Energy Politics & Science

[DougMacG]

Gov of Colo, on my 2016 Dem short list, seems to be taking on the fracking opponents on the left (like the NY Times) by asserting that the fluid is completely safe.  He is such a newcomer that he doesn't even know the name Haliburton is a Democratic swear word.

http://www.washingtontimes.com/blog/inside-politics/2013/feb/12/colorado-gov-hickenlooper-i-drank-fracking-fluid/#ixzz2LGJz39zE

I drank fracking fluid, says Colorado Gov. John Hickenlooper

By Ben Wolfgang - The Washington Times  February 12, 2013, 12:32PM

Colorado Gov. John Hickenlooper went to unusually great lengths to learn firsthand the strides the oil and gas industry has made to minimize environmental harm from fracking.

The first-term Democrat and former Denver mayor told a Senate committee on Tuesday that he actually drank a glass of fracking fluid produced by oilfield services giant Halliburton.

The fluid is made entirely “of ingredients sourced from the food industry,” the company says, making it safe for Mr. Hickenlooper and others to imbibe.

“You can drink it. We did drink it around the table, almost rituallike, in a funny way,” he told the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. “It was a demonstration. … they’ve invested millions of dollars in what is a benign fluid in every sense.”

Sen. Al Franken, Minnesota Democrat, found humor in the governor’s admission and asked if the experience was part of some bizarre occult practice.

“No, there were no religious overtures,” Mr. Hickenlooper responded.

While some laughed at the governor’s statement, he brought up the incident to make a serious point: that oil and gas companies have taken major steps forward in fracking technology.

The practice uses water, sand and chemicals injected into the ground at tremendous pressure to break apart rock formations and release fuel. Environmental groups and many other critics long have been concerned about the chemicals used in the practice and their potential effect on groundwater.

Mr. Hickenlooper stressed that the Halliburton food additive mixture is so safe, one can literally drink it. He also cautioned against state and federal lawmakers going too far with laws to force companies such as Halliburton to disclose the formulas for such products.

“If we were overzealous in forcing them to disclose what they had created, they wouldn’t bring it into our state,” he said.

[Crafty_Dog]

Methane Hydrates and the Potential Natural Gas Boom
 

February 11, 2013 | 1115 GMT




Summary
 

 
Hydrate methane burning at Japan's Gas Pavilion in 2005



Methane hydrates, which are natural gas molecules trapped in ice, offer a potentially abundant source of natural gas widely distributed across the globe. Assuming the extraction technology can be mastered, methane hydrates could offer traditionally resource-poor countries greater energy security.
 


Analysis
 
The so-called shale gas revolution has changed the face of the energy industry in the United States. Natural gas production in the United States is at an all-time high. Proposals for, and the actual construction of, liquefied natural gas export terminals in the United States have replaced plans for liquefied natural gas import terminals. But shale gas deposits as a proportion of global natural gas supplies may seem minor in comparison to methane hydrates.
 
Methane hydrates form at a specific range of low temperatures and high pressures. They occur in the Arctic permafrost and along continental slopes, typically at water depths greater than 500 meters (1,640 feet). Once considered only a hindrance to conventional extraction, emerging technologies to tap methane hydrates mean they now have the potential to alter the global energy outlook. Estimates for total methane hydrate gas in place are rough, but range anywhere from 3,000 trillion cubic meters to more than 140,000 trillion cubic meters, the large range illustrating the uncertainty of the estimate. By comparison, combined global technically recoverable conventional natural and shale gas reserves total roughly 640 trillion cubic meters. (In 2011, global natural gas consumption stood at approximately 3.4 trillion cubic meters.)
 
Despite the promise of methane hydrates, the technology for their extraction is still under development, and potential risks have not been neutralized. These include the uncontrolled release of natural gas formerly trapped in ice, which could result in large amounts of the greenhouse gas methane entering the atmosphere. They also include the possibility of destabilizing the ocean floor, leading to underwater landslides and subsequently the possible sinking of drilling rigs.
 
