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251
Espanol Discussion / GPF: Russia anally raped in Venezuelan oil play
« on: March 30, 2020, 08:33:06 PM »
•   On March 28, Russian state oil company Rosneft announced the end of its operations in Venezuela. The company said it will receive a liquidation payment worth 9.6 percent of its capital.

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Espanol Discussion / !A la carcel!
« on: March 26, 2020, 12:22:16 PM »
U.S. Charges Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro With Drug Trafficking
Trump administration charged more than a dozen other current and former Venezuelan officials with money laundering and other offenses; $15 million reward

Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro speaking at a news conference in Caracas on March 12.
PHOTO: MANAURE QUINTERO/REUTERS
By Aruna Viswanatha, José de Córdoba and Ian Talley
Updated March 26, 2020 12:50 pm ET
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TEXT
U.S. authorities charged Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro with drug trafficking and offered a $15 million reward for information leading to his arrest, in a sweeping set of actions that targeted more than a dozen current and former Venezuelan officials and escalated the Trump administration’s effort to unseat the leftist regime.

Prosecutors unsealed a series of criminal cases in New York, Florida and Washington on Thursday that they described as the product of a decadelong investigation and accuse Mr. Maduro and others of coordinating with a Colombian drug-trafficking guerilla group to flood the U.S. with tons of cocaine for the past 20 years.

Attorney General William Barr described the Venezuelan regime as “plagued by criminality and corruption,” saying that it was dominated by a “system constructed and controlled to enrich those at the highest levels of the government.” He spoke at a Thursday press conference held online because of the coronavirus pandemic.

While Mr. Maduro remains in control of Venezuela, the U.S. and nearly 60 countries last year recognized the then-president of the country’s national assembly, Juan Guaidó, as the country’s legitimate president.

The Venezuelan government didn’t have an immediate reaction to the indictments. In the past, Venezuela has rejected any U.S. accusations of drug trafficking, corruption or support for terrorist groups as part of a U.S. plot to destabilize the Maduro government.

The indictment comes at a time when Venezuela and the Maduro government are reeling from the global collapse of oil prices and U.S. economic sanctions that have shriveled the country’s crucial oil shipments.

The country, already five years into a depression that last year saw economic growth contract by 35%, also faces the threat of the global coronavirus pandemic amid a collapsed health-care system and a population suffering from widespread malnourishment.

In another case, filed in federal court in Miami, prosecutors accused the sitting chief justice of Venezuela’s Supreme Court, Maikel José Moreno Pérez, with taking millions of dollars in bribes related to cases he was overseeing and spending the funds on luxury goods and real estate in southern Florida.

The case against Mr. Maduro is the first time that the U.S. has charged a sitting head of state since Florida prosecutors indicted Panamanian strongman General Manuel Noriega in 1988 on drug trafficking and money-laundering charges. The U.S. invaded Panama the following year.

Mr. Noriega was tried in Miami and convicted of drug trafficking and money laundering. He served a long prison sentence in the U.S. before being extradited to Panama, where he died in 2017.

Mr. Maduro is unlikely to ever be in U.S. custody and face the charges inside a U.S. courtroom, but the Justice Department uses such “name and shame” cases to publicize allegations of wrongdoing that prosecutors believe they can prove to the standard of criminal cases—beyond a reasonable doubt.

U.S. officials said Thursday they remained optimistic that they would be able to eventually prosecute some of the officials, who could face arrest if they travel overseas.

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Martial Arts Topics / WSJ: NY No Bail Fiasco
« on: March 07, 2020, 08:29:20 AM »
The ‘No Bail’ Fiasco in New York
Crime is breaking out again amid a get-out-of-jail-free law.
By The Editorial Board
March 6, 2020 7:09 pm ET


You know New York has a problem when even Mayor Bill de Blasio admits it. On Thursday the New York Police Department held a press conference to report that major crime is up 22.5% this February over a year ago. Both the cops and the mayor attribute the spike to the bail reform pushed through the state Legislature in Albany last year, which is releasing people who have been arrested for one crime to go out and commit another.

“There’s a direct correlation to a change in the law, and we need to address it, and we will address it,” Mr. de Blasio said of the increase in crime. The mayor also said he was “absolutely confident” it will be addressed in Albany in the budget due April 1.


The Democratic Legislature, with the backing of both Mr. de Blasio and Gov. Andrew Cuomo, ended cash bail last year. The goal was to prevent cases such as that of Kalief Browder, a 16-year-old charged with stealing a backpack. Because his family could not afford bail he spent three years in prison on Rikers Island—much of it in solitary—without being tried or convicted of a crime. After his release, he ultimately committed suicide.

The sensible part of bail reform was aimed at preventing injustices such as this one. The non-sensible part was to deprive judges of the discretion to keep behind bars criminals who remain a menace to the community.

The law went into effect on Jan. 1, and the NYPD numbers are sobering: “In the first 58 days of 2020, 482 individuals who had already been arrested for committing a serious (felony) crime such as robbery or burglary were rearrested for committing an additional 846 crimes. Thirty-five percent, or 299, were for arrests in the seven major crime categories—murder, rape, robbery, felony assault, burglary, grand larceny and grand larceny auto—that is nearly triple the amount of those crimes committed in the same 58 days in 2019.”

Police Commissioner Dermot Shea underscored the main point: “Each number represents a victim.”

Some on the political left, including a coalition of public defenders, claim the cops are deliberately manipulating the figures as “scare tactics.” Ditto for Assembly Speaker Carl Heastie, who is blaming the New York Post, which refuses to take dictation from the city’s progressive powers. Mayor de Blasio is having none of it. “They’re wrong,” he says.

Another crime problem that Mr. de Blasio doesn’t acknowledge is the explosion of minor offenses since the City Council decriminalized such antisocial behavior as urinating in public, smoking marijuana in public, and turnstile jumping on the subways. This creates a culture of tolerance for lawlessness that the bail reform has compounded.

Polls show support for the bail reform dropping fast, and New York’s chief judge says it is the only state in which judges do not have the ability to consider whether a defendant poses a credible risk of danger before releasing him. There is a simple fix that would take care of the biggest problem: Give judges the ability to weigh this risk before letting people out. If Albany doesn’t fix this, we hope the voters run them all out office.


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Espanol Discussion / WSJ: Mexico Slides towards one man rule
« on: February 25, 2020, 11:49:20 AM »
Mexico Slides Toward One-Man Rule
The president uses his authority to muscle business and suppress dissent.

By Mary Anastasia O’Grady
Feb. 23, 2020 1:55 pm ET


A recent “invitation” to business leaders from Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador to attend a fundraiser at the National Palace was an offer many couldn’t refuse. Some 70 of the Mexican “suits” who showed up reportedly pledged to spend 1.5 billion pesos ($88 million) on government lottery tickets.

About half the tickets in the pot—another 1.5 billion pesos’ worth—remained unsold at the end of the evening. The drawing is scheduled for September, when up to 100 winners will take home 20 million pesos each. The proceeds, if any, will be earmarked for public assistance, which the president says he will allocate to the nation’s ailing hospitals.

It’s unclear whether the scheme can succeed, but the larger problem is that it looks like pay-to-play. Presidential fundraising for pet projects has the whiff of illegality because the state dishes out valuable concessions and no-bid contracts and can let unpaid tax bills slide. Yet when AMLO—the president is known by his initials—does it, no one dares stop him.

The Mexican economy did not grow in 2019 and the standstill is expected to continue this year because business and government investment has collapsed. To understand why, look no further than Mr. López Obrador’s use of executive power to try to make himself the savior of the nation.

AMLO has a utopian vision for Mexico in which he gets to decide what economic fairness looks like and how rich is too rich. Think Bernie Sanders en español. Not all wealthy people are brought low—only the ones who get in the way.

AMLO’s decisions to scrap the construction of a new airport in Mexico City and to force the renegotiation of natural-gas pipeline contracts have received a lot of international attention. His effort to cap salaries at the central bank may violate the Mexican Constitution and is seen as a ploy to chase out qualified technocrats so he can replace them with political loyalists.

This smells bad. Behind the scenes it’s even worse, as “the law” is used to spread terror among opponents. A key tool is the Financial Intelligence Unit, which derives its power from international commitments to combat money laundering. The unit, which is inside the Treasury, is supposed to investigate suspicious financial activity and pass the information to the attorney general. In practice, critics say, it is being used to gain control of institutions that ought to be independent.

Mr. López Obrador remains popular because Mexicans still see in him a guy who is willing to stand up to corruption and crony capitalism. Hot money chasing high interest rates in Mexico has held up the peso, and U.S. ratification of a new North American free-trade agreement has removed a source of market uncertainty.

Yet 15 months into AMLO’s presidency, the weak economy, rampant violence and a breakdown of the public-health system have diminished his popularity. All eyes are now on the midterm elections of July 2021. If his Morena Party and its allies win two-thirds of Congress’s lower house and strong support among the nation’s 32 governors, he will have smooth sailing in the second half of his six-year term. If the opposition surges, he may become a lame duck.

Meantime, he is working to consolidate as much power as possible. The lottery spectacle at the National Palace showcased his muscle. He lavished praise on the tycoons, congratulating them for meeting their moral obligation to contribute to his causes.

