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TEX PE. CODE ANN. § 38.02 : Texas Statutes - Section 38.02: FAILURE TO IDENTIFY



(a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally refuses to give his name, residence address, or date of birth to a peace officer who has lawfully arrested the person and requested the information.

(b) A person commits an offense if he intentionally gives a false or fictitious name, residence address, or date of birth to a peace officer who has:

(1) lawfully arrested the person;

(2) lawfully detained the person; or

(3) requested the information from a person that the peace officer has good cause to believe is a witness to a criminal offense.

(c) Except as provided by Subsections (d) and (e), an offense under this section is:

(1) a Class C misdemeanor if the offense is committed under Subsection (a); or

(2) a Class B misdemeanor if the offense is committed under Subsection (b).

(d) If it is shown on the trial of an offense under this section that the defendant was a fugitive from justice at the time of the offense, the offense is:

(1) a Class B misdemeanor if the offense is committed under Subsection (a); or

(2) a Class A misdemeanor if the offense is committed under Subsection (b).

(e) If conduct that constitutes an offense under this section also constitutes an offense under Section 106.07, Alcoholic Beverage Code, the actor may be prosecuted only under Section 106.07.


Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1987, 70th Leg., ch. 869, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1987. Acts 1991, 72nd Leg., ch. 821, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1991; Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994; Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 1009, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 2003.
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UNITED STATES v. STANFIELD

United States Court of Appeals,Fourth Circuit.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Billy Howard STANFIELD, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 96-4061.
Argued Dec. 2, 1996. -- March 31, 1997
Before HAMILTON, LUTTIG, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges. ARGUED:  Stanley Howard Needleman, Baltimore, MD, for Defendant-Appellant.   Philip S. Jackson, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, MD, for Plaintiff-Appellee.   ON BRIEF:  Steven J. Potter, Baltimore, MD, for Defendant-Appellant.   Lynne A. Battaglia, United States Attorney, Baltimore, MD, for Plaintiff-Appellee. OPINION

Law enforcement officials literally risk their lives each time they approach occupied vehicles during the course of investigative traffic stops.   As the Supreme Court has repeatedly observed, “a significant percentage of murders of police officers occurs when officers are making traffic stops.”   United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 n. 5, 94 S.Ct. 467, 476 n. 5, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973).   In recognition of the extraordinary dangers to which officers are exposed during such encounters, the Court has consistently accorded officers wide latitude to protect their safety, authorizing them, inter alia, to routinely order both drivers and passengers to exit their vehicles during such stops and to conduct the equivalent of “frisks” of automobile interiors whenever they reasonably believe their safety might be in jeopardy.

The advent of tinted automobile windows, however, has threatened to bring to naught these essential law enforcement protections.   Confronted with the grave risk that tinted windows pose to the safety of law enforcement personnel, we address herein whether the government's substantial interest in officer safety during a lawful traffic stop outweighs the intrusion on the privacy interests of the vehicle's occupants which results when, because of heavily tinted windows that prevent the interior compartment from being viewed, an officer opens a door of the vehicle in order to ensure that the vehicle's driver is unarmed and that there are no other occupants who might threaten his safety during the investigatory stop.   We conclude that, perhaps generally, but at least under the circumstances of this case, the substantial government interest in officer safety which exists when law enforcement officers must approach vehicles with heavily tinted windows far outweighs any minimal privacy interest the suspect retains in the otherwise visible interior compartment of his vehicle.

I.

At approximately 9:00 a.m. on the morning of April 29, 1996, three officers from the Baltimore City Police Department-Officers Mackel, Buie and Hamel-were patrolling a high crime area in West Baltimore known for its open narcotics trafficking when they saw a late model, black Nissan Pathfinder with heavily tinted windows illegally parked in the middle of the street, effectively blocking traffic.   See Md. Transportation Code Ann. §§ 21-1003(r), 27-101(a) & (b) (Michie 1996).   The officers, who were armed and wearing bullet-proof vests over their uniforms because of the dangerousness of their assignment, see United States v. Stanfield, 906 F.Supp. 300, 301 (D.Md.1995), circled the block and, when the driver of the Pathfinder made no effort to move his vehicle to allow a free flow of traffic, parked their unmarked vehicle in front of the Pathfinder.   Upon exiting their cruiser, the officers noticed that the Pathfinder's driver, appellant Billy Howard Stanfield, was talking to a man leaning from a second story window, whom the officers recognized as William Staten, a known drug dealer.   See id.;   J.A. at 151-52 (testimony of Officer Mackel);  see also J.A. at 19 (Government's Memorandum of Law in Response to Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence).

The officers approached Stanfield's Pathfinder from both the driver and passenger sides, and, as they did so, they noticed that the front driver's side window was down, but that the front passenger side window was raised.   See Stanfield, 906 F.Supp. at 301, 303.   The tinting on the Pathfinder's windows was so dark that Officer Mackel, who was approaching on the passenger's side, could not see into the vehicle.   See id. at 302, 303.   Nor could Officers Buie and Hamel see much of the vehicle's interior during their approach from the driver's side.   As a consequence of the officers' inability to see inside the vehicle as they approached, Officer Mackel opened the front passenger side door of Stanfield's vehicle in order to determine whether Stanfield was armed or had access to weapons and whether he was alone in the Pathfinder.   When Officer Mackel opened the passenger door, he saw in plain view, from his vantage point entirely outside the vehicle, see id., a clear plastic bag of cocaine protruding from the mouth of a brown paper bag which was overturned on the back seat of the Pathfinder.   See id. & n. 6.1 The officers arrested Stanfield, searched the Pathfinder, and discovered a nine-millimeter semi-automatic handgun, numerous empty vials, two contact pagers, and over 200 grams of cocaine.   See id. at 302.   Stanfield was subsequently charged with possession with intent to distribute cocaine and possession with intent to distribute cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).

Prior to trial, Stanfield moved to suppress the cocaine seized from the back seat of his Pathfinder, contending that the search affected by Officer Mackel's opening of the front passenger door was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment and, therefore, that the cocaine discovered as a consequence of that search must be suppressed.   Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the motion, upholding the search on two independent grounds.   First, citing Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 740, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 1542, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983), the district court held that Officer Mackel's opening of the passenger side door was permissible because Stanfield did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the interior of his car.   See Stanfield, 906 F.Supp. at 304 n. 9. Second, the district court held that, under Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983), “Officer Mackel was Constitutionally permitted to open the door to determine whether there were other[ ] [occupants in the vehicle] and if any weapons were within Stanfield's immediate reach,” determinations which the district court found were otherwise virtually impossible because of the heavy window tinting.  Stanfield, 906 F.Supp. at 304;  see also id. at 303-04 & n. 11 (“ecause Officer Mackel was unable to see through the heavily tinted windows of the Pathfinder, he had an objectively reasonable belief that Stanfield (or a hidden passenger) was potentially dangerous.”).

Following the district court's denial of Stanfield's suppression motion, Stanfield pled guilty to one count of possession, reserving the right to appeal the district court's suppression ruling that is now before us.   For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

II.

“[T]he ‘touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.’ ”  Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, ----, 117 S.Ct. 417, 421, 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996) (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1803, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991)).   And, as the Court explained in Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977), reasonableness “depends ‘on a balance between the public interest and the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.’ ”   Id. at 109, 98 S.Ct. at 332 (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2579, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975)).   Under this balancing test, the Supreme Court has consistently approved of protective searches of persons, vehicles, and even homes, during routine and other lawful investigatory detentions, in recognition of the paramount interest in officer safety and the extraordinary risks to which law enforcement officials are exposed during such detentions.

Thus, for example, in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), the Court sanctioned the now-familiar “pat-down” search, or “frisk,” because of the “immediacy” of the government's interest in officer safety, notwithstanding its conclusion that “[e]ven a limited search of the outer clothing for weapons constitutes a severe ․ intrusion upon cherished personal security,” id. at 24-25, 88 S.Ct. at 1881-82.   If an officer possesses a reasonable belief based on “specific and articulable facts” that the suspect is potentially dangerous, id. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1880, reasoned the Court, then the officer is justified in undertaking the “limited steps” necessary to “protect himself and others from possible danger.”   Id. at 28, 88 S.Ct. at 1883.

Fifteen years later, in Long, the Court authorized what are essentially “frisks” of automobile interiors during traffic stops, see Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 332, 110 S.Ct. 1093, 1097, 108 L.Ed.2d 276 (1990), holding that such protective searches are “justified by the principles ․ established in Terry.”  Long, 463 U.S. at 1046, 103 S.Ct. at 3479.   Recognizing that all “investigative detentions involving suspects in vehicles are especially fraught with danger to police officers,” id. at 1047, 103 S.Ct. at 3480, and accepting without discussion that an area search of a vehicle is less intrusive than the frisk of the person, the Court concluded that “the balancing required by Terry clearly weighs in favor of allowing the police to conduct an area search of the passenger compartment to uncover weapons, as long as they possess [a] reasonable belief that the suspect is potentially dangerous.”   Id. at 1051, 103 S.Ct. at 3482.2

In Mimms and Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 117 S.Ct. 882, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997), the Court even adopted bright-line rules that officers may, as a matter of course, order both drivers and passengers from vehicles during routine traffic stops in order to ensure that such stops are completed without incident.

The Court in Mimms held that the “inordinate risk” that exists every time “an officer ․ approaches a person seated in an automobile,” 434 U.S. at 110, 98 S.Ct. at 333, justifies a per se rule that drivers may be ordered out of their vehicles during lawful traffic stops, whether or not there exists any particular reason under the circumstances to believe that officer safety might be in jeopardy.   In contrast to the substantial state interest in safety at stake when officers must approach a stopped vehicle, the Court characterized the additional intrusion on personal liberty occasioned by requiring drivers to exit their vehicles and to move off onto the shoulder of the road as “de minimis,” “at most a mere inconvenience,” id. at 111, 98 S.Ct. at 333, and “hardly ris[ing] to the level of a ‘petty indignity,’ ” id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 17, 88 S.Ct. at 1877), reasoning that “[t]he driver is being asked to expose to view very little more ․ than is already exposed” when the driver is seated in his automobile.   Id.

