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Martial Arts Topics / Rubber Bullets
« on: June 07, 2020, 04:45:31 PM »
Popular Science has certainly gone Prog, but what seems to be some interesting info herein:
https://www.popsci.com/story/health/rubber-bullets-safety-protection/?utm_source=internal&utm_medium=email
https://www.popsci.com/story/health/rubber-bullets-safety-protection/?utm_source=internal&utm_medium=email
203
Martial Arts Topics / Bust the Police Unions to Rank and Yank the Bad Cops
« on: June 06, 2020, 09:48:24 PM »
Bust the Police Unions to Rank and Yank Bad Cops
Officials need the ability to fire low-performing officers and reward ones who go above and beyond.
By Saqib Qureshi
WSJ
June 5, 2020 7:43 pm ET
The police officer who killed George Floyd had been the subject of more than a dozen complaints about his conduct. In two previous incidents, Derek Chauvin had been disciplined with letters of reprimand. Tou Thao, who stood by as Floyd died, previously had a lawsuit brought against him over excessive use of force. The lawsuit was settled for $25,000. How can such men be allowed to “serve and protect”? Unions.
Public-sector unions, including police unions, will do almost anything to protect their members. These unions create a culture of impunity. Even police officers who are terminated can be reinstated, “often via secretive appeals geared to protect labor rights rather than public safety” as a 2014 piece in the Atlantic put it.
A Jobs Surprise / Jim Mattis Fires Back
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The Minneapolis police union has signaled it will fight to ensure the officers fired over George Floyd’s killing get their jobs back. The union’s Lt. Bob Kroll said he’d “worked with the four defense attorneys that are representing each of our four terminated individuals under criminal investigation, in addition with our labor attorneys to fight for their jobs.” This should be a warning of the difficulties inherent in reforming police departments and ending police violence.
But it is clearly time to rethink public-sector unions, and one good place to start would be more and better information. There will be no improvement until officers are no longer protected at all costs by unions.
Take an example from Canada. In 2017, the Fraser Institute found that employees in Canada’s private economy were five times as likely to be removed from their jobs as public-sector employees were. Public-sector workers were almost five times as likely to be unionized.
Increasing turnover of public-sector jobs could help root out toxic employees. A first step would be to let go of the lowest-performing 2% of public-sector workers—in this case, police officers—each year. That would help ensure that the most violent, disrespectful and incompetent officers are dismissed each year.
Yet we should also acknowledge officers who exceed standards of behavior and policing. In recent days videos have emerged of cops and National Guardsmen interacting with peaceful demonstrators. Some have shown solidarity or engaged in polite conversations to hear real grievances. It would make sense to reward the top-performing 5% of public employees, including police officers.
Sheriff Chris Swanson of Flint, Mich., has attracted praise for laying down his gear and joining protesters in a peaceful march that defused a potential confrontation. “We’ll walk all night,” he says in a video. Mr. Swanson has received praise from the Trump White House and former President Barack Obama for his handling of the incident. Flint has seen multiple peaceful protests since that night. Sheriff Swanson, who holds an elected position, faces a level of accountability that many other law-enforcement officials don’t. Accountability matters.
These reforms are hardly sufficient to change longstanding cultures of violence or uproot racism, but they can go a long way toward accomplishing our shared goals.
Mr. Qureshi is CEO of Building Capital, a Toronto real-estate firm, and author of “The Broken Contract: Making Our Democracies Efficient, Representative and Accountable.”
Officials need the ability to fire low-performing officers and reward ones who go above and beyond.
By Saqib Qureshi
WSJ
June 5, 2020 7:43 pm ET
The police officer who killed George Floyd had been the subject of more than a dozen complaints about his conduct. In two previous incidents, Derek Chauvin had been disciplined with letters of reprimand. Tou Thao, who stood by as Floyd died, previously had a lawsuit brought against him over excessive use of force. The lawsuit was settled for $25,000. How can such men be allowed to “serve and protect”? Unions.
Public-sector unions, including police unions, will do almost anything to protect their members. These unions create a culture of impunity. Even police officers who are terminated can be reinstated, “often via secretive appeals geared to protect labor rights rather than public safety” as a 2014 piece in the Atlantic put it.
A Jobs Surprise / Jim Mattis Fires Back
SUBSCRIBE
The Minneapolis police union has signaled it will fight to ensure the officers fired over George Floyd’s killing get their jobs back. The union’s Lt. Bob Kroll said he’d “worked with the four defense attorneys that are representing each of our four terminated individuals under criminal investigation, in addition with our labor attorneys to fight for their jobs.” This should be a warning of the difficulties inherent in reforming police departments and ending police violence.
But it is clearly time to rethink public-sector unions, and one good place to start would be more and better information. There will be no improvement until officers are no longer protected at all costs by unions.
Take an example from Canada. In 2017, the Fraser Institute found that employees in Canada’s private economy were five times as likely to be removed from their jobs as public-sector employees were. Public-sector workers were almost five times as likely to be unionized.
Increasing turnover of public-sector jobs could help root out toxic employees. A first step would be to let go of the lowest-performing 2% of public-sector workers—in this case, police officers—each year. That would help ensure that the most violent, disrespectful and incompetent officers are dismissed each year.
Yet we should also acknowledge officers who exceed standards of behavior and policing. In recent days videos have emerged of cops and National Guardsmen interacting with peaceful demonstrators. Some have shown solidarity or engaged in polite conversations to hear real grievances. It would make sense to reward the top-performing 5% of public employees, including police officers.
Sheriff Chris Swanson of Flint, Mich., has attracted praise for laying down his gear and joining protesters in a peaceful march that defused a potential confrontation. “We’ll walk all night,” he says in a video. Mr. Swanson has received praise from the Trump White House and former President Barack Obama for his handling of the incident. Flint has seen multiple peaceful protests since that night. Sheriff Swanson, who holds an elected position, faces a level of accountability that many other law-enforcement officials don’t. Accountability matters.
These reforms are hardly sufficient to change longstanding cultures of violence or uproot racism, but they can go a long way toward accomplishing our shared goals.
Mr. Qureshi is CEO of Building Capital, a Toronto real-estate firm, and author of “The Broken Contract: Making Our Democracies Efficient, Representative and Accountable.”
207
Martial Arts Topics / Is the previous post is an example of this?
« on: June 05, 2020, 03:58:15 PM »210
Martial Arts Topics / What to do if a riot threatens your business?
« on: June 04, 2020, 07:03:44 PM »211
Martial Arts Topics / Mises: Why abusive cops so often keep their jobs
« on: June 03, 2020, 08:31:54 AM »212
Martial Arts Topics / Heather Mac Donald: The Myth of Systemic Police Racism
« on: June 03, 2020, 08:30:03 AM »
The Myth of Systemic Police Racism
Hold officers accountable who use excessive force. But there’s no evidence of widespread racial bias.
By Heather Mac Donald
June 2, 2020 1:44 pm ET
George Floyd’s death in Minneapolis has revived the Obama-era narrative that law enforcement is endemically racist. On Friday, Barack Obama tweeted that for millions of black Americans, being treated differently by the criminal justice system on account of race is “tragically, painfully, maddeningly ‘normal.’ ” Mr. Obama called on the police and the public to create a “new normal,” in which bigotry no longer “infects our institutions and our hearts.”
Joe Biden released a video the same day in which he asserted that all African-Americans fear for their safety from “bad police” and black children must be instructed to tolerate police abuse just so they can “make it home.” That echoed a claim Mr. Obama made after the ambush murder of five Dallas officers in July 2016. During their memorial service, the president said African-American parents were right to fear that their children may be killed by police officers whenever they go outside.
Minnesota Gov. Tim Walz denounced the “stain . . . of fundamental, institutional racism” on law enforcement during a Friday press conference. He claimed blacks were right to dismiss promises of police reform as empty verbiage.
This charge of systemic police bias was wrong during the Obama years and remains so today. However sickening the video of Floyd’s arrest, it isn’t representative of the 375 million annual contacts that police officers have with civilians. A solid body of evidence finds no structural bias in the criminal-justice system with regard to arrests, prosecution or sentencing. Crime and suspect behavior, not race, determine most police actions.
In 2019 police officers fatally shot 1,004 people, most of whom were armed or otherwise dangerous. African-Americans were about a quarter of those killed by cops last year (235), a ratio that has remained stable since 2015. That share of black victims is less than what the black crime rate would predict, since police shootings are a function of how often officers encounter armed and violent suspects. In 2018, the latest year for which such data have been published, African-Americans made up 53% of known homicide offenders in the U.S. and commit about 60% of robberies, though they are 13% of the population.
The police fatally shot nine unarmed blacks and 19 unarmed whites in 2019, according to a Washington Post database, down from 38 and 32, respectively, in 2015. The Post defines “unarmed” broadly to include such cases as a suspect in Newark, N.J., who had a loaded handgun in his car during a police chase. In 2018 there were 7,407 black homicide victims. Assuming a comparable number of victims last year, those nine unarmed black victims of police shootings represent 0.1% of all African-Americans killed in 2019. By contrast, a police officer is 18½ times more likely to be killed by a black male than an unarmed black male is to be killed by a police officer.
On Memorial Day weekend in Chicago alone, 10 African-Americans were killed in drive-by shootings. Such routine violence has continued—a 72-year-old Chicago man shot in the face on May 29 by a gunman who fired about a dozen shots into a residence; two 19-year-old women on the South Side shot to death as they sat in a parked car a few hours earlier; a 16-year-old boy fatally stabbed with his own knife that same day. This past weekend, 80 Chicagoans were shot in drive-by shootings, 21 fatally, the victims overwhelmingly black. Police shootings are not the reason that blacks die of homicide at eight times the rate of whites and Hispanics combined; criminal violence is.
The latest in a series of studies undercutting the claim of systemic police bias was published in August 2019 in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. The researchers found that the more frequently officers encounter violent suspects from any given racial group, the greater the chance that a member of that group will be fatally shot by a police officer. There is “no significant evidence of antiblack disparity in the likelihood of being fatally shot by police,” they concluded.
A 2015 Justice Department analysis of the Philadelphia Police Department found that white police officers were less likely than black or Hispanic officers to shoot unarmed black suspects. Research by Harvard economist Roland G. Fryer Jr. also found no evidence of racial discrimination in shootings. Any evidence to the contrary fails to take into account crime rates and civilian behavior before and during interactions with police.
The false narrative of systemic police bias resulted in targeted killings of officers during the Obama presidency. The pattern may be repeating itself. Officers are being assaulted and shot at while they try to arrest gun suspects or respond to the growing riots. Police precincts and courthouses have been destroyed with impunity, which will encourage more civilization-destroying violence. If the Ferguson effect of officers backing off law enforcement in minority neighborhoods is reborn as the Minneapolis effect, the thousands of law-abiding African-Americans who depend on the police for basic safety will once again be the victims.
The Minneapolis officers who arrested George Floyd must be held accountable for their excessive use of force and callous indifference to his distress. Police training needs to double down on de-escalation tactics. But Floyd’s death should not undermine the legitimacy of American law enforcement, without which we will continue on a path toward chaos.
Ms. Mac Donald is a fellow at the Manhattan Institute and the author of “The War on Cops,” (Encounter Books, 2016).
Hold officers accountable who use excessive force. But there’s no evidence of widespread racial bias.
By Heather Mac Donald
June 2, 2020 1:44 pm ET
George Floyd’s death in Minneapolis has revived the Obama-era narrative that law enforcement is endemically racist. On Friday, Barack Obama tweeted that for millions of black Americans, being treated differently by the criminal justice system on account of race is “tragically, painfully, maddeningly ‘normal.’ ” Mr. Obama called on the police and the public to create a “new normal,” in which bigotry no longer “infects our institutions and our hearts.”
Joe Biden released a video the same day in which he asserted that all African-Americans fear for their safety from “bad police” and black children must be instructed to tolerate police abuse just so they can “make it home.” That echoed a claim Mr. Obama made after the ambush murder of five Dallas officers in July 2016. During their memorial service, the president said African-American parents were right to fear that their children may be killed by police officers whenever they go outside.
Minnesota Gov. Tim Walz denounced the “stain . . . of fundamental, institutional racism” on law enforcement during a Friday press conference. He claimed blacks were right to dismiss promises of police reform as empty verbiage.
This charge of systemic police bias was wrong during the Obama years and remains so today. However sickening the video of Floyd’s arrest, it isn’t representative of the 375 million annual contacts that police officers have with civilians. A solid body of evidence finds no structural bias in the criminal-justice system with regard to arrests, prosecution or sentencing. Crime and suspect behavior, not race, determine most police actions.
