators believe were used in an Aug. 21, 2013, sarin gas attack that killed some 1,400 people, these officials say.

Obama administration officials have voiced alarm this year about reports that Mr. Assad is using the chlorine weapons on his own people. And U.S. intelligence now suggests he hid caches of even deadlier nerve agents, and that he may be prepared to use them if government strongholds are threatened by Islamist fighters, according to officials familiar with the intelligence. If the regime collapses outright, such chemical-weapons could fall into the hands of Islamic State, or another terror group.

“Nobody should be surprised that the regime is cheating,” says Robert Ford, former U.S. ambassador to Syria under President Barack Obama. He says more intrusive inspections are needed.

The White House and State Department say last year’s mission was a success even if the regime hid some deadly chemicals. Western nations removed 1,300 metric tons of weapons-grade chemicals, including ingredients for nerve agents sarin and VX, and destroyed production and mixing equipment and munitions. U.S. officials say the security situation would be far more dangerous today if those chemicals hadn’t been removed, especially given recent battlefield gains by Islamists. Demanding greater access and fuller disclosures by the regime, they say, might have meant getting no cooperation at all, jeopardizing the entire removal effort.

“I take no satisfaction from the fact that the chlorine bombs only kill a handful at a time instead of thousands at a time,” says Thomas Countryman, the assistant secretary of state for international security and nonproliferation. “But it is important to keep a perspective that the most dangerous of these inhumane weapons are no longer in the hands of this dictator.”

The following account of the inspectors’ efforts on the ground is based on interviews with people who were involved. Syrian officials in New York and Damascus didn’t respond to repeated requests for comment.

Inspectors from The Hague-based Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, or OPCW, together with U.N. personnel, arrived in Damascus in October 2013 to an especially difficult work environment. They were in a war zone, and rebel forces viewed them with hostility because the inspection process forestalled U.S. airstrikes, which the rebels were counting on to weaken the Assad regime.

Veto power

Because the regime was responsible for providing security, it had an effective veto over inspectors’ movements. The team decided it couldn’t afford to antagonize its hosts, explains one of the inspectors, or it “would lose all access to all sites.” And the inspectors decided they couldn’t visit some sites in contested areas, fearing rebels would attack them.

Under the terms of their deployment, the inspectors had access only to sites that the Assad regime had declared were part of its chemical-weapons program. The U.S. and other powers had the right to demand access to undeclared sites if they had evidence they were part of the chemical-weapons program. But that right was never exercised, in part, inspectors and Western officials say, because their governments didn’t want a standoff with the regime.

Russia, Mr. Assad’s longtime ally, had used its clout at the U.N. and the OPCW to limit the mandate of the inspectors, preventing them from accusing the regime directly of using chemical weapons, such as in the 2013 sarin attack.

In its initial confidential declaration to the OPCW, the regime identified 23 sites where 1,300 metric tons of chemicals were stored. The regime also admitted to having more than 100 missile warheads, mainly Scud missiles, and roughly 1,100 aerial bombs, which principally posed a threat to Israel.

The sites stretched for more than 240 miles, from an air base 16 miles from the Jordan border in the south to a facility close to Turkey in the north. A network of bunkers hiding chemical weapons was located just 3 miles from a major Hezbollah base.

Among the biggest surprises for the inspectors was Syria’s fleet of mobile chemical-weapons production facilities, housed on 18-wheeler trucks. They looked so much like regular trucks that they even carried advertisements, including one for a Hungarian moving company.

Scott Cairns, a chemist and munitions expert who was one of the inspection mission’s leaders, says it was “unlike any other program that I’ve seen or read about.”

The big question looming over the whole operation was how forthcoming the regime had been about the scope of its chemical-weapons work. As the inspections were beginning, in private briefings for U.N. and congressional officials, U.S. intelligence agencies gave the regime an informal grade of B-plus for truthfulness, according to U.S. and U.N. officials.

Central Intelligence Agency analysts initially thought the declaration matched what they believed the regime had. Some intelligence officials at the Pentagon were more skeptical, believing that Syria may have squirreled away a secret reserve, defense officials say.

The inspectors were suspicious of Syria’s claim to have only 20 tons of ready-to-use mustard agent, which can be loaded into artillery shells, aerial bombs and rockets. U.S. intelligence agencies expected the Syrians to have hundreds of tons.

