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Author Topic: Privacy, Big Brother (State and Corporate) and the 4th & 9th Amendments  (Read 84562 times)
Body-by-Guinness
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« Reply #100 on: September 13, 2010, 10:16:18 PM »

Think you are missing some nuance lurking between "security" and "secure in their persons." I'm sorting though some of the links in the piece, but a fundamental question they seem to be circling is "can you be secure in your person if the government can correlate your email, cell phone, purchase history, vehicle, locational, data at their leisure and correlate it as they desire to demonstrate if a crime has been committed?" These days you need to be a secret squirrel type to do so. In the not so distant future it's gonna be possible for just about any police agency to do. When the day comes that they can I think a strong argument can be made that the people will no longer be secure in their persons.
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G M
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« Reply #101 on: September 13, 2010, 10:24:07 PM »

Law enforcement investigations have always been based on the correlating of information. There is a digital element today there wasn't in the past, but aside from the technology/forensic science, homicide investigations today are done much as they were when Jack the Ripper was stalking Whitechapel.
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Crafty_Dog
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« Reply #102 on: September 13, 2010, 10:58:33 PM »

Haven't had a chance yet to read today's posts yet but a preliminary skim indicates they seem worthy of a good focused read.  Indeed, the material therein could well belong on the Constitutional Law thread.  In that regard I would note the 9th Amendment's "all rights not otherwise enumerated etc" and submit the proposition that privacy was/is such an obvious concept that our Founding Fathers saw no need to mention it any more than the right of self-defense.  The analysis I saw proferred that privacy is limited to the 4th (which was the position held by Judge Bork until he was , , , borked) is one with which I disagree for the reasons I just gave.

If someone would like to move/continue this on the Constitutional Law thread we can continue it there.  It IS a very important subject.

Anyway, here's this:
===============

The internet is spying on you

Every time you go online, sophisticated data miners are tracking your every move. What do they know about you?

How to fight back against data miners




How frequently am I followed online?
Constantly. Your computer leaves a unique digital trail every time you visit a website, post a comment on a blog, or add a photo to your Facebook wall. A growing number of companies follow that trail to assemble a profile of you and your affinities. These profiles can contain shocking levels of detail—including your age, income, shopping habits, health problems, sexual proclivities, and ZIP code—right down to the number of rooms in your house and the number of people in your family. Although trackers don’t identify their subjects by name, the data they compile is so extensive that “you can find out who an individual is without it,” says Maneesha Mithal of the Federal Trade Commission.

How does the technology work?
The moment you land on a website, it installs a unique electronic code on your hard drive. Owners of websites originally placed “cookies,” the simplest such codes, on computers for users’ convenience, in order to remember things like the contents of online shopping carts. But a cookie placed by one site can also serve as a tracking device that allows marketers to identify an individual computer and follow its path on every Web visit. It’s like a clerk who sells you a pair of jeans at one store, then trails you around the mall, recording every store you visit and every item of clothing you try on. “Beacons” are super-cookies that record even computer keystrokes and mouse movements, providing another layer of detail. “Flash cookies” are installed when a computer user activates Flash technology, such as a YouTube video, embedded on a site. They can also reinstall cookies that have been removed. Such “persistent cookies,” says Marc Rotenberg of the Electronic Privacy Information Center, make it “virtually impossible for users to go online without being tracked and profiled.”

Who’s doing the spying?
Marketers, advertisers, and those whose businesses depend on them. Most websites install their own cookies and beacons, both to make site navigation easier and to gather user information. (Wikipedia is a rare exception.) But third parties—advertisers and the networks that place online ads, such as Google and iAds—frequently pay site hosts to install their own tracking technology. Beacons are even sometimes planted without the knowledge of the host site. Comcast, for example, installed Flash cookies on computers visiting its website after it accepted Clearspring Technologies’ free software for displaying slide shows. Visitors who clicked on a slide show at Comcast.com wound up loading Clearspring’s Flash cookies onto their hard drives, which Comcast said it had never authorized.

How is personal data used?
It’s collected and sold by companies like Clearspring. Such information can be sold in large chunks—for example, an advertiser might pay $1 for 1,000 profiles of movie lovers—or in customized segments. An apparel retailer might buy access to 18-year-old female fans of the Twilight movie series who reside in the Sunbelt. “We can segment it all the way down to one person,” says Eric Porres of Lotame, which sells these profiles. Advertisers use the profiles to deliver individualized ads that follow users to every site they visit. Julia Preston, a 32-year-old software designer from Austin, recently saw how this works firsthand when she started seeing lots of Web ads for fertility treatments. She had recently researched uterine disorders online. “It’s unnerving,” she says.

Is all this snooping legal?
So far, yes. While an e-commerce site can’t sell to third parties the credit card numbers it acquires in the course of its business, the legality of various tracking technologies—and the sale of the personal profiles that result—has never been tested in court. Privacy advocates say that’s not because there aren’t abundant abuses, but because the law hasn’t kept pace with advancing technology. “The relevant laws,” says Lauren Weinstein of People for Internet Responsibility, an advocacy group, “are generally so weak—if they exist at all—that it’s difficult to file complaints.”

Can you avoid revealing yourself online?
Aside from abandoning the Internet altogether, there’s virtually no way to evade prying eyes. Take the case of Ashley Hayes-Beaty, who learned just how exposed she was when The Wall Street Journal shared what it had learned about her from a data miner. Hayes-Beaty’s computer use identified her as a 26-year-old female Nashville resident who counts The Princess Bride and 50 First Dates among her favorite movies, regularly watches Sex and the City, keeps current on entertainment news, and enjoys taking pop-culture quizzes. That litany, which advertisers can buy for about one-tenth of a cent, constitutes what Hayes-Beaty calls an “eerily precise” consumer profile. “I like to think I have some mystery left to me,” says Hayes-Beaty, “but apparently not.”

 

There are ways to minimize your exposure to data miners. One of the most effective is to disrupt profile-building by clearing your computer browser’s cache and deleting all cookies at least once a week. In addition, turning on the “private browsing” feature included in most popular Web browsers will block tracking technologies from installing themselves on your machine. For fees ranging from $9.95 to $10,000, companies like ReputationDefender can remove your personal information from up to 90 percent of commercial websites. But it’s basically impossible to eradicate personal information, such as property records and police files, from government databases. “There’s really no solution now, except abstinence” from the Internet, says Lt. Col. Greg Conti, a computer science professor at West Point. “And if you choose not to use online tools, you’re really not a member of the 21st century.”
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Body-by-Guinness
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« Reply #103 on: September 27, 2010, 08:56:52 AM »

U.S. Wants to Make It Easier to Wiretap the Internet
By CHARLIE SAVAGE
WASHINGTON — Federal law enforcement and national security officials are preparing to seek sweeping new regulations for the Internet, arguing that their ability to wiretap criminal and terrorism suspects is “going dark” as people increasingly communicate online instead of by telephone.

Essentially, officials want Congress to require all services that enable communications — including encrypted e-mail transmitters like BlackBerry, social networking Web sites like Facebook and software that allows direct “peer to peer” messaging like Skype — to be technically capable of complying if served with a wiretap order. The mandate would include being able to intercept and unscramble encrypted messages.

The bill, which the Obama administration plans to submit to lawmakers next year, raises fresh questions about how to balance security needs with protecting privacy and fostering innovation. And because security services around the world face the same problem, it could set an example that is copied globally.

James X. Dempsey, vice president of the Center for Democracy and Technology, an Internet policy group, said the proposal had “huge implications” and challenged “fundamental elements of the Internet revolution” — including its decentralized design.

“They are really asking for the authority to redesign services that take advantage of the unique, and now pervasive, architecture of the Internet,” he said. “They basically want to turn back the clock and make Internet services function the way that the telephone system used to function.”

But law enforcement officials contend that imposing such a mandate is reasonable and necessary to prevent the erosion of their investigative powers.

“We’re talking about lawfully authorized intercepts,” said Valerie E. Caproni, general counsel for the Federal Bureau of Investigation. “We’re not talking expanding authority. We’re talking about preserving our ability to execute our existing authority in order to protect the public safety and national security.”

Investigators have been concerned for years that changing communications technology could damage their ability to conduct surveillance. In recent months, officials from the F.B.I., the Justice Department, the National Security Agency, the White House and other agencies have been meeting to develop a proposed solution.

There is not yet agreement on important elements, like how to word statutory language defining who counts as a communications service provider, according to several officials familiar with the deliberations.

But they want it to apply broadly, including to companies that operate from servers abroad, like Research in Motion, the Canadian maker of BlackBerry devices. In recent months, that company has come into conflict with the governments of Dubai and India over their inability to conduct surveillance of messages sent via its encrypted service.

In the United States, phone and broadband networks are already required to have interception capabilities, under a 1994 law called the Communications Assistance to Law Enforcement Act. It aimed to ensure that government surveillance abilities would remain intact during the evolution from a copper-wire phone system to digital networks and cellphones.

Often, investigators can intercept communications at a switch operated by the network company. But sometimes — like when the target uses a service that encrypts messages between his computer and its servers — they must instead serve the order on a service provider to get unscrambled versions.

Like phone companies, communication service providers are subject to wiretap orders. But the 1994 law does not apply to them. While some maintain interception capacities, others wait until they are served with orders to try to develop them.

The F.B.I.’s operational technologies division spent $9.75 million last year helping communication companies — including some subject to the 1994 law that had difficulties — do so. And its 2010 budget included $9 million for a “Going Dark Program” to bolster its electronic surveillance capabilities.

Beyond such costs, Ms. Caproni said, F.B.I. efforts to help retrofit services have a major shortcoming: the process can delay their ability to wiretap a suspect for months.

Moreover, some services encrypt messages between users, so that even the provider cannot unscramble them.

There is no public data about how often court-approved surveillance is frustrated because of a service’s technical design.