Drilling likely will be required to access the natural gas in the hydrates. A number of drilling techniques could be used to destabilize the equilibrium of the hydrates and release natural gas. These include thermal injections, which involve increasing temperatures, often by injecting steam, to dissociate the gas. They also include depressurization, or reducing the pressure of the formation to release the gas. Finally, and perhaps most promising, is carbon dioxide injection. In this process, carbon dioxide essentially replaces the natural gas within the hydrate, allowing for the release of natural gas and the capture of carbon dioxide.
 
Research programs focused on methane hydrate detection and extraction can be found in numerous nations, including Japan, South Korea, India, China, Norway, the United Kingdom, Germany, the United States, Canada, Russia, New Zealand, Brazil and Chile. Much of the initial research has been highly collaborative, with the government and private companies from the United States playing a prominent role.
 





.
 
Most of these research programs are in the exploratory, experimental and laboratory phases, with expeditions seeking samples to determine the extent of deposits so as to direct further research. Last year, however, Japan completed a successful field test in Alaska in collaboration with Norway and ConocoPhillips, successfully producing natural gas through controlled dissociation via carbon dioxide injections. In recent weeks, Japan has also begun offshore production tests in the Nankai Trough off the coast of central Honshu.
 
Despite these recent advances, commercial production is still unlikely for at least 10 to 15 years. Japan believes that commercial production will be possible by 2018, while the U.S. Geological Survey estimates that countries with the "political will" to pursue methane hydrates could see production by around 2025. Though expensive compared to conventional methods of recovering natural gas, the estimated cost of methane hydrate extraction is similar to other unconventional sources, such as shale gas. The International Energy Agency estimates that once developed, it will cost between $4.70-$8.60 to extract 1 million British thermal units of methane hydrates. The same studies estimate conventional costs as low as $0.50 per 1 million British thermal units. Developmental and capital costs are likely to be high, since the deposits are in difficult, harsh locations (e.g., Arctic or deepwater environments) and depending on their location, new fields could also mean additional capital costs from infrastructure development.
 
Methane hydrates are widely distributed throughout the globe, including locations that do not have substantial conventional natural gas reserves. Deposits have been discovered off the coasts of Japan, India, South Korea and Chile, in the Gulf of Mexico and off the southeastern coast of the United States. Potential reserves also exist in the Arctic permafrost of Alaska, Canada and Russia. Their widespread distribution means traditionally resource-poor countries could now have access to domestic sources of energy.
 
Methane hydrate estimates throughout Asia are still being determined through further exploration, but initial median estimates place Japan's reserves at 6 trillion cubic meters, China's at 5 trillion cubic meters and India's at 26 trillion cubic meters. Japan was the first nation to establish a methane hydrate program, which it founded in 1995. India formed its national program in 1997, and China and South Korea followed suit later. Since 2006, China, India and South Korea have all led exploratory expeditions that included conducting seismic studies and retrieving core samples to determine the composition of possible reserves.
 






.
 

Japan continues to lead the field, as shown by its recent offshore production testing. Though technologically advanced, Japan lacks many natural resources and so must import the majority of its energy supply. In 2011, it consumed 123 billion cubic meters of natural gas, of which 117 billion cubic meters were imported. Developing a domestic source of energy could restore some of the energy security lost when Japan ceased the majority of its nuclear power production. Japan's imperative to secure energy supplies combined with its technical capabilities may allow it to push forward despite the high economic cost.
 
While initial offshore exploration has occurred near the coast, often within a given country's exclusive economic zone, future exploration will likely continue offshore. This exploration could happen in contentious waters, especially in East Asia. As technology continues to advance, a new dimension to pre-existing territorial frictions could emerge as nations switch from competing for potential resources to actual resources. Exploration for this resource is a tool competing nations could use to claim sovereignty over disputed waters. Whether or not the technical hurdles of extracting methane hydrates are overcome, short- and medium-term exploration efforts could help countries in their attempts to establish a presence in international or disputed waters. Japan's lead in the development of methane hydrate extraction could give it an edge in the competition for future resources in the region.
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Read more: Methane Hydrates and the Potential Natural Gas Boom | Stratfor

[DougMacG]

Just bought gas in the heart of the ND oil boom.  Prices same as at home.  Still need refineries, cars don't run on heavy crude. 