Finally, repeating its oft-repeated observation that the government has a “legitimate” and “weighty” interest in officer safety, the Court in Wilson recently expanded the Mimms per se rule to allow officers to order not only drivers, but all occupants, to exit vehicles and move off onto the shoulder of the road during routine traffic stops.   See 519 U.S. at ----, 117 S.Ct. at 885.   While acknowledging that the passengers' liberty interests implicated by orders to exit vehicles might be stronger than those of the drivers, the Court nonetheless readily concluded that these interests likewise are “minimal” and necessarily must yield to the state's interest in officer safety, finding persuasive Maryland's common-sense argument that every occupant in a vehicle “increases the possible sources of harm to the officer.”   Id.

A.

1.

Notwithstanding that the Court “generally eschew bright-line rules in the Fourth Amendment context,” id. at ---- n. 1, 117 S.Ct. at 885 n. 1;  see also Robinette, 519 U.S. at ----, 117 S.Ct. at 421, we believe that the Court's decisions in Mimms and Wilson in particular would support a holding that whenever, during a lawful traffic stop, officers are required to approach a vehicle with windows so heavily tinted that they are unable to view the interior of the stopped vehicle, they may, when it appears in their experienced judgment prudent to do so, open at least one of the vehicle's doors and, without crossing the plane of the vehicle, visually inspect its interior in order to ascertain whether the driver is armed, whether he has access to weapons, or whether there are other occupants of the vehicle who might pose a danger to the officers.   Indeed, it seems to us that a contrary holding would not only be irreconcilable with, but arguably undermine altogether, the caselaw from the Supreme Court that was developed specifically for the purpose of protecting officer safety during what are, in today's society, frighteningly perilous encounters.

 Even where the interiors of vehicles are fully visible, “roadside encounters between police and suspects are especially hazardous,” Long, 463 U.S. at 1049, 103 S.Ct. at 3481, with as many as “30% of police shootings occur [ing] when a police officer approache a suspect seated in an automobile,” Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110, 98 S.Ct. at 333;  see also Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148 n. 3, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1924 n. 3, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972).   In fact, as the Court noted recently in Wilson, in 1994 alone, 5,762 assaults on police officers occurred during the course of traffic pursuits or stops.   See Wilson, 519 U.S. at ----, 117 S.Ct. at 885 (citation omitted).   Thus, “it [is]'too plain for argument' ” that the governmental interest in officer safety during traffic stops is substantial.   Id. at ----, 117 S.Ct. at 885 (quoting Mimms, 434 U.S at 110, 98 S.Ct. at 333).

When, during already dangerous traffic stops, officers must approach vehicles whose occupants and interiors are blocked from view by tinted windows, the potential harm to which the officers are exposed increases exponentially, to the point, we believe, of unconscionability.   Indeed, we can conceive of almost nothing more dangerous to a law enforcement officer in the context of a traffic stop than approaching an automobile whose passenger compartment is entirely hidden from the officer's view by darkly tinted windows.   As the officer exits his cruiser and proceeds toward the tinted-windowed vehicle, he has no way of knowing whether the vehicle's driver is fumbling for his driver's license or reaching for a gun;  he does not know whether he is about to encounter a single law-abiding citizen or to be ambushed by a car-full of armed assailants.   He literally does not even know whether a weapon has been trained on him from the moment the stop was initiated.   As one officer put the obvious:  “If the suspect has a weapon, I might not see it until he rolls down the window.   He may just shoot me through the window.” 3  If, as the Court has noted, officers face an “inordinate risk” every time they approach even a vehicle whose interior and passengers are fully visible to the officers, Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110, 98 S.Ct. at 333, the risk these officers face when they approach a vehicle with heavily tinted windows is, quite simply, intolerable.   In fact, it is out of recognition of just such danger that at least twenty-eight states, including Maryland, have now enacted laws either regulating or altogether prohibiting the use of tinted windows on vehicles in their states.4

In contrast to the indisputably substantial government interest in protecting its law enforcement officials from the danger that inheres in the lawful stop of a vehicle with heavily tinted windows, the privacy and liberty interests implicated by the opening of such a vehicle's door for the limited purpose of determining whether the vehicle is occupied by one or several persons and whether the vehicle's occupants are armed or have access to weapons, are, although not unimportant, comparatively minor, and will always be so.

It is axiomatic, of course, that “

• ne has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle,” in part because “its function is transportation and it seldom serves as one's residence or as the repository of personal effects.”  United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) (quoting Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590, 94 S.Ct. 2464, 2469, 41 L.Ed.2d 325 (1974) (plurality opinion)).   Because of this, and the fact that vehicular travel is, of necessity, highly regulated, individuals traveling in vehicles “must expect that the State, in enforcing its regulations, will intrude to some extent” on their privacy.  New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 113, 106 S.Ct. 960, 965, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986).

But, apart from the fact that there is a considerably reduced privacy interest in a vehicle's interior passenger compartment as a matter of law, the driver and other occupants of a lawfully stopped vehicle have already had their liberty curtailed.   Moreover, because the driver must comply with routine requests for identification and registration, he will be required at some point during the brief detention to expose the interior compartment of his vehicle to view through at least one window, if for no other reason than to interact with the officer.   Of course, when the driver lowers the window, then much if not all of the car's interior will be visible to the officer.   The additional interference with the occupants' privacy interests affected by the opening of one of the vehicle's doors would seem minimal when measured against the enormous danger law enforcement officers face when they approach a vehicle with heavily tinted windows.   Such an intrusion would seem considerably less than the intrusions affected by ordering the driver and passengers to exit the vehicle and to proceed to the shoulder of the road, which were held in Mimms and Wilson, respectively, to be “de minimis ” in comparison to the states' interests in protecting their law enforcement personnel under circumstances far less inherently dangerous than those existing when the stopped vehicle has heavily tinted windows.   Not only does the person subjected to the limited search entailed in the opening of the vehicle door not have his entire body exposed to the view of the officers and public, he also retains his liberty interest in remaining seated in his automobile during the duration of the detention.   Indeed, the actual invasion of privacy entailed in an officer's opening of the vehicle door is indistinguishable from, if not precisely the same as, that which occurs when an occupant is required to open a door to exit a vehicle pursuant to an order given under the authority of Mimms or Wilson.

2.

Even if there were reasonable alternatives to allowing officers to open the door of a vehicle with heavily tinted windows in order to ascertain whether the driver is armed and whether there are other occupants in the vehicle, we would hesitate to impose them on the law enforcement community as a matter of constitutional law.   As the Supreme Court has been at pains to observe, during Terry-type stops, officers “must make ․ ‘quick decision as to how to protect [themselves] and others from possible danger’ ” at times when they are “particularly vulnerable,” and thus it has “not required that officers adopt alternate means to ensure their safety in order to avoid the intrusion involved in [such an] encounter.”  Long, 463 U.S. at 1052, 103 S.Ct. at 3482 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 28, 88 S.Ct. at 1883);  see also id. at 1052 n. 16, 103 S.Ct. at 3482 n. 16. That is, the Court has scrupulously avoided substituting its judgment for that of law enforcement as to how best to ensure officer safety.

With that said, however, we are at a loss to identify an acceptable alternative to a rule such as that we suggest would be justified.   Upon a moment's reflection, it becomes apparent that neither requiring officers (while in their cruisers or as they proceed toward the stopped vehicle) instead to order occupants to exit the vehicle nor requiring that they order that all of the vehicle's doors be opened, represents an acceptable, or even a reasonable, alternative.   To require officers to order the vehicle's occupants to exit as the officers approach the stopped vehicle exposes the officers to the very danger to which we believe it is unconscionable to subject them, namely, that they might be fired upon as they approach the vehicle.   As the Court observed in Terry, it is by definition “unreasonable to require that police officers take unnecessary risks in the performance of their duties.”  392 U.S. at 23, 88 S.Ct. at 1881.   On the other hand, to insist that officers remain in their vehicles and order the occupants out ignores the fact that, with heavily tinted windows, the officers could never know whether all of the vehicle's occupants had exited;  and, eventually, the officers would still be required under this alternative to approach a vehicle which, insofar as the officers could know, still held passengers who might be armed and dangerous.   Ordering that the vehicle's doors be opened, of course, allows the vehicle's occupants legitimately to move about the vehicle in ways that would enable them to access available weapons, which represents a separate danger unto itself.

Therefore, in the end, we believe, it will be impractical, if not impossible, for law enforcement officers to neutralize the dangers to which they are exposed by virtue of heavily tinted windows.   There simply do not appear to be any alternatives to the bright-line rule we suggest, which would infringe less on the residual privacy interests that drivers and passengers retain in the interior compartment of a lawfully stopped vehicle, yet still allow law enforcement officers to take that control of the situation that enables them to minimize the risk of harm to themselves and to the vehicle's occupants.   Cf. Wilson, 519 U.S. at ----, 117 S.Ct. at 886 (“The risk of harm to both the police and the occupants is minimized if the officers routinely exercise unquestioned command of the situation.”) (quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 703, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 2594, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981)).   A bright-line rule that officers could always pursue the course of opening the door of a tinted-windowed vehicle when, in their informed judgment, such an act appears necessary to protect their safety, would not render the stops of such vehicles risk-free, but it would at least reduce to an extent the enormous danger to which law enforcement authorities are exposed as a consequence of the advent of tinted windows.

B.

