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 on: October 06, 2015, 02:48:02 PM 
Started by captainccs - Last post by Crafty_Dog
OTOH also to be considered are these variables:

1) The byproduct of the refugee invasion of Europe (and ultimately us too I fear-- already His Glibness talks of taking in 200,000 refugees-with Christians being given a harder time getting in than Muslims) Will Europe survive as such?  What implications if not?
2) the formation of the Russian-Iranian-Iraq (a.k.a. Shiastan)-Syria-Hezbollah axis.  IMHO this has deep and dangerous middle and long term implications, amongst them:
*Iran acquiring advanced anti-aircraft missile systems-- thus making most military options for insisting they do not go nuke far more dangerous and expensive
*Per the Obama-Kerry deal, in about 5 years Iran can get ICBMs on the international market.  Contemplate this-- Iran sets them up in Cuba
*Iranian troops under a Russian umbrella on the Golan Heights.  Is it a coincidence that Abbas has just renounced the Oslo Accords?
*Hezbollah also being under the Russian Umbrella
*Will Jordan fall due to the chaos being unleased?  What implications for Israel if it does? 
*Indeed, speaking of Israel, at what point does it feel cornered into nuclear options?
*the nuclear arms race that is just beginning e.g. Saudi Arabia is already in talks with Pakistan
*Kazakstan a plausible future target for Putin.  Already he has said it is "not a real country"
*intimidation of NATO has already begun  What implications for how Putin moves next with our NATO allies Lithuania et al?  What implications for Ukraine?
*What implications for China in the South China Sea?  Will they not be encouraged to militaristic intervention there (where 30-40% of the world's trade sails?) as they face serious internal economic contradictions?

 on: October 06, 2015, 02:42:48 PM 
Started by captainccs - Last post by ppulatie
BTW, why are we supporting those in Syria who want to create an Islamic State in Syria? Is one Islamic faction "better" than another?

We are soooo stupid.

 on: October 06, 2015, 02:24:08 PM 
Started by captainccs - Last post by ppulatie
At this point, who knows what the truth is regarding Turkish airspace violations and the duration. It could be innocent or it could be testing Turkey and the US. As to the Russian ground forces in Syria, let the Russians do what they desire.

There is a fine balance of what to do or not do in any situation. Our cold war forces knew what that balance was, and when airspace violations occurred, they knew how to react. Now we have idiot politicians and generals who have no real cold war experience who are going to be in charge.

All it takes is one mistake and we have a mess. I don't have the confidence in the leadership to not make that mistake.

As to the new post you just did, I think Robinson gives Obama too much credit. Instead of real planning and strategy with Obama, I think it is more pure dumb luck.

I ask this question............what happens if Assad is removed? Who fills the power vacuum?

 on: October 06, 2015, 02:17:27 PM 
Started by captainccs - Last post by Crafty_Dog
second post

A cogent line of thought, but one that leaves out several deeply important variables IMHO.

Obama is Right to be Cautious on Syria
By Eugene Robinson - October 6, 2015

WASHINGTON -- Contrary to popular belief, President Obama does have a plan for Syria. It's just not one that promises to have much immediate impact on the course of the brutal civil war.

Russian President Vladimir Putin, by contrast, has a plan that is far bolder and much more likely to produce results on the ground -- but only in the short term. I struggle to understand all the handwringing in Washington about the implications of Putin's intervention for "American leadership." We're unprepared to wade in -- for good reason, in my view -- and thus in no position to do much of anything about Russia's foray.

From the start, Obama's bottom-line goal has been to avoid getting dragged into a multi-sided conflict in which the lines between good guys and bad guys are faint and shifting. The president has been cautious in sending arms to the "moderate" rebels seeking to oust dictator Bashar al-Assad, fearing those weapons would fall into the hands of the Islamic State or other jihadist forces. Events have proved Obama right.

Last month, the Pentagon admitted that one-fourth of a shipment of vehicles and ammunition intended for U.S.-trained "good" rebels was quickly handed over to the radical Jabhat al-Nusra, an al-Qaeda affiliate. This is the first time U.S. officials have acknowledged such a weapons transfer but reportedly not the first time it has happened.
The big problem is that our most important goal in Syria is different from that of the non-jihadist rebels we support. The overriding American interest, as defined by Obama, is to "degrade and ultimately destroy" the Islamic State. U.S. airstrikes are designed to further that end, with a major focus being support of rebel forces seeking to recapture Raqqa, the Islamic State's de facto capital in the eastern part of the country.