Privately many Mexicans snickered about what was seen as a blatant act of extortion. The misuse of the Financial Intelligence Unit at the Treasury is also worrying. It has been employing its power selectively to pressure the president’s adversaries.

According to Article 115 of the banking and credit law and Article 41 of the anti-money-laundering act, officials at the Treasury must safeguard the confidentiality of ongoing investigations. Further, under Mexican law all suspects are entitled to the presumption of innocence. Yet the unit has a record of violating both norms, making public statements of condemnation and freezing the financial assets of the accused and their extended families even before charges are filed and without a judge’s ruling.

The chief of the unit, Santiago Nieto, told me Saturday that the prohibition on speaking about investigations applies only to the attorney general’s office and that he uses his freedom of speech to expose findings. He said freezing assets is an administrative tool to block the moving of money.

But Mexico’s Supreme Court has ruled that freezing assets without a court order is unconstitutional, and the attorney general has complained about the lack of due process. Nevertheless, the weaponization of the unit continues, probably because it gets results.

The head of the regulatory commission on energy and a Supreme Court justice were both named as suspects—along with family members—in possible financial crimes. Both maintained their innocence. But the freezing of assets meant possible financial ruin even if there was eventual exoneration. Neither was ever charged but both resigned. AMLO replaced them with his own handpicked appointees. Tick-tock, Mexico.

Write to O’Grady@wsj.com.

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Espanol Discussion / Stratfor: Argentina default looms
« on: February 20, 2020, 04:09:54 PM »
Stratfor Worldview
In Argentina, Another Default Looms Ever Larger
4 MINS READ
Feb 20, 2020 | 21:52 GMT
HIGHLIGHTS
The IMF's latest assessment of the Argentine economy has sent a clear message to the country's many creditors: Get ready for a significant -- and likely painful -- debt restructuring....

The Big Picture

Argentina's economy is in a recession. And after several years of debt-fueled fiscal deficits, the country is also now on the brink of its ninth default. President Alberto Fernandez has attempted to satisfy voters by increasing public spending. But this has come at the cost of maintaining a budget surplus to ensure its debt is sustainable.

See Economics
What Happened

In a Feb. 19 public statement, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) said Argentina's debt was unsustainable, and that the primary surplus required to reduce its public debt was neither "economically nor politically feasible." In its June 2019 review of Argentina's aid program, the IMF noted a primary fiscal surplus of 3.5 percent was needed to stabilize the country's debt as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP). The IMF also projected a gross external financing requirement of more than $90 billion for Argentina in 2020. But a closer reading of the IMF's quantitative projections behind those previous assessments revealed that a heroic fiscal adjustment should have been undertaken to substantially mitigate Argentina's debt, which the IMF said has since "deteriorated decidedly." As a result, the IMF called on private bondholders to enter “collaborative” negotiations with the Argentine government to restructure its debt.

Why It Matters

By recognizing the country's economic reality, the IMF is setting the stage for what could eventually be a large-scale debt restructuring, provided Argentina also takes actions to stem the fiscal deficits driving its debt problem. Creditors have likely been preparing for major losses in their Argentine investments, given that the country's debt was already priced at distress levels in secondary markets. But the IMF's new sobering assessment announcement has likely put Argentina's bondholders on official notice that a full-scale reorganization of debt is coming — and with it, a substantial cut to their investments.

The Argentine government will likely weaponize the IMF's new assessment to justify a significant restructuring of its debt and make unreasonable demands of its foreign creditors. Earlier this week, Vice President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner called on the IMF to write-off part of its outstanding $45 billion in loans to the country. The IMF, however, promptly rejected this proposal. Convincing creditors that recognizing losses is a worthwhile endeavor would require a credible and comprehensive economic program that shows Argentina is on a realistic path to debt sustainability. Without that assurance, the country's foreign creditors are thus unlikely to accept such a restructuring. Unlike in a domestic bankruptcy proceeding, the IMF cannot order a "standstill," nor can it force terms on creditors.

The IMF has sent a clear message to Argentina's many creditors: Get ready for a significant — and likely painful — debt restructuring.

Moreover, the IMF statement didn't discuss the amount of fiscal retrenchment that such an adjustment would require from Argentina. As such, it remains to be seen just how much of the burden will fall on creditors, which could further stymie the process. The IMF statement could also embolden holdouts among bondholders that refuse to participate in a debt exchange and demand full payment, as with holdouts from the 2005 bond swap, precluding a critical mass of acceptance under collective action clauses in bond contracts.

Background

Argentina has defaulted on its external debt payments eight times in its history. Still, after defaulting in 2002, engaging in a controversial bond exchange in 2005, and not paying recalcitrant creditors until 2016, Argentina again borrowed heavily in global financial markets. As a result, Buenos Aires again began to struggle to make payments in 2018, prompting the IMF to support a lending program. In accordance with the IMF program, Argentina's previous government began to implement a small degree of fiscal discipline. But the unpopular cuts to public spending ultimately resulted in the election of a populist government in late 2019.

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Martial Arts Topics / Re: Tippy-tappy drills-- threat or menace?
« on: February 14, 2020, 08:21:20 PM »
ttt

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House-passed bill would allow more nonviolent elderly prisoners to serve the rest of their sentence at home, instead of in jail
GovTrack.us
GovTrack.us
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Feb 7 · 3 min read

Rep. Ted Deutch (D-FL22)
More people aged 60 and older could get a “get out of jail free” card.

Context

The Second Chance Act of 2007 allowed some elderly prisoners to serve the remainder of their sentence at home, if they were at least 65 and had served either 10 years or ¾ of their sentence — whichever was longer.

The First Step Act of 2018 expanded the number of prisoners eligible, by reducing the age from 65 to 60, and reducing the time served to either 10 years or ⅔ of their sentence — still whichever is longer. Terminably ill prisoners were also made eligible.
However, the program doesn’t factor in time off a prisoner’s sentence for good behavior, which under federal law can be reduced by up to 54 days per year of the original sentence.

That’s a departure from the standard practice of the federal Bureau of Prisoners, which factors in time off for good behavior when — for example — deciding whether to move a prisoner to a lower-security facility.

What the bill does

A House bill would reduce the home stay of a nonviolent elderly prisoner eligible for the early-release program, factoring in their accumulated time off earned for good behavior.

Unlike most congressional legislation, this one does not appear to have an official title.

It was introduced in the House on July 25 as bill number H.R. 4018, by Rep. Ted Deutch (D-FL22).

What supporters say

Supporters argue the recidivism rate for elderly prisoners is much lower than for younger prisoners, making their release to home much less risky — and that it would save taxpayer money in the process.

“We are making an important clarification to the pilot program that allows elderly prisoners to transition to home confinement for the remainder of their sentence,” Rep. Deutch said in a press release. “As elderly prisoners are among the most vulnerable populations in prisons, this fix to include good time credit will allow more of them to benefit from this program. Not only is this the right thing to do, but it will also reduce federal costs in our prison system.”

GovTrack Insider was unable to locate any explicit statements of opposition, although eight House Republicans opposed the bill in committee without saying why.

Odds of passage

The House Judiciary Committee approved the bill on September 10 by a 28–8 vote. Democrats voted unanimously 21–0, while Republicans narrowly opposed it 7–8.

It then passed the full House on December 3 by a voice vote, a procedure usually used for noncontroversial legislation in which no record of individual votes is cast. Considering that a number of Republicans opposed the bill in committee, it’s unclear why a voice vote was used in the full chamber.

But no Republicans spoke against the bill on the House floor, after lead sponsor Rep. Deutch gave his speech in favor.

This article was written by GovTrack Insider staff writer Jesse Rifkin.

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Espanol Discussion / Wild Capitalism in Venezuela
« on: February 07, 2020, 02:54:04 PM »


February 7, 2020   View On Website
Open as PDF



    ‘Wild Capitalism’ in Venezuela
By: Allison Fedirka

In a development that would have been unheard of just a few years ago, the government in Caracas is slowly and quietly loosening its control over the Venezuelan economy. Markets are opening, regulations are being relaxed, and foreign countries are participating in its flailing state oil company. Various Venezuelan media have dubbed this unexpected period of transition “wild capitalism” and “chaotic capitalism,” but whichever name sticks, the strategy of the government is clear: adapt or die. It’s a fairly pragmatic response to the actions of the U.S., which hoped that economic pressure, widespread public protests and international support would bring an end to the Maduro administration. Instead, Caracas has simply become more creative and resourceful as it seeks to remain in power – this time by integrating its informal economy with its formal one.

Economic Pressure

For nearly 20 years, the United States has opposed the Venezuelan government on political and security grounds. But Washington grew more impatient as the Venezuelan economy tanked, thanks largely to low oil prices, high social welfare spending and economic mismanagement. The social instability that followed was a perfect opportunity for the U.S. to tackle what it saw as a security threat head on to try to facilitate regime change. It employed a strategy of heavy economic pressure for three reasons. First, U.S. military intervention in Latin America is risky, unpopular and historically counterproductive.

Second, the strategy corresponds with a broader shift in national strategy away from military action as the force to bring about change. Third, the U.S. is the largest economy in the world and formerly Venezuela’s single biggest customer, so changes in trade patterns would disrupt the Venezuelan economy.