Someone please remind again why Dick Cheney should not have had industry experts advise him on how to meet future energy needs and what the his opponents are using in their tanks.  Harry Potter broom fuel?

[G M]

Unicorns!

[DougMacG]

Famous people reading the forum, we already touched on this: http://dogbrothers.com/phpBB2/index.php?topic=1096.msg69803#msg69803

Former Dem Senator criticizing current Dem policies and threats!

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323478304578329952822121118.html?mod=WSJ_Opinion_LEFTTopOpinion

Natural Gas Exports and the Mythical 'Sweet Spot'
Congressional meddling so warped the market in 1977 that an emergency law was needed to undo the harm.
By J. BENNETT JOHNSTON (former Democratic senator from Louisiana, was chairman of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources from 1986-94.)

"Which brings us back to today's calls for top-down control of the LNG market. Does anyone really think that Congress or the Department of Energy, years in advance, can predict supply and demand or determine which of the 16 applicants can procure the billions of dollars and decades-long contracts necessary to build an LNG export facility?"

"The free market might not always lead to everyone's definition of the sweet spot, but experience has shown that it is a better allocator and regulator than bureaucrats and politicians. We should heed the admonition of Adam Smith that demand begets supply: Allow the free market to allocate the nation's newfound energy bounty."
------
Which party would he join now?

[Crafty_Dog]

By BENOÎT FAUCON, SARAH KENT and HASSAN HAFIDH

The American energy boom is deepening splits within the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, threatening to drive a wedge between African and Arab members as OPEC grapples with a revolution in the global oil trade.

OPEC members gathering on Friday in Vienna will confront a disagreement over the impact of rising U.S. shale-oil production, with the most vulnerable countries arguing that the group should prepare for production cuts to prop up prices if they fall any lower.


"We are heading toward some problems," said a Persian Gulf OPEC delegate.

African OPEC members such as Algeria and Nigeria—which produce oil of similar grade to shale oil—are suffering the worst effects from the North American oil boom. Nigeria Oil Minister Diezani Alison-Madueke deemed U.S. shale oil a "grave concern."

Gulf countries, notably Saudi Arabia, pass relatively unscathed—and are the only OPEC members with the flexibility to cut production. But they are unlikely to let that happen at Friday's meeting, several OPEC delegates said.

That would deepen power struggles that have dominated the organization in recent years. Iran, Venezuela and Algeria, who need high oil prices to cover domestic spending and offset falling production, have regularly clashed with Gulf countries led by Saudi Arabia, who have the financial strength to withstand lower prices.

More

Heard on the Street: East Coasters Drive Down Gasoline Demand
OPEC has overcome past rivalries to rally against an external threat, most notably in 2008 when it agreed to a production cut of more than four million barrels a day to stem a price crash during the financial crisis. But the uneven impact of the North American supply surge makes a collective response—such as a coordinated production cut to support prices—more difficult, said delegates on both sides of the divide.

The U.S. and Canada are set to produce about 21% more oil by 2018 than from this year, according to data from the International Energy Agency.

This marks a historic and largely unexpected reversal. U.S. crude-oil production peaked in 1970 and had declined continuously for more than 20 years when shale oil first began to flow after 2008. U.S. crude production has risen to a 21-year high as hydraulic fracturing, known as fracking, and other technologies have unlocked large resources of oil previously trapped in shale rock in North Dakota and Texas. Shale deposits in other areas, such as Pennsylvania, are yielding mostly natural gas.

OPEC, the source of around one-third of the world's oil, has clearly been taken aback by the shift in U.S. production. In 2010, the organization forecast U.S. and Canadian oil production of 2014 at 11.8 million barrels a day. Just two years later, that forecast had risen to 14.5 million barrels a day.