When U.N. officials pressed the matter, the Syrians said they had destroyed hundreds of tons of mustard agent in fire pits before agreeing to the inspections. The inspectors were skeptical, noting that it had taken other countries decades to destroy similarly large stockpiles.

Inspectors also were suspicious of Syrian claims that a high percentage of chemical-weapons warheads and bombs—around 30% of the total—had been detonated during exercises and trials. Additional stocks, Syria claimed, were converted into conventional weapons. The worry was that the regime was keeping weapons in reserve.
Jerry Smith, a retired British military officer, was in charge of field operations for a team of international weapons inspectors involved with trying to rid Syria of chemical weapons. ENLARGE
Jerry Smith, a retired British military officer, was in charge of field operations for a team of international weapons inspectors involved with trying to rid Syria of chemical weapons. Photo: Matthew Lloyd for The Wall Street Journal

Syria’s declaration listed only strategic weapons—Scud warheads and aerial bombs meant for war with Israel—not short-range munitions, including the rockets that an earlier U.N. inquiry found at the site of the August 2013 sarin attack.

Members of the inspection team didn’t push for answers, worried that it would compromise their primary objective of getting the regime to surrender the 1,300 tons of chemicals it admitted to having. “It was a question of priorities,” says one team member.

After traveling to the Syrian capital from Beirut in a convoy of armored Toyota Land Cruisers, the inspection team took over the ninth floor of the Four Seasons hotel, which they turned into a makeshift command center. The team included weapons experts, chemists, medics and negotiators. Three were native Arabic speakers.

Jerry Smith, a retired British military officer who had taken part in similar OPCW operations during his seven years with the organization, was in charge of field operations.

That first night, Mr. Smith and other team leaders drove to Syria’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs to meet their main contact, Gen. Hassan al-Sharif.

Weeks earlier, Gen. Sharif had hosted a U.N. team sent to investigate the sarin attack. His message at the time was that Syria didn’t have a chemical-weapons program. Now, Syria was admitting to having chemical-weapons sites, and it was Gen. Sharif’s job to ensure inspectors got access to them.

The Syrians laid out the ground rules. Inspectors could visit only sites Syria had declared, and only with 48-hour notice. Anything else was off-limits, unless the regime extended an invitation.

“We had no choice but to cooperate with them,” said Mr. Cairns. “The huge specter of security would have hampered us had we gone in there very aggressively or tried to do things unilaterally.”

At 7 a.m. on Oct. 6, 2013, seven inspectors headed out for the team’s first inspection. A U.N. security officer had insisted on armored vehicles as escorts. The Syrians sent two slow-moving, Soviet-era BRDM-2 vehicles armed with machine guns, and two unmarked vehicles filled with Syrian intelligence agents toting AK-47s.

The slow speed of the convoy—15 m.p.h.—unnerved the inspectors. They later told the Syrians to get rid of the BRDM-2s, concluding they were better off being less conspicuous and more agile.

The convoy stopped first at the mouth of a bunker in the side of a hill. It was covered with camouflage netting. Inspectors in protective suits entered two at a time and walked through concrete tunnels to chambers filled with steel containers. The containers held chemicals that, when mixed together, created sarin. The bunker also contained aerial bombs and warheads.

Parked outside the bunker were mobile weapons-production facilities that sat on 18-wheelers. Inspectors would later liken the vehicles to Transformers toys because they looked so ordinary on the outside. As such, they would have been difficult to target from the air.

“This wasn’t kitchen chemistry,” Mr. Smith recalls thinking. “It was a piece of quality engineering.”

Syrian guards carried the empty aerial bombs out of the bunker and laid them in a row. The Syrians had stored them without chemicals inside. Mr. Cairns says the bombs contained two internal chambers separated by a thin membrane. When the bombs are filled with chemicals, activating them requires turning a crank attached to the back of the bomb, which rotates a rod inside, pierces the membrane and mixes the chemicals.

The inspectors directed the Syrians to destroy the bombs by rolling over them with a bulldozer. But that failed to dent them. Mr. Smith spotted a nearby tank and asked a Syrian colonel to use it. The tank rolled over each bomb repeatedly. Eventually, it crushed one.