But as an example, one official said, an investigation into a drug cartel earlier this year was stymied because smugglers used peer-to-peer software, which is difficult to intercept because it is not routed through a central hub. Agents eventually installed surveillance equipment in a suspect’s office, but that tactic was “risky,” the official said, and the delay “prevented the interception of pertinent communications.”

Moreover, according to several other officials, after the failed Times Square bombing in May, investigators discovered that the suspect, Faisal Shahzad, had been communicating with a service that lacked prebuilt interception capacity. If he had aroused suspicion beforehand, there would have been a delay before he could have been wiretapped.

To counter such problems, officials are coalescing around several of the proposal’s likely requirements:

¶ Communications services that encrypt messages must have a way to unscramble them.

¶ Foreign-based providers that do business inside the United States must install a domestic office capable of performing intercepts.

¶ Developers of software that enables peer-to-peer communication must redesign their service to allow interception.

Providers that failed to comply would face fines or some other penalty. But the proposal is likely to direct companies to come up with their own way to meet the mandates. Writing any statute in “technologically neutral” terms would also help prevent it from becoming obsolete, officials said.

Even with such a law, some gaps could remain. It is not clear how it could compel compliance by overseas services that do no domestic business, or from a “freeware” application developed by volunteers.

In their battle with Research in Motion, countries like Dubai have sought leverage by threatening to block BlackBerry data from their networks. But Ms. Caproni said the F.B.I. did not support filtering the Internet in the United States.

Still, even a proposal that consists only of a legal mandate is likely to be controversial, said Michael A. Sussmann, a former Justice Department lawyer who advises communications providers.

“It would be an enormous change for newly covered companies,” he said. “Implementation would be a huge technology and security headache, and the investigative burden and costs will shift to providers.”

Several privacy and technology advocates argued that requiring interception capabilities would create holes that would inevitably be exploited by hackers.

Steven M. Bellovin, a Columbia University computer science professor, pointed to an episode in Greece: In 2005, it was discovered that hackers had taken advantage of a legally mandated wiretap function to spy on top officials’ phones, including the prime minister’s.

“I think it’s a disaster waiting to happen,” he said. “If they start building in all these back doors, they will be exploited.”

Susan Landau, a Radcliffe Institute of Advanced Study fellow and former Sun Microsystems engineer, argued that the proposal would raise costly impediments to innovation by small startups.

“Every engineer who is developing the wiretap system is an engineer who is not building in greater security, more features, or getting the product out faster,” she said.

Moreover, providers of services featuring user-to-user encryption are likely to object to watering it down. Similarly, in the late 1990s, encryption makers fought off a proposal to require them to include a back door enabling wiretapping, arguing it would cripple their products in the global market.

But law enforcement officials rejected such arguments. They said including an interception capability from the start was less likely to inadvertently create security holes than retrofitting it after receiving a wiretap order.

They also noted that critics predicted that the 1994 law would impede cellphone innovation, but that technology continued to improve. And their envisioned decryption mandate is modest, they contended, because service providers — not the government — would hold the key.

“No one should be promising their customers that they will thumb their nose at a U.S. court order,” Ms. Caproni said. “They can promise strong encryption. They just need to figure out how they can provide us plain text.”

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/27/us/27wiretap.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1&th&emc=th
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G M
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« Reply #104 on: September 27, 2010, 09:46:26 AM »

What? Domestic al qaeda cells could no longer be sure their Skype conference calls are secure?  Outrageous!!!!   rolleyes
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Body-by-Guinness
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« Reply #105 on: September 27, 2010, 10:24:51 AM »

Yeah, and those technical mavens in federal law enforcement get to tell private sector businesses what kind of holes they have to build into their networks at their expense. Nothin' could go wrong there.
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G M
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« Reply #106 on: September 27, 2010, 11:10:58 AM »


http://www.askcalea.net/

Question: What is the purpose of CALEA?

Answer:

The purpose of CALEA is to preserve the ability of law enforcement to conduct electronic surveillance in the face of rapid advances in telecommunications technology. Further details can be found at H.R. Rep. No. 103-827, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.(1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3489

Question: Who must be CALEA-compliant?

Answer:

All telecommunications carriers as defined by Section 102(Cool of CALEA.  Basically, this includes all entities engaged in the transmission or switching of wire or electronic communications as a common carrier for hire.

Question: What is "call-identifying information?"

Answer:

Section 102(2) of CALEA defines call-identifying information as "dialing or signaling information that identifies the origin, direction, destination, or termination of each communication generated or received by a subscriber by means of any equipment, facility, or service of a telecommunications carrier."

Question: What is "call content?"

Answer:

Defined in 18 U.S.C. 2510(Cool it is an intercept "when used with respect to any wire or electronic communications, includes any information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that communications."

Question: What is a "safe harbor" under CALEA?

Answer:

Section 107(a)(2) of CALEA contains a "safe harbor" provision, stating that "[a] telecommunications carrier shall be found to be in compliance with the assistance capability requirements under Section 103, and a manufacturer of telecommunications transmission or switching equipment or a provider of telecommunications support services shall be found to be in compliance with Section 106 if the carrier, manufacturer, or support service provider is in compliance with publicly available technical requirements or standards adopted by an industry association or standard-setting organization, or by the FCC under subsection (b), to meet the requirements of Section 103."

Question: What CALEA responsibilities do telecommunications equipment manufacturers have?

Answer:

Under CALEA, a manufacturer of telecommunications transmission or switching equipment and a provider of telecommunications support services shall, on a reasonably timely basis and at a reasonable charge, make available to the telecommunications carriers using its equipment, facilities, or services such features or modifications as are necessary to permit such carriers to comply with the assistance capability requirements and the capacity requirements.

The FBI has implemented a reimbursement strategy that will allow many telecommunications carriers to receive CALEA software at no charge for certain high priority switching platforms. Under nationwide right-to-use (RTU) license agreements, the Government pays for the development of CALEA software solutions for certain high priority switching platforms. This allows carriers to receive CALEA software at a nominal charge for equipment, facilities, or services installed or deployed now and in the future.

To date, the FBI has signed agreements with AG Communications Systems, Lucent Technologies, Motorola, Nortel Networks, and Siemens AG for technical solutions developed to meet the assistance capability requirements of CALEA.  When considered in total, these agreements result in software solutions being available for the vast majority of law enforcement's priority, pre-January 1, 1995 switches.

Frequently Misunderstood Questions

On March 17, 2004, we published a press release regarding our joint petition.

Q: Does the petition for CALEA rulemaking propose to apply CALEA to all types of online communication, including instant messaging and visits to websites?

A: No. The petition proposes CALEA coverage of only broadband Internet access service and broadband telephony service. Other Internet-based services, including those classified as "information services" such as email and visits to websites, would not be covered.

Q: Does the petition propose extensive retooling of existing broadband networks that could impose significant costs?

A: No. The petition contends that CALEA should apply to certain broadband services but does not address the issue of what technical capabilities those broadband providers should deliver to law enforcement. CALEA already permits those service providers to fashion their own technical standards as they see fit. If law enforcement considers an industry technical standard deficient, it can seek to change the standard only by filing a special "deficiency" petition before the Commission. It is the FCC, not law enforcement, that decides whether any capabilities should be added to the standard. The FCC may refuse to order a change in a standard on many different grounds. For example, a capability may be rejected because it is too costly. Therefore CALEA already contains protections for industry against paying undue compliance costs.


Q: Did law enforcement ask the FCC to curtail its usual review process to implement the petition?

A: No. Law enforcement asked the FCC to give the proposed rulemaking expedited treatment. Such treatment is often requested and granted when urgent matters are brought to the FCC's attention. Some FCC rulemaking proceedings can take years to complete. Law enforcement believes expedited treatment is warranted in this case based on evidence that terrorists, criminals, and/or spies are already exploiting the networks of broadband communication providers to evade lawful electronic surveillance.

Q: Is Law enforcement trying to dictate how the Internet should be engineered to permit whatever level of surveillance law enforcement deems necessary?

A: No. Law enforcement does not seek the power to dictate how the Internet should be engineered or even to decide how broadband communications networks should be engineered. As explained above, CALEA already allocates those decisions to industry and any resulting capability disputes between industry and law enforcement are decided by the FCC. Moreover, the level of surveillance is not an issue raised in the petition, is not within the scope of CALEA, and is not decided by law enforcement. Based on a statute known as "Title III," before a law enforcement agent or officer is permitted to engage in lawful electronic surveillance, he or she must seek an appropriate court order from a judge or magistrate. Only if a judicial order is issued can the lawful surveillance take place, and the level of surveillance is prescribed by the order.


Q: Does the petition ignore the letter or spirit of CALEA's "information services" exemption by seeking to apply CALEA to such services?

A: No. The petition notes that CALEA contains a definition of "telecommunications carrier" that is different from and broader than the definition of that term in the Communications Act, which governs most FCC actions. The petition therefore asks the FCC to decide the scope of CALEA coverage based on the CALEA definition, not the Communications Act definition. As a result, some carriers classified as "information service" providers for purposes of the Communications Act would be simultaneously deemed "telecommunications carriers" for purposes of CALEA.

Q: Would the petition force carriers to decode data that might be encrypted?

A: No. The petition does not raise the issue of encryption. That issue is already addressed by CALEA. The statute states that if encryption is provided by a telecommunications carrier and the carrier possesses the information necessary to decrypt the communication, it must decrypt the communications subject to an order for lawful interception. But if the encryption is provided by a subscriber or customer, the carrier is not responsible for decrypting the targeted communications.
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Body-by-Guinness
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« Reply #107 on: September 27, 2010, 11:16:36 AM »

And here's CATO's initial take. Hadn't heard that Greek and Chinese exploits are thought to have initiated through suveilance designed portals:

Designing an Insecure Internet

Posted by Julian Sanchez

If there were any doubt that the 90s are back in style, witness the Obama administration’s attempt to reignite the Crypto Wars by seeking legislation that would force Internet services to redesign their networks and products to provide a centralized mechanism for decrypting user communications. It cannot be stressed enough what a radical—and terrible—idea this is.  I’ll be writing on this at greater length this week, but a few quick points.

