Israel, and its neighbors

[G M]

http://pjmedia.com/andrewklavan/2013/01/31/hey-jews-the-jokes-on-you/

Hey, Jews, the Joke’s on You!

January 31st, 2013 - 7:52 am


In the light of the comic genius of people like Jack Benny, the Marx Brothers, and Mel Brooks, it’s sometimes said that Jewish people have an especially keen sense of humor. Perhaps that would explain why so many of them voted for Barack Obama. They must’ve been anticipating the knee-slapping hilarity of Obama pulling the rug out from under them to send them falling butt first onto the hard floor of his broken promises where they’d slip on the banana peel of his deceit and go skittering into the mud pit of his betrayal.
 
What a chuckle it’s been indeed. Right after winning well over 60% of the Jewish vote in November, Obama delivered his gut-busting punchline by nominating former Senator Chuck Hagel to serve as secretary of Defense. And as if that weren’t funny enough, Hagel is now before the Senate, where he’ll almost certainly be confirmed.

 


Now the good news for Jews is that Hagel rhymes with bagel, a tasty breadstuff much beloved by our Hebraic citizens. The bad news is just about everything else. Supporters of the former senator have been reassuring various media outlets that Hagel doesn’t dislike Jewish people. And I’m sure that’s mighty Christian of him. The problem is he’s not being asked to dance at a bar-mitzvah. He’s being called to support our allies and stand up to our enemies and when it comes to the Middle East he doesn’t seem quite sure about which are which.
 
Hagel has complained about the “Jewish lobby,” he’s criticized Israel’s commitment to peace even as her citizens were being slaughtered by terrorists, he’s opposed sanctions against Syria and Iran while describing Israel’s war against terrorist Hezbollah as “the systematic destruction of an American friend,” meaning Lebanon.  He also refused to sign a 1999 letter condemning Russian anti-semitism, a letter that was signed by 99 other senators, which by my count is all of them except Chuck.
 
Can’t stop laughing? How about this one. Hagel’s supporters say Hagel’s anti-semitic comments and actions and feelings have been taken out of context. And that, coincidentally, is just what Egyptian dictator Mohammed Morsi says about his comments. Morsi, you remember, is the guy to whom Obama just sent a couple of F-16′s. Which must be another of the president’s hilarious Jewish jokes, since Morsi’s also the dude who described Jews as the descendants of apes and pigs. But like Hagel, Morsi says he was misunderstood. After all, who doesn’t love that funny pig in Babe, right? And what about King Kong where that gigantic Jew chased Naomi Watts around. That was fun.
 
Okay, Obama’s nomination of Hagel — like his weapons aid to Morsi — may not be in the best traditions of Jewish humor, but this administration is certainly a joke to anyone who supports our only true ally in the Middle East.

[Crafty_Dog]

Summary
 


JACK GUEZ/AFP/Getty Images
 
An Israeli F-15 fighter jet takes off on Nov. 19, 2012, for a mission over the Gaza Strip
 


Israel's strategic environment has changed since the beginning of the Syrian uprising. Instability now exists on all its borders, and Israel has behaved accordingly. On Jan. 30, the Israeli air force bombed a Lebanon-bound convoy from Syria. Two days earlier, Israel Defense Forces deployed two Iron Dome batteries to the northern part of the country. Recent diplomatic activity likewise suggests that Israel now feels threatened on its northern border.
 
Historically, Israel has undertaken pre-emptive military action when it has felt threatened. Famous examples include strikes on nuclear facilities in Iraq in 1981 and Syria in 2007. More recently in October 2012, Israel allegedly bombed a Sudanese arms factory believed to be supplying weapons to militants in Gaza. Israel's target in the airstrike remains unconfirmed -- unnamed security officials claim the convoy carried Russian SA-17 anti-aircraft missiles -- but the incident nonetheless shows that Syria's situation has deteriorated enough to merit military action.
 


Analysis
 
Reuters initially reported the airstrike, which was later confirmed by a Stratfor source. Four Israeli aircraft entered Lebanese airspace around 4:30 p.m. the evening of Jan. 29, but were relieved four hours later by other aircraft. Then at 2 a.m. the next day, these aircraft were replaced by yet another group, which remained in Lebanese airspace until about 8 a.m.
 
The duration of the operation is significant. The Israelis clearly anticipated a target to appear in a specific window of time; bombing a fixed target would not necessitate a prolonged mission. The revelations of SA-17s notwithstanding, the target of the attack remains unconfirmed. Leaks from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's office indicate that the government has been anxiously monitoring potential chemical weapons traffic into Lebanon, a haven for Hezbollah militants. Israel's anxiety may be justified: On Jan. 28, Ynet reported that Hezbollah had established several bases in Syria near suspected Syrian chemical weapons stockpiles.
 

Visit our Syria page for related analysis, videos, situation reports and maps.
 
In addition to chemical weapons, Israel also fears the transfer of advanced conventional weapons, ranging from advanced anti-tank guided missiles and man-portable air defense systems to various types of artillery systems and larger vehicle-mounted surface-to-air missile systems. Such systems could jeopardize the Israeli air force's ability to conduct operations in the region, according to an air force spokesperson. If the reports were true that the convoy carried SA-17s, the airstrike would validate some of Israel's concerns
 
Managing Multiple Threats
 






.
 The reported strike is only the latest measure Israel has taken in recent days to secure its northern border. On Jan. 27, Israel deployed two Iron Dome batteries to the North -- one in the Krayot area outside Haifa, and one in Galilee. The Iron Domes will reinforce batteries already stationed in Haifa. But more important, the new batteries could have been deployed in anticipation of retaliatory strikes for today's operation.
 
Meanwhile on the diplomatic front, Israeli National Security Council head Yaakov Amidror has been in Moscow since Jan. 28 to discuss the Syrian chemical weapons issue. Specifically, he has spoken with his Russian counterpart, Nikolai Patrushev, about the weapons falling into the hands of Hezbollah. Notably, the strike shows Russia that Israel will not stand idly by if it feels threatened by continued instability in Syria.
 
 
 
Taken together, the strike and the diplomatic activity reflect Israel's insecurity with regard to its northern border. But the strike also comes in the context of uncertainty elsewhere. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood has called into question the future of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty, which has shaped regional geopolitics since 1978. The situation in Jordan is no more encouraging. Economic woes have led to political problems for the ruling Hashemites, who find themselves dependent on economic support from Saudi Arabia and from Persian Gulf countries. Moreover, the Syrian crisis has prompted more than 21,000 refugees to enter Jordan over the past week alone. Jordan reportedly has since bolstered its military presence along its border with Syria.
 
 
 
Instability on every border has created a new strategic environment in Israel. And on Jan. 30, Israel clearly felt compelled to preserve its northern border proactively. Israel is continuing to develop its missile defense systems, such as Iron Dome and David's Sling. On its southern border, Israel has reorganized its military deployments, creating a new brigade under the 80th Division to increase security in Eilat and on the border with the Sinai. It has also built new fences and enacted security measures on the border. And in the north, Israel has now seen sufficient provocation to attack a target close to the Syria-Lebanon border. But unfortunately for Israel, such actions can actually make its border more dangerous.
 
 
 
The ultimate objective of the strike remains unknown. It could have been meant to take out an actual convoy of surface-to-air missile systems that challenge Israeli air superiority. Just as plausible is that it was meant as a warning to discourage Hezbollah from transferring weapons into Lebanon as the Syria crisis continues to degrade. Whatever the reason, one thing is clear: The new Israeli government faces the daunting challenge of managing multiple external threats on its borders.