 Even absent a Mimms /Wilson-type per se rule that officers may, in the circumstances we have described, open a vehicle's door to deter mine the number of occupants within and whether any of those occupants are armed or have access to weapons, however, Officer Mackel's opening of Stanfield's passenger door was fully authorized under the principles, if not by the direct holdings, of Terry, Long and Buie. Officer Mackel's belief that he was potentially in danger as he approached Stanfield's Pathfinder was imminently reasonable;  it would be folly to suggest otherwise.   Under Terry, Long and Buie, therefore, it is clear that Officer Mackel could have conducted a protective search of the entire interior compartment of Stanfield's vehicle to ensure his safety and that of his partners.   It follows a fortiori that Officer Mackel's much more limited search of merely opening the Pathfinder's door was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

As our previous discussion suggests, we are convinced that the presence of windows so tinted that the vehicle's interior compartment is not visible is, in itself, a circumstance that would cause an officer reasonably to believe that his safety might be in danger-as the district court held.   When the fact of the tinted windows on Stanfield's Pathfinder is considered together with the other circumstances informing Officer Mackel's judgment as he approached Stanfield's vehicle on the morning of April 29, 1996, we are satisfied that no reasonable officer would have failed to appreciate the potential danger confronting Officer Mackel and his partners.

First, Stanfield was, at the time of the stop, in violation of the state's traffic laws, having parked his Pathfinder in the middle of a two-way street, which was not passable by two cars simultaneously.   See Stanfield, 906 F.Supp. at 301.   Second, Stanfield's vehicle was stopped in the early morning in a relatively deserted area of town.   See id.;   J.A. at 128.   Third, Stanfield's vehicle was stopped in an area of Baltimore known for its open narcotics trafficking and high crime rate.   See Stanfield, 906 F.Supp. at 301;  J.A. at 53.   As we have often noted, where there are drugs, there are almost always guns.   And, as the Supreme Court has recognized, in a high crime area, “the possibility that any given individual is armed is significant.”   Buie, 494 U.S. at 334 n. 2, 110 S.Ct. at 1098 n. 2. Fourth, Stanfield was driving a vehicle which, according to the officers' testimony and the district court's factual finding, “is of the class of four wheel drive vehicles favored by drug dealers,” and is also “the preferred target of car thieves.”   Stanfield, 906 F.Supp. at 301 & n. 3;  J.A. at 163-64.   Fifth, as the district court found, the officers did not know and could not determine, because of the tinting on the windows, “whether Stanfield was alone or whether any weapon was within arms reach of the defendant.”   See Stanfield, 906 F.Supp. at 303.   And, sixth, as the district court found, Stanfield had been seen by the officers conversing with William Staten, a known drug dealer, immediately prior to his encounter with Officers Mackel, Buie and Hamel.   Id. at 301, 304 n. 10;  J.A. at 151-52, 237 (testimony of Officer Mackel);  J.A. at 19 (Government's Memorandum of Law in Response to Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence).5  Only the most foolhardy would not have believed that his safety was “potentially” in danger, see Long, 463 U.S. at 1051, 103 S.Ct. at 3481-82, as he approached Stanfield's Pathfinder.

There was more reason for Officer Mackel to believe that his safety might be in danger than there was in Long for Deputies Howell and Lewis to believe that their safety might be in danger.   The Supreme Court there held that Howell and Lewis were “clearly justified” in their conclusion that Long might pose a danger to them were he allowed to reenter his vehicle because (1) “[t]he hour was late and the area rural,” (2) Long had been speeding and had swerved into a ditch, (3) Long had appeared to be under the influence of an intoxicant, and (4) the officers had seen a hunting knife on the floorboard of Long's car.6  463 U.S. at 1050, 103 S.Ct. at 3481.   The Court readily reached this conclusion notwithstanding that the officers had already completed their detention of the suspect without incident;  they knew that there were no other occupants in Long's vehicle;  they also knew that there was no one else in the vicinity who could pose an immediate threat to their safety;  they knew that Long did not have a weapon on his person;  they had determined that, although Long was not impaired sufficiently that he could not drive, he was unlikely to initiate an assault on the officers;  and they had reason to believe that Long wished to leave the scene without further involvement with the authorities.

In contrast, here, Officers Mackel, Buie and Hamel had just initiated their encounter with Stanfield, who was driving a vehicle not uncommonly associated with drug activity;  they were in a high crime area known for its open drug trafficking;  they had, only moments earlier, seen Stanfield talking with a known drug dealer;  they did not know whether Stanfield was alone or accompanied by others;  they were unable, because of the tinting of the windows, to determine whether Stanfield, or any other occupants of the vehicle, were presently armed or had ready access to weapons;  and they had no reason to think Stanfield might be incapacitated in such a way as actually to reduce any threat he might pose to them.

If there was less reason for Officer Mackel to believe that he might be in danger than there was in Terry for Officer McFadden to believe he might be in danger, we are satisfied that the difference is not significant enough to warrant a different conclusion as to the reasonableness of Officer Mackel's perception of possible danger, especially given the greater vulnerability of the officers here because of the heavy tinting of the Pathfinder's windows.   Officer McFadden had observed conduct by Matthew Terry and his companions that was entirely innocent in itself, although suspicious to McFadden, a trained officer, who recognized the conduct as “consistent with [an] hypothesis that the[ ] men were contemplating a daylight robbery.”   Terry, 392 U.S at 28, 88 S.Ct. at 1883.   Under these circumstances, observed the Court, it was reasonable for Officer McFadden to assume that one or more of the men might be armed.   Here, of course, Stanfield was not engaged in entirely innocent behavior;  he was actually committing an offense, albeit a relatively minor traffic offense, when he was stopped.   And, it bears repeating, he was stopped in an area of the city known for its open drug trafficking, in a vehicle frequently associated with drug activity, and he was talking with a known drug dealer.   A trained officer certainly would be as warranted in believing that his safety might be in danger in these circumstances as in those present in Terry.   Of course, in neither instance need the officer have been “absolutely certain that the individual [was] armed;  the[only question] is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would[have been] warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.”  Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. at 1883.   As to this question, in this case, we have no doubt whatsoever.

Although the Court in Buie did not itself resolve the ultimate issue of whether the protective sweep undertaken by the officers was justified under the Terry and Long standard, which the Court there held was applicable to the officers' sweep of Buie's home, the Court specifically analogized law enforcement's interest “in taking steps to assure themselves that the house in which a suspect is being, or has just been, arrested is not harboring other persons who are dangerous and who could unexpectedly launch an attack,” to the “immediate interest of the police officers [in Terry and Long ] in taking steps to assure themselves that the persons with whom they were dealing were not armed with, or able to gain immediate control of, a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against them.”  Buie, 494 U.S. at 333, 110 S.Ct. at 1097.   The Court noted that an in-home arrest, unlike the typical encounter on the street, “puts the officer at the disadvantage of being on his adversary's ‘turf[,]’ [and that] [a]n ambush in a confined setting of unknown configuration is more to be feared than it is in open, more familiar surroundings.”   Id. Even so, however, the Court was hesitant to characterize either the risk of danger during an in-home arrest or the risk of danger in an “on-the-street or roadside investigatory encounter” as the greater.   Id. Based upon these overarching observations concerning the relative risks associated with in-home arrests and traffic stops, and with due regard to the relevant specifics, we are even unprepared to say that the risk of danger to Officers Mackel, Buie, and Hamel was less pronounced than was the risk to the officers in Buie.

First, and most significantly, any difference between the inherent risk existing during an in-home arrest and a lawful investigatory traffic stop due to the officers' lack of familiarity with the surroundings, was minimized, if not entirely eliminated, in this case, because the interior of Stanfield's vehicle was not visible to the officers.   Through the use of heavy tinting, the driver and occupants of a vehicle effectively secure for themselves, as Stanfield did in this case, a “confined setting of unknown configuration,” forcing law enforcement authorities to confront them on their own “turf”-not unlike if they were hiding in their home.   Second, some six or seven officers were present at Buie's residence to affect the arrest, whereas only three officers, were investigating Stanfield.   Third, the officers in Buie had proceeded to Buie's house for the specific purpose of arresting Buie and were fully prepared for anything that might develop in connection with that assignment;  unlike Officers Mackel, Buie, and Hamel, they had not simply come upon Buie unexpectedly in circumstances requiring a quick, on-the-street judgment.   Fourth, the officers had already arrested Buie and had only to depart the residence and premises;  at the time of their search of Buie's basement, the officers were not merely beginning their investigatory detention, as in the case sub judice, when a confrontation is more likely.   Fifth, two days had lapsed since the robbery in Buie, and, although it was certainly not unreasonable to think someone (in particular, Buie's accomplice) might be hiding in the house with Buie, the officers had nothing specific to support such an inference.   As the dissenting judge on the Maryland Court of Appeals said in his opinion on the remand from the Supreme Court:

From the information elicited at the suppression hearing, we do not know whether Allen [Buie's accomplice] had been arrested or was still at large.   The testimony at the hearing does not give any indication that Allen was seen entering or leaving Buie's home during the three day surveillance period.   In fact, there was no testimony that placed Allen at Buie's home at any time prior to Buie's arrest.   Neither is there information as to what type of relationship Buie and Allen had;  that is, we do not know whether they were longtime friends who spent a great deal of time together or whether the only time they were ever together was the night of the alleged robbery.

The inconclusive surveillance ․ does not help the State.   It surely does not permit the inference that the police thought Allen was at Buie's house, for if they had believed that they would have brought along his arrest warrant as well as Buie's.

Buie v. Maryland, 320 Md. 696, 580 A.2d 167, 173-74 (1990) (Adkins, J., dissenting).   Here, of course, while Officers Mackel, Buie, and Hamel likewise had no specific reason to believe that there were other passengers in the Pathfinder, they did know that there was someone in the vehicle (Stanfield) who, for the reasons earlier recited, potentially might be dangerous.