A rebound in U.S. production would have been unexpected just five years ago because shale oil production requires an oil price that has rarely proved sustainable—typically $70 a barrel or above. But oil prices have remained much higher in the past two years, thanks in part to persistent geopolitical tensions in OPEC producers, such as the Libyan civil war and Persian Gulf tensions.

As U.S. production has grown, exports to the U.S. from three of OPEC's African members, Nigeria, Algeria and Angola, have fallen to their lowest levels in decades, dropping 41% in 2012 from 2011, largely because of shale oil, according to the U.S. Department of Energy. In contrast, Saudi shipments of oil to the U.S. increased 14% in 2012. Saudi Oil Minister Ali al-Naimi said recently that the rise of unconventional energy sources doesn't threaten his country's dominant role in world oil supply because demand also is increasing.

"I don't think anyone should fear new supplies…. The pie is getting bigger, and there is enough to go around," he said.

But the Nigerian oil minister, Ms. Alison-Madueke, sees danger for her country. "Shale oil has been identified as one of the most serious threats for African producers," she said in the U.K. this month. Those producers, she said, could lose 25% of their oil revenue as they are edged out of the U.S.

Nigeria has been hardest hit because its light and low-sulfur crudes compete directly with shale oil, unlike Saudi Arabia's heavier and more sulfurous crude. Other OPEC members who don't serve the U.S. market, such as Iran, are also complaining. Muhammad Ali Khatibi, Iran's envoy to OPEC, told The Wall Street Journal that a combination of rising U.S. shale production and tepid demand is bringing "the price down."

While Saudi Arabia can tolerate lower prices, "there will be some members, like Venezuela, Iran who will struggle at $90," said Amrita Sen, chief oil analyst at London-based Energy Aspects Ltd. The front month Brent contract for July settled at $102.62 a barrel Monday. Venezuela's oil minister said on Monday that he would push for a cut in OPEC production if oil falls below $100 a barrel.

Iran needs high prices to offset the loss of $26 billion of oil revenue last year from tough Western sanctions on its exports, according to estimates from the U.S. Energy Information Administration.

Algeria, which has been rattled by riots over food and housing, needs an oil price of $121 a barrel to cover planned domestic spending—including for roads, jobs and housing—according to the International Monetary Fund.

The country's oil and gas revenue fell by 9% in the first four months of 2012, according to government figures. Algerian Finance Minister Karim Djoudi has said that lower revenue tied to mounting U.S. shale production could force the government to cut domestic spending.

"Cutting subsidies without increasing wages could bring tremendous political animosity," and instability, said Geoff Porter, head of security consultancy North Africa Risk Inc.

OPEC officials said the group is preparing studies to evaluate the impact of U.S. shale oil on demand for its crude. "Definitely, we will review nonconventional shale oil from the U.S.," said Mr. Khatibi, the Iranian envoy.

However, there is no agreement on the size of the challenge. Mr. Khatibi said the North American oil boom has created a global oversupply of 1.5 million barrels a day. Delegates from Gulf nations see the excess at no more than 500,000 barrels a day.

In the past, Saudi Arabia has simply ignored more hawkish members such as Iran and increased oil production when they failed to reach an agreement—as was the case during an acrimonious split two years ago. Saudi Arabia is the only country with sizable flexible production, giving it some influence on prices.

But the group can ill afford new divisions. In 2008, Saudi Arabia was forced to backpedal from a unilateral supply boost after prices crashed by $100 a barrel.

[Crafty_Dog]

The New Prometheus
The domestic energy industry is booming—and driving a U.S. economic revival
By DANIEL YERGIN

When the 'shale gale'—the surge in the production of natural gas trapped in very dense shale rock—first came into public view in 2008, the focus was primarily on the energy and environmental implications. But the past couple of years have brought recognition of shale gas's economic consequences, beginning with major job creation in a time of stubbornly high unemployment. President Barack Obama has repeatedly cited the jobs impact of shale, including in his State of the Union address last year and even in one of his debates with Mitt Romney. At the same time, abundant low-cost energy is stimulating a revival of manufacturing in the U.S. as well as increased American economic competitiveness—as angst-ridden European CEOs will tell you. And the change has come quickly. Shale gas, only 2% of total U.S. natural gas production a decade ago, is now nearly 40%.