Mr. Smith was amazed. A Syrian officer thumped his chest and said: “Made in Syria.”

In Homs, the inspectors slept in abandoned villas ringed by Syrian troops. On the main road into the city, inspectors toured one of the largest sarin storehouses, surrounded by a wall but few guards. Mr. Smith says it was “hidden in plain sight.”

At another site, guards were bearded and weren’t wearing Syrian army uniforms. Many were equipped with German-made G3 rifles, a weapon often carried by Iranian forces. Inspectors suspected they were members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps or an Iranian-backed militia.

Other facilities were too risky to approach. To check on one near Aleppo, where there was heavy fighting, inspectors sent Syrian troops with tamper-proof cameras to confirm the regime’s claims that all chemicals had been removed. For another, inspectors spoke to rebel leaders over Skype to negotiate safe passage, but in the end decided against going because they thought they could be targeted.

    Dangerous Mission: Destroying Chemical Weapons at Sea

Getting the deadly chemicals out of Syria was fraught with difficulty. They had to be shipped through often-dangerous terrain to the port of Latakia on the Mediterranean, where they could be loaded onto ships to be destroyed at sea.

First, the tall legs on the tanks storing the chemicals had to be cut so the vessels would fit into trucks. Some weren’t cut evenly and chemicals spilled in transit.

At a meeting at a U.S. military headquarters in Frankfurt, Germany, an American admiral laid out a plan for moving the chemicals. The plan assumed the international community would be able to control the speed, frequency and order of deliveries to the port. Mr. Smith informed the admiral that the Assad regime was calling the shots.

In Latakia, which was flooded with Syrian soldiers, a Danish vessel was charged with transferring the most dangerous chemicals to an American ship. Syrian soldiers were taken aback when Danish Marines stepped ashore, prompting Mr. Smith to step between them. Gen. Sharif defused the situation by inviting the Danish captain for tea.

In February 2014, with the Syrians dragging their feet on delivering the declared chemicals to Latakia, the OPCW created a new team to try to identify what the Syrians might have been hiding.
Suspected gaps

The new team flew into Damascus once a month to meet with Gen. Sharif and Syria’s leading scientists. As inspectors pressed the Syrians about suspected gaps in their initial weapons declaration, new details about the program began to emerge.

U.S. and Israeli intelligence agencies had long suspected that there were research facilities in Damascus run by the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center, or SSRC. In a bombing run in early 2013, Israeli warplanes had struck a convoy of trucks next to one of them. Israel believed the trucks were carrying weapons for Hezbollah.

At first, the Syrians told the new team they had no research facilities at all because they had developed their weapons in the field using what they described as “pop-up” labs. The inspectors had seen intelligence that suggested otherwise.

During an informal dinner in April 2014, inspectors half-jokingly suggested that the Syrians should allow them to visit an SSRC facility.

“If you are so interested, why don’t you just come along?” a Syrian official responded, according to Mr. Smith.
A Syrian man received treatment at a field hospital following a suspected chlorine-gas attack by Assad forces in Idlib in May. ENLARGE
A Syrian man received treatment at a field hospital following a suspected chlorine-gas attack by Assad forces in Idlib in May. Photo: Firas Taki/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images

One Saturday the following month, the inspectors’ motorcade entered one of the SSRC compounds in Damascus. The facility’s director told the inspectors that no chemical weapons had been developed there. The facility had done research on detecting chemical agents and on treating people exposed to toxins, he said.

Gen. Sharif attended the presentation, which included an Arabic-language PowerPoint. The slides explained the SSRC’s work in areas including oncology and pesticides. The skeptical inspectors urged the Syrians to come clean about all their research and development facilities.

Last October, the Syrian regime added several research facilities to its official declaration of chemical-weapons sites, including the one in Damascus visited by inspectors that May. That gave inspectors the right to visit them for examinations. Western officials say samples taken by inspectors at the sites found traces of sarin and VX, which they say confirms that they had been part of the chemical-weapons program.

Earlier this year, American intelligence agencies tracked the regime’s increasing use of chlorine-filled bombs. The weapons-removal deal didn’t curtail the work of Syria’s weapons scientists, allowing the regime to develop more effective chlorine bombs, say U.S. officials briefed on the intelligence. The regime denies using chlorine.

