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Crafty_Dog
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« Reply #250 on: July 06, 2017, 10:51:43 PM »

second post

Putin’s Assist for North Korea
Russia sends a message to Trump by nixing a U.N. resolution.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, second from right, inspects the preparation of the missile launch, July 4.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, second from right, inspects the preparation of the missile launch, July 4. Photo: /Associated Press
July 6, 2017 7:01 p.m. ET
25 COMMENTS

President Trump meets with Vladimir Putin on Friday, and the Russian strongman sent his early regards on Thursday by nixing a U.S. resolution at the U.N. Security Council condemning North Korea’s latest missile launch. The resolution didn’t stipulate any action, but our friends the Russians still objected.

The Kremlin excuse is that the draft U.S. statement referred to the rocket as an intercontinental ballistic missile. Never mind that North Korea claims the missile was the equivalent of an ICBM, and the U.S. and other analysis of the trajectory and altitude suggest the same.

“The rationale [for Russia’s rejection] is that based on our (Ministry of Defense’s) assessment we cannot confirm that the missile can be classified as an ICBM,” Russia’s U.N. mission said in an email to other Security Council members. “Therefore we are not in a position to agree to this classification on behalf of the whole council since there is no consensus on this issue.”

The likelier explanation is that Mr. Putin wanted to send a message that he can make trouble if Mr. Trump resists a “reset” in U.S.-Russia ties. Russia has also joined with China in trying to coax the U.S. and South Korea to cease military exercises in Northeast Asia in return for North Korea freezing its nuclear program. But that would merely ratify Pyongyang’s current stockpile and missile progress, assuming it even honored such a freeze, which it would not.

Russia and China are authoritarian powers seeking to dominate their regions, but the problem with tolerating such “spheres of influence” is that regional powers often collaborate to stir trouble beyond those spheres. As they are now abetting North Korea.

Appeared in the July 7, 2017, print edition.
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G M
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« Reply #251 on: July 07, 2017, 12:29:42 AM »

Strange, I was told Putin and Trump were BFFs! Or, that Trump was Putin's sockpuppet.


second post

Putin’s Assist for North Korea
Russia sends a message to Trump by nixing a U.N. resolution.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, second from right, inspects the preparation of the missile launch, July 4.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, second from right, inspects the preparation of the missile launch, July 4. Photo: /Associated Press
July 6, 2017 7:01 p.m. ET
25 COMMENTS

President Trump meets with Vladimir Putin on Friday, and the Russian strongman sent his early regards on Thursday by nixing a U.S. resolution at the U.N. Security Council condemning North Korea’s latest missile launch. The resolution didn’t stipulate any action, but our friends the Russians still objected.

The Kremlin excuse is that the draft U.S. statement referred to the rocket as an intercontinental ballistic missile. Never mind that North Korea claims the missile was the equivalent of an ICBM, and the U.S. and other analysis of the trajectory and altitude suggest the same.

“The rationale [for Russia’s rejection] is that based on our (Ministry of Defense’s) assessment we cannot confirm that the missile can be classified as an ICBM,” Russia’s U.N. mission said in an email to other Security Council members. “Therefore we are not in a position to agree to this classification on behalf of the whole council since there is no consensus on this issue.”

The likelier explanation is that Mr. Putin wanted to send a message that he can make trouble if Mr. Trump resists a “reset” in U.S.-Russia ties. Russia has also joined with China in trying to coax the U.S. and South Korea to cease military exercises in Northeast Asia in return for North Korea freezing its nuclear program. But that would merely ratify Pyongyang’s current stockpile and missile progress, assuming it even honored such a freeze, which it would not.

Russia and China are authoritarian powers seeking to dominate their regions, but the problem with tolerating such “spheres of influence” is that regional powers often collaborate to stir trouble beyond those spheres. As they are now abetting North Korea.

Appeared in the July 7, 2017, print edition.

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Crafty_Dog
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« Reply #252 on: July 09, 2017, 11:07:24 AM »

I have commented on the probabilities of Nork cross-breeding with the Iranians, but in the last couple of days I have seen a number of reports that the Nork mobile missile launcher and other missile related equipment (including parts of missiles in question) were CHINESE.

Would love to have some citations for this.