For many of the rebels, however, the Islamic State is a secondary target. Their principal aim is deposing Assad, whose scorched-earth campaign to retain power is responsible for most of the death and destruction in the country -- and the exodus of millions of refugees who have flooded neighboring countries and created a crisis in Europe.

So, according to foreign policy hawks, we're supposed to give substantially more weapons and air support to rebels whose goals are not the same as ours? That dog don't hunt, and I'm glad Obama remains so cautious.

Putin, by contrast, has a single proxy in Syria and a clear goal: keeping Assad in power. Why should this be a surprise? Moscow has a decades-old relationship with the Assad family regime and a strategically valuable naval base in Syria. From Putin's point of view, the "moderate" rebels -- who are stronger in the western part of the country, around the big cities of Aleppo and Damascus -- are the more consequential threat.

That is why the first Russian airstrikes were against "good" rebels rather than "bad" ones. By no means would I ever defend Putin's Syria policy, which is morally bankrupt. But it's important to understand it.

Inevitably, there have already been reports of civilian casualties from the Russian bombing campaign. But the tragic U.S. bombing Saturday of a Doctors Without Borders hospital in Kunduz, Afghanistan, gives Russian officials a convenient retort: We regret that there is always unfortunate collateral damage in war.

Which brings me to the underlying lesson from the Kunduz accident: Be careful how you choose your friends. The U.S. airstrike reportedly was called in by Afghan military officers, who either made a terrible mistake or had their own reasons for wanting the hospital bombed. In Syria's bloody crazy-quilt landscape, where we have even less reliable allies on the ground, the possibilities for such deadly mistakes are myriad.

All of the above makes Syria a place to tread lightly and carefully. Putin's action has provoked calls for Obama to do something, anything, and I'm sure the Republican presidential candidates will have lots of bellicose advice. Most will involve action the president might have taken several years ago, when the war began; only Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., has a real alternative plan of action -- send tens of thousands of U.S. troops into Syria and Iraq -- and he's barely registering 1 percent in the polls.

The simple fact is that Russia has a clear way to achieve its immediate goals in Syria while the United States does not. Obama's continued reluctance to act for action's sake is prudent -- and presidential. He is right to keep the national interest in mind, not the national ego.
(c) 2015, Washington Post Writers Group

 on: October 06, 2015, 02:13:11 PM 
Started by G M - Last post by Crafty_Dog
 With a New Trade Agreement, the Devil Is in the Details
Geopolitical Diary
October 6, 2015 | 00:42 GMT Text Size

This morning, with little fanfare, the United States and 11 other nations announced they had reached a final agreement on the much discussed and meticulously negotiated trade agreement known as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The TPP is remarkable in its scale and scope, but equally remarkable have been the ordinary issues prolonging its adoption — dairy products in New Zealand, auto parts in Mexico, questions of patent regimes and new medicines. The devil is in the details, of course, and finding common ground between two nations, let alone a dozen, is rarely easy. And as difficult as the negotiations were, equally contentious political debates will soon begin in each of the new trade agreement's member countries.

The TPP was once seen as the centerpiece of the United States' "pivot" to Asia. It was a clear response to rising Chinese economic influence in the Asia-Pacific region and a push by Washington to gain increased access in Southeast Asia, one of the few dynamic markets in the world. But in recent months, the political aspects of the TPP have been played down by all involved, even by China. Rarely is the TPP described as an anti-China trade bloc any longer — unsurprising, given the significant amount of trade each TPP member does with China. There is also increased talk of the potential, however remote, of China's membership. This may all change now that the TPP has moved beyond the theoretical to the actual — or at least to the stage where the text will soon be revealed and domestic constituents will take over the role of debate.

What is a Geopolitical Diary?