The CIA had been confident that Mr. Assad destroyed all of the chemical weapons it thought he possessed when the weapons-removal deal was struck. In recent weeks, the CIA concluded that the intelligence picture had changed and that there was a growing body of evidence Mr. Assad kept caches of banned chemicals, according to U.S. officials.

Inspectors and U.S. officials say recent battlefield gains by Islamic State militants and rival al Qaeda-linked fighters have made it even more urgent to determine what Syria held back from last year’s mass disposal, and where it might be hidden. A new intelligence assessment says Mr. Assad may be poised to use his secret chemical reserves to defend regime strongholds. Another danger is that he could lose control of the chemicals, or give them to Hezbollah.

The team that visited the SSRC facility in Damascus recently asked the regime for information about unaccounted for munitions. Officials say there has been no response from Damascus.

“Accountability?” asks Mr. Cairns, the inspector. “At this point in time, it hasn’t happened.”

Write to Adam Entous at and Naftali Bendavid at

 on: July 24, 2015, 06:29:32 AM 
Started by Crafty_Dog - Last post by Crafty_Dog
second post

Anwar Ibrahim
Updated July 23, 2015 7:37 p.m. ET

Selangor, Malaysia

Since Prime Minister Najib Razak’s 2013 electoral victory, which was plagued by widespread allegations of gerrymandering, fraud and voter intimidation, Malaysia has taken a turn for the worse. Mr. Najib, who once promised democratic and economic reforms and pledged to allow “the voices of dissent” to be heard, has doubled down on political repression.

A former deputy prime minister of Malaysia and leader of the opposition, I am now in the fifth month of a five-year prison sentence that has been roundly condemned by governments and human-rights groups around the world. I spend my days in solitary confinement in meditation and in the company of the few books that are allowed into my cell. Meanwhile, allegations of corruption at the highest levels of Malaysian government have surfaced.

In 2012, the draconian Internal Security Act was repealed by the Najib government with much fanfare, only to be replaced by the Prevention of Crime and Prevention of Terrorism Acts, which are equally, if not more, repressive. Beyond encroaching on Malaysian citizens’ fundamental liberties, these new laws rob judges of their discretionary sentencing powers.

Instead of abolishing the outdated and much-abused Sedition Act of 1948 as promised, Mr. Najib’s government has deployed it as a weapon of mass oppression. In the past 18 months, more than 150 Malaysians have been arrested and many charged with sedition for an array of activities including accusing the government of voter fraud and criticizing the verdict in my trial. The arrested include students, professors, journalists, cartoonists, activists, human-rights lawyers and opposition politicians.

Mr. Najib’s finance ministry’s “strategic development fund,” 1Malaysia Development Bhd., or 1MDB, founded by Mr. Najib in 2008, is under intense scrutiny. As this newspaper reported on July 2, Malaysian investigators “have traced nearly $700 million of deposits into what they believe are the personal bank accounts of Malaysia’s prime minister, Najib Razak.” Neither the original source nor ultimate destination of the money is clear.

A few weeks earlier, on June 18, this newspaper reported that during the 2013 election 1MDB “indirectly supported Prime Minister Najib Razak’s campaign.” The fund paid what appeared to be an inflated price for assets acquired from a Malaysian company; the company then contributed to a Najib-led charity that announced projects, such as aid to schools, that Mr. Najib was able to tout as he campaigned.

After these two stories were published, Mr. Najib’s office put out a statement that “there have been concerted efforts by certain individuals to undermine confidence in our economy, tarnish the government and remove a democratically-elected prime minister.” It called the Journal articles a “continuation of this political sabotage.” Not surprisingly, foreign investors are increasingly wary. Malaysia’s currency, the ringgit, recently fell to a 16-year low.

Meanwhile, the Najib government sows communal and religious animosity among the Muslim ethnic Malay majority and the country’s large ethnic Chinese and Indian minorities. Mr. Najib’s ruling coalition blamed a “Chinese tsunami” for its losing the popular vote in the 2013 parliamentary elections, regardless of a study showing this to be false. And despite Mr. Najib’s claims of moderation internationally, the state-run media have vilified Shiite Islam. Last summer the prime minister urged his ruling United Malays National Organization members to be “brave” like Islamic State fighters in Iraq, causing him to later explain he doesn’t support Islamic State or its radical brand of Islam.