 In contrast to the substantial state interest in having the investigatory detention necessitated by Stanfield's traffic infraction conclude without harm to its law enforcement officials, the liberty and privacy interests which Stanfield attempts to protect are, for the reasons previously discussed, notably insubstantial.   Additionally, because, even according to Stanfield, the driver's side window was down when the officers approached the Pathfinder, the interior of Stanfield's car, as well as contents lying exposed on the back seat, were fully open to the view of the officers and passersby.7  Even had all of the Pathfinder's windows been raised, the undisputed evidence in the record before us is that Stanfield's tinted windows would not have prevented passersby from viewing the Pathfinder's interior under all lighting conditions.   See J.A. at 88.   Hence, it was only because of the mere happenstance of cloud cover that the back seat of Stanfield's car was not visible, just as in Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983), the interior of the open glove compartment was not visible to the officer only because of the happenstance that the stop occurred at night.   Therefore, as the district court alternatively held, it is questionable whether Stanfield had any privacy right at all in those portions of his interior passenger compartment relevant in this case, for there is no legitimate expectation of privacy “shielding that portion of the interior of an automobile which may be viewed from outside the vehicle by either inquisitive passersby or diligent police officers.”   Id. at 740, 103 S.Ct. at 1542.

 Assuming that Stanfield did have some residual privacy interest in the interior compartment of his car, the additional intrusion on that interest that resulted from the mere opening of the passenger door was inconsequential.   There is, of course, no comparison between the “severe,” “surely ․ annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating” pat-down of the person authorized by the Court in Terry, 392 U.S. at 24-25, 88 S.Ct. at 1881-82, and the incremental additional intrusion on Stanfield's privacy interests affected by the mere opening of his passenger door.   Similarly, the protective sweep of the home authorized by the Court in Buie, pursuant to which the police were authorized to search closets, showers, attics, studies, basements, and underneath beds, was much more offensive to privacy interests than was the search here.   And, obviously, the opening of the car door and perusal of the car's interior from the outside interfered less with Stanfield's privacy interest than would have a complete search of the vehicle's interior permitted under Long, which could have included visual inspection of any area in which a weapon might have been secreted.

We even believe, as explained supra, that the intrusion affected by Officer Mackel's mere opening of the passenger door of Stanfield's Pathfinder was considerably less than those intrusions authorized as a matter of course by the Court in Mimms and Wilson.   The opening of the door of the Pathfinder exposed to view little more of Stanfield's body than was already exposed to view through the open driver side window and little more of the interior compartment than was visible through that same window.   And, in contrast to the action that may be ordered under Mimms and Wilson, the mere opening of the door did not require Stanfield (nor would it have required any other occupants of the vehicle) to move at all.

 In sum, when the state's substantial interest in ensuring that its investigatory detention of Stanfield occurred without incident to its law enforcement agents is weighed in the balance with Stanfield's privacy interests implicated by Officer Mackel's search, there can be no doubt but that the search was reasonable under the circumstances and appropriately limited in scope.   What was said of Officer McFadden's actions in Terry is no less true of Officer Mackel's actions here:

We cannot say his decision [to open the passenger door to Stanfield's Pathfinder in order to determine whether there were other passengers in the vehicle or whether the driver or other had access to weapons] was the product of a volatile or inventive imagination, or was undertaken simply as an act of harassment;  the record evidences the tempered act of a policeman who in the course of an investigation had to make a quick decision as to how to protect himself and others from possible danger, and took limited steps to do so.

392 U.S. at 28, 88 S.Ct. at 1883.   To hold otherwise than we do today would be “to require that police officers take unnecessary risks in the performance of their duties,” Terry, 392 U.S. at 23, 88 S.Ct. at 1881, something which, as the Supreme Court has

consistently held, the Constitution does not require.8

III.

Because Officer Mackel was engaged in a reasonable protective search when he opened Stanfield's passenger door for the limited purpose of determining whether Stanfield was armed and whether there were any other occupants within the vehicle who might pose a danger to him or his partners, and because the cocaine that Stanfield seeks to suppress was seen by Officer Mackel in plain view during the conduct of this reasonable search, the district court's denial of Stanfield's motion to suppress is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The recited facts are those as found by the district court.   A number of the material facts were vigorously disputed at the suppression hearing and, ultimately, the district court did not fully credit the testimony of either the officers or Stanfield, a fact which brings the case to us in a somewhat awkward posture.   For example, the officers testified that both the front driver and passenger side windows were open, and that the cocaine was seen through the open passenger window.   See Stanfield, 906 F.Supp. at 301.   The district court, for reasons we find difficult to understand, rejected this testimony seemingly for the reason alone that it was fifty-nine degrees on the day in question, and therefore “it seem[ed] more likely than not that [Stanfield] would have left the passenger's side window up.”   See id. at 303 n. 5. Stanfield, for his part, testified that the passenger side window was raised and that Officer Mackel opened the passenger side door, climbed inside the vehicle, and searched under the back seat to find the cocaine.   See id. at 302.   The district court specifically found, however, that the cocaine was in plain view once Officer Mackel opened the passenger side door and that Officer Mackel, contrary to Stanfield's contention, neither entered the vehicle nor searched under the vehicle's seat.   See id. at 303 n. 6.

2.   The Court expressly extendedTerry and Long in Buie, authorizing, “in conjunction with ․ in-home arrest,” 494 U.S. at 337, 110 S.Ct. at 1099, protective sweeps even of personal residences, where a reasonably prudent officer, based upon articulable facts, would believe “that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.”   Id. at 334, 110 S.Ct. at 1098 (stating that the adopted standard “is no more and no less than was required in Terry and Long, and as in those cases, we think this balance is the proper one.”).   Although the Court remanded for application of this standard, it concluded that, even though the suspect sought by police had been arrested and handcuffed, and all discernible threat to the police had been neutralized, a “cursory search” of Buie's house still might be permissible on the ground that the house could “harbor[ ] other persons who are dangerous and who could unexpectedly launch an attack” on the officers.   Buie, 494 U.S. at 333, 110 S.Ct. at 1098.   Not surprisingly, the Maryland Court of Appeals on remand did in fact hold that the cursory search of Buie's basement was reasonable.   See Buie v. Maryland, 320 Md. 696, 580 A.2d 167, 172 (1990).

3.   Leef Smith, “They're Dark No More,” The Washington Post, Dec. 4, 1996, at VO4 (explaining that suspected gang members often drive around “in cars whose windows are all but blacked out,” using the cover created by the tinting to “hide illegal activities”) (statement of Officer Linda Hudson);  see also, e.g., Norman Peckham, “Phoenix Now Enforcing Window Tint Law,” The Tucson Citizen, March 17, 1995, at 9E (“Heavy tint may conceal the fact that the occupant may have a weapon.”) (statement of Officer Eugene Mejia);  Caroline Lemke, “In the Dark:  Tinted Windows Give Cars A Cool Look, But Some Are Illegal,” The Los Angeles Times, February 13, 1992, at 2 (When a car has tinted windows “t is hard for an officer to see into [that] car.   A gun could be pointed at you.   It puts you in a vulnerable position.”) (statement of Officer John Marinez).

4.   See Alabama Code § 32-5-215(e) (Michie 1996);  Arkansas Code of 1987 Ann. § 27-37-306 (1987-95);  Connecticut Gen.Stat. Ann. § 14-99g(b) (West 1996);  Delaware Code. Ann. Title 21 § 4313 (1975-95);  Code of Georgia § 40-8-73.1 (1982-96);  Idaho Code § 49-944(1) (Michie 1948-96);  West's Smith-Hurd Illinois Comp. Stat. Ann. § 5/12-503 (West 1996);  West's Ann. Indiana Code § 9-19-19-4(c) (West 1996);  Baldwin's Kentucky Rev. Stat. Ann. § 189.110(3) (Banks-Baldwin 1996);  West's Louisiana Stat. Ann. R.S. 32:361.1 (West 1996);  Maine Revised Stat. Ann. Title 29 § 1916(3) (1996);  Maryland Transportation Code § 22-406 (Michie 1957-96);  Michigan Comp. Laws Ann. § 257.709 (1996);  Mississippi Code 1972 Ann. § 63-7-59 (1995);  Montana Code Ann. § 61-9-405 (1978-95);  Nebraska Rev. Stat. of 1943 § 60-6,257 (1995);  Nevada Rev. Stat. § 484.6195 (1995);  New Hampshire Stat. Ann. § 265:95 (1995);  Gen Stat. of North Carolina § 20-127(b) (Michie 1944-96);  North Dakota Century Code § 39-21-39 (Michie 1995);  Baldwin's Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 4513.241 (Baldwin-Banks 1996);  1995 Oregon Rev. Stat. § 815.221 (1995);  Code of Laws of South Carolina 1976 Ann. § 56-5-5015 (1995);  Tennessee Code Ann. § 55-9-107 (1955-96);  Utah Code, 1953 § 41-6-149 (Michie 1987-96);  Code of Virginia § 46.2-1052(C)(1) (Michie 1982-96);  Wyoming Stat.1977 § 31-5-962(b) (1977-96);  West's Revised Code of Washington Ann. § 46.37.430(5) (1996).  The District of Columbia and Puerto Rico have done so as well.   See District of Columbia Code 1981 § 40-718.1 (1981-96);  Laws of Puerto Rico Ann. Title 9 § 1134 (1994).