Comeback

By Charles R. Morris
PublicAffairs, 179 pages, $12.99


The economic portent of America's unconventional oil-and-gas revolution is at the heart of Charles Morris's "Comeback: America's New Economic Boom." Mr. Morris is the author of a number of books on the U.S. economy and economic history. His most recent, the commendable "The Dawn of Innovation," described the explosive growth that resulted from America's first industrial revolution during the early decades of the 19th century. But it was in 1990, at another time of economic gloom, that Mr. Morris published "The Coming Global Boom," correctly predicting an era of strong economic growth.

Now he is back with a similar argument, namely that "the United States is on the threshold of a long-term economic boom, one that could rival the 1950s-'60s era of industrial dominance." The country, as he sees it, is at a turning point that most people, mired in chronic pessimism, are missing. The source of the boom this time, Mr. Morris says, will be "rising American productivity" and industrial "restructuring" that "has made the United States one of the most desirable manufacturing sites in the world, especially in states like Virginia, Tennessee, Georgia, the Carolinas, and Alabama."

The "manufacturing renaissance" in the U.S. is also fueled by what is happening elsewhere. With industrial wages increasing 15% to 20% per year, China is losing what had been the indubitable edge that transformed it into the workshop of the world. There is also the logistical advantage of manufacturing close to North American markets, especially when transportation costs are added in. All this is giving the U.S. renewed impetus as a manufacturing platform for global exports: Japanese auto makers now build cars in the U.S. for export to Europe; the German engineering conglomerate Siemens SIE.XE -1.38% does the same for gas turbines sold to Saudi Arabia.

But—and this is central to Mr. Morris's argument—what really turbo-charges this American advantage is what he calls "the new X-factor, the American energy advantage," the arrival of low-cost shale gas. Here is the big new chance for American industry. As Mr. Morris puts it, shale gas can be the central pillar of America's coming economic rebound. "Unless something goes horribly wrong," he says, "energy is a game changer." The U.S. and Canada have this ace up their sleeves while, at least at this point, no one else does.

There are other reasons to be optimistic, according to Mr. Morris: The comeback he foresees is bolstered not only by the new availability of inexpensive, abundant energy and the resurgence of manufacturing but also by an uptick in public infrastructure investment and the continuing growth of the health-care sector.

His main focus, however, is the positive economic impact of shale gas. He spends some time on the employment effects. He cites research findings from IHS, a research firm of which I am vice chairman, showing that 1.7 million jobs are currently supported by this unconventional revolution in oil and gas. (That doesn't include the additional jobs resulting from the expansion of manufacturing.) Most of these shale jobs have been created since 2008 and the beginning of the recession. The economic impact of shale, including especially the job numbers, helps explain why public policy has been supportive of shale gas and why state governors focused on economic development are among shale's biggest backers. And the job creation will continue to explode: Mr. Morris argues that this unconventional revolution could support more than four million jobs by the end of this decade.

Mr. Morris adroitly explains the workings of what he calls—no doubt to the alarm of some—"the splendid technology that makes [shale] possible." That is hydraulic fracturing, better known by the now-famous shorthand "fracking." This is the process of injecting water and sand mixed with a small amount of chemicals, under high pressure, to create fractures in rock deep underground that allow gas to flow into the drill hole.

But the author's discussion becomes confusing when he takes on the environmental questions around shale gas. Despite the oft-expressed concerns in the fracking debate about the amount of water used in the process, Mr. Morris points out, such drilling even in gas-rich Texas uses only 1% of the total water consumed in the state. He rightly underlines the importance of properly dealing with the waste water produced from drilling a well, one of the central tasks of proper environmental stewardship. All good, but then he also declares that the most dire portrayal of the environmental risks by anti-fracking critics is "mostly right." Yet then he switches course yet again and concludes that the environmental issues can be managed—although he never really demonstrates that they aren't being managed well in the first place.