In 2019 police officers fatally shot 1,004 people, most of whom were armed or otherwise dangerous. African-Americans were about a quarter of those killed by cops last year (235), a ratio that has remained stable since 2015. That share of black victims is less than what the black crime rate would predict, since police shootings are a function of how often officers encounter armed and violent suspects. In 2018, the latest year for which such data have been published, African-Americans made up 53% of known homicide offenders in the U.S. and commit about 60% of robberies, though they are 13% of the population.
The police fatally shot nine unarmed blacks and 19 unarmed whites in 2019, according to a Washington Post database, down from 38 and 32, respectively, in 2015. The Post defines “unarmed” broadly to include such cases as a suspect in Newark, N.J., who had a loaded handgun in his car during a police chase. In 2018 there were 7,407 black homicide victims. Assuming a comparable number of victims last year, those nine unarmed black victims of police shootings represent 0.1% of all African-Americans killed in 2019. By contrast, a police officer is 18½ times more likely to be killed by a black male than an unarmed black male is to be killed by a police officer.
On Memorial Day weekend in Chicago alone, 10 African-Americans were killed in drive-by shootings. Such routine violence has continued—a 72-year-old Chicago man shot in the face on May 29 by a gunman who fired about a dozen shots into a residence; two 19-year-old women on the South Side shot to death as they sat in a parked car a few hours earlier; a 16-year-old boy fatally stabbed with his own knife that same day. This past weekend, 80 Chicagoans were shot in drive-by shootings, 21 fatally, the victims overwhelmingly black. Police shootings are not the reason that blacks die of homicide at eight times the rate of whites and Hispanics combined; criminal violence is.
The latest in a series of studies undercutting the claim of systemic police bias was published in August 2019 in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. The researchers found that the more frequently officers encounter violent suspects from any given racial group, the greater the chance that a member of that group will be fatally shot by a police officer. There is “no significant evidence of antiblack disparity in the likelihood of being fatally shot by police,” they concluded.
A 2015 Justice Department analysis of the Philadelphia Police Department found that white police officers were less likely than black or Hispanic officers to shoot unarmed black suspects. Research by Harvard economist Roland G. Fryer Jr. also found no evidence of racial discrimination in shootings. Any evidence to the contrary fails to take into account crime rates and civilian behavior before and during interactions with police.
The false narrative of systemic police bias resulted in targeted killings of officers during the Obama presidency. The pattern may be repeating itself. Officers are being assaulted and shot at while they try to arrest gun suspects or respond to the growing riots. Police precincts and courthouses have been destroyed with impunity, which will encourage more civilization-destroying violence. If the Ferguson effect of officers backing off law enforcement in minority neighborhoods is reborn as the Minneapolis effect, the thousands of law-abiding African-Americans who depend on the police for basic safety will once again be the victims.
The Minneapolis officers who arrested George Floyd must be held accountable for their excessive use of force and callous indifference to his distress. Police training needs to double down on de-escalation tactics. But Floyd’s death should not undermine the legitimacy of American law enforcement, without which we will continue on a path toward chaos.
Ms. Mac Donald is a fellow at the Manhattan Institute and the author of “The War on Cops,” (Encounter Books, 2016).
220
Martial Arts Topics / WSJ: Twin Cities cops stand by
« on: May 29, 2020, 04:43:48 PM »
Twin Cities Cops Stand and Watch as Buildings Burn
Local business owners say they are willing to use force if necessary to keep their shops from being looted.
By Kyle Hooten
May 29, 2020 6:37 pm ET
A police officer stands watch as a looted pawn shop burns in Minneapolis, May 28.
PHOTO: STEPHEN MATUREN/GETTY IMAGES
Minneapolis
Hennepin County prosecutors on Friday charged former Minneapolis police officer Derek Chauvin with third-degree murder and second-degree manslaughter in the death of George Floyd, 46. The white Mr. Chauvin was recorded Monday kneeling on the African-American Floyd’s neck for nearly nine minutes as he and three other officers tried to arrest him on suspicion of passing a counterfeit $20 bill. Floyd, who was struggling to breathe, repeatedly asked the officers to help him stand up and died after being taken into custody.
Each night since, the Twin Cities have burned. This isn’t the first time Minneapolis has experienced civil unrest with racial overtones. In the summer of 1967, young residents of North Minneapolis threw rocks, smashed windows and set fires to shops along Plymouth Avenue in protest against unjust conditions in the city’s black neighborhoods. Mayor Arthur Naftalin urged the police to show restraint, and the situation eased.
Minneapolis police have similarly taken a hands-off approach to this week’s rioting, which has destroyed roughly 130 local businesses, but the anger shows no sign of letting up. Downtown business owners—even those who stand against police brutality—have been fighting off looters with their bare hands. Some have taken up arms in defense of their establishments.
A local man posted a video to Snapchat Thursday showing four armed men guarding a stretch of black-owned businesses near where the riots were taking place. One of the men in the clip appeared to be wearing body armor and could be seen holding a Vector SDP, a gun the size of a small rifle that fires handgun caliber bullets. Two of the men in the clip appeared to hold AR-style pistols. The fourth man held an AK-style pistol at the high-ready position. A voice on the video could be heard warning looters to “run up in here and see what happens.”
Early Friday morning, as fires raged along the Lake Street corridor, the African-American owners of GM Tobacco told me they were armed and ready to protect their business—and that they stand in solidarity with those who seek justice for Floyd.
“This our home, this is where we live, this is where we shop,” one the men in front of the tobacco store said. “Our problem is they could have took it to the Capitol, could have took it to different places, but they took it here.” From the sidewalk in front of the tobacco shop I could see Minneapolis’s Third Police Precinct, which rioters set on fire.
“Why are you attacking small businesses and family owned businesses?” one of the men in front of the tobacco store said. “Why are you doing that if you have a problem with the police? We feel the same way that you feel.”
While the owners of the tobacco store avoided violent confrontation that night, the same couldn’t be said for the owner of Cadillac Pawn, who allegedly shot and killed Calvin Horton as he and others tried to loot his East Lake Street jewelry store. Hennepin County Jail records show that the 59-year-old owner was arrested.
Small-business owners aren’t the only ones packing heat. Minutes after I spoke with the tobacconists, I heard gunshots. As flames poured out of the Third Precinct, live streams showed several people brandishing firearms. One rioter suggested that he had recently acquired the gun he was holding, which looked to be a SIG Sauer P226—a law-enforcement and military favorite.
Dozens of shots could be heard Thursday night and into the early hours of Friday. Most bullets were presumably fired into the air, but the Star Tribune reported at least one gunshot victim had sought medical help overnight Thursday. “A gentleman pulled out a gun and started shooting in this direction,” the paper quoted a St. Paul resident as saying. “It’s just been crazy out here.”
Although Gov. Tim Walz has deployed some 500 members of the state’s National Guard to patrol Twin Cities streets, the police haven’t done much to protect businesses or bystanders. As the Third Precinct was under attack, a convoy of police vehicles was caught on video driving away. Early Thursday, I watched three looters carrying armfuls of goods jump into a getaway car. Dozens of police officers who were blocking access to an adjacent street stood by and let them go.
Mr. Hooten is a contributor at the Daily Caller and a reporter with Alpha News.
Local business owners say they are willing to use force if necessary to keep their shops from being looted.
By Kyle Hooten
May 29, 2020 6:37 pm ET
A police officer stands watch as a looted pawn shop burns in Minneapolis, May 28.
PHOTO: STEPHEN MATUREN/GETTY IMAGES
Minneapolis
Hennepin County prosecutors on Friday charged former Minneapolis police officer Derek Chauvin with third-degree murder and second-degree manslaughter in the death of George Floyd, 46. The white Mr. Chauvin was recorded Monday kneeling on the African-American Floyd’s neck for nearly nine minutes as he and three other officers tried to arrest him on suspicion of passing a counterfeit $20 bill. Floyd, who was struggling to breathe, repeatedly asked the officers to help him stand up and died after being taken into custody.
Each night since, the Twin Cities have burned. This isn’t the first time Minneapolis has experienced civil unrest with racial overtones. In the summer of 1967, young residents of North Minneapolis threw rocks, smashed windows and set fires to shops along Plymouth Avenue in protest against unjust conditions in the city’s black neighborhoods. Mayor Arthur Naftalin urged the police to show restraint, and the situation eased.
Minneapolis police have similarly taken a hands-off approach to this week’s rioting, which has destroyed roughly 130 local businesses, but the anger shows no sign of letting up. Downtown business owners—even those who stand against police brutality—have been fighting off looters with their bare hands. Some have taken up arms in defense of their establishments.
A local man posted a video to Snapchat Thursday showing four armed men guarding a stretch of black-owned businesses near where the riots were taking place. One of the men in the clip appeared to be wearing body armor and could be seen holding a Vector SDP, a gun the size of a small rifle that fires handgun caliber bullets. Two of the men in the clip appeared to hold AR-style pistols. The fourth man held an AK-style pistol at the high-ready position. A voice on the video could be heard warning looters to “run up in here and see what happens.”
Early Friday morning, as fires raged along the Lake Street corridor, the African-American owners of GM Tobacco told me they were armed and ready to protect their business—and that they stand in solidarity with those who seek justice for Floyd.
“This our home, this is where we live, this is where we shop,” one the men in front of the tobacco store said. “Our problem is they could have took it to the Capitol, could have took it to different places, but they took it here.” From the sidewalk in front of the tobacco shop I could see Minneapolis’s Third Police Precinct, which rioters set on fire.
“Why are you attacking small businesses and family owned businesses?” one of the men in front of the tobacco store said. “Why are you doing that if you have a problem with the police? We feel the same way that you feel.”
While the owners of the tobacco store avoided violent confrontation that night, the same couldn’t be said for the owner of Cadillac Pawn, who allegedly shot and killed Calvin Horton as he and others tried to loot his East Lake Street jewelry store. Hennepin County Jail records show that the 59-year-old owner was arrested.
Small-business owners aren’t the only ones packing heat. Minutes after I spoke with the tobacconists, I heard gunshots. As flames poured out of the Third Precinct, live streams showed several people brandishing firearms. One rioter suggested that he had recently acquired the gun he was holding, which looked to be a SIG Sauer P226—a law-enforcement and military favorite.
Dozens of shots could be heard Thursday night and into the early hours of Friday. Most bullets were presumably fired into the air, but the Star Tribune reported at least one gunshot victim had sought medical help overnight Thursday. “A gentleman pulled out a gun and started shooting in this direction,” the paper quoted a St. Paul resident as saying. “It’s just been crazy out here.”
Although Gov. Tim Walz has deployed some 500 members of the state’s National Guard to patrol Twin Cities streets, the police haven’t done much to protect businesses or bystanders. As the Third Precinct was under attack, a convoy of police vehicles was caught on video driving away. Early Thursday, I watched three looters carrying armfuls of goods jump into a getaway car. Dozens of police officers who were blocking access to an adjacent street stood by and let them go.
Mr. Hooten is a contributor at the Daily Caller and a reporter with Alpha News.
223
Espanol Discussion / Re: Argentina
« on: May 28, 2020, 12:18:20 PM »
HIGHLIGHTS
Argentina's debt restructuring negotiations with creditors appear stuck, but the recent extension of the country's self-imposed deadline for talks with private debt bondholders keeps alive the possibility of reaching some form of a long-term deal. Ultimately, however, debt restructuring will not by itself change the fiscal and monetary policies that...
The Big Picture
Argentina has formally entered its ninth sovereign debt default in its history, but negotiations with creditors are still ongoing to prevent this default unraveling into a larger economic crisis that could again push the South American country down a populist and nationalistic path.
See Economics
Argentina's debt restructuring negotiations with creditors appear stuck, but the recent extension of the country's self-imposed deadline for talks with private debt bondholders keeps alive the possibility of reaching some form of a long-term deal. Ultimately, however, debt restructuring will not by itself change the fiscal and monetary policies that initially led to Argentina overborrowing. Whether the country's default again transforms into another full-fledged economic crisis will instead hinge on its government's willingness to reach a compromise with bondholders, as well as produce a credible, long-term economic growth plan that remedies the country's currently untenable levels of public spending.
Argentina's prolonged tango with international investors and private sector creditors is about to reach a crescendo in which capital markets will either intensify their embrace with Buenos Aires, or move into a prolonged rift that would be costly for both sides.
On May 22, Argentina officially entered its ninth default on international debt after failing to make a $503 million interest payment on Eurobonds by the end of a contractual 30-day grace period.
Argentina was already in default on dollar-denominated domestic debt, on which it unilaterally declared a moratorium on April 6.