Still, the political aspects of the TPP remain, no matter how each country's representatives try to downplay their implications. The TPP was not initially a U.S. invention; it was a small trade agreement among Singapore, New Zealand, Chile and Brunei. But as the United States started looking closer at the need to counter China's regional economic expansion, at least to reassure U.S. allies in the region if not to avoid falling behind the trade curve, the TPP presented an opportunity for Washington to take hold of a regional initiative and give it a new purpose. This was not the undertaking of the administration of U.S. President Barack Obama. It was initiated by the George W. Bush administration, near the end of his term, as Washington was able to focus back on the situation in Asia and begin to end its preoccupation with the Middle East.

The "pivot" was a recognition that the global geopolitical landscape was changing. The global center of gravity had shifted through the end of the Cold War to the present, moving from Europe and the North Atlantic westward, with the Pacific equaling and then surpassing the Atlantic in regard to international trade, and thus placing the Americas, and the United States, squarely in the middle. The rise of China, following on the heels of the Asian Tigers and Japan, contrasted strongly with the near economic exhaustion of Europe.

With the economic dynamism came an alteration to the balance of power. China's economic growth exerted its own pressure on Beijing, prompting and facilitating the nascent expansion of the Chinese military from a domestic security force to the early stages of an international expeditionary force. The U.S. global dominance that seemed set with the end of the Cold War was being challenged more formally than by terrorists and militants in Iraq or Afghanistan. This is not to say that China is an equal military power to the United States, and its expansion abroad remains in the very earliest of stages, but the United States is under no illusion about the growing regional implications of rising Chinese military power. Nor has it forgotten the example of Japan's rapid rise to military prominence during its emergence at the dawn of the 20th Century.

The TPP — alongside the U.S. engagement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the political rehabilitation of Myanmar, the encouragement of Japanese "normalization" and expanding security cooperation with Vietnam and the Philippines — is part of the same response to shifting international patterns. The TPP may not be specifically about squeezing China out of its increasingly substantial economic role in the Asia-Pacific, but it is certainly in recognition of the rising significance of the region, and the challenges confronting an emerging power on the regional and global stage. China is a major power emerging a century late, long after it is fashionable to be seen as rising, expansionary or even imperialistic. The perception and responses are in part shaped by 19th and 20th century ideas of emerging powers, zero-sum games and global balances. But they are equally shaped by the new realities of integrated global markets, the heavy economic interactions and interdependencies between erstwhile competitors, and the evolving definitions and applications of "power" on a regional and global scale.

 on: October 06, 2015, 02:03:17 PM 
Started by Crafty_Dog - Last post by Crafty_Dog
second post

 Reshaping the Modern Intelligence Community
Geopolitical Weekly
October 6, 2015 | 08:00 GMT Print
Text Size

By Philip Bobbitt

Nearly seven months ago, CIA Director John Brennan publicly unveiled his plan to significantly rethink the organization of his agency and how it would conduct its business. In my previous columns, I have tried to link strategy, law and history; now it occurs to me that this linkage lies at the heart of the proposed CIA reforms.

The CIA was created in 1947, nearly six years after Japan bombed Pearl Harbor. The chief reason given for its formation was to prevent another surprise attack against the United States, and for 60 years it succeeded. And yet, on Sept. 11, 2001 — a date that might also be said to "live in infamy" — another surprise attack hit the United States, resulting in a greater loss of life than the attack at Pearl Harbor. Despite an annual budget totaling twice the defense outlays of Iran, Iraq, Syria, North Korea, Cuba and Libya combined — and roughly equal to the entire British defense budget — the U.S. intelligence community was unable to thwart or even give sufficient warning of the attack.

Nevertheless, the failure to prevent the atrocities of 9/11 was not the most significant intelligence failure of the new millennium. In October 2002, the National Intelligence Council produced a National Intelligence Estimate that said Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear weapons program. (The National Intelligence Estimate is the U.S. intelligence community's most authoritative intelligence assessment, drawn from all community sources and representing the conclusions of the community as a whole.) But according to the subsequent work of the Iraq Survey Group, this assessment was almost entirely premature. The 2002 National Intelligence Estimate also said that Iraq's biological weapons capability had grown more advanced than it had been before the Gulf War, and that Baghdad possessed mobile biological weapons labs. This, too, was wrong. The report further concluded that Iraq had resumed its production of chemical weapons, including mustard gas, sarin and VX, and had accumulated stockpiles of these weapons amounting to between 100 and 500 metric tons. These claims were also wrong. Finally, the intelligence estimate said that Iraq had obtained unmanned aerial vehicles intended for the delivery of biological weapons, also an erroneous conclusion.

