Dog Brothers Public Forum
Return To Homepage
March 10, 2014, 04:54:23 AM
Login with username, password and session length
Welcome to the Dog Brothers Public Forum.
Dog Brothers Public Forum
Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities
Politics & Religion
Stratfor: Russia's Great Power Strategy
Topic: Stratfor: Russia's Great Power Strategy (Read 12767 times)
Stratfor: Russia warily eyes a US-Iran deal
Reply #50 on:
November 17, 2013, 08:23:16 AM »
6 3 googleplus3 17 5
Russia Warily Eyes a U.S.-Iran Deal
November 14, 2013 | 0528 Print Text Size
Russia Warily Eyes a U.S.-Iran Deal
U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry (R) and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on Oct. 7. (SONNY TUMBELAKA/AFP/Getty Images)
Russia is concerned that a U.S.-Iranian accord could alter the regional balance of power at Moscow's expense. Even before the possible entente, the Kremlin was worried that the U.S. military withdrawal from much of the Islamic world would give the United States more freedom of action elsewhere. An agreement with Iran could undermine Moscow's influence in the Middle East and open the door to U.S.-Iranian cooperation along Russia's southern borderlands. Like many other global and regional players with a stake in the outcome of the talks, Russia will have to contemplate a world in which Iran and the United States are not at odds.
Over the past two decades, Russia has been one of Iran's primary supporters at a time when Tehran was relatively isolated in the international community and had hostile relations with many Western powers. However, Moscow and Tehran never shared any particular affinity. In fact, Russia and Iran have historically competed for influence in Turkey, the Caucasus and Central Asia. During the imperial periods, Persia and Russia fought several large wars from 1722 to 1828. While the Soviet Union was the first state to recognize the Islamic republic in 1979, relations between the two were cool, in part because Tehran condemned Moscow's restrictions on religion and the Soviets were already allied with Iraq.
Russia and Iran: Competing Spheres of Influence
Following the fall of the Soviet Union, relations between Tehran and Moscow began to warm while Iran's international isolation was growing. Russia committed to take over construction of Iran's Bushehr nuclear power plant and became a source of military hardware for Iran. Russia has also provided Iran with intelligence on a range of matters, including Israeli networks in Lebanon and U.S. and British plans to destabilize the Iranian government by, for example, taking advantage of the 2009 "Green Revolution" protests.
For much of the 2000s, U.S. attention (military and otherwise) was focused on the Islamic world, from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to the standoff with Iran. Moscow took advantage of Washington's preoccupation to start rolling back Western influence in Russia's borderlands. In addition, Russia could leverage its ties with Iran in negotiations with Washington on other matters, such as U.S. support for anti-Russian governments in Ukraine and Georgia. The relationship with Iran was also a way for Russia to secure its southern flank and limit Iranian-Russian competition in the region.
George Friedman and Robert D. Kaplan on U.S.-Iran Relations
Indeed, Moscow has found the standoff between Iran and the United States to be a particularly useful foreign policy tool. For example, during Moscow's negotiations with Washington over U.S. missile defense installations in Central Europe, Russia threatened to counter by selling S-300 missile defense systems to Iran. But Russia has been careful not to support Iran too much, both because a strengthened Iran would threaten Russia's southern flank and because it could provoke the United States and its allies into taking action against Moscow.
From Leverage to Liability
Russia is comfortable and familiar with partnering with a U.S. foe, though in the past such relationships have not proved durable. During the Cold War, Moscow assumed that the United States and China would remain adversaries because there were too many constraints on either side to ever reach a compromise. Following the Sino-American entente in 1971, the United States became a swing player in Sino-Soviet relations, and China became the same in Soviet-American relations. A similar phenomenon is now taking place with Iran. Russia knows that any agreement between Iran and the United States does not mean the two will become allies, and a change would not necessarily affect Russia immediately. But Russia's leaders past and present have had to be long-term strategists, and the Kremlin is weighing the ramifications of an U.S.-Iran entente well into the future.