Initially, things went according to plan. Increasingly heavy sanctions aggravated the underlying weaknesses of the country’s economy. Working conditions and quality of life went from bad to worse for the vast majority of Venezuelans as hyperinflation, power outages and food shortages became commonplace. The economy has contracted for the past six years, losing roughly two-thirds of its gross domestic product from 2013 to 2019, according to the International Monetary Fund. Projections for 2020 remain bleak as GDP is expected to contract by another 10 percent.

Emigration – particularly among oil industry experts – was a problem even during the Chavez administration, but economic decay over the past two years has accelerated the trend. As of this year, an estimated 4.7 million people – out of a population of 28.4 million – have fled the country.
 
(click to enlarge)

Washington also enacted a political strategy of supporting Maduro’s enemies to capitalize on public discontent and usher in a new government, culminating with Juan Guaido, the president of the opposition-led National Assembly, declaring himself the president in 2019. For a brief moment, it seemed that pressures were aligning such that the U.S. would deliver the intended results.

Except it didn’t. Economic restrictions and lack of availability of goods expanded a robust parallel market that became essential for procurement of basic public goods. Before the U.S. levied its sanctions, economic hardship taught Venezuelans the value of acquiring and saving strong foreign currency, namely the U.S. dollar. Those who could established bank accounts in the U.S. Meanwhile, early expatriate Venezuelans, many of whom were educated and/or wealthy enough to find work abroad, provided a steady flow of U.S. dollars directly to their fellow Venezuelans. Indeed, remittances to Venezuela have risen sharply since 2016, totaling an estimated $3.7 billion-$4 billion in 2019, according to Ecoanalisis. (The increase owes to both the number of transactions and value of transactions.) According to a Consultores 21 survey, some 40 percent of the population has received remittances at some point in time and another 32 percent receive remittances on a regular basis. When government restrictions made it harder to get or use U.S. dollars, more informal or electronic means were employed to get dollars into the country. This rendered the local bolivar essentially worthless as bartering and foreign currencies have become the preferred choice for commercial transactions.

 
(click to enlarge)

Rather than fight the dollarization of the economy, the Maduro government embraced it. It relented on some currency controls and allowed a freer circulation of dollars because doing so would help to normalize the economy. After all, a recent Ecoanalitica report estimated that over half of the country’s transactions occur in U.S. dollars and that there are likely more dollars circulating in the country than bolivares. Changes in fiscal policy now allow for some purchases of foreign currency with a 25 percent value-added tax. This allows for fees and goods to be purchased and sold in foreign currency on a larger scale, making them more accessible to those with foreign currency. Businesses have also resorted to dollar-denominated transactions. Over the past few months, banks have begun to offer custodial services for holding billions of U.S. dollars and euros in cash for businesses that want to avoid ties with the government and thus evade sanctions. This may not be much help to those without access to dollars, but it has lowered inflation in the dollar-denominated economy while giving more access to more people for basic goods.

The Maduro government has eased off other areas of the economy too. It has let imports in and lifted restrictions on certain exports. Goods can now be shipped out of Cabello Port in Carabobo without the requisite red tape. Price controls have also been lifted on many goods, and companies have been allowed to invest what small funds they have.

But the most notable changes pertain to state-run oil company PDVSA. The lack of funds to repair dilapidated equipment, improve production and support business operations like refining has led PDVSA to look for support from foreign oil players, particularly Rosneft, to conduct its business. The government is also in talks with Spain’s Repsol and Italy’s ENI on how to partner or take a share in the company in exchange for capital and assistance in a scheme of virtual privatization.

Saving Face

All these measures demand a certain political flexibility to mitigate whatever risks they could pose, considering they fly in the face of Maduro’s previous policies. By allowing for reform, he has tacitly admitted that those policies have failed.

Caracas has made sure to sell the changes without losing face. In some cases it downplayed them. In others, such as dollarizing the economy, it simply passively allowed it to happen. The government has also attempted to employ traditional revolutionary rhetoric when publicly speaking of the changes, framing them as measures necessary to help the poor in Venezuela and respond to economic attacks. (The regime’s roots are buried deep in Hugo Chavez’s legacy; echoing him lends Maduro some legitimacy.)

Still, Venezuela is long past the point where it can downplay or ignore its plight. When Maduro opened the judiciary session this year, he acknowledged that the U.S. isn’t entirely to blame for everything wrong in the country – a pretty significant rhetorical departure for him – adding that more work was needed to transform the country. He received a standing ovation.

But Maduro still has to tread carefully. He shares a delicate balance of power with Diosdado Cabello, the head of the Constituent Assembly (the pro-government legislature) and current #2 in the governing PSUV party, and Vladimir Padrino Lopez, the minister of defense. (Economic liberalization would be particularly galling to a dyed-in-the-wool Chavista such as Cabello.) There are also two competing legislatures that would be involved in whatever economic change is made into law.

Which is to say that Maduro’s hold on power is still precarious. “Wild capitalism” hasn’t solved any problems – things are still very expensive, and not everyone benefits from access to foreign currency – and Maduro risks alienating his supporters by seemingly turning his back on the legacy of Chavismo. This means he is still vulnerable to losing power and opening a path for a more moderate Chavista to step in, rather than someone like Guaido who marked a complete departure from the regime. This is the opposite of what the U.S. had in mind.   




276
Espanol Discussion / Stratfor: Tracking Mexico's Cartels in 2020
« on: February 04, 2020, 03:11:06 AM »
Tracking Mexico's Cartels in 2020
Scott Stewart
Scott Stewart
VP of Tactical Analysis, Stratfor
14 MINS READ
Feb 4, 2020 | 10:00 GMT

Editor's Note: This security-focused assessment is an excerpt from one of many such analyses found at Stratfor Threat Lens, a unique protective intelligence product designed with corporate security leaders in mind. Threat Lens enables industry professionals and organizations to anticipate, identify, measure and mitigate emerging threats to people, assets and intellectual property the world over. Threat Lens is the only unified solution that analyzes and forecasts security risk from a holistic perspective, bringing all the most relevant global insights into a single, interactive threat dashboard.

Since 2006, Stratfor has produced an annual cartel report that chronicles the dynamics shaping the complex mosaic of organized crime in Mexico and that forecasts where those forces are headed in the coming year. When we began producing these forecasts, the landscape was much simpler, with only a handful of major cartel groups. As we noted in 2013, the long process of Balkanization — or splintering —  of the groups made it difficult to analyze them the way we used to. Indeed, many of the cartels we had been tracking, such as the Gulf cartel, had imploded and fragmented into several smaller, often competing factions.
 
Because of this, we began to look at the cartels by focusing on the clusters of smaller groups that emanate from three distinct geographic areas: Tamaulipas state, Sinaloa state and the Tierra Caliente region (Guerrero and Michoacan). When viewed individually, the daily flow of reports of cartel-related murders and firefights can be overwhelming and often appears senseless. But the violence is not senseless when viewed through the lens of the dynamics driving it. Our intent here is to provide the framework for understanding those forces.
 
This year's report will begin with a general overview of the past year and then examine and provide an update and a forecast for each of those three areas of organized crime. For a detailed historical account of the dynamics that brought the major cartel groupings to where they are today, please read our 2017 report.

A map showing areas of cartel influence in Mexico

2019 in Review —  Mired in Bloody Conflict

The forces that shaped the violence in 2019 were much the same as those in 2018, and as 2020 dawns, the regions are mired in bloody cartel conflicts that show no sign of resolution. Part of the reason is the involvement of powerful external organizations that can supply the money, guns and men to sustain weaker local groups and prevent them from being defeated. This dynamic has been at work for several years in Tijuana and Juarez, where local proxies supported by the Sinaloa cartel and the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion (CJNG) are locked in bitter battles for control. In Reynosa, the CJNG has thrown its support behind a faction of Los Metros, preventing it from being defeated by the more powerful Gulf cartel faction from Matamoros, attacking from the east, or the Cartel del Noreste (CDN), attacking from the west. But the CJNG is also being vexed by this same phenomenon. The Sinaloa cartel is funding a breakaway CJNG faction in Guadalajara, creating problems for the CJNG in its core area. The Sinaloa cartel is also reportedly backing anti-CJNG forces in Guerrero and Michoacan states.

As a result of these brutal conflicts, murders in Mexico set another record in 2019, hitting 34,582 — and surpassing the record 33,341 of 2018. The rate of increase, however, has slowed from the steep jumps seen during 2015-18. It is important to note that these numbers don't account for the many abducted and slain people whose bodies are buried in clandestine graves, burned or dissolved in acid.
 
Violence has been persistent in border plaza towns such as Tijuana, Juarez, Nuevo Laredo and Reynosa. It has been nearly constant along the interior routes where drugs and precursor chemicals are smuggled, as well as in places where opium poppies and marijuana are grown. Despite this, the cartel groups continue to produce and traffic large quantities of drugs, including South American cocaine and Mexican heroin. But the cartels realize their biggest profit margins in synthetic drugs such as methamphetamine and fentanyl.
 
