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Messages - xtremekali

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Politics & Religion / Why July 4th matters
« on: July 05, 2006, 10:50:21 AM »
Funny I just read this on Monday.  It shows what wonders a small group of men can accomplish when they put their minds to it.

Myke Willis

Martial Arts Topics / african stickfighting
« on: July 05, 2006, 10:47:32 AM »

Sorry Guro C. I searched the back pages and found nothing.  I know there is a thread on the members forum though.

Anyway, while I was in Eastern Africa a few years back (Djibouti and Somalia) I was introduced to a tribe from SW Ethiopia.  The Surma Tribe has a Tribal get together that involves stick fighting (Donga Stick fighting).  It is both ritual and martial.

Africa: Surma / Stick fighting
ambience: Stick Fight


It's said to be one of the fiercest competitions on the entire African continent. But here among Ethiopia's Surma tribe, the Donga Stick Fight takes place in the name of love.  When their harvest season is over, the Surma people observe a period of courtship, spending days by the river, fingerpainting designs on their bodies. And according to photographer Angela Fisher, co-author of the book "African Ceremonies", the next stage of the Surma courtship tradition is not quite so peaceful.

"Once the bodies are painted and men and women have started courting one another, the other side of courtship starts. Once a week, the Surma men from different villages come together, sometimes walking thirty miles on very small grass paths to meet one another to perform the most wild sport we have ever seen on the entire African continent. The donga stick fight is fought with long, straight poles of about eight foot long made of very hard wood, and the Surma men perform these fights to prove their masculinity, to settle personal vendettas, but most importantly, to win wives."

This competition has only one rule: you cannot kill your opponent.

"And at the end of the day, the winner of the day's fighting bouts is carried out of the arena on a wonderful platform of poles, and he's held high in the air, and he's carried towards a group of very beautiful young girls. So as he arrives, the winner is taken by one of the girls."

Myke Willis

Politics & Religion / WW3
« on: July 03, 2006, 08:52:20 AM »
Iraqis say US exit plan should await security By Scott Peterson and Awadh al-Taee
Tue Jun 27, 4:00 AM ET

News of a possible US military reduction in Iraq, beginning as early as this fall, is being met in Baghdad with the deep skepticism of a war-weary people who have witnessed many other American exit plans go unfulfilled.

Most Iraqis want an end to the 127,000-strong US presence, which they consider an occupation. But they are concerned, too, that Iraqi forces, while growing in size and capability, still can't cope with the insurgency and sectarian killings that have killed tens of thousands of Iraqis.

"I want the Americans to leave as soon as possible, so the reason to attack Iraqi troops will end, because insurgents are always accusing us of being agents and supporting these foreign troops," a first lieutenant of Iraq's Interior Ministry said Monday, while commanding a checkpoint on Baghdad's airport road.

"Before they leave, they should destroy the [sectarian] militias and make sure the security elements are strong," says the officer. "I don't want them to leave completely; they should stay in bases. But if they don't lower their numbers, we will pressure them to do so."

The apparent plan, initially reported by The New York Times on Sunday, projects that US combat brigades in Iraq, of 3,500 troops each, would be cut from 14 to five or six by the end of next year. An initial two brigades now slated to go home this September would not be replaced, according to the Times.

But, says Ismael Zayer, editor of Baghdad's Sabah al-Jadiid newspaper, "We need to face the fact that if security ... does not improve in a very crucial way, there is nothing to talk about.

"We have the impression that a battle of Baghdad has begun already now," says Mr. Zayer. "Pulling out small troops or something bigger is good, it's welcome, but it has to be part of a ... genuine plan; not propaganda."

US officials have "emphasized that any withdrawals would depend on continued progress" and strength of Iraqi units ? the same caveat that has undermined every previous pullout plan ? and that the newly formed Iraqi government had yet to be consulted, the Times noted.

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki on Sunday unveiled a 24-point plan for national reconciliation, and called on Iraqi forces to take control of growing slices of Iraq, to enable US-led coalition troops to leave. He gave no timeline for a US pullout.

"When they finish supplying us Humvees, tanks, cannons, and airplanes like their army, [US forces] should leave today, before tomorrow," says Captain Mohammad, of the Iraqi Army, who would not give his full name. "We originally did not even want to smell their perfume, or [for them to] leave any footprint in Iraq."

US forces are "not more courageous than us, and they do not care more about our homes than we do," asserts Mohammad, though newly trained Iraqi units have disintegrated in past years when ordered to quell uprisings.

Poll results in late March from the US-funded International Republican Institute (IRI) indicate that, at least relative to security, withdrawal of US troops is not a top demand. When asked to list priorities for the new government, 48 percent said security should rank first; more than 85 percent listed security as one of the top three most important issues.

Among more than 2,800 Iraqis polled, withdrawal of coalition forces from Iraq ranked a distant third, the top priority of just 9 percent of Iraqis. In the IRI poll, withdrawal was 1 point ahead of fixing the economy and job creation.

In some cases, US lawmakers have been as skeptical as Iraqis. Democrats in Congress were criticized for trying to vote on an exit timeline for Iraq last week, during heated debate in both houses.

"The [Defense] Department's drawn up plans at all times, but I think it would be wrong now to say that this is the plan we are going to operate under," Sen. John Warner (news, bio, voting record) (R) of Virginia said on FOX News Sunday, when asked about US General George Casey's reported plan.

Monday, White House Press Secretary Tony Snow said, "I would caution very strongly against everybody thinking, 'Well, they're going to pull two brigades out.'

"Maybe they will, maybe they won't," he said. "It really does depend upon a whole series of things that we cannot at this juncture predict. I would characterize this more in terms of scenario building and we'll see how it proceeds."

According to the Associated Press, Mr. Snow said the general has "a number of scenarios in mind for differing situations on the ground," that would depend on conditions on the ground.

Regardless of any pullout strategy, US Marine units in Iraq's western Anbar Province ? where, along with Baghdad and central Iraq, the insurgency has been most violent and widespread ? have no plans to reduce numbers, the Times reported on Monday.

Lt. Gen. John Sattler, who commands Marines across the Middle East, told The New York Times Monday that he could foresee "no reductions" in US troop strength in Anbar "at least through next summer, because of the restiveness there. Al Anbar is going to be one of the last provinces to be stabilized."

In fact, US commanders in late May ordered a reserve force of 1,500 from Kuwait to Anbar for a short tour of perhaps four months to deal with the "challenge" in that province. Already, one-fifth of all US troops in Iraq are deployed in Anbar.

"When the Americans leave, the militias will eat us," predicts Khalil Mohammad, an air conditioning specialist in Baghdad. "The hands that came here to help us ? the Americans ? should finish their work and leave.... They should increase the power of the law, and should not leave completely but stay in bases."

One US military assessment last April predicted that it would take two to five years of continual US backup before Iraqi security forces could stand on their own. One senior Iraqi official spoke in April about an understanding with US officials that troop numbers might dip below 100,000 by the end of 2006, with an eventual total pullout by mid-2008.

But sectarian killing and a six-month security vacuum between mid-December elections and formation of new government last month has complicated efforts to build up Iraqi units. According to the Brooking Institution's Iraq Index, the total number of security forces is 265,600.

"The situation steadily deteriorated more quickly than Iraqi forces could be brought online. Ethnic and sectarian fighting vastly broadened that area where security was a major problem," writes Anthony Cordesman, a veteran defense and Iraq analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, in a draft assessment made public last week.

"These issues were not addressed in coalition and Iraqi reporting. Claims that Iraqi forces could take control of large areas of battle space in Iraq had never been honest or realistic," writes Mr. Cordesman. "Performance was so mixed that US forces had to constantly intervene, embedded advisors were often critical to Iraqi success, and Iraqi forces remained heavily dependent on US [firepower]."

The results are felt on the ground in Baghdad, where a two-week-old security clampdown has barely dented insurgent attacks. Gunmen took on a checkpoint during a curfew Friday, sparking street battles.

"We are not sure that the development of Iraqi security forces will be strong or sufficient enough in the future, because the indicators are almost all negative," says editor Zayer, comparing the sectarian divisions in Iraq to those that defined civil war in Lebanon for 15 years, from the mid-1970s. "If the Americans don't manage to find a solution, and remedies for this deterioration, then there is no hope."

"I am afraid there is a trend we notice in the American media ... with the position of the administration, the White House, the Pentagon, which tries to put a rosy view of the situation which is not fact, not honest, [and] not the reality we have now," adds Zayer, about reports of US withdrawal. "There is a sort of propaganda-like line; I don't like it. It doesn't mean anything."

Politics & Religion / WW3
« on: July 03, 2006, 08:43:46 AM »
June 28, 2006:
Saudi Arabia detains 43 suspected militants (back to list)    
International Analysis Alert Level: High

Saudi Arabia

Saudi security forces have detained 43 suspected Islamist militants, including two Somalis, an Ethiopian and an Iraqi, the interior ministry said Saturday after a deadly gunbattle in the capital. The ministry said the arrests had been made in different parts of the oil-rich kingdom since May 9. Two arrests followed a firefight in Riyadh Friday in which six suspected Al-Qaeda militants and a policeman were killed. Full Story

TRC Analysis:
The recent arrests and killings of more than 40 militants in Saudi Arabia (Country Profile) is continuing testament of the capabilities of the Saudi security forces, who have hunted, pursued, killed, and captured militants in the Kingdom with such a dogged persistence that the once fearsome al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (Group Profile) has been unable to pull off a major attack in almost two years. At the same time, the repetitive emergence of new militants in the country shows that Saudi Arabia still has much reform to do of its educational, cultural, and religious environment. The existence of more than 40 people in the Kingdom who were planning terrorist attacks also demonstrates that the country is still very much at risk of another terrorist attack. In addition to the militants themselves, Saudi security secured weapons, documents, and money being prepared to carry out an attack.

The presence of foreigners in these militant networks in Saudi Arabia demonstrates the extent to which the Kingdom is seen as a legitimate target of the international Jihad, not just a target for local dissidents. The absorption of foreigners into militant networks is dangerous for Saudi Arabia, as foreigners are more difficult to identify and intercept in terror networks in other countries. The vast traffic of Muslim foreigners into Saudi Arabia, not only during the pilgrimage season but for jobs that Saudi citizens refuse to work, makes the population difficult to police, and their ill treatment by the Saudi government can fuel tendencies toward militancy and the desire for revenge.

Also notable of those arrested in this recent campaign is that they have not been characterized as part of the al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula organization. They seem to have been examples of distinct, spontaneously emerging terrorist cells that were not recruited by the existing, prevailing terrorist organization in the Kingdom. While the al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula organization is thought to have been severely weakened by the campaign against it, the emergence of new, separate terrorist groups or cells demonstrates that Saudi Arabia will continue to suffer from terrorist threats even if the al-Qaeda organization within the Kingdom is eradicated.

A parallel of this dynamic has occurred recently with the media wing of the Mujahideen in Saudi Arabia. The "Sawt al-Jihad" media arm of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has nearly ceased all production, but recently a new media company, called "al-Bisha'ir," has announced its existence and put out its first two productions. Al-Bisha'ir has announced that it is not part of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula but is concerned with the plight of the Mujahideen in the Kingdom generally.

By Rebecca Givner-Forbes, TRC Staff

Politics & Religion / WW3
« on: June 26, 2006, 10:00:03 AM »
Hundreds of chemical weapons found in Iraq: US intelligence by Charlotte Raab
Thu Jun 22, 6:39 AM ET

US-led coalition forces in Iraq have found some 500 chemical weapons since the March 2003 invasion, Republican lawmakers said, citing an intelligence report.

"Since 2003, Coalition forces have recovered approximately 500 weapons munitions which contain degraded mustard or sarin nerve agent," said an overview of the report unveiled by Senator Rick Santorum and Peter Hoekstra, head of the intelligence committee of the House of Representatives.

"Despite many efforts to locate and destroy Iraq's pre-Gulf war chemical munitions, filled and unfilled pre-Gulf war chemical munitions are assessed to still exist," it says.

The lawmakers cited the report as validation of the US rationale for the war, and stressed the ongoing danger they pose.

"This is an incredibly -- in my mind -- significant finding. The idea that, as my colleagues have repeatedly said in this debate on the other side of the aisle, that there are no weapons of mass destruction, is in fact false," Santorum said.

A Pentagon official who confirmed the findings said that all the weapons were pre-1991 vintage munitions "in such a degraded state they couldn't be used for what they are designed for."

The official, who asked not to be identified, said most were 155 millimeter artillery projectiles with mustard gas or sarin of varying degrees of potency.

"We're destroying them where we find them in the normal manner," the official said.

In 2004, the US army said it had found a shell containing sarin gas and another shell containing mustard gas, and a Pentagon official said at the time the discovery showed there were likely more.

The intelligence overview published Wednesday stressed that the pre-Gulf War Iraqi chemical weapons could be sold on the black market.

"Use of these weapons by terrorists or insurgent groups would have implications for coalition forces in Iraq. The possibility of use outside Iraq cannot be ruled out," it said.

Santorum said the two-month-old report was prepared by the National Ground Intelligence Center, a military intelligence agency that started looking for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq when the Iraq Survey Group stopped doing so in late 2004.

Last year the head of Iraq Survey Group, Charles Duelfer, said that insurgents in Iraq had already used old chemical weapons in their attacks.