First, while the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) already requires phone and broadband providers to build in interception capacity at their network hubs, this proposed requirement—at least going on the basis of the press description, since there’s no legislative text yet—is both broader and more drastic. It appears that it would apply to the whole panoply of online firms offering secure communication services, not just big carriers, imposing a greater relative burden. More importantly, it’s not just mandating that already-centralized systems install a government backdoor. Rather, if I understand it correctly, the proposal would insist on a centralized (and therefore less secure) architecture for secure communications, as opposed to an end-to-end model where encryption is handled client-side. In effect, the government is insisting on the right to make a macro-design choice between competing network models for thousands of companies.

Second, they are basically demanding that providers design their systems for breach. This is massively stupid from a security perspective.  In the summer of 2004, still unknown hackers exploited surveillance software built in to one of Greece’s major cell networks to eavesdrop on high government officials, including the prime ministers. The recent hack of Google believed to originate in China may have used a law-enforcement portal to acquire information about dissidents. More recently, we learned of a Google engineer abusing his access to the system to spy on minors.

Third, this demand has implications beyond the United States. Networks designed for interception by U.S. authorities will also be more easily tapped by authoritarian governments looking to keep tabs on dissidents. And indeed, this proposal echoes demands from the likes of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates that their Blackberry system be redesigned for easier interception. By joining that chorus, the U.S. makes it more difficult for firms to resist similar demands from unlovely regimes.

Finally, this demand highlights how American law enforcement and intel agencies have been circumventing reporting requirements designed to provide information on this very problem. As the Crypto Wars of the 90s drew to a close, Congress amended the Wiretap Act, which creates strong procedural protections when the government wants to use intrusive electronic surveillance, to add a requirement that agencies report each instance in which they’d encountered encryption.  The idea was to get an objective measure of how serious a problem this posed. The most recent report, however, cited only one instance in which encryption was encountered, out of 2,376 wiretap orders. Why, then, are we now being told encryption is a huge problem? Almost certainly because law enforcement and intelligence agencies aren’t using the Wiretap Act to intercept electronic communications—preferring, instead, to avail themselves of the far more lax standards—and spare reporting requirements—provided by the Stored Communications Act.  It’s always easier to claim you need sweeping new powers from Congress when you’ve managed to do an end-run around the provisions Congress put in place to keep itself informed about how you’re using your existing powers, after all.

http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/designing-an-insecure-internet/
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G M
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« Reply #108 on: September 27, 2010, 11:50:50 AM »

More importantly, it’s not just mandating that already-centralized systems install a government backdoor. Rather, if I understand it correctly, the proposal would insist on a centralized (and therefore less secure) architecture for secure communications, as opposed to an end-to-end model where encryption is handled client-side. In effect, the government is insisting on the right to make a macro-design choice between competing network models for thousands of companies.

**Uh, no, not according to the first article you posted.**

Essentially, officials want Congress to require all services that enable communications — including encrypted e-mail transmitters like BlackBerry, social networking Web sites like Facebook and software that allows direct “peer to peer” messaging like Skype — to be technically capable of complying if served with a wiretap order. The mandate would include being able to intercept and unscramble encrypted messages.
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G M
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« Reply #109 on: September 27, 2010, 11:59:29 AM »

http://www.fcc.gov/pshs/services/calea/

CALEA COMPLIANCE - SOME BASIC INFORMATION

Pursuant to CALEA, industry is generally responsible for setting CALEA standards and solutions. Unless a party files a special petition pursuant to CALEA section 107(b), the Commission does not get formally involved with the compliance standards development process. CALEA also does not provide for Commission review of manufacturer-developed solutions. Entities subject to CALEA are responsible for reviewing the Commission's regulations and analyzing how this regulation applies per their specific network architecture.

A telecommunications carrier may comply with CALEA in different ways. First, the carrier may develop its own compliance solution for its unique network. Second, the carrier may purchase a compliance solution from vendors, including the manufacturers of the equipment it is using to provide service. Third, the carrier may purchase a compliance solution from a trusted third party (TPP). See CALEA Second Report and Order at para. 26. To contact TPPs, carriers may conduct an Internet search using such key words as "CALEA compliance" and "CALEA compliance help," or any combination that will yield a display of TPPs.

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Body-by-Guinness
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« Reply #110 on: September 27, 2010, 01:58:08 PM »

Quote
First, the carrier may develop its own compliance solution for its unique network.

Which impacts the little guys a lot more than the big, statist, companies.

What do you make of the claim that out of 2,376 wiretap orders, only one had to contend with encryption? Are we inventing a lot of infrastructure to deal with a rare occurrence?
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G M
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« Reply #111 on: September 27, 2010, 02:12:42 PM »

If it's not much of an issue at the moment (If), how long do we wait after it's determined to be an issue?

Do you see any problem requiring a telecommunication provider to able to comply to a lawfully issued title III warrant?
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Body-by-Guinness
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« Reply #112 on: September 27, 2010, 02:18:41 PM »

Nope. Just don't like bureaucrats building in unsecure backdoors into stuff that have been exploited already. Actually expect the NSA already has this stuff well in hand, the question is now how far down the law enforcement food chain these capabilities creep.
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G M
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« Reply #113 on: September 27, 2010, 02:28:40 PM »

If this legislation works as CALEA has in the past, it's not a matter of bureaucrats building a backdoor into systems, just requiring the telecom provider to be able to comply with a title III warrant.
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Crafty_Dog
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« Reply #114 on: October 05, 2010, 11:16:58 AM »

In a landmark 1967 case, the Supreme Court ruled that evidence from a wiretap on a phone booth was obtained unconstitutionally. Despite the public nature of a phone booth, the tap violated the defendant’s privacy under the Fourth Amendment. “Wherever a man may be,” the court explained, “he is entitled to know that he will remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures.”

Fast forward to today, when courts are wrestling with the question of whether new technology requires them to think differently about what is a reasonable expectation of privacy.

In August, three judges on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia (two conservatives, one liberal) ruled unanimously — and correctly — that police violated the Constitution when they hid a GPS device on a person’s car and tracked his every move without a valid warrant. That person, Antoine Jones, was convicted of conspiracy to distribute crack and cocaine based on the tracking of his Jeep for four weeks.

The way to define what was reasonable for Mr. Jones to regard as private, the court said, is by focusing on what was unreasonable for law enforcement to consider public. “The whole of one’s movements over the course of a month is not constructively exposed to the public,” Judge Douglas Ginsburg said, adding that it “reveals an intimate picture of the subject’s life that he expects no one to have — short perhaps of his spouse.”

Last week, the Justice Department asked the whole court to rehear the case. The government relies heavily on one precedent. In 1983, the Supreme Court said it was legal for police to use a beeper without a warrant to track a suspect on public roads. The argument was dubious: The suspect’s movements were visible and anyone could have gleaned what the police did without the beeper’s help, so he had no reasonable expectation of privacy.

The government now contends that replacing the beeper with a GPS makes no difference because surveillance of Mr. Jones was on public roads as well. Two other appeals courts in the past three years have accepted that argument. In one, the opinion was written by Richard Posner, among the most respected federal judges.

He got it wrong. Judge Ginsburg got it right: “The difference is not one of degree but of kind.” He also said that, in the Supreme Court case, the justices “distinguished between the limited information discovered by use of the beeper — movements during a discrete journey — and more comprehensive or sustained monitoring.” The justices left for another day whether 24/7 surveillance should be regulated by another legal principle.

That day is here. Digital technology raises questions about differences between cyberspace and the physical world, which most search-and-seizure laws deal with. In showing why a powerful advance in technology calls for significantly greater protection of privacy, the three-judge panel provided an important example of how the law can respond to new circumstances.
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DougMacG
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« Reply #115 on: October 05, 2010, 12:50:17 PM »

Tracking the movement of a crack dealer by law enforcement makes perfect sense... except for that small detail, 'without a warrant'.

Whatever the police reasons were, they needed to run it by a judge first, otherwise they could be tracking any one of us on suspicion rather than probable cause. 
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G M
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« Reply #116 on: October 05, 2010, 01:31:04 PM »

Ok, you are are a LEO tasked with counterterrorism duties. A friendly european law enforcement agency tips you to a resident of your city. They believe that the individual in question is running multiple AQ cells in both the US and europe. They either do not have or are not willing to share the evidence that makes them believe this. How do you get a warrant to place this person under surveillance?
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Body-by-Guinness
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« Reply #117 on: October 05, 2010, 02:31:06 PM »

We don't! We throw out the Bill of Rights and go all Jack Bauer on his a$$!

What did I win?  grin
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G M
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« Reply #118 on: October 05, 2010, 02:37:37 PM »

Be sure to let me know when you come up with a valid argument.
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G M
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« Reply #119 on: October 05, 2010, 02:45:22 PM »

**Oh look, a case that was initiated by a tip from the brits. No throwing out of the bill of rights or Jack Bauer antics required to make a case. I bet lots of surveillance by the FBI was involved, however.**

Department of Justice
Office of Public Affairs
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Tuesday, October 27, 2009
Two Chicago Men Charged in Connection with Alleged Roles in Foreign Terror Plot That Focused on Targets in Denmark

Two Chicago men have been arrested on federal charges for their alleged roles in conspiracies to provide material support and/or to commit terrorist acts against overseas targets, including facilities and employees of a Danish newspaper that published cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed in 2005, federal law enforcement officials announced today. There was no imminent danger in the Chicago area, officials said, adding that the charges are unrelated to recent terror plot arrests in Boston, New York, Colorado, Texas and central Illinois.

The defendants charged in separate criminal complaints unsealed today in U.S. District Court in Chicago are David Coleman Headley, 49, and Tahawwur Hussain Rana, 48, also known as Tahawar Rana, announced Patrick J. Fitzgerald, U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, and Robert D. Grant, Special Agent-in-Charge of the Chicago Office of the FBI. The complaints remained under seal temporarily after the defendants’ arrests, with court approval, so as not to compromise further investigative activity.