On May 14, the province of Buenos Aires also defaulted on $7 billion in debt when it missed a $150 million payment.
President Alberto Fernandez's administration has yet to present a long-term economic plan, and instead seems to be betting on a debt deal that will give some reprieve to public finances.
On April 17, Argentina proposed an initial debt restructuring deal that as many as 80 percent of investors in Eurobonds totaling $66.2 billion have rejected.
Bondholders presumably found the original proposal, which Buenos Aires says is still on the table, objectionable because Argentina would capture nearly all of the existing secondary market discount of 65-70 percent through a 5 percent “haircut” on principle, as well as a 62 percent reduction in the value of interest payments with no payments to creditors for three years.
Argentina's proposal also lacks a “menu” of alternative options from which creditors could choose from to provide equivalent debt relief via a mix of par bonds with reduced interest or discount bonds with higher interest rates.
The draft deal includes very low long-term economic growth assumptions as well, which creditors deem as very conservative.
Argentina recently extended its debt restructuring negotiations with creditors until June 2, but is giving conflicting signals about what kind of new proposal it is ready to present, if any.
Economy Minister Martin Guzman says the country is waiting for creditors to further modify their proposals to bring them closer to Argentina's request to delay any payment until 2024, which is unlikely.
But in a May 22 interview with Reuters, Guzman also indicated that some revisions to the draft deal could be forthcoming, which may include concessions on Argentina's proposed interest rate cut that Argentina, as well as some modest payments.
Three groups of bondholders have presented counteroffers to Argentina's original April 17 proposal, which still suggests a willingness from both parties to negotiate in good faith and the existence of some common ground. This, combined with the continuation of talks and the lack of public acrimony that characterized previous negotiations, signal that there is ground for some compromise that could provide the basis for a settlement where the latest missed payments would be only a hiccup in Argentina's long debt saga. A potential agreement may include:
A grace period on all payments of less than three years, perhaps with small interest payments that increase over time and a shorter overall maturity for when final payments are due.
Compromises on the overall amount of the “haircut” or reduction in the present value of cash flows.
Allowing creditors to choose between par bonds, discount bonds or interest reduction bonds.
A proposal by a minority group, mainly holding previously restructured debt from 2005, for GDP-linked contingencies in which creditors could conceivably recover higher amounts if the economy does better than now projected.
Avoiding another full-fledged crisis after Argentina's latest default will hinge on whether its government can produce a credible economic growth plan and reach a debt restructuring deal with bondholders.
However, there are still obstacles that could complicate the final success of a debt restructuring agreement between Buenos Aires and bondholders.
Some hard-line bondholders could decide to hold out from any deal that the majority of the private lenders agree with Argentina.
Argentina and creditors could also fail to agree on what a credible long-term economic recovery plan for the country, and the Argentine's government willingness to present one in the first place.
But even with a deal, Argentina's future economic prospects remain dire.
Due to the fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic, the Argentine economy is expected to contract by more than five percent in 2020.
The global oil price crash has complicated Argentina's plans to continue exploiting the shale-rich area of Vaca Muerta, which requires reference oil prices upwards of $45 per barrel to be viable.
Tensions with neighboring Brazil and an initially protectionist outlook from Argentina complicate the possibility of the Common Market of the South (Mercosur) successfully negotiating more free-trade agreements that would expand export markets for Argentina, as well as the rest of the region.
Avoiding a prolonged default and the subsequent financial crisis will thus also require deft management of the economy, as well as the involvement of key external institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund.
TO READ THE FULL ARTICLE
Argentina's debt restructuring negotiations with creditors appear stuck, but the recent extension of the country's self-imposed deadline for talks with private debt bondholders keeps alive the possibility of reaching some form of a long-term deal. Ultimately, however, debt restructuring will not by itself change the fiscal and monetary policies that...
The Big Picture
Argentina has formally entered its ninth sovereign debt default in its history, but negotiations with creditors are still ongoing to prevent this default unraveling into a larger economic crisis that could again push the South American country down a populist and nationalistic path.
See Economics
Argentina's debt restructuring negotiations with creditors appear stuck, but the recent extension of the country's self-imposed deadline for talks with private debt bondholders keeps alive the possibility of reaching some form of a long-term deal. Ultimately, however, debt restructuring will not by itself change the fiscal and monetary policies that initially led to Argentina overborrowing. Whether the country's default again transforms into another full-fledged economic crisis will instead hinge on its government's willingness to reach a compromise with bondholders, as well as produce a credible, long-term economic growth plan that remedies the country's currently untenable levels of public spending.
Argentina's prolonged tango with international investors and private sector creditors is about to reach a crescendo in which capital markets will either intensify their embrace with Buenos Aires, or move into a prolonged rift that would be costly for both sides.
On May 22, Argentina officially entered its ninth default on international debt after failing to make a $503 million interest payment on Eurobonds by the end of a contractual 30-day grace period.
Argentina was already in default on dollar-denominated domestic debt, on which it unilaterally declared a moratorium on April 6.
On May 14, the province of Buenos Aires also defaulted on $7 billion in debt when it missed a $150 million payment.
President Alberto Fernandez's administration has yet to present a long-term economic plan, and instead seems to be betting on a debt deal that will give some reprieve to public finances.
On April 17, Argentina proposed an initial debt restructuring deal that as many as 80 percent of investors in Eurobonds totaling $66.2 billion have rejected.
Bondholders presumably found the original proposal, which Buenos Aires says is still on the table, objectionable because Argentina would capture nearly all of the existing secondary market discount of 65-70 percent through a 5 percent “haircut” on principle, as well as a 62 percent reduction in the value of interest payments with no payments to creditors for three years.
Argentina's proposal also lacks a “menu” of alternative options from which creditors could choose from to provide equivalent debt relief via a mix of par bonds with reduced interest or discount bonds with higher interest rates.
The draft deal includes very low long-term economic growth assumptions as well, which creditors deem as very conservative.
Argentina recently extended its debt restructuring negotiations with creditors until June 2, but is giving conflicting signals about what kind of new proposal it is ready to present, if any.
Economy Minister Martin Guzman says the country is waiting for creditors to further modify their proposals to bring them closer to Argentina's request to delay any payment until 2024, which is unlikely.
But in a May 22 interview with Reuters, Guzman also indicated that some revisions to the draft deal could be forthcoming, which may include concessions on Argentina's proposed interest rate cut that Argentina, as well as some modest payments.
Three groups of bondholders have presented counteroffers to Argentina's original April 17 proposal, which still suggests a willingness from both parties to negotiate in good faith and the existence of some common ground. This, combined with the continuation of talks and the lack of public acrimony that characterized previous negotiations, signal that there is ground for some compromise that could provide the basis for a settlement where the latest missed payments would be only a hiccup in Argentina's long debt saga. A potential agreement may include:
A grace period on all payments of less than three years, perhaps with small interest payments that increase over time and a shorter overall maturity for when final payments are due.
Compromises on the overall amount of the “haircut” or reduction in the present value of cash flows.
Allowing creditors to choose between par bonds, discount bonds or interest reduction bonds.
A proposal by a minority group, mainly holding previously restructured debt from 2005, for GDP-linked contingencies in which creditors could conceivably recover higher amounts if the economy does better than now projected.
Avoiding another full-fledged crisis after Argentina's latest default will hinge on whether its government can produce a credible economic growth plan and reach a debt restructuring deal with bondholders.
However, there are still obstacles that could complicate the final success of a debt restructuring agreement between Buenos Aires and bondholders.
Some hard-line bondholders could decide to hold out from any deal that the majority of the private lenders agree with Argentina.
Argentina and creditors could also fail to agree on what a credible long-term economic recovery plan for the country, and the Argentine's government willingness to present one in the first place.
But even with a deal, Argentina's future economic prospects remain dire.
Due to the fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic, the Argentine economy is expected to contract by more than five percent in 2020.
The global oil price crash has complicated Argentina's plans to continue exploiting the shale-rich area of Vaca Muerta, which requires reference oil prices upwards of $45 per barrel to be viable.
Tensions with neighboring Brazil and an initially protectionist outlook from Argentina complicate the possibility of the Common Market of the South (Mercosur) successfully negotiating more free-trade agreements that would expand export markets for Argentina, as well as the rest of the region.
Avoiding a prolonged default and the subsequent financial crisis will thus also require deft management of the economy, as well as the involvement of key external institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund.
TO READ THE FULL ARTICLE
225
Martial Arts Topics / Re: Citizen-Police interactions
« on: May 27, 2020, 07:18:20 AM »
We are having a big discussion about this case on DBMA FB. All the LEOs there are agreed-- this was fuct up.
Here's an intelligent discussion by a friend of friends-- a man with serious track record-- of the Arbrey case:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d9PQjo2tJ-g&feature=youtu.be
Here's an intelligent discussion by a friend of friends-- a man with serious track record-- of the Arbrey case:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d9PQjo2tJ-g&feature=youtu.be
227
Espanol Discussion / GPF: Porque Maduro no esta' peor como se hubiera pensado
« on: May 19, 2020, 09:18:56 AM »
May 19, 2020 View On Website
Open as PDF
Why Venezuela's Maduro Isn’t Worse Off Than He Is
By: Allison Fedirka
The past few months have been a nightmare for economies that rely on oil. After the coronavirus pandemic sent prices plummeting, finance ministries had to triage planned revenue, major social and infrastructure projects were put on hold or aborted altogether, and the public started to lose its temper. All available evidence would suggest that oil-dependent Venezuela is, once again, on the brink of collapse. Yet President Nicolas Maduro finds himself in a comparatively stronger position now than when oil prices collapsed in early March. Since then, he has managed to navigate through extensive U.S. actions meant to cripple the Venezuelan economy and has weathered three key external events — the pandemic, the oil crash and a farcical coup attempt involving two Americans — maintaining his power however precariously.
Venezuela is strategically important to the U.S., at least within the parameters of hemispheric security and control of the Caribbean Sea, and it’s no secret that the Trump administration would like to see Maduro fall. Hence Washington’s general low-cost, low-effort policy of slowly tightening an economic vise around the country, which keeps its interests in play while waiting for the Maduro government to self-destruct or for the opposition to take over. The fall of the price of oil, however, gave Washington an opportunity to pitch new transition talks to Maduro and his opponents. On March 31, the U.S. State Department issued its proposed Democratic Transition Framework for Venezuela, in which it offered to begin lifting parts of the sanctions if members of Maduro’s United Socialist Party of Venezuela formed an interim government without Maduro to transition to new elections. Unsurprisingly, Maduro publicly rejected the plan.
He could afford to. Low oil prices didn’t damage the Venezuelan economy as badly as expected. Mostly that’s because the economy, particularly its hydrocarbon sector, was already in ruins. Food shortages have been rampant since at least 2012, the currency been in a state of hyperinflation since 2016, power shortages occur regularly and many citizens depend on the black market for survival. U.S. sanctions targeting high-level politicians and key business activities made things only worse. Oil production has been in decline since 2016 and has fallen dramatically since 2018. Most of the oil Venezuela does produce is sold at a discount and used to pay off debts or for domestic consumption. These problems were such that the drop in oil prices hurt the economy but not as badly as the drop hurt healthier economies.
(click to enlarge)
When it became clear the transition proposal was dead on arrival, the Trump administration called on Chevron, the only U.S. oil company still operating in Venezuela, to leave or give up its shares in its operations. It was meant to be retaliatory but in fact did little to hurt Maduro. Chevron produced only 34,000 barrels per day in 2019 — a drop in the bucket for a country that produces under 1 million bpd (and falling) in a bad year — and so it made sense for it to halt operations, which it did. However, Chevron kept its shares in joint ventures with state-run oil company Petroleos de Venezuela, meaning the company will keep its foot in the door in Venezuela, which has been the company’s only purpose in the country for the past couple of years. The truth is that the Chevron decision did little to undercut Maduro or hurt the Venezuelan oil sector writ large.
(click to enlarge)
The biggest danger to Venezuela is the price of domestic duel, which skyrocketed around the same time prices fell as supplies ran low. The shortages are due primarily to poor refining capacity. At the beginning of 2015, Venezuela refined 915,000 bpd of crude. By the start of 2020, it was refining just 135,000 bpd. Now, refining has never been Venezuela’s strong suit; it generally relied on U.S. facilities. But low gasoline prices were a fixture of Venezuela for decades, and raising the price is politically dangerous.
Thus Venezuela turned to Iran, a country with lots of experience and little to lose from angering the United States. In exchange for about $900 million worth of gold, Iran sent input chemicals for refining, pledged help to repair refineries and dispatched five tankers to delivery emergency fuel to Venezuela. That is a hefty sum of money for a country with few reserves, but solving the fuel crisis is necessary for Maduro to remain in power.