This does make considerable sense-- my initial read being that the Chinese are being this as a way of forcing us to acquiesce in its conquest of the SCS , , , AND break our alliance with South Korea.
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G M
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« Reply #253 on: July 09, 2017, 11:23:24 AM »

https://www.forbes.com/sites/anderscorr/2016/11/23/is-china-using-north-korea-for-nuclear-blackmail-against-the-us/#e37c24f2f8d1

Is China Using North Korea For Nuclear Blackmail Against The US?





Anders Corr ,   CONTRIBUTOR
I cover international politics, security and political risk. 

“Some White House officials believe that if Mr. Trump follows through on campaign vows to label China a currency manipulator and slaps Chinese imports with hefty tariffs, Chinese President Xi Jinping will make it a point to be uncooperative on North Korea.”
China’s linkage of cooperation on North Korea to U.S. trade issues would be close to using the nuclear weapons of a proxy country to blackmail the United States.

A Wall Street Journal article recently stated that “Some White House officials believe that if Mr. Trump follows through on campaign vows to label China a currency manipulator and slaps Chinese imports with hefty tariffs, Chinese President Xi Jinping will make it a point to be uncooperative on North Korea.” The main issue on which the U.S. needs Chinese cooperation on North Korea is to stop its development of nuclear weapons that can reach the United States. If the White House officials are correct, China’s linkage of cooperation on North Korea to U.S. trade issues would be close to using the nuclear weapons of a proxy country to blackmail the United States.


A South Korean man watches a TV newscast reporting the visit to China by North Korea's Kim Jong-un, at a railway station in Seoul on May 20, 2011. Kim Jong-Un began a visit to China, according to Seoul media reports, signified Beijing's approval of the North's succession process. JUNG YEON-JE/AFP/Getty Images

China has arguably done this before, including through nuclear assistance to proliferating authoritarian countries. China is a major ally of Pakistan, whose China-assisted nuclear weapons threaten India. China is an ally of Russia, whose nuclear weapons threaten the U.S. and Europe. China is an ally of Iran, whose China-assisted nuclear weapons development threatens Israel and Saudi Arabia, both of which are U.S. allies. In other words, China assists all the major nuclear-armed countries that oppose the United States and its democratic allies. Why is that? Could it be that China is purposefully supporting nuclear proxies against the United States? If one of these proxies launches just a few weapons against the U.S., and destroys our economy, tax base, and therefore our defense industry, China could sit the conflict out, high and dry, and announce itself afterwards as the next global hegemon.

Giving into authoritarians with nuclear weapons, as one writer in the Atlantic recently proposed to do with North Korea, is not the answer. The U.S., our European allies, Japan, South Korea, and Australia, are all democracies, and have bigger, better, and more innovative economies than the autocrats. If democracies could unify against the threat of authoritarian regimes, we could use strong economic sanctions and a robust military defense to dissuade them from their current path of authoritarian militarization. We should start with China, whose economy has the most to lose from trade sanctions, and which supports lesser autocrats worldwide. If we wait and do nothing about nuclear proliferation among autocrats, which is essentially what we have done for the last few decades, we abandon millions of people in our cities to the whims of nuclear-armed tin pot dictators like Kim Jong-un.
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Crafty_Dog
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« Reply #254 on: July 09, 2017, 08:43:19 PM »

https://warontherocks.com/2017/07/north-koreas-icbm-a-new-missile-and-a-new-era/
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G M
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« Reply #255 on: July 10, 2017, 12:11:05 AM »


"My reconstruction of the missile's trajectory, assuming the North Korean claims are correct, give it a maximum range of perhaps 8,000 kilometers," John Schilling, a consultant to the 38 North website, told Yonhap News Agency.

So, if I am not mistaken, if a NorK ICBM were based in another country, like Iran, then all of europe would be in range, correct? All our Asian allies as well, right?

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Crafty_Dog
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« Reply #256 on: July 10, 2017, 12:45:08 PM »

Too bad Obama-Hillary undid President Bush's foresight with the ABM deals with Poland and Czech Republic , , , Good thing President Trump is looking to rectify that.
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DougMacG
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« Reply #257 on: July 13, 2017, 01:45:20 PM »

A VDH piece this week on NK seemed to have no solution or idea in it:
https://townhall.com/columnists/victordavishanson/2017/07/13/west-can-neither-live-with-nor-take-out-north-korean-nukes-n2353920

There are reports that we had a clear chance of taking out Kim Jung UN on July 4 at the missile launch site (and didn't take it):
http://www.businessinsider.com/why-us-didn-t-kill-kim-jong-un-icbm-test-july-4-2017-7

Regime change was not the goal?  Huh??