In short, the intelligence community's assessments of Iraq were riddled with errors, and its reputation has yet to fully recover. The role the intelligence community played in persuading the public of the necessity of going to war has done historic damage to the country's trust in subsequent claims for intervention, and indeed, to the credibility of executive action more generally. The Robb-Silberman Commission charged with investigating the community's claims regarding Iraq's weapons of mass destruction concluded:

    "While the intelligence services of the U.K., France Germany, and Russia also thought that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction [in 2002], in the end it was the United States secretary of state that put American credibility on the line, making this one of the most public — and most damaging — intelligence failures in recent American history."

The Dangers of Structural Division

At first glance, the intelligence failures of 9/11 and Iraqi WMDs appear to have little in common. The 9/11 Commission Report criticized the intelligence community for failing to share information among agencies, concluding that the lack of communication materially contributed to the wider failure to "connect the dots" — that is, to anticipate the attack and thwart it. "With each agency holding one or two pieces of the puzzle, none could see the whole picture." The Iraq WMD failure presented a different problem. It wasn't so much that analysts were unaware of what their counterparts in other agencies were thinking; it was rather that, with some exceptions, all of the analysts were thinking the same thing. Information that was inconsistent with the widely held thesis was discarded or, tellingly, reclassified as the result of Iraqi deception. Put simply, analysts enthusiastically connected dots that had little to do with one another or that might be better described as inkblots into a false picture.

But what the two fiascos did have in common was the fundamental structure of problem solving that existed within the CIA and throughout the intelligence community as a whole. This structure was the consequence of a particular way of understanding the collection and use of intelligence: Analysts treated these activities as a kind of proto-social science that they conducted from a detached, disinterested, scientific point of view. That understanding was then manifested in bureaucratic organization.

As with most organizations, this problem-solving structure could partly be explained by history. Figures from the World War II-era Office of Strategic Services were incorporated into the newly formed Directorate of Operations, bringing with them covert action; the bureaucratic empire building of J. Edgar Hoover kept the CIA on a tight leash whenever the FBI's interest were implicated; and so on. But the history itself could also be explained by the ideas it represented, for that's what history often is: Institutions and individuals working out the ideas they come to take for granted. In the intelligence community, these ideas came in the form of several antinomies:

    The division between the public and private sectors.
    The separation between the domestic and the international.
    The different rules we apply to law enforcement and intelligence operations.
    The different reliance we place on secret and open sources.
    The distinction between intelligence collection and analysis.
    The different roles of the intelligence producer and consumer.

And although these antinomies enabled the U.S. intelligence services to successfully navigate the challenges of the Cold War, they also directly led to the failures of 9/11 and Iraq.
A New Organization for a New Threat

While some critics have described the reforms announced in March as mere bureaucratic reshuffling, they are in fact an effort to overcome the difficulties imposed by these antinomies as we confront a new international reality.

The key reform is the creation of "mission centers," each led by an assistant director, that are not linked to any particular directorate. These centers will be organized around regions, such as Africa or East Asia, and functions or threats, like counterterrorism or WMD. Indeed, it is telling that the current National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) is the model for the new mission centers, because global market state terror is a phenomenon that most challenges the six contradicting sets of ideas listed above. Market state terrorists outsource their activities, merging the private and public spheres; they operate across borders, unconfined by any particular territory, blurring the lines between the domestic and the international; they commit crimes to further their political goals, often depending on criminal activity for their operations; their groups are difficult to penetrate but advertise themselves relentlessly in the media, including social media; the threat they pose requires close collaboration between intelligence producers and consumers who confront it, because typical intelligence customers can't be relied upon to ask for information in such novel and unpredictable circumstances; and they cannot be defeated if analysts are unaware of the sources of their information and if collectors are not constrained to information that is useful to analysts.