Read more: Israel: An Airstrike at the Syria-Lebanon Border | Stratfor

[Crafty_Dog]

The New 'Silk Route;' Weapons to Gaza and Beyond
by Paul Alster
Special to IPT News
February 7, 2013
http://www.investigativeproject.org/3904/the-new-silk-route-weapons-to-gaza-and-beyond
 
 
November's "Pillar of Defense" operation by the Israeli military included a couple of unpleasant surprises for Israeli citizens. For the first time, Palestinian terrorists fired missiles at the country's two population centers, Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, sending residents scurrying for shelter. For years, Palestinian rocket fire was isolated to smaller cities in southern Israel. Israeli military officials say weapons smuggled into Gaza via the new "Silk Route," a pipeline created and protected by governments including Iran, Sudan and others, made that dramatic new range possible.

In a wide-ranging interview for the Investigative Project on Terrorism, a senior source in the Israeli Defense Force, speaking on condition of anonymity, explained how that smuggling works and what it means.

"You can see how it goes between Iran, northern Sudan, via Egypt. It didn't gradually evolve and develop like the old merchant trail, 'The Silk Route.' It's not something built thousands of years ago. It is something that we believe government officials sat down and decided on. Let me put it this way; in such countries, under such regimes, we don't believe that anything is being done without the permission and knowledge of the local power."

The official, whose assessments are based on his day-to-day experience of combating efforts to supply terror groups in Gaza, said the smuggling of more sophisticated weaponry was facilitated in part by upheaval in North Africa.

"When we are talking about the smuggling of illegal arms into the Gaza Strip" the officer began, "we should focus on a few members of this notorious community; we are talking about Iran, north Sudan, Libya as a state, not a government, and of course, the Sinai Peninsula.  Libya has become a serious problem since the fall of the Gaddafi regime because it is an open black market" he said. "Unlike Iran and Sudan, there is no government behind what is going on there. There were huge stocks of weapons (some of it western), that are now being offered to the one able to pay the highest price. The Palestinians are taking advantage of that. They will send procurements missions to look for specific items there (in Libya), or sometimes they are taking part in open auctions in Sinai to whoever will pay the most for weapons like SSR's, Anti-Tank Guided Missiles, MANPADs etc."

The flow of arms from Iran to specific groups in Gaza has long been a major concern for Israel and others seeking stability in the region. A Western intelligence report highlighted by Reuters back in September, confirmed a long-held Israeli view, saying "Planes are flying from Iran to Syria via Iraq on an almost daily basis, carrying IRGC (Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps) personnel and tens of tons of weapons to arm the Syrian security forces and militias fighting against the rebels.  Iran continues to be the major arms supplier to the Palestinian organisations" the officer said. They have been for quite a few years, every year spending many tens of millions of US dollars. Their main transfer route to the Gaza Strip is via north Sudan and Syria, we believe in cooperation with local governments, or at least with the awareness of such governments. The Iranians have used civilian cargo and civilian flights in order to deliver such shipments even without the knowledge of passengers taking seats on such flights."

Israel believes that some of that weaponry found its way to arm Hizballah in South Lebanon, while some also arrived further down the line in Hamas-controlled Gaza. In September, news of the shipments reportedly prompted then-U.S. Sen. John Kerry to threaten to withdraw aid from Iraq, (where the planes sometimes stop in transit and through whose airspace the flights pass), unless such planes were stopped and searched as a matter of routine.

"These were flights that originated in Tehran and went to Damascus, cargo flights or civilian flights with passengers/tourists flying without knowing that in the belly of the plane there are explosives and other such materials" the Israeli officer said. "Right now there are bans against the Iran Air cargo planes and Mahan Air (which are supposed to be civilian companies).These are restrictions led by the U.S. and Europe."

No sooner had the recent Israel/Hamas conflict ended than Iran publicly pledged to re-arm its Gazan militias. The process had been made more difficult following the much publicised destruction of the Yarmouk factory in Sudan in late-October, blown up by a series of missiles strikes attributed by the Sudanese government to the Israeli air force. Sudanese Information Minister Ahmad Bilal Osman told Al Jazeera the day after the attack, "Israel has accused Sudan of sending arms to Hamas. These allegations are not correct."

Intelligence showed that the factory was being used as an assembly point for Iranian Fajr5 missiles and other weaponry shipped to Sudan and subsequently transported through Egypt's Suez Canal. From there it was smuggled into Gaza through the network of tunnels overseen by the Hamas authorities.

A massive increase in the trafficking of missiles from Sudan to Gaza corresponds with Hosni Mubarak's fall in Egypt, and the subsequent rise to power of the Muslim Brotherhood, (the parent organization of Hamas), and its leader, Mohammed Morsi.

Palestinian terrorists have obtained Fajr5 rockets, anti-tank and surface-to-surface missiles and rockets that can travel 40 kilometers.

What differentiates this route from others is the quality of arms coming through. It is what we call 'Equilibrium Breaking Arms,' things that are not that common in the area. Only the participation of governments in the armament process can deliver to Sinai. You don't get coastal missiles like we caught on the Victoria in March 2011 by purchasing them on Ebay. It is something that a government planned will come from a particular ship on its way to Egypt, then on through Sinai which is the bottleneck of all smuggling activities in the Gaza Strip."

The interception of the freighter Victoria was one of three high-profile weapons seizures at sea by Israel during the last decade in which more than 450 tons of weapons were seized. Katyusha rockets, thousands of mortars, F-704 anti-ship missiles, two rocket launchers, two British-made radar systems, and tens of thousands of rounds of ammunition suitable for AK-47 assault rifles, were just part of the haul. Despite those raids, weapons still get through.

"In 2009 Fajr5 rockets entered the Gaza Strip without us knowing about it. We discovered that later on. There is no 100 percent success in this field of business. We are doing our best to see that we are on any movement of such kind, but yes, of course we are never sure we know everything. We cannot allow coastal missiles to enter the Gaza Strip as then all merchant routes will be under threat. We have gas platforms now on the coast of Israel which could potentially be placed in danger by such missiles."

The discovery in recent years of vast quantities of natural gas off the coast of Israel could prove a huge boon to the Israeli economy over the next generation, but the terminals are viewed as a prime target for terrorist attacks and their security is clearly of paramount importance to the Israeli Defence Force and security services.

The other critical issue that the IDF officer touched on is the huge danger posed to both Israel and Egypt by the lawlessness in the Sinai Peninsula and the plethora of weaponry arriving there, much of it from the now dysfunctional Libya. Stopping those weapons from reaching Gaza has not proven to be a priority for Egypt, either.

"They do not want any part of the Palestinian problem on their shoulders. If they stop the tunnel industry they will have to open more border crossings and let more supplies in, and that they don't want to do. But when it comes to Libyan weapons any group can go there [Sinai] to buy, say, anti-tank missiles or MANPAD's."

Egyptian forces did intercept a consignment of U.S.-made anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles smuggled out of Libya in early January, and another again two weeks later. These came at a time when Morsi was desperately trying to convince the U.S. that its offer of billions of dollars of aid and F16 fighters should be honored despite concerns over Morsi's governance.

Last March, former IDF southern command head Yom Tov Samia went on the record on this issue, stating, "Egypt has been playing the same game since 1967: Whenever they want to be the bad guy, they're bad guys, when they want to be the good guys, they're the good guys. This situation has to come to an end. Egypt cannot continue to play the good and the bad guy whenever it's convenient for them."

Open air auctions of lethal weapons are taking place in Sinai, and whoever comes up with the most cash, whoever they are, takes the goods and walks.

"These weapons are then not under the control or 'political wisdom' of Hamas leaders or PIJ leaders. They might well end up under the control of a small group of Al Qaeda who might decide for themselves that they are now going to shoot at an airplane carrying European tourists travelling into Sharm El Sheik (Sinai resort), or shooting at an airplane landing at Aqaba [Jordan]."

Sinai's increasing instability is a concern far beyond Israel, the source emphasized, and already serves as an open market for arms, raw materials and technology flowing into the Gaza Strip.