After dithering and floundering on Osama bin Laden (1998), Iran, NK, healthcare, economics and so many other issues, it would be nice once in a while if the US had a plan instead of just talk and running up military, spending and debt.

This will be easier, safer, later??

I wouldn't want to be accused over at the UN of taking out a guy who is seriously threatening to destroy half the world.
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G M
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« Reply #258 on: July 13, 2017, 02:16:14 PM »

A VDH piece this week on NK seemed to have no solution or idea in it:
https://townhall.com/columnists/victordavishanson/2017/07/13/west-can-neither-live-with-nor-take-out-north-korean-nukes-n2353920

There are reports that we had a clear chance of taking out Kim Jung UN on July 4 at the missile launch site (and didn't take it):
http://www.businessinsider.com/why-us-didn-t-kill-kim-jong-un-icbm-test-july-4-2017-7

Regime change was not the goal?  Huh??

After dithering and floundering on Osama bin Laden (1998), Iran, NK, healthcare, economics and so many other issues, it would be nice once in a while if the US had a plan instead of just talk and running up military, spending and debt.

This will be easier, safer, later??

I wouldn't want to be accused over at the UN of taking out a guy who is seriously threatening to destroy half the world.


Killing Lil' Kim would almost guarantee kicking off a major war, if not WWIII. It may be a bullet we have to bite, but we really need to exhaust every other option first.
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DougMacG
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« Reply #259 on: July 13, 2017, 06:41:23 PM »

"Killing Lil' Kim would almost guarantee kicking off a major war, if not WWIII. It may be a bullet we have to bite, but we really need to exhaust every other option first."

You are right - that is the thinking of the military experts who know more than me and  advise Pres. Trump that keeps it from happening.  

I think any American President also fears the international relations aftermath and our own domestic reaction to it.  Easier to just keep kicking the can down the road, as was done by others at different times with OBL, Saddam, Iran and NK.  Let the next administration deal with it.  Is that in the best interest of the country?

Exhausting all other options, it's been 60 years, and 30 years since the phony Clinton- Albright deal where they promised to not do what is now done.

A strike should be done only if/when we are as ready as is possible with all possible allies to put down whatever happens in response.

My view is that if we conduct a surgical strike, in this case he is standing there and then he just falls over dead from a strike he can't see and nothing else... I'll bet there would be confusion, contention, struggle and decisions to be made from the inside to figure out who is in charge and what to do next.  If their next move is to set off major offensive attacks, it is a suicide mission and the end of the regime, just as he would face now..  If the successors reaction is to continue the same games of the last decades, now they know we might strike them at any time for their threats.  Think of the Reagan strike on Khadafy.
 We missed him but his life and his decision making changed.  Iran and whoever else threatens us would also feel the effect.  The message to those who do is, don't.
« Last Edit: July 13, 2017, 07:34:37 PM by DougMacG » Logged
Crafty_Dog
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« Reply #260 on: July 18, 2017, 09:51:24 AM »

    Regions & Countries

    Topics

    Themes

    Series

Editor's Note:

North Korea demonstrated at least a rudimentary capability to launch a road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile with its latest test of the Hwasong-14. At the extreme estimates of its range, the missile has the ability to strike parts of the western United States. More tests and developments will be necessary to increase the Hwasong-14's range, payload and re-entry system, and questions remain about North Korea's ability to miniaturize a nuclear weapon and make it rugged enough to mount on the missile. Even so, Pyongyang is clearly well on its way to realizing its goal of a long-range nuclear weapons capability. This is the first installment in a three-part series examining the implications of this development for the United States' relationship with North Korea.

War is rarely the first option for countries trying to preserve or enhance their strategic positions. The United States and North Korea alike would rather avoid a conflict on the Korean Peninsula, which would be complicated and costly for all parties involved. Neither wants war; each side strongly prefers an alternative path to resolve the core issues underlying the crisis. Yet their differing strategic imperatives and desired end states leave little room for compromise.

As North Korea draws closer to achieving long-range missile capabilities, something it sees as a security guarantee, the United States faces mounting pressure to act. But as Washington tries to coerce North Korea to end its quest for more sophisticated arms, Pyongyang feels compelled to accelerate its nuclear weapons and missile development. Each country is merely acting to preserve its interests. But their interests are driving them closer to a physical confrontation.