There are two other factors that explain why Maduro is relatively safe behind his heightened security. The first and most obvious is that the coronavirus pandemic discouraged people from protesting in public, and gave the military an excuse to patrol the streets and take control of the distribution of health equipment and food. The second was the May 3 “coup attempt,” if you can call it that. Dozens of people — including two Americans — launched an amphibious assault, only to be immediately snuffed out by authorities. The incursion was never a real threat to Maduro’s power, but since the alleged orchestrator was an American mercenary with a company based in Florida, Maduro had more than enough reason to publicly villainize the U.S., increase security even more and portray the government from a position of strength. Most important, it gave Caracas two U.S. prisoners who can be used in future negotiations.
The U.S. is in no rush to re-engage Venezuela. It’s written off Juan Guaido, the so-called other president of Venezuela who failed to serve his purpose of ushering in a new government. Washington is content to wait until it can capitalize on its reconstruction once there is a new government in place. Reconstruction comes down to who has the most money to pour into Venezuela, and to no surprise the U.S. was for the past few months the most well-suited to do so. Now, with low oil prices, a global recession and record-level unemployment in the U.S., Washington has no will and limited ability to fund Venezuela's reconstruction.
And so Maduro occupies his post relatively uncontested for now. The economy is still a mess, but time seems again to be on his side.
397381
Open as PDF
Why Venezuela's Maduro Isn’t Worse Off Than He Is
By: Allison Fedirka
The past few months have been a nightmare for economies that rely on oil. After the coronavirus pandemic sent prices plummeting, finance ministries had to triage planned revenue, major social and infrastructure projects were put on hold or aborted altogether, and the public started to lose its temper. All available evidence would suggest that oil-dependent Venezuela is, once again, on the brink of collapse. Yet President Nicolas Maduro finds himself in a comparatively stronger position now than when oil prices collapsed in early March. Since then, he has managed to navigate through extensive U.S. actions meant to cripple the Venezuelan economy and has weathered three key external events — the pandemic, the oil crash and a farcical coup attempt involving two Americans — maintaining his power however precariously.
Venezuela is strategically important to the U.S., at least within the parameters of hemispheric security and control of the Caribbean Sea, and it’s no secret that the Trump administration would like to see Maduro fall. Hence Washington’s general low-cost, low-effort policy of slowly tightening an economic vise around the country, which keeps its interests in play while waiting for the Maduro government to self-destruct or for the opposition to take over. The fall of the price of oil, however, gave Washington an opportunity to pitch new transition talks to Maduro and his opponents. On March 31, the U.S. State Department issued its proposed Democratic Transition Framework for Venezuela, in which it offered to begin lifting parts of the sanctions if members of Maduro’s United Socialist Party of Venezuela formed an interim government without Maduro to transition to new elections. Unsurprisingly, Maduro publicly rejected the plan.
He could afford to. Low oil prices didn’t damage the Venezuelan economy as badly as expected. Mostly that’s because the economy, particularly its hydrocarbon sector, was already in ruins. Food shortages have been rampant since at least 2012, the currency been in a state of hyperinflation since 2016, power shortages occur regularly and many citizens depend on the black market for survival. U.S. sanctions targeting high-level politicians and key business activities made things only worse. Oil production has been in decline since 2016 and has fallen dramatically since 2018. Most of the oil Venezuela does produce is sold at a discount and used to pay off debts or for domestic consumption. These problems were such that the drop in oil prices hurt the economy but not as badly as the drop hurt healthier economies.
(click to enlarge)
When it became clear the transition proposal was dead on arrival, the Trump administration called on Chevron, the only U.S. oil company still operating in Venezuela, to leave or give up its shares in its operations. It was meant to be retaliatory but in fact did little to hurt Maduro. Chevron produced only 34,000 barrels per day in 2019 — a drop in the bucket for a country that produces under 1 million bpd (and falling) in a bad year — and so it made sense for it to halt operations, which it did. However, Chevron kept its shares in joint ventures with state-run oil company Petroleos de Venezuela, meaning the company will keep its foot in the door in Venezuela, which has been the company’s only purpose in the country for the past couple of years. The truth is that the Chevron decision did little to undercut Maduro or hurt the Venezuelan oil sector writ large.
(click to enlarge)
The biggest danger to Venezuela is the price of domestic duel, which skyrocketed around the same time prices fell as supplies ran low. The shortages are due primarily to poor refining capacity. At the beginning of 2015, Venezuela refined 915,000 bpd of crude. By the start of 2020, it was refining just 135,000 bpd. Now, refining has never been Venezuela’s strong suit; it generally relied on U.S. facilities. But low gasoline prices were a fixture of Venezuela for decades, and raising the price is politically dangerous.
Thus Venezuela turned to Iran, a country with lots of experience and little to lose from angering the United States. In exchange for about $900 million worth of gold, Iran sent input chemicals for refining, pledged help to repair refineries and dispatched five tankers to delivery emergency fuel to Venezuela. That is a hefty sum of money for a country with few reserves, but solving the fuel crisis is necessary for Maduro to remain in power.
There are two other factors that explain why Maduro is relatively safe behind his heightened security. The first and most obvious is that the coronavirus pandemic discouraged people from protesting in public, and gave the military an excuse to patrol the streets and take control of the distribution of health equipment and food. The second was the May 3 “coup attempt,” if you can call it that. Dozens of people — including two Americans — launched an amphibious assault, only to be immediately snuffed out by authorities. The incursion was never a real threat to Maduro’s power, but since the alleged orchestrator was an American mercenary with a company based in Florida, Maduro had more than enough reason to publicly villainize the U.S., increase security even more and portray the government from a position of strength. Most important, it gave Caracas two U.S. prisoners who can be used in future negotiations.
The U.S. is in no rush to re-engage Venezuela. It’s written off Juan Guaido, the so-called other president of Venezuela who failed to serve his purpose of ushering in a new government. Washington is content to wait until it can capitalize on its reconstruction once there is a new government in place. Reconstruction comes down to who has the most money to pour into Venezuela, and to no surprise the U.S. was for the past few months the most well-suited to do so. Now, with low oil prices, a global recession and record-level unemployment in the U.S., Washington has no will and limited ability to fund Venezuela's reconstruction.
And so Maduro occupies his post relatively uncontested for now. The economy is still a mess, but time seems again to be on his side.
397381
229
Espanol Discussion / Re: Venezuela Politica
« on: May 17, 2020, 08:39:49 AM »
How Cuba’s Spies Keep Winning
They’ve infiltrated another attempt to unseat Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro.
By Mary Anastasia O’Grady
May 10, 2020 3:40 pm ET
The failed landing on a rugged stretch of Venezuelan coastline last week by a band of mercenaries hoping to unseat Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro is another tragedy for the beleaguered nation.
The predawn mission was meant to capitalize on the element of surprise. But the irregular soldiers were immediately confronted by Venezuelan troops because their operation had been thoroughly penetrated by Cuban-backed Venezuelan intelligence. Some were killed in the fighting and more may have been executed. Among the captured are two Americans.
The debacle is demoralizing for an enslaved nation suffering dire privation and brutal repression. It is also an opportunity to reflect on Cuba’s asymmetric-warfare capabilities and the sophistication of its intelligence apparatus, which over more than a half-century has run circles around the U.S. Beyond the killing, the fiasco will deepen suspicion and distrust among the members of the opposition—particularly of “friends” who claim to have broken with the dictatorship.
The U.S. government has said it had no “direct involvement” in the seaborne operation. Jordan Goudreau, a former Green Beret who was the ring leader of the plot, did receive some interest in his services from advisers to U.S.-backed interim Venezuelan President Juan Guaidó. But Mr. Guaidó’s communications team has put out a statement insisting that the interim president never agreed to launching the operation.
Mr. Goudreau, who heads the U.S.-based security firm Silvercorp, apparently planned to provoke a military uprising, detain Mr. Maduro, and put him on a plane to the U.S.
There is near universal agreement that it was a reckless endeavor. Yet it is only the latest in a string of desperate attempts to try to bring down the dictatorship. And while the methods have varied, the common denominator in all the quashed uprisings has been how effectively Cuban-led intelligence has disrupted the plans. In some cases the plots may even have originated with state-security agents, who recruited eager patriots and mercenaries and set them up to be killed. This also reinforces a sense of futility among would-be rebels.
Whether it’s inside the military or among the ranks of the opposition, many Venezuelans now conclude that Cuban moles are everywhere and it’s too risky to put confidence in anyone. This is key to Havana’s control strategy in Venezuela. It is also standard practice on the island.
The struggle to liberate Venezuela is a proxy war between the U.S. and Cuba, which is backed by its allies Russia, Iran and China. The conflict drags on because Cuba has the edge where it matters.
When it comes to traditional military capabilities, the U.S. soars above its adversaries. But Havana dominates in deception, human intelligence and propaganda. It’s been that way from the early days of the Cuban dictatorship. “The Cubans were underestimated for more than a quarter of a century,” former CIA Cuba analyst Brian Latell wrote in his 2012 book, “Castro’s Secrets.” The U.S. thought it was dealing with “bush-league amateurs” until Florentino Aspillaga Lombard, a highly decorated Cuban agent, defected in 1987. That’s when the U.S. began to understand that Castro’s Cuba had “developed a foreign intelligence service that quickly rose into the ranks of the half dozen best in the world.” Moreover, “in some covert specialties, particularly in running double agents and counterintelligence,” over decades, Mr. Latell wrote, “Cuba’s achievements have been unparalleled.”
It’s a mistake to think this is only about people like high-ranking Pentagon intelligence analyst Ana Belén Montes, who was exposed as a Cuban spy in 2001 after some 16 years working for the enemy. Cuba has myriad ways of spreading disinformation, combating critics, and widening its influence. Return access to the island for journalists and academics, for example, is denied when there is unfavorable coverage, which is presumably why yours truly cannot get a visa.
Blackmail is another method of manipulation. I have twice interviewed a Cuban defector who told me it was his job in Cuba to retrieve videocassettes from hidden cameras in hotel rooms and official residences where visiting dignitaries were staying. The goal was to capture on film compromising behavior that could be used to extort political favors or, for example, force a resignation. With heavy political and diplomatic traffic to the island from Europe and Washington, it’s a safe bet that at least a few have been compromised in this way.
The Guaidó team now says it balked at the Goudreau plan in part because it did not trust former Venezuelan General Cliver Alcalá, whose brother is Mr. Maduro’s ambassador to Tehran but who claimed to have switched sides. Mr. Alcalá was taken into custody in the U.S. on drug-trafficking charges in March. But that he got close to the Guaidó team in the first place is another credit to Cuba’s intel network—most likely in this case with a lot of help from Iran.
Write to O’Grady@wsj.com.
They’ve infiltrated another attempt to unseat Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro.
By Mary Anastasia O’Grady
May 10, 2020 3:40 pm ET
The failed landing on a rugged stretch of Venezuelan coastline last week by a band of mercenaries hoping to unseat Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro is another tragedy for the beleaguered nation.
The predawn mission was meant to capitalize on the element of surprise. But the irregular soldiers were immediately confronted by Venezuelan troops because their operation had been thoroughly penetrated by Cuban-backed Venezuelan intelligence. Some were killed in the fighting and more may have been executed. Among the captured are two Americans.
The debacle is demoralizing for an enslaved nation suffering dire privation and brutal repression. It is also an opportunity to reflect on Cuba’s asymmetric-warfare capabilities and the sophistication of its intelligence apparatus, which over more than a half-century has run circles around the U.S. Beyond the killing, the fiasco will deepen suspicion and distrust among the members of the opposition—particularly of “friends” who claim to have broken with the dictatorship.
The U.S. government has said it had no “direct involvement” in the seaborne operation. Jordan Goudreau, a former Green Beret who was the ring leader of the plot, did receive some interest in his services from advisers to U.S.-backed interim Venezuelan President Juan Guaidó. But Mr. Guaidó’s communications team has put out a statement insisting that the interim president never agreed to launching the operation.
Mr. Goudreau, who heads the U.S.-based security firm Silvercorp, apparently planned to provoke a military uprising, detain Mr. Maduro, and put him on a plane to the U.S.
There is near universal agreement that it was a reckless endeavor. Yet it is only the latest in a string of desperate attempts to try to bring down the dictatorship. And while the methods have varied, the common denominator in all the quashed uprisings has been how effectively Cuban-led intelligence has disrupted the plans. In some cases the plots may even have originated with state-security agents, who recruited eager patriots and mercenaries and set them up to be killed. This also reinforces a sense of futility among would-be rebels.