Nevertheless, "the impression that the Iraqi Survey Group left with the American people was they didn't find anything," Hoekstra said.

"But this says: Weapons have been discovered; more weapons exist. And they state that Iraq was not a WMD-free zone, that there are continuing threats from the materials that are or may still be in Iraq," he said.

Asked just how dangerous the weapons are, Hoekstra said: "One or two of these shells, the materials inside of these, transferred outside of the country, can be very, very deadly."

The report said that the purity of the chemical agents -- and thus their potency -- depends on "many factors, including the manufacturing process, potential additives, and environmental storage conditions."

"While agents degrade over time, chemical warfare agents remain hazardous and potentially lethal," it said.

Reporters questioned the lawmakers as to why the Bush administration had not played up the report to boost their case for continued warfare in Iraq.

"The administration has been very clear that they want to look forward," Santorum said. "They felt it was not their role to go back and fight previous discussions."

Fear that Saddam Hussein might use his alleged arsenal of chemical and biological weapons was a reason US officials gave for launching the March 2003 invasion of Iraq.

Politics & Religion / WW3
« on: June 26, 2006, 09:48:51 AM »
A North Korean Missile Test: Implications for the U.S. and the Region
by Balbina Y. Hwang, Ph.D.
WebMemo #1134

June 20, 2006 |   |  


According to international intelligence reports, for the last five weeks, North Korea has been steadily moving towards a test launch of the Taepodong 2, an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) with a range up to 6,000 kilometers ? enough to reach Alaska. Satellite intelligence reveals that Pyongyang has loaded booster rockets onto a launch pad in Musuduan-ri, in the North Hamkyong Province of northeastern North Korea, and moved fuel tanks in preparation for fueling. This action is in violation of North Korea?s international agreements and appears designed to goad the United States into direct bilateral talks. The U.S. must not take the bait. No good will come from rewarding North Korea for its belligerent behavior.

A missile test is problematic for the region and the United States because it would end North Korea?s 1999 self-imposed moratorium on long-range missile tests ? a moratorium that was reiterated in the Pyongyang Declaration when Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi met with North Korean leader Kim Jong Il in September 2002. The test would spell further trouble for the stalled Six-Party negotiations over the North?s nuclear ambitions. More broadly, a test would raise questions about the future stability and security of the region and North Korea?s enduring role as the region?s troublemaker.

If the missile test does occur, the Bush Administration must not succumb to pressure to enter into in bilateral talks with North Korea. The United States has been clear that all diplomatic negotiations must go through the Six-Party framework involving North Korea, the United States, South Korea, Russia, Japan, and China. The Bush Administration should make clear that aggressive behavior by the North Koreans will not cause the United States to alter its position.

Why Test?
North Korea last tested a long-range missile in August 1998, when it fired a Taepodong 1, with a range of 2,000 km, over northern Japan. That test took many by surprise and confirmed that North Korean capabilities had progressed beyond previous estimates. A launch of the Taepodong 2 would put North?s Korea?s military efforts back into the spotlight and demonstrate that it now has a missile with the range to reach the U.S. mainland.

Knowledge of the Taepodong 2 is limited, in part because the system has never been tested. A 2001 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate forecast that a three-stage version of the missile could reach North America carrying a sizable payload. It could be fitted with a chemical or biological warhead but probably not a nuclear payload, because North Korea has likely not yet developed the capability to miniaturize a nuclear weapon.

The United States ? along with Japan, South Korea, and Australia ? has urged North Korea to abandon its plans to test the missile, stating clearly that a launch would be dangerous and provocative and damaging to North Korean interests. But Pyongyang may have reached the opposite conclusion. From a North Korean standpoint, a missile test launch would further three goals:

Pyongyang?s strategic objective is to raise the stakes for the Six-Party talks, which have stalled since North Korea?s refusal to return to the table last November. With little incentive for Washington to relent on its long-standing insistence that Pyongyang must first agree to return to the talks without preconditions and the global perception that Iran has become Washington?s top priority, a missile test would raise the level of tension and bring focus back to North Korea. Further, a test launch would put yet another issue on the negotiating table and, Pyongyang hopes, distract attention from the core issue of its nuclear weapons program.

North Korea wants to test years of investment in missile research and development. Ultimately, the only way to prove that a missile works is to test it. A test would not only serve as a stern warning to the region about the strength of North Korea?s ballistic missile capabilities, but also would enhance the legitimacy of North Korean missiles in the weapons proliferation marketplace. In part due to the U.S. crackdown on North Korea?s illicit financial activities, a major source of income of the Kim Jong Il regime, Pyongyang may turn its attention elsewhere, such as the lucrative weapons and missile markets. The missile test preparations are being conducted in open view of foreign satellites; Pyongyang is clearly showing off.

Domestic pressure may also be at play. A missile test would demonstrate the military?s supremacy in national policymaking. A launch could also be a tremendous morale boost for the North Korean public. The regime has been testing engines for a new missile since at least 2002, and a successful test would bolster Kim?s claims that he is developing advanced technology for his people. This would have the added benefit of boosting nationalism as a counterweight to increased international pressures on the regime.
Regional Response
Is Pyongyang fully prepared for the negative repercussions of a launch? Japan is deeply concerned about a launch that it would consider a direct threat to its security. North Korea?s Taepodong 1 test over Japan in 1998 was a wake-up call that led Tokyo to cooperate with Washington on a missile defense system. A new launch would not only bolster Japanese efforts to erect defensive capabilities against North Korea but would also likely spur the U.S. Congress to increase its support for missile defense efforts. Furthermore, such aggression from North Korea could play a role in selecting the future leadership of Japan. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi is preparing to step down in September, and polls indicate that Shinzo Abe, who has taken a strong stance against North Korea and China, trails moderate candidate Yasuo Fukuda. A North Korean missile test could aid Abe?s campaign, reducing the possibility of a diplomatic reconciliation between North Korea and Japan.

Seoul?s reaction is more uncertain. A North Korean missile test would further undermine President Roh Moo Hyun?s policy of engagement with Pyongyang, which is already under pressure due to the North?s lack of reciprocity. A test launch would attract criticism both domestically and internationally. Former President and Nobel laureate Kim Dae-Jung would have to cancel his scheduled trip to Pyongyang on June 27th. Yet, it is unclear if a missile launch would be enough to turn public opinion against engagement with the North. While critical voices will grow stronger, a new missile test will be perceived much the same as the previous one was in 1998: an abstract concern that does not directly threaten South Koreans.

North Korea may hope that South Koreans will focus on strongly negative U.S. and Japanese reactions rather than the North Korean threat, thereby driving a wedge between Seoul and Washington. There is precedent: The 1998 missile launch did not slow down Kim Dae Jung?s ?Sunshine Policy.?

Unfortunately, the range of policy options for the international community should Pyongyang proceed with its test are limited. Washington and Tokyo already have strict economic sanctions in place, and there is little additional economic leverage they could exercise. They can, and likely will, continue to pressure the North Korean regime by aggressively targeting its illicit activities, but unless China and South Korea decide to halt their economic assistance to the North, this will have limited effect. A military option ? such as shooting down the North Korean missile with responding interceptors ? should be kept on the table. In the event of a launch, the U.S. should bring North Korea?s aggression before the United Nations Security Council. While UN sanctions would have minimal practical impact, they would carry important symbolic value.

The United States and its partners in the Six-Party process must not succumb to North Korea?s manipulation and brinksmanship. Undoubtedly, one of Pyongyang?s goals is to put pressure on Washington to re-engage in direct bilateral talks to resolve not only the missile issue, but its nuclear programs. North Korea has some reason to believe this will work: After its missile launch in 1998, the Clinton Administration engaged in concerted high-level bilateral efforts with Pyongyang over its missile programs ? to no avail. The Bush Administration, therefore, should continue to insist that the diplomatic process must occur within the context of the established multilateral format. It should not allow aggressive North Korean actions to alter this.

The five parties engaging with North Korea agree that a North Korean missile test would be a dangerous act and only isolate Pyongyang further from the rest of the international community. Ironically, such isolation is an important step towards successful conclusion of the Six-Party process.


Balbina Y. Hwang, Ph.D., is Senior Policy Analyst for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation.

Politics & Religion / Geo Political matters
« on: June 26, 2006, 09:38:59 AM »
Order Code RS21968
Updated June 15, 2006

CRS Report for Congress

Received through the CRS Web

Iraq: Elections, Government, and Constitution
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division


Elections in 2005 for a transition government (January 30, 2005), a permanent
constitution (October 15), and a permanent (four year) government (December 15)
were concluded despite insurgent violence, progressively attracting Sunni participation.
On May 20, a unity government was formed as U.S. officials had been urging, but it is
not clear that the new government will be able to reduce ongoing violence. (See CRS
Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security, by Kenneth Katzman.)

After Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) deposed Saddam Hussein in April 2003, the
Bush Administration linked the end of U.S. military occupation to the adoption of a new
constitution and national elections, tasks expected to take two years. Prominent Iraqis
persuaded the Administration to accelerate the process, and sovereignty was given to an
appointed government on June 28, 2004, with a government and a permanent constitution
to be voted on thereafter, as stipulated in a Transitional Administrative Law (TAL, signed
March 8, 2004 []. Elections were held on
January 30, 2005, for a 275-seat transitional National Assembly; a provincial assembly
in each of Iraq?s 18 provinces (41 seats each; 51 for Baghdad); and a Kurdistan regional
assembly (111 seats). The Assembly chose a transitional ?presidency council? (a
president and two deputies), a prime minister with executive power, and a cabinet. The
transitional Assembly was to draft a constitution by August 15, 2005, to be put to a
referendum by October 15, 2005. The draft could be vetoed with a two-thirds majority
of the votes in any three provinces. A permanent government, elected by December 15,
2005, was to take office by December 31, 2005. If the constitution was defeated, the
December 15 elections would be for another transitional National Assembly (which
would re-draft a constitution).

January 30 Elections

The January 30, 2005, elections, run by the ?Independent Electoral Commission of
Iraq? (IECI), were conducted by proportional representation (closed list); voters chose
among ?political entities? (a party, a coalition of parties, or individuals). Seats in the
Assembly and the provincial assemblies were allocated in proportion to a slate?s showing;
any entity receiving at least 1/275 of the vote (about 31,000 votes) won a seat. A female

Congressional Research Service ? The Library of Congress


candidate occupied every third position on electoral lists in order to meet the TAL?s goal
for at least 25% female membership. A total of 111 entities were on the National
Assembly ballot: 9 multi-party coalitions, 75 single parties, and 27 individual persons.
The 111 entities contained over 7,000 candidates. About 9,000 candidates, organized into
party slates, ran in provincial and Kurdish elections.

In the January 30 (and December 15) elections, Iraqis abroad were eligible to vote.
The International Organization for Migration (IOM) was tapped to run the ?out-of-country
voting? (OCV) program. OCV took place in Australia, Canada, Denmark, France,
Germany, Iran, Jordan, Sweden, Syria, Turkey, UAE, Britain, Netherlands, and the United
States. (See [].) About 275,000 Iraqi expatriates (dual citizens
and anyone whose father was Iraqi) registered, and about 90% of them voted (in January).

The Iraqi government budgeted about $250 million for the January elections, of
which $130 million was offset by international donors, including about $40 million from
the European Union. Out of $21 billion in U.S. reconstruction funds, the United States
provided $40 million to improve IECI capacity; $42.5 million for Iraqi monitoring; and
$40 million for political party development, through the International Republican Institute
and National Democratic Institute. OCV cost an additional $92 million, of which $11
million was for the U.S. component, but no U.S. funds were spent for OCV.

Violence was less than anticipated; insurgents conducted about 300 attacks, but no
polling stations were overrun. Polling centers were guarded by the 130,000 members of
Iraq?s security forces, with the 150,000 U.S. forces in Iraq available for backup. Two
days prior to election day, vehicle traffic was banned, Iraq?s borders were closed, and
polling locations were confirmed. Security measures were similar for the October 15 and
December 15 votes, although with more Iraqi troops and police trained (about 215,000)
than in January. Polling places were staffed by about 200,000 Iraqis in all three elections
in 2005. International monitoring was limited to 25 observers (in the January elections)
and some European parliament members and others (December elections).

Competition and Results. The Iraqi groups that took the most active interest in
the January elections were those best positioned: Shiite Islamist parties, the Kurds, and
established secular parties. The results of this and the December 2005 election are shown
in the table below. The most prominent slate was the Shiite Islamist ?United Iraqi
Alliance? (UIA), consisting of 228 candidates from 22 parties, primarily the Supreme
Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and the Da?wa Party. The first
candidate on this slate was SCIRI leader Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim; Da?wa leader Ibrahim
al-Jafari was number seven. Even though radical Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr
denounced the election as a U.S.-led process, 14 of his supporters were on the UIA slate;
eight of these won seats. The two main Kurdish parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
(PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) offered a joint 165-candidate list.
Interim Prime Minister Iyad al-Allawi filed a six-party, 233-candidate ?Iraqi List? led by
his Iraqi National Accord (INA) party.1

Sunni Arabs (20% of the overall population), perceiving electoral defeat and
insurgent intimidation, mostly boycotted and won only 17 seats spread over several lists.