Headley, a U.S. citizen who changed his name from Daood Gilani in 2006 and resides primarily in Chicago, was arrested on Oct. 3, 2009, by the Chicago FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) at O’Hare International Airport before boarding a flight to Philadelphia, intending to travel on to Pakistan. He was charged with one count of conspiracy to commit terrorist acts involving murder and maiming outside the United States and one count of conspiracy to provide material support to that overseas terrorism conspiracy.

Rana, a native of Pakistan and citizen of Canada who also primarily resides in Chicago, was arrested on Oct. 18, 2009, at his home by federal agents. Rana is the owner of several businesses, including First World Immigration Services, which has offices on Devon Avenue in Chicago, as well as in New York and Toronto. He was charged with one count of conspiracy to provide material support to a foreign terrorism conspiracy that involved Headley and at least three other specific individuals in Pakistan.

Both men have been held in federal custody since each was arrested. If convicted, Headley faces a maximum sentence of life imprisonment for conspiracy to murder or maim persons abroad, while Headley and Rana each face a maximum of 15 years in prison for conspiracy to provide material support to terrorism.

On Oct. 18, 2009, JTTF agents executed search warrants in connection with the investigation at four locations: Headley’s and Rana’s residences on the north side of Chicago, Rana’s immigration business in Chicago, and a farm he owns in Kinsman, Ill., approximately 80 miles southwest of Chicago, which is used to provide halal meat for Muslim customers, as well as a grocery store in Chicago.

According to both complaints, since at least late 2008 until Oct. 3, 2009, as part of the conspiracy to murder and maim persons abroad, Headley allegedly identified and conducted surveillance of potential targets of a terrorist attack in Denmark on two separate trips to Denmark in January and July 2009, and reported and attempted to report on his efforts to other conspirators in Pakistan. As part of the conspiracy to provide material support to terrorism, Rana allegedly helped arrange Headley’s travels overseas and conceal their true nature and purpose to surveil potential terror targets overseas, and discussed potential targets for attack with Headley.

Headley allegedly reported and attempted to report on his overseas surveillance to other conspirators, according to the affidavits, including:

Ilyas Kashmiri, identified as the operational chief of the Azad Kashmir section of Harakat-ul Jihad Islami (HUJI), a Pakistani-based terrorist organization with links to al Qaeda. Kashmiri, who is presently believed to be in Waziristan in the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) region in northwestern Pakistan, issued a statement this month that he was alive and working with al Qaeda;

"Individual A" (who is identified as Individual A in the Headley affidavit and as Individual B in the Rana affidavit), who is associated with Kashmiri, as well as with Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), another Pakistani-based terrorist organization;

an individual identified as "Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A" (LeT Member A), who has substantial influence and responsibility within the organization and whose identity is known to the government.

"The public should be reassured that there was no imminent danger in the Chicago area. However, law enforcement has the duty to be vigilant to guard against not just those who would carry out attacks here on our soil but those who plot on our soil to help carry out violent attacks overseas. I wish to express my deep appreciation to the FBI agents and other members of the Joint Terrorism Task Force for their extremely hard work on this matter," said Mr. Fitzgerald.

"The criminal complaints unsealed today have exposed a serious plot against overseas targets by two Chicago-based men working with Pakistani-based terrorist organizations.  Information developed during this investigation was shared with our foreign partners as we worked together to mitigate these threats. This case is a reminder that the threat posed by international terrorist organizations is global in nature and requires constant vigilance at home and abroad," said David Kris, Assistant Attorney General for National Security.

"This investigation demonstrates the well-established relationships that we have with our law enforcement partners, both foreign and domestic. We work closely with state, local and federal law enforcement agencies in the United States, as well as with our overseas partners, to identify and disrupt threats here and abroad," said Mr. Grant.

According to the affidavits in both cases, Headley at times has claimed to be a consultant with or representative of Rana’s business, First World Immigration Services, but appears to perform little if any actual work for the business. In addition, Headley’s apartment in Chicago is leased to an individual who is deceased. Despite his apparent lack of financial resources and substantial employment, Headley has traveled extensively since the second half of 2008, including multiple trips to Pakistan and various countries in Europe. Postings to an internet group for graduates of a military school in the Pakistani town of Hasan Abdal (a group that refers to itself as "abdalians"), reflect that both Rana and Headley have participated in the group and referred to their attendance at that school.

The Denmark Project

Beginning in late 2008, Headley corresponded extensively with Individual A and LeT Member A regarding what they referred to in coded communications as the "Mickey Mouse Project," "mmp," and "the northern project," according to the affidavit. The Mickey Mouse Project allegedly involved planning for one or more attacks at facilities and employees of Morgenavisen Jyllands-Posten, a Danish newspaper that in 2005 published cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammed, to which many Muslims took great offense. In October 2008, Headley allegedly posted a message to the "abdalians" internet discussion group stating that "I feel disposed towards violence for the offending parties," referring to the Danish cartoonists and others who he identified "as making fun of Islam."

Using coded language, Rana, Headley, Individual A and LeT Member A allegedly have referred to this plot, as well as discussions of other targets, as "investments," "projects," "business," and "action," and have described their hopes for success both in terms of receiving religious awards, as well as getting "rich," "richer," and making "profit." Between August 2008 and Dec. 7, 2008, Headley sent multiple email messages from internet addresses located in Karachi and Lahore in Pakistan, the charges allege. On Dec. 7, 2008, just before traveling from Pakistan to the United States that same day, Headley alleged used one of multiple email accounts to store a detailed list of items for himself, which he titled "Mickey Mouse." Included on the list (contained in the affidavits) were the following items:

Route Design (train, bus, air)

Cross (Cover Authenticator)

Trade? Immigration?

Ad? (Lost Luggage) (Business) (Entry?)

Kings Square (French Embassy)

...

Counter surveillance (magic eye)

...

Security (armed)?

In January 2009, Headley traveled to Copenhagen, Denmark, and Rana allegedly arranged portions of his travel. During the trip, Headley allegedly visited two different offices of the Jyllands-Posten — in Copenhagen and Arhus, Denmark. The Copenhagen office is located in Kings Square near the French Embassy. Headley falsely told Jyllands-Posten employees that he was visiting on behalf of First World Immigration Services, which he said was considering opening offices in Denmark and might be interested in advertising the business in the newspaper. While in Denmark, Headley instructed Rana to be alert for an email from a Jyllands-Posten sales representative, and to ask First World’s Toronto and New York offices to "remember me," in case a newspaper representative called. According to the complaints, Rana corresponded from Chicago with a representative of the Jyllands-Posten by email in which he pretended to be Headley.

After visiting Denmark, Headley traveled to Pakistan to meet with Individual A. During this visit, Headley traveled with Individual A to Pakistan’s FATA region and met with Kashmiri. Before returning to Chicago in June 2009, Headley sent his will to Rana and Rana responded by sending a coded message establishing a new email account, the complaint alleges.

In July and August 2009, Headley exchanged a series of emails with LeT Member A, including an exchange in which Headley asked if the Denmark project was on hold, and whether a visit to India that LeT Member A had asked him to undertake was for the purpose of surveilling targets for a new terrorist attack. These emails reflect that LeT Member A was placing a higher priority on using Headley to assist in planning a new attack in India than on completing the planned attack in Denmark. After this time, Headley and Individual A allegedly continued focusing on the plan with Kashmiri to attack the newspaper, rather than working with LeT, the complaint alleges.

In late July 2009, Headley traveled again to Copenhagen and to other locations in Europe, and Rana again arranged portions of his travel. When Headley returned to the United States, he falsely told border inspectors that he was traveling on business as a representative of First World Immigration, although his luggage contained no papers or other documents relating to First World.

After returning to Chicago in August 2009, Headley allegedly used coded language to repeatedly inquire if Individual A had been in touch with Kashmiri regarding planning for the attack, and expressing concern that Individual A’s communications with Kashmiri had been cut off. In early September 2009, Headley and Rana took a lengthy car ride during which they discussed the activities of the other individuals, including past terrorist acts, and Headley discussed with Rana five actions involving targets that expressly included "Denmark." In conversations with Rana and Individual A in August and September 2009, Headley indicated that if the "doctor" (alleged to be a reference to Kashmiri) and his people were unable to assist, then Headley would perform the planned operation himself.

In September 2009, after initial press reports indicated that Kashmiri had been killed in a drone attack in Pakistan, Headley and Individual A allegedly had a series of coded conversations in which they discussed the reports of Kashmiri’s death and what it meant for the projects they were planning. Individual A sought to reassure and encourage Headley, telling him, among other things, that "[t]his is business sir; these types of things happen." On Sept. 20, 2009, Headley allegedly told a family member words to the effect that he had spoken to Rana and they agreed that "business must go on."

In a Sept. 21, 2009, telephone conversation, Individual A indicated to Headley that Kashmiri was alive and "doing well." In a subsequent conversation on Sept. 30, 2009, Individual A again assured Headley that Kashmiri, whom he referred to as "Pir Sahib," was "absolutely all right" and had not gotten "married," which was code for being killed. Headley asked Individual A if it was possible to now have a meeting with Kashmiri and Individual A responded that Kashmiri "just today, was asking about you" (Headley).

According to the affidavit, Headley stated in conversations last month that he intended to travel to Pakistan in early October to meet with Individual A and Kashmiri, and he was arrested on Oct. 3 as he prepared to board a flight from Chicago to Philadelphia, intending to travel on to Pakistan. During a search of Headley’s luggage, a memory stick was recovered that contained approximately 10 short videos of Copenhagen, including video focused on the Jyllands-Posten building in King’s Square taken both during the day and night, as well as a nearby Danish military barracks and the exterior and interior of Copenhagen’s central train station, consistent with the checklist he stored which mentioned "route design." In addition, Headley had an airline reservation, allegedly made by Rana, to fly from Atlanta to Copenhagen on Oct. 29, 2009.