Whether it’s inside the military or among the ranks of the opposition, many Venezuelans now conclude that Cuban moles are everywhere and it’s too risky to put confidence in anyone. This is key to Havana’s control strategy in Venezuela. It is also standard practice on the island.
The struggle to liberate Venezuela is a proxy war between the U.S. and Cuba, which is backed by its allies Russia, Iran and China. The conflict drags on because Cuba has the edge where it matters.
When it comes to traditional military capabilities, the U.S. soars above its adversaries. But Havana dominates in deception, human intelligence and propaganda. It’s been that way from the early days of the Cuban dictatorship. “The Cubans were underestimated for more than a quarter of a century,” former CIA Cuba analyst Brian Latell wrote in his 2012 book, “Castro’s Secrets.” The U.S. thought it was dealing with “bush-league amateurs” until Florentino Aspillaga Lombard, a highly decorated Cuban agent, defected in 1987. That’s when the U.S. began to understand that Castro’s Cuba had “developed a foreign intelligence service that quickly rose into the ranks of the half dozen best in the world.” Moreover, “in some covert specialties, particularly in running double agents and counterintelligence,” over decades, Mr. Latell wrote, “Cuba’s achievements have been unparalleled.”
It’s a mistake to think this is only about people like high-ranking Pentagon intelligence analyst Ana Belén Montes, who was exposed as a Cuban spy in 2001 after some 16 years working for the enemy. Cuba has myriad ways of spreading disinformation, combating critics, and widening its influence. Return access to the island for journalists and academics, for example, is denied when there is unfavorable coverage, which is presumably why yours truly cannot get a visa.
Blackmail is another method of manipulation. I have twice interviewed a Cuban defector who told me it was his job in Cuba to retrieve videocassettes from hidden cameras in hotel rooms and official residences where visiting dignitaries were staying. The goal was to capture on film compromising behavior that could be used to extort political favors or, for example, force a resignation. With heavy political and diplomatic traffic to the island from Europe and Washington, it’s a safe bet that at least a few have been compromised in this way.
The Guaidó team now says it balked at the Goudreau plan in part because it did not trust former Venezuelan General Cliver Alcalá, whose brother is Mr. Maduro’s ambassador to Tehran but who claimed to have switched sides. Mr. Alcalá was taken into custody in the U.S. on drug-trafficking charges in March. But that he got close to the Guaidó team in the first place is another credit to Cuba’s intel network—most likely in this case with a lot of help from Iran.
Write to O’Grady@wsj.com.
235
Espanol Discussion / Re: Mexico
« on: May 06, 2020, 07:21:53 PM »
Mexico falls 4% on peace index due to surge in organized crime
Baja California least peaceful state last year, Yucatán the most peaceful
Published on Wednesday, May 6, 2020
9
SHARES
Peacefulness in Mexico deteriorated 4.3% in 2019, largely due to a 24.3% increase in the rate of organized crime, according to a global think tank.
The Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) said in its report Mexico Peace Index 2020 that peacefulness has declined 27.2% over the past five years. Published on Tuesday, the report highlighted that the homicide rate in Mexico last year was 28 per 100,000 residents, seven times higher than the global average.
The IEP noted that the rate increase of 1.4% in 2019 represented “a much slower rise than the previous year’s increase of 15.7%” but highlighted that the national violent crime rate increased by 4.7%. The latter increase was mainly driven by an 18.7% rise in the sexual assault rate, the think tank said.
It said that Baja California was the least peaceful state in Mexico last year for a second consecutive year followed by Colima, Quintana Roo, Chihuahua and Guanajuato. Yucatán remains the most peaceful state, followed by Tlaxcala, Chiapas, Campeche and Nayarit.
The IEP said that only seven states have recorded improvements in homicide rates since 2015. “Baja California Sur has achieved the largest improvement, reducing its homicide rate by more than half to stand at 10.3 deaths per 100,000 people,” the report said.
The think tank said that statistical analysis shows that there are four distinct types of violence in Mexico: political, opportunistic, interpersonal and cartel conflict.
The overall economic impact of violence in Mexico last year – the first full year of the new federal government – was 4.57 trillion pesos (US $238) billion, the IEP said, noting that the figure is equivalent to 21.3% of national GDP. Homicides caused just under half of the economic damage.
“The economic impact of violence was nearly eight times higher than public investments made in health care and more than six times higher than those made in education in 2019,” the report said.
“The economic impact of violence was 36,129 pesos per person, approximately five times the average monthly salary of a Mexican worker. The per capita economic impact varies significantly from state to state, ranging from 11,714 pesos in Yucatán to 83,926 pesos in Colima.”
Despite the high cost of rampant violence, the federal government spent just 0.7% of GDP on domestic security and the justice system last year, the IEP said, highlighting that the percentage was the lowest among the 37 member countries of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.
Source: Reforma (sp), El Economista (sp)
Baja California least peaceful state last year, Yucatán the most peaceful
Published on Wednesday, May 6, 2020
9
SHARES
Peacefulness in Mexico deteriorated 4.3% in 2019, largely due to a 24.3% increase in the rate of organized crime, according to a global think tank.
The Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) said in its report Mexico Peace Index 2020 that peacefulness has declined 27.2% over the past five years. Published on Tuesday, the report highlighted that the homicide rate in Mexico last year was 28 per 100,000 residents, seven times higher than the global average.
The IEP noted that the rate increase of 1.4% in 2019 represented “a much slower rise than the previous year’s increase of 15.7%” but highlighted that the national violent crime rate increased by 4.7%. The latter increase was mainly driven by an 18.7% rise in the sexual assault rate, the think tank said.
It said that Baja California was the least peaceful state in Mexico last year for a second consecutive year followed by Colima, Quintana Roo, Chihuahua and Guanajuato. Yucatán remains the most peaceful state, followed by Tlaxcala, Chiapas, Campeche and Nayarit.
The IEP said that only seven states have recorded improvements in homicide rates since 2015. “Baja California Sur has achieved the largest improvement, reducing its homicide rate by more than half to stand at 10.3 deaths per 100,000 people,” the report said.
The think tank said that statistical analysis shows that there are four distinct types of violence in Mexico: political, opportunistic, interpersonal and cartel conflict.
The overall economic impact of violence in Mexico last year – the first full year of the new federal government – was 4.57 trillion pesos (US $238) billion, the IEP said, noting that the figure is equivalent to 21.3% of national GDP. Homicides caused just under half of the economic damage.
“The economic impact of violence was nearly eight times higher than public investments made in health care and more than six times higher than those made in education in 2019,” the report said.
“The economic impact of violence was 36,129 pesos per person, approximately five times the average monthly salary of a Mexican worker. The per capita economic impact varies significantly from state to state, ranging from 11,714 pesos in Yucatán to 83,926 pesos in Colima.”
Despite the high cost of rampant violence, the federal government spent just 0.7% of GDP on domestic security and the justice system last year, the IEP said, highlighting that the percentage was the lowest among the 37 member countries of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.
Source: Reforma (sp), El Economista (sp)
236
Espanol Discussion / Mexico knew about top cop's narco involvement
« on: May 04, 2020, 05:33:22 PM »238
Martial Arts Topics / VA Crime and Punishment-- no quarantine for the criminal
« on: May 01, 2020, 04:45:39 PM »241
Espanol Discussion / GPF: Mexico's Three Economic Fronts
« on: April 23, 2020, 12:40:35 PM »
April 22, 2020 View On Website
Open as PDF
Mexico’s Three Economic Fronts Face a Recession
By: Allison Fedirka
Mexico is bracing for a serious economic recession this year, much like the rest of the world. But unlike many other countries, the Mexican government is not meeting the event with an abundance of bailouts, tax breaks or other fiscal measures. Instead, Mexican President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (popularly known as AMLO) has opted to stay the course with his plans of austerity and social development funding, much to the chagrin of big business. He has made it clear that his goal for combating the recession is to avoid sovereign debt and mitigate the impact felt by the country’s poor. Lopez Obrador is facing three fronts in his battle against a recession in Mexico: the country’s formal, informal and black market economies. And his decision to focus on propping up and reining in the informal economy through continued social development funding is more than just a continuation of adherence to political policy. It also reflects that the government is unable to effectively address the other two economies on its own.
The Three Economic Fronts
Lopez Obrador’s strategy to confront the economic recession preserves his big-picture plan to “transform” the Mexican economy and wrestles with the fact that the Mexican economy can be clearly divided into three distinct sub-economies, each playing by its own set of rules. The formal economy is characterized by services, finance and high-end manufacturing with intricate supply chains. It generates 77.5 percent of the country’s gross domestic product and is concentrated in the central and northern parts of the country. The informal economy — a “gray zone” not taxed or regulated by the government but still legal — generates 22.5 percent of the country’s GDP and is characterized by precarious employment, basic manufacturing and low wages. It exists in much higher concentrations in the country’s south. The black market economy, run by organized crime, is prevalent throughout the entire country. Its economic contribution is not clearly known given the illicit nature of its activities, but recent estimates put Mexican drug sales to the United States at $19 billion to $29 billion annually. Despite its illegality, the black market injects a massive amount of capital into the economy, which generally speaking is a good thing. On the other hand, it also deters investment and infrastructure development and breeds extortion, corruption and violence. The result is a mixed bag of economic effects that is not easy to define or calculate.
(click to enlarge)
AMLO’s proposed solution for dealing with the segmented nature of Mexico’s economy involves diminishing the economic and development disparities across the country through youth education and job training programs, labor-intensive infrastructure projects, support for small businesses, anti-corruption measures and government austerity. In other words, he is attempting to reduce the informal economy and merge it with the formal economy. His approach has been controversial and viewed by the opposition as contrary to the ultimate objectives of developing and growing Mexico’s economy. Indeed, the segmented nature of the country’s economy makes it extremely difficult to pursue a policy that helps one segment without hurting the other two. But in the face of the recession, the government has opted to direct the few funds it has toward the informal sector, an approach that aligns with long-term goals and exists as the most viable short-term solution available.
The Formal Economy: Severe Limits
Mexico’s formal economy has a high degree of exposure to external forces and is therefore largely out of the government’s control. For starters, the Mexican economy is largely dependent on the health of the U.S. economy. Mexican exports to the United States are equivalent to about 31 percent of the country’s GDP, and the United States is the leading supplier of foreign direct investment to Mexico. Remittances, which totaled $36.05 billion last year, are Mexico’s largest source of U.S. dollars, and 95 percent come from senders in the United States.
When the U.S. economy performs poorly (or restricts border crossings), the effects are often amplified in the Mexican economy. The International Monetary Fund expects the U.S. economy to contract 5.6 percent this year, and new unemployment claims in the country at the time of publication stand at 22 million. For Mexico, this means that there are far fewer buyers of Mexican goods and that the country can’t trade its way out of the crisis, even considering the strong decline in the peso’s value relative to the dollar so far this year.
To escape its mild 2019 recession, Mexico had planned to turn to foreign direct investment in 2020. And even before a global recession became imminent, the government was struggling to attract foreign investment over concerns of regulations, crime and general doubts over management. Now, the United Nations estimates that foreign investment will drop by 30-40 percent globally this year. For Mexico, this means investment will be difficult to come by and require fierce competition with others.
Foreign investment is no longer a viable option to stimulate the economy. Lastly, other major financial sources, such as oil and tourism, not only remain out of Mexico’s control but have poor prospects this year. Admittedly, state-owned oil company Pemex has been struggling for years, but even in the company’s best-case scenario, it can do little to address low oil prices, let alone change them. As for tourism, travel restrictions and personal fears mean the cancellation of many summer trips.
(click to enlarge)
The Mexican government has offered little to mitigate the recession’s impact on the formal economy because the influence of external factors will outweigh much of what it can offer. The government says it only has about $10 billion available from various rainy day funds. This means the bailouts, tax breaks and fiscal stimulus called for by businesses in the formal sector cannot be executed on a scale that would have an impact on a $1.3 trillion economy. Effectively stimulating an economy takes massive amounts of money, which often means taking on debt — and the concern over government debt in Mexico predates AMLO. The government currently does not have enough reserves to cover its debt in the event of an emergency, and incurring new debt would make matters only worse. Additionally, spending money on the formal economy would largely put the two other major segments of the economy on the sidelines. The government’s financial authorities did loosen liquidity rules on banks, which they assert are well equipped to handle the pending economic crisis, but aside from that, it has taken a largely hands-off approach.