1 See CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security, by Kenneth Katzman.


The relatively moderate Sunni ?Iraqi Islamic Party? (IIP) filed a 275-seat slate, but it
withdrew in December 2004. The hard-line Iraqi Muslim Scholars Association (MSA),
said to be close to the insurgents, called for a Sunni boycott.

After the election, factional bargaining over governmental posts and disagreements
over Kurdish demands for substantial autonomy delayed formation of the government.
During April and May, the factions formed a government that U.S. officials said was not
sufficiently inclusive of Sunnis, even though it had a Sunni (Hajim al-Hassani) as
Assembly speaker; a Sunni deputy president (Ghazi al-Yawar); a Sunni deputy prime
minister (Abd al-Mutlak al-Jabburi); a Sunni Defense Minister (Sadoun Dulaymi); and
five other Sunni ministers. Most major positions were dominated by Shiites and Kurds,
such as PUK leader Jalal Talabani as president and Da?wa leader Ibrahim al-Jafari as
Prime Minister; SCIRI?s Adel Abd al-Mahdi was second deputy president. In provincial
elections, the Kurds won about 60% of the seats in Tamim (Kirkuk) province (26 out of
41 seats), strengthening the Kurds? efforts to gain control of the province.

Permanent Constitution and Referendum

The next step in the transition process was the drafting of a permanent constitution.
On May 10, the National Assembly appointed a 55-member drafting committee, chaired
by SCIRI activist Humam al-Hammoudi. The committee included only two Sunni Arabs,
prompting Sunni resentment, and 15 Sunnis (and one member of the small Sabian
community) were later added as full committee members, with 10 more as advisors.
Missing the August 15 deadline to produce a draft, the talks produced a document on
August 28 that included some compromises sought by Sunnis ? the Shiites and Kurds
declared it final. The Kurds achieved a major goal; Article 136 set December 31, 2007,
as a deadline for resettling Kurds in Kirkuk and holding a referendum on whether Kirkuk
will join the Kurdish region.

The draft (Article 2)2 designated Islam ?a main source? of legislation and said no
law can contradict the ?established? provisions of Islam. Article 39 implied that families
could choose which courts to use to adjudicate family issues such as divorce and
inheritance, and Article 34 made only primary education mandatory. These provisions
provoked opposition from women who fear that the males of their families will decide to
use Sharia (Islamic law) courts for family issues and limit girls? education. The 25%
electoral goal for women was retained (Article 47). Article 89 said that federal supreme
court will include experts in Islamic law, as well as judges and experts in civil law.

The remaining controversy centered on the draft?s provision allowing two or more
provinces together to form new autonomous ?regions.? Article 117 allowed each ?region?
to organize internal security forces, which would legitimize the fielding of sectarian
(presumably Shiite) militias, in addition to the Kurds? peshmerga (allowed by the TAL).
Article 109 requires the central government to distribute oil and gas revenues from
?current fields? in proportion to population, implying that the regions might ultimately
control revenues from new energy discoveries. These provisions raised Sunni alarms,
because their areas have few known oil or gas deposits. Sunni negotiators, including
chief negotiator Saleh al-Mutlak of the National Dialogue Council opposed the draft on

2 [].


these grounds. Article 62 establishes a ?Federation Council, a second chamber of a size
with powers to be determined, presumably to review legislation affecting regions.

After further negotiations, on September 19, 2005, the National Assembly approved
a ?final? draft, with some Sunni proposals, such as a statement that Iraq has always been
part of the Arab League. However, no major changes to the provisions on new regions
were made and Sunnis registered in large numbers (70%-85% in some Sunni cities) to try
to defeat the constitution. The United Nations printed and distributed 5 million copies.
The continued Sunni opposition prompted U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad
to mediate an agreement (October 11) between Kurdish and Shiite leaders and a major
Sunni party, the Iraqi Islamic Party, providing for (Article 137) a panel to convene after
the installation of a post-December 15 election government and, within four months,
propose a bloc of amendments. The amendments require a majority Assembly vote of
approval and, within another two months, would be put to a public referendum under the
same rules as the October 15, 2005 referendum. As of its seating on March 16, 2006, the
new parliament was expected to begin work on amending the constitution, as provided
in Article 137. It has not done so, to date, and might not do so until September 2006,
according to observers. Some believe that the Sunnis are not pressing the amendment
process because they fear that the UIA will not agree to major amendments, and the
Sunnis do not want to force a political confrontation.

The October 15 referendum was relatively peaceful. Results, released October 25,
were 78.6% in favor and 21.4% against, nationwide. The Sunni provinces of Anbar and
Salahuddin had a 97% and 82% ?no? vote, respectively. Mostly Sunni Nineveh province
voted 55% ?no,? and Diyala, believed mostly Sunni, had a 51% ?yes? vote. The draft
passed because only two provinces, not three, voted ?no? by a 2/3 majority. The
Administration praised the vote as evidence that Sunnis support the political process.

December 15, 2005, Elections

In the December 15 elections, under a formula designed to enhance Sunni
representation, each province contributed a pre-determined number of seats to the new
?Council of Representatives.? Of the 275-seat body, 230 seats were allocated this way,
and there were 45 ?compensatory? seats for entities that did not win provincial seats but
garnered votes nationwide, or which would have won additional seats had the election
constituency been the whole nation. A total of 361 political ?entities? registered: 19 of
them were coalition slates (comprising 125 different political parties), and 342 were other
?entities? (parties or individual persons). About 7,500 candidates spanned all entities.

Most notably for U.S. policy, major Sunni slates competed. Most prominent was
the three-party ?Iraqi Concord Front,? comprising the IIP, the National Dialogue
Council, and the Iraqi People?s General Council. The UIA slate formally included Sadr?s
faction as well as other hard line Shiite parties Fadila (Virtue) and Iraqi Hizballah.
Ahmad Chalabi?s Iraqi National Congress ran separately. Former Prime Minister Iyad
al-Allawi?s mostly secular 15-party ?Iraqi National? slate was broader than his January
list, incorporating not only his Iraq National Accord but also several smaller secular
parties. The Kurdish alliance slate was little changed from January.

Violence was minor (about 30 incidents) as Sunni insurgents, supporting greater
Sunni representation in parliament, facilitated the voting. However, results suggest that


voters chose lists representing their sects and regions, not secular lists. The table gives
results that were court-certified on February 10, 2006. According to the constitution:
within 15 days of certification (by February 25), the Council of Representatives was to
convene to select a speaker and two deputy speakers. The Council first convened on
March 16, but without selecting these or any other positions. After choosing a speaker
the Council was to select (no deadline specified, but a thirty-day deadline for the choice
after subsequent Council elections), a presidency council for Iraq (President and two
deputies). Those choices required a 2/3 vote of the Council. Within another 15 days, the
presidency council (by consensus of its three officials) was to designate the ?nominee of
the [Council] bloc with the largest number? as Prime Minister, the post that has executive
power. Within another 30 days, the prime minister designate was to name a cabinet for
approval by majority vote of the Council.

With 181 seats combined (nearly two thirds of the Council), the UIA and the Kurds
were well positioned to continue their governing alliance. However, their alliance frayed
when the Kurds, Sunnis, and Alawi block protested the UIA?s February 12 nomination
of Jafari to continue as Prime Minister. In March 2006, attempting to promote comity,
Iraqi leaders agreed to a U.S. proposal to form extra-constitutional economic and security
councils including all factions. On April 20, Jafari agreed to step aside, breaking the
logjam. On April 22, the Council of Representatives approved Talabani to continue as
president, Abd al-Mahdi to continue as a deputy president, and another deputy president,
Concord Front/IIP leader Tariq al-Hashimi. National Dialogue Front figure Mahmoud
Mashhadani was chosen Council speaker, with deputies Khalid al-Attiya (UIA/Shiite) and
Arif Tayfour, a KDP activist (continuing in that post). Senior Da?wa Party figure Jawad
al-Maliki was named Prime Minister. Maliki, who was in exile in Syria during Saddam?s
rule, is considered a Shiite hardliner, although he now professes non-sectarianism.

New Cabinet. Amid U.S. and other congratulations, Maliki named and won
approval of a 39 member cabinet (including deputy prime ministers) on May 20, one day
prior to his 30-day deadline. However, three key cabinet slots (Defense, Interior, and
National Security) were not filled permanently until June 8 because of factional
infighting. Many believe that Iran has substantial influence over the Iraqi government
because of the presence of several officials who belong to Shiite Islamist organizations
that have had close ties to Iran.

Of the 37 ministerial posts, a total of eight are Sunnis; seven are Kurds; twenty-one
are Shiites; and one is Christian. Kurdish official Barham Salih and Sunni Arab Salam
al-Zubaie are deputy prime ministers. Four ministers are women. KDP activist Hoshyar
Zebari remained Foreign Minister. The Defense Minister is Gen. Abdul Qadir
Mohammad Jasim al-Mifarji, a Sunni who had been expelled from the Iraqi military and
imprisoned for criticizing the invasion of Kuwait in 1990. More recently, he commanded
operations of the post-Saddam Iraqi Army in western Iraq. The Interior Minister is Jawad
al-Bulani, a Shiite who has been associated with a number of Shiite Islamist trends,
including Sadr?s faction, and the Fadila (Virtue) party that is prominent in Basra. The
Minister for National Security is Sherwan al-Waili, a Shiite who is from a different
faction of the Da?wa Party. He has served since 2003 as head of the provincial council
in the city of Nassiriyah and as adviser in the national security ministry. The Minister of
Trade and Minister of Education are from this Da?wa faction. Reflecting Shiite strength:


! Sadr followers are Ministers of Health, of Transportation, and of
Agriculture. Another is Minister of State for Tourism and Antiquities.

! From SCIRI, the most pro-Iranian party, Adel Abd al-Mahdi, is one of
two Vice Presidents. Bayan Jabr is Finance Minister, moving there from
Minister of Interior. The Minister of Municipalities and Public Works
is from the Badr Organization, SCIRI?s militia wing.

! Several officials in the new government are from other pro-Iranian Shiite
organizations. Deputy parliament speaker Khalid al-Attiyah spent time
in exile in Iran. The Minister of Civil Society Affairs is from the Islamic
Action Organization, a Shiite Islamist grouping based in Karbala. A
minister of state (no portfolio) is from Iraqi Hizbollah, which represents
former Shiite guerrilla fighters against Saddam?s regime based in the city
of Amarah. The Minister of Oil (Hussein Shahristani) is an aide to Shiite
leader Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. The Minister of Electricity and the
Minister of Labor and Social Affairs are independent UIA Shiites.

Table 1. Election Results (January and December)

(Jan. 05)
(Dec. 05)
UIA (Shiite Islamist); Sadr formally joined list for Dec. vote
(Of the 128: SCIRI~30; Da?wa~28; Sadr~30; Fadila~15; others~25) 140 128
Kurdistan Alliance (PUK and KDP) 75 53
Iraqis List (secular, Allawi); added some mostly Sunni parties for Dec. vote 40 25
Iraq Concord Front (Sunni). Main Sunni bloc; not in Jan. vote ? 44
Dialogue National Iraqi Front (Sunni, Saleh al-Mutlak) Not in Jan. vote ? 11
Iraqi National Congress (Chalabi). Was part of UIA list in Jan. 05 vote ? 0
Iraqis Party (Yawar, Sunni); Part of Allawi list in Dec. vote 5 ?
Iraqi Turkomen Front (Turkomen, Kirkuk-based, pro-Turkey) 3 1
National Independent and Elites (Jan)/Risalyun (Mission, Dec) pro-Sadr 3 2
People?s Union (Communist, non-sectarian); on Allawi list in Dec. vote 2 ?
Kurdistan Islamic Group (Islamist Kurd) 2 5
Islamic Action (Shiite Islamist, Karbala) 2 0
National Democratic Alliance (non-sectarian, secular) 1 ?
Rafidain National List (Assyrian Christian) 1 1
Liberation and Reconciliation Gathering (Sunni, secular) 1 3
Ummah (Nation) Party. (Secular, Mithal al-Alusi, former INC activist) 0 1
Yazidi list (small Kurdish, heterodox religious minority in northern Iraq) ? 1

Number of polling places: January: 5,200; December: 6,200.
Eligible voters: 14 million in January election; 15 million in October referendum and December.
Turnout: January: 58% (8.5 million votes)/ October: 66% (10 million)/ December: 75% (12 million).

Politics & Religion / Invitation to dialog to Muslims
« on: June 24, 2006, 03:09:38 PM »

An infidel is a "non believer" one is not of the Islamic faith.  Just like a heathen is not of the Christian faith.

Myke Willis

Politics & Religion / Invitation to dialog to Muslims
« on: June 24, 2006, 11:18:40 AM »
My apologizes if this is fragmented but I am heading out the door for a training session. This is what I have been exposed to.  It is not my intention to degrade or insult anyone.  I spoke of breaking bread only to make a point where I have seen and taken part or a culture.  The good and the brutial.

The reality is that the mainstream Muslim population is not going to speak out.  For whatever their reasoning.  Why? Basicly in the extremeist point of view the people that support my enemy are my enemy.

For whatever internal troubles they have to take the "Infidel" side is against how they believe.  Unless it benifits them in some way.