First, should there be a true rapprochement with Iran, it could free Washington to focus more on other parts of the world. Moscow is worried that Washington would expand its attention both in Russia's periphery, where it has been attempting to boost its influence, and inside Russia itself, where the United States has actively supported anti-Kremlin groups. Russia would not be able to use Iran to counter any U.S. activities against Moscow's interests, and it has little else that is comparably effective in negotiations with Washington.
The second concern is how much the U.S.-Iranian relationship warms in the long term. Iran alone cannot threaten Russia in the region, since the Islamic republic is much smaller economically and militarily. However, U.S. backing could allow Iran to weaken Russia's regional position. Moscow cannot be certain that improved U.S.-Iranian ties would not eventually lead to increased military cooperation and support similar to Washington's relationship with Tehran in the decades before Iran's Islamic Revolution in 1979.
Moscow's Areas of Concern
A U.S.-backed Iran increases the vulnerability of Russia's southern flank. Specifically, there are three regions that Russia is concerned could once again fall away from its influence: Turkey, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Namely, Iran has the potential to be a regional energy competitor to Russia, and it can act as a land bridge for Eurasian transit through the Russian borderlands to the Persian Gulf.
Turkey is Russia's second-largest energy consumer, as well as another regional rival to Moscow's influence in its borderlands. Ankara has been looking for alternative suppliers for energy in order to reduce its dependence on Russia. Though there are minor alternatives such as Azerbaijan, Iran has the potential to seriously compete with Russia on the energy production front. Iran is already a minor energy exporter to Turkey, but with increased foreign investment and support in Iran's energy sector -- particularly from U.S. firms -- the country could increase its production on a scale that might challenge Russian energy dominance in the region. In addition, the historical geopolitical competition that saw Russia spar with Ottoman Turkey and Persian Iran -- with the countries alternately aligning with and against one another -- could resume.
The second region where Russia's sway could be undermined is the Caucasus, where Russia relatively successfully increased its influence this year. Currently, Armenia is isolated and reliant on its relationship with Russia in nearly every respect. Georgia has ushered in a government that is more cooperative with Russia, and Russian troops are still stationed in the country's breakaway territories. Azerbaijan has become more accommodating to Russian interests to avoid isolation as the rest of the region moves closer to Moscow. Russia will want to solidify its position in the Caucasus in the short term in case Iran (possibly with U.S. backing) attempts to undermine Russia's position. For example, Iran could offer Azerbaijan an alternative land route for transporting energy to Turkey and Europe or the Persian Gulf. Iran could also boost trade and energy exports to Armenia or Georgia, challenging Russian influence there.
Lastly, Moscow's grip on Central Asia -- a region already seeing increased Sino-Russian competition -- could be jeopardized. The current struggle between Moscow and Beijing has centered on the flow of energy out of Central Asia. Russia has strengthened its control over the pipelines that run between Turkmenistan and China through Kazakhstan. However, Turkmenistan's largest natural gas fields are on the border with Iran, making Iran an option for increasing Turkmen energy exports to the Persian Gulf or the West. Iran could become a transit corridor for Kazakh and Uzbek energy as well. For Central Asian states concerned about possible instability in Afghanistan, Iran could also prove to be a useful security partner on intelligence or even military cooperation in the wake of the U.S. military withdrawal.
The Kremlin understands these vulnerabilities, but it also sees that there is little it can do to interrupt the trajectory of U.S.-Iran negotiations. Instead, Russia has to be thinking of how to protect its position in a changing world. If Iran is no longer an option, finding a new tool to counter U.S. actions and shoring up the southern borderlands will be at the top of Moscow's list of priorities.