"There are more and more contacts between Al Qaeda and the small groups in Sinai. Egypt finds it [Sinai] hard to police after years of neglect. As far I know there are a quarter of a million Bedouins that were never governed, that were, and still are discriminated against by local authorities...and they have lately become more and more religious. If at the beginning we saw these tribes supporting terror cells for the sake of money, now we see it becoming more an ideological support, and we see more and more cases that these groups of Al Qaeda-influenced extreme Jihadists are becoming more powerful than the tribes."

"The attack of August 5 that killed 16 Egyptian soldiers has brought home [to Egypt] that the threat is not only against those who don't follow Allah, but also against less religious Muslims."

This unique insight from someone so closely associated with trying to stop lethal weapons from reaching the hands of radical Islamists in the Sinai, paints a picture of a worrying broadening of the disparate groups and the massive danger that weapons from Iran and the barely functioning new Libya pose to the security of Israel and to Arab nations who don't currently espouse wholly radical Islamist views.

"I believe that most people do not understand the threat to targets other than Israel by the open markets of weapons in the Middle East" the intelligence officer concluded. "I don't think that an American, European, or British customer understands the connection between Libyan black markets and his holiday destination in Aqaba or Sharm El Sheik."
Then a final parting thought, (delivered with absolute certainty), and a wake-up call to those who believe that the reach of Islamic terror will not encroach on their daily life the way it does in other parts of the world.

"If they think this is just Israel's problem, or just a Middle East problem, it is not."

[Crafty_Dog]

Caught the final portion of an interview with some Israeli general on the Huckabee show last night.  Huckabee did his part well and set up things nicely for the general who graciously pointed out that maybe now that the first term of the Obama administration had revealed to them that the middle east was other than they thought (saying without saying that we have been run out of Iraq, are being run out of Afpakia, Libya, and stand irrelevant with Syria, Egypt, etc that maybe they will be ready to realize that only Israel is a true friend, and a true and highly capable ally in the region.  He seemed to hold real hope for good things coming out of Baraq's impending maiden voyage to Israel.

[Crafty_Dog]

The Truth About Hamas' Smuggling Tunnels
by Paul Alster
Special to IPT News
February 15, 2013
http://www.investigativeproject.org/3915/the-truth-about-hamas-smuggling-tunnels

 
The general narrative of the situation in Hamas-controlled Gaza is of a people under siege, deprived of everyday goods, whose only means of receiving sufficient supplies is through the network of tunnels that bring a wide range of essential items from Egypt.
In fact, Israel delivers an average of 300 truckloads of goods each day through official crossing points to the Gaza Strip, basic supplies that provide steady, if unspectacular amounts of necessary items to the 1.6 million inhabitants of the Hamas-controlled enclave. The majority of everyday commodities as well as luxury items and, most significantly of all, drugs, explosives, and military hardware, come through the tunnels. They are run by a band including multi-millionaire Gazan businessmen often making vast amounts of money, and critically, paying taxes/bribes to Hamas to allow free passage of all goods.
A senior Israeli Defense Force officer, speaking exclusively to the Investigative Project on Terrorism on condition of anonymity, explained why that continues.
"Why don't Hamas pressure Israel to open more crossing points?" the officer asked. "The only crossing they insist that is open is Rafah, [the border between Gaza and Egypt], because that is a sign of sovereignty and is an international border crossing point between two countries. We are willing to transfer more goods at Nitzan crossing and Kerem Shalom crossing, but that is something they [Hamas] are not encouraging."
If goods flowed more freely into Gaza there would be no need for the tunnels. So it is in Hamas' interest to paint a picture suggesting a "population under siege" that would suffer without the tunnels bringing in food and goods. It's a story non-governmental agencies lap up and repeat throughout the world in their solicitations. The import of illegal weapons and contraband is rarely mentioned in that narrative.
Last summer, 16 Egyptian border policemen were killed by Islamist terrorists based in Sinai who later managed to breach the Israeli border before being overwhelmed by a combination of Israeli Air Force and army units. This attack, understood to have included weapons that originated from the Libyan conflict of the previous year, was a wake-up call to Egypt's new Muslim Brotherhood government. Although it is Hamas' parent organization, the Muslim Brotherhood may recognize that it, too, is now a potential target for the weapons smuggled through Gaza's tunnels, some of which have been acquired by Al Qaeda-inspired terrorists now moving with impunity throughout the Sinai Peninsula's Bedouin tribes. These fanatical terror cells seek nothing less than achieving the introduction of strict Islamic law in Egypt, Africa's most populous Muslim nation.
That might explain a recent crackdown on the tunnels from a somewhat surprising source; Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood, expected by most Gazans to offer them significant support, but who now appears shaken by the growing threat from Sinai and other major factors as he struggles to cling on to power.
On Monday, the Times of Israel reported that Egyptian security forces had surprised border smugglers around the Rafah crossing by deliberately pumping water into tunnels, flooding them and making them vulnerable to collapse.
This could be the first real indication that Egypt is responding to international pressure, Gaza-based political analyst Mkhaimar Abu Sada told the IPT.
"It is true that the U.S. Congress is not happy with the situation happening between Egypt and Gaza," Abu Sada said, "and members of the U.S. Congress have been asking Egyptian secret services to take much more decisive measures to block the smuggling of weapons and explosives from Sinai to Gaza, and also to put an end to the tunnel business between Gaza and Israel. The Egyptian government will have no other choice but to do something to please the US and the international community, because at the end of the day if Egypt doesn't take decisive measures it will lose some of the international funding from the US and the Europeans."
Many tunnel operators are getting worried.
"I know for a fact that the Egyptians have been making it harder for the Palestinians to smuggle over the past two weeks" Abu Sada said. "It seems to me that the Egyptian authorities are trying to tell Gazans that commodities that are allowed to enter the strip from Israel must not be smuggled from Egypt into Gaza. They are only allowing commodities that are prohibited by the Israelis to come from Egypt to the Strip."
If Israel unilaterally decided to double or triple the number of goods going into Gaza it would completely undermine large sections of the illegal tunnel economy. That, however, could prompt Hamas to renew its rocket fire into Israel that has been on hold since the end of the November's "Pillar of Defense" campaign. In short, Israel is damned if it does, and damned if it doesn't act on any increased in the transfer of goods to Gaza.
"If Israel increased the number of trucks entering the Gaza Strip on a daily basis that would deprive Hamas and its government of collecting taxes and customs payments that are coming through the tunnels," Abu Sada explained. "The price the Palestinians in Gaza are paying for cigarettes and fuel is much, much cheaper than the price they used to pay when these came from Israel. For example, the price of gas [in Gaza] is currently one-third of what Palestinians in the Fatah-controlled West Bank are paying, and cigarettes are half of what Palestinians in the West Bank are paying."
The tunnels generate $188 million in tax revenues on things like cigarettes and gas and building materials, Egyptian journalist Sarah A Topol wrote in the Bloomberg Business Weekly on Jan. 31. But "the smugglers say their importance is waning: Access to Israeli goods is improving, and the Gazan government has begun regulating [taxing] the tunnels, sapping profits."
So, while the tunnels are essential for transporting illegal arms and materials into Gaza ready to wage war against Israel, they are also critical in maintaining the goodwill of poor Gazans by providing them with cut-price commodities, even with surcharges added by Hamas officials.
"At the end of the day it is not only food and commodities that are entering the Gaza Strip, so it will be very difficult to close down the tunnels completely. These taxes and levies are essential to the economy of the Hamas government and will never be readily relinquished," Abu Sada said.
Israeli officials have different views as to why Egypt doesn't fully open its border with Gaza and allow free movement of goods. The IDF officer, speaking to the IPT in late-January, suggested that the Egyptians simply want to keep the whole Gaza situation at arms' length, rather than take control of the issue.
"The problem is that maybe then they would have to pay more attention, pay out more money, and take responsibility for the Gaza Strip if they prevent goods, people and other supplies going through tunnels. That is something they are not willing to do," he said. "They have determined that we, Israel, must do that. They do not want any part of the Palestinian problem on their shoulders. If they stop the tunnel industry they will have to open more border crossings and let more supplies in, and that they don't want to do."
Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman Paul Hirschson suggested that the idea that the tunnels were kept open for tax collection doesn't necessarily make sense. "Hamas runs the Gaza Strip," he said. "They could quite easily impose a tax system on goods coming across the border with Egypt. If Hamas were to get a deal with the Egyptians to pass goods on top of the border rather than under it, they could tax the goods as much as they want. But there are things going through the tunnels that wouldn't be allowed by the Egyptians anyway, such as drugs trafficking, human trafficking, and of course, arms trafficking."
Gerald Steinberg, president of the Jerusalem-based NGO Monitor and a professor of political studies at Israel's Bar Ilan University is the author of 'NGOs, Human Rights, and Political Warfare in the Arab-Israel Conflict.' Steinberg has no doubt as to what is behind Hamas' tunnel strategy.
"The Hamas leadership thrives on conflict and of portraying the situation in Gaza as one of Palestinian suffering. It is created for the Palestinian leadership by playing the victim card strongly and has been assisted in that by the NGO network and by the UN human rights frameworks all working together. They will always exaggerate claims that they cannot import basic materials, while at the same time seeking to downplay changes that will actually benefit the population. There is always a careful play off that Hamas does between allowing materials in [to Gaza] and playing the victim card."
Steinberg characterizes the on-the-ground situation in Gaza in relation to the NGO's as one of dangerous and often willful misinformation by organizations funded, in particular, by pro-Palestinian European governments. The suggestion is that these groups have become politicized and are prepared to turn a blind eye to the highly incendiary issue of illegal weapons trafficking into Gaza in order to further their own agendas in support of their view of the downtrodden local population.
Steinberg also feels that Israel has been guilty of being embarrassingly slow in presenting its case to the international community. "Part of the problem is the Israeli government's incompetence in countering these allegations issued by a powerful propaganda machine. The reason our organization exists is because there was no counterpoint. The Israeli leadership, until the last year or two, didn't understand that this was a major threat to national security. This isolation and boycott process was as powerful as a military process."
Anat Kurz, research director at Israel's Institute for National Security Studies, agrees with Steinberg's view that NGOs are misrepresenting the situation in Gaza and are allowing themselves to be misled by Hamas.
"I think it sounds quite logical" she told the IPT. "I think Hamas is treading a fine line, because if Egypt resorts to harsher measures with regard to the tunnels there will be greater or more vocal calls from the Strip by the people to allow the transfer of goods for daily use. Hamas will have to be more attentive to such calls. It depends on the systemic dynamic between Hamas, the Palestinian Authority, Egypt, what's going on in the Sinai Peninsula, and of course, Israel. There might be a change in light of developments on the ground."
Paul Alster is an Israel-based journalist with a special interest in Israeli/Palestinian relations and Middle East politics. He is a regular contributor to FoxNews.com and the Times of Israel, and blogs at www.paulalster.com