Here is a example of what I mean.  In the Muslim community of the Middle East there is no love lost when it comes to the Palestinians. The Palestinians are in the eyes of most just a little a head of Israel. They could care less if they get a home land.  But as long as they are willing to kill Israelis then they will receive all the help and support they want.

When the U.S. decides to pull our troops out of Iraq within six months to a year there will be civil war.  Why, because you cannot force feed democracy to a country that has no concept of what it  really is.  You have to want to earn these freedoms for yourself and it is too hard for those who are use to being told what to do, what to think.  Look at the former USSR, they are not flourishing without the comminist regime.  Most would like the old ways to return.

Myke Willis

Politics & Religion / Invitation to dialog to Muslims
« on: June 23, 2006, 12:20:28 PM »
The best way to understand the nature of Islam and Muslims is to read the Qur'an.  Then study the life of Muhammed.

Bryan, I must admit I have very little contact with the American Muslim community.  My personnal experience comes from my dealings with Muslims in the Middle East, Eastern Africa and Southwest Asia.  

I have said before I have broken bread with many families and found them to be nothing but gracious.  I have personally seen the good and
experienced the bad. In these dealings I have found that when it comes to "believers and non believers" that the believers will look the other way and mind their own business as to avoid conflict with fellow Muslims.

Muslim speaking against Muslim, Muslim killing Muslim in strictly prohibited.  The terrorist kill their Muslim brothers becaus they see them as working with the Great Satan so they are viewed as tratiors to Islam.

This conflict has been around since the Crusades.  Will it get any better?
Only when both sides decide to stop trying to convert to other to their ways of thinking.

Myke Willis

Politics & Religion / WW3
« on: June 23, 2006, 07:45:55 AM »
U.S.: New bomb plot aimed to 'kill all the devils'
Court documents: Black Muslim group thought informant was with al-Qaida

Charles Rex Arbogast / AP file
Chicago's Sears Tower, the tallest highrise on the city's skyline, was allegedly the focus of a bomb plot, officials said Thursday after seven men were arrested in Miami.
MIAMI - Following a warehouse raid and their arrests a day earlier, seven young men were charged Friday with conspiring to work with al-Qaida to blow up Chicago's Sears Tower and federal buildings. Court documents obtained by NBC News said the ringleader boasted of wanting to "kill all the devils we can" in a mission "just as good or greater than 9/11."

The seven individuals indicted by a federal grand jury were taken into custody Thursday when authorities swarmed a Miami warehouse that had been used by a Black Muslim group.

According to the court documents, a man identified as Narseal Batiste was the recruiter who wanted to organize "soldiers" to build an Islamic army to wage holy war.

The others were identified as Patrick Abraham, Stanley Grant Phanor, Naudimar Herrera, Burson Augustin, Lyglenson Lemorin, and Rotschild Augustine.

Batiste allegedly met last December in a hotel room with someone posing as a representative of al-Qaida ? someone law enforcement officials say was actually an agent of a country friendly to the United States.

The indictment described the alleged scheme this way:

Batiste initially asked for "boots, uniforms, machine guns, radios, and vehicles," as well as $50,000 in cash, to help him build an "Islamic Army to wage jihad.?

'Good or greater than 9/11'
In February, Batiste told the foreign agent that he wanted him and his men to attend an al-Qaida training camp so as to "kill all the devils we can" in a mission he said "would be just as good or greater than 9/11" ? beginning with the destruction of the Sears Tower.

At a meeting on March 16 at a warehouse in the Miami area, the seven defendants discussed a plot to bomb FBI buildings in five cities, and each swore an oath of loyalty to al-Qaida before the purported al-Qaida representative.

The person they believed to be an al-Qaida representative gave Batiste a video camera, which Batiste said he would use to film the North Miami Beach FBI building, the indictment said. At a March 26 meeting, Batiste and Augustin provided the foreign agent with photographs of the FBI building, as well as video of other Miami government buildings, and discussed the plot to bomb the FBI building.

But on May 24, the indictment said, Batiste told the foreign agent that he was experiencing delays ?because of various problems within his organization.? Batiste said he wanted to continue his mission and his relationship with al-Qaida nonetheless, the document said.

The informant's ability to track the group from its early stages had neutralized the threat.

?There is no imminent threat to Miami or any other area because of these operations,? said Richard Kolko, spokesman for FBI headquarters in Washington. He declined further comment.

One source said the suspects had been trying to buy weapons and other things needed to carry out attacks. Ammonium nitrate, a fertilizer compound that can also be used as an explosive, was reportedly among the items.

U.S. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales is scheduled to hold a news conference Friday to discuss the arrests. A news conference also will be held in Miami.

'Like military boot camp'
Neighbors who lived nearby said young men, who appeared to be in their teens and 20s, slept in the warehouse, running what looked like a militaristic group. They appeared brainwashed, some said.

?They would come out late at night and exercise,? said Tashawn Rose. ?It seemed like a military boot camp that they were working on there. They would come out and stand guard.?

Residents living near the warehouse said the men taken into custody described themselves as Muslims and had tried to recruit young people to join their group. Rose said they tried to recruit her younger brother and nephew for a karate class.

She said she talked to one of the men about a month ago. ?They seemed brainwashed,? she said. ?They said they had given their lives to Allah.?

Residents said FBI agents spent several hours in the neighborhood showing photos of the suspects and seeking information. They said the men had lived in the area for about a year.

Benjamin Williams, 17, said the group sometimes had young children with them. At times, he added, the men ?would cover their faces. Sometimes they would wear things on their heads, like turbans.?

A man who called himself Brother Corey and claimed to be a member of the group told CNN late Thursday that the individuals worship at the building and call themselves the ?Seas of David.?

He dismissed any suggestion that the men were contemplating violence. ?We are peaceful,? he said. He added that the group has ?soldiers? in Chicago but is not a terrorist organization.

Xavier Smith, who attends the nearby United Christian Outreach, said the men would often come by the church and ask for water.

?They were very private,? said Smith.

Sears Tower
Managers of the Sears Tower, the nation?s tallest building, said in a statement they speak regularly with the FBI and local law enforcement about terror threats and that Thursday ?was no exception.?

Security at the 110-floor Sears Tower, a Chicago landmark, was ramped up after the Sept. 11 attacks, and the 103rd-floor skydeck was closed for about a month and a half.

?Law enforcement continues to tell us that they have never found evidence of a credible terrorism threat against Sears Tower that has gone beyond criminal discussions,? the statement said.

The warehouse owner declined comment. ?I heard the news just like you guys,? George F. Mobassaleh told the AP. ?I can?t talk to you.?

South Florida has been linked to several terrorism investigations in the past. Several of the Sept. 11 hijackers lived and trained in the area, including ringleader Mohamed Atta and several plots by Cuban Americans against the government of Fidel Castro have also been based in Miami.

Jose Padilla, a former resident once accused of plotting to detonate a radioactive bomb in the country, is charged in Miami with being part of a North American terror support cell to al-Qaida and other violent Islamic extremist organizations. He has been in federal custody since 2002 and is scheduled for trial in September.

Padilla was originally designated an "enemy combatant" and held for three years without charge by the Bush administration shortly after his May 2002 arrest at Chicago's O'Hare International Airport.

NBC News? Pete Williams, Jim Popkin, Reuters and The Associated Press contributed to this report.

Martial Arts Topics / DB Seminar in Tulsa
« on: June 19, 2006, 05:08:16 PM »





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Politics & Religion / WW3
« on: June 19, 2006, 08:26:15 AM »

Ali M. Koknar*
April 26, 2006

??I wanna bite the hand that feeds me.
I wanna bite that hand so badly.
I want to make them wish they'd never seen me??
Radio Radio
from the album: This Year's Model
By Elvis Costello

There is much speculation in Washington these days about whether Iran will respond to a
preemptive strike by the United States and/or Israel in order to damage or destroy its nuclear
weapons program. The deficiencies in the human intelligence collection and analysis capability of
the United States resulting in the confusion about Iran?s war fighting ability is a major factor in
this current speculation. American experts are finding it hard to gauge Iran?s military strength and
effectiveness. One way to measure Iran?s might with some degree of accuracy is to study how it
has been fighting recently. Iran has not fought a conventional campaign since the end of the Iran-
Iraq War in 1988, almost two decades ago. Since then, Iran?s military industrial complex and
manpower evolved significantly. Some of this new technology and training has been put into
action by the Tehran regime in a limited extent at Iran?s periphery, which offers a window to
peek at the Iranian military under actual combat conditions. Except for the two proxy campaigns
in Lebanon and Iraq which Iranian military and intelligence are engaged in, Iran?s only direct
military action on its enemies has materialized in the form of a few surface-to-surface missile
attacks on Mojahedin-e-Khalq camps in Iraq in the late 1990s and its ongoing conflict with the
Kurdish terrorist organization PKK (Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan-Workers? Party of Kurdistan)
inside Iran and in Northern Iraq at present, which this analysis is about.

Starting in 1979, the Islamic regime continued the Shah?s policy of attacking the armed
ethnic Kurds (as represented by the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan and Komala, the
Marxists) with conventional military forces. These clashes continued during the Iran-Iraq War,
until the mid 1990s and resulted in the deaths of around 10 thousand Kurdish insurgents, 50
thousand Kurdish civilians and thousands of troops from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps
(IRGC-Pasdaran). A de facto cease-fire came into effect in 1995. Paradoxically, the Islamic
regime in Tehran harbored and supported the Maoist PKK against Turkey in the 1980s but
especially after the removal of PKK?s leader from Syria in 1998. The Iranian intelligence service
(Ettelaat-SAVAMA) managed the PKK presence inside Iran and the infiltration of PKK terrorists
into Turkey. Interestingly enough, during the same period of time Ettelaat supported the activities
of the Islamist Turkish Hezbollah, an ethnically Kurdish organization which organized itself in

* Ali M. Koknar, a private security consultant in Washington, DC, specializing in counterterrorism and international
organized crime, is an Associate of the Terrorism Research Center. His e-mail is

the 1980s to oppose the PKK in southeast Turkey. In fact, the Turkish intelligence services
believe that the Ettelaat engineered a truce between the PKK and the Turkish-Kurdish Hezbollah
in the late 1990s. At the peak of its relations with the Iranian regime in 1995, the PKK maintained
about 1,200 of its members at around 50 locations in Iran. The Ettelaat even used the PKK
against other Kurdish groups in Iran such as Komala, eight leaders of which the PKK ambushed
and killed in June 1998. Fed up with Iran?s harboring the PKK, Turkey sent a direct message to
Tehran in July 1999, when Turkish F16s attacking a PKK camp in Iran, accidentally bombed a
Pasdaran base, killing a Pasdar officer and four Pasdaran troops and wounding ten. A new
Turkish government elected at the end of 2002, developed a d?tente with Tehran in 2003, making
it possible for Ankara to press Tehran into cutting off its support to the PKK.

With its charismatic leader, Abdullah Ocalan captured by Turkey in 1999, the PKK
withdrew about 3,000 of its 4,000 field cadres from Turkey and Iran to its dozen or so camps
strewn along the Qandil mountain range which straddles the Iran-Iraq border across from Turkey.
The PKK used the period between 1999 and 2003 to reorganize its command structure, recruit
new members and especially after Saddam?s quick defeat in April 2003, to acquire ex-Iraqi Army
weapons and explosives. They also set up a front, Part?ya J?yane Azad?ya Kurdistan (Kurdistan
Free Life Party-PJAK) in Iran (heretofore referred to as simply ?PKK? for practicality). Despite
sporting its own leader, Haji Ahmedi, its operations are conducted under orders from PKK?s
strongman, Murat Karayilan, and like other PKK teams operating in Turkey, its armed cadres are
ethnic Kurds recruited from Iran, Iraq and Turkey. The PKK operates camps housing about 500
of these on Mount Asos, which is on the Iranian side of the Qandil Range.

In 2004, from their Asos bases the PKK terrorist started operating in northwestern Iran,
near the Iranian towns of Selmas, Mahabad, Serdest, Bane, P?ranshahr, Mer?wan, Sine, and
Hewraman. By July that year, the Pasdaran started mounting battalion-level operations in the area
against the PKK, to total about eight such operations by the end of the year. In 2004, the PKK
claimed killing about 20 Pasdaran troops, but did not admit its own casualties as a result of a
brigade-level Pasdaran operation near Xoye/Urumiyeh in October, during which the Pasdaran
deployed Katyusha artillery rockets.

A Pasdaran brigade, accompanied by hundreds of Basej paramilitaries, conducted sweep
operations in the sector between the Iraqi border and the town of Piranshahr in late May and early
June 2005 using AH-1J Cobra attack helicopters, but did not report any PKK terrorists killed or
captured. As they did in Turkey, the PKK made attempts to foment a Kurdish uprising in Iran in
2005 to affect the outcome of the presidential elections. As if in response to the Pasdaran/Basej
sweep a month earlier, in July, these attempts materialized in the ethnically Kurdish populated
Mahabad and clashes between armed PKK terrorists, their civilian Kurdish supporters and the
Pasdaran and Basej resulted in the declaration of martial law and curfew. The PKK claimed that
they had killed 16 Pasdaran and Basej for a loss of four of their own during the July clashes.