The Directorate of Intelligence (which will be renamed the Directorate of Analysis) and the National Clandestine Service (which will revert to its old name, the Directorate for Operations) will mainly function as talent pools, recruiting and training personnel to be deployed in the mission centers. Each center will have a team of analysts and operators working side by side and responsibility for espionage, analysis and covert action within its assigned mission area.

The most important objective of the reorganization is not simply to enhance collaboration or to achieve greater structural coherence. It is to create accountability through the assistant directors. Currently, there is no single person the CIA director can call upon to summarize threats, future trends and current operations in any particular area outside the NCTC and counterintelligence.

Critics' main objections to the reform will be that the CIA is forsaking the very structures that made it successful, and there is much truth to this concern. By keeping intelligence analysis separate from collection, the United States has enhanced the professionalization of both. By keeping intelligence consumers separate from producers, we have reduced — if not entirely removed — the politicization that can corrupt both. By relying on the government to find and maintain secrets while leaving publicly available information to the academics and journalists, we have attempted to protect U.S. journalists from being arrested overseas and to prevent CIA analysts from infiltrating university journals.

In future columns, I will say more about the uses of intelligence by statesmen. For now, I simply leave you with this: These reforms are essential to a preclusive strategy for the United States

 on: October 06, 2015, 01:53:08 PM 
Started by Crafty_Dog - Last post by objectivist1

The profound impact of culture.

October 6, 2015  Thomas Sowell   

The prevailing social dogma of our time — that economic and other disparities among groups are strange, if not sinister — has set off bitter disputes between those who blame genetic differences and those who blame discrimination.

Both sides ignore the possibility that groups themselves may differ in their orientations, their priorities and in what they are prepared to sacrifice for the sake of other things.

Back in the early 19th century, an official of the Russian Empire reported that even the poorest Jews saw to it that their daughters could read, and their homes had at least ten books. This was at a time when the vast majority of the population of the Russian Empire were illiterate.

During that same era, Thomas Jefferson complained that there was not a single bookstore where he lived. In Frederick Law Olmsted's travels through the antebellum South, he noted that even plantation owners seldom had many books.

But in mid-18th century Scotland, even people of modest means had books, and those too poor to buy them could rent books from lending libraries, which were common throughout Scottish towns.

There is no economic determinism. People choose what to spend their money on, and what to spend their time on. Cultures differ.

On a personal note, as a child nearly nine years old, I was one of the many blacks who migrated from the South to Harlem in the 1930s.

Although New York had public libraries, elite public high schools and free colleges of high quality, I had no idea what a public library was, or what an elite high school was, and the thought of going to college never crossed my mind.

Jewish immigrants who arrived in New York, generations before me, seized upon the opportunities provided by public libraries and later their children flooded into the elite public high schools and free city colleges. This was consistent with the values of their centuries-old culture.

For most of the black kids of my generation, those things might as well not have existed, because nothing in their culture would have pointed them toward such things.

There was no reason to believe that I would have been any different from the rest, except for the fact that members of my family, who had very little education themselves, wanted me to get the education that they never had a chance to get.

They had no more idea of the role of public libraries and elite quality high schools and colleges than I did.

But they knew a boy a little older than I was, who came from a better educated family, and they decided that he was somebody I should meet and who could serve as a guide to me on things they knew nothing about.

His name was Eddie Mapp, and I can still recall how he took me to a public library, and how patiently he tried to explain to me what a public library was, and why I should get a library card. He opened a door for me into a wider world. But most other black kids in Harlem at that time had no one to do that for them.

Nor did kids from various other ethnic groups in New York have someone to open doors to a wider world for them. It didn't matter how smart they were or whether opportunities were available for them, if they knew nothing about them.

An internationally renowned scholar of Irish American ancestry once said in a social gathering that, when he was a young man of college age, he had no plans to go to college, until someone else who recognized his ability urged him to do so. There was no reason to expect all groups to follow in the footsteps of the Jews.

In my later years, two middle-class couples I knew took it upon themselves to each take a young relative from the ghetto into their home and, at considerable cost in time and money, try to provide them with a good education.

One of these youngsters had an IQ two standard deviations above the mean. But both of them eventually returned to the ghetto life from which they came. It wasn't genetics and it wasn't discrimination.