The Informal Economy: Opportunity for Impact
The Mexican government has directed its efforts toward the informal economy because its potential for impact is higher and the informal economy plays a critical role in the workforce. Mexico defines the informal economy as one that includes any economic activity that is legally produced and marketed but the production or distribution units are not formally registered. It also includes all economic activities that operate from family resources, such as micro- and small businesses that are not constituted as companies. Because informal workers tend to have lower-quality jobs, lower wages and no insurance compared to those with formal-sector jobs, they are more vulnerable to recession. And since the latest official figures from the end of 2019 show that Mexico’s informal sector employs 56.2 percent of all workers, a sizable portion of the country’s working population is highly vulnerable to recession.
(click to enlarge)
The actions the Mexican government has taken to mitigate the impact of a recession on the country’s economy have focused on supporting the continued employment of informal workers. Earlier this month, the government said it would provide a 25,000-peso ($1,000) credit for small and micro-companies that have retained employees and not reduced wages, offering low interest rates that increase slightly by company size. The plan allows for a million total recipients, though an estimated 5 million will request access, and money will arrive in May and June. This low-interest-rate credit will need to be paid back in three years, with payments starting after the fourth month. Lopez Obrador also announced additional credit for the creation of 2 million more formal jobs this year, but such a project was already in the works prior to the global recession.
One wild card that could impede the government’s task of easing the recession’s impact is remittances, which play a key role in many household incomes, particularly in poor segments of the economy. BBVA estimates that, this year, remittances will decline by 17 percent to $29.9 billion due to the recession and mass unemployment in the United States. Nevertheless, from the government’s perspective, it’s still more cost-effective to support working programs now than deal with millions of people eventually out of work amid economic collapse.
The Black Market Economy: A Very Large Shadow
Though Mexico’s organized crime groups are not often considered in terms of their contribution to economic activity, they must also be factored in to efforts to combat the recession. For better or worse, the large scale and high value of their operations do create jobs and support economic activity at local levels. The pervasive nature of organized crime means it touches the pocketbooks of hundreds of thousands of Mexicans. And these groups are not immune to the recession, though they are positioned better than most to confront it. Like many multinational companies, organized crime groups in Mexico experienced supply chain disruptions with the slowing global economy, particularly with respect to the chemical precursors from China used to make fentanyl. The disruptions hurt major fentanyl suppliers, such as the Sinaloa and Jalisco New Generation cartels.
Meanwhile, alternative revenue flows, including human trafficking, fuel robbing and extortion, are not currently available due to increased border restrictions, low oil prices and businesses going on hold for quarantine. Of course, the addictive nature of drugs means that demand in that area remains. And that, in turn, has meant an increase in price due to supply chain shortages and stricter border measures.
AMLO’s government will have to face the threat of increased social and political encroachment by organized crime. The recession and health crisis have already presented organized crime groups with opportunities to intensify their presence in socioeconomic gaps in place of the government. Big-name cartels like Golf, Jalisco New Generation and Sinaloa have also started community outreach and charity programs to provide locals with goods at a time when supplies and funds are scarce. In this area, AMLO finds himself extremely limited in terms of what he can do to combat organized crime, particularly on the economic end; freezing assets will not reach a sum high enough to stop operations anytime soon. This is one major reason that AMLO reiterated his plans to continue social development funding and welfare programs, which are intended (at least on paper, over time) to undermine the hold that organized crime has on local communities. That said, the president knows this remains a weak point for the government because it cannot throw money around as easily as the cartels.
The Only Real Option
Lopez Obrador was forced to choose sides in preparation for mitigating the impact of Mexico’s deeper recession, and his outlier approach of rejecting stimulus measures reflects the reality of three very distinct economic segments, none of which overwhelmingly dominates the others. He does not have the funds or enough control over the formal economy to risk stimulus; he does not have the reach or security ability to take on organized crime. What remains is the country’s informal sector, where the bang for the buck (or punch for the peso) is larger, and where efforts generally align with longer-term goals of integrating the informal economy into the formal one, thereby improving economic standards for Mexico’s lower socioeconomic classes. This may not be considered the ideal move by many, but it’s AMLO’s only decent option.
Open as PDF
Mexico’s Three Economic Fronts Face a Recession
By: Allison Fedirka
Mexico is bracing for a serious economic recession this year, much like the rest of the world. But unlike many other countries, the Mexican government is not meeting the event with an abundance of bailouts, tax breaks or other fiscal measures. Instead, Mexican President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (popularly known as AMLO) has opted to stay the course with his plans of austerity and social development funding, much to the chagrin of big business. He has made it clear that his goal for combating the recession is to avoid sovereign debt and mitigate the impact felt by the country’s poor. Lopez Obrador is facing three fronts in his battle against a recession in Mexico: the country’s formal, informal and black market economies. And his decision to focus on propping up and reining in the informal economy through continued social development funding is more than just a continuation of adherence to political policy. It also reflects that the government is unable to effectively address the other two economies on its own.
The Three Economic Fronts
Lopez Obrador’s strategy to confront the economic recession preserves his big-picture plan to “transform” the Mexican economy and wrestles with the fact that the Mexican economy can be clearly divided into three distinct sub-economies, each playing by its own set of rules. The formal economy is characterized by services, finance and high-end manufacturing with intricate supply chains. It generates 77.5 percent of the country’s gross domestic product and is concentrated in the central and northern parts of the country. The informal economy — a “gray zone” not taxed or regulated by the government but still legal — generates 22.5 percent of the country’s GDP and is characterized by precarious employment, basic manufacturing and low wages. It exists in much higher concentrations in the country’s south. The black market economy, run by organized crime, is prevalent throughout the entire country. Its economic contribution is not clearly known given the illicit nature of its activities, but recent estimates put Mexican drug sales to the United States at $19 billion to $29 billion annually. Despite its illegality, the black market injects a massive amount of capital into the economy, which generally speaking is a good thing. On the other hand, it also deters investment and infrastructure development and breeds extortion, corruption and violence. The result is a mixed bag of economic effects that is not easy to define or calculate.
(click to enlarge)
AMLO’s proposed solution for dealing with the segmented nature of Mexico’s economy involves diminishing the economic and development disparities across the country through youth education and job training programs, labor-intensive infrastructure projects, support for small businesses, anti-corruption measures and government austerity. In other words, he is attempting to reduce the informal economy and merge it with the formal economy. His approach has been controversial and viewed by the opposition as contrary to the ultimate objectives of developing and growing Mexico’s economy. Indeed, the segmented nature of the country’s economy makes it extremely difficult to pursue a policy that helps one segment without hurting the other two. But in the face of the recession, the government has opted to direct the few funds it has toward the informal sector, an approach that aligns with long-term goals and exists as the most viable short-term solution available.
The Formal Economy: Severe Limits
Mexico’s formal economy has a high degree of exposure to external forces and is therefore largely out of the government’s control. For starters, the Mexican economy is largely dependent on the health of the U.S. economy. Mexican exports to the United States are equivalent to about 31 percent of the country’s GDP, and the United States is the leading supplier of foreign direct investment to Mexico. Remittances, which totaled $36.05 billion last year, are Mexico’s largest source of U.S. dollars, and 95 percent come from senders in the United States.
When the U.S. economy performs poorly (or restricts border crossings), the effects are often amplified in the Mexican economy. The International Monetary Fund expects the U.S. economy to contract 5.6 percent this year, and new unemployment claims in the country at the time of publication stand at 22 million. For Mexico, this means that there are far fewer buyers of Mexican goods and that the country can’t trade its way out of the crisis, even considering the strong decline in the peso’s value relative to the dollar so far this year.
To escape its mild 2019 recession, Mexico had planned to turn to foreign direct investment in 2020. And even before a global recession became imminent, the government was struggling to attract foreign investment over concerns of regulations, crime and general doubts over management. Now, the United Nations estimates that foreign investment will drop by 30-40 percent globally this year. For Mexico, this means investment will be difficult to come by and require fierce competition with others.
Foreign investment is no longer a viable option to stimulate the economy. Lastly, other major financial sources, such as oil and tourism, not only remain out of Mexico’s control but have poor prospects this year. Admittedly, state-owned oil company Pemex has been struggling for years, but even in the company’s best-case scenario, it can do little to address low oil prices, let alone change them. As for tourism, travel restrictions and personal fears mean the cancellation of many summer trips.
(click to enlarge)
The Mexican government has offered little to mitigate the recession’s impact on the formal economy because the influence of external factors will outweigh much of what it can offer. The government says it only has about $10 billion available from various rainy day funds. This means the bailouts, tax breaks and fiscal stimulus called for by businesses in the formal sector cannot be executed on a scale that would have an impact on a $1.3 trillion economy. Effectively stimulating an economy takes massive amounts of money, which often means taking on debt — and the concern over government debt in Mexico predates AMLO. The government currently does not have enough reserves to cover its debt in the event of an emergency, and incurring new debt would make matters only worse. Additionally, spending money on the formal economy would largely put the two other major segments of the economy on the sidelines. The government’s financial authorities did loosen liquidity rules on banks, which they assert are well equipped to handle the pending economic crisis, but aside from that, it has taken a largely hands-off approach.
The Informal Economy: Opportunity for Impact
The Mexican government has directed its efforts toward the informal economy because its potential for impact is higher and the informal economy plays a critical role in the workforce. Mexico defines the informal economy as one that includes any economic activity that is legally produced and marketed but the production or distribution units are not formally registered. It also includes all economic activities that operate from family resources, such as micro- and small businesses that are not constituted as companies. Because informal workers tend to have lower-quality jobs, lower wages and no insurance compared to those with formal-sector jobs, they are more vulnerable to recession. And since the latest official figures from the end of 2019 show that Mexico’s informal sector employs 56.2 percent of all workers, a sizable portion of the country’s working population is highly vulnerable to recession.
(click to enlarge)
The actions the Mexican government has taken to mitigate the impact of a recession on the country’s economy have focused on supporting the continued employment of informal workers. Earlier this month, the government said it would provide a 25,000-peso ($1,000) credit for small and micro-companies that have retained employees and not reduced wages, offering low interest rates that increase slightly by company size. The plan allows for a million total recipients, though an estimated 5 million will request access, and money will arrive in May and June. This low-interest-rate credit will need to be paid back in three years, with payments starting after the fourth month. Lopez Obrador also announced additional credit for the creation of 2 million more formal jobs this year, but such a project was already in the works prior to the global recession.
One wild card that could impede the government’s task of easing the recession’s impact is remittances, which play a key role in many household incomes, particularly in poor segments of the economy. BBVA estimates that, this year, remittances will decline by 17 percent to $29.9 billion due to the recession and mass unemployment in the United States. Nevertheless, from the government’s perspective, it’s still more cost-effective to support working programs now than deal with millions of people eventually out of work amid economic collapse.
The Black Market Economy: A Very Large Shadow
Though Mexico’s organized crime groups are not often considered in terms of their contribution to economic activity, they must also be factored in to efforts to combat the recession. For better or worse, the large scale and high value of their operations do create jobs and support economic activity at local levels. The pervasive nature of organized crime means it touches the pocketbooks of hundreds of thousands of Mexicans. And these groups are not immune to the recession, though they are positioned better than most to confront it. Like many multinational companies, organized crime groups in Mexico experienced supply chain disruptions with the slowing global economy, particularly with respect to the chemical precursors from China used to make fentanyl. The disruptions hurt major fentanyl suppliers, such as the Sinaloa and Jalisco New Generation cartels.
Meanwhile, alternative revenue flows, including human trafficking, fuel robbing and extortion, are not currently available due to increased border restrictions, low oil prices and businesses going on hold for quarantine. Of course, the addictive nature of drugs means that demand in that area remains. And that, in turn, has meant an increase in price due to supply chain shortages and stricter border measures.
AMLO’s government will have to face the threat of increased social and political encroachment by organized crime. The recession and health crisis have already presented organized crime groups with opportunities to intensify their presence in socioeconomic gaps in place of the government. Big-name cartels like Golf, Jalisco New Generation and Sinaloa have also started community outreach and charity programs to provide locals with goods at a time when supplies and funds are scarce. In this area, AMLO finds himself extremely limited in terms of what he can do to combat organized crime, particularly on the economic end; freezing assets will not reach a sum high enough to stop operations anytime soon. This is one major reason that AMLO reiterated his plans to continue social development funding and welfare programs, which are intended (at least on paper, over time) to undermine the hold that organized crime has on local communities. That said, the president knows this remains a weak point for the government because it cannot throw money around as easily as the cartels.