The seasonal nature of contacts between the PKK and Iranian security forces was
somewhat altered in 2006 as the PKK mounted attacks in Iran during the snowy winter months
just as they did inside Turkey. In February, there were about a dozen PKK and Pasdaran on each
side killed in action and at least a dozen wounded. In March the Pasdaran staged heliborne
assaults killing at least 2 PKK terrorists. The PKK claimed they killed seven Pasdaran.

As the weather improved in April, the Pasdaran launched a division-level operation against the PKK for
the first time, deploying towed howitzers. The PKK also claimed that the Iranian Air Force
fighters bombed one of its camps near Xinira next to the Haji Umran Iran-Iraq border crossing.
The Pasdaran also hit a PKK camp near Sidakan, about 50 miles north of the Iraqi city of Arbil
and about 6 miles from the Iranian border, with Katyusha artillery rockets. These attacks killed at
least three PKK terrorists (as admitted by them) and probably up to a dozen more. The PKK
claimed that they engaged the Pasdaran along the border and killed six and wounded eight, which
the Pasdaran did not admit. The Pasdaran did admit however, that they lost 100 troops between
2003 and 2006 in contacts with the PKK. The PKK admits losing no less than 50 terrorists in
contacts with the Pasdaran between July 2005 and March 2006.

The cyclical nature of the PKK operations to date in Iran suggest that the coming months
will bring more contacts with Iranian security forces. Based on the escalation of the conflict in the
last three years, it is plausible that the size of the Iranian troop movements will be large (from
battalion-level in 2004 to division-level in 2006) and will involve heavy weapons such as artillery
pieces and may also be conducted as combined-arms operations with the participation of regular
Iranian Army units in addition to the Pasdaran. These developments will offer a unique
opportunity to observe the Iranian military in action using its inventory against a real enemy, as
opposed to the recent war games they conducted in the Persian Gulf during which reverse-
engineered Russian weapons systems were showcased. Iran?s success or failure against an
insurgent force of no more than a battalion or two will be indicative of its conventional
warfighting ability against a larger opposing force, such as the United States Army or Marines.

Politics & Religion / Invitation to dialog to Muslims
« on: June 16, 2006, 04:13:00 PM »

I am glad that you have found a way of life that has brought you inner peace.  I too have found peace in the ways of the my grandfathers (Apache).  

First, As a Vet I want to thank you for your service to our country.  I too have spent many a cold night sitting on some isolated air field waiting to go to some place unknown. I have also spent many nights in the Middle East doing the biding of Uncle Sam.  As a soldier/contractor it is not my place to make policy.    

I feel the hostility coming from your post.  Maybe the cartoon was in poor taste. It is not my place to defend someone elses work.  But as you can see the actions of 9/11 have certain effects on different people.  I maybe wrong, and please correct me if I am,  but it seems you take issue with certain freedoms that we have. I can understand this to a certain extent coming from a people that the U.S. commited genocide against.  That made everything we believed and praticed "against the law".  Forced us to pray to their God and forced us to learn their english.  Know after saying this I will get to the point.

I will  share a few things that I have a hard time with that your Islamic brothers/sisters have done.  Burning and cursing our flag, hanging and setting our public figures in effigy, flying planes into buildings full of innocent civilians, boarding buses full of women and childern and blowing themselves up and watching such actions of cowards being celebrated, ect...

Marc, I will apologize to you and the rest if I have overstepped the "be friends at the end of the day"  rule.

Myke Willis

Politics & Religion / Invitation to dialog to Muslims
« on: June 15, 2006, 08:39:20 AM »

Christians and Muslims are alike after all.  :lol:

Myke Willis

Politics & Religion / Invitation to dialog to Muslims
« on: June 13, 2006, 12:06:38 PM »
Salam Sitbatan,

When I hear what can we do about thugs, that it is up to Governments to take care of the problem.  I would agree to a point if it where a local problem.   The terrorist activities are not under any one Government.  But under God.  So IMHO if the moderate and peace loving Clerics took a more active stance against car bombing, the killing of inocent people then maybe more young people would listen.  But by their silence then they let the religion be controled by madmen filled with hate.  We did not want this holy war but it was thrust upon us.  We reacted in self defense.

Like most Mulims we Americians want to work, go to school and raise our kids.  But as Americans it is our duty to get involved no matter if we are for or against.

It is good that something like the FMA can at least bring a small group of people together.

Myke Willis

Politics & Religion / WW3
« on: June 12, 2006, 07:14:27 PM »
al-Qaida in Iraq Names New Leader
Jun 12, 9:48 PM (ET)
CAIRO, Egypt (AP) - Al-Qaida in Iraq named a successor Monday to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and said he would stick to the slain leader's path - attacks on Shiites as well as on U.S. and Iraqi forces.

The new leader, identified by the nom de guerre Abu Hamza al-Muhajer in a statement posted on the Web, appeared to be a foreign Arab, like his predecessor.

But otherwise he is an unknown. The name has not appeared in previous al-Qaida in Iraq propaganda or on U.S. lists of terrorists with rewards on their heads, suggesting he is a lower-level figure or someone more prominent who has taken a new pseudonym.

President Bush said Monday that al-Muhajer would join the ranks of those sought by the U.S. "I think the successor to Zarqawi is going to be on our list to bring to justice," Bush said.

The lack of detail appeared to reflect a new emphasis on secrecy by the group. U.S. forces have launched a series of raids against al-Qaida in Iraq based on intelligence found in the safehouse where al-Zarqawi was killed by an American airstrike Wednesday. The group may fear infiltration or that al-Zarqawi's public stance led to his downfall.

"Al-Qaida in Iraq's council has agreed on Sheik Abu Hamza al-Muhajer to be the successor of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in the leadership of the organization," the group said.

The authenticity of the statement could not be independently confirmed. It was posted on an Islamic militant Web forum where al-Qaida in Iraq often posts messages.

The posting said al-Muhajer was "a beloved brother with jihadi (holy war) experience and a strong footing in knowledge.

"We ask Almighty God to strengthen him that he may accomplish what Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, God have mercy on his soul, began," it said.

That could mean he will continue the strategy the Jordanian-born al-Zarqawi followed: a campaign of brutal attacks on Shiite civilians, aimed at sparking a Sunni-Shiite civil war.

The attacks sparked tensions between al-Zarqawi's group and some Iraqi insurgents who felt the bloodshed hurt the image of their resistance against U.S. forces. They wanted to focus attacks on American and Iraqi troops.

Iraqi insurgents loyal to Saddam Hussein made a rare public acknowledgment of disputes with al-Zarqawi in a condolence letter posted on the same Web site.

"Although there were many matters we differed with him on and him with us, ... what united us was something greater," said the statement by the Fedayeen Saddam. It said the group had "the honor" of fighting alongside al-Zarqawi and that "our determination is only increased for waging jihad."

Al-Zarqawi's death raised speculation the group might turn to an Iraqi leader to smooth over the differences with Iraqis. Al-Zarqawi's deputy is an Iraqi known as Abu Abdul-Rahman al-Iraqi. The U.S. military told The Associated Press on Monday that he was not a man identified as "Abdul-Rahman" who was killed with al-Zarqawi.

The name al-Muhajer, Arabic for "immigrant," suggested the new leader was not Iraqi. The name is often used by foreign Arab militants, referring to the "muhajereen," Islam's early converts who fled persecution in Mecca to join the Prophet Muhammad in Medina.

Rohan Gunaratna, a terror expert at Singapore's Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, said the choice of a non-Iraqi means the group is "likely to continue the foreign operations."

Al-Zarqawi had sought to expand his campaign beyond Iraq, including a triple suicide bombing against hotels in Jordan last November that killed 60 people.

Al-Zarqawi also had links to al-Qaida's branch in Saudi Arabia, which in a statement Monday thanked him for helping its fight against the kingdom's rulers. "We will not forget his favors to jihad and the mujahedeen in the prophet's peninsula," the group said.

The U.S. military had predicted a militant named Abu Ayyub al-Masri would become al-Qaida in Iraq's leader. Al-Masri, an Egyptian associate of al-Zarqawi, has a $50,000 reward on his head.

Militants usually adopt a pseudonym made up of a nickname called a "kunya" in Arabic - "Abu," meaning "father of," plus a name that sometimes refers to an actual child of the militant. The second part of the pseudonym is usually an adjective denoting the militant's nationality.

Al-Zarqawi was born Ahmad Fadhil Nazzal al-Khalayleh, but took a pseudonym from Zarqa, his hometown in Jordan. He had a child named Musab, so took the kunya of "Abu Musab."

The secrecy surrounding the new leader could hurt the group's ability to carry out attacks, said Egyptian analyst Diaa Rashwan. Al-Zarqawi built a reputation as a holy warrior, helping draw foreign militants to carry out suicide bombings.

"Al-Zarqawi's charisma was very important factor for many to join his organization," Rashwan said. "All al-Zarqawi had was car bombs and people ready to blow themselves up."

"My feeling is that they are going to have establish a persona for him," said Evan Kohlmann, a New York-based terror consultant and founder of "They're going to have to introduce this fellow to the world."

Politics & Religion / WW3
« on: June 12, 2006, 07:11:43 PM »
A Dying Al-Zarqawi Tried to Get Away
Jun 9, 6:50 PM (ET)

BAGHDAD, Iraq (AP) - Abu Musab al-Zarqawi could barely speak, but he struggled and tried to get away from American soldiers as he lay dying on a stretcher in the ruins of his hideout.

The U.S. forces recognized his face, and knew they had the leader of al-Qaida in Iraq.

Initially, the U.S. military had said al-Zarqawi was killed outright. But Friday new details emerged of his final moments.

For three years, al-Zarqawi orchestrated horrific acts of violence guided by his extremist vision of jihad, or holy war - first against the U.S. soldiers he considered occupiers of Arab lands, then against the Shiites he considered infidels.

On Wednesday, the U.S. military tracked him to a house northwest of Baghdad, and blew it up with two 500-pound bombs.

Al-Zarqawi somehow managed to survive the impact of the bombs, weapons so powerful they tore a huge crater in the date palm forest where the house was nestled just outside the town of Baqouba.

Iraqi police reached the scene first, and found the 39-year-old al-Zarqawi alive.

"He mumbled something, but it was indistinguishable and it was very short," Maj. Gen. William Caldwell, spokesman for U.S.-led forces in Iraq, said Friday of the Jordanian-born terrorist's last words.

Iraqi police pulled him from the flattened home and placed him on a makeshift stretcher. U.S. troops arrived, saw that al-Zarqawi was conscious, and tried to provide medical treatment, the spokesman said.

"He obviously had some kind of visual recognition of who they were because he attempted to roll off the stretcher, as I am told, and get away, realizing it was the U.S. military," Caldwell told Pentagon reporters via videoconference from Baghdad.

Al-Zarqawi "attempted to, sort of, turn away off the stretcher," he said. "Everybody re-secured him back onto the stretcher, but he died almost immediately thereafter from the wounds he'd received from this airstrike."

So much blood covered al-Zarqawi's body that U.S. forces cleaned him up before taking photographs. "Despite the fact that this person actually had no regard for human life, we were not going to treat him in the same manner," Caldwell said.

The airstrike killed two other men and three women who were in the house, but only al-Zarqawi and his spiritual adviser have been positively identified, he said.

Caldwell also said experts told him it is not unheard of for people to survive a blast of that magnitude.

"There are cases when people, in fact, can survive even an attack like that on a building structure. Obviously, the other five in the building did not, but he did for some reason," Caldwell said.

He said he did not know if al-Zarqawi was inside or outside the house when the bombs struck.

"Well, what we had found, as with anything, first reports are not always fully accurate as we continue the debriefings. But we were not aware yesterday that, in fact, Zarqawi was alive when U.S. forces arrived on the site," Caldwell said.

His recounting of the aftermath of the airstrike could not be independently verified. The Iraqi government confirmed only that Iraqi forces were first on the scene, followed by the Americans.

An aide to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, speaking on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to talk to the media, said he saw Caldwell's news briefing but could neither confirm nor deny that al-Zarqawi briefly survived the blast.

"Well, I think it's clear: The Americans said he was seriously wounded and he died," the aide said.

Politics & Religion / Invitation to dialog to Muslims
« on: June 12, 2006, 09:05:33 AM »
I have thought long and hard before adding anything to this thread.  Anyway,  my exposure to the Muslim culture is mostly middle eastern and east Africa.  I have broken bread with many families and find them to be gracious hosts and good hearted people.  Now after saying that I will add.  Would I trust them to watch my back in a fire fight.  NO.  Why because in their eyes I am part of a invading/occuping army thats only mission is to kill Muslims.  

Recent history reveals that in almost every major terror attack on the U.S. was engineered by extreme Muslims.  These extremist take great pleasure in killing and degrading the corpses of  "The Great Satin".  I have been called and Infidal more than once because I do not follow the Koran.

IMHO we in the west are exposed to the most extreme part of Islam.  Only because the moderate and peace loving Muslims fail to speak out publicly against the acts of the terrorist.  I have seen Muslims commit horrendous acts of violence upon fellow Muslims.  Their only crime was helping the Infidals.  I believe this act of Muslims killing Muslim is forbidden by the Koran.

The most life changing act and what made me what I am today.  Happened in 1972 when a saw a man wearing a ski mask at the Munich Olymipics.

Would I use the FMA to kill an Islamic terrorist.  Yes.