The youngster with an IQ two standard deviations above the mean will probably never achieve what a Jewish or Asian youngster with an IQ only one standard deviation above the mean achieves.

Those who are celebrating the ghetto culture might consider what the cost is to those being raised in that culture. And they might reconsider what they are hearing from charlatans parading statistical disparities.

 on: October 06, 2015, 01:46:25 PM 
Started by captainccs - Last post by Crafty_Dog

You OK with this Pat?

 on: October 06, 2015, 01:41:25 PM 
Started by Crafty_Dog - Last post by objectivist1

Just another day in the suicidal West.

October 6, 2015  Robert Spencer    

Last week a fifteen-year-old Muslim, Farhad Jabar Khalil Mohammad, went to a police station in New South Wales and shot dead a civilian police employee, Curtis Cheng. After the murder, the young murderer was, according to an eyewitness, “dancing joyously.” Outside the station, he waved his gun at police and screamed “Allahu akbar” at them before he was killed in the ensuing gunfight.

In the wake of this jihad murder, Australian officials have behaved in an utterly predictable manner – one that we have seen many, many times before in Western countries, and that we will doubtless see many more times as well: they rushed to profess ignorance of the killer’s motives and above all, to defend Islam.

None of these officials are Muslims. They have all just been thoroughly indoctrinated with the idea that to look too closely at the motivating ideology behind murders like that of Curtis Cheng would be “hateful” and “bigoted.”

And so Pat Gooley from the New South Wales Police Association said: “We are used to being under threat. What’s really concerning police is there’s no rhyme or reason to these current terror threats.”

No rhyme or reason? Have you ever heard of jihad, Mr. Gooley? Evidently not.

Other police officials, meanwhile, made themselves busy ensuring that Farhad Jabar Khalil Mohammad’s jihad murder doesn’t lead anyone to think there is anything amiss with the Muslim community. The murder “was doubly shocking because it was perpetrated by a 15-year-old boy and it underlines the importance of families, communities, leaders being very aware of whether young people are becoming radicalised,” said Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull, complacently assuming that Muslim “families, communities, leaders” in Australia are against this “radicalization” — but where is the evidence of that?

Turnbull also said: “We must not vilify or blame the entire Muslim community with the actions of what is, in truth, a very, very small percentage of violent extremist individuals. The Muslim community are our absolutely necessary partners in combating this type of violent extremism.”

When has the Muslim community in Australia or elsewhere in the West genuinely acted like partners in combating this type of violent extremism? And we must indeed not vilify or blame the entire Muslim community, but can we not call upon them to institute honest, transparent and inspectable programs in mosques and Islamic schools that teach against this understanding of Islam that they ostensibly reject and oppose?

Meanwhile, opposition leader Bill Shorten said: “Our thoughts are also with the family of the alleged young perpetrator. Like all Australians, they will be struggling to comprehend how someone so young could be part of such a terrible crime.” How does he know his family wasn’t involved? Has he carried out an investigation? He assumes that the family taught young Farhad Jabar Khalil Mohammad the true, peaceful Islam, but that he was then “radicalized on the Internet” — but why was his family’s true, peaceful Islam not able to withstand the challenge from the twisted, hijacked Internet Islam?

New South Wales Premier Mike Baird said that he and others were trying to understand “how someone so young could commit such a hideous crime.” He might wish to look into Islam’s teachings about jihad, but he won’t. He also said: “We cannot let actions such as this divide us. We cannot let hate overtake us. We have to come together and I’m sure that’s what we’ll see from this city and state.”

Indeed, we must not let hate overtake us, as it overtook Curtis Cheng. But can we do that by refusing to examine the ideology that led to his murder? By “hate,” Baird means “honest investigation into the texts and teachings of Islam that incite attacks such as this one, and the prevalence of such teachings in the Muslim community.”

And that’s the problem: every time there is another jihad attack or foiled jihad plot in the free world, our leaders just circle the wagons, trot out their Religion-of-Peace cliches again, warn us against “Islamophobia,” and refuse to look into the genuine root causes of the problem.

It’s a sure-fire path to societal suicide.

 on: October 06, 2015, 01:37:16 PM 
Started by Crafty_Dog - Last post by Crafty_Dog
If Sudanese are Muslim, then this is the correct thread:

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