The investigation is continuing and is being conducted by the Chicago FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force, with particular assistance from the Chicago Police Department, the Illinois State Police and the Department of Homeland Security.

The prosecution is being handled by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Daniel Collins and Vicki Peters from the Northern District of Illinois, with assistance from the Counterterrorism Section of the Justice Department’s National Security Division.

The public is reminded that a criminal complaint contains mere allegations that are not evidence of guilt. The defendants are presumed innocent and are entitled to a fair trial at which the government has the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
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G M
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« Reply #120 on: October 05, 2010, 03:51:54 PM »

**See, here is how it works: Law enforcement gets a tip to criminal activity. This tip is NOT probable cause. It may be valid, it may not. So you watch the suspects, looking for evidence of a crime or crimes. If you find sufficient evidence of a crime to reach the level of probable cause, you can THEN get search/arrest warrants.**

http://www.times-herald.com/Local/Four-arrested--money-cash-vehicles-guns-seized-during-drug-raid-1094161

Four arrested; money, cash, vehicles, guns seized during drug raid

By Alex McRae

The Times-Herald

Weeks of undercover surveillance paid off Sunday afternoon when a raid on a Highway 16 East residence by members of the Coweta Crime Suppression Unit resulted in four drug-related arrests and the seizure of weapons, vehicles, cash and methamphetamine valued at $300,000, according to Maj. James Yarbrough of the Coweta County Sheriff's Office.

"We've been watching these suspects for a while," Yarbrough said, "Sunday afternoon it finally paid off. We're glad to get these drugs off the street."

Members of the Crime Suppression Unit had been watching the residence at 3395 Highway 16 E. in Sharpsburg for more than two months, according to Sgt. Pat Lyons of the CSU.

Three individuals resided at the home: Charles Robert Stroup, 46; Stroup's daughter, Kassandra Lee Stroup, 23; and Karen Lanell Cary, 37, described as Charles Stroup's girlfriend.

The surveillance began after authorities received an anonymous tip that led them to believe drug-related activities were taking place. Heavier than normal vehicle traffic was observed during the surveillance, and CSU officers were able to get a search warrant issued for probable cause before Sunday's bust and seizure.
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Body-by-Guinness
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« Reply #121 on: October 05, 2010, 05:00:23 PM »

Quote
Be sure to let me know when you come up with a valid argument.

Wow, a valid argument for respecting the Bill of Rights as envisioned by the Constitution's Framers. Hmm, I'll have to think on that.
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G M
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« Reply #122 on: October 05, 2010, 05:06:44 PM »

Please point out the part of the constitution that forbids police from surveilling suspects to determine if there is evidence of a crime.
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G M
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« Reply #123 on: October 05, 2010, 05:48:20 PM »

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Van Clark SHERMAN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 92-30067.

 7

C. The district court admitted a videotape of the drug transaction which occurred on a mountain pass near Helena, Montana. Although Sherman wasn't present at the transaction, and therefore wasn't featured in the tape, he argues the surveillance violated the Fourth Amendment and the Electronic Communication Privacy Act of 1986 (Title I). Sherman's Title I claim fails, because Title I doesn't regulate silent domestic video surveillance. United States v. Koyomejian, 970 F.2d 536, 540-41 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 617 (1992). Such surveillance is, however, subject to the dictates of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 541.
8

Although the parties frame the question as Sherman's ability to assert the privacy rights of his coconspirators who appear in the videotape, we don't decide the standing issue because we conclude none of them had a reasonable expectation of privacy. The transaction took place in plain view in a public place along a highway. Everything that was captured by the camera could just as easily have been seen by a person hiding in the trees where the camera was located. "Videotaping of suspects in public places ... does not violate the fourth amendment; the police may record what they normally may view with the naked eye." United States v. Taketa, 923 F.2d 665, 677 (9th Cir.1991); cf. United States v. Broadhurst, 805 F.2d 849, 855-56 (9th Cir.1986) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in translucent greenhouse, because activities are observable by planes and helicopters).
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G M
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« Reply #124 on: October 05, 2010, 07:14:52 PM »

UNITED STATES, Petitioner
v.
Leroy Carlton KNOTTS.

No. 81-1802.

Argued Dec. 6, 1982.

Decided March 2, 1983.

Having reason to believe that one Armstrong was purchasing chloroform to be used in the manufacture of illicit drugs, Minnesota law enforcement officers arranged with the seller to place a "beeper" (a radio transmitter) inside a chloroform container that was sold to Armstrong. Officers then followed the car in which the chloroform was placed, maintaining contact by using both visual surveillance and a monitor which received the beeper signals, and ultimately tracing the chloroform, by beeper monitoring alone, to respondent's secluded cabin in Wisconsin. Following three days of intermittent visual surveillance of the cabin, officers secured a search warrant and discovered the chloroform container, and a drug laboratory in the cabin, including chemicals and formulas for producing amphetamine. After his motion to suppress evidence based on the warrantless monitoring of the beeper was denied, respondent was convicted in Federal District Court for conspiring to manufacture controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the monitoring of the beeper was prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.

Held: Monitoring the beeper signals did not invade any legitimate expectation of privacy on respondent's part, and thus there was neither a "search" nor a "seizure" within the contemplation of the Fourth Amendment. The beeper surveillance amounted principally to following an automobile on public streets and highways. A person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements. While respondent had the traditional expectation of privacy within a dwelling place insofar as his cabin was concerned, such expectation of privacy would not have extended to the visual observation from public places of the automobile arriving on his premises after leaving a public highway, or to movements of objects such as the chloroform container outside the cabin. The fact that the officers relied not only on visual surveillance, but on the use of the beeper, does not alter the situation. Nothing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting their sensory faculties with such enhancement as science and technology afforded them in this case. There is no indication that the beeper was used in any way to reveal information as to the movement of the chloroform container within the cabin, or in any way that would not have been visible to the naked eye from outside the cabin. Pp. 280-285.
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DougMacG
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« Reply #125 on: October 05, 2010, 11:47:56 PM »

Going back a couple of steps in this argument... I wrote regarding the placing of a GPS device on a crack dealer that they should get a warrant, with probable cause, "otherwise they could be tracking any one of us on a suspicion... "

GM replied with a question relating to counter-terrorism.  But I am with GM on that.  Whether by Patriot Act or new legislation if needed, I support going further to prevent an act like blowing up a city, than we would under criminal law or defendant rights.  The loophole in the 4th is the word "unreasonable" searches and seizures.  I posted previously that if I had dialed by accident or inadvertently bumped into one of bin Laden's henchmen I would expect and welcome the idea that some federal surveillance might be on me until my good name and the misunderstanding got cleared up. 

Preventing a crack deal from taking place doesn't rise to that level.  Probable cause seems like a fitting test to authorize a hidden device planted on the subject of a tip or suspicion, as you would need to enter their home.

Reading the US v. Knotts appeal at http://cases.justia.com/us-court-of-appeals/F2/662/515/416444/ I found: "On February 28, 1980, Minnesota agents delivered to the Hawkins Chemical Company a can of chloroform in which a beeper had been placed with the company's consent." The authorities were following a product they corrupted with permission, as it changed hands a couple of times to a suspected illegal use, not directly tracking a person under suspicion. I'm not sure how that that affected the decision but 'with the company's consent' seemed to be a relevant point in the facts. 

US v. Knotts is supportive of GM's argument to a point but I can't say I agree with the decision if it truly means the right to plant a GPS tracking device on a citizen without probable cause.

I wonder how a beeper of 1980, presumably a short range device of limited accuracy, compared with "using binoculars to enhance your field of vision" is analogous to planting a GPS device for satellite and computer based tracking indefinitely, based on (any?) 'reason to believe', short of probable cause. Assume I am found to be innocent, who owns the device hidden on me, do they sneak in again and take it back, inform me I am no longer under suspicion, or leave it on me for others to track me?  Does it contain metal and go off when I enter the airport or government center?  Did I have a reasonable expectation of that?  Or will they use the GPS that was required to be implanted in my phone for (reasonable expectation of) 911 services only.

Likewise with On-Star.  The listening device is already planted in the vehicle and it transmits over public airwaves.  The courts I believe require a warrant issued before the provider will switch on the listening capability for law enforcement. Even in all my attempts to be law abiding, I think still I will stay away from that technology.

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G M
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« Reply #126 on: October 06, 2010, 08:13:34 AM »

Doug,

The relevant aspects of the caselaw that I posted are that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in public areas. Just as a cat can look at a king, so can a cop. Using technological devices to assist in viewing the subject in public areas is no different than an agency like the FBI using teams of surveillance specialists and aircraft to track a suspect's movements through public spaces.
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Body-by-Guinness
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« Reply #127 on: October 06, 2010, 09:14:58 AM »

As stated repeatedly, I have no problem with "retail" policing, that is policing where probable cause goes before a judge, a warrant is issued, terms abided by, and so on. What I object to is wholesale privacy invasions such as tracking locational data, data mining, camera surveillance, etc. where harvested data is put together to establish probable cause rather than some prerequisite act being required to enable the invasions of privacy outlined above.

As to the scenario that's lead to this thread, I expect you are acquainted with instances where information provided by a snitch has proved to be false; your pal Radley Balko has documented a lot of instances where incorrect or overstated drug "tips" have lead to shooting injuries and deaths. Information, moreover, can also be wrong with no malevolent intent involved. It really ought to take more that a few whispers to subject an American citizen to the kinds of scrutiny that can be unleashed these days, and it scares me greatly that the closeted Marxists at the helm today have access to surveillance tools that have been shown to have been casually applied by others.
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G M
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« Reply #128 on: October 06, 2010, 09:51:20 AM »

As stated repeatedly, I have no problem with "retail" policing, that is policing where probable cause goes before a judge, a warrant is issued, terms abided by, and so on. What I object to is wholesale privacy invasions such as tracking locational data, data mining, camera surveillance, etc. where harvested data is put together to establish probable cause rather than some prerequisite act being required to enable the invasions of privacy outlined above.