Last year also saw an increase in the amount of cannabis oil that the cartels are producing and smuggling (often in 5-gallon buckets) into the United States. The oil is a concentrated form of cannabis, making it easier to smuggle than large bales of marijuana. And vaping has opened a market for marijuana cartridges, which can be manufactured using the oil.

Tierra Caliente-Based Cartel Groups

A map showing areas of Tierra Caliente cartel influence in Mexico

Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion (CJNG)

The CJNG is by far the most powerful of the Tierra Caliente-based groups, and it is involved in nearly every part of the country that is currently experiencing elevated violence. In Jalisco, Guerrero, Veracruz and Guanajuato, it is acting directly. In Tijuana, Mexico City, Reynosa and Juarez, it is working with local partners or proxies. The CJNG has aggressively sought control of ports, border plazas and areas where drugs are grown and where fuel is stolen. The government has reported that the CJNG has become the most powerful cartel group in Mexico and that it has a presence in more places than the Sinaloa cartel.
 
In looking from west to east, we see that the CJNG is working with remnants of the Arellano Felix organization (Tijuana cartel) for control of the Tijuana smuggling plaza; is supporting the Chapo Isidro group for control of the smuggling plazas in Sonora state against Sinaloa cartel ally Los Salazar; is supporting La Linea in its efforts to push Sinaloa out of Juarez and the drug-growing areas of Chihuahua state; and is backing a faction of Los Metros as it attempts to maintain control of the Reynosa plaza. Farther south, the CJNG is continuing its bloody campaign in Guanajuato state, where it is fighting the Santa Rosa de Lima cartel, led by Jose Antonio Yepez Ortiz, alias El Marro. The CJNG is also fighting for control of Michoacan and Guerrero states against an array of smaller cartels. In addition, it has pushed into Quintana Roo state, home to the resort cities of Cancun, Playa del Carmen and Cozumel.
 
This avarice has led to the group's leader, Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, aka El Mencho, being declared public enemy No. 1. The Mexican and U.S. governments have worked with other governments to track down and arrest members of his wife's family, the powerful Valencia smuggling clan, which facilitates money laundering for the group.

Other Tierra Caliente-Based Groups

Tierra Caliente is the most heavily fragmented region in Mexico, with dozens of distinct and often competing organized crime cartels in the states of Michoacan and Guerrero. The implosions of the Beltran Leyva organization, the Knights Templar and La Familia Michoacana resulted in the creation of a number of these groups.
 
In Michoacan, the remnants of the Knights Templar, including Los Viagras, and of La Familia Michoacana, such as La Nueva Familia Michoacana, fight for control of the state with the CJNG. One interesting development this past year was the creation of the Carteles Unidos (United Cartels), a group that combined Los Viagras and a number of smaller Michoacan cartel groups. The Sinaloa cartel may be supporting Carteles Unidos as a way to foil the aspirations of the CJNG in the state.
 
The militant landscape is further complicated by the large number of autodefensas, or self-defense, groups in Michoacan and Guerrero. These heavily armed militias often set up roadblocks and charge tolls. In July, two American citizens were shot dead and their 12-year-old son was wounded when they attempted to run a roadblock in Guerrero state.

Forecast

The CJNG will remain the largest and most aggressive cartel group this year. It will continue to profit handsomely from cocaine and synthetic drugs, and those profits will pay for its far-flung military operations and support for proxy groups. The CJNG can be expected to expand its operations to San Luis Potosi, Torreon, Monterrey and perhaps even Nuevo Laredo.
 
Efforts to roll up its leadership and its financial operations are unlikely to have a major impact on the group. We do expect to see more fractures of the CJNG in 2020, and if Oseguera Cervantes is finally captured or killed, his removal would increase the infighting and splintering. Guerrero and Michoacan will continue to be excessively violent in 2020.

Sinaloa-Based Cartel Groups

a map showing areas of Sinaloa Cartel influence in Mexico

Sinaloa cartel

While a great deal of attention has been paid to the July conviction of Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman Loera and his life sentence, he isn't the only Sinaloa cartel figure who faced legal problems over the past year. In December, Ismael Zambada Imperial, the son of Guzman Loera's partner and current Sinaloa cartel leader Ismael "El Mayo" Zambada Garcia, was extradited to the United States to stand trial on drug charges. Zambada Imperial was arrested in Mexico in 2014 and convicted on drug and weapons charges. The United States requested his extradition in 2015.
 
Two of his half-brothers have already been convicted in the United States. Jesus Vicente Zambada Niebla was arrested in Mexico in 2009 and extradited in 2010. He was sentenced to 15 years in May 2019 after testifying in the trial of Guzman Loera. With credit for time served, he could be released as early as 2023. Half-brother Serafin Zambada Ortiz was arrested in 2013 as he attempted to cross the U.S. border in Arizona. He was sentenced to 5 1/2 years in prison and released in September 2018.
 
The only son of Zambada Garcia who remains free is Ismael Zambada Sicairos, who is also believed to be involved in the narcotics trade. The U.S. indictment of Zambada Imperial lists his half-brother Ismael Zambada Sicairos; their father; and Ivan Archivaldo Guzman Salazar, the son of Guzman Loera, as co-conspirators.
 
Guzman Salazar along with his half-brother Ovidio Guzman Lopez are known as Los Chapitos (The Little Chapos). They made international headlines in October, when Guzman Lopez was arrested in Culiacan, the capital of Sinaloa. Guzman Salazar mobilized his group's gunmen and laid siege to the city with the support of the forces of Zambada Garcia. These gunmen entered a military housing area and captured some military personnel and their families. They used them as hostages, forcing the government to release Guzman Lopez.

Tijuana Cartel Remnants

The remnants of the Arellano Felix organization (Tijuana cartel) remain divided into two camps. The stronger faction is affiliated with the Sinaloa cartel and is run by the Arzate Garcia brothers, Rene, aka La Rana, and Alfonso, aka El Aquiles. The brothers helped Sinaloa wrest control of Tijuana from the Arellano Felix organization.
 
Their main opposition sometimes refers to itself as the Cartel de Tijuana Nueva Generacion, an acknowledgment of its affiliation with the CJNG. This conflict has been extremely bloody, and the state of Baja California has the second-highest murder rate for Mexican states (76.7 per 100,000).

Juarez Cartel Remnants

The situation in Juarez is quite similar to that in Tijuana. The Sinaloa cartel worked with a splinter group of the Carrillo Fuentes organization (Juarez cartel) to establish a firm foothold in the Juarez plaza. The CJNG is supporting other remnants of the cartel — Nuevo Cartel de Juarez and La Linea — to strike back against Sinaloa and its allies. This struggle also involves the battle for the city of Chihuahua and the drug-growing areas in the mountains of Chihuahua state.
 
Last year it appeared that Sinaloa forces Gente Nueva with support from the Los Salazar organization in Sonora were gaining the upper hand in the mountains of Chihuahua, but the dynamics changed and La Linea began to win back territory. Perhaps one of the highest-profile events tied to this fight was the Nov. 4 ambush of a family in northern Sonora near the Chihuahua border, which resulted in nine dead women and children. Most of those killed were dual U.S. and Mexican citizens.

Remnants of the Beltran Leyva Organization

Fausto "El Chapo" Isidro Meza Flores continues to fight with the Sinaloa cartel. Though his organization hasn't made much headway in gaining control over a larger portion of the drug-growing areas in Sinaloa, it appears to have had more success in taking control of smuggling plazas and fuel theft rackets in Sonora. It is fighting Los Salazar, the Sinaloa faction that has long held power in Sonora.

Forecast

Despite the many challenges the Sinaloa cartel has faced in the courts and on the battlefield in recent years, the organization will remain strong in 2020. El Mayo Zambada Garcia appears to have slowed the fragmentation that has taken a heavy toll on the group since the Beltran Leyva organization split from it in 2008.
 
The CJNG has been working hard with the help of its local allies to undermine the Sinaloa cartel's control of the smuggling plazas stretching from Tijuana to Juarez. The Sinaloa cartel has lost some ground, but it hasn't been decisively defeated in any conflict zone. This is why the battleground cities have remained largely in stasis during 2019, and we don't anticipate a major shift in 2020.

Tamaulipas-Based Cartel Groups
A map showing areas of Tamaulipas cartel influence in Mexico
Gulf Cartel Fragments
Many people, including the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, continue to refer to the Gulf cartel as a unified entity, but it is nothing of the sort. It has disintegrated into an array of smaller, competing groups that control smaller pieces of territory, such as Matamoros or a part of Reynosa.

The border city of Reynosa remains a hot spot as several cartel groups vie for control of it. The two main local competitors are splinter groups of Los Metros, formerly a Reynosa-based enforcer group of the Gulf cartel. After the two factions exhausted themselves in years of battle, they reached out to more powerful outsiders for help. One group aligned with the Gulf cartel faction from Matamoros, which is aligned with the powerful Cardenas smuggling clan — the family of former Gulf cartel leader Osiel Cardenas Guillen.