Such actions undermine the fragile fabric of Malaysia’s multiethnic and multireligious society. In four decades in public service I cannot recall a time when racial and religious sensitivities have become so inflamed, and at the same time so poorly managed by the country’s political leadership.

Yet I stayed put in Malaysia to face a difficult third bout of unjust incarceration because we in the opposition believe in a brighter future made possible by good governance and the rule of law. We believe in the dismantling of Malaysia’s system of race-based privileges that has devolved into nothing more than rent-seeking for the privileged few. We believe that corruption is a slow bleed that robs future generations of the education and business opportunities that will make them prosper.

Most important, we are joined by a new generation of young, millennial Malaysians with a commitment to building an inclusive, democratic and economically vibrant country.

Still, there is real danger ahead. Middle-income nations like Malaysia—after several decades of economic mismanagement, opaque governance and overspending—can devolve into failed states. The irresponsible manner in which the current leadership is handling religious issues to curry favor from the extreme right is fueling sectarianism. Increased political repression may drive some to give up on the political system altogether and consider extralegal means to cause change, thus creating a tragic, vicious cycle.

Yet there remains a clear path out of this mess: a return to the underpinnings of the Malaysian Constitution, which preserves and protects the rights of all Malaysians; a devolution of power from the executive, whose role now resembles that of a dictator more than a servant of the people; elections that are truly free and fair; and a free media unafraid to challenge authority.

Malaysia is ready for change. This is why, rather than flee my country, I chose to stay and continue the fight for peaceful, democratic reform from my prison cell. This is not easy and puts a tremendous burden on my family. I am grateful for their love and commitment. While I am physically behind bars my spirit remains with them, the people of Malaysia, and people all around the world who continue the struggle for dignity and for freedom.

Mr. Anwar, a former deputy prime minister of Malaysia (1993-98), is a former member of parliament for the People’s Justice Party and until April was leader of the opposition.

 on: July 24, 2015, 06:27:34 AM 
Started by Crafty_Dog - Last post by Crafty_Dog


    Review & Outlook

Malaysia’s Missed Democracy Lesson
Obama again can’t find a voice for liberty and moderate Muslims.
July 23, 2015 7:14 p.m. ET

Malaysia is in the midst of a first-class political scandal, thanks in part to reporting in this newspaper that $700 million linked to a state-owned investment fund allegedly was transferred to the personal accounts of Prime Minister Najib Razak. Mr. Najib denies wrongdoing, and neither the original source nor ultimate destination of the money is clear.

Yet the larger scandal in Malaysia is hiding in plain sight. We’re talking about the imprisonment of opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim, who is five months into a nonappealable five-year prison sentence on trumped-up sodomy charges. Nearby we publish an op-ed by Mr. Anwar, written in his jail cell, detailing the Najib government’s broader assault on the civil liberties of all Malaysians.

While Mr. Anwar’s op-ed speaks for itself, it would help if others speak up for him. That goes especially for President Obama, who has long claimed an interest in cultivating the forces of moderation in the Muslim world. Too bad, then, that he refused to meet Mr. Anwar when he visited Malaysia last year, though he had time for a very public round of golf with Mr. Najib in Hawaii a few months later. Mr. Obama’s reticence on behalf of political freedom in the world, from Iran in 2009 to Malaysia today, is one of the mysteries of his Presidency. Out of realpolitik or indifference, he is mute.

At a White House event in June with young South Asian leaders, he answered a pointed question about Mr. Anwar’s imprisonment with a dainty answer about how “democracy is hard,” adding that “it’s important for America to recognize that we’re not perfect, either.” And what, exactly, did Mr. Obama have in mind? “I mean, the amounts of money, for example, that are involved in our elections these days is disturbing because it makes it seem as if a few people have more influence in the democracy than the many.”

We often hear from friends overseas that they find U.S. foreign policy perplexing and disheartening these days. Maybe it has something to do with a President who sees a moral equivalence between funding free speech at home and jailing a moderate opposition leader abroad.

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