[objectivist1]

Israel to award Obama prestigious Presidential Medal of Distinction

Posted by Robert Spencer - 2-19-2013 at www.jihadwatch.org

This is about as meaningful as his Nobel Prize. Pamela Geller nails it, calling it the "Please-Don't-Hurt-Us Award" and noting: "It's an interesting strategy. I am sure Israel's top psychiatrists thought this one up. Feed the narcissist. Perhaps he'll do less harm. What are they calling it? The Hagel? The Brennan? Or the Mursi? Or the Romney Walk-back?"

"Israel to award Obama prestigious medal in visit," from the Associated Press, February 18 (thanks to Pamela Geller):

JERUSALEM – Israel will award President Barack Obama the country's Presidential Medal of Distinction during his upcoming visit.
Israeli President Shimon Peres' office said Monday that Obama will be recognized for his "unique and significant contribution to strengthening the State of Israel and the security of its citizens."

Huh?

Obama is scheduled to visit Israel in March -- his first as president.
Obama has often had a tense relationship with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu over the Jewish state's West Bank settlement policies and the lack of peace process with the Palestinians.

But Peres and the committee behind the award noted Obama's overall friendship and backing of the Iron Dome missile defense system.

Israel's Presidential Medal of Distinction is comparable to the France's "Legion of Honor" or the "Order of Canada."

[Crafty_Dog]

What do you make of my post #1753?

[objectivist1]

Crafty,

I think the General's hope is nothing but a pipe dream.  Obama has many Muslim Brotherhood operatives in his administration, he is sympathetic to Islam, and his actions to date have proven that he is not simply naive or misinformed, but pursuing a deliberate strategy of putting distance between Israel and his administration.  Franky, I think Obama would be just fine with the idea of Israel being wiped off the map by Iran with nuclear weapons, though he will never publicly say so.

[Crafty_Dog]

Well, it's not like you are without evidence, indeed I will add presumed next SecDef Hagel to your list.

[Crafty_Dog]

Next Steps After Israel's Flotilla Apology
March 22, 2013 | 1943 GMT

Summary

The seemingly rushed circumstances in which the United States secured an Israeli apology to Turkey and the Turkish government's restrained response raises questions about how far Turkey intends to carry its purported renewal of diplomatic ties with Israel.
 
Analysis
 
Multiple reports have appeared saying that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has apologized to Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan for the Mavi Marmara flotilla incident in 2010 and that Israel has agreed to pay compensation for the families of the victims. The apology reportedly happened on a phone call between the two leaders that was originally initiated by U.S. President Barack Obama.
 
It first became clear that something was developing when Israeli media reported that Obama and Netanyahu held much longer talks than expected on the morning of March 22; Obama was very late for his scheduled visit to the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem. When Obama arrived back at Ben Gurion Airport to board Air Force One for a trip to Jordan, Israeli President Shimon Peres, Netanyahu and Obama held an unexpected lunch meeting at the airport, during which Obama reportedly initiated a call between Erdogan and Netanyahu. A few minutes before Obama boarded Air Force One to depart for Amman, the White House released a short statement that said Obama "welcomed the call between Prime Minister Netanyahu and Prime Minister Erdogan" and that he hoped it would be the beginning of "deeper cooperation" on regional peace and security.
 
The prime minister's office in Israel then released a statement that said Netanyahu had apologized to Erdogan for the flotilla incident and that he had agreed to compensate the families of the victims. It also said that the two men had agreed to "restore normalization between Israel and Turkey, including the dispatch of ambassadors and the cancellation of legal steps against Israeli soldiers."
 
Notably, this statement, quoted by both Middle Eastern news site Independent Media Review Analysis and the Wall Street Journal, differs from what the Israeli Foreign Ministry posted on its website in English as Netanyahu's official statement. In that version of the statement, the line on the exchange of ambassadors and cancellation of legal steps against Israel Defense Forces soldiers was omitted. The Israeli Foreign Ministry website in Hebrew so far does not contain any statement on the apology.
 
The prime minister's office in Turkey also released a statement, though it was far more measured. According to Hurriyet, Erdogan's statement merely stated that Erdogan has accepted Netanyahu's apology and that some restrictive measures aimed at the Gaza Strip would be lifted today and remain lifted as long as the situation there remained stable.
 
Besides these official statements, various reports in the media are attempting to shape the story according to their interests. Turkish state-owned Anatolia news agency claimed that "Israel's embargo of Gaza has been lifted," implying that Erdogan's demands on the embargo were fulfilled. Meanwhile, Israeli media organizations are claiming Erdogan had asked Netanyahu to lift the Gaza blockade but that Netanyahu refused. So far, there are no tangible indications that Israel has lifted restrictions to Gaza border crossings. In fact, Israel actually closed the Kerem Shalom crossing with Gaza and partially closed the Erez crossing after rockets landed in Israel on March 21; new Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Yaalon said those crossings would remain closed until security considerations were addressed.
 