5.   Although the government opposed Stanfield's suppression motion, see Government's Memorandum of Law in Response to Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence, J.A. at 18-40, on appeal it inexplicably conceded error and then went to quite unusual lengths to have the case decided on the briefs and without oral argument.   Unwilling to reverse the district court's judgment summarily, we ordered the reluctant Assistant United States Attorney, Philip S. Jackson, to appear and argue the case.   When confronted by the court with the Supreme Court authorities described above, and questioned why he was unable even to advance good-faith arguments before this court in support of the district court's judgment, Mr. Jackson represented to the court that he had confessed error solely because, in his view, there was no basis for the district court's finding that Staten was a known drug dealer, a view that was nowhere mentioned in the government's three and one-half page brief.   Mr. Jackson thereafter, however, conceded that neither he nor the United States had any basis at all for challenging the district court's finding as clearly erroneous, ultimately acknowledging that if that finding were sustained, the United States had improperly confessed constitutional error.We find the district court's finding to be amply supported by the record, especially the testimony of Officer Mackel, in response to questions from Stanfield's counsel:Q: What really happened here was that you were on routine patrol, in your bullet proof vests, and you saw Mr. Stanfield talking to someone who you knew, isn't that correct?A: Once I pulled into the block, that is correct.   I recognized who it was.․Q:  ․ Now, when you saw Mr. Stanfield talking to someone, isn't it true that that is why you really stopped your vehicle and got out of the car and started investigating Mr. Stanfield?A: No.Q: Isn't it true that that person [Staten] you had known through previous, I guess through some previous dealings, that he might be or was a law breaker?A: Yes, I had dealings with Mr. Staten before.Q: And the real reason you got out of the car, all three of you, had nothing to do with being double parked, but you wanted to see what was up, isn't that correct?A: No, that is not true.Q: And you really, all you really had was a hunch and you just wanted to go in and see what was up?J.A. at 152.It is plain from this exchange between defendant's own counsel and Officer Mackel that defense counsel himself understood that Officer Mackel had previously had “dealings” with Staten in connection with drug transactions.   Stanfield even contended to the district court that, as the officers exited their cruiser, “one of the officers then shouted up to William [Staten] and asked [Staten] whether he had stopped dealing drugs.”   See J.A. at 238.It is plain that defense counsel's strategy was to develop a case that the officers had relied upon the pretext of Stanfield's traffic offense to investigate their “hunch” that, because Stanfield was talking to a known drug dealer, he might be engaged in a drug transaction, and, in fact, this was the very argument defendant advanced before the district court, see J.A. at 238 (opinion of district court) (“Stanfield argues that the officers were not attracted to him because of any traffic violation but because they were investigating drug trafficking.”).   Indeed, although Stanfield (for obvious reasons) does not mention the officers' previous dealings with Staten in his submissions to this court, one of Stanfield's two assignments of error from the district court's denial of his suppression motion was that the officers acted only on this hunch.   See Appellant's Br. at 2-9.It is evident, therefore, that the district court's finding that Stanfield was talking with a man known by the officers to be a drug dealer is unassailable.   The Assistant United States Attorney himself, albeit in direct contradiction of his own representations before us, even represented to the district court that “[a]n officer recognized th[e] individual [to whom Stanfield was talking] as William Staten, an individual about whom [the officer] had received information indicating Staten's involvement in the distribution of controlled substances.”   See Government's Memorandum of Law in Response to Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence, J.A. at 18, 19.

6.   When listing the circumstances supporting the reasonableness of the officers' belief that they might be in danger if Long were allowed to reenter his vehicle, the Court did, as noted, mention that the officers had earlier seen the hunting knife on the floorboard of Long's automobile.   It is relatively clear, however, that the knife was mentioned more in support of the court's alternative holding that the search of Long's person was also reasonable, and that the presence of the knife played little, if any, role in the Court's determination that Officers Howell and Lewis were reasonable in their belief that their safety might be at risk if Long were allowed to reenter his car, see 463 U.S. at 1050 & n. 15, 103 S.Ct. at 3481 & n. 15. When it mentioned the knife, the Court even noted that “ Long was not frisked until the officers observed that there was a large knife in the interior of the car into which Long was about to reenter,” id. at 1050, 103 S.Ct. at 3481 (emphasis added), and, as the Court had noted earlier, after observing the knife on the floorboard, “[t]he officers [had] stopped Long's progress and subjected him to a Terry protective pat-down.”   Id. at 1036, 103 S.Ct. at 3474.   As the Court explained, the question with respect to the search of the vehicle's passenger compartment was whether the officers acted “unreasonably in taking preventive measures to ensure that there were no other weapons [other than the knife] within Long's immediate grasp before permitting him to reenter his automobile.”   Id. at 1051, 103 S.Ct. at 3482 (emphasis added).

7.   This fact, of course, suggests that the district court's denial of Stanfield's suppression motion might well be sustainable on the alternative ground that the cocaine would inevitably have been discovered by Officer Buie or Officer Hamel, even had it not been discovered by Officer Mackel.   Where the preponderance of evidence establishes that the information would “ultimately or inevitably” have “been discovered by means wholly independent of any constitutional violation,” the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule allows the prosecution to admit the evidence obtained through an illegal search.  Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 2508-09, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984).

8.   Stanfield also argues that the initial seizure of his vehicle was illegal because the officers stopped his vehicle in order to investigate possible drug trafficking, not, as the officers contended, because he was in violation of the state's traffic laws.   See supra note 5. Because, as the Supreme Court has recently held, an officer's subjective state of mind in stopping a vehicle is irrelevant to the constitutionality of the stop, see Robinette, 519 U.S. at ----, 117 S.Ct. at 420 (“ ‘Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.’ ”) (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 1723-24, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978));  Whren v. U.S., 517U.S. 806, ----, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1774, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (“[Our] cases foreclose any argument that the constitutional reasonableness of a traffic stop depends on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved.”), the district court was unquestionably correct in rejecting this argument.

LUTTIG, Circuit Judge:

Affirmed by published opinion.   Judge LUTTIG wrote the opinion, in which Judges HAMILTON and WILLIAMS joined.
.

Ummm , , , no.  I find it somehow intriguing.

Q:  You find the officer's illegal search of the vehicle OK?

Q:  What do you make of the variance between the letter of the law and reality?

Q:  What do you make of matter about his wanting to view the video by himself first?  I for one have had experience with police lying about me in court that was revealed only by the judge requiring each to testify without the other present.

How do you know the search was illegal? Facts not in evidence. Technically, looking inside the vehicle is a plain view search, though it's not colloquially called a search. also, the courts have upheld opening car doors for officer safety purposes.

If one is ever in a self defense shooting, you should be calling 911 asap.

From what I can tell, this man, despite CCW for 20 years, acted quite wrongly here.

Mistrial on First-Degree Murder Charge as Jury Reaches Partial Verdict in Florida Killing
 
After four days of deliberation, the jury in the trial of Michael Dunn, a Florida man who shot a teenager to death in a parking lot during a dispute over loud music, said it could not agree on whether Mr. Dunn had acted in self-defense or was guilty of murder.
The jurors did find Mr. Dunn guilty of three counts of attempted murder for getting out of his car, and firing several times at the Durango sport utility vehicle in which Jordan Davis, 17, was killed but three other teenagers survived. Mr. Dunn continued to fire at the car even as it pulled away. For that crime, Mr. Dunn he could be sentenced to 20 to 60 years in prison.
The judge declared a mistrial on the count of first-degree murder. The jury also failed to reach agreement on lesser charges that are automatically included in jury instructions.Those were second- and third-degree murder and manslaughter. Prosecutors are free to move ahead with a new trial on the murder charge, if they wish.
READ MORE »
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/16/us/florida-killing-over-loud-music.html?emc=edit_na_20140215

http://www.thedailysheeple.com/police-state-violence-meme-and-the-story-behind-it_022014

Is there a point to linking to this moronic website?

http://abcnews.go.com/International/teen-dies-saving-classmates-suicide-bomber/story?id=21491486

Heroic.

http://patriotpost.us/pages/290

To All my Christian Friends--Merry Christmas and happy holidays to everyone else.

Ditto

http://www.cracked.com/article_20775_7-horrifying-things-you-didnt-want-to-know-about-prison.html

(You know those prison stabbing scenes in Breaking Bad? That was years of violence shoved into a montage, but it looked just about right.)

My thoughts exactly.

If someone is catching "the bitch" (as it's known in the criminal subculture) they have to have multiple prior felony convictions.
How many bites at the apple should they get?

 Were any for obscure,unknowable laws?

Well, there was a time when no-knock raids in the middle of the night were quite a bit less common.  There was a time when we were not the nation with the largest % of its population in jail on the planet.  There was a time when our laws were more or less knowable, and more or less in line with the American Creed.

Were any of the raids mentioned in the article no knock raids?

Good info there. Thanks BD.

On that note, GM: did you see this?

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/02/world/africa/during-siege-at-kenyan-mall-government-forces-seemed-slow-to-respond.html?_r=0

From the article:

When the first shots of automatic gunfire burst out, Raju, a member of a local gun club, was waiting in line in a bank at the Westgate shopping mall. He crouched down, pulled out his phone and feverishly pecked out a text message: “I am inside and I can confirm this is not a robbery.”

Within minutes, his fellow gun club members, neighborhood watch volunteers, off-duty police officers and other armed Samaritans rushed to the mall. They found no command center, no SWAT team — in short, no coordinated government response as heavily armed Islamist militants shot civilians at will

I was talking to Frankie McRae today. He's working as the tech adviser on a new TV show. They told him they were sending two MMA fighters for him to train in gun skills. Turns out the two fighters were Forest Griffin and Stefan Bonner!

So, Frankie is teaching them "the Crafty Dog Stance" and FG says "You know Marc Denny? Tell him hello for me."

Even my son thinks this is cool 

I heard Forrest Griffin interviewed on the radio a while ago. He sounded like a real sharp guy. Quick witted and good sense of humor.

**The gun free zones obviously need bigger signs...


British hero of the mall massacre: Ex Royal Marine with a handgun saved 100 lives as terrorists ran amok
 Was having coffee at Westgate mall when it was attacked on Saturday
 He returned to building a dozen times despite intense gunfire
 Man, who can't be named for security reasons, was pictured with victims
 Gunfire heard early today despite Kenyan assurances mall had been secured
 'At least 10 hostages still being held by a band of Al Shabaab militants'

 Up to three American teenagers and one British person among terrorists
 
By Paul Bentley and David Williams
 
PUBLISHED:16:59 EST, 23 September 2013| UPDATED: 05:46 EST, 24 September 2013
 

 
A former marine emerged as a hero of the Nairobi siege yesterday after he was credited with saving up to 100 lives.
 
The ex soldier was having coffee at the Westgate mall when it was attacked by Islamists on Saturday.
 
With a gun tucked into his waistband, he was pictured helping two women from the complex.
 
His story emerged as sporadic gunfire continued to ring out from inside the mall early today as Kenyan security forces battled Al Qaeda-linked terrorists into a fourth day.
 