The Only Real Option
Lopez Obrador was forced to choose sides in preparation for mitigating the impact of Mexico’s deeper recession, and his outlier approach of rejecting stimulus measures reflects the reality of three very distinct economic segments, none of which overwhelmingly dominates the others. He does not have the funds or enough control over the formal economy to risk stimulus; he does not have the reach or security ability to take on organized crime. What remains is the country’s informal sector, where the bang for the buck (or punch for the peso) is larger, and where efforts generally align with longer-term goals of integrating the informal economy into the formal one, thereby improving economic standards for Mexico’s lower socioeconomic classes. This may not be considered the ideal move by many, but it’s AMLO’s only decent option.
243
Espanol Discussion / Re: Mexico
« on: April 07, 2020, 02:39:48 PM »
In Mexico, Lopez Obrador Takes a Timid Approach to COVID-19's Economic Battering
4 MINS READ
Apr 7, 2020 | 19:25 GMT
HIGHLIGHTS
The lack of significant stimulus measures could ultimately sap the Mexican president’s ability to govern....
The Big Picture
Mexico's GDP is expected to contract significantly due to the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and the fall in international oil prices. The Mexican government announced its long-awaited fiscal stimulus on April 5, but the measures did not gain investors' confidence. A minimal response to economic headwinds could increase insecurity in Mexico, eroding a significant portion of Lopez Obrador's support.
See COVID-19
What Happened
Mexican President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador on April 5 outlined the steps his government will take to deal with the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. With the prevailing consensus among analysts projecting Mexican GDP will contract 8 percent in 2020 (versus government estimates GDP will contract 4 percent), Lopez Obrador's government has come under criticism for not announcing fiscal stimulus sooner like the many other world governments that have announced aggressive fiscal and monetary responses over the past several weeks.
With an economy already in recession, the Mexican government was not expected to produce a plan on the order of those unveiled by most developed nations. It was not even expected to unveil a plan of the size announced by the Chilean government, which said it will spend an estimated 5 percent of GDP to boost the economy. Still, the lack of significant measures surprised even the most pessimistic analysts.
Expectations for a more robust announcement increased after Lopez Obrador met April 2 with business leaders, who asked him for tax and social security fees deferments in line with what the IRS has announced in the United States, deferments in utility services payments similar to those enacted in France, support for small businesses payroll payments, and reconsideration of controversial public investments.
But the president granted none of those requests in his April 5 address, much to the business community’s displeasure. Instead, Lopez Obrador said the government will modestly expand a direct-payment program for rural communities expected to suffer from a decline in remittances from the United States, create a limited small-business loan program and develop a new mortgage program for public employees. The message also included more support for Mexico's national oil company, Petroleos Mexicanos.
Previous massive contractions in Mexico's economy were followed by spikes in insecurity and violence.
A more aggressive recovery package could be partially financed by generous existing credit lines with the IMF of $61 billion, which the Mexican administration has so far been unwilling to use. Injecting liquidity into the market could be partially supported with a smaller credit line with the U.S. Federal Reserve, which Mexico's central bank has started to partially use. But the lack of a clear, coordinated response between Mexico's Finance Ministry and the Central Bank has hampered efforts to address the economic crisis.
Rating agencies had already downgraded Pemex's and Mexico's federal government debt, and follow-up downgrades are likely now that Lopez Obrador has unveiled his proposal — something that will hamper the public and private investment needed for a recovery.
Why It Matters
Previous massive contractions in Mexico's economy (-6.3 percent in 1995 and -5.3 percent in 2009) were followed by spikes in insecurity and violence. The number of homicides in Mexico has continued to increase in the first months of 2020, and a large economic contraction could be a fertile ground for increased criminal activity, organized or otherwise.
Lopez Obrador's popularity was already declining during the first quarter of 2020 because of his administration's failure to address crime and for mismanaging the public health sector even before COVID-19. While his approval rating is still high compared to most other leaders in the region, the downward trend is clear, potentially diminishing his party's fortunes in midterm congressional elections in 2021. Up to now, Lopez Obrador has managed to pass a good portion of the legal reforms he had promised. But if he loses his majority, Mexico might move toward a more investor-friendly environment.
Lopez Obrador's administration had been able to maintain a tense and cordial equilibrium with Mexico's private sector despite their disapproval of the government's pursuit of various projects it objected to, including the Santa Lucia Airport, Dos Bocas refinery and the Maya Train infrastructure projects. The president gave the go-ahead for the continuation of all of these projects during his April 5 message — he even designated all activities surrounding their constructions as "essential." Existing displeasure with Lopez Obrador plus his unwillingness to give the private sector the COVID-19 relief it wanted could fracture the relationship between government and business community.
A less popular and more isolated president could lead to more uncertainty regarding the economic direction of the country and less trust in the ability of the federal government to conduct policy. As in the United States, the absence of clear direction from the top could see various state governors start playing more important policy roles.
4 MINS READ
Apr 7, 2020 | 19:25 GMT
HIGHLIGHTS
The lack of significant stimulus measures could ultimately sap the Mexican president’s ability to govern....
The Big Picture
Mexico's GDP is expected to contract significantly due to the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and the fall in international oil prices. The Mexican government announced its long-awaited fiscal stimulus on April 5, but the measures did not gain investors' confidence. A minimal response to economic headwinds could increase insecurity in Mexico, eroding a significant portion of Lopez Obrador's support.
See COVID-19
What Happened
Mexican President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador on April 5 outlined the steps his government will take to deal with the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. With the prevailing consensus among analysts projecting Mexican GDP will contract 8 percent in 2020 (versus government estimates GDP will contract 4 percent), Lopez Obrador's government has come under criticism for not announcing fiscal stimulus sooner like the many other world governments that have announced aggressive fiscal and monetary responses over the past several weeks.
With an economy already in recession, the Mexican government was not expected to produce a plan on the order of those unveiled by most developed nations. It was not even expected to unveil a plan of the size announced by the Chilean government, which said it will spend an estimated 5 percent of GDP to boost the economy. Still, the lack of significant measures surprised even the most pessimistic analysts.
Expectations for a more robust announcement increased after Lopez Obrador met April 2 with business leaders, who asked him for tax and social security fees deferments in line with what the IRS has announced in the United States, deferments in utility services payments similar to those enacted in France, support for small businesses payroll payments, and reconsideration of controversial public investments.
But the president granted none of those requests in his April 5 address, much to the business community’s displeasure. Instead, Lopez Obrador said the government will modestly expand a direct-payment program for rural communities expected to suffer from a decline in remittances from the United States, create a limited small-business loan program and develop a new mortgage program for public employees. The message also included more support for Mexico's national oil company, Petroleos Mexicanos.
Previous massive contractions in Mexico's economy were followed by spikes in insecurity and violence.
A more aggressive recovery package could be partially financed by generous existing credit lines with the IMF of $61 billion, which the Mexican administration has so far been unwilling to use. Injecting liquidity into the market could be partially supported with a smaller credit line with the U.S. Federal Reserve, which Mexico's central bank has started to partially use. But the lack of a clear, coordinated response between Mexico's Finance Ministry and the Central Bank has hampered efforts to address the economic crisis.
Rating agencies had already downgraded Pemex's and Mexico's federal government debt, and follow-up downgrades are likely now that Lopez Obrador has unveiled his proposal — something that will hamper the public and private investment needed for a recovery.
Why It Matters
Previous massive contractions in Mexico's economy (-6.3 percent in 1995 and -5.3 percent in 2009) were followed by spikes in insecurity and violence. The number of homicides in Mexico has continued to increase in the first months of 2020, and a large economic contraction could be a fertile ground for increased criminal activity, organized or otherwise.
Lopez Obrador's popularity was already declining during the first quarter of 2020 because of his administration's failure to address crime and for mismanaging the public health sector even before COVID-19. While his approval rating is still high compared to most other leaders in the region, the downward trend is clear, potentially diminishing his party's fortunes in midterm congressional elections in 2021. Up to now, Lopez Obrador has managed to pass a good portion of the legal reforms he had promised. But if he loses his majority, Mexico might move toward a more investor-friendly environment.
Lopez Obrador's administration had been able to maintain a tense and cordial equilibrium with Mexico's private sector despite their disapproval of the government's pursuit of various projects it objected to, including the Santa Lucia Airport, Dos Bocas refinery and the Maya Train infrastructure projects. The president gave the go-ahead for the continuation of all of these projects during his April 5 message — he even designated all activities surrounding their constructions as "essential." Existing displeasure with Lopez Obrador plus his unwillingness to give the private sector the COVID-19 relief it wanted could fracture the relationship between government and business community.
A less popular and more isolated president could lead to more uncertainty regarding the economic direction of the country and less trust in the ability of the federal government to conduct policy. As in the United States, the absence of clear direction from the top could see various state governors start playing more important policy roles.
245
Espanol Discussion / Re: Venezuela Politica
« on: April 04, 2020, 03:52:45 PM »Rosneft Leaves Venezuela
By: GPF Staff
(click to enlarge)
Russian oil company Rosneft announced last week that it would cease all its operations in Venezuela. The decision was not a surprise; the U.S. had imposed sanctions against two Rosneft subsidiaries – TNK Trading International and Rosneft Trading – for continuing to buy oil from Venezuela despite sanctions against such purchases. The move could, however, negatively affect the company's image as well as its performance. Moscow remains heavily dependent on oil sales, and the recent fluctuations in oil prices have hit the country's finances hard.
But Russia isn't leaving Venezuela completely. Rosneft's Venezuelan assets have been sold to a Russian state-owned company, which will acquire shares in the Petromonagas, Petroperija, Boqueron, Petromiranda and Petrovictoria oil fields as well as Rosneft's trading operations. Venezuela is one of Russia's few remaining partners in Latin America, so Moscow was prepared to buy up Rosneft's assets to help support the Maduro regime. Moscow also owns a 49.9 percent stake in U.S.-based Citgo, giving it some leverage in future talks with Washington.
246
Espanol Discussion / Cruise ship sinks Venezuelan patrol boat
« on: April 02, 2020, 04:45:28 PM »248
Espanol Discussion / Re: Venezuela Politica
« on: April 01, 2020, 11:14:09 AM »
In Venezuela, the U.S. Offers Sanctions Relief for a Power-Sharing Deal
4 MINS READ
Apr 1, 2020 | 17:46 GMT
HIGHLIGHTS
In a notable shift from its hardline anti-Maduro rhetoric, Washington has called on both sides of Venezuela's political battle to step aside for a new transitional government and free elections....
The Big Picture
The U.S. State Department has called on both sides of Venezuela’s ongoing political battle to stand down and make way for a new transitional government and democratic elections, marking a notable shift from Washington’s more hardline, pro-opposition rhetoric. But the United States' primary goal of undermining elite support for President Nicolas Maduro nonetheless remains in place.
See Venezuela's Unraveling
What Happened
To break Venezuela’s ongoing political stalemate, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced a plan on March 31 that outlines a path to a power-sharing framework and free elections in exchange for the potential removal of U.S. sanctions. Dubbed the "Democratic Transition Framework," the proposal specifically calls for both President Nicolas Maduro and U.S.-backed opposition leader Juan Guaido to step aside for the formation of a new “inclusive transitional government acceptable to the major factions” without either leader. Elected by the country’s opposition-controlled National Assembly, this transitional government would remain in power until it oversees free elections, ideally held in six to 12 months.
To put the plan into motion, the United States has offered the quick removal of sanctions on individuals who resign from their posts within the Maduro regime. The removal of broader U.S. sanctions on Venezuela’s oil industry and state-owned energy company Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), however, are contingent on Maduro himself leaving office, as well as the withdrawal of all Cuban and Russian forces currently deployed in the country. In a separate statement, the U.S. Special Representative for Venezuela, Elliot Abrams, notably added that the proposal does not have a mechanism to reject the U.S. Department of Justice’s recently announced indictment of Maduro and other Venezuelan officials over so-called "narco-terrorism" charges.
Why It Matters
The fact that the new proposal is less overtly Guido-centeric marks a notable shift in tone for the United States, and could indicate that Washington has concluded that its former hardline rhetoric against the Maduro regime has failed to quickly oust the leader from office as intended. But the core of the White House’s strategy in Venezuela is still the same — that is, driving a wedge between Maduro and his loyalists in both the United Socialist Party and the military so that they eventually turn on the leader in some fashion. The U.S.-led push to oust Maduro was always going to inherently require a transitional government; this plan just formally plots the course to reach that end.
However, Washington’s move to indict a number of Maduro’s allies less than a week ago — and that the newly proposed transition plan does not include dropping those charges — could backfire on this goal by hardening solidarity among the regime’s top indicted officials who now all find themselves in the same boat. It will thus be critical to monitor whether non-indicted officials begin to come out against Maduro in response to the new U.S. plan, and if those who do have enough political sway to encourage other officials to follow suit.