It is unclear how much coordination among Israel, Turkey and the United States took place prior to the apology announcement. The content and manner in which the statements rolled out did not give the impression that this was a carefully crafted diplomatic unveiling in which each side had their statements prepared in advance. There were factions in both the Israeli and Turkish government pushing for a diplomatic mending of relations but little indication that a breakthrough was imminent. Embattled former Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman was one of the biggest obstacles on the Israeli side while Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu was the major block on the Turkish side. Davutoglu preferred instead to capitalize on Turkey's hostile relationship with Israel as a way to boost the country's credibility in the Islamic world. If cooperation needed to take place between the two countries on a strategic or tactical level, it could be done quietly.
 
This may explain why the Turkish response to the apology appears to be both reactive and restrained. Turkey likely has limits on how far it wants to go with this diplomatic warming of relations in order to protect its image in the region as willing to stand up to Israel. At the same time, Erdogan will likely use this apology to show that Turkey can get results by maintaining a firm stance. Even when Erdogan made a statement to a Danish newspaper March 20 to clarify his earlier controversial comment that likened Zionism to a crime against humanity, he said he stood by his earlier statement, even if it was misunderstood, and would continue criticizing Israeli policies, especially over Gaza and the settlements. It remains to be seen what the United States will do for both Turkey and Israel to move their relationship forward, but Turkey will likely need further convincing if a more meaningful rapprochement is to take place.
.

Read more: Next Steps After Israel's Flotilla Apology | Stratfor

[bigdog]

http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21574016-america-and-israel-get-closer-joint-strategy-towards-iran-during-barack?fsrc=scn/fb/wl/pe/letstryalessawkwardembrace

[bigdog]

http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130324/DEFREG02/303240005/U-S-Israel-Negotiate-Military-Aid-Extension?odyssey=tab%7Ctopnews%7Ctext%7CFRONTPAGE

From the article:

The pending 10-year military aid package would commit Washington to provide up to $40 billion in additional Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grant assistance to Israel, sources here say. It would automatically kick in at the conclusion of the current 10-year, $30 billion agreement signed in 2007 under President George W. Bush and would bind Obama’s successor to continued military aid to Israel.

...

“As part of our long-term commitment to Israel’s security, the prime minister and I agreed to begin discussions on extending military assistance. Our current agreement lasts through 2017, and we’ve directed our teams to start working on extending it for the years beyond,” Obama said.

Obama’s unusually early authorization of negotiations for a follow-on aid package is one of the many confidence-building, security-enhancing measures aimed at “encouraging the Israeli government to take those risky, yet necessary steps toward peace,” a U.S. source here said.

[Crafty_Dog]

Israel's Insightful Cynicism
By Robert D. Kaplan
Chief Geopolitical Analyst
Israel is in the process of watching a peace treaty unravel. I don't mean the one with Egypt, but the one with Syria. No, I'm not crazy. Since Henry Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy in 1974, the Israelis have had a de facto peace agreement of sorts with the al Assad family. After all, there were clear red lines that both sides knew they shouldn't cross, as well as reasonable predictability on both sides. Forget about the uplifting rhetoric, the requirement to exchange ambassadors and the other public policy frills that normally define peace treaties. What counts in this case is that both sides observed limits and constraints, so that the contested border between them was secure. Even better, because there was no formal peace agreement in writing, neither side had to make inconvenient public and strategic concessions. Israel did not have to give up the Golan Heights, for example. And if Syria stepped over a red line in Lebanon, or say, sought a nuclear capacity as it did, Israel was free to punish it through targeted military strikes. There was usefully no peace treaty that Israel would have had to violate.         
Of course, the Syrians built up a chemical arsenal and invited the Iranians all over their country and Lebanon. But no formal treaty in the real world -- given the nature of the Syrian regime -- would likely have prevented those things. In an imperfect world of naked power, the al Assads were at least tolerable. Moreover, they represented a minority sect, which prevented Syria from becoming a larger and much more powerful version of radical, Sunni Arab Gaza. In February 1993 in The Atlantic Monthly, I told readers that Syria was not a state but a writhing underworld of sectarian and ethnic divides and that the al Assads might exit the stage through an Alawite mini-state in the northwest of their country that could be quietly supported by the Israeli security services. That may yet come to pass.
         
Israeli political leaders may periodically tell the media that Bashar al Assad's days are numbered, but that does not necessarily mean Israelis themselves believe that is an altogether good scenario. Indeed, I strongly suspect that, for example, when the Israelis and the Russians meet, they have much in common regarding Syria. Russia is supporting the al Assad regime through arms transfers by sea and through Iraq and Iran. Israelis may see some benefits in this. Russian President Vladimir Putin may actually enjoy his meetings with Israelis -- who likely don't lecture him about human rights and the evils of the al Assad regime the way the Americans do.
         
True, a post-al Assad Syria may undermine Iranian influence in the Levant, which would be a great benefit to Israel, as well as to the United States. On the other hand, a post-al Assad Syria will probably be an anarchic mess in which the Iranians will skillfully back proxy guerrilla groups and still be able to move weapons around. Again, al Assad is the devil you know. And the fact that he is no longer, functionally speaking, the president of Syria but, rather, the country's leading warlord, presents challenges that Israelis would prefer not to face.
         
What about Hezbollah, in this admittedly cynical Israeli view? Hezbollah is not a strategic threat to Israel. Hezbollah fighters are not about to march en masse over the border into Haifa and Tiberias. Anti-missile systems like Iron Dome and David's Sling could reasonably contain the military threat from the north. Then there are Israel's bomb shelters -- a one-time only expense. Hezbollah, moreover, needs Israel. For without a powerful Israel, Hezbollah would be robbed of the existential adversary that provides Hezbollah with its immense prestige in the Lebanese political universe, making Hezbollah so much more than just another Shiite group battling Sunnis.
 
Israel's war against Hezbollah in 2006 is known as a disaster. But it did have its positive side effects: Israel has had seven years of relative peace on its northern border, even as the war usefully exposed many inadequacies in the Israeli military and reserve system that had been building for years and were henceforth decisively repaired, making Israel stronger as a consequence.
 
Threats abound, truly. The collapse of the al Assad regime may lead to a weapons free-for-all -- just like in post-Gadhafi Libya -- that might force Israel to "mow the lawn" again in southern Lebanon. As for Hassan Nasrallah, the charismatic and capable Hezbollah leader, maybe he, too, is the devil you know, informally obeying red lines with Israel since 2006. Nasrallah appears to be less extreme than his deputy, Naim Qassim, who would take over if Nasrallah were ever assassinated by the Israelis, unless the Sunnis in a Lebanon and Syria thrown into utter, post-al Assad chaos assassinate him sooner.
         
Then there is Gaza: once again, like southern Lebanon, "mow the lawn" once or twice a decade, though this might be harder in a post-Arab Spring geopolitical environment because of the greater danger of unhinging Israeli-Egyptian relations. Still, in Gaza there is no existential threat, nor a real solution, regardless of what the diplomats say. Idealists in the West talk about peace; realists inside Israel talk about spacing out limited wars by enough years so that Israeli society can continue to thrive in the meantime. As one highly placed Israeli security analyst explained to me, the East Coast of the United States and the Caribbean have periodic hurricanes. After each one, people rebuild, even as they are aware that a decade or so down the road there will be another hurricane. Israel's wars are like that, he said.
         
Presently a real underlying worry for Israel appears to be Jordan. Yes, King Abdullah has so far expertly manipulated the growing unrest there, but to speculate about the collapse of the Hashemite dynasty is only prudent. More anarchy. More reason to heed Ariel Sharon's analysis of four decades ago to the effect that Jordan is the real Palestinian state, more so than the West Bank. And because Jordan and Saudi Arabia could conceivably unravel in coming decades, maybe Israel should seek to avoid attacking Iran -- which along with Israel is the only real state between the Mediterranean Sea and the Iranian Plateau. Iran may have a repulsive regime, but its society is probably healthier than most in the Arab world. So there is some hope.
         
