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Recent Posts
22
Espanol Discussion / Saltos de palo en Palo Canario
« Last post by Crafty_Dog on April 22, 2023, 04:21:43 PM »23
Espanol Discussion / PG Crafty en el DF, Mexico
« Last post by Crafty_Dog on April 18, 2023, 03:19:19 PM »25
Martial Arts Topics / Re: **WEBSITE UPDATES**
« Last post by Bob Burgee on April 06, 2023, 08:42:33 AM »Greetings DBMA Association Members!
The Gathering of the Pack - USA - Open - 2022 is now available for our members. 100 Fights!
https://dogbrothers.com/gathering-of-the-pack-usa-2022/
Enjoy!
The Gathering of the Pack - USA - Open - 2022 is now available for our members. 100 Fights!
https://dogbrothers.com/gathering-of-the-pack-usa-2022/
Enjoy!
26
Martial Arts Topics / SEAL Jocko on the DBs
« Last post by Crafty_Dog on April 04, 2023, 05:52:42 AM »See 1:10:30
https://jockopodcast.com/2017/11/15/100-with-tim-ferriss-musashi-and-how-warrior-way-relates-to-life/?fbclid=IwAR2B_LtgtNGf1JXWGMneg5KtFglIGmKfyD1eP1aUcOThJs7OPdHqRTOQEnM
BTW, the "Stinky Stick" fight is me
https://jockopodcast.com/2017/11/15/100-with-tim-ferriss-musashi-and-how-warrior-way-relates-to-life/?fbclid=IwAR2B_LtgtNGf1JXWGMneg5KtFglIGmKfyD1eP1aUcOThJs7OPdHqRTOQEnM
BTW, the "Stinky Stick" fight is me
27
Espanol Discussion / US-China space race en Latino America
« Last post by Crafty_Dog on March 23, 2023, 07:13:59 PM »March 22, 2023
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Open as PDF
Latin America in the US-China Space Race
Partnerships and strategic locations are in high demand.
By: Allison Fedirka
Next week, Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and his science and technology minister will be in China to negotiate the construction of a new satellite. They want the satellite for climate observation and to monitor deforestation in the Amazon. Brazil and China have more than two decades of history working together on satellites, but this potential project takes place in a very different geopolitical context than past dealings. Space has emerged as a serious battleground in the U.S.-China rivalry, and Washington is sensitive to any Latin American space collaborations involving Beijing. Anxious about security risks in its own hemisphere, the U.S. has only recently emphasized space cooperation with its southern neighbors.
Situational Awareness
Space is a critical domain for national defense. Businesses and militaries worldwide depend on satellites for information and communications. A few countries – the United States, China, Russia, Japan, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Germany and, arguably, India – boast robust space programs with military applications. Historically, the Americans are the dominant player in space, but thanks to massive public investment the Chinese are quickly catching up. For the rest, partnerships are essential to overcome the immense technical and financial challenges.
First, a primer. The space domain includes terrestrial, orbital and link segments. Fixed, secure ground locations are required to monitor space activity and communicate with hardware in orbit. Ground stations support telemetry, tracking and command of satellite and spacecraft operations. However, ground stations can’t communicate with satellites when large objects – the Earth, for example – get in the way. Instead, states need a global network to maintain space situational awareness. This includes the detection and tracking of launched and orbital objects, threat assessments, and data integration and exploitation. Situational awareness enables warfighters to predict the future location of space objects and the overall operational environment. The broader the satellite and observation network, the more complete the coverage. Therefore, interstate cooperation is critical, and it presents opportunities for regions like Latin America to accrue the funding and expertise to develop their own space capabilities.
Information Mobility for Space Operations
(click to enlarge)
National space programs in Latin America are more than 60 years old, but funding has always been a problem. Prior to the pandemic, the U.S. government allocated $22.7 billion to space programs, while Brazil, Argentina and Mexico together spent roughly $100 million. Until fairly recently, space was not a priority in the region. China’s emergence in the sector, combined with the falling cost of launching a satellite, helped change this. Vast borders are ripe for smuggling, while remote areas are difficult to monitor for illegal mining or deforestation. Satellites would boost governments’ abilities to secure their borders and enforce the law within them.
China was quick to develop space partnerships in the Western Hemisphere. Determined to become a leading space power, Beijing targeted middle-income countries for partnerships and leveraged its technology and expertise through commercial agreements. Moreover, ground stations close to the equator provide more robust satellite coverage, making South America even more attractive. Today, China operates or can access a series of space observation centers across South America.