The Rational Assumption

Geopolitics teaches us to assume rationality on the part of actors on the international stage. The assumption doesn't suppose that individual leaders are somehow beyond the influence of emotion, misinformation or miscalculation. Rather it acknowledges the deeper forces at work, from the interactions of place and people that shape national characteristics and strategic culture to the systems and structures that develop in countries over time. No leader operates free of these constraints and compulsions. Though they still have leeway to shape their policies and actions, leaders, as individuals and as a collective group, do so within limits defined in large part by the environments in which they emerged. The rationality we assume from leaders is not universal; it is the product of their place and time under the influence of factors such as history, geography and economics.

The key, then, is to understand what guides the rationality of a country's leadership, on an individual level and in the government as a whole. After all, no one individual rules a country, since no single person could extend power over an entire population without the help of intermediaries. And each layer of leadership adds another set of constraints to the exercise of power. Disagreements arise in governments and in the populations they preside over. But the forces that influence the options available to leaders are far larger than the concerns of the individual. It is an analyst's job to understand and explain these factors, and a policymaker's job to take them into account when considering how to achieve a desired outcome.

Even so, it is sometimes simpler in international relations to assume one's adversaries are crazy. They don't follow the desired path or react in the anticipated way, so they must be acting irrationally. If one makes the wrong assumptions of an adversary (or even of an ally), however, the response to a given action may be far from what was intended.

Of course, understanding the other side doesn't guarantee the desired outcome, either. Irreconcilable differences in interests and perceptions of risk can get in the way of compromise. The most viable solution often is to constantly adjust one's actions to manage these contradictions, even if they prove insurmountable. At times, though, the differences can be so intractable as to drive nations into conflict if each side's pursuit of contrary interests leads to fear and insecurity for the other. Moves by one nation to constrain the threatening behavior it perceives from another then perpetuate the cycle of action and reaction. In the case of North Korea and the United States, the contradiction in their interests is growing ever starker as Pyongyang accelerates its nuclear weapons program and nears its goal of developing a missile capable of striking the continental United States.

As Pyongyang draws closer to the deliverable long-range nuclear weapon it has long pursued, Washington will be forced to decide whether to accept North Korea as a nuclear-armed state and live with that reality or to take the necessary steps to disarm it.

A Mutual Misunderstanding

Misunderstandings, misapplied assumptions and mismatched goals have characterized relations between the United States and North Korea for decades. Washington expected — or at least hoped — that North Korea would collapse on its own under the force of economic and social pressures. The evaluation misjudged the country as the Asian equivalent of an Eastern Bloc state waiting for the Soviet Union's demise to break free from the shackles of a foreign-imposed power structure. North Korea hasn't collapsed. In fact, in times of trouble, its neighbors (and even the United States) have helped stabilize the government in Pyongyang for fear that the consequences of the country's failure would be more dangerous than the risks entailed in its survival. North Korea, meanwhile, considered itself a fixture on the United States' target list, a remnant of the Cold War that Washington was trying to toss on the ash heap of history.

The two have had many opportunities for some form of reconciliation over the years. Time and again, though, progress has run afoul of perceived threats, diverging commitments, changing priorities, domestic politics and even extraregional events. As Pyongyang draws closer to the deliverable long-range nuclear weapon it has long pursued, Washington will be forced to decide whether to accept North Korea as a nuclear-armed state and live with that reality or to take the necessary steps to disarm it. The cost of action is high, but so is the perceived threat of inaction.
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Crafty_Dog
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« Reply #261 on: July 18, 2017, 09:56:18 AM »

The United States and North Korea appear to be on a collision course. Their differing interests are reaching a point of irreconcilability, and each side sees in the other a significant threat to its national interests. To understand the rapidly shrinking timeline for a potential conflict between the two, we must first state a few assumptions about each country's view of the other.

These assumptions are based on more than merely statements by individual leaders, which often are more about subjective desire than about objective reality. Instead, they are founded on a geopolitical analysis and intelligence study of the United States and North Korea drawing from assessments of history and strategic culture as well as studies of politics, economics and past behavior. Assumptions, of course, can be wrong and must be constantly tested; they also evolve over time, as circumstances and evidence change. But for now, these are our baseline assumptions about the key actors in the Korean crisis.