Read more: Russia Warily Eyes a U.S.-Iran Deal | Stratfor
Stratfor: Russia feeling under siege
Reply #51 on:
February 13, 2014, 09:51:50 AM »
Russia is facing a confluence of strategic challenges in the former Soviet periphery, an area where the Kremlin has worked hard to expand Russian influence over the past decade. An emerging financial crisis in Kazakhstan and the political crisis in Ukraine are threatening Russia's economic and strategic interests. At the same time, progress in Georgia and Moldova's path toward European integration is eroding Russia's leverage in the region.
What is a Geopolitical Diary? George Friedman explains.
These challenges to Russia's status as a resurgent regional power come at a delicate time because the country faces a growing host of domestic difficulties. Demographic decline, ethnic tensions and a continued dependency on an unreformed extractive industry are looming dark clouds on the horizon for the Kremlin. While not yet threatening Russia's dominance, the current crises in the former Soviet space are a challenge to Moscow's long-term strategy for the region.
Yesterday, the National Bank of Kazakhstan devalued the country's currency, the tenge, by nearly 20 percent in the aftermath of the emerging markets crisis that has been rocking developing economies over the past few weeks. The impact of the devaluation was immediate, with some currency exchanges and shops throughout Kazakhstan shutting down. More important, the devaluation has raised fears of contagion to other regional economies. A financial crisis in the Moscow-led Customs Union -- currently comprising Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus -- would hamper the expansion efforts of the bloc and perhaps even threaten the cohesion of what has been a cornerstone of Russia's strategy to secure its Central Asian hinterland.
The Kazakh move has also placed additional pressure on the already volatile economic and political situation in Ukraine, where Russia faces yet another strategic threat. Constrained in part by its need to maintain its international image during the Sochi Winter Olympics, Russia has been unsuccessful in helping President Viktor Yanukovich to end the political standoff and defuse the protests that have been reinvigorated by support from the West as well as from independent domestic actors. The ongoing political stalemate in Ukraine has demonstrated that although Russia has significant levers of influence in the country, it is for now unable to unilaterally shape political outcomes.
Farther west and south, Russia faces growing pressure in maintaining its influence in another two traditional strategic focal points: Georgia and Moldova. While those countries are not as essential to Russia's security as Ukraine, they are the key for the Kremlin's strategy of consolidating its southwestern flank. European incentives have contributed to the development of Moldova and Georgia's Western-leaning trajectory in recent years.
While Georgia's current ruling Georgian Dream coalition has been more open to engagement with Russia than the previous administration of President Mikhail Saakashvili, Georgia is developing a strong partnership with NATO and is pursuing a path to European integration that threatens Russia's policy. However, Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili has balanced Wednesday's announcement that the United States would finance his country's participation in the NATO Response Force with a public statement that he would be willing to meet with Russian leaders. Similarly, Moldova is building stronger ties to Western institutions.
Also on Wednesday, the European Parliament took a step toward visa liberalization for Moldovans, further incentivizing Moldovan leaders to strengthen cooperation with the European Union. Russia's support for breakaway regions, as well as its past economic pressures on Georgia and Moldova, have not been effective in dissuading the countries from pursuing integration with the West.
Much of Moscow's current assertive foreign policy in its periphery has been driven by concerns that its relatively strong position in the region will come under threat, especially when the United States is able to pay serious attention to the former Soviet periphery. The Putin administration is in the process of addressing the delicate question of restructuring the country's energy sector -- the lifeline of the country's economy -- while also managing the country's looming demographic crisis and growing ethnic tensions, which have the potential to spiral into violence.
The confluence of crises in its periphery may not necessarily signify a definite weakening of Russia's global and regional position -- the European Union, for all its rhetoric, remains weak and internally divided while the United States remains relatively distant -- but it adds to Moscow's growing burden.
Read more: Russia Suddenly Feeling Under Siege | Stratfor
Please select a destination:
DBMA Martial Arts Forum
=> Martial Arts Topics
Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities
=> Politics & Religion
=> Science, Culture, & Humanities
=> Espanol Discussion
Dog Brothers Information
=> Instructor Lists
=> Biographies & Instructor Details
Powered by SMF 1.1.17
SMF © 2011, Simple Machines