Myke Willis

Martial Arts Topics / DB Seminar in Tulsa
« on: June 09, 2006, 02:20:12 PM »





COST: 175.00 FOR BOTHDAYS, ONE DAY 100.00 IF PAID BEFORE SEPT. 16, 2006 125.00.




Martial Arts Topics / DB Seminar in Tulsa
« on: June 08, 2006, 03:02:38 PM »
Woof All,

Dates will be either 13-14 of Oct or 14-15. I will let all know soon.


Martial Arts Topics / DB Seminar in Tulsa
« on: June 08, 2006, 09:24:28 AM »
Woof all,

Guro C. will be making his second trip to Tulsa, OK in Oct. 2006. For more information contact Myke Willis at


Politics & Religion / Geo Political matters
« on: June 05, 2006, 05:58:40 AM »
May 31, 2006:
Disarming Warlords a Test for Colombia's Uribe (back to list)    
International Analysis Alert Level: Elevated


Rafael says his life as a Colombian paramilitary fighter left him with nothing but dead friends and seven bullet scars. So a year ago he traded fighting for farming at a ranch near Bogota in a program set up by Colombian President Alvaro Uribe to demobilize illegal armed groups and prepare them to return to civilian life. "We exchanged guns for shovels," said Rafael, 25, showing a bullet fragment lodged in his leg. "We've changed a lot of things, like the idea we can't live without the war." Full Story

TRC Analysis:
On May 28, 2006, Colombian President Alvaro Uribe was reelected overwhelmingly to the presidency, securing a better than expected 62 percent of the popular vote. Pundits largely contribute this unprecedented victory to the substantial decrease in criminal and terrorist activity in Colombia (Country Profile) since 2002 and the reinvigoration of the Colombian economy?a feat largely attributable to record levels of US (Country Profile) military and economic assistance. However, a closer examination reveals a country in flux, alternating between civil war and democratic-capitalistic growth, with international observers not yet sure in which direction the state might head. What is determinable, however, is the awesome power Uribe has acquired in four years and his usage of such power to generate a "successful" conclusion to disarmament talks with Colombia's largest paramilitary group, the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) (Group Profile). Granting the AUC a controversial de facto amnesty, Uribe's second term rests largely on the peaceful reintegration of AUC forces into the general populace, while curtailing their illicit narcotics enterprises.

Uribe, throughout the campaign, cited the demobilization of more than 30,000 paramilitary fighters as a key success in ameliorating the lives of Colombians. Local and international human rights groups, however, continue to wonder if demobilization came at far too great a price. Critics have condemned the agreed upon framework law as too lenient toward militia leaders accused of drug trafficking and civilian massacres (WAR Report). The framework law, as passed by the Colombian Congress, calls for AUC members found guilty of crimes against humanity to serve five- to eight-year prison terms, minus credits for good behavior and time spent negotiating. Imprisonment would likely be in some form of "house arrest" in a rural hacienda, similar to the house arrest of renowned drug lord Pablo Escobar. Additionally, disarmed paramilitary fighters would not be subject to extradition agreements with the United States (Country Profile), as membership in a paramilitary group was declared a "political crime" (see the May 17, 2006 Intel Report concerning the AUC disarmament framework).

The Colombian populace granted Uribe considerable leeway throughout the demobilization process, believing leniency was far better than a continued two front war. However, like Uribe and the Colombian Congress, Colombians believed AUC paramilitary personnel would reintegrate peacefully into the general populace, curtailing past nefarious activities. As recent events now indicate, however, factions within the AUC have chosen to continue their war against alleged leftist subversives.

As reported by Amnesty International, paramilitary groups have sent several death threats to prominent human rights organizations that work on issues relating to communities forcibly displaced by the armed conflict in Colombia. The group, Colombia Libre de Comunistas (Colombia Free of Communists), is thought to have the backing the Colombian military, not an unprecedented occurrence in Colombia, as paramilitary groups and the Colombian military have routinely worked in conjunction. The threat was sent via email to 20 organizations working in Colombia and warns "you are going to know something more about us now that we are to continue in power?along with the legitimate Colombian armed forces clearing our countryside and cities of grovellers like you." Human rights organizations are frequently labeled as guerrilla collaborators by paramilitary units and are targeted for assassination or forced disappearance.

Amnesty agreements are predicated on the belief that it is impossible to eliminate all terrorists, necessitating a means of enticing terrorists to terminate their connections to the group. Franco Ferracuti, professor of criminological medicine and of forensic psychiatry at the University of Rome, suggests the state must encourage dissent within the terrorist group and the defection from it, providing a way out. Ferracuti believes this is best achieved by providing a place within the country's political system for members of society with dissenting views. Unfortunately, Ferracuti's writing was referencing ideological terrorism in general and leftist terrorism in particular. The AUC is neither ideological per se nor leftist in nature. Although generally labeled as right wing, the AUC paramilitary has maturated into a narco-trafficking syndicate with certain limited elements remaining devoted to the elimination of leftist guerrillas but emphatically engaged in the pursuit of profit.

Ferracuti, referencing the Italian (Country Profile) government's success in alluring Red Brigade (Group Profile) members to defect, believed a lenient and flexible judicial system would facilitate this exit. However, such amnesties may not be so successful for the Colombian government, as the AUC has a historical role within Colombian politics, eliminating the allure of political participation. Rather than offering political participation, Uribe must allow for the possibility of extradition to the US if AUC members do not discontinue narcotics operations. By allowing for such possibilities, Uribe provides the incentive to abide by disarmament and reintegration agreements. Further, Uribe must adamantly inform AUC personnel that any rearmament or continuation of narco-operations will result in the elimination of the agreed upon framework law. Without such threats, AUC remobilization is likely occur in the near-term.

By Brent Heminger, TRC Staff

Primary Related Group:
Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC)  

Secondary Related Group:
Red Brigades (BR)  

Tertiary Related Group:

Politics & Religion / Homeland Security
« on: June 03, 2006, 01:21:08 PM »
Canada charges 17 in plot to blow up buildings
Authorities: Group had 3 tons of material used in ?95 Oklahoma City blast

J.P. Moczulski / Reuters
Police officers from the Ontario Provincial Police and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police execute a search warrant at a private residence in Mississauga, a Toronto suburb, on Friday.
 View related photos  NBC VIDEO

? Canada suspects knew Ga. Tech student
June 3: The suspects charged in Canada had contact with a Georgia Tech student, who has since been arrested. NBC's Pete Williams reports.


 ? Effects of ammonium nitrate
June 3: Col. Jack Jacobs explains how terrorists might use 3 tons of ammonium nitrate.

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MSNBC News Services
Updated: 1 hour, 31 minutes ago
TORONTO - A group of Canadian residents arrested in coordinated raids across the Toronto area for ?terrorism-related offenses? had planned to blow up targets around southern Ontario, Canadian police said on Saturday.

Mike McDonnell, assistant commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, said the group had acquired three metric tons of ammonium nitrate ? or three times the amount used in the 1995 bombing in Oklahoma City ? as they sought to ?create explosive devices.? Police said they had arrested 12 adults and five young people.

?This group posed a real and serious threat,? McDonnell said. ?It had the capacity and intent to carry out attacks. Our investigation and arrests prevented the assembly of any bombs and the attacks being carried out.?

Officials showed evidence of bomb making materials, a computer hard drive, camouflage uniforms and what appears to be a door with bullet holes in it at a news conference Saturday morning.

?This group took steps to acquire three tons of ammonium nitrate and other components necessary to create explosive devices,? McDonnell said.

The arrests were made Friday, with some 400 officers involved.

McDonnell said the suspects were either citizens or residents of Canada and had trained together.

?The men arrested yesterday are Canadian residents from a variety of backgrounds. For various reasons they appeared to have become adherents of a violent ideology inspired by al-Qaida,? said Luc Portelance, the assistant director of operations with CSIS ? Canada?s spy agency.

Heavily armed police officers ringed the Durham Regional Police Station in the city of Pickering, just east of Toronto, as the suspects were brought in late Friday night in unmarked cars which were drove into an underground garage.

The Toronto Star reported Saturday that Canadian youths in their teens and 20s, upset at the treatment of Muslims worldwide, were among those arrested.

The newspaper said they had trained at a camp north of Toronto and had plotted to attack CSIS?s downtown office near the CN Tower, among other targets.

Melisa Leclerc, a spokeswoman for the federal Public Safety Minister Stockwell Day, had no comment on the arrests.  NBC VIDEO

? Canada arrests 17 on terror charges
June 3: Canadian authorities arrested 17 people on ?terrorism-related offenses.?
In March 2004, Ottawa software developer Mohammad Momin Khawaja became the first Canadian charged under the country?s Anti-Terrorism Act for alleged activities in Ottawa and London. Khawaja was also named, but not charged, in Britain for playing a role in a foiled bomb plot. He is being held in an Ottawa detention center, awaiting trial.

The Canadian anti-terrorism law was passed swiftly following the Sept. 11 assaults, particularly after Osama bin-Laden?s named Canada one of five so-called Christian nations that should be targeted for acts of terror. The others, reaffirmed in 2004 by his al-Qaida network, were the United States, Britain, Spain and Australian, all of which have been victims of terrorist attacks.

The anti-terrorism law permits the government to brand individuals and organizations as terrorists and gives police the power to make preventive arrests of people suspected of planning a terrorist attack.

Though many view Canada as an unassuming neutral nation that has skirted terrorist attacks, it has suffered its share of aggression, including the 1985 Air India bombing, in which 329 people were killed, most of them Canadian citizens.

Intelligence officials believe at least 50 terror groups now have some presence in the North American nation and have long complained that the country?s immigration laws and border security are too weak to weed out potential terrorists.

Politics & Religion / Political Theory
« on: June 03, 2006, 08:31:48 AM »
Multiple Terrorist Doctrine
By: Frank Borelli
with thanks to John Giduck

Not long ago I read through the book, "Terror At Beslan: A Russian Tragedy with Lessons for America's Schools" by John Giduck (review of the book here). The book so convinced me that we in law enforcement are training for the wrong threat (Active Shooter) that I doubted my own thought process. So, to double check my understanding, this past week I attended a presentation by John Giduck given at a conference in Washington, DC. What I found was that not only did I understand the book correctly, but the situation is worse than I actually perceived it. Understand that all of the following is provided thanks to Mr. John Giduck and his insights into the Beslan incident. I am merely reiterating his material and hope I got it all right out of my notes.

Through his presentation, Mr. Giduck explains the terrorist thought process and how the attacks / sieges they've committed have been motivated, planned and performed. Yes, I said "sieges". As Mr. Giduck explained:

There are two types of prevalent terrorist attacks -
The Decimation Assault - such as suicide bombings, drive by shootings, etc.
The Siege - otherwise known as a Mass Hostage Siege.

Recent history shows us two that were reported in the popular media: The taking of over 800 hostages at the NordOst Theater in Moscow, and the taking of over 1,200 students, teachers and parents at the school in Beslan.

As Mr. Giduck pointed out: the Beslan siege had a larger number of hostages than that of the NordOst theater. Every time the terrorists attack they have to do something bigger and better. Follow that to the logical conclusion and that means that IF or WHEN they take over a target in America, the number of hostages will HAVE to be in excess of 1,200.

Now let's take a look at the popular targets, preferred method of attack and the resultant bad news for the United States:

1) Transportation: public transit systems can be attacked to cause interuption in service. The preferred method of attack is a Decimation Assault - suicide (although I prefer the term HOMICIDE) bomber. Poison has been used in other attacks, but the end affect is still roughly the same - there are a limited number of victims and a relatively short burst of media attention.

2) Malls: although we have these in abundance in the United States, the number of terrorists required to actually take over, secure and hold a mall would be difficult to mount. Therefore, the preferred method of attack would likely be the Decimation Assault. Not that the numbers of victims would be small. Virtually any urban mall on a Saturday night is packed with potential casualties.

3) Places of Worship: bearing in mind that a number of Imams have specifically stated that places of worship are viable targets. Skip Saturday night at the mall and you can hit Sunday morning in the churches all around our country. It is not coincidental that our "heartland" is largely populated by conservative devout citizens. Again, the method of attack would most likely be a Decimation Assault simply because there are very few churches where any terrorist would have a hope of taking more than 1,200 hostages.

4) Schools: Here is the bad news. We have schools in abundance. A great many high schools, and even plenty of our junior high / middle schools have student counts in excess of 1,200. I went to a private high school and even it had a student count near 1,000. Add in teachers and staff and how quick can you reach 1,200 or more? Now let's make it even scarier. We all know how the country reacted to two students killing thirteen people at Columbine. Those were high school students and a teacher. All of them were at least fourteen years old. Look at what the reaction was. Now imagine what it would have been had that been an elementary school and that those thirteen dead had been children under the age of ten. At Beslan, the terrorists had, as their hostages, babies still in diapers and children of all ages.

Now consider this: Al Queda trains to hit four targets at once. Why? As Mr. Giduck explains, because even terrorists understand Murphy's Law: what can go wrong will. If they plan and attempt to execute four simultaneous attacks, they expect at least two to move forward. If only ONE does and they get the kind of media attention they crave, then they've succeeded in part of their goal.