The View from Pyongyang

North Korea has long considered the United States, and not South Korea, its primary adversary. Pyongyang sees the long-term presence of U.S. military forces in South Korea as a direct, intentional hindrance to unification of the Korean Peninsula on its own terms. And when North Korea denounces joint exercises between U.S. and South Korean armed forces as practice for military action against it, it sincerely believes in the threat that it's decrying. North Korea has deterred the United States from military action for decades through a combination of political tactics and a robust military capacity that would create mass casualties for U.S. forces on the ground and for civilians in Seoul. Pyongyang, meanwhile, ensured that it never became enough of a threat that the cost of nonintervention would exceed that of intervention from Washington's point of view. 

Since the final years of Kim Jong Il's rule, however, North Korea's core leadership has reassessed its position. The government has begun to doubt that its frontline conventional weapons, even when supplemented with biological or chemical weapons, would deter U.S. military action or stop Washington from taking steps to overthrow it. A peace accord and nonaggression pact are no longer sufficient to guarantee the North Korean system's survival, a perception that has been reinforced again and again, most notably when the United States invaded Iraq despite the risks entailed. (Various so-called "color" revolutions, the Arab Spring uprisings, and the ouster and death of Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi even after his country gave up its weapons of mass destruction program likewise put Pyongyang on edge.)

North Korea's Artillery Concentration

Under current leader Kim Jong Un, North Korea has drastically accelerated its nuclear and missile programs to try to develop a demonstrable capacity to strike at the continental United States with a nuclear weapon. The capability, from Pyongyang's perspective, would provide the only viable assurance that the United States would not work to overthrow the Kim administration through political, economic or military action. Pyongyang fully recognizes that the closer it gets to demonstrating the ability to strike the United States, the more pressure Washington will feel to stop the program, whatever the means. But the high cost of military action, which could rapidly expand beyond the Korean Peninsula, still keeps the United States from following through, as do political differences with its two regional allies, South Korea and Japan. China's objections have also deterred Washington from action.

North Korea, then, is caught in a conundrum: It feels it needs a nuclear capability to deter interference in its government, yet it understands that developing its deterrent will increase the chances of intervention. As a result, Pyongyang relies on the complexities of the region and the costs of military action to keep the United States at bay long enough that it can realize its nuclear ambitions. It's a dangerous gamble, but one that North Korea's leaders feel is worth the risk, since capitulation is the only alternative.

Washington's Perspective

For the United States, North Korea has long been a secondary problem. Though the country is a perpetual source of potential regional instability, its neighbors, and its own economic limitations, always manage to keep it in check. North Korea's nuclear program presented Washington with one of its first major post-Cold War crises. But the United States avoided military action in 1994 through diplomacy, and in the years since, its general policy toward Pyongyang has been to manage the issue and put off conflict. Confronted with the price of military intervention, the United States preferred declaring moratoriums on Pyongyang's missile testing, isolating it financially and making the occasional diplomatic deal. Washington, after all, has always expected North Korea to collapse at any moment, so waiting a while longer has been the more logical policy.

But in recent years, the U.S. view has started to change. Isolation, sanctions and stern statements from the United Nations have hardly slowed North Korea's drive toward a viable nuclear deterrent. Pyongyang no longer treats its nuclear and missile programs as bargaining chips to trade away in negotiations. And as its nuclear weapons development continues, nearing a point where the threat reaches the continental United States, moratoriums on testing are not enough. The sense is growing in the United States that Pyongyang's quest for nuclear capability is a crisis that can't be punted down the road any longer.

A North Korea armed with missiles that can deliver nuclear weapons to the United States is a danger Washington cannot accept. Even if the U.S. government assumes that Pyongyang wouldn't start a war (an idea not everyone agrees with), questions remain over how it would use its new capability. North Korea could, for example, use it to constrain Washington's responses to regional moves or perhaps share its weapons technology with other "rogue" states, thereby significantly altering the global nuclear landscape. Given the pace of Pyongyang's missile tests, Washington sees that the window for taking one last shot at non-military action is rapidly closing.