You get the picture. Israel had a convenient situation for decades, surrounded as it was by stable Arab dictatorships. Israel could promote itself as the region's only real democracy, even as it quietly depended on the likes of Hosni Mubarak, the al Assad clan and the Hashemites to ensure order and more-or-less few surprises. Now dictators are falling and anarchy is on the rise. Fighting state armies of the kind that the Arab dictators built in wars in 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973 was simpler compared totoday's wars: Because the Arabs never really believed in their dysfunctional states, they didn't always fight very well in state-organized formations. But sub-state militaries like Hezbollah and Hamas have been more of a challenge. In the old days, Israel could destroy an Egyptian air force on the ground and solve its security dilemma in the south. Nowadays, to repeat, there are no solutions for Israel: only sub-state adversaries that hide among civilian concentrations in order to attack your own civilian concentrations. No peace ever, therefore, just periodic wars, hopefully spaced-out.
       
The Middle East today has turned out perfectly if you are a Jewish West Bank settler. The divisions within Palestinian ranks, coupled with the increasing anarchy of the Arab world, mean the opportunities for territorial concessions on Israel's part have diminished. In fact, Israel's only option may be more unilateral withdrawals. That is probably the only thing the settlers have to worry about.
       
But the Zionist dream lives on. Jerusalem and much of the rest of Israel are thriving. Light rail and pedestrian walkways make Jerusalem more vibrant than ever. The Arabs in the Old City survive well -- under the circumstances, that is -- on the "Jewish" side of the "fence," where the standard of living and quality of life is so much better than on the Arab side. The "fence" is both a monstrosity in abstract moralistic terms and a practical solution in an age of repeated diplomatic failure and fewer and fewer diplomatic opportunities. From 28 percent of the gross domestic product in the mid-1970s, Israeli military spending is down to between 6 and 8 percent of the country's GDP. Life is good in Israel. The unemployment rate is lower than in the United States and Europe, despite high housing costs and the need for reform in health care and education. One could argue that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu -- so vilified in the West -- has not handled the economy altogether badly.
         
But what about idealism? What about a better, more humane Middle East? What about the wise and talented statesmen who periodically see opportunities where others see none? What about slowing down Israel's drift to a quasi-Apartheid society, characterized by Israeli domination of the more numerous Arabs and something certainly not in Israel's interest? These are all real things to constantly keep in mind and to struggle for. But the Levant remains a zero-sum struggle for physical survival. So it is a place where there will always be benefits to dealing with strong dictators. Given their geographical circumstances, Israelis can be forgiven their cynicism.

[Crafty_Dog]

The Limited Geopolitical Clout of Israeli Natural Gas
 

April 2, 2013 | 1000 GMT
Summary


The start of natural gas production at a recently discovered field has raised hopes of energy independence in Israel, but few effects of the newfound resources will be felt outside Israeli borders. On March 30, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced that natural gas had begun flowing to Israel from Tamar, a field located roughly 90 kilometers (50 miles) off Israel's northern coast. Exactly how much natural gas is being pumped from Tamar is unclear. But if projections are realized, the Tamar field could make Israeli access to energy more secure and stable than at any other point in the country's modern history.
 
The Israeli Energy and Water Resources Ministry estimates that Tamar could meet between 50 percent and 80 percent of the country's natural gas needs over the next decade. The field may also allow Israel to incentivize additional domestic energy production and reduce the country's use of coal and fuel oil in sectors where demand overlaps with natural gas, such as power generation. However, Israel's ability to leverage its energy assets to affect the policies of neighboring countries or resolve the myriad challenges it faces on its borders will be constrained by the region's enduring geopolitical realities.
 


Analysis
 
Israel estimates that its annual consumption of natural gas will increase to 8.5 billion cubic meters in 2013 and continue to rise for the foreseeable future. In recent years, the country has depended on two major sources of natural gas: In 2005, a deal was brokered through the East Mediterranean Gas Company, an Egyptian-Israeli natural gas consortium, for Egypt to supply Israel with approximately 40 percent of its natural gas needs for the next 20 years, or roughly 1.7 billion cubic meters per year. (The agreement was later increased to 2.1 billion cubic meters per year).
 
But Israel's energy partnership with Egypt has been beset with problems. Egypt, a net exporter of natural gas facing its own problems with rising domestic demand, reportedly negotiated a rate increase in 2008, and since the onset of the Arab Spring in 2011, the subsequent strain on Egyptian-Israeli relations has curtailed Israeli imports from Egypt. Moreover, militants in the Sinai Peninsula have frequently targeted the natural gas pipeline that connects the two countries, occasionally shutting down flows for weeks at a time. In April 2012, Egypt's state-owned natural gas company announced that it would pull out of the 2005 agreement, and the Israel Electric Corporation formally followed suit on March 25.
 
Tamar's Promise
 
For the remaining 60 percent of its natural gas needs, Israel has relied on production from Mari B, a domestic reservoir in the Yam Tethys field located off the coast of Ashdod. Mari B's reserves, however, have depleted faster than expected. In response, Israel in recent months has turned to stopgap measures such as expediting production at smaller natural gas fields nearby, including Noa and Pinnacle. The country has also increased its use of diesel and fuel oil for electricity production.
 








VIDEO: Energy Security in the Eastern Mediterranean (Agenda)
.In 2012, the state-owned Israel Natural Gas Lines Ltd. built a $134 million floating liquefied natural gas import terminal. Israel received its first shipment of liquefied natural gas from BP in January 2013, reportedly sourced from Trinidad, and the government hopes that as much as 2 billion cubic meters of natural gas will arrive at the terminal each year. The project was not intended to become a primary source of natural gas for Israel, but rather to bolster Israeli energy security by making the country less dependent on its pipeline. For Israel, imported liquefied natural gas is expected to cost three to four times as much as natural gas from Tamar.
 
With an estimated 246 billion cubic meters of natural gas reserves, Tamar will be particularly important to Israeli energy security, especially considering the unclear future of relations with Egypt and the inevitable depletion of Israel's natural gas fields. Still, the benefits of developing Tamar will not be felt immediately in Israel. Despite the field's initiation, electricity prices will increase by some 6.5 percent in May, and Israeli Energy Minister Silvan Shalom said on March 31 that additional increases could follow. But over the long term, production at Tamar will serve as a stable source of natural gas fully under Israeli control, and it will thus promote Israeli energy independence.
 
Export Obstacles
 
The Israeli government has yet to articulate a clear vision for exporting the reserves at Tamar -- and at Leviathan, an even larger offshore field discovered in June 2010. In 2012, the Tzemach committee, a task force commissioned by the government to review Israel's natural gas export policy, recommended that 53 percent of the country's reserves be made available for export. But this figure was based on an assumption that future discoveries would increase Israel's total reserves to around 950 billion cubic meters and that 450 billion cubic meters of natural gas would be needed to cover domestic consumption over the next 25 years. Opposition elements in the Israeli government have called for a reassessment of the committee's recommendations, asserting that the group underestimated Israeli natural gas consumption. Disappointing results from exploratory drilling at the Mira, Sara and Shimshon sites have cast further doubt on the recommendations.
 
The committee's findings have yet to be adopted, though Israel's new government is rumored to be favoring them. Proponents of exporting natural gas argue that doing so would encourage foreign investment in Israel. Perhaps more beneficial, the country could also use its newfound resources to attempt to cement strategic relationships with countries such Turkey and Jordan.
 
However, there would also be advantages to prioritizing domestic energy needs. By reserving its strategic supplies of natural gas for use at home, Israel might be able to keep consumer prices low and guarantee access to the resource. This, in turn, would make it easier for industry and household consumers to shift to natural gas and away from other energy sources. In 2011, according to the Israel Electric Corporation, roughly two-thirds of Israeli electricity was produced with coal and refined petroleum products, while natural gas provided the rest. Directing most of the reserves to the domestic market could also allow Israel to lower its import bills and reduce the country's strategic energy vulnerabilities.
 