Los Zetas Splinters
Many people continue to refer to Los Zetas as a cohesive entity, but like the Gulf cartel it split from, it is heavily fractured. The Cartel del Noreste (CDN), based in Nuevo Laredo, has also attempted to capitalize on the Los Metros infighting and a push toward Reynosa from the west, but it hasn't been able to make much headway. It has a strong hold on Nuevo Laredo, and the territory it controls stretches into Coahuila and Nuevo Leon. CDN remains at war with another Los Zetas remnant, the Zetas Vieja Escuela (ZVE), or the Old School Zetas, for Ciudad Victoria.

The CDN has aggressively gone after government forces in recent months, specifically the special forces of the state police agency known as the Center for Analysis, Information and Studies of Tamaulipas (CAIET). The CDN has attacked hotels where CAIET forces have stayed in Nuevo Laredo and have ambushed many of their patrols. The CDN and their Tropa del Infierno (Troops From Hell) have suffered serious losses in these confrontations, and their threats are alienating the local population.

Forecast
The battle for Reynosa will continue to rage because of the support from powerful outside actors who have the resources to keep the money, men and guns flowing. In the Monterrey area, violence will increase in 2020 if the CJNG makes a concerted effort to establish its presence in the important logistical hub.
 
The CDN alienation of the local population will likely result in an intelligence windfall. However, we are skeptical that government forces will have the foresight to take advantage of the opportunity. But the weakness of the CDN will be noted by others, and it is quite possible that CJNG, ZVE or some other group will make a move on Nuevo Laredo in 2020.

Implications for Businesses and Organizations
Violence has affected almost every part of Mexico, including areas that are considered generally safer than others, such as upscale neighborhoods and tourist resorts and attractions. Most of the violence has been cartel on cartel or government on cartel, but with the organized crime groups using military-grade equipment, the risk of injury or death for bystanders is considerable. 
 
Moreover, these persistent conflicts rapidly burn through men, weapons and vehicles, forcing the groups to look beyond drug smuggling to augment their incomes. Many have resorted to other criminal rackets, including extortion, human smuggling, kidnapping, cargo theft and hydrocarbon theft. This is taking a heavy toll on businesses operating in conflict areas, forcing some to suspend operations in the states of Guerrero and Guanajuato.
 
We remain concerned that a significant breakdown or implosion of the CJNG could lead to a scramble for control of its territories, including the important commercial center of Guadalajara and the ports of Manzanillo, Lazaro Cardenas and Veracruz. Such a struggle could result in a significant increase in violence in those areas, or a drop in some cities as men and resources are pulled back to fight for control of these core areas.

277
Martial Arts Topics / Re: DBMA Tactical:
« on: February 03, 2020, 04:01:51 PM »
Marc:

I wanted to let you know that since we have started working together I have learned a tremendous amount. More so with the adaptation of your fighting (deleted)stance and the flexibility it offers for my Gunfighter series. I have found that it allows for a more mobile base to a more reflexive stance that keeps the shooter from becoming too lazy and moving into a Weaver stance.  Indeed, I think it no less an innovation than the Weaver stance and no less deserving of its own name and hereby propose “the Crafty Dog Stance”. 

Why?

You know how I feel about a restrictive position. The Crafty Dog gives a more powerful position to the shooter to start from  and makes movement easier. It is better for recoil management in a rapid shooting engagement and allows smaller shooters and women to shoot bigger handguns without all the shoulder involvement. It allows for better follow thru and for sure makes recovery easier for faster shooting and quicker target engagement for follow on shots. I just taught a three day Gunfighter course and some of the students had attended a previous course. They loved the new addition and thought it was better adapted to shooting as well. One student said it was more comfortable for him to use the Crafty Dog than a regular Isosceles because it put less stress on his lower back with all the kit on. Anything that helps our backs with 60lbs of body armor and kit  has got to be better than the normal. I wanted to thank you again for the mentoring and the new techniques you have taught me. I hope one day to be able to reciprocate as much. Frankie Mcrae

Director of Training
Raidon Tactics Inc.
37 PSR Gunclub
910-670-9236 cell
910-774-9370 office
Asked why it was dishonorable to return without a shield and not without a helmet, the Spartan king, Demaratos (510 - 491) is said to have replied: "Because the latter they put on for their own protection, but the shield for the common good of all." (Plutarch, Mor.220


www.Raidon Tactics

Frank McRae
Director of Training
He is the former head of the US Army Special Forces Advanced Reconnaissance Target Analysis and Exploitation Techniques Course (SFARTAETC) at Ft. Bragg N.C. He started his military career in the 1st Ranger Bn as an 11B infantryman. He served in the 1st Special Forces Group (ABN) Okinawa Japan, in Cco 1st Bn. 1st SFG(A) (C-1-1) where he was an assault team leader for F team,Troop 1 in the Combatant Commanders In-extremis Force (CIF) conducting operations in Operation Enduring Freedom. Advising, training and standing up the Light Reaction Company of the Armed Forces of the Phillipines (AFP). He was then assigned as an Instructor to the SFARTAETC at the Special Warfare Center and School in Ft. Bragg NC, was promoted and became the NCOIC of the course and awarded for having the highest graduation rate for the course in it's twenty year history . He also served as a Troop SGM Troop 1 and Team SGT ODA-354 in B co 2nd Bn 3rd SFG(A) CIF in IRAQ as an Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Force (ICTF) Company SGM advisor and combat leader on many missions in Iraq and also attended the Israeli Counter-Terrorism Course as an exchange instructor.


278
Marc:
I would like to compliment you on your recent developments in Close Quarter Combatives With the knife :
First, there is the "The Chupacabra", this is a specialized but very aggressive technique that I believe can be used by both Professionals and Civilians alike. I really like how it requires little training and is ready ”now” when you need it the most in a fight.
Second, there are the knives of your design.  I carry the larger version, the Akita, on my Battle Belt and the smaller version “The Shiba” in my EDC setup. Not only does the handle design, found on both knives, allow for ready access when the fight is already underway, it also makes for a secure grip in high adrenal circumstances.  No fear of sliding down onto the blade when a thrust hits something hard, even when the handle is slippery from blood.
Third, there is your integration of gun and knife for when the gun goes click instead of bang.  This gives a new meaning to a “secondary” weapon system. Not only does the transition to blade allow for ready and rapid lethality, it also enables returning to the gun to bring it back into battery without having to re-sheathe the knife back first. Not having to find the sheath and insert the knife without stabbing yourself during a firefight because you can return the gun to battery without having to re-sheathe the knife can be a real life saver!

Most all other techniques that I have seen tried in the past have this one fatal flaw, of having to take your eyes off the enemy when putting the knife back, yours takes care of that and I do believe the design of the knife itself is key to being able to do the correct and safe technique you taught.

I look forward to learning many more Knife and Stick Fighting techniques from you.

As you say, ”The adventure continues”.
Frankie McRae
Director of Training
910-556-9755 office
910-670-9236 cell
910-893-9887 proshop
www.raidontactics.com
www.37psr.com

280
Espanol Discussion / WSJ: Putin outfoxes Trump in Venezuela
« on: January 27, 2020, 09:53:45 PM »

By Jessica Donati, Andrew Restuccia and Ian Talley
Jan. 27, 2020 10:22 am ET

The Trump administration’s bid to replace Venezuela’s authoritarian leader Nicolás Maduro hit a roadblock after a meeting with Russian officials in Rome last year—and has never recovered.

U.S. envoy Elliott Abrams arrived at the Westin Excelsior hotel hoping to persuade Russia to withdraw its support for Mr. Maduro and to recognize Juan Guaidó as Venezuela’s legitimate leader. Russian deputy foreign minister Sergei Ryabkov instead demanded the U.S. back down from military threats and lift the economic sanctions intended to force Mr. Maduro’s hand.


Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow in September. PHOTO: SERGEI CHIRIKOV/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

In the months that followed, the U.S. campaign spiraled into a foreign-policy debacle, thwarted by familiar adversaries, Russia and Cuba, as well as allies, Turkey and India—all countries that one way or another helped Venezuela sidestep U.S. sanctions, according to current and former U.S. officials and Venezuelan opposition activists. The European Union watched from the sidelines.


The Trump administration, confident Mr. Maduro would fall, didn’t foresee Russia leading the way for other countries to eclipse the sanctions. In turn, administration reluctance to impose sanctions on Russian enterprises and others kept Venezuela’s oil and gold flowing to buyers.

This month, in a sign of how much the opposition is floundering, Venezuela security forces blocked Mr. Guaidó from entering the National Assembly building, where he was seeking re-election as leader. Mr. Guaidó, in a blue suit, tried and failed to scale the spiked iron fence.

Russia now handles more than two-thirds of Venezuela’s crude oil, current and former administration officials said, including helping to conceal export destinations. The lifeline has helped Mr. Maduro slow the economy’s free fall, consolidate his grip on power and weaken the opposition.

Almost half of the $1.5 billion in Venezuelan crude exported to India in the nine months after the U.S. sanctions was purchased by an Indian joint venture with Russia’s oil giant, Rosneft, according to a Wall Street Journal analysis of data compiled by trade database Import Genius.

The United Arab Emirates has imported around $1 billion in gold from Venezuela since gold sanctions were imposed in late 2018, according to Venezuela trade records. U.S. intelligence officials say the actual amounts are far higher, based on evidence that Venezuelan gold is leaving the country masked as originating from Colombia, Uganda and elsewhere. The exports land in Turkey, the U.A.E. and other gold-trade hubs.