Mr. Morris is particularly exercised about "fugitive emissions" of methane from gas production. This is a subject of major debate because methane is 25 times more potent a greenhouse gas than carbon dioxide. Mr. Morris wholeheartedly embraces the view that this is a very big problem, dismissing analysis that indicates that the risks have been greatly overstated. But in April, the Environmental Protection Agency—which had previously expressed much concern on this subject—significantly lowered its estimate of methane emissions owing to an improved understanding of well operations. Further reductions in the estimates will likely result from the prevalence of "green completions" in new wells, which trap methane instead of allowing it to be flared or vented into the atmosphere.

What really bothers Mr. Morris, however, is the possibility that the U.S. might join the ranks of liquefied natural gas (LNG) exporters. This, he says, would not only hijack the low-cost energy opportunity but would also turn the U.S. into "a raw material colony of an Asian industrial juggernaut"—that is to say, relegate the U.S. to the subservient role of provider of cheap energy for rising China.

Actually, he is a little late on that. The "train" (to use the industry word for LNG export facilities) has already left the station. The first new export facility to be permitted by the U.S. Department of Energy will begin exporting around 2016, and two weeks ago a second was approved.

Being a mere raw-material colony would clearly be a bad thing in anybody's book. But Mr. Morris's assertions are a little overheated. Markets themselves will dictate that only a handful of new LNG export facilities will be built in the U.S. There will be a great deal of competition, from present and future suppliers in other countries. As many as five new LNG export facilities are planned just on the west coast of Canada, a country that doesn't have a hang-up about energy exports. The huge new resources of natural gas that have been discovered off the shore of East Africa will also enter the market, and perhaps even the big discoveries off Israel. The U.S. won't be the lowest-cost supplier. The discipline dictated, moreover, by the cost of new projects—ranging from $7 billion to $60 billion—will also limit what gets built.

Mr. Morris's worry about exports reflects his fear that there may not be enough natural gas to go around. But today's natural-gas market is constrained by demand, not supply. Just a few weeks ago, the Potential Gas Committee, a nonprofit affiliated with the Colorado School of Mines and the authoritative source on the nation's gas resources, raised its projection for technically recoverable natural gas supplies in the U.S. by 26%.

When he gets to his third pillar—stepped-up spending on roads, bridges, railways and the like—Mr. Morris makes a compelling case that the U.S. is significantly under-investing in the infrastructure needed to support economic growth. "We now spend," he writes, "half as much on public infrastructure relative to the size of the economy as we did fifty years ago." He points, for example, to the deterioration of the inland waterways that tie the Midwest and its industries together and on which the manufacturing revival will depend. It was too late for his book, but the collapse a week ago of I-5 over the Skagit River in Washington state underscores his warnings about the risks from aging infrastructure, including tens of thousands of "structurally deficient" and "functionally obsolete" bridges around the country. Remedying the widespread infrastructure deficiency through public spending, Mr. Morris predicts, will add fuel to a once-again roaring industrial engine. "Infrastructure financed by borrowing has a long and honorable history in the United States," he writes.

But it is not only lack of such government finance that, in Mr. Morris's view, is holding things up. There is another big constraint: inordinate delay. To make that point, he calls on his own experience: He worked in New York City government 45 years ago trying to get a third water tunnel built for the city. It was supposed to take a decade, but "current expectations are that it will be completed around 2020." That may be an extreme, but it does point to what seems the ever-lengthening time it takes to "get to yes" on major infrastructure projects.

When it comes to health care—another pillar of the comeback—Mr. Morris asks an interesting question: Does it make sense that the purchases of refrigerators, cars and computers are considered positives for economic growth but not any expansion of medical services? He provides his own answer: Health care is a "vibrant industry" that contributes to growth.