Despite Kenyan police assurances that they had taken control of the building, a security expert with contacts inside the mall said at least 10 hostages were still being held by a band of attackers, possibly as many as 13.

 
Scroll down for video

 



Our saviour: The soldier, whose gun is circled, helps two women to safety. His identity has been protected for security reasons


Read more: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2430201/British-hero-mall-massacre-Ex-Royal-Marine-handgun-saved-100-lives-terrorists-ran-amok.html

Well, to be precise, the accusers probably aren't citizens and probably the great majority of the accusations are BS, but still it seems logical that there should be a proper process , , ,

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/18/us/call-for-better-tracking-of-cases-of-excessive-force-at-borders.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit_th_20130918&_r=0

The border is muy Peligro. If Mexicans are concerned, stay away.

http://abcnews.go.com/US/charges-texas-father-beat-death-daughters-molester/story?id=16612071

God bless Texas! At least there are a few sane places left.

Obviously , , , very opinionated, but is there some merit here too?

http://www.policestateusa.com/archives/144

Not so much. Funny enough, a website with the above name might not be so evenhanded in it's coverage of law enforcement issues. The author of the piece claiming he was the taget of assassination attempts by the police administration tend to raise doubts about his credibility to me.

http://legalinsurrection.com/2013/08/merritt-landry-allies-developing-narrative-of-innocence/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+LegalInsurrection+%28Le%C2%B7gal+In%C2%B7sur%C2%B7rec%C2%B7tion%29

Nice to see honest, ethical people stand against the forces of hatred.

Grateful to have found out today that the baby my wife is expcting is a boy.  A future Dog Brother!  Can't be more happier

Congrats!

Eric Holder’s Stand Your Ground Squirrel








By Michelle Malkin  •  July 17, 2013 09:34 AM



 
Welcome to the Obama administration’s cringe-inducing non sequitur of the week. On Tuesday, Attorney General Eric Holder continued stoking the fires of racial resentment over a Florida jury’s acquittal of George Zimmerman. In an address to NAACP leaders, who are demanding federal intervention, Holder attacked Stand Your Ground self-defense laws.
 
All together now: Squirrel!
 
“Separate and apart from the (Trayvon Martin) case that has drawn the nation’s attention, it’s time to question laws that senselessly expand the concept of self-defense and sow dangerous conflict in our neighborhoods,” Holder opined. He then baselessly claimed that such laws are creating “more violence than they prevent” and used his platform to promote citizens’ “duty to retreat.”
 
So, what exactly do Stand Your Ground laws have to do with Zimmerman and Martin? Absolutely nothing, of course. Outside your own home, common principles of self-defense dictate that unless you have reasonable fear of deadly force or harm, you must flee if possible rather than use deadly force. But a “duty to retreat” rests on the ability to retreat. And “duty to retreat” was irrelevant in Zimmerman’s case because — pinned to the ground with Martin on top of him, bashing his head on the concrete — he was unable to retreat.
 
This didn’t stop the NAACP crowd from cheering their heads off when Holder tossed out his red meat. Holder’s racial-grievance-mongering agenda has also been bolstered by media propaganda outlets, who’ve been dutifully bashing Stand Your Ground regardless of the facts.
 
The New York Times, for example, falsely claimed in an editorial preceding Holder’s speech that the jury “reached its verdict after having been asked to consider Mr. Zimmerman’s actions in light of the now-notorious Stand Your Ground provision in Florida’s self-defense law.” Rolling Stone made a similarly inflammatory claim, calling Martin a “victim of Florida’s Stand Your Ground law.”
 
All nonsense. The jury received standard instructions. Zimmerman did not invoke the Stand Your Ground provision. Zimmerman later waived his right to a pretrial immunity hearing under the Stand Your Ground procedures.
 
And as National Review’s Sterling Beard points out, “The only time Stand Your Ground came up during the trial proper was when a prosecution witness stated that he’d taught a class Zimmerman had attended that covered Stand Your Ground.”
 
Even the prosecution rejects the cynical attempt to tie Martin’s death to Stand Your Ground. Prosecutor John Guy couldn’t have made it clearer during the trial: “This case is not about standing your ground.” During their post-trial press conference, as conservative talk show host Victoria Taft first noted, a Miami Herald reporter asked the prosecution team specifically whether Stand Your Ground “affected the facts in this case and whether this case could have been won, perhaps, pre the changes in the law.”
 
Prosecutor Bernie De La Rionda replied: “You know, self-defense has existed for a long time. And we’ve dealt with it in Jackson for a long time. We’ve tried a lot of self-defense cases; I’ve personally tried 10-15 self-defense cases. They’re tough cases, but we accept it so … the law really hasn’t changed all that much. Stand Your Ground was a big thing, but really the law hasn’t changed. We have a right to bear arms and a right to self defense.”
 
In short, Stand Your Ground did not kill Trayvon Martin. Stand Your Ground did not sway the jury. Stand Your Ground saboteurs don’t have a leg to stand on. Columnist Jacob Sullum observed drily: “You might think that, given all we now know about Zimmerman’s actual defense, critics of ‘stand your ground’ laws would have to find a different, more apposite case to illustrate their concerns. Instead they just barrel along, citing the same phony example again and again, without regard to the facts. It does not inspire confidence in their argument.”
 
Nope, it inspires exasperation and contempt. Once again, Eric Holder’s Department of Selective and Social Justice is grasping for straws. Holder now vows to “continue to fight for removal of Stand Your Ground laws” that had nothing to do with the Zimmerman trial. He promises to ban “racial profiling” in the aftermath of a local crime incident that — according to Holder’s own FBI employees — had nothing to do with race.
 
This is all a transparent pretext, of course, for undermining a plethora of state laws enacted by pro-Second Amendment legislatures. (Never mind that eight of 15 states that adopted Stand Your Ground legislation were helmed by Democratic governors at the time of passage.) Even more insidiously, left-wing groups have exploited the Martin case to launch broader attacks on the political speech and activities of limited-government groups like the American Legislative Exchange Council, which supported Stand Your Ground.
 
The Obama administration’s cynical campaign against Stand Your Ground laws is a racially charged weapon of mass distraction. The goal isn’t public safety or community harmony. The goal is for conservative political opponents to Surrender Your Ground. Silence, as always, is complicity. Political self-defense, as with physical self-defense, begins with self-assertion.

http://larrycorreia.wordpress.com/2013/07/22/on-profiling-and-stand-your-ground/#comment-48806

On Profiling and Stand Your Ground

 Posted on July 22, 2013 by correia45


This post isn’t really about the Zimmerman case, though I’ll touch on how use of force laws actually work relating to that case, but it is a result of the ignoramuses who know jack about how self-defense laws work who are currently talking about it and pissing me off. Included in that list is the President of the United States.
 
On Friday, Barack Obama said the following during a press conference. Our illustrious leader is in italics. My response is in bold.
 
You know, when Trayvon Martin was first shot I said that this could have been my son.

Yes. We appreciate the leader of the free world chiming in on local crime issues, especially before any facts are known.

Another way of saying that is Trayvon Martin could have been me 35 years ago.

Where you in the habit of committing battery against people 35 years ago?

And when you think about why, in the African American community at least, there’s a lot of pain around what happened here, I think it’s important to recognize that the African American community is looking at this issue through a set of experiences and a history that doesn’t go away.
 
And your preconceived notions, feelings, and emotions should be totally irrelevant in the eyes of the law. Justice should be blind, and a case should be decided based upon the evidence and whether the prosecution can convince a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that a crime was committed or not.

There are very few African American men in this country who haven’t had the experience of being followed when they were shopping in a department store. That includes me.

Me too. And despite my dad being of darker skin tone than Al Sharpton, according to these Home Depot paint chips I’m only Warm Beige. Also totally irrelevant. I’ve got a family member who takes after my mom’s super lily white side of the family, way the hell whiter than my swarthy self, who always got tailed through stores because he managed to look suspicious, and oddly enough got arrested for shop lifting on his 18th birthday. 
 
There are very few African American men who haven’t had the experience of walking across the street and hearing the locks click on the doors of cars. That happens to me — at least before I was a senator.
 
Don’t flatter yourself. Nobody has ever been physically intimidated by somebody wearing mom jeans. Now Vlad Putin on the other hand, he shows up, hide your wife, hide your kids.

 There are very few African Americans who haven’t had the experience of getting on an elevator and a woman clutching her purse nervously and holding her breath until she had a chance to get off. That happens often.
 
And this happens to black men, white men, Asians, Latinos, you name it, and I think that’s awesome. That means that woman is paying attention to her surroundings and knows that simple physics gives a huge advantage to the male in case he decides to do something. Aren’t you from the same side that is constantly complaining that America has a “rape culture”?

I happen to look like a scary 6’5” Tony Soprano. I’m actually physically intimidating, and that is at 37 years old and years of desk job. When I was in my 20s I could bench press 365 pounds and was 270 pounds, 16% body fat, of Big Ugly. I usually had a shaved head and a goatee and I looked like my favorite hobby was punching things, which it was. I was a hundred times more physically intimidating that President Lady Parts on his best day. So I’ve been profiled tons, and I’ve had lots of women obviously assess me like I was a threat.

And I don’t think it is a bad thing at all.

#
 
First off, way to bring America together there, champ, sending the DoJ after a guy who got acquitted with your civil rights violations witch hunt. People get shot every single day, and some of them in cases way more complicated and questionable than this one, but none of those happened in the lead up to a national election where you needed to try and scare the electorate that America is still Mississippi circa 1957.
 
Second off, that is an incredibly vapid and naïve sentiment, not to mention hypocritical coming from a dude whose family will have armed security profiling potential threats for the rest of their lives.
 
Over the last couple of days I’ve grown tired listening to people who know jack about use of force laws bloviating on and on about how it is awful to profile people, and how the mere act of being suspicious of another person makes you evil. So today I’m going to talk about profiling, and how come it isn’t a bad thing at all. Notice that I didn’t say racial profiling, because race has absolutely nothing to do with it.
 