The Turkish Embassy in Washington denied any oil or gold trade with Venezuela that breached U.S. sanctions. “The allegations do not reflect the facts, and they are only speculative and hearsay,” a spokesman said.

The Russian Embassy in Washington declined to comment. It referred to past foreign-ministry statements criticizing the U.S. for interfering in Venezuela’s affairs. Officials from India and the U.A.E. didn’t respond to requests for comment.

Administration officials acknowledge President Trump’s frustration and say the White House continues to press for Mr. Maduro’s ouster. Mr. Trump, pointing to America’s superior economy and military, suggested in a recent interview with the Journal that the U.S. had the resources to outlast Mr. Maduro. “We have a lot of options,” the president said.

Yet with an election, impeachment and attention turned to the Middle East, Venezuela has for now moved to a back burner, an administration official said.

The stalemate allows Mr. Maduro to take a star turn as David to America’s Goliath. He makes speeches and appearances nearly every day to show he remains comfortably in charge. He chided Mr. Abrams and other U.S. officials, saying they misled Mr. Trump that a regime change would be easy.

“They’re trying to save their jobs because Trump is furious with the lies they’ve fed him on Venezuela,” Mr. Maduro said in a recent address. “They failed, and Venezuela triumphed.”

Mr. Maduro’s hold on the presidency has been costly for what was once Latin America’s most-prosperous economy. Hyperinflation, high infant mortality rates and a shortage of medical supplies contribute to the humanitarian crisis there. Food, electricity and water shortages have driven an exodus of 4.5 million people.

Mr. Abrams, the U.S. envoy, acknowledged this month that the yearlong U.S. effort to remove Mr. Maduro hit unexpected obstacles. “We underestimated the importance of the Cuban and Russian support for the regime,” he said. “The Russian role in the economy, particularly the oil economy, is larger and larger.”


Elliott Abrams, the U.S. envoy to Venezuela. PHOTO: ERIK S LESSER/EPA/SHUTTERSTOCK
Mr. Guaidó, in an interview, sounded a similar note. “I think we did underestimate things,” he said. He called on countries to help block gold exports from Venezuela. “You have to try to bring pressure on those who support the regime,” he said. “Sanctions today are the only real tool we have.”

Mr. Guaidó’s approval rating had fallen by more than 20 points to 38%, according to Venezuelan pollster Datanalisis. Allegations against opposition members, including accepting bribes from Maduro cronies, have eroded confidence.

Despite the setbacks, administration officials said there are no plans to abandon Mr. Guaidó. Vice President Mike Pence last month summoned senior administration officials to a meeting in the White House’s Situation Room. U.S. officials later hosted a conference with opposition leaders to try to reinvigorate them, people familiar with the gathering said.

Mr. Guaidó’s backers see Russia as their principal obstacle and want the U.S., Europe and other allies to take a harder line on sanctions loopholes.

“Russia in my view has become the most important partner of Maduro,” said Carlos Vecchio, the Venezuela ambassador to the U.S. for Mr. Guaidó. “A multilateral approach on sanctions is critical.”

The EU hasn’t introduced sanctions or prevented Maduro officials from traveling to the eurozone to raise money and support.


Charles Shapiro, a former U.S. ambassador to Venezuela who is now president of the nonpartisan think tank World Affairs Council of Atlanta, said the Trump administration’s predicament showed the difficulty of regime change without military force.

“And if you use military force,” he said, “there are all sorts of other problems.”

The U.S. has warned officials in Russia, Turkey, the U.A.E. and India about sanctions violations in private meetings, U.S. officials said, but hasn’t moved to blacklist companies or individuals suspected of breaking the sanctions.

Policy options have split the administration. Some officials believe sanctions on Russia’s oil firm Rosneft and other companies doing business with intermediaries could close loopholes that have allowed Mr. Maduro to survive.

Others say they could undermine U.S. interests elsewhere, including Iran. India agreed to stop importing Iranian crude as part of Washington’s pressure campaign against Tehran, but it continues to import Venezuelan oil. India pays for the deliveries in gasoline, a trade that the nation says doesn’t violate U.S. sanctions.

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo hasn’t ruled out negotiations with Mr. Maduro.

“We will continue to tweak our policy to get the strategy just right, but we’ve seen no evidence that Maduro is remotely interested in having free and fair elections,” Mr. Pompeo said recently about direct talks. “As far as our strategy, the tack we’ll take, I’m sure that will change over time.”

Long road
Mr. Guaidó, 36 years old, was virtually unknown in Mr. Trump’s circles before he came to Washington with a delegation in December 2018. Administration officials and opposition leaders made a plan to put Mr. Guaidó in charge, and Mr. Pence was given a central role.

Administration officials targeted Venezuela, in part to punish Cuba and win support among Cuban Americans, a potent Republican voting bloc in Florida. Republican Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida and Mauricio Claver Carone, the National Security Council’s head for Latin American affairs, had roles in forging Venezuela policy.


President Trump spoke about Venezuela during a visit to Florida International University in Miami last February. PHOTO: KEVIN LAMARQUE/REUTERS
Cuba provides Mr. Maduro with intelligence and security services, helping to minimize defections in his government, U.S. officials said.

When Mr. Guaidó declared himself interim president in a widely watched oath of office ceremony a year ago, the U.S. swiftly recognized him as Venezuela’s legitimate leader. Canada, Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, Chile, Peru and other South American countries followed. They supported Mr. Guaidó on the grounds that Mr. Maduro’s election to a second six-year term was a sham.

Two days after Mr. Guaidó’s oath, Mr. Abrams was appointed as the top envoy to Venezuela. He was given one job: Remove Nicolás Maduro.

Mr. Abrams rattled some at the State Department, in part for his involvement in the Iran-Contra affair, a covert operation in the mid-1980s to sell weapons to Iran and use the proceeds to arm rebels in Nicaragua.

Some career State Department staff feared that any heavy-handed U.S. intervention would derail Mr. Guaidó’s popular support, while political appointees questioned Mr. Abrams’s support of Mr. Trump.

In March, Mr. Abrams met with the Russian deputy foreign minister in Rome. After Russia refused to back Mr. Guaidó, the U.S. envoy promised more sanctions and possible military action. After this article was published, Mr. Abrams said: “I and all the others in the U.S. party had very low expectations of what could come from the meeting.”

The realization that regime change wouldn’t be easy came in April. The opposition planned to have Venezuela’s top court recognize the National Assembly, headed by Mr. Guaidó, as the legitimate representative of the Venezuelan people. That would give the country’s armed forces legal grounds to abandon Mr. Maduro.

Guaidó supporters expected high-ranking Maduro officials to announce they were switching sides. The plan flopped, and White House frustrations erupted.

In May, secret talks brokered by Norway opened in Barbados between Mr. Maduro and the opposition, which called for fair elections. In August, Mr. Maduro quit the talks.


Mr. Trump met with Fabiana Rosales, the wife of Juan Guaidó, at the White House in March. PHOTO: WIN MCNAMEE/GETTY IMAGES
Looking back, the U.S. campaign originated with unrealistic expectations, current and former U.S. officials and Venezuelan opposition activists said.

“There was a firm belief, and briefed to the president, that all that had to be done was to recognize Guaidó, and Maduro would fall,” said Fernando Cutz, a former White House National Security Council official during the Trump and Obama administrations who was involved in U.S.-Venezuela policy.

The administration’s call for the Venezuelan military to defect and support Mr. Guaidó was wishful thinking, said Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue, a nonpartisan think tank: “The last thing the military are going to do is follow orders from a foreign power, especially the U.S.”

Mr. Trump complained to aides and allies that he was led to believe Mr. Maduro would be removed quickly, people familiar with the matter said.

The president directed much of his anger at national security adviser John Bolton, those people said, adding that those frustrations contributed to Mr. Bolton’s ouster in September.

Helping hand
With Russia’s help, Venezuelan oil output could return to 1 million barrels a day from a low of 650,000 to 700,000 barrels, Rapidan Energy Group, a geopolitical risk consulting firm, said in December. Rosneft is helping Petróleos de Venezuela SA, the state oil company, pay for overdue maintenance and the hiring of foreign experts, according to the group.

Russia has provided Venezuela more than $300 million in currency over the past 18 months—dollars and euros that have become more scarce under the sanctions, according to the Journal analysis of data from Import Genius.

Mr. Abrams said he still believed sanctions will work. “The situation of the regime is untenable and many people in the regime clearly know it,’ he said. “They would not keep sending their money, their wives, their children, and their mistresses out of the country if they thought it was stabilizing.”

Cynthia Arnson, director of the Latin American program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, said the standoff this month at the National Assembly underscored the opposition’s weakened state.

“At the same time,” she said, “the [Maduro] government has no real options for ending the economic, humanitarian and legitimacy crises that it faces.”

The issue surfaced at a Trump re-election event this month in Florida, a battleground state with the largest population of Venezuelans in the U.S. Some of Mr. Trump’s supporters in Florida have voiced frustration that Mr. Maduro remained in power.

Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross, speaking informally to a small group at the event, said the administration had expected the leadership change to happen faster, and that some officials sought more aggressive efforts, according to a person familiar with conversation.