In a previous book, "The Surgeons: Life and Death in a Top Heart Center" (2007), Mr. Morris investigated health care by "shadowing an elite cardiac unit" at Columbia-Presbyterian hospital in New York City for most of a year. But how health care fits into his argument in "Comeback" isn't so clear. He wants to build upon the "new Obamacare machinery" to extend "federal bargaining power in setting vendor payments." And he has no doubt as to who are the villains in his health-care narrative. "Doctors," he writes, "increasingly ply their trade within various forms of corporate organizations devoted to exploiting the hallowed fee-for-service payment paradigm by ping-ponging patients between as many diagnostic tests and minor procedures as they can." This seems to be a rather broad brush with which to paint doctors, many of whom are even more confused than the public about how health reform will work and what it will mean for their ability to practice.

Mr. Morris's other big villain is the drug industry. His proof is the hefty dollars in legal settlements between the federal government and drug companies. Yet the size of settlements between the federal government and companies, intent on avoiding litigation and reputation damage, is not necessarily proof of wrongdoing. What all this really has to do with shale gas and manufacturing revivals isn't obvious, and Mr. Morris doesn't persuasively connect these developments.

Overall, "Comeback" captures the major changes set in motion by the unconventional oil and gas revolution. The result, Mr. Morris says, will be higher economic growth and a quickly disappearing federal budget deficit. "Trade and budget deficits will shrink in real terms and cease to dominate the political discourse," he writes. This will in turn change politics: "A vigorously growing economy going into the 2016 election should lock in a liberal ascendancy for a considerable period." To help speed the decline of the deficit, Mr. Morris, who describes himself as an "old-fashioned liberal," calls for moving tax rates up "a good notch," though without addressing the setback that such a "good notch" might mean for the comeback.

There are misfires on facts in the book. Natural-gas prices did not plummet last year due to lack of pipelines. It was primarily because production exceeded demand. In other words, there was a surplus. Here Mr. Morris is confusing natural gas with oil, where the once-famed WTI crude—the West Texas Intermediate—stripped of its place as global benchmark, sells at a discount owing to inadequate pipeline capacity. It is true, as Mr. Morris says, that North Dakota is now the second largest oil-producing state in the country, but it follows not Alaska, as he writes, but Texas. In fact, Alaska, worrying about declining production, is now in fourth place, behind California. Speaking of North Dakota, Mr. Morris glides rather quickly over the significance of the rapid growth in "tight oil" that uses the same technology as shale gas. Yet, with U.S. oil production up 43% since 2008, the impact is no less striking. And more impact is to come.

The contribution of "Comeback" is to cogently lay out the bright economic consequences of the unconventional oil and gas revolution and the revival of manufacturing. Shale gas and tight oil are proving, in ways not expected even a couple of years ago, the fuels of America's comeback. Without them, the economy, instead of gearing up for a comeback, would have been held back even more than it has these past few years.

[DougMacG]

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/telegraph-view/10121584/Wind-power-has-failed-to-deliver-what-it-promised.html

Wind power has failed to deliver what it promised
The wind-power industry is expensive, passes costs on to the consumer and does not create many jobs in return

Today, The Sunday Telegraph reveals how many ''green jobs’’ the wind-power industry really generates in exchange for its generous subsidies. The figures show that for 12 months until February 2013, a little over £1.2  billion was paid out to wind farms through a consumer subsidy financed by a supplement on electricity bills. During that period, the industry employed just 12,000 people, which means that each wind-farm job cost consumers £100,000 [US$ 157,000] – an astonishing figure.
...
Wind farms can end up being surprisingly environmentally unfriendly, too. When the wind does not blow and the turbines fail to do their job, consumers have to fall back on the very fossil fuels that they were designed to replace. The result is that we come to rely on foreign imports of oil and gas that hit the household budget hard (domestic coal stations that ought to supply more of the demand have been closed in order to meet carbon-emission reduction targets). Moreover, wind farms can be a blot on the landscape: the dormant turbines take up large tracts of land and kill wildlife; it is the visual pollution of our beautiful countryside that has led some communities to protest against their presence.

The Government has shown recognition of public concern by announcing that residents will be able to stop the construction of wind farms.  (more at link above)