Back when I was teaching concealed carry classes I used to spend a bunch of time going over use of force issues. This can be basically broken into two main categories:  Legal, as in when you are legally justified in shooting somebody (a Reasonable Man would believe there is Ability, Opportunity, and an Immediate Threat of Serious Bodily Harm to themselves or a 3rd person from an aggressor), and Tactical, as in the decisions you make in order to maximize your chances of not getting hurt or killed. The two aren’t always the same, as you can be legally justified in getting involved, but it is tactically stupid, or vice versa.
 
Profiling falls under the tactical end of things.
 
The single best weapon you’ve got to defend yourself isn’t your gun, but rather your brain. You need to be smart, and try not to put yourself into situations where you would need to use your gun. The best way to do this is by paying attention, and when you notice something which could be construed as a potential threat, you do what you need to do in order to avoid it.
 
And at this point, somebody is going to read that and shriek about how according to my advice Zimmerman shouldn’t have followed Trayvon… Uh huh, legally that doesn’t matter, because as I noted above law and tactics aren’t the same, and you can be 100% legally justified even if you didn’t make the best decisions in the world leading up to the event. I had somebody get all belligerent on Facebook and demand “would you have done what Zimmerman did?!” And my answer was No, but the jury is going to ask “did you act as a reasonable man?” not “did you act like a guy who has gone through hundreds of hours of training?” And you’d better pray to God they never change it from Reasonable Man to “did you act as Larry Correia would have acted?” because then you’re all screwed.
 
So getting back on topic, the best way to avoid a violent encounter is to watch out for potential threats so you can hopefully avoid them, or be ready to react appropriately should things go south. That means paying attention to your surroundings. (This also keeps you from getting hit by cars, falling in holes, or being devoured by wild animals, so yay! Happy bonus!) That means paying attention to people who could–but more than likely won’t–want to hurt you.
 
I used to tell my students to pay attention to their instincts. If you get a bad vibe off of somebody, for whatever reason, pay attention to it. That doesn’t make you rude, or a jerk, that is just you paying attention to survival instincts that have been built into the human species over millennia for a reason. If the person that made you nervous happens to be a different color than you, who cares? That doesn’t make you racist, and it doesn’t make you a bad person. It just means that they’ve made your survival instincts tingle. So pay attention.
 
I had somebody on Twitter today tell me that according to that reasoning, Martin was justified in attacking Zimmerman, because Zimmerman made him nervous… That’s just freaking stupid. I said pay more attention, I didn’t say go over and commit a forcible felony against them. Duh.
 
So if you see somebody coming up to your car, where is the harm in locking the door? I know this may offend the president’s tender feelings, but he’ll get over it. You’re out nothing and 99.99% of the time it doesn’t matter, but that .01% of the time you just told a potential predator that he’s better off picking a different victim. (this part is highly ironic, as the people I’ve been debating with keep saying Zimmerman should have stayed in his car, but apparently he shouldn’t have locked the door!)
 
There’s a saying from firearms instructor Clint Smith, “If you look like food, you’re going to get eaten.” I used to explain to my classes that criminals were as good at their chosen career as the students were at theirs. Criminals are experts at picking out victims, and they prefer the suckers who aren’t paying attention. If you look like work, they’re probably going to pick somebody else to victimize. If you’re paying attention you’ve gone from “food” to “work” and if they wanted to work for a living they’d get a real job.
 
I think one reason permit holders don’t get into as many violent encounters as the regular population isn’t because the gun is some magic talisman that wards off evil, but rather because once you’ve made the decision to carry a firearm, you tend to pay more attention to the world around you.
 
So pay attention! Watch people. Watch for those visual, non-verbal clues that set off your survival instincts. If somebody makes you nervous, be prepared for something to happen, or try to move yourself out of the way. I call this common sense. Barack Obama calls it profiling, except for when DHS does it to veterans, because that’s just groovy.
 
But good people have been trained that judging others is bad! Violent criminals, especially those that specialize in preying on women, are aware of this, and they absolutely love it. The creepers and the stalkers and the would-be rapists take advantage of regular folk’s inclination to be polite. I’ve taught hundreds of female students, and many of them could personally cite some jackass taking advantage of their attempts to be polite, or if the woman stood up for herself (or clutched nervously at her purse and held her breath) they’d get some variation of “how come you gotta be such a bitch?”
 
Thieves and jerks who want to physically assault you love this too. If somebody is getting into your personal space, the natural human inclination is to move away, but too many people have been trained by liberals to be good little serfs, and they try to avoid giving offense, so they let the bad guy close on them, and once they are too close, it is too late. I’ve seen normal people let scary, aggressive, obviously messed up people close way into their personal space, and they sit there and take it, because they’ve been programmed that “profiling is bad” or he could actually be bug nuts crazy and you let the dude with the rusty box cutter get into bad breath distance. At least after he opens your jugular, at your funeral they’ll be able to say you never judged anyone.
 
I don’t give a crap if race comes into this or not. I’m the same color as Cheech Marin. During the summer I’m best described as “swarthy” but my olive skin tone and ability to tan well isn’t why I think it is awesome when I see some woman in a parking lot take note of my approach. It is because for all she knows I’m a potential threat, capable of easily physically overwhelming her, and she can stand there like a sucker and bank on fortune and karma that I’m not, or she could notice me and pay attention. Maybe even not stick her head inside the car and obliviously load groceries until I walk past. In fact, I’m so big that I’m used to going around people in places like that, simply to avoid making them nervous.
 
I’m so big and ugly that if I got into an elevator with Barack Obama he’d hold his breath and clutch his purse. Except I’d never be allowed into an elevator with Barack Obama because his highly trained Secret Service detail would profile me first.
 
I’m going to teach this to my daughters. Pay freaking attention. I’d much rather they hurt Barack Obama’s delicate lilac scented feelings, than they end up as victims. But then again, I’m also expecting my children to all carry firearms, because a firearm is the ultimate equalizer.
 
Now, for the people who are getting offended because people are profiling you… Yep. No big deal. Grow up. Some of us are scary looking.  Don’t let it hurt your feelings. You just need to come to terms with the fact that humans routinely victimize other humans, and some of us look more like predators than others. Does it sting when somebody reacts like that, even though you’re the nicest, most genuinely friendly person around? Sure does. Now imagine it was your wife, or your daughter, or your mom, or your grandma, and they were dealing with some scary son of a bitch that looks like you… Yeah, that changes your perspective, doesn’t it?
 
A fact of life is that people are going to look at you and make a snap judgment. If I see a group of young men dressed all Thug Life, you’re damn right I’m going to pay more attention. If you dress and act in a manner that equates with a culture well known for its violent tendencies, well yeah, people are going to be suspicious of you. Duh. If that offends you, pull up your pants. You look like an idiot with your underwear hanging out anyway. I also don’t trust white guys with swastikas tattooed on their faces. I obviously must be racist toward white people.
 
When I was 17 I got my jaw dislocated and a concussion from a beating I took from four members of an “inner city youth organization”. They came up and sucker punched me because I wasn’t paying attention and dog piled me (though I did actually win in the end, like I said, big dude). Would I notice them now? More than likely, because I’m older, wiser, and I’ve had the experience of getting my ass kicked enough to reinforce the need to pay attention in public places to groups of young men acting like they’re looking to give somebody the “whoop ass”. Knowing what I know now I might have picked up on the indicators, the way they got charged up, the target selection process, whatever, and I might have been able to move myself out of the way, or at least been more prepared for the confrontation. And in this case, all four of them were within two shades of Home Depot paint chips worth of skin color off of me. Race was irrelevant. I’d notice the same thing if they were Nigerian or Norwegian. Because once they are stomping on your head, race is fairly irrelevant.
 
#
 
Stand Your Ground Laws
 
In related idiocy, the other thing that I’m hearing a lot of bleating about is how evil Stand Your Ground laws are. I keep seeing people saying that Stand Your Ground should be repealed, and then they cite a bunch of crap that actually doesn’t have anything to do with SYG type laws. Of course, Attorney General Eric Holder, who is best known for illegally smuggling thousands of guns to Mexican drug cartels, is totally trust worthy on this topic.
 
I saw a blog post from another sci-fi author talking about how SYG laws basically make it legal for white people to kill black people if the black people make them nervous… Wow… That’s like saying we dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima because Americans weren’t fond of origami or haiku. No, dumbass, that’s not how the law works. Just because MSNBC told you SYG laws are racist doesn’t make it true.
 
The thing is, SYG laws protect everybody, and everybody includes minorities. It protects anybody who acts in self-defense from the state and from over-zealous prosecutors. I keep seeing all these liberals talking about the racist injustice inherent in the system and how blacks are more likely to be sent to prison, and in the next sentence they are saying that we need to give the state MORE prosecutorial power and get rid of things like Reasonable Doubt and SYG laws.
 
There are two differing sets of law that govern how state’s self-defense laws work, Stand Your Ground and Duty to Retreat.  Basically all Stand Your Ground means is that you don’t have a Duty to Retreat, and most states have been this way since George Washington chased out the British, so this isn’t anything new.
 
Duty to Retreat means that you MUST flee from your attacker if possible. If you don’t retreat, and you shoot, then you can be prosecuted for that. Some states even require you to try and retreat from inside your own home. Stand Your Ground means you have no Duty to Retreat (but it doesn’t mean you can just shoot whoever you want whenever you want like people are trying to spin it).
 
But why wouldn’t you want to avoid shooting somebody? I always taught my students to avoid shooting if possible. That sounds great! Except here’s the problem. You get into a violent encounter. You’ve got a couple of seconds, tops, of gut wrenching terror in which to decide a course of action, commit, and see it through. So somebody attacks you, you are in fear for your life, and you shoot them. Except now when you go to court the prosecution can go after you because in those two seconds, when you didn’t see a way out, the prosecutor thought of one! And nowthey are going to pontificate on what you should have did differently, and how you should have tried harder to get away… Only they are going to do it in an air conditioned court room for ten thousand times longer than you had to decide, and when they get hungry they are going to order pizza.
 