A spokesman for Mr. Ross declined to comment on the meeting but said the administration is looking at all options. “The U.S. is 100% behind Guaidó,” Mr. Ross said Thursday in a TV interview.

—José de Córdoba, Alex Leary, Kejal Vyas and Vivian Salama contributed to this article.

287
Martial Arts Topics / DBMA Guro Splinter Dog Antone Haley
« on: January 20, 2020, 10:46:22 PM »

296


The Business Impact of Corruption and Impunity in Mexico
Scott Stewart
Scott Stewart
VP of Tactical Analysis, Stratfor
7 MINS READ
Dec 24, 2019 | 10:00 GMT

HIGHLIGHTS
Falling victim to crime can make business operations unprofitable, but cooperating with criminals can prove even more costly....

The detention in the United States of Mexico's former secretary of public security highlights how corruption reaches to the highest levels of Mexico's government. Former Secretary Genaro Garcia Luna was arrested Dec. 10 in Grapevine, Texas. He has been charged in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York with three counts of cocaine trafficking conspiracy and one count of making false statements related to bribes he allegedly received from the Sinaloa cartel to help facilitate its smuggling operations. Garcia Luna held the national security post in Mexico during the administration of former President Felipe Calderon from 2006 to 2012. Before then, he headed Mexico's Federal Investigations Agency (AFI) from 2001 to 2006.
 
Testimony from the Sinaloa cartel's former chief accountant during the trial of Sinaloa cartel leader Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman Loera incriminated Garcia Luna. Jesus Zambada, the brother of Guzman Loera's business partner Ismael "El Mayo" Zambada, testified that on two occasions he delivered briefcases containing $3 million to Garcia Luna. According to Jesus Zambada, the first delivery occurred in 2005 while Garcia Luna was leading the AFI and the second transaction occurred while Garcia Luna was secretary of public security.

The Big Picture

There is no disputing that Mexico's proximity to illicit U.S. markets has resulted in the rapid growth of extremely violent criminal enterprises. Crime and violence take a huge toll on Mexico's citizens and economy. But geography alone is not responsible for the majority of Mexico's violence. Other factors, such as corruption and impunity, have permitted the cartels to become powerful and to operate brazenly. Until Mexico can address these issues, its government will be unable to kill its way out of the situation.

See Security Challenges in Latin America

For those who watch Mexico, the arrest of Garcia Luna — who has been dogged by accusations of corruption — comes as no surprise. Former high-ranking member of the Beltran Leyva organization Edgar Valdez Villarreal, aka La Barbie, wrote a letter in 2012 published in the Mexican newspaper Reforma claiming he had paid protection money to Garcia Luna beginning in 2002. Garcia Luna and the Calderon administration denied the accusation, claiming Valdez was lashing out at those who had arrested him. But rumors of Garcia Luna's corruption persisted, regularly appearing in major Mexican news outlets such as Proceso. In fact, the rumors were so widespread that Forbes magazine named Garcia Luna to its list of the 10 most corrupt Mexicans for 2013. When Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto was elected in 2012, he subsequently abolished the Secretariat of Public Security that Garcia Luna had led; rumors of Garcia Luna's corruption likely played a role in Pena Nieto's decision.
 
Recent Mexican history is replete with law enforcement organizations being disbanded for corruption, and not just municipal police departments. For example, the administration of former Mexican President Vicente Fox created the AFI in 2001 to replace the Federal Judicial Police, an agency disbanded because of rampant corruption. Patterned after the FBI, the AFI was structured to block corruption spilling over into it from other agencies. Despite those safeguards, by late 2005 the Mexican Attorney General's Office reported that almost 1,500 of the AFI's 7,000 agents were under investigation for suspected criminal activity and 457 agents faced criminal charges. Because of this corruption, Calderon's 2008 police reforms disbanded the AFI and assigned its mission to the Federal Police in early 2009. Garcia Luna, however, managed to dodge a Mexican criminal probe into the AFI's corruption problem, and for that matter, any legal consequences in Mexico from the various allegations against him. This highlights another long-standing problem that has plagued Mexico: impunity.
 
While news reports following Garcia Luna's arrest have suggested the Mexican Attorney General's Office is planning to request his extradition from the United States for trial in Mexico, it is highly unlikely the U.S. government would comply. The history of prison escapes involving high-profile figures such as Joaquin Guzman Loera and of judicial malfeasance resulting in the release of prisoners such as Rafael Caro Quintero has made the United States wary of such requests.
 
In October, I wrote a column discussing how corruption and impunity were enabling Mexican cartel groups to behave far more brazenly and brutally on the south side of the U.S.-Mexico border than they do north of it. This case illustrates how corruption and impunity reach even the highest levels of the Mexican government. Corruption is even more pervasive at the state level and endemic at the municipal level. And Mexico is certainly not the only country in the region impacted by corruption and impunity: Neighboring Guatemala and Honduras suffer even more severely from these maladies — and even the United States is by no means immune to them. Among the dangers of corruption and impunity is the way they enable criminal enterprises.

Enabling Criminals

Corruption helps smugglers by allowing contraband (or people) to pass through ports, checkpoints or over borders when authorities accept payment to turn a blind eye. In several recent court cases, testimony emerged that high-ranking Honduran politicians and police officials took this a step further and accompanied high-value loads of cocaine to ensure the loads did not encounter any problems while passing through Honduras.
 
Corruption also helps criminals use the proceeds of their illegal activities, such as when officials allow bulk cash shipments to pass through checkpoints and when corrupt bank officials or businessmen permit money laundering through their organizations. The lure of huge amounts of criminal cash continues to be difficult for banks and businesses to resist despite the potential consequences, such as the $1.9 billion dollar fine HSBC paid in 2012 to avoid prosecution for laundering funds for Mexican and Colombian drug traffickers.

The freedom of operation that corruption and impunity allow criminal organizations to pursue lets them extort businesses, kidnap executives, steal cargo or hydrocarbons, or hide contraband within a company's products or shipments with little fear of legal repercussions.

Corruption also greatly facilitates criminal organizations' ability to acquire weapons, such as when corrupt officials look the other way when illegal shipments of guns and ammunition pass over borders. Many documented cases also exist of military or police officials selling guns to criminal groups, and in fact, the vast majority of the medium and heavy machine guns, hand grenades, 40 mm grenades, rocket-propelled grenades and other military ordnance Mexican cartels use is purchased from military sources in the region.
 
There have also been many well-documented cases in which police and military personnel have served as muscle for various criminal groups, in which police dispatchers have conducted records checks for criminals, and in which police command center personnel have even used government CCTV systems to serve as "halcones" (lookouts) for criminals.
 
Impunity follows corruption when law enforcement officials or judicial authorities are bribed or threatened into allowing criminals to avoid arrest, to be released without charges or to otherwise escape prosecution. Even when criminals are prosecuted, corruption often allows them to live like kings in their prison cells and to continue to operate their criminal enterprises from behind bars — or, as mentioned, to get out of prison through jailbreaks or legal shenanigans.

The Business Impact

All this corruption negatively impacts businesses by allowing criminals to operate brazenly and with impunity. The freedom of operation allows criminal organizations to extort businesses, kidnap executives, steal cargo or hydrocarbons, or hide contraband within a company's products or shipments with little fear of legal repercussions. We have seen companies shutter or suspend operations in parts of Mexico most affected by crime flowing from corruption and impunity, such as Guerrero and Guanajuato states.

Clearly, criminality can make business operations unprofitable. But cooperating with criminals as with money laundering can prove even more costly, as HSBC found. Paying bribes to corrupt officials can also create crushing liabilities: Companies have been forced to pay hundreds of millions of dollars in fines for violating the American Foreign Corrupt Practices Act or the U.K. Bribery Act. Until Mexico is able to come to grips with the situation, businesses will continue to suffer.

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Espanol Discussion / WSJ: Ivan Simonovis escapes jail
« on: December 28, 2019, 01:01:10 PM »
A Former Top Cop Makes a Daring Escape
Iván Simonovis went from Caracas police chief to prisoner of Venezuela’s socialist regime—then over a 60-foot cliff to freedom.
By Tunku Varadarajan
Dec. 24, 2019 6:18 pm ET


Iván Simonovis is celebrating Christmas as a free man for the first time in 16 years.

A former police commissioner of Caracas, Venezuela, he became a political prisoner in 2004 and spent much of the next decade in a tiny underground cell. In 2014 he was transferred to house arrest, from which he made a daring escape this May. Accomplices spirited him to Florida, where he now lives with his wife, Bony. With her by his side, he tells me in Spanish that he’s “trying to adapt to a life of liberty.”

Mr. Simonovis, 59, and his family—two grown daughters and a brother-in-law—are enjoying a traditional Venezuelan Christmas feast: hallacas, a dish that resembles tamales, plus bread baked with ham and olives, chicken-and-potato salad and papaya pudding. “For sure, this is a meal that very few people in Venezuela will eat this Christmas,” he says. Even if the ingredients were available, hyperinflation would make them much too expensive for ordinary citizens.