**Crimes, especially ongoing criminal conspiracies are often covertly structured to avoid scrutiny. By your standard, unless the mafia is leaving a body in your front yard, they should be ignored by law enforcement. Right?**

As to the scenario that's lead to this thread, I expect you are acquainted with instances where information provided by a snitch has proved to be false;

**Yes, which is why you INVESTIGATE any allegations made of criminal acts. This is why you are required to corroborate the information given by an informant and seek evidence of criminal acts to be presented to a judge to obtain a search/arrest warrant.**

 your pal Radley Balko has documented **You mean distorted/exaggerated/falsified**


a lot of instances where incorrect or overstated drug "tips" have lead to shooting injuries and deaths. Information, moreover, can also be wrong with no malevolent intent involved.

**Again, this is why you INVESTIGATE. People do supply incorrect information to police, sometimes with ill intent, sometimes by honest error. Either way, as as a LEO, you are morally/legally/ethically required to perform an investigation in a fair and impartial manner, which will ultimately be strictly scrutinized by a judge and jury.**

It really ought to take more that a few whispers to subject an American citizen to the kinds of scrutiny that can be unleashed these days

**It does. People that knowingly provide false information to law enforcement are usually criminally charged themselves. Major case investigations are costly in time, money and resources and all these are in especially short supply these days. They aren't undertaken lightly, and certainly not without corroboration of the initial complaint.**


, and it scares me greatly that the closeted Marxists at the helm today have access to surveillance tools that have been shown to have been casually applied by others.
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Body-by-Guinness
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« Reply #129 on: October 08, 2010, 11:33:52 AM »

Quote
**Crimes, especially ongoing criminal conspiracies are often covertly structured to avoid scrutiny. By your standard, unless the mafia is leaving a body in your front yard, they should be ignored by law enforcement. Right?**

That's silly and you ought to know it. My concern is with wholesale invasions of privacy that hope to net criminals or information about their crimes when filtering through all the data. There is no way of knowing what is scooped up by wholesale operations--as I keep pointing out--won't be used inappropriately down the line. Despots have a long history of doing just that.

Quote
**Crimes, especially ongoing criminal conspiracies are often covertly structured to avoid scrutiny. By your standard, unless the mafia is leaving a body in your front yard, they should be ignored by law enforcement. Right?**

Yet one doesn't have to look too hard to find instances where investigated information leads to an incorrect door being kicked in.

Quote
**You mean distorted/exaggerated/falsified**

Others disagree. List members are invited to make up their own minds viewing the data shown here: http://www.cato.org/raidmap/

Quote
**Again, this is why you INVESTIGATE. People do supply incorrect information to police, sometimes with ill intent, sometimes by honest error. Either way, as as a LEO, you are morally/legally/ethically required to perform an investigation in a fair and impartial manner, which will ultimately be strictly scrutinized by a judge and jury.**

Yet as the map above attests, investigations lead to bad results. Or don't municipalities regularly pay out for wrongful deaths and injuries resulting from police activity?

I don't think we will ever resolve this disagreement between us GM, so I'm not sure how much more energy I'll put in to trying. You ultimately think that political administrations and the LEOs they hire can be trusted with fairly easy access to broad tools that are incredibly invasive, while I can't find a time in history where that kind of power wasn't grossly misused on a wholesale level. I hope you are right, and fear that I am.

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G M
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« Reply #130 on: October 08, 2010, 11:59:34 AM »

You can't un-invent technology. If a government is oppressive, exactly how will some law or policy regarding the use of technology stop it from doing so?



Yet one doesn't have to look too hard to find instances where investigated information leads to an incorrect door being kicked in.


And there are civil and criminal liabilities related to the incorrect door being kicked in. Aside from the structural disincentives already present, what else would you do? To have a rule of law, laws must be enforced.



Others disagree. List members are invited to make up their own minds viewing the data shown here: http://www.cato.org/raidmap/


Note that the website you link to is the creation of Radley Balko, who will not let the truth get in the way of his anti-law enforcement agenda.

Or don't municipalities regularly pay out for wrongful deaths and injuries resulting from police activity?

In our litigious society, it's often the strategy to pay to settle suits rather than litigate them, no matter how much the suit might lack merit.




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Crafty_Dog
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« Reply #131 on: October 08, 2010, 12:03:20 PM »

GM, BBG:

Although your conversation may be without resolution, for me it most certainly has merit and I hope the two of you will continue.  There is much for the rest of us to learn from it.

The Adventure continues!
Marc
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G M
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« Reply #132 on: October 08, 2010, 01:49:28 PM »

http://patterico.com/2009/07/29/balko-utterly-demolishes-a-few-arguments-that-jack-dunphy-and-i-never-made/

Oh look, Radley Balko not letting the truth get in the way of his agenda. Shocking.
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Body-by-Guinness
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« Reply #133 on: October 08, 2010, 04:44:41 PM »

Quote
You can't un-invent technology. If a government is oppressive, exactly how will some law or policy regarding the use of technology stop it from doing so?

Straw man as I'm not arguing for that. Rather I'm arguing that invasive technologies only be applied in an accountable, retail manner rather than in a poorly accountable wholesale manner. We don't know what laundry the NSA sifts through. We do know the FBI is applying the Patriot Act in a manner that most citizens and most assuredly this nation's founders would take issue with. This trend is one worth resisting.

Quote
And there are civil and criminal liabilities related to the incorrect door being kicked in. Aside from the structural disincentives already present, what else would you do? To have a rule of law, laws must be enforced.

The argument grows circular here. You posit robust surveillance tools are required by law enforcement. I rejoin that these tools are ones that could be easily misused. You reply that rigorous rules and oversight prevent that from occurring. I bring up instances where that was not the case. You want to know what I'd suggest instead. I respond that strict accountability, retail rather than wholesale use, and a strong civil libertarian ethic would greatly reduce the chance of misuse. Alas, a strong civil libertarian ethic prevents police from using all the tools in the box when they want to and the circle starts again.

Quote
In our litigious society, it's often the strategy to pay to settle suits rather than litigate them, no matter how much the suit might lack merit.

Or stonewall when plenty of merit is there. I've already mentioned the Maryland mayor who was mistakenly raided, his dogs shot, while his head, his wife's and his mother's got kneeled on. That police chief is still swearing up and down that he'd make the same decisions if the same set of circumstances presented themselves today. Fool. Then there is a case in Sunrise, Florida where a police department that sounds pretty shady by several accounts I've read shot and killed a guy who had just fallen asleep after his restaurant shift. A small amount of marijuana was recovered, the informant he made the dead guy sound like a big dealer sounds pretty shady, while discovery has been thwarted at every turn. But hey, we live in the day of Google; click on one of the dots on the map then sniff around for yourself. Bet it wont take too long for most list member to find a case that makes them shake their head in disgust.

Quote
Oh look, Radley Balko not letting the truth get in the way of his agenda. Shocking.

Wow, and peeps who warble at each other on the internets disagree when quoting the other. Will wonders never cease?

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G M
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« Reply #134 on: October 08, 2010, 05:03:46 PM »

The reason we know that some FBI agents haven't complied with the required documentation in some cases? Because the DOJ OIG investigated and published it's findings. I'm pretty sure that's what you would call oversight.

Exactly what surveillance tools are you objecting to?

The FBI works lots of public corruption cases. If there are indications of corrupt law enforcement agencies, they often get lots of attention from the feds. The NOPD springs to mind as an example.

Radley Balko uses inflammitory press clippings in the same way gun control groups do. Ohhhh, that gun is an "assault rifle" because it has a flash hider and folding stock! Oh, that Mini-14 is ok because it has a wooden stock. There is no legal difference between a LEO in a class b uniform, BDUs and external vest or "soft clothes". Graham v. Connor is still the legal standard for the use of force, no matter what a LEO is wearing or what use of force tools are used.

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DougMacG
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« Reply #135 on: October 08, 2010, 05:59:50 PM »

Like Crafty expressed, I am enjoying the contention (in a sort of painful way) between our rights to be left alone and our rights to have crime and corruption rooted out as necessary.

I am thankful for a couple of stings the FBI did within Minneapolis City Hall a few years back that shook up some of the corruption that festers when you have single party rule.  I am thankful for 19 al Qaida related arrests they made before I had to do with any of these people on a tenant application, though I know none of the facts so far.  I am thankful the IRS, after a couple of swings at me, determined that I am mostly a law abiding citizen and definitely a small fish unworthy of very much of their time.  They can be far more abusive than local police or FBI IMO.  I am thankful that my own small town on the outskirts of the metro has never had a rape, murder, abduction or armed robbery that i know of.  Leaves our fraction of a LEO very free to observe lumens from taillights and important matters like that.

Most of what is wrong in this country has to do with excessive laws, not excessive enforcement.  Little things like saying the houses have to be the same height and the same distance from the street piss me off more than current drug dealer and murder investigation techniques.