With Stand Your Ground, that’s not going to come up, because you’re not required to try and run away. That’s it. That’s really all it comes down to. You’re not required to try and flee.
 
It doesn’t mean you can just shoot brown people who make you nervous. That’s propaganda bullshit. Even in the most lenient use of force law states (one of which I live in and taught this stuff for a decade) that’s not how it works at all. Let me condense down a couple of hours of legal lecture into a few points to see if any given shoot is justified or not. Most states operate on the following criteria:
 
Would a Reasonable Person (like a jury) make the following assumptions in your circumstances?

Were you in fear of receiving Serious Bodily Harm from an attacker? (some states use the term Grievous Bodily Harm instead, but either way it means were you in fear for your life, or of getting a bad life threatening or potentially life altering injury? Also, in some states it is you, or a third person, meaning that you can get involved not just to save your life, but someone else’s life as well)
 
If so, would a Reasonable Person come to the conclusion that your assailant(s) met the following three criteria:
 1.Did they have the Ability to cause you Serious Bodily Harm? (basically meaning can they actually hurt you?)
 2.Did they have the Opportunity to cause you Serious Bodily Harm? (basically meaning can they reach you with their ability?)
 3.Were they acting in a manner that suggested they were an Immediate Threat? (basically meaning are they actually acting like they’re going to do all this stuff to you now? Some states refer to this as Jeopardy)
 
Check. Check. Check… Bang. That’s fundamentally how the law works. Keep in mind in a class I would spend an hour going over examples of shoot and no shoot situations based on those things, but that’s basically all there is to it.
 
So let’s look at Trayvon Martin getting shot by George Zimmerman. Go through the criteria. The stuff leading up to it is basically irrelevant for this portion. Serious Bodily Harm? In most cases there aren’t even any physical injuries to show, and you’re still justified just by the reasonable belief of potential threat, but in this case there are actual injuries. Slamming your head into pavement meets the legal threshold. In fact, any blow to the head sufficient to render you unconscious is sufficient to kill you, and also if somebody renders you unconscious a reasonable man can say that you can assume they’re not going to stop there. So good to go.
 
Ability? Yep. Physically Martin was dominating Zimmerman. Opportunity. Yep, it’s happening right now. Jeopardy? Already in play.
 
Right there, within a couple of days of the shooting most of the self-defense instructors in the nation looked at this case and said, yep, he’s getting off. Not because of race, because for us you could flip the races and it was the 1/8th black Peruvian that got shot after committing battery against a black guy, and the answer remains the same, because that’s how the law is structured.
 
I say this and I’ve got people saying that I’m rejoicing in the death of a black kid… Sigh… Yeah, don’t tell all the black people I taught to shoot and certified to carry concealed weapons…  No, you freaking idiots, my FEELINGS are irrelevant, because law isn’t supposed to operate on feelings. It is supposed to operate on evidence.
 
So up next comes the legal question of whether the individual did anything which escalated, contributed to, or caused the violent encounter. Now the Reasonable People of the jury are deciding if this was Mutual Combat (when two people mutually decide to fight) that turned deadly. This is actually what most of the Zimmerman trial was about, and this is the point of the phone calls, and the timelines, and the witnesses, and everything else. It was to see if Zimmerman was partially legally at fault for the events, and if so, how much.
 
In this case, the jury looked at the events in question leading up to the shooting, and they couldn’t say Zimmerman was responsible beyond a Reasonable Doubt. (see, there’s that word Reasonable again).
 
Remember earlier when I mentioned law and tactics? They’re not the same. Could Zimmerman have done things differently? Certainly. But making bad tactical decisions isn’t necessarily illegal. The jury figured that regardless of what Zimmerman did, ultimately it was Martin that circled back around and committed the Forcible Felony. At that point it went up to the checklist above. Part of being a Reasonable Man is not being able to predict the future with 100% accuracy. Everybody makes assumptions, and sometimes they are incorrect, that doesn’t make it illegal. Jumping on somebody and braining them on the sidewalk is illegal.
 
I’ve had people demand how come Stand Your Ground didn’t protect Trayvon! (seriously, I’ve seen this like 50 times on Twitter. It is like everybody works off the same narrative talking points). SYG doesn’t apply in this case because apply the checklist of Ability, Opportunity, and Immediacy to Zimmerman. Somebody following you through a neighborhood doesn’t mean that you can go and beat the hell out of them. And if you attack somebody before they reasonably present a threat of Serious Bodily Harm, then it isn’t lawful self-defense, so SYG doesn’t apply.
 
Prosecution’s witness, Rachel Janteel, (Trayvon’s girlfriend) was on Piers Morgan and said that the reason Trayvon Martin attacked George Zimmerman was because he thought Zimmerman was a “gay rapist”. And also that Martin didn’t mean to kill Zimmerman, that was just a misunderstanding on Zimmerman’s part, and really Travyon just wanted to give him the “whoop ass” (her words, not mine) which was a cultural thing and how they took care of people like that… Despite MSNBC’s narrative to the contrary SYG doesn’t allow you to give the “whoop ass” to somebody just because you think they’re gay.
 
(On that note, gay rights community… Seriously?  I taught and certified a lot of gays and lesbians to carry guns, and the reason they usually gave me was so they could protect themselves from somebody giving them the “whoop ass” because of how they looked, and now I’m hearing crickets. Where’s the condemnation against this reasoning? Where’s the outrage?)
 
I’ve had people yell at me that there was only one side alive to tell their story… (again, another common talking point) Oh my gosh… That’s so incredibly dumb. That’s not how it works at all. If that was the case then there would never be any murder trials because obviously one side couldn’t testify! There’s ALWAYS more than one side. There’s evidence, there’s witnesses, there’s experts who reconstruct the details, and the prosecution had all of that to present, and the jury still had Reasonable Doubt.
 
Then I’ve got people crying about how “unjust” Reasonable Doubt is… You fools. You stupid, stupid fools. Put your emotion in check. What Reasonable Doubt really is the final check and balance against the state’s ability to throw your ass in prison forever with a flimsy case. You’re going to bitch and whine about the injustice, and how it is racist that more blacks are prosecuted and incarcerated, and your answer is to make it EASIER for the state to throw people in prison? Holy moly. You have no idea what you are wishing for.
 
That’s it. That’s how the self-defense laws work. Wrap your heads around the actual laws and calm the hell down.  Instead you’re begging stalwart defenders of civil rights like President Drone Strike and the AG who is cool with killing Mexicans to get rid of laws that protect YOU from the STATE. That’s way scarier than any one neighborhood watch guy with a gun.

Outstanding reaction time and great composure by this LEO and very nice movement while shooting too-- truly exemplary.

http://www.cnn.com/video/#/​video/bestoftv/2012/08/31/​pkg-security-guard-shoots-thiev​es-internet-cafe.wesh

Nice!

http://www.heraldtribune.com/article/20130718/COLUMNIST/130719612/2256

The correct spelling for the law enforcement title is "Marshal".

Balko peddling his deceptive and bogus line of b.s. once again.   

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/03/howard-morgan-ex-cop-shot_n_1399834.html

A Detective just decides to shoot it out w/CPD on a traffic stop? I'd sure like to see the crime scene photos, police reports and documentation of the injuries allegedly inflicted on the CPD officer.

http://hotair.com/archives/2013/07/15/video-teen-saves-5-year-old-from-abduction/

Video: Teen saves 5-year-old from abduction


posted at 12:41 pm on July 15, 2013 by Ed Morrissey


[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=Fd31e02l3jk&safety_mode=true&persist_safety_mode=1&safe=active[/youtube]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=Fd31e02l3jk&safety_mode=true&persist_safety_mode=1&safe=active



It’s midday on Monday, but it’s a good moment for a feel-good palate cleanser already on the main page (Allahpundit linked it in the Green Room earlier). We’ve received a few e-mails about Temar Boggs, who rescued a girl from an abductor and returned her to her family this weekend.  The teen got a feeling he was supposed to find the missing five-year-old, and his presence turned out to be the key:
 



That’s when, Boggs said, “I had the gut feeling that I was going to find the little girl.”
 
Read more: http://lancasteronline.com/article/local/872026_Lancaster-teen-Temar-Boggs-hailed-as-a-hero-in-5-year-old-s-abduction.html
 
A friend asked Boggs to hold his bike. Boggs figured the bike would help him search for the girl.
 
So he and another friend, Chris Garcia, rode on area streets — Michelle Drive, St. Phillips Drive, Gable Park Road — looking for her.
 
That’s when a maroon car caught his eye. (He had gotten a bit ahead of Garcia.)
 
The car was on Gable Park and turned around when it got near the top of a hill toward Millersville Pike, where Boggs said several police officers were gathered with the kind of cart used to carry an injured football player off the field.
 
The driver, an older white man, then began quickly turning onto and out of side streets connecting to Gable Park, Boggs said.
 
The neighborhood is something of a maze; many of its streets are cul-de-sacs.
 
Boggs got close enough to the car to see a little girl inside. Garcia was nearby.
 
The driver looked at Boggs and Garcia, then stopped the car at Gable Park and Betz Farm Road and pushed the girl out of the car. The driver then drove off, Boggs said.
 
Police are still looking for the suspect:
 

Police are still looking for the alleged kidnapper. Cops described him as a white man, between 50 and 70 years old, who walks with a limp. The car was described as a red or maroon-purple Chevy.
 
The girl’s family calls Boggs a hero, but Boggs himself demurs:
 

Boggs, meanwhile, said he doesn’t consider himself a hero.
 
“I’m just a normal person who did a thing that anybody else would do,” he said.
 
Both Boggs and Garcia are heroes for getting involved and helping to rescue the little girl.  These days, it’s too easy to remain passive in the face of evil.  We are fortunate that we still have young men willing to step up and act in a responsible manner to protect their communities.