The United States wants to avoid war, but to do so, it feels it must make clear that it will use military action if necessary. Washington's airstrike against the Syrian government for allegedly using chemical weapons, recent ballistic missile tests and higher-profile military exercises on the Korean Peninsula were all meant in part to demonstrate that the United States is willing to resort to military action in the absence of a better option. The U.S. government is using the threat perhaps more to try to sway China and Russia than it is to change North Korea's behavior. From Washington's point of view, Beijing alone has the leeway to propose a nonmilitary solution to the North Korean crisis. Not only is China Pyongyang's primary economic backer, but it is also keenly interested in keeping the North Korean system in place as a buffer at its border.

From the Other Sides

But the risk of intervention outweighs the risk of inaction for Beijing. China still considers instability in North Korea, or the political and military repercussions of trying to overturn the leadership there, a greater danger than Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program. It continues to believe, moreover, that for all Washington's bluster, the United States wouldn't follow through on military action to stop North Korea's missile development because doing so would risk starting an East Asian war. For China, which already lives with a nuclear-armed North Korea at its border, not to mention a nuclear India, Pakistan and Russia, Pyongyang's growing capabilities are a problem, but not an unmanageable one. The United States poses a bigger risk to its strategic interests. At the same time, China's options to respond have dwindled as Pyongyang has steadily restricted Beijing's communications and influence with it.

South Korea, too, has been coping with the North Korean military threat for decades. North Korea's nuclear program threatens South Korea, aimed as it is at the U.S. alliance structure. Nevertheless, Seoul understands that its national interests and those of Washington may diverge in the future, or at least not fully coincide. South Korea also foresees little danger of North Korea trying to reunify through force; U.S. support notwithstanding, Seoul's military capabilities have grown since 1950, and the international system is no longer conducive to military action on Pyongyang's part. In the event of another war between the two Koreas, China would be just as likely to intervene on the side of the South as on that of the North, if only to prevent the United States from getting involved.

Seoul and Beijing are each interested in managing the situation and forestalling conflict rather than in resolving the issue immediately. The advancement in North Korea's ballistic missile range, though a paradigm shift for the United States, represented only a small change for the region's overall security. Consequently, South Korea and China are trying to convey through their remaining channels with North Korea that they are willing to delay a crisis to shield Pyongyang from potential military action. Their assurances may embolden North Korea, but for Seoul and Beijing alike, delaying a confrontation is the preferable path, especially since neither see much chance of a true compromise between Washington and Pyongyang. China, meanwhile, maintains a sliver of hope that Washington may eventually accept the reality in North Korea and adjust its behavior toward the government in Pyongyang accordingly, backing off from military threats in favor of dialogue and management.

Russia and Japan each play a slightly smaller role and differ in their views of the situation. Moscow, which wants to avoid a war but lacks much clout with Pyongyang, is using the crisis to emphasize the threat Washington poses to international peace and stability. And Japan feels the change in North Korea's nuclear development perhaps more acutely than does South Korea. The missiles Pyongyang has been testing serve a more valuable military purpose aimed at Japan and the U.S. bases there than they do trained on South Korea, a country that has long been within the demonstrated reach of North Koreas' missiles. Tokyo sees the standoff with North Korea as an opportunity to fortify its position as the key U.S. ally in the region and to counter China's growing influence. In addition, the threat of Pyongyang gives the Japanese government further justification for its decision to lift the constitutional restrictions on the use of its armed forces.

Population Density

If these assumptions stand, a time is fast approaching when the United States won't be able to sit back and delay action anymore. Washington still has several options short of military action, but history has so far shown that the tactics are only temporary. Every deferral enables North Korea to move closer to its goal of developing a long-range nuclear missile while reinforcing Pyongyang's notion that U.S. security guarantees are nonbinding and rarely outlast a single president. Whether each side's perceptions of the other are accurate matters less than whether North Korea and the United States believe them and make their decisions accordingly.
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ccp
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« Reply #262 on: July 18, 2017, 10:14:58 AM »

we don't have near as much to lose as the S Koreans.

Unless NK attacks us outright I don't see us being able to do anything.

http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/Poll-War/2017/07/18/id/802285/
I guess most Americans think it is better for K to have nucs on ICBMs that can reach us.

I would totally for military action now if it were not the blowback to S Korea.
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Crafty_Dog
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« Reply #263 on: July 18, 2017, 10:32:23 AM »

True sanctions with those who trade with Norks (CHINA!) trade War with China, sailing the SCS, nukes to Japan (and Sorks?), rebuild/strengthen regional alliances (Australia, and others --Philippines may or may not be possible) build alliance with India.

