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Crafty_Dog:
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/33322/breaking-down-the-absolutely-batshit-botched-coup-attempt-against-venezuelas-maduro

Crafty_Dog:
https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2020/05/08/ex-green-beret-pitched-venezuela-plot-to-colorado-investors-last-year-claiming-links-to-trump-insider-and-dc-consultants/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Army%20Times%205.8.20&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Army%20-%20Daily%20News%20Roundup

396,578

Crafty_Dog:
How Cuba’s Spies Keep Winning
They’ve infiltrated another attempt to unseat Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro.

By Mary Anastasia O’Grady
May 10, 2020 3:40 pm ET

The failed landing on a rugged stretch of Venezuelan coastline last week by a band of mercenaries hoping to unseat Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro is another tragedy for the beleaguered nation.

The predawn mission was meant to capitalize on the element of surprise. But the irregular soldiers were immediately confronted by Venezuelan troops because their operation had been thoroughly penetrated by Cuban-backed Venezuelan intelligence. Some were killed in the fighting and more may have been executed. Among the captured are two Americans.

The debacle is demoralizing for an enslaved nation suffering dire privation and brutal repression. It is also an opportunity to reflect on Cuba’s asymmetric-warfare capabilities and the sophistication of its intelligence apparatus, which over more than a half-century has run circles around the U.S. Beyond the killing, the fiasco will deepen suspicion and distrust among the members of the opposition—particularly of “friends” who claim to have broken with the dictatorship.

The U.S. government has said it had no “direct involvement” in the seaborne operation. Jordan Goudreau, a former Green Beret who was the ring leader of the plot, did receive some interest in his services from advisers to U.S.-backed interim Venezuelan President Juan Guaidó. But Mr. Guaidó’s communications team has put out a statement insisting that the interim president never agreed to launching the operation.

Mr. Goudreau, who heads the U.S.-based security firm Silvercorp, apparently planned to provoke a military uprising, detain Mr. Maduro, and put him on a plane to the U.S.

There is near universal agreement that it was a reckless endeavor. Yet it is only the latest in a string of desperate attempts to try to bring down the dictatorship. And while the methods have varied, the common denominator in all the quashed uprisings has been how effectively Cuban-led intelligence has disrupted the plans. In some cases the plots may even have originated with state-security agents, who recruited eager patriots and mercenaries and set them up to be killed. This also reinforces a sense of futility among would-be rebels.

Whether it’s inside the military or among the ranks of the opposition, many Venezuelans now conclude that Cuban moles are everywhere and it’s too risky to put confidence in anyone. This is key to Havana’s control strategy in Venezuela. It is also standard practice on the island.

The struggle to liberate Venezuela is a proxy war between the U.S. and Cuba, which is backed by its allies Russia, Iran and China. The conflict drags on because Cuba has the edge where it matters.

When it comes to traditional military capabilities, the U.S. soars above its adversaries. But Havana dominates in deception, human intelligence and propaganda. It’s been that way from the early days of the Cuban dictatorship. “The Cubans were underestimated for more than a quarter of a century,” former CIA Cuba analyst Brian Latell wrote in his 2012 book, “Castro’s Secrets.” The U.S. thought it was dealing with “bush-league amateurs” until Florentino Aspillaga Lombard, a highly decorated Cuban agent, defected in 1987. That’s when the U.S. began to understand that Castro’s Cuba had “developed a foreign intelligence service that quickly rose into the ranks of the half dozen best in the world.” Moreover, “in some covert specialties, particularly in running double agents and counterintelligence,” over decades, Mr. Latell wrote, “Cuba’s achievements have been unparalleled.”

It’s a mistake to think this is only about people like high-ranking Pentagon intelligence analyst Ana Belén Montes, who was exposed as a Cuban spy in 2001 after some 16 years working for the enemy. Cuba has myriad ways of spreading disinformation, combating critics, and widening its influence. Return access to the island for journalists and academics, for example, is denied when there is unfavorable coverage, which is presumably why yours truly cannot get a visa.

Blackmail is another method of manipulation. I have twice interviewed a Cuban defector who told me it was his job in Cuba to retrieve videocassettes from hidden cameras in hotel rooms and official residences where visiting dignitaries were staying. The goal was to capture on film compromising behavior that could be used to extort political favors or, for example, force a resignation. With heavy political and diplomatic traffic to the island from Europe and Washington, it’s a safe bet that at least a few have been compromised in this way.

The Guaidó team now says it balked at the Goudreau plan in part because it did not trust former Venezuelan General Cliver Alcalá, whose brother is Mr. Maduro’s ambassador to Tehran but who claimed to have switched sides. Mr. Alcalá was taken into custody in the U.S. on drug-trafficking charges in March. But that he got close to the Guaidó team in the first place is another credit to Cuba’s intel network—most likely in this case with a lot of help from Iran.

Write to O’Grady@wsj.com.