.
 Moreover, Israel must overcome myriad technical and geopolitical hurdles before exporting natural gas from Tamar and Leviathan is even possible. The easiest way for Israel to sell the resource abroad would be to build a pipeline running along the coasts of Lebanon and Syria and eventually reaching Turkey. But Lebanon and Syria are openly hostile to the idea. Even if they agreed, neither country has a government stable enough to secure such a project in perpetuity. Syria is engulfed in conflict, and violence from the civil war has been spilling across the border into Lebanon more frequently.
 
In 2010, Israel signed an agreement with Cyprus recognizing the island's claims to certain natural gas reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean -- a deal that raised the possibility of future energy cooperation between the two countries. But Cyprus' major economic and political issues would limit its ability to build the technically advanced infrastructure needed in such a partnership. Meanwhile, geographic, technical and political issues would undermine energy cooperation between Israel and Turkey. Even Jordan, a country whose own serious energy issues could be mollified somewhat by importing Israeli natural gas, would be hesitant to cooperate openly with Israel due to domestic political concerns.
 
The launch of natural gas production at Tamar is still welcome news for Israel and will likely make the country less dependent on neighboring countries and foreign partners for energy. The field will have a positive effect on Israel's economy and, considering the mounting challenges facing the country, will lessen one area of concern for the Israelis. But the tangible effects of production at Tamar on the broader region will be subtle at best. Israel's estimated reserves are relatively small compared to other natural gas fields in the region. The region's pervasive political instability will hamper Israel's ability to navigate the major infrastructural and political obstacles that prevent it from exporting natural gas. And the type of development needed to make fields such as Tamar relevant outside Israel's domestic market is unlikely, thus blunting Tamar's possible geopolitical impact.
.

Read more: The Limited Geopolitical Clout of Israeli Natural Gas | Stratfor

[Crafty_Dog]

JERUSALEM — The United Nations Relief and Works Agency has indefinitely suspended food distribution in the Gaza Strip after protesters angry over the cancellation of a cash assistance program for the poor stormed the agency’s main compound in Gaza City on Thursday, an official said Friday.
 

“There will be no food tomorrow,” said Adnan Abu Hasna, a spokesman for the agency, which provides nutrition, education, health and other services to 815,000 Palestinians who are refugees and their descendants, nearly half of Gaza’s population. “The food distribution centers and the relief offices will be closed in the coming days unless there’s a real security being provided to the life of our staff, because there is a great concern about their safety.”

The agency provides three-month rations of flour, oil, sugar, rice and other staples to about 25,000 people a day through scores of centers scattered throughout Gaza’s refugee camps. Though the centers and the relief offices that provide psychological and other support are shut, the 246 schools and 21 health clinics that the United Nations runs in Gaza will operate as usual.

Ismail Haniya, the Hamas prime minister of Gaza, told reporters Friday that his government would pursue “urgent and quick talks” with the agency in hopes of restoring the food distribution and other services “in a state of security and stability.”

But Abu Ahmad al-Massri, 42, a father of seven who lives in the Beach refugee camp in Gaza City and participated in the demonstration Thursday, said he would continue to protest the ending of the cash program. A former clothes manufacturer, Mr. Massri is unemployed and said he had been relying on the grants since 2004. He said his aid had been reduced over the years to about $80 every three months from $250.

“They want to make reductions, they should reduce the costs they spend for their bodyguards,” Mr. Massri said of the agency. “I am ready to die in defending the food of my family. If I lost one of my kids it’s easier for me than losing my food.”

The violent protest Thursday followed days of smaller demonstrations after a decision Monday to cancel the cash program, which has provided 21,000 families, totaling 100,000 people, with about $4 million in direct aid per year — $10 per person every three months. The agency said that the program had been ended because of a $67 million deficit and that the agency had offered recipients three-month jobs instead. Though the jobs pay double the cash grants, refugees are concerned that they will not last.

After several smaller protests at offices of the agency throughout the week, about 100 people joined a demonstration Thursday organized by the Palestine Liberation Organization’s committee for refugees. They carried signs and banners, including one that read, “Don’t deprive our children of their rights in life.” After some of the refugees broke into the compound, the police eventually dispersed the demonstrators.

“They have the right to demonstrate peacefully and to protest any decision,” said Mr. Abu Hasna, the agency spokesman. “But to reach that level is really unacceptable. They jumped over the walls. They stormed the gates. They began to scream and to threaten, also. What happened yesterday is crossing all the red lines.”

In a statement, the P.L.O. refugee committee blamed the agency for the protest. “What happened yesterday was a result of a state of anger and boiling in the refugees,” it said, adding that the agency “has neglected our warnings.”

Though unrelated, the protests over the elimination of the cash assistance came amid days of unrest in Gaza and the West Bank over a Palestinian prisoner who died of cancer in Israeli custody, and the killing by Israeli soldiers Wednesday night of two teenagers who approached an army post during a demonstration.

Israeli and Palestinian security forces were on high alert Friday for protests after the noon prayers, and access to Al Aksa Mosque in Jerusalem’s Old City was limited to women and men over 50 to prevent clashes that have become routine there in recent months.

A spokeswoman for the Israeli military said one Palestinian was injured in the northern Gaza Strip on Friday evening when Israeli soldiers, after firing warning shots, fired at a group of stone throwers approaching the border fence. Another Palestinian was hurt by a rubber-coated bullet fired by soldiers near the West Bank Jewish settlement of Beit El, the spokeswoman said, and an Israeli soldier was lightly wounded by rocks near Beit Laqia earlier in the day.


Fares Akram contributed reporting from the Gaza Strip.

[Crafty_Dog]

RAWABI, West Bank—A project to build what would be the first modern Palestinian city here has stumbled over an issue that has become an enduring obstacle to efforts to boost the territory's economy: access to Israeli-controlled lands that surround it.
 
Cranes with Palestinian flags mark the massive construction site at Rawabi, 5½ miles north of Ramallah, where truck drivers navigate rows of midrise buildings and prospective homeowners use iPads to select apartments. Some 3,000 people are at work on the city, and the first residents are expected to move in within a year. Rawabi, on a hilltop with a view to the Mediterranean, is slated to have a population of 40,000, its own schools, shopping mall, mosques and an office complex.
 
But developers said the city, which investors say will cost $1 billion to build, is in jeopardy because of Israel's refusal to authorize a permanent access road for construction crews and residents to cross to Rawabi through Israeli-held territory.



.

Investors want Israel to allow construction of the permanent road, and to let the Palestinians control it. Israel's government, under pressure from Jewish settlers on surrounding land, has demurred.

The impasse highlights one of the challenges facing Secretary of State John Kerry as the U.S. weighs an initiative to boost the sagging Palestinian economy to help restart peace negotiations: getting Israel to relinquish control over West Bank lands to allow for Palestinian economic expansion.

"It's stuck in politics,'' said Bashar Masri, the Palestinian entrepreneur whose investment firm, Masar International, is backing Rawabi along with Qatari Diar, the real-estate arm of Qatar's sovereign-wealth fund. "If we slow down, we'll lose most of those jobs. If we get access approval, we can add 3,000 jobs."

Israeli considers the temporary access road currently in use sufficient for now, said an Israeli official. "Israel has taken steps to support the Palestinian economy, but transferring land to Palestinian control is a political issue," the official said. "I assume that when we see progress [on peace talks] we will see movement on the building of the road to Rawabi as well."
 
In recent years, Israel loosened the reins on the Palestinian economy by removing military checkpoints and giving Palestinians more permits to work in Israel.

Now the U.S. is focusing on helping Palestinians find a way to push ahead with building projects, many of which are still on paper because they are slated for West Bank territory off limits to Palestinians, said a Western official familiar with the diplomacy. Mr. Kerry said at the end of a visit to the region on April 9 that he wanted to "move rapidly toward increased business expansion" in the West Bank.
 
Allowing Palestinians to develop lands under Israeli control would enable the expansion of agriculture, telecommunications and energy networks and the development of new tourist attractions, the World Bank said in a 2012 report.
 