Every new law passed and every GPS bug planted, judge or no judge, should be with the understanding that most of us are innocent and want to be left alone.
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G M
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« Reply #136 on: October 08, 2010, 07:50:30 PM »

I can tell you that as someone that has spent the vast majority of my adult life working in some aspect of the criminal justice system, the vast majority of men and women in law enforcement are good people who go out to do the right thing for the right reasons.
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G M
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« Reply #137 on: October 08, 2010, 08:22:33 PM »

Doug,

A lot of seriously bad people get arrested as the result of traffic stops for very minor traffic offenses. If you look at the stats for wanted felons arrested every year, state troopers tend to have the highest rates. Not because of special units that chase wanted felons, but sheer numbers of traffic stops. The more contacts, the better your odds of grabbing someone who really needs to go into custody. Dirtbags tend to not maintain their cars, stolen vehicles often have certain tell-tale signs as well. So living in a place where the local cops do lots of traffic tends to deter the criminal element from that area.
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G M
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« Reply #138 on: October 08, 2010, 08:47:07 PM »

http://americansecurityproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/Foiled-Plots.pdf

Key Findings
There is no silver bullet for thwarting terrorist attacks. Few of the terror plots thwarted after 9/11 were disrupted using a single, clearly identifiable method. Many of the plots were discovered through a combination of happenstance, allowing authorities to take advantage of what were, in essence, lucky breaks; diligent police work; foreign law enforcement cooperation; civilian-provided intelligence; and other means, none of which can be clearly identified as having been the most critical to thwarting an attack. Since it is difficult to determine objectively what has prevented terrorist attacks since 9/11, attempts to state definitively which piece of information or counterterrorism measure led to the disruption of a given terrorist network or plot must be treated with a degree of skepticism.
Post-9/11 counterterrorism measures—including the PATRIOT Act and amended FISA surveillance provisions, unlawful combatant designations, indefinite detentions, and the use of torture techniques—have been instrumental in thwarting attacks in only a small number of cases. There has been considerable speculation that post-9/11 counterterrorism provisions have been instrumental in preventing many or all of the terrorist attacks thwarted since 9/11.3 This report finds,

however, that the law enforcement techniques, detention and interrogation procedures, and legislative measures adopted after 9/11 demonstrably contributed to thwarting attacks in only five cases, or less than one-sixth of the total number of foiled attacks. The fact that intelligence and law enforcement officials often closely guard specific details of counterterrorism investigations makes it impossible to definitively claim that the use of techniques and legal provisions enacted after 9/11 has not contributed significantly to a larger number of post-9/11 counterterrorism successes. It is also critical to note, however, that there has been little clear evidence demonstrating that they have. In March 2009, for example, FBI director Robert Mueller stated that roving wiretaps had been obtained 147 times after 9/11.4 However, authorities identified roving wiretaps as having been used to disrupt only one terrorist plot.

Counterterrorism investigations leading to thwarted attacks have drawn heavily on traditional law enforcement techniques. A plurality of the post-9/11 terrorist plots were disrupted using traditional law enforcement techniques—specifically physical surveillance, undercover agents, and confidential informants—to obtain information on terror suspects and their attack plans. Though in some cases these techniques have been modified to take into account new developments in communication technology (e.g., monitoring internet chat rooms and jihadist websites), the techniques employed in the majority of thwarted attacks have been in keeping with those used in criminal investigations before 9/11.

Citizens’ vigilance and luck have played a fairly significant role in thwarting attacks. In approximately 21% of the cases examined, civilians’ proactive involvement (either through direct action or provision of intelligence) and simple happenstance that worked to the authorities’ advantage were significant factors in plots being discovered or disrupted. This does not suggest that direct or indirect civilian action can or should be relied upon as a means of thwarting attacks. Nor does it imply that successful counterterrorism is primarily a matter of luck. It does, however, underscore the complex range of factors and circumstances that contribute to preventing attacks and the danger inherent in uncritically reducing counterterrorism successes to an explicit validation of any one policy or tool.

International cooperation remains vital. In several cases foreign intelligence and law enforcement cooperation—including the provision of intelligence and making arrests—was instrumental in dismantling terror plots. Though this is hardly a new phenomenon, Umar Farouk Abdumutallab’s use of international transfer points to reach his final attack site highlights the increasing importance of international cooperation when terrorist conspirators live, plan, and operate in multiple international jurisdictions where the United States might have a limited presence or reach. Cooperation has also become especially important in light of the fact that terrorists increasingly conspire to attack targets in the United States and abroad simultaneously, as with the attempted liquid explosives attack and Dhiren Barot’s multiple international plots. This trend underscores the importance of making real-time communication and deconfliction of national and agency priorities paramount.
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G M
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« Reply #139 on: October 10, 2010, 01:13:08 AM »

http://www.fletc.gov/training/programs/legal-division/podcasts/hot-issues-podcasts/hot-issues-transcripts/gps-tracking-transcript.html

Miller: How else might GPS be help to a law enforcement officer? I mean, could they track people with it?

Hodges: Yeah, and I think that’s the thrusts of where we want to go. And here’s how tracking works. Officers can take a GPS receiver and covertly attach it to a vehicle. The receiver is set up to at particular, pre-set, pre-determined intervals. It calculates its location and remembers it. That data is recorded and then later on the officers can download that information from the device, put it on a computer and display when and where the vehicle was. It can even show a vehicles particular route, speed and the life.

More sophisticated installations are going to have equipment that will immediately translate the location through a cell phone on another wireless connection and officers can stand back and live track the vehicle either through a notebook computer that receives a cell phone signal or I’ve seen set ups where officers back in their offices or maybe even cross country can all track the same vehicle at the same time and we call that live tracking.

Miller: It’s got to have some limitations; it can’t be all perfect.

Hodges: Nothings perfect and there are both technical and some legal implications. Now obviously the departments are going to have to obtain the equipment and I recommend that they get proper training from the manufacture on how to use it. There’s also a course at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center called the Covert Electronic Tracking Program and you can go to the same FLETC website without the legal part and you can sign up for that course or get information about it.

Another limitation with GPS is that current technology requires that satellite antenna or the GPS satellite antenna be exposed, so it’s able to see the sky. If it can’t see the sky, it can’t get a satellite signal. If the receiver, or more accurately, if the receiver antenna’s at a place where it can’t do that like a parking garage or a heavily forested area then GPS won’t work or if it does it’s going to be severally limited.

Miller: There’s also there’s got to be some legal implications.

Hodges: There always is. It’s our friend the 4th Amendment that comes back again. It’s all about REP, reasonable expectations of privacy. I think the easiest way to look at this is to have somebody who wants to do a GPS installation and use it for tracking, that officer should ask himself or herself three questions. First, do I need to intrude into a REP area to get to the vehicle to install the equipment? Second question is do I need to intrude into the vehicle’s REP to install the equipment? And the third question is will the officer be tracking a vehicle as it moves into a REP area? So, if the answer to any of those three questions is yes, then we are going to need a warrant. If the answer to all three of those questions is no, then we don’t need a warrant.

Before we get too far into the details, let me say that this Podcast deals with federal law. State law can differ and some of the differences are outlined in that webpage article that we talked about earlier.

Miller: Well let’s take a look at that first question, location of the vehicle at the time of the installation. Tell me a little bit about that.

Hodges: Well you and Jenna Solari have covered this already in your 4th Amendment Podcast series. And the way it goes is this; if the vehicle is located in an area where there’s REP, such as on a curtilage, the officers are going to need a warrant to get into the REP area to install the equipment. On the other hand, if the vehicle is parked out on a public road, a parking garage or even a road in a gated community there is no intrusion into REP to get that to the um vehicle.

I would add that most federal cases hold that there is no REP in ordinary driveways leading up to a residence, but I would certainly recommend an officers speak to their AUSA before doing an warrant less installation on a vehicle that’s parked in an owners driveway.

Miller: Okay, let’s look at that second question, now REP on the vehicle.

Hodges: Right. In some cases all the GPS tracking equipment can be installed on the exterior of the vehicle and we’re not having to intrude in the vehicle’s interior or the trunk or taping into the vehicle’s wiring. In that case there is no intrusion into a REP area because there’s no REP as to the exterior of a vehicle. If officers do have to go into interior of the vehicle or the trunk or tap into the vehicle’s wiring, they we are going to have an intrusion into a REP area and then a warrant is going to be required.

Miller: Now you told me that you can use this GPS system to actually track the vehicle. Correct?

Hodges: That’s right.

Miller: Talk to me about this, this third issue location of the vehicle in terms of where it might move.

Hodges: Now, federal law does not require a warrant to GPS monitor a vehicle as it moves over public roads and highways. If you are going to go tracking in public roads or highways I should say if you’re going to track in a REP area then a warrant is required. Usually this last factor isn’t very important in GPS tracking and that’s because GPS doesn’t work indoors and most REP areas for a vehicle is going to be in some covered area like a garage or a large warehouse complex. If you get into RF tracking that would be a different matter but we’re not talking about RF tracking today, we’re just talking about GPS.

Miller: Okay, you covered a lot of information. Can you, can you review these three questions please?

Hodges: Yep, I think that’s a good idea. First question is do I need to intrude into a REP area to get to the vehicle to install the equipment? Second, do I need to intrude into the vehicle’s REP to install the equipment; and third, will the officer be tracking the vehicle as it moves into a REP area? And again the math on this is pretty simple. If the answer to all of the questions is no, then under federal law I don’t need a warrant. If the answer to any of the three questions is yes, then I am going to going to need a warrant.

Miller: Hey, does Title III wire taps have anything to do with this tracking device?

Hodges: Tim, it doesn’t. In fact, Title III specifically excludes tracking devices from its coverage.
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DougMacG
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« Reply #140 on: October 10, 2010, 03:05:44 PM »

GM, This article is very helpful to understand their thinking and the criteria they use.  It answers one of my questions regarding the planting of the device.  I disagree slightly with their thinking.

If my private car is parked in a public location or close to the street in my driveway and someone without permission is seen climbing under it to attach something to it, pipe bomb, etc,  my reasonable expectation is that if law enforcement saw them, attaching, removing, tampering, whatever, they would arrest them, not be the ones planting or removing the device.

Planting a device and capturing (partially) private data goes IMO way beyond the comparison in the court case to aiding physical vision with binoculars.  In the case of Knotts/Armstrong, the FBI in fact planted the device with permission to the supplier and it was the supplier of the chemical that betrayed the trust of the suspect in the interest of preventing his product from being used for criminal activity.  Personally I see a distinction though I couldn't tell if the court did.