Now, before I attended Mr. Giduck's presentation, I would have assumed that there was simply no way that 49 or 50 terrorists could infiltrate the United States, secure weapons, plan the attack(s) and execute them. If you look at the recent news reports you can find - on any given day - reports on how many illegal immigrants are flowing into our country. How many of them could be terrorists? Potentially worse yet, how many terrorists are applying for political asylum from any country and getting temporary or permanent visas? We already know that they know how to get student and visitor visas. Still, how realistic is it to expect that 49 terrorists (the number that took Beslan school) will attack a single American school?

Let's take a look at a relatively small number: 15. Even using as an example only fifteen terrorists taking over a school, the challenges we face are immediate and daunting.

First, let's consider this: who is responsible for responding? Who will negotiate? Who will assault? Do any of our current tactical protocols effectively address the situation? I will answer these in that order.

1) Terrorism is a crime in the United States. Since it is a crime, law enforcement personnel will have to deal with it. Posse Comitatus explicitely prohibits the use of soldiers to affect an arrest, and even though arrest may not be on anyone's mind, all politicians will have to maintain a civil facade. Any terrorist that wants to surrender will have to be arrested and not executed. Let's just hope they aren't wrapped in explosives as they come out with their hands up, chanting to Allah before blowing themselves and anyone nearby into smithereens. So, it will be law enforcement that responds. Eventually the FBI will get on scene and take over. How long will that take? And how much longer will it be before a sufficient number of FBI HRT members are on hand to mount an assault? LONGER THAN WE CAN AFFORD.

2) Initially a local representative will negotiate. When the FBI arrives arrives and assumes command, an FBI agent will negotiate. Here in the United States we have a general rule of thumb: the longer we negotiate the better our chances are for a peaceful conclusion. We have time on our side. With "normal" criminals that's true. With terrorists, negotiation only provides time for more media to arrive while the terrorists fortify their positions inside the structure.

3) It's easy to think that the FBI HRT members will make any necessary assault. I'm not sure there are enough of them though. A standard rule of infantry is that it takes personnel numbering 3-to-1 (good guys to bad guys / assaulters to terrorists) to overwhelm a NON-entrenched enemy. If you give the enemy time to fortify their position, it takes closer to 9 or 10-to-1. Okay: so using that 15 terrorist scenario, we need about 150 FBI HRT guys on ready stand by to do the assault. Let's not forget: we also need 150 FBI HRT agents planning and training for the assault. Oh, and we have another 150 FBI HRT agents getting some down time - they have to sleep too. So that's a total of 450 FBI HRT agents. Are there that many? That's just assault troops, too. What about inner and outer perimeter? What about crowd control? What about counter-snipers?

4) Do any of our current tactical protocols effectively address the situation? No that I'm familiar with in law enforcement training. Right now we deliver, on a fairly regular basis, training that DOES adequately address the two-student-shooters model of Columbine High School. I don't believe our current training is even adequate to have responded to the five-shooter model that was stopped just last week in Kentucky. A four- or five-man diamond (so standard now) is decent against two students who have had no training and who may be quickly overcome. That same four- or five-man diamond would have faced a challenge with five student shooters. OK: so I here some of you mentally arguing, "But more teams form up and come in on a constant basis." Yep, you're right. And they move to the sound of shots aggressively - using that diamond formation with carefully trained tactics for checking doors, bypassing IEDs, etc.

"No plan survives first contact with the enemy." Remember that? The diamond is going to fall apart as soon as the team finds itself under any more than one shot or two at the most. Seeking cover will become a primary concern. How many agencies today train their officers to move under fire? Is Fire and Maneuver taught in any police academy? It took Russia's BEST troops in excess of nine hours to take back the Beslan school. What will our reaction be?

Well, here's how it's usually been presented in training for Active Shooter / Immediate Response:

"When you first arrive on the scene, listen for the sounds of shots. If there is an Active Shooter, advise communications and maintain a good position of observation until enough units arrive to form a team. Leave one officer in charge of communications while the team moves in under command of the first officer who arrived on the team. Move to the sound of shots and neutralize the threat."

What's going to happen when the 911 call comes in but when the officer arrives at the school he hears no shots? In the event of a terrorist takeover at any school, what our law enforcement personnel should be looking for is:

- a couple of large trucks with their motors running in the immediate vicinity.

- no children in any windows.

- no children evacuating (an emergency where no one is leaving?)

- no sounds of gunfire (because the terrorists KNOW how we train - they aren't stupid)

If that's what we find when we roll up, we had better get our act together hard and fast. Every second that passes guarantees two things: dead hostages and a more securely entrenched enemy.

Yes, we're going to lose cops. I disagree with the basic labelling of "terrorism" in this country. I don't think it should be considered a crime. I think it should be considered an act of war. That way we could at least get the military to assist. Speaking of that, if the governor declares a state of emergency fast enough, you MIGHT get National Guard troops to help with crowd control. You might get some equipment made available from them.

So, understanding that these terrorists are there getting their position hardened, the best thing we can do is attack as fast as we can plan and mount an assault. Yes, cops are going to die. Yes, hostages may die. What is guaranteed is that hostages WILL die if we SIT WAIT AND TALK.

For this very reason it is imperative that a new doctrine for response to Active Shooters be developed. "Active Shooter / Immediate Response" tactics and training must evolve into a training methodology that prepares our front line police officers to have some reasonable expectation of effectiveness if they assault into a school being held by terrorists armed with AK74s and explosives. The four- and five-man diamond will not work. In fact, every formation I can think of will fall apart pretty fast. Small unit tactics, applied to fire-team size (four) or even assault pairs (two), have to be developed, put into policy and then trained. What will be even more difficult is the following: cops have to be hardened both mentally and emotionally to face true battle.

Let's be honest: some cops today aren't warriors. They are civil servants who are dedicated to their jobs and do them well. But we all know a few that would be perfectly happy to man the radio while we go into the building where an Active Shooter is hunting innocent prey. We can't afford that. The harsh reality of life behind a badge is that we are the front line defense against anyone and anything that threatens to harm the innocents of our community. If we take the oath to Protect and Serve, we'd damned well better be as good as our word.

As the Russian Special Forces say, "If not me, who?" When the terrorists come to threaten and harm our children, I ask you: If not me, who? If not YOU, who?

I'd like to thank John Giduck for the work he's doing spreading much needed information to the law enforcement community in our country. It's information many don't want to hear because they are too busy hiding their heads in the sand. They'll fall where they stand when the time comes. Thank you, John, for your information and motivation.

Mr. John Giduck is an honorably discharged American Special Forces Soldier, survivor of eight wars / conflicts. He is also president of the Archangel Group, a nonprofit organization that provides consulting and training at all levels of public safety and military operations.


John Giduck is the feature speaker at the 1st SWATdigest Tactical Counter Terrorism Conference on July 20-21, 2006 in Terre Haute, Indiana.

Martial Arts Topics / Seminar in Tulsa?
« on: June 01, 2006, 03:45:57 PM »
Woof Guro C.,

Are you available in Aug.  If not then Oct.

Myke Willis

Politics & Religion / Political Theory
« on: June 01, 2006, 10:46:07 AM »
Suicide Terror ? How real is the danger and what could be done
By Henry Morgenstern
Security Solutions International (SSI)
Security Solutions International is the leading national training company for Homeland Security from awareness training for first responders, to hospital and medical response and even helicopter and marine emergency response to acts of terror.

Many Police Departments view the threat of Suicide Terror on American Soil seriously but feel that if this happens it will happen somewhere else and therefore it is not a direct threat to their jurisdiction. Scarce funds are therefore not allocated to training for this possibility. We all hope this will never happen but events show that there are no good grounds for being optimistic about if, when and where terrorism could strike in our communities.

Everything happening in Iraq shows that the weapon is effective as far as terrorists are concerned. In training hundreds of Police Departments to deal with terrorist threats, we have learned a few things: number one is that are no red lines where terrorists are concerned; that terrorists will employ the most inconceivable methods in unpredictable places; experience in Middle East, in Asia and in Europe demonstrates that their targets are very difficult to determine.

In the light of this, it pays Police Departments ? the first line of Homeland Security ? to be aware of the mindset of terrorists, their modus operandi and some ideas for preventing or preempting these attacks.

Suicide Terror in the Mind of Terrorists
The first attack of Suicide Terror occurred in
Lebanon in 1983. On April 19th a car that had been
watching the US Embassy there drove a few blocks
and flashed its lights to a truck waiting for that
signal. As the truck sped towards its destination,
the many Embassy staff, including the entire
Intelligence division, had no idea that their world
was about to end. Within minutes, 63 Americans
were dead and hundreds more were injured.

Within a few months the success of this first mission
encouraged enemies of the US Peace mission in
Lebanon to employ a far deadlier attack. In place of
a 2000 pound bomb used against the Embassy, a
12,000 pound bomb was used against the Marine
Barracks.  The deadly attack, pictured here, killed
242 Americans and caused the US to leave Lebanon.                                                                      


                                                                                                                   Bombing of the Marine Barracks on Oct.23 1983

 The birth of the Vehicle Born Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) heralded a new era.

Not only had the terrorists in Lebanon successfully attacked a super-power without having sophisticated weapons. In employing what is arguably the most sophisticated weapon available ? a human bomb, one that can change its mind, defer delivery, change target or even decide not to deploy ? they forced the US to leave Lebanon. That created the justification for use of Suicide Terror as a weapon.

Since then, the weapon has been used extensively by terrorists ? and not only by Islamic Fundamentalists. The Tamil Tigers have even used it more than the Islamic groups.
The reason: it was successful from their point of view.

What is the Modus Operandi of Terrorists
Every terror group uses different methods in carrying out their heinous attacks against indiscriminate targets. In reviewing many case studies relating to the use of the weapon in Iraq and using classified information obtained by the Israeli Police after having interviewed many suicide terrorists, we have come to some important conclusions.

The idea that the act of Suicide Terrorism is the act of a deranged individual who is a young male and a fundamentalist fanatic is totally wrong. There is a well-oiled machine that deploys this weapon. It relies on:

Funding to achieve its aims, usually in the guise of benevolent fund-raising but also utilizing crime such as cigarette smuggling, drug dealing and theft
A recruitment procedure that uses the values of the Moslem Community to recruit even reluctant participants
Religious justification ? since Suicide itself is forbidden by most religions, this forms a vital factor in enabling recruits to contradict their religious faith.
Generally, Islamic Fundamentalist groups use the Mosque as the main focus of recruitment. By having cell members interact with the community, they can discover people that are fanatics, recently bereaved, even those whose moral standards are at odds with the community?s values. All these issues are used for recruitment.

So the potential Suicide Terrorist may come from a different backgrounds, different age groups, be male or female, educated or uneducated, an upstanding citizen, or a deviant.

When a potential suicide bomber is spotted, various means are employed to monitor their behavior but all result in the same. When the final approach is made it must result in success or risk the entire mission. After recruitment the ?ticking bomb? goes through a process of preparation that can take weeks or hours.

Religious sanctification of the act is first and foremost. For this terrorists will rely on ?Fatwas? or religious opinions such as the one of that most famous of ?clerics? Osama Bin Laden in 1998 that attacking any American anywhere is completely justified. The well-known promise of 72 virgins in the after life is just one potential reward. Much more effective are promises that a family with a member of suspect moral standards will be redeemed completely as a result of his act.

When the recruit has the bomb operation explained to him, he will undergo mental preparation for the task at hand. This can involve lying in graves to prepare the recruit for death, careful analysis of the target and briefing about how and when, and finally the recruit will be sent to his or her target and rituals of purification before the end of this life.
Spot the Suicide Terrorist? ? Answer: All of them!

What does all this have to do with the US? Right now in Mexico?s Chiapas region a very worrying increase in Islamic Fundamentalism is taking place among the impoverished of that area and could translate into fertile ground for recruitment. In Islamic communities across the US, there are families that are torn apart by the culture clash, when younger members adopt US standards of behavior. In these communities, the very suspicion of extra-marital affairs or even ?dating? without the proper protocol may shame the family, lower their status drastically and create the conditions for successful recruitment.

The Bomb ? Knowing how to recognize materials      
One of the areas we find most lacking here in the US is knowledge of improvised explosives. Such knowledge could lead to successful prevention. After the infamous attack on the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma, everyone knows what fertilizer can do. But that is being reactive and not proactive. We must know something about the materials used in these attacks so that we can help officers recognize a potential bomb lab. Apart from necessary but easily recognizable materials such as the detonator, there are many materials available to the terrorists to create a bomb that should be instantly recognized as such.




Our training programs try to instill an awareness of what these materials are and the effects they cause. Also, with Force safety in mind, we try and teach how they act or react. Should a patrol man called to a house to investigate something else, notice that extensive corrosion is present on metal objects because the place is being used to mix explosives? What should he or she do?
The types of improvised explosives are wide spread, easy to obtain and readily commercially available. Terrorist instructions for making them are available on the Internet. But good intelligence, by knowing these materials well, can reveal an impending attack more keenly than other methods.

Shrapnel used in a terrorist bomb to make it more effective


Is there anything that can be done to stop terror attacks
One of the frequent questions we are asked as we explain the way terrorists work is this: How realistic is it to think that an attacks carried out in this way, with very few people involved ? maybe a small cell? be effectively deterred?

The experience in Israel, where over the last four years some 850 people have been killed in these attacks, effectively answers this question.