While the proposed power-sharing deal marks a notable shift in tone, Washington's primary goal of undermining elite support for President Nicolas Maduro nonetheless remains the same.
There’s also a chance Maduro would still be eligible to run in the new elections: While Pompeo stressed Maduro would "never again" rule Venezuela in his statement, Abrams also noted that he could "theoretically run." Indeed, there is significant concern among Venezuela hawks in the United States that the new proposal could effectively pull the rug out from Guaido’s feet, and it remains unclear whether there's a different opposition figure who could replace him to challenge Maduro.
What’s Next
The U.S. offer for a transition will entice some non-indicted officials to turn against Maduro, but those pathways have always been there. So far this year, Maduro’s security forces also have continued to successfully block attempts by Guaido’s opposition movement to access the National Assembly building. Stratfor thus maintains its assessment that Maduro’s government will remain in power through the end of 2020, despite the mounting financial strain brought on by U.S. sanctions, the collapse in oil production and now coronavirus-related drops in global oil prices and demand. The more likely timetable for those fissures to metastasize into pushing out Maduro is 2021 or 2022, with the long-term health of Venezuela’s oil industry and oil prices still the most important force that could eventually result in a government transition.
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Apr 1, 2020 | 17:46 GMT
HIGHLIGHTS
In a notable shift from its hardline anti-Maduro rhetoric, Washington has called on both sides of Venezuela's political battle to step aside for a new transitional government and free elections....
The Big Picture
The U.S. State Department has called on both sides of Venezuela’s ongoing political battle to stand down and make way for a new transitional government and democratic elections, marking a notable shift from Washington’s more hardline, pro-opposition rhetoric. But the United States' primary goal of undermining elite support for President Nicolas Maduro nonetheless remains in place.
See Venezuela's Unraveling
What Happened
To break Venezuela’s ongoing political stalemate, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced a plan on March 31 that outlines a path to a power-sharing framework and free elections in exchange for the potential removal of U.S. sanctions. Dubbed the "Democratic Transition Framework," the proposal specifically calls for both President Nicolas Maduro and U.S.-backed opposition leader Juan Guaido to step aside for the formation of a new “inclusive transitional government acceptable to the major factions” without either leader. Elected by the country’s opposition-controlled National Assembly, this transitional government would remain in power until it oversees free elections, ideally held in six to 12 months.
To put the plan into motion, the United States has offered the quick removal of sanctions on individuals who resign from their posts within the Maduro regime. The removal of broader U.S. sanctions on Venezuela’s oil industry and state-owned energy company Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), however, are contingent on Maduro himself leaving office, as well as the withdrawal of all Cuban and Russian forces currently deployed in the country. In a separate statement, the U.S. Special Representative for Venezuela, Elliot Abrams, notably added that the proposal does not have a mechanism to reject the U.S. Department of Justice’s recently announced indictment of Maduro and other Venezuelan officials over so-called "narco-terrorism" charges.
Why It Matters
The fact that the new proposal is less overtly Guido-centeric marks a notable shift in tone for the United States, and could indicate that Washington has concluded that its former hardline rhetoric against the Maduro regime has failed to quickly oust the leader from office as intended. But the core of the White House’s strategy in Venezuela is still the same — that is, driving a wedge between Maduro and his loyalists in both the United Socialist Party and the military so that they eventually turn on the leader in some fashion. The U.S.-led push to oust Maduro was always going to inherently require a transitional government; this plan just formally plots the course to reach that end.
However, Washington’s move to indict a number of Maduro’s allies less than a week ago — and that the newly proposed transition plan does not include dropping those charges — could backfire on this goal by hardening solidarity among the regime’s top indicted officials who now all find themselves in the same boat. It will thus be critical to monitor whether non-indicted officials begin to come out against Maduro in response to the new U.S. plan, and if those who do have enough political sway to encourage other officials to follow suit.
While the proposed power-sharing deal marks a notable shift in tone, Washington's primary goal of undermining elite support for President Nicolas Maduro nonetheless remains the same.
There’s also a chance Maduro would still be eligible to run in the new elections: While Pompeo stressed Maduro would "never again" rule Venezuela in his statement, Abrams also noted that he could "theoretically run." Indeed, there is significant concern among Venezuela hawks in the United States that the new proposal could effectively pull the rug out from Guaido’s feet, and it remains unclear whether there's a different opposition figure who could replace him to challenge Maduro.
What’s Next
The U.S. offer for a transition will entice some non-indicted officials to turn against Maduro, but those pathways have always been there. So far this year, Maduro’s security forces also have continued to successfully block attempts by Guaido’s opposition movement to access the National Assembly building. Stratfor thus maintains its assessment that Maduro’s government will remain in power through the end of 2020, despite the mounting financial strain brought on by U.S. sanctions, the collapse in oil production and now coronavirus-related drops in global oil prices and demand. The more likely timetable for those fissures to metastasize into pushing out Maduro is 2021 or 2022, with the long-term health of Venezuela’s oil industry and oil prices still the most important force that could eventually result in a government transition.
249
Espanol Discussion / WSJ: Elliot Abrams: A New Path to Venezuelan Democracy
« on: March 31, 2020, 04:30:22 AM »
A New Path to Venezuelan Democracy
The U.S. State Department proposes Maduro and Guaidó both step aside and make way for free elections.
By Elliott Abrams
March 31, 2020 5:00 am ET
As the coronavirus spreads around the world, it’s easy to forget the Venezuelan people’s suffering at the hands of Nicolás Maduro’s regime. The Trump administration hasn’t. Today we are announcing a Democratic Transition Framework to help Venezuelans escape from the national crisis that falling oil prices and the coronavirus have now deepened.
We present this framework as a path for Venezuela to emerge from years of repression and political conflict. It proposes that both Mr. Maduro, the former president who has clung to power, and Juan Guaidó, the interim president, step aside so that the elected members of the National Assembly from both sides can create a Council of State to serve as the transitional government, which would hold free and fair presidential elections. In last year’s negotiations, the team representing Mr. Guaidó and the National Assembly proposed this path forward toward the restoration of democracy.
Democracy isn’t only about elections. A new, balanced and independent National Electoral Council is also critical, and an independent Supreme Court must replace the current one, which is but an arm of the Maduro regime. A vibrant democracy also demands a free and independent media with an end to the regime’s pervasive censorship.
The U.S. doesn’t support any particular political party in Venezuela. We support a return to democracy and believe that every party—including the regime’s party, the PSUV—should be able to compete on a level playing field in free and fair elections. This means an end to the unjust prosecutions that have left dozens of members of Parliament in exile, four in prison, and many more barred from running for office—including Mr. Guaidó, who would continue as president of the National Assembly until new parliamentary and presidential elections. The U.S. will recognize the results of a free and fair election, no matter which party wins; what we oppose is the abuse of state power that enables one party to rule indefinitely.
For the Maduro regime, the deep cuts in income due to falling oil prices compound the crisis of a medical system that it pushed into slow collapse over two decades. U.S. pressure hasn’t prevented food or medicine from reaching Venezuelans. The purpose of sanctions is to deprive the regime of the income it uses for repression—or steals through vast corruption—and force the regime to agree to presidential elections. Mr. Maduro has never negotiated in good faith about that central issue. National Assembly elections alone do not constitute a political solution.
The military will play an essential role in bringing about peaceful change and shaping Venezuela’s future. Venezuelan soldiers, along with police officers, are suffering as civilians are; they can barely afford to feed their families and can’t afford medical care or medications. Venezuela faces a great security challenge from drug traffickers, terrorist groups and criminal gangs, and it needs security forces that are better paid, trained and equipped to secure the nation’s borders and maintain peace. The military and police must abandon the role the Maduro regime has forged for them—carrying out the repression of the Venezuelan people. The military must also join in expelling the Cuban intelligence agents who spy on them and all citizens and serve as the regime’s true shield. The armed forces’ support of the Democratic Transition Framework would be a key step in this direction.
Free and fair presidential elections are the path out of Venezuela’s crisis. Because Mr. Maduro cannot be trusted to organize them, establishing the Council of State is an essential step. We are prepared to work with all Venezuelans and with other nations and lift sanctions when the necessary conditions are met. The Democratic Transition Framework paves the best path to a restoration of democracy through fair participation of all parties, and an end to the brutality, repression and political turmoil that have marked Venezuela’s recent past.
Until that objective is achieved, our pressure will strengthen. We look forward to the day when elections have been held, a new democratic government is in place, and sanctions can be lifted. We look forward to restoring once-close Venezuela-U.S. relations, to helping Venezuelan migrants and refugees displaced by the crisis return to their beloved country, and to seeing Venezuela’s children able to share again in their country’s natural bounty.
Mr. Abrams is special representative for Venezuela at the U.S. State Department.
The U.S. State Department proposes Maduro and Guaidó both step aside and make way for free elections.
By Elliott Abrams
March 31, 2020 5:00 am ET
As the coronavirus spreads around the world, it’s easy to forget the Venezuelan people’s suffering at the hands of Nicolás Maduro’s regime. The Trump administration hasn’t. Today we are announcing a Democratic Transition Framework to help Venezuelans escape from the national crisis that falling oil prices and the coronavirus have now deepened.
We present this framework as a path for Venezuela to emerge from years of repression and political conflict. It proposes that both Mr. Maduro, the former president who has clung to power, and Juan Guaidó, the interim president, step aside so that the elected members of the National Assembly from both sides can create a Council of State to serve as the transitional government, which would hold free and fair presidential elections. In last year’s negotiations, the team representing Mr. Guaidó and the National Assembly proposed this path forward toward the restoration of democracy.
Democracy isn’t only about elections. A new, balanced and independent National Electoral Council is also critical, and an independent Supreme Court must replace the current one, which is but an arm of the Maduro regime. A vibrant democracy also demands a free and independent media with an end to the regime’s pervasive censorship.
The U.S. doesn’t support any particular political party in Venezuela. We support a return to democracy and believe that every party—including the regime’s party, the PSUV—should be able to compete on a level playing field in free and fair elections. This means an end to the unjust prosecutions that have left dozens of members of Parliament in exile, four in prison, and many more barred from running for office—including Mr. Guaidó, who would continue as president of the National Assembly until new parliamentary and presidential elections. The U.S. will recognize the results of a free and fair election, no matter which party wins; what we oppose is the abuse of state power that enables one party to rule indefinitely.
For the Maduro regime, the deep cuts in income due to falling oil prices compound the crisis of a medical system that it pushed into slow collapse over two decades. U.S. pressure hasn’t prevented food or medicine from reaching Venezuelans. The purpose of sanctions is to deprive the regime of the income it uses for repression—or steals through vast corruption—and force the regime to agree to presidential elections. Mr. Maduro has never negotiated in good faith about that central issue. National Assembly elections alone do not constitute a political solution.
The military will play an essential role in bringing about peaceful change and shaping Venezuela’s future. Venezuelan soldiers, along with police officers, are suffering as civilians are; they can barely afford to feed their families and can’t afford medical care or medications. Venezuela faces a great security challenge from drug traffickers, terrorist groups and criminal gangs, and it needs security forces that are better paid, trained and equipped to secure the nation’s borders and maintain peace. The military and police must abandon the role the Maduro regime has forged for them—carrying out the repression of the Venezuelan people. The military must also join in expelling the Cuban intelligence agents who spy on them and all citizens and serve as the regime’s true shield. The armed forces’ support of the Democratic Transition Framework would be a key step in this direction.
Free and fair presidential elections are the path out of Venezuela’s crisis. Because Mr. Maduro cannot be trusted to organize them, establishing the Council of State is an essential step. We are prepared to work with all Venezuelans and with other nations and lift sanctions when the necessary conditions are met. The Democratic Transition Framework paves the best path to a restoration of democracy through fair participation of all parties, and an end to the brutality, repression and political turmoil that have marked Venezuela’s recent past.
Until that objective is achieved, our pressure will strengthen. We look forward to the day when elections have been held, a new democratic government is in place, and sanctions can be lifted. We look forward to restoring once-close Venezuela-U.S. relations, to helping Venezuelan migrants and refugees displaced by the crisis return to their beloved country, and to seeing Venezuela’s children able to share again in their country’s natural bounty.
Mr. Abrams is special representative for Venezuela at the U.S. State Department.
250
Espanol Discussion / GPF: Russia anally raped in Venezuelan oil play
« on: March 30, 2020, 08:33:06 PM »
• On March 28, Russian state oil company Rosneft announced the end of its operations in Venezuela. The company said it will receive a liquidation payment worth 9.6 percent of its capital.