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« Last post by Crafty_Dog on November 01, 2021, 03:54:38 AM »
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No tomo muy en serio las propuestas sugeridas, pero la descripcion de los problemas tiene valor en mi opinion:
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A Long-Term US Strategy for Latin America
The pandemic created unprecedented problems in the region at a time when Washington’s ability to help is severely constrained.
By: Allison Fedirka
When U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken admitted last month that the U.S. had a mixed record on improving civilian security in Latin American countries, the region did a double-take. Security cooperation, even direct intervention, has been the cornerstone of U.S. engagement with Latin America. When it works, it’s a low-cost approach that leaves spare resources and energy for Washington to project power across the globe. But the economic and social disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic has wreaked havoc across the region, interacting with existing security threats to pose new challenges to the United States. The U.S. is responding with a new approach that also emphasizes social and economic development projects, which it hopes will not only reduce immediate security threats but also support longer-term goals like reducing power vacuums, strengthening the region’s economic ties with the U.S., and securing the U.S.-aligned regime structure.
Past the Tipping Point
Nearly all the countries in Latin America were poorly equipped to deal with the pandemic. Large segments of the population lacked access to adequate health care; few workers could perform their jobs remotely; and governments lacked the funds for massive social spending or recovery projects. The region’s economy contracted nearly 8 percent in 2020 – well above the 3 percent global average – and economists expect it will take nearly a decade to recover. Making matters worse, many of these countries were facing severe socio-economic difficulties even before the pandemic, like organized crime, forced displacement, lack of formal employment and natural disasters. The pandemic pushed many states past the tipping point.
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Latin American governments’ difficulties meeting the needs of their population had three major consequences. First, organized crime groups stepped in to ensure economic activity, food distribution and other public needs, especially in remote areas. These groups also offered employment opportunities at a time when jobs were hard to come by. As organized crime gained a stronger hold in these areas, attacks on local communities, turf wars and displacement increased. Second, public trust in government was severely damaged. Nearly all leaders in the region saw their popularity drop, with several facing calls for impeachment. With their power diminished and populations disgruntled, politicians became vulnerable to the influence of foreign powers offering economic relief or political support.
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Finally, migration pressures in three separate areas overflowed and collided in Central America, en route to the United States. The Northern Triangle region (El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras) is most familiar to Americans because of its prominence during the Trump administration. A second wave involves people from Hispaniola fleeing Haiti’s latest political crisis. There are also migrating Haitians who previously settled in South America, primarily Brazil and Chile, after the 2010 earthquake. Deteriorating conditions in those countries have pushed the migrants north toward the United States. Finally, Venezuelans have been leaving their country in droves in recent years. Many of them settled in Colombia, but with Bogota saying it cannot host any more and other governments in the region prioritizing their own citizens, many Venezuelan migrants are now looking to make the trek north as well.
The simultaneous occurrence of increased migration, stronger organized crime and regionwide political instability poses a formidable security threat to the United States. Though elements of this activity have always been present to some degree in the region, the current magnitude and scope go well beyond previous levels. An adequate U.S. security response would require a massive mobilization of resources at a time when the U.S. is trying to reduce military commitments, manage an unprecedented economic recovery and unify a deeply divided public. Furthermore, these types of operations provide only short-term relief at best. Washington needs a strategy that also addresses long-term threats while minimizing costs.
A New Approach
In recent weeks, the U.S. government has signaled a shift in its engagement strategy with Latin America that integrates a much stronger socio-economic focus to complement security efforts. The first clue came in early October when Mexican officials announced the end of the Merida Initiative, the linchpin policy for U.S.-Mexican security cooperation, and the start of a new stage of cooperation. Shortly thereafter the two countries held their High-Level Security Dialogue, which ended with a joint statement declaring the decision to take a more holistic approach to security. The parties pledged more indirect efforts like working with at-risk youth, reducing drug use and jointly combating arms trafficking. Mexico City had long lobbied for this approach, but Washington had resisted.
Similarly, on Oct. 25, the U.S. government announced a new strategy for combating drug trafficking in Colombia. The objective is to strengthen the government’s presence in rural communities, support the incomes of legal businesses and eliminate coca production. There are other indications of a shift in U.S. strategy in other parts of Latin America. During an Oct. 20 speech in Quito, Blinken said the U.S. had focused too much on addressing the symptoms of organized crime and relied too much on working with security forces rather than addressing root causes. Many communities have come to rely on organized crime to stimulate economic activity. It’s difficult to convince people to leave organized crime without providing them an alternative source of income, especially when their former “employer” relies on violence to keep people in check. The Biden administration wants to correct this, Blinken said, and to create economic opportunities that will weaken organized crime over time.
Migration is another area where a security-focused approach may provide temporary relief but not a permanent solution. People leave their countries for many reasons. Addressing physical insecurity and political turmoil must be part of the solution, but unless the economic situation improves, those problems will invariably return.
Foreign Threats
A final element of Washington’s new approach has less to do with Latin American instability itself than with what hostile powers could do with it. In June, the U.S. said fighting corruption, both domestically and internationally, was a core interest for U.S. national security. Corruption and authoritarian government go hand in hand, Washington argues, and undemocratic regimes divert resources away from economic growth. This is directly relevant to the post-pandemic economic and political landscape in Latin America.
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Disillusionment with Latin American governments’ inability to deal with the pandemic’s fallout has added fuel to preexisting questions about democratic governance. This trend poses a long-term threat to the U.S., which promotes and relies on democratic regimes worldwide. It also raises the possibility that governments in the region will look to nondemocratic powers like Russia or China for assistance if that gives them a better chance of holding on to power. By stressing the links between corruption, economic development and democracy, Washington is trying to make the case for like-minded, pro-U.S. governments in the region.
Funding plays a critical role in any economic development project, and for that the U.S. has relied on its International Development Finance Corp. Washington set up the DFC in late 2018 as part of its response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. In Latin America, DFC efforts have focused primarily on providing financing for small and midsized businesses. The DFC can also invest in large infrastructure projects, and it encourages the participation of foreign partners.
Its strength is also a potential weakness: its dependence on private-sector cooperation to execute development projects. The DFC offers longer investment horizons, U.S. government funding upfront, protection against currency inconvertibility, and insurance against expropriation and political violence, all in an effort to attract investors. Without private participation, the DFC lacks the funds to make a serious difference in Latin American economies. The potential benefit of this model, however, is that it allows U.S. companies to gradually increase their presence in Latin America, boosting economic growth in a sustainable way while reinforcing long-term economic ties with the United States.
By giving socio-economic development a more prominent role in U.S. strategy toward Latin America, the U.S. is redefining how it engages with the hemisphere. Security operations will always be needed to deal with immediate threats, but a sustainable approach requires attention to the underlying causes of instability and violence. Doing so now, before the scale of the threats is too great or the costs too high, is key to Washington’s continued ability to project power around the globe.