Mr. Simonovis’s story is, in many respects, the story of Venezuela under the Bolivarian socialist regime that has ravaged the country since Hugo Chávez came to power in 1999. The deprivation of freedom has accompanied the destruction of the economy, and the arrest and imprisonment of Mr. Simonovis—initially without warrant or charge—proves that no one is immune to the regime’s political vendettas.

Iván Simonovis became a police detective at 21 and eventually came to be a boldface name in Venezuela. He created the country’s first SWAT team, the Brigada de Acciones Especiales. In 1998 BAE acquired an international profile when one of its snipers shot dead a gunman who’d taken a woman hostage in the town of Cúa, 40 miles from Caracas. “If you type ‘BAE Caso Cúa’ into YouTube,” he tells me, “you’ll see what happened.” The episode was caught on TV cameras. The viewing isn’t for the squeamish, but it leaves no doubt BAE knew how to do its job.

He was promoted to head the Office of Operations for the national police. Chávez was elected president in 1999, and a year later the mayor of Caracas asked Mr. Simonovis to run his city’s police force. There he established “a professional alliance” with the New York City Police Department, importing many of its methods to the most dangerous parts of Caracas. “We tropicalized the NYPD,” he says with a smile. He enlisted the help of Bill Bratton, who had been and would again be New York’s police commissioner, as a private consultant. This association would come back to haunt Mr. Simonovis, as the regime later used it to support its contention that he was in the pay of the Central Intelligence Agency.


ILLUSTRATION: TERRY SHOFFNER
“This was a turbulent time in Venezuela,” Mr. Simonovis says. “Politics was really starting to heat up.” Chávez was consolidating his control, but the press was still resilient, and civil society hadn’t lost its appetite or capacity to fight. On April 11, 2002, provoked by Chávez’s sacking of strikers at Petróleos de Venezuela SA, the national oil monopoly, tens of thousands of demonstrators marched toward the presidential palace demanding his resignation. “His treatment of PdVSA caused consternation,” Mr. Simonovis says. “The marchers were angry. There were many there from the middle class, from the nicer parts of the city.”

The demonstration sealed Mr. Simonovis’s fate. “There was no way to stop the march,” he says. As protesters approached the palace, Chávez loyalists confronted them at the Llaguno Overpass. What happened there is fiercely disputed. Mr. Simonovis says that 19 marchers were shot dead and hundreds wounded. “I should add that some pro-Chávez people died, too.” As he tells it, the Caracas police—his officers—intervened to halt the mayhem, and that mostly involved protecting the unarmed marchers from pro-Chavez gunfire. Inevitably, the regime accused Mr. Simonovis of siding with the opposition. “That’s when the accusations started—that I was CIA,” he says. “They wanted a scapegoat for Llaguno.”

Two months later Mr. Simonovis resigned, fed up with the regime’s hostility. He started a security consultancy with clients in Venezuela and the U.S. He worked unmolested until Nov. 22, 2004, when he was arrested at Maracaibo airport on his way to a business trip. “They told me they had to detain me because I was a flight risk,” he says. “But this was my fifth trip to the U.S. that year. I always came back to Venezuela after my business was over.”

The most renowned cop in Venezuela was flown to Caracas in handcuffs and driven to the headquarters of the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service, known by the Spanish acronym Sebin. “They took me to a cell, 6 feet by 6 feet, subterranean, with no natural light or source of air, concrete floors, no toilet,” he says. “I didn’t know at the time, but I was to be there for eight years. Until 2012.”

He describes his life in jail in simple language, seemingly without rancor. “My trial began a year later, in a court in Maracay, 60 miles from Caracas,” he recounts. “For many years, until my trial was over and my sentence was passed, the only time I saw natural light was when they hustled me to Maracay and back.”

His trial lasted three years and four months. “I must have made about 80 trips, woken at the crack of dawn, bundled into a car with tinted windows, where I sat in the middle at the back between two policemen.” At Maracay he was taken straight to a cell, then brought out to the kangaroo courtroom, then bundled back into a car and returned to Sebin in Caracas. “I didn’t really see much sunlight, but I was aware of it for a few hours each time.”

His cell was “full of mosquitoes, with a clunky fan that just churned up the hot air in there.” The greasy, dirty food antagonized his stomach. His eyesight deteriorated, as did his bones. Osteoporosis set in. He was never allowed to see a doctor. “A male nurse would come down to see me and the other political prisoners, some bankers and others, from time to time. His verdict always was that I was a ‘healthy adult.’ ”

His wife visited him when the authorities permitted, sometimes with the children. Then she spoke to the press, indignantly describing his treatment. “Whenever she did that,” he says, “they punished me. They would curtail her visits. Sometimes, they would confiscate my toothbrush and other items of personal hygiene for weeks, just to degrade me.” After one of Bony’s fulminations to the press, he wasn’t allowed out of his cell for a month, except for one daily visit to the toilet.

When he first saw his wife and younger daughter, Ivana, after that ordeal, it was in the usual filthy visiting room, “a place crawling with rats. My daughter, then 8, thought one of the rats was a rabbit, they were so big.” Mr. Simonovis was unshaven and cut a figure that frightened the girl. She shrank back, and he reassured her that he was emulating Tom Hanks in the 2000 movie “Cast Away.” That film, he says, “really helped me. Especially the Hanks character’s idea to set a daily routine to keep sane.”

Mr. Simonovis set up his own routine: Exercises—sit-ups, jumps, push-ups. Contemplation. Reading. Writing, on paper smuggled in to him by Bony with the complicity of friendly guards. He painstakingly wrote a memoir, “El Prisionero Rojo” (“The Red Prisoner”). “My jailers weren’t aware I was writing a book,” he says, adding with a chuckle that they found out only once it was published, in 2013, while he was still in captivity. (He’s working on a second volume.)

In 2008 the court in Maracay convicted Mr. Simonovis of conspiracy to commit murder and imposed a 30-year prison sentence. “The future seemed as bleak,” he says, “as the verdict was absurd.” Chávez had consolidated his suffocating control. In the tiniest concession, Mr. Simonovis was permitted to go into the sun—for 10 minutes each morning. “Sometimes, it was just five minutes. The men guarding me were occasionally men I knew. It was awkward. Mostly, they were young recruits who didn’t know how to deal with a man of my rank.”

His condition eased in 2012. He was shifted to a military prison in Ramo Verde, 20 miles southwest of Caracas. There his cell had some natural light and air, and he had occasional visits by a doctor. “They treated me with more dignity here,” he says, because his jailers were no longer from the intelligence service.

In 2014, thanks to Bony’s tireless efforts, he was moved to house arrest—heaven by comparison. His wife stayed with him in their two-story, detached Caracas home. “I was permitted visits by close family, but no one else,” he says. He had to wear an electronic ankle bracelet at all times, and be available for three random checks a day, when he was photographed as proof of his presence. Often that meant rousting him from bed at 3 a.m.

Yet the security had its vulnerabilities. A police post outside the front gate was “manned by 14 or 15 cops who were bored out of their minds,” Mr. Simonovis says. He “set them up with a nice table, an awning to keep out the sun, and a TV connection.” They often wandered off “to grab a bite, or to meet sweethearts.” Behind the house was a cliff—a sheer, 60-foot drop to a road below. There was no police presence there. Who could possibly exit that way?

Mr. Simonovis could. Before daybreak on May 6, 2019, he rappelled from a balcony to the road below. He used gear that had been smuggled into the house over months. A waiting car whisked him to a safe house. His family, by this point living in Germany, were unaware of his escape. For a month, he sneaked from one hideout to another before being driven by friends to a fishing village on the Caribbean coast, opposite the Venezuelan island of Margarita. “We passed several roadblocks from Caracas to the coast, but we weren’t stopped.” Venezuela’s culture of corruption helped: The police were interested only in stopping commercial trucks.

At the village, Mr. Simonovis got into “a creaky motorboat” with a fisherman who’d agreed to ferry him to a “nearby Caribbean island” outside Venezuela. He won’t name the island for fear of endangering those who helped him, but he does say they swerved west. “We had bad luck on the way,” he says. “The launch developed engine trouble, and a trip that should’ve taken six hours took 12 instead.” When they finally sputtered into their destination, he was met on a desolate coast by accomplices, who drove him to an airfield.

From there a small plane carried him to Fort Lauderdale, Fla., where U.S. immigration agents awaited him. “ ‘Welcome to America,’ they said, as they took my decades-old passport, which was expired—a museum piece, really. It was the only documentation I had.”

Mr. Simonovis is now working with U.S. and inter-American agencies to build forensic cases against members of the Venezuelan regime who have trafficked drugs and laundered stolen money. “I want nothing more than the freedom of my country,” he says, “and to help bring an end to [Nicolás] Maduro,” who succeeded Chávez after the latter’s death in 2013.

After years of captivity, freedom takes some getting used to. “Sometimes,” Mr. Simonovis says, “when I’m driving on the highway, I have to pull over and ask myself, ‘Is all this open space for real?’ ” Unlikely triggers stir his emotions—not all of them as warm as the family’s Christmas. “In jail, you can’t imagine the value that a single cube of ice has,” Mr. Simonovis says. He didn’t have any ice for years. “Now, every time I hold a cold glass, I think of jail.”

Mr. Varadarajan is executive editor at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution.

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