These are all options.

« Last Edit: July 18, 2017, 04:47:19 PM by Crafty_Dog » Logged
ccp
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« Reply #264 on: July 18, 2017, 10:43:16 AM »

" trade War with China "

well we got that Democrat GS guy Cohen in WH talking Trump out of any such thing.

I also like the idea on the internet few days ago about kicking the Chinese students all 345 K of them out of our universities

But the Universities would go crazy with that.  Think of all the cash they get and the rest.
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Crafty_Dog
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« Reply #265 on: July 19, 2017, 05:43:39 AM »

This is how wars begin: not through the rash actions of erratic warmongers, but through the slow confrontation of irreconcilable differences. When the threat of inaction appears to exceed the threat of action, and compromise is off the table, conflict looks unavoidable.

North Korea and the United States appear to be well past the point of compromise. Pyongyang feels that its security hinges on a deterrent that would make Washington think twice about trying to overthrow North Korea's leadership or launching military action against the country. Washington, meanwhile, can't tolerate Pyongyang's efforts to develop a reliable nuclear weapon and delivery system that could strike the continental United States. Having nearly attained its security goal, North Korea can't delay further missile tests without giving the United States time to build national and international political support for military intervention. The United States similarly can't stop at a moratorium on North Korea's missile tests since only a few steps separate Pyongyang from long-range weapons capability. And past measures have done little to roll back North Korea's progress.

In the absence of a suitable middle ground with Pyongyang, Washington is counting on China and Russia to finally pressure North Korea into cooperating. Under the best-case scenario, further sanctions and isolation would cause factions of North Korea's elite to revolt, overthrow the Kim government and divert the country from its current course. But that outcome is not likely. The risk of destabilizing the country, on the other hand, would be high — too high for Beijing and Moscow to accept, especially when they have doubts that the United States will make good on its threat of military action. North Korea sees hesitation on the part of China, Russia and even South Korea and figures their reluctance to act will restrain a U.S. strike against it.

North Korea's Arms Push

Neither side wants war. The threat of physical conflict must be credible, however, if Washington wants to change Pyongyang's behavior or to convince Beijing that the risk of inaction outweighs the risk of direct action. The more credible the threat of war, the more pressure Pyongyang would feel to complete its program, and quickly. The more the looming prospect of conflict pushes China and Russia to try to prevent war, calling for talks and claiming the real danger lies in U.S. military action, the more confident Pyongyang would become that it can finish testing before Washington intervenes. And the closer North Korea gets to realizing its weapons ambitions without China's interference, the closer Washington gets to military action. That's not to say that war is inevitable, though. Changes in intelligence assessments, in leadership, in interpretations and in perceptions can always intervene unexpectedly. Or it may be that our core assumptions are simply wrong.

The U.S. military has for several years operated under the assumption that Pyongyang already possesses a nuclear weapon and the ability to deliver it at least regionally. But North Korea is unlikely to use a limited number of nuclear weapons to start a war with the United States, with its vastly superior military and nuclear arsenal. Consequently, traditional forms of nuclear deterrence could still keep Pyongyang in check. Political will may be lacking in the United States to undertake military action against North Korea that would disrupt economic and trade activity and leave behind a massive reconstruction project in Northeast Asia, if not lead to a regional conflict.

North Korea's government may be more risk averse than it seems. Pyongyang may not be willing to push its testing far enough to incite the United States to intervene. Alternatively, North Korea might not respond to a surgical strike against some of its nuclear and missile facilities, enabling Washington to interrupt its weapons development without triggering a full-blown war on the peninsula. Some Chinese commentaries have suggested that limited attacks on North Korea — even a single symbolic strike on a mobile missile ahead of a test — would shake the government enough to change its behavior. Pyongyang otherwise may feel sufficiently confident in its progress with the missile program that it shifts focus to political reconciliation with South Korea in an effort to ensure both its national security and its future economic prospects.

Geopolitics does not teach determinism. Despite the constraints and compulsions it creates, a country's geography can't eliminate every possible option. For all their differences, the United States and North Korea, perhaps ironically, share the same goal: avoiding a war. But each sees the other's path as untenable for its own national security. A war between the United States and North Korea is not inevitable, but it is growing increasingly likely — and not because their leaders are crazy.
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