Crafty_Dog:
May 19, 2020   View On Website
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    Why Venezuela's Maduro Isn’t Worse Off Than He Is
By: Allison Fedirka

The past few months have been a nightmare for economies that rely on oil. After the coronavirus pandemic sent prices plummeting, finance ministries had to triage planned revenue, major social and infrastructure projects were put on hold or aborted altogether, and the public started to lose its temper. All available evidence would suggest that oil-dependent Venezuela is, once again, on the brink of collapse. Yet President Nicolas Maduro finds himself in a comparatively stronger position now than when oil prices collapsed in early March. Since then, he has managed to navigate through extensive U.S. actions meant to cripple the Venezuelan economy and has weathered three key external events — the pandemic, the oil crash and a farcical coup attempt involving two Americans — maintaining his power however precariously.

Venezuela is strategically important to the U.S., at least within the parameters of hemispheric security and control of the Caribbean Sea, and it’s no secret that the Trump administration would like to see Maduro fall. Hence Washington’s general low-cost, low-effort policy of slowly tightening an economic vise around the country, which keeps its interests in play while waiting for the Maduro government to self-destruct or for the opposition to take over. The fall of the price of oil, however, gave Washington an opportunity to pitch new transition talks to Maduro and his opponents. On March 31, the U.S. State Department issued its proposed Democratic Transition Framework for Venezuela, in which it offered to begin lifting parts of the sanctions if members of Maduro’s United Socialist Party of Venezuela formed an interim government without Maduro to transition to new elections. Unsurprisingly, Maduro publicly rejected the plan.

He could afford to. Low oil prices didn’t damage the Venezuelan economy as badly as expected. Mostly that’s because the economy, particularly its hydrocarbon sector, was already in ruins. Food shortages have been rampant since at least 2012, the currency been in a state of hyperinflation since 2016, power shortages occur regularly and many citizens depend on the black market for survival. U.S. sanctions targeting high-level politicians and key business activities made things only worse. Oil production has been in decline since 2016 and has fallen dramatically since 2018. Most of the oil Venezuela does produce is sold at a discount and used to pay off debts or for domestic consumption. These problems were such that the drop in oil prices hurt the economy but not as badly as the drop hurt healthier economies.
 
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When it became clear the transition proposal was dead on arrival, the Trump administration called on Chevron, the only U.S. oil company still operating in Venezuela, to leave or give up its shares in its operations. It was meant to be retaliatory but in fact did little to hurt Maduro. Chevron produced only 34,000 barrels per day in 2019 — a drop in the bucket for a country that produces under 1 million bpd (and falling) in a bad year — and so it made sense for it to halt operations, which it did. However, Chevron kept its shares in joint ventures with state-run oil company Petroleos de Venezuela, meaning the company will keep its foot in the door in Venezuela, which has been the company’s only purpose in the country for the past couple of years. The truth is that the Chevron decision did little to undercut Maduro or hurt the Venezuelan oil sector writ large.
 
(click to enlarge)

The biggest danger to Venezuela is the price of domestic duel, which skyrocketed around the same time prices fell as supplies ran low. The shortages are due primarily to poor refining capacity. At the beginning of 2015, Venezuela refined 915,000 bpd of crude. By the start of 2020, it was refining just 135,000 bpd. Now, refining has never been Venezuela’s strong suit; it generally relied on U.S. facilities. But low gasoline prices were a fixture of Venezuela for decades, and raising the price is politically dangerous.

Thus Venezuela turned to Iran, a country with lots of experience and little to lose from angering the United States. In exchange for about $900 million worth of gold, Iran sent input chemicals for refining, pledged help to repair refineries and dispatched five tankers to delivery emergency fuel to Venezuela. That is a hefty sum of money for a country with few reserves, but solving the fuel crisis is necessary for Maduro to remain in power.

There are two other factors that explain why Maduro is relatively safe behind his heightened security. The first and most obvious is that the coronavirus pandemic discouraged people from protesting in public, and gave the military an excuse to patrol the streets and take control of the distribution of health equipment and food. The second was the May 3 “coup attempt,” if you can call it that. Dozens of people — including two Americans — launched an amphibious assault, only to be immediately snuffed out by authorities. The incursion was never a real threat to Maduro’s power, but since the alleged orchestrator was an American mercenary with a company based in Florida, Maduro had more than enough reason to publicly villainize the U.S., increase security even more and portray the government from a position of strength. Most important, it gave Caracas two U.S. prisoners who can be used in future negotiations.

The U.S. is in no rush to re-engage Venezuela. It’s written off Juan Guaido, the so-called other president of Venezuela who failed to serve his purpose of ushering in a new government. Washington is content to wait until it can capitalize on its reconstruction once there is a new government in place. Reconstruction comes down to who has the most money to pour into Venezuela, and to no surprise the U.S. was for the past few months the most well-suited to do so. Now, with low oil prices, a global recession and record-level unemployment in the U.S., Washington has no will and limited ability to fund Venezuela's reconstruction.