In the 1990s, Israel and the Palestinians divided the West Bank into three zones: Areas A and B were Palestinian cities and villages, where they were granted self-rule. Area C comprised Jewish settlements and their access roads, military bases and all open lands, which Israel held as a security buffer and as bargaining chips in negotiations. Israel maintains full control over 60% of West Bank land.
 
"If you are going to jump-start the Palestinian economy, the place to do it is Area C," said a Western diplomat. "It's the largest area of contiguous land."
 
The World Bank warned in September, in a report on the importance of economic development in Area C, that uncertainty over access to Rawabi could deter future investment in large projects in the West Bank.
 
Rawabi has attracted a stream of foreign dignitaries because it is seen by the international community as a flagship project of a future Palestinian state.

To reach the site today, cement mixers and trucks traverse a shoulderless two-lane road that curves through an olive grove. The road is temporary and the permit for it needs to be renewed every several months, said Mr. Masri. The Palestinians want their own road linking Rawabi with Ramallah.
 
Rania Maree, a spokeswoman for Rawabi, said investors are moving ahead despite frozen peace talks. "We can't wait for the peace process to be done, because apparently it isn't going to happen anytime soon."
 
Turning over West Bank land would be a politically sensitive concession for the government of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Jewish settlers—a key constituency of Israel's right-leaning government—consider widened Palestinian presence a security threat.
 
It seems the government has little leeway. The Israeli army needs to control about 50% of West Bank land to protect road networks between the dozens of settlements scattered across the West Bank, said Shaul Arieli, a former Israeli colonel and former adviser to Israeli governments on peace negotiations. But the West Bank's 163 Palestinian cantons must be linked together for a Palestinian state to function, Mr. Arieli said.
 
The Israel government is discussing Rawabi as well as other Area C access issues with the U.S., according to an Israeli defense official with knowledge of talks regarding access to Area C. The official suggested that if Palestinians dropped conditions for returning to peace talks, Israel would be willing to give more access to Area C.

But trust is low. The Palestinians, for now, haven't dropped preconditions because they suspect Israel will keep building settlements while stalling on peace compromises, said an official close to the negotiations.

And the Palestinians suspect Israel will only allow economic aid that they can control, stopping well short of enabling a sovereign Palestinian economy, the Palestinian official said.
 
At a sleek showroom that looks out to the Tel Aviv skyline and the Mediterranean, Palestinians walk through neighborhood models and computerized illustrations of a high-end shopping center, an amphitheater, and a belt of tiny parks linking the city's 21 neighborhoods.
 
More than half the 700 apartments in the first phase have been reserved, the developers said.

"This is a Palestinian city with a modern twist," said Ms. Maree. "We need to build five or six cities like this."

[Crafty_Dog]

The Other Bluffer Barack Obama isn't the only world leader issuing threats that he won't execute.
By BRET STEPHENS
 
Until not long ago, Israelis remained prudently coy about whether they would strike Iran's nuclear facilities. More recently, prominent Israelis have voiced doubts about whether Israel can strike those facilities, at least in any way that would make a lasting difference to Tehran's bid to acquire nuclear weapons.

Essentially, they're saying it's all a bluff.

The transition marks another decline in the quality of the Jewish state's deterrence. This would be bad news in better circumstances. Considering the way the Obama administration is acting with respect to Syria, it's much worse than that.

 
That's because President Obama has now made it clear that, when it comes to rogue regimes and weapons of mass destruction, he's exactly the bluffer he promised he wasn't. He warned repeatedly that the use by Bashar Assad's regime of chemical weapons against the Syrian people was a red line, a game changer, a thing "we will not tolerate." And he responded to the regime's use of chemical weapons by doing nothing. This is supposed to be the guy who has Israel's back and will never allow Iran to get a nuclear weapon?

What's Fuhgeddaboudit in Yiddish?

That's a lesson that needs to sink in fast with Israeli decision makers. Israel has justified reservations about taking anything except covert or surgical action against Iran and Syria. Among those reservations: the limits of its military capability; its vulnerability to counterstrikes; its diplomatic isolation; the displeasure of the Obama administration.

Above all, Israelis have shied away from action on the theory that Mr. Obama's red lines were real, even if he drew them further down field than Israel would like. What's the point of rushing to do something yourself at great immediate risk, when you can wait for someone else to do it, at much less risk to them or to you, a little later?

Sound logic, one flaw: There is no someone else. Israelis are now watching how the administration reacts when a rogue regime crosses the president's red lines. It calls for a U.N. investigation to corroborate the findings of Western intelligence agencies. It justifies the exercise in the name of international consensus. It emphasizes the need to avoid the mistakes of the Iraq war.

That's the path the administration is traveling in the Syrian chemical-weapons case, and things will only get worse. As the Assad regime realizes it can use these weapons without international penalty, it will unleash them again. Sooner or later it will figure out that the more widely it uses them, the quicker it can kill enemies at home and deter enemies abroad. A twofer. The administration will go from arguing that it's too soon to intervene in Syria, to arguing that it's too late.

What Israel gets from this is a chemical-weapons free-fire zone on its Syrian border, along with the growing likelihood that the weapons will reach Hezbollah's hands along its Lebanese border. On the plus side, Israel also gets an arms deal from the administration. But the deal consists of selling Israel stuff it already has or doesn't particularly need, like aerial tankers and V-22 tilt-rotor aircraft, while withholding stuff it doesn't have and dearly needs, like large bunker-busters and the means of delivering them.

Meanwhile, Israel faces an Iran that, according to former military intelligence chief Amos Yadlin, has already crossed the nuclear red line Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu drew at the U.N.'s General Assembly last September. Did Mr. Netanyahu draw that line as a means of warning Iran, or of goading the U.S. to act?

If it was the latter, it was a bad bet. Mr. Obama will treat evidence of Iran's impending nuclearization the way he has looked at Syria's use of chemical weapons, demanding a standard of proof that will be impossible to meet until it is too late to do much about it. And as in Syria, the longer he searches for proof, the tougher the military options will become.

If it was the former, however, then Israel had better be prepared to act. Soon. A threat that cannot be executed should never be issued. It invites contempt from friend and foe alike. If Mr. Netanyahu really has been bluffing all along, he'll go down as the man who made Ehud Olmert look good.

Israel's military planners have now had more than a decade to plan an attack on Iran. Let's assume their capabilities are better than advertised. (Can a country that can come up with Iron Dome be incapable of producing the required bunker busters?) Let's assume also there's a known-unknown in this plan, an element of surprise that will take even the most hardened war-gamers by surprise.

It had better work. Because Israel cannot live with a nuclear Iran. Because Israel should know by now that this American administration will not be coming to its rescue. Because the purpose of a Jewish state is never having to rely for survival on the kindness of others, even ones so charming and solicitous as Barack Obama.

[G M]

Obama abandons Israel ? Who could have seen this coming?

[Crafty_Dog]

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/may/4/israeli-strike-syria-targeted-weapons-shipment/

[bigdog]

"Mr. Obama now confronts the most urgent foreign policy issue of his second term, one in which he must weigh humanitarian impulses against the risk to American lives. After about two years of ineffectual diplomacy, whether or how he chooses to follow through on his warning about chemical weapons could shape his remaining time in office."

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/05/world/middleeast/obamas-vow-on-chemical-weapons-puts-him-in-tough-spot.html?smid=fb-nytimes&WT.z_sma=WO_OTC_20130505&_r=0

[Crafty_Dog]

"humanitarian impulses against the risk to American lives"

One might note that these are not the only variables in play here , , ,

[bigdog]

"humanitarian impulses against the risk to American lives"

One might note that these are not the only variables in play here , , ,

Absolutely. The article is a rather long one.

[Crafty_Dog]

http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2013/05/13/moderate-palestinian-leader-swears-if-we-had-nuke-wed-have-used-it-this-very-morning/