Translating that figure to US population would mean something like 38,000 deaths. This caused social and economic devastation. It took time for the Israeli authorities to understand the nature of the weapon being employed against them from 2000 to the present. Yet, in the last year, some 90% of attacks have been stalled.  We here in the US can learn some valuable lessons from the hard-won and very costly Israeli experience.

1.  Intelligence

One of the critical factors in the Israeli success is intelligence. By utilizing the law-abiding Moslem American citizens and knowing how they think and paying attention to their social rules, Law Enforcement could develop very effective intelligence into the communities, their fund-raising activities and monitor potential trouble. This requires some cultural sensitivity, language ability but these skills are obtainable.

In addition, Intelligence must take a less technological approach and see the value in knowing what is happening in the community, despite the tremendous case-log that most officers are faced with. For example, a 10,000 pound theft of fertilizer may not rank up there with a homicide investigation but it could lead to a very important prevention of a much greater homicide attack. Was the theft of a few detonators from a local factory significant? Were the Drug Dealers background interests investigated thoroughly?

For example, in the aftermath of 9/11, some Middle Easterners asking questions about crop-sprayers like they did in Belle Glades, Florida or others learning to fly, but not land, a Jet certainly would raise the concern of authorities. What other examples can you think of that might raise your concern now?

Local intelligence about these types of incidents can be a powerful force and may even be more effective than federal agencies usually responsible for this. You are the person closest to the potential incident and can learn the most.

2. Force Coordination

This is a readily understood concept that gets a lot of lip service but ends up being buried under turf wars and real technological difficulties. Without the complete cooperation of Federal, State and Local enforcement, there is no possibility of preventing these attacks.

This cooperation must seek to duplicate the Israeli model where everyone has served in that Nation?s army. Therefore, people know each other across the spectrum of Law Enforcement activities and have access to each other across units and jurisdictions. Clearly, Israel is a very small country but a lot more could be done to make cooperation a reality in the US despite its size. Apart from the joint exercises conducted by Homeland Security ? usually an annual event at best ? the regular training schedule of forces could include observers and participants from other units.

Technological barriers like communication equipment and access to information have to be more centralized.

3. Training

Our experience is that US Law Enforcement takes a back seat to no other law enforcement in any other country. With the volume of dangerous crime here, and the constant volume of cases, the experience of Law Enforcement here could be a model for other countries to follow in the prevention, solution and prosecution of crimes.

However, in terms of terrorism this is a new field of activity for most law enforcement. We have found that a small amount of training could make a major difference. Taking the example of SWAT or Special Op Forces, it would take a few days to drill teams in the very subtly different but extremely dangerous situation of dealing with people whose mission in life is dying and taking as many with them as they can. When taking a building where there are hostages in the hands of terrorists (that may be armed with devastating bombs) should the same tactics be used for breaching? Certainly not! But teaching these very experienced and skilled forces the differences of dealing with Suicide Terror may only take a few days of training because of their underlying skills.

The focus on Homeland Security has definitely made a difference. Two years ago few were interested in our training offerings and now we are inundated with requests. However, training
in Counter-terrorism should be an ongoing (at the very least annually) part of law enforcement?s training program.

Remember: the enemy in this case is a very creative, and well-organized foe and we need to keep up with their mindset, methods and activities to avoid their vicious weapons becoming a fact of life in the US.

Guro C.,

Put me down for a copy when it comes out.

Myke Willis

Martial Arts Topics / Wolves & Dogs
« on: May 24, 2006, 04:07:20 PM »
Bee attack kills dog in Sand Springs
By MANNY GAMALLO World Staff Writer

View in Print (PDF) Format

Officials investigate whether Africanized 'killer bees' stung the Great Dane to death.
SAND SPRINGS -- State agricultural officials will try to determine whether the death of a Sand Springs dog resulted from an attack of Africanized bees.

Gary Phillips, field officer for the state Department of Agriculture, Food & Forestry, said an agent will travel to Sand Springs on Wednesday to collect two bee specimens to determine whether they are the so-called "killer bees."

Phillips said DNA testing will be used to make the final determination.

"If they are Africanized bees, it will be the furthest north they've traveled" in Oklahoma, Phillips said Tuesday.

Since Aug. 6, 2004, when Africanized bees were first spotted in the state, 29 counties -- mostly in the south and west -- have reported swarms of the bees, he said.

The northernmost county to report the bees was McIntosh County last year.

"We've been getting lots of calls on them swarming during the last 14 to 20 days," Phillips said.

The Sand Springs dog attacked by bees Monday night was a 140-pound Great Dane named Stormy.

Dog owner Thomas Forbes of 816 N. Grant Ave. said he and his wife, Judy, were at home  
about 6:30 p.m. when all of a sudden she heard the dog bark, followed by yelping cries of pain.

"She ran to the back door and screamed that something was covering the dog's head and back," Forbes said.

"The dog's head was completely engulfed with bees," Forbes said, "and they were covering her back, too."

Forbes said he is allergic to bee stings, so there was little he could do.

However, he said a neighbor he identified as Bobby jumped the fence and used a fire extinguisher, plus water from a garden hose, to disperse the bees.

Forbes said Stormy was stung up to 400 times.

"We cleaned out 100 stingers alone just from her right ear," Forbes said.

He said the dog died within 30 minutes of the attack.

Forbes said it was the first time he and his family had seen bees in their backyard, noting they were in the yard, sitting around the pool, about a half-hour before the attack occurred.

"They came out of the blue," Forbes said.

He said the bees were in the backyard again Tuesday afternoon.

"We think they might be taking water from the pool," he said.

Forbes said he hasn't spotted a nest yet.

He said Stormy was 2 1/2 years old, "and I've had her since she was a puppy."

The dog was a close companion to the Forbes family, in particular to the couple's 3-year-old daughter, Kaia.

Sand Springs Assistant Police Chief Mike Carter said multiple bee stings have been reported before in the city, but never this massive.

He said city animal control Officer Jimmy Taber told him that bees tend to be rather protective this time of year.

Africanized bees look much like regular honeybees.

However, they tend to nest closer to the ground and are less tolerant of any activity near their nest.

Its sting is no worse than any other bee, except that Africanized bees attack in swarms up to 10 times larger than other bees do, according to experts.

The Africanized bee migrated northward from South America, where some of them got loose in a shipment from Africa 40 years ago.

Last June, several Tulsa residents in the 2700 block of 28th Street North were attacked by bees which had taken up massive nests in trees. They turned out to be Italian honeybees.


Martial Arts Topics / Rambling Ruminations: Knife
« on: May 24, 2006, 08:51:08 AM »

I do enjoy when you ramble about such things.


Martial Arts Topics / Zacarias Moussaoui is guilty!
« on: May 09, 2006, 10:42:51 AM »
Now this scum bag claims to have committed perjury and that he had nothing to do with AQ. What a waste of breathe.


Martial Arts Topics / Zacarias Moussaoui is guilty!
« on: April 14, 2006, 11:52:30 AM »
Moussaoui had fore knowedge of an attack on the U.S. by citizens from a hostile government. Which makes this an act of war. He offered no help to the FBI. So since he had information of this act and kept it to him self that makes him an accessory.

Myke Willis

Martial Arts Topics / First Brent Lewis CD recommendation
« on: April 01, 2006, 07:47:22 AM »
I have to agree Drum Sex.

Myke Willis

Martial Arts Topics / Knife vs. Gun
« on: March 27, 2006, 04:41:44 PM »

Two 1911's a little overkill don't you think.



Martial Arts Topics / Seminar in Tulsa?
« on: March 24, 2006, 04:39:09 PM »
Looking for a training group here in tulsa.


Martial Arts Topics / Knife vs. Gun
« on: March 23, 2006, 07:48:38 PM »

I said nothing about a flat footed gunner. You can move all you want. But if you don't see a weapon what is you justifacation of firing your weapon. I was in fear for my life? From a guy walking up to you with hands in pocket?

Most assailants will not run up on you like a mad man.


Martial Arts Topics / Knife vs. Gun
« on: March 23, 2006, 04:44:40 PM »
IMHO if the knifer knows what he is doing the blade won't be seen until he is on top of you. If he is serious in doing harm he won't be waving the blade around to give the person with the pistol a chance to draw.

They will approach you then attack. What are you going to do shoot because you think he might have a weapon.


Martial Arts Topics / Knife vs. Gun
« on: February 22, 2006, 04:48:08 PM »

Interesting question. IMHO it depends on who has the better draw. Knifeman must close the distance while deploying his weapon. While Gun guy only has to draw and shoot. Most knife people unfortunitly don't train deploying their weapons effectively.

If the knife was already drawn I would go with the knife. But in this scenerio I will take the pistol.


Martial Arts Topics / Craftydog Seminar in Tulsa OK
« on: January 29, 2006, 10:19:52 AM »
Here are a list of hotels in the area of the seminar:

Days Inn
4727 South Yale Ave. 918-496-9300

Double Tree
6110 South Yale Ave. 918-495-1000

Baymont Inn
4530 East Skelly Drive 918-488-8777

Holiday Inn Express
9010 East 71st Street 918-459-5321

Holiday Inn Select
5000 East Skelly Drive 918-622-7000

Red Roof Inn
4117 South Yale Ave. 918-622-6776

Myke Willis
Whoever fights monsters should see to it that in the process he does not become a monster.


Martial Arts Topics / DB classes coming to Oklahoma
« on: January 27, 2006, 09:44:22 PM »
Woof all,

The class is moving to Saturday afternoons 300-400 starting FEB. 04

Myke Willis

Martial Arts Topics / training in Dallas, TX?
« on: January 25, 2006, 02:55:32 PM »

For anyone in the Dallas area who might be interested:

Renagade Kali Group
Guro Marc Denny of the Dogbrothers

Date: FEB. 11-12, 2006

Times:11:00-4:00 Both days

Location: Adams Muay Thai Academy
6703 # H East 81st
Tulsa, OK

Cost: 150.00 for both days, 90.00 for one day,
If paid before Jan. 28, 2006 120.00

Equipment: Pair of sticks, workout clothing, wrestling/tennis shoes, mouth piece/athletic cup,
Bag gloves, and a training knife

Curriculm: Los Triques, Small Improvised Weapons for the street, Kali tudo (tm), Attacking Blocks/Footwork

For more information contact:
Myke Willis

send payment to:
Myke Willis
8507 East 63rd Street # D
Tulsa, OK. 74133
money orders, cash, bank checks only

Martial Arts Topics / Essential street ground fighting
« on: January 11, 2006, 08:10:31 PM »

Didn't mean to ruffle any feathers or question anyones "manhood". Just another point of view.


Martial Arts Topics / Essential street ground fighting
« on: January 09, 2006, 02:55:03 PM »

I have to admit I am not a big fan of going to the ground in a street fight. Only because I don't want his buddies caving in my ribs or using my head as a soccer ball.

Using your scenerio instead of slamming you on the hood of your car he instead slams you to the ground. Your head bounces off the road While you are out with a concussion he decides to cave in your ribs.

Just my 2 cents.


Martial Arts Topics / Knife vs. Baseball Bat
« on: January 03, 2006, 07:17:46 PM »

IMHO, it depends on who controls the distance. If the knife can bridge the gap then the fight should be his. If not sooner or later the bat will connect and lights out.


Martial Arts Topics / Craftydog Seminar in Tulsa OK
« on: December 12, 2005, 01:54:23 PM »





DATES: FEBURAY 11-12, 2006

TIMES: 11:00-4.00 BOTH DAYS







CELL: 918-361-7056



TULSA, OK.  74133

Martial Arts Topics / DB classes coming to Oklahoma
« on: December 11, 2005, 11:45:14 AM »
Woof all,

Details have all been worked out. Group will start Friday Jan. 06, 2006 time 7:30 to 8:30. Location Adams Muay thai Academy 6703 # H East 81st Street, Tulsa OK Phone 918-488-0707.

Myke Willis

Martial Arts Topics / Craftydog Seminar in Tulsa OK
« on: November 30, 2005, 02:08:37 PM »

The seminar will be limited to 25 people.


Martial Arts Topics / Craftydog Seminar in Tulsa OK
« on: November 30, 2005, 01:43:05 PM »
Woof all,

Guro Crafty will be in Tulsa OK. on FEB. 11-12 2006.
 Times: 11:00-4:00 both days.

Cost: will be 150.00 for both days, 90.00 for one day and if you register before JAN. 28, 2006 the cost will be 120.00.

Location: Adams Muay Thai, 6703 #H East 81st Street, Tulsa, OK.

Epuipment: 2 Sticks, work out clothing, wrestling/tennis shoes, mouthpieces/athletic cup and bag gloves

Any questions call me or e-mail me.


Myke Willis

Martial Arts Topics / Craftydog Seminar in Tulsa OK
« on: November 26, 2005, 01:04:54 PM »
Woof All,

Guro C. is coming to Tulsa OK. I am working with a local hotel trying to get discounted room rates for those who need to spend the night. I need to let the hotel know how many rooms maybe needed.

If you a interested in attending this seminar and need a room let me know.


Myke Willis

Martial Arts Topics / DB classes coming to Oklahoma
« on: November 11, 2005, 10:19:09 AM »
Woof all,

DB Martial Art classes maybe coming to Tulsa. 8)  I will be talking with KK Samuel Adams owner of Sam Adams Muay thai here in Tulsa. If every thing works out there will be two classes a week. :D


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