To the layman it seems like a small but important step to go from convincing the chief of police or FBI superviser, that a specific crime is so likely (probable) that it 'warrants' such a bold action, to convincing a judge of probable cause.  The difference is a tighter legal standard and having the review done by a somewhat neutral third party.
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G M
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« Reply #141 on: October 10, 2010, 03:11:59 PM »

Law enforcement officers are empowered to do things that others are not. A non-LEO cannot serve a search warrant/arrest warrant or obtain a title III warrant to wiretap a suspects phone or drive a vehicle far in excess of posted limits legally.
« Last Edit: October 10, 2010, 03:18:19 PM by G M » Logged
G M
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« Reply #142 on: October 10, 2010, 03:23:49 PM »

http://volokh.com/2009/12/13/does-the-fourth-amendment-prohibit-warrantless-gps-surveillance/

IV. Why the Knotts/Karo Line Is a Reasonable One

Some readers may be thinking, “But wait, Knotts is wrong!” As a result, they may want the courts to do anything that helps limit Knotts or even plant the seeds of its overruling. That raises the more fundamental question of whether the future Supreme Court should stick with Knotts/Karo or adopt a different rule.

To answer this, it help to see Knotts and Karo as examples of a recurring question of Fourth Amendment law: How to adapt the inside/outside distinction in light of new technologies? As I argue in this article, the inside/outside distinction is the basic building block of the Fourth Amendment. Surveillance of open spaces does not trigger the Fourth Amendment, while surveillance that breaks into enclosed spaces does. This dividing line ordinarily gives the government the power to investigate open spaces but not enclosed ones. The key question is how or whether to apply this line when technology changes: If technology allows greater surveillance, should the Supreme Court move the Fourth Amendment line accordingly? Karo and Knotts update the old line in a way that retains the basic inside/outside distinction. The cases look to whether the information collected reveals information about the inside of the home or what is happening outside, treating the locating device as a virtual person who either enters the home or stays outside it.

I think that’s a reasonable choice, as it aims for technology neutrality. It’s the basic approach I advocate in applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet. It’s not perfect, of course. In my view, it should also be supplemented by statutory privacy laws to regulate the use of GPS devices, much like existing statutory privacy law presently regulates location information for cell phones. Statutory privacy laws have the advantage of flexibility: They could adopt a mid-level standard such as “reasonable suspicion” to regulate GPS surveillance and deter abuses, something that is much harder to get from the Fourth Amendment (which ordinarily requires a warrant).

Finally, if you reject Knotts and the inside/outside line, you need to come up with a replacement. It’s easy to say that you think the Fourth Amendment should regulate GPS surveillance. But it’s much harder to come up with a general view as to how the Fourth Amendment should regulate public surveillance and then situate the case of GPS within it. It’s not impossible, but it’s much harder. It’s especially difficult for a group of Justices to agree on another line that could operate with a reasonable degree of clarity in a range of cases over time. So while Knotts/Karo do not provide the only line the Court could follow, I think they do offer a reasonable one.
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G M
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« Reply #143 on: October 10, 2010, 03:36:08 PM »

**Should law enforcement engage in proactive terrorism investigations or wait to do post-blast investigations?**

http://abcnews.go.com/US/fbi-arrests-terrorists-sting-operations-dallas-springfield/story?id=8666300

The FBI concluded two sting operations in the last two days that culminated with the arrests of a pair of terrorism suspects who believed they would be blowing up buildings in Dallas and Springfield, Ill.

Although not connected, officials say the FBI and Justice Department had to coordinate the timing of the two cases so that arrests would not cause suspects to get cold feet with their intention to conduct their operations.

Today, shortly after noon in Dallas, FBI agents swooped in on Hosam Maher Husein Smadi, who allegedly placed what he believed to be explosives in a car bomb near Fountain Place in downtown Dallas. Smadi, 19, a resident of Italy, Texas, is a citizen of Jordan and was in the U.S. illegally.

FBI agents became aware of Smadi on Internet chat rooms. According to an FBI affidavit filed by Thomas Petrokowski, head of a counterterrorism squad in the FBI's Dallas field office, "Smadi stood out, based on his vehement intention to actually conduct terror attacks in the United States."

Just 24 hours earlier, FBI agents in Springfield, Ill., arrested and charged Michael Finton with attempted murder, after he planted what he thought was a one-ton bomb outside Springfield's federal courthouse. Finton, aka Talib Islam, drove a van that he believed was carrying nearly a ton of explosives and parked it in front of the courthouse. Then, the FBI says, Finton "got out of the van," according to court documents and jumped into another car and dialed a cell phone to remotely detonate the bomb.

Finton's arrest was a sting operation, the explosives were fake. Finton was arrested and has been appointed a lawyer from the federal defenders office in Springfield. In Washington Thursday, David Kris, the assistant attorney general for the National Security Divsion, said of Finton's case, "Fortunately, a coordinated undercover law enforcement effort was able to thwart his efforts and ensure no one was harmed,"

Suspect Monitored on Internet Vowing Attacks

On chat rooms and jihadist Internet forums, Smadi consistently stated his commitment to attacks and violent jihad. According to the affidavit, after Smadi repeated these comments, an FBI undercover employee made contact with the young Jordanian and had about 10 communications with him. "During those interactions, Smadi made clear his intention to serve as a solider for [Osama] bin Laden and [al Qaeda], and to conduct violent jihad," according to the FBI affidavit.
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DougMacG
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« Reply #144 on: October 11, 2010, 09:29:34 AM »

The techniques that I would consider reasonable to extract information from a known terrorist to disrupt a planned, major terror act are far too graphic to post on this family friendly site.  I would distinguish anything to do with mass murder, genocide or suicide bombing from the rules of criminal law enforcement as we once knew it.  Besides the casualties of the act and the terror infliction on society, it is not possible to punish the suicide bomber after the fact.
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G M
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« Reply #145 on: October 15, 2010, 06:28:19 PM »

http://www.technologyreview.com/blog/editors/25891/?p1=A4

Note that this is all private industry.
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Crafty_Dog
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« Reply #146 on: October 23, 2010, 12:38:08 AM »

Telegraph UK: Every Email And Website To Be Stored By Brit Government

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
' Every email, phone call and website visit is to be recorded and stored after the Coalition Government revived controversial Big Brother snooping plans. '

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technolog...overnment.html
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G M
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« Reply #147 on: October 23, 2010, 11:45:27 AM »

**US Gov't uses Big Brother tactics on poor undocumented immigrants just trying to make a living.**

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2010/10/18/ST2010101806011.html?sid=ST2010101806011

Their surveillance effort captured more than 50,000 calls over six months, conversations that reached deep into Mexico and helped build a sprawling case against 43 suspects - including Mexican police and top officials - allegedly linked to a savage trafficking ring known as the Fernando Sanchez Organization.

According to the wiretaps and confidential informants, the suspects plotted kidnappings and killings and hired American teenage girls, with nicknames like Dopey, to smuggle quarter-pound loads of methamphetamine across the border for $100 a trip. To send a message to a rival, they dumped a disemboweled dog in his mother's front yard.

But U.S. law enforcement officials say the most worrisome thing about the Fernando Sanchez Organization was how aggressively it moved to set up operations in the United States, working out of a San Diego apartment it called "The Office."

At a time of heightened concern in Washington that drug violence along the border may spill into the United States, the case dubbed "Luz Verde," or Green Light, shows how Mexican cartels are trying to build up their U.S. presence.

The Fernando Sanchez Organization's San Diego venture functioned almost like a franchise, prosecutors say, giving it greater control over lucrative smuggling routes and drug distribution networks north of the border.

"They moved back and forth, from one side to the other. They commuted. We had lieutenants of the organization living here in San Diego and ordering kidnappings and murders in Mexico," said Todd Robinson, the assistant U.S. attorney who will prosecute the alleged drug ring next year.

The case shows that as the border becomes less of an operational barrier for Mexican cartels, it appears to be less of one for U.S. surveillance efforts. Because the suspects' cellphone and radio traffic could be captured by towers on the northern side of the border, U.S. agents were able to eavesdrop on calls made on Mexican cellphones, between two callers in Mexico - a tactic prosecutors say has never been deployed so extensively.
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Captured on one wiretap: a cartel leader, a former homicide detective from Tijuana, negotiating with a Mexican state judicial police officer about a job offer to lead a death squad.

Recorded on other calls: the operation's biggest catch, Jesus Quinones Marquez, a high-ranking Mexican official and alleged cartel operative code-named "El Rinon," or "The Kidney." As he worked and socialized with U.S. law enforcement officials in his role as international liaison for the Baja California attorney general's office, Quinones passed confidential information to cartel bosses and directed Mexican police to take action against rival traffickers, prosecutors say.

He and 34 other suspects are now in U.S. jails. The remaining eight are still at large.

Investigators say it is not unusual for Mexican cartel leaders and their underlings to move north to seek refuge, or place representatives in such cities as Los Angeles, Chicago and Atlanta to manage large deliveries of drugs. But the Fernando Sanchez Organization was more ambitious. It was building a network in San Diego, complete with senior managers to facilitate large and small drug shipments and sales.
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Crafty_Dog
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« Reply #148 on: October 31, 2010, 12:23:09 PM »

I'm not familiar with this site, but saw this mentioned elsewhere:

http://www.itstactical.com/2010/10/19/carry-a-cloaking-device-for-your-cell-phone-anywhere-you-go/
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Vicbowling
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« Reply #149 on: November 01, 2010, 11:58:21 AM »

It is total surveillance the the US government is pushing for. Your phone calls, emails and faxes haven't been private for years. Why would you expect your online surfing habits to be off limits? The child pornography thing is just an excuse to keep tabs on a lot of other stuff. You can install fancy
home security systems but so much about you is already in the public realm that even if your possessions aren't compromised your identity and personal information likely already is. Also, there is a big push in Washington to censor the Internet. Check this out: http://www.zeropaid.com/news/91177/chamber-of-commerce-claims-growing-support-for-filtering-the-web/

EDITED TO ADD From Marc/Crafty:  The link here has been reported by one of our members as a "malicious" website.
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