And so Maduro occupies his post relatively uncontested for now. The economy is still a mess, but time seems again to be on his side.   






397381

Crafty_Dog:
Bolton’s Warmed-Over Venezuelan Dish
The elephant in ‘The Room Where It Happened’ is an intelligence failure.

By Mary Anastasia O’Grady
Updated June 21, 2020 10:42 pm ET

During John Bolton’s 17 months as White House national security adviser, he headed a U.S. policy aimed at removing Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro and restoring that country’s democracy. A chapter in his new memoir, “The Room Where It Happened,” is his version of what went wrong.

The book isn’t the “tell-all” it’s cracked up to be. The U.S. policy crackup in Venezuela is more than anything else a colossal intelligence failure. Either because he doesn’t understand that reality or, more likely, because writing about U.S. intel capabilities would have landed Mr. Bolton in legal trouble, he doesn’t go there.

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Instead he trains his firepower on the lack of coordination of the interagency process and lays the blame on President Trump. The breakdown in intel is there—but you have to read between the lines to find it.

The president claims he fired Mr. Bolton in September 2019. Mr. Bolton says he quit. In either case they parted on bad terms and now Mr. Bolton is getting even. The 39 pages of his book devoted to Venezuela include juicy tidbits from private conversations and closed-door meetings that many argue he was honor-bound to withhold from the public at least until after Mr. Trump’s time in office.

Trump critics will delight in these vignettes, as they support charges that the president is an erratic decision maker with a short attention span and weird fixations. Mr. Maduro can be expected to make hay out of claims that Mr. Trump has been privately critical of interim Venezuelan President Juan Guaidó, at one point referring to him as “the Beto O’Rourke of Venezuela.”

The Venezuela mess predates the Trump presidency. President Obama was clueless about the threats that the military dictatorship in Caracas and its handlers in Havana pose to the region, and his policies weakened the democratic opposition by strengthening U.S. ties to the Castro regime. John Kerry, Mr. Obama’s secretary of state, even declared the end of the Monroe Doctrine. Mr. Bolton thinks his Venezuela policy failed because Mr. Trump wasn’t sufficiently committed to its success.

In January 2019 Venezuelans cheered when Mr. Guaidó, then-president of the National Assembly, made a constitutional claim on the presidency. “The revolution was on,” Mr. Bolton writes. He ordered his staff to issue a statement in support of the new government while Mr. Maduro refused to step aside.

The U.S. recognized Mr. Guaidó, and Mr. Bolton argued that Washington should move fast with biting sanctions on the Maduro regime. For that he needed leadership from Treasury and the State Department, and he says he got none.

Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin takes the sharpest criticism from Mr. Bolton, who says that Treasury resisted oil sanctions and financial sanctions every step of the way. Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross explained to Mr. Bolton that Mr. Mnuchin was “more worried about secondary effects on U.S. companies than about the mission.”

The State Department wasn’t much help. In answer to Mr. Mnuchin’s objections to the oil sanctions, Secretary Mike Pompeo suggested that they be done “in slices,” a far cry from the shock and awe Mr. Bolton wanted.

Mr. Pompeo didn’t have a handle on the bureaucracy below him either. State’s Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs went into “open revolt against petroleum sanctions” on the grounds that they would “endanger embassy personnel.” Mr. Bolton writes that Mr. Pompeo one day called him, “uncertain about what to do about the bureaucracy’s resistance.”

Mr. Pompeo eventually went along with the oil sanctions, but Mr. Bolton worried that State personnel were simultaneously undermining coalition-building efforts in the region. Later, when Mr. Bolton announced in a meeting a plan to broaden and deepen the sanctions, Energy Secretary Rick Perry, National Economic Council Director Larry Kudlow, Commerce’s Mr. Ross and Homeland Security Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen backed him. “Mnuchin was resistant” and “Pompeo was largely silent.”

“Disarray” at the State Department and “Treasury footdragging” were harmful to the sanctions cause, Mr. Bolton writes, insisting that “time lost in internal debate was equivalent to throwing Maduro a lifeline.”

Yet the elephant in the room—where it happened—is the glaring absence of human intelligence on the ground. Mr. Pompeo’s decision to close “Embassy Caracas and withdraw all U.S. personnel” because he feared “another Benghazi” was a devastating miscalculation. In particular, when Mr. Guaidó launched an effort to unseat Mr. Maduro on April 30, 2019, the U.S. was flying blind.

Mr. Bolton’s tactical maneuvers failed, but probably not for the reasons he gives. The U.S. is in a proxy war with Russia, Iran, China and Cuba in Venezuela, and Washington fails to assess adequately its enemies’ effectiveness in the areas of intelligence, propaganda and strategy. Mr. Bolton’s narrative takes revenge but does nothing to advance U.S. interests.

Write to O’Grady@wsj.com.


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