Chinese Satellite Ground Stations in Latin America
(click to enlarge)
Beijing’s growing footprint in the Latin American space sector triggered alarm in Washington. The U.S. worries that China could use the proximity of its space facilities to spy on U.S. communications. There is hardly any daylight between civilian or commercial space research and military applications, especially in the Chinese case. (For example, GPS is useful whether you are trying to pinpoint a local restaurant or armed insurgents.) Latin American governments have few problems with this, given their own interest in the technology’s contributions to national security. For instance, Brazil’s national defense strategy promotes heavy use of satellites to monitor the border. Although its satellite negotiations with China will center on deforestation, the areas of interest significantly overlap with Brazil’s military interests.
Washington Joins the Race
The U.S. strategy for countering China’s ambitions for space in Latin America started to take shape last year. Last summer, U.S. Southern Command and the Space Force’s Space Training and Readiness Command hosted their first Latin America Space Doctrine Conference, intended to incorporate space into the U.S. security cooperation framework for the region. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru and Uruguay attended. A second conference in January 2023 attracted 11 Latin American countries. Washington hopes to convince Latin American states to adopt U.S. standards and procedures so that they can share information – and shut China out. It has highlighted the immediate payoffs of cooperation, such as access to information to counter illegal logging, mining and fishing, as well as crop monitoring. Eventually, the U.S. says it wants to conduct large-scale space-based exercises with Latin American militaries, which China has never done.
Alignments in much of the region are practically settled. Venezuela and Bolivia are firmly in China’s camp, while traditional U.S. security allies Colombia, Chile and Peru are sticking with Washington. The current focus of the U.S.-Chinese competition for space partnerships is the southernmost part of South America. The Southern Cone countries, along with Mexico, have the most advanced space programs, and their alignments will shape security in the Antarctic region. A presence there is important to keep the Strait of Magellan and the Drake Passage free and clear for navigation.
By far the most prized relationship is with Brazil, the Latin American country with the most advanced space program. Brazil is well positioned to monitor most of the South Atlantic and hosts the Alcantara Space Center, the closest launching base to the equator. Five years ago, the U.S. and Brazil signed an agreement to share information about known space objects, including Brazilian satellites. They also discussed a deal to permit the U.S. to launch satellites from Alcantara. Some of the Space Force’s first international outreach efforts in 2020 involved discussions with Brazil about opportunities to collaborate. Not to be outdone, China has leveraged its decades-old relationship with Brazil in satellite development and launches as well as telecommunications.
After Brazil, Chile was the next Latin American country that U.S. Southern Command engaged in direct space talks. China leases some facilities at the Santiago Satellite Station in Chile, but the station’s operator, the Swedish Space Corp., has said it will not renew the contracts. The U.S. will probably fill the void. Meanwhile, Argentina hosts China’s most important space observation facility in the region. The secretive Espacio Lejano station in Neuquen is owned and operated by China; even the Argentine government’s access is restricted. The intelligence community assumes China conducts both scientific and military activity there.
Mexico is the exception to the U.S.-China competition for space partnerships. Mexico is too close to the U.S. to form a strong partnership with China, but space is too sensitive for Mexico to depend on the United States. Therefore, Mexico has advocated the creation of a Latin American and Caribbean space agency. A regional grouping to pool resources makes sense for Mexico – and many countries have signed on – but funding and the huge technological disparities between members remain obstacles. Mexico will likely have to give the U.S. major concessions to secure a partnership, or accept that it will trail its regional peers
92065
View On Website
Open as PDF
Latin America in the US-China Space Race
Partnerships and strategic locations are in high demand.
By: Allison Fedirka
Next week, Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and his science and technology minister will be in China to negotiate the construction of a new satellite. They want the satellite for climate observation and to monitor deforestation in the Amazon. Brazil and China have more than two decades of history working together on satellites, but this potential project takes place in a very different geopolitical context than past dealings. Space has emerged as a serious battleground in the U.S.-China rivalry, and Washington is sensitive to any Latin American space collaborations involving Beijing. Anxious about security risks in its own hemisphere, the U.S. has only recently emphasized space cooperation with its southern neighbors.
Situational Awareness
Space is a critical domain for national defense. Businesses and militaries worldwide depend on satellites for information and communications. A few countries – the United States, China, Russia, Japan, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Germany and, arguably, India – boast robust space programs with military applications. Historically, the Americans are the dominant player in space, but thanks to massive public investment the Chinese are quickly catching up. For the rest, partnerships are essential to overcome the immense technical and financial challenges.
First, a primer. The space domain includes terrestrial, orbital and link segments. Fixed, secure ground locations are required to monitor space activity and communicate with hardware in orbit. Ground stations support telemetry, tracking and command of satellite and spacecraft operations. However, ground stations can’t communicate with satellites when large objects – the Earth, for example – get in the way. Instead, states need a global network to maintain space situational awareness. This includes the detection and tracking of launched and orbital objects, threat assessments, and data integration and exploitation. Situational awareness enables warfighters to predict the future location of space objects and the overall operational environment. The broader the satellite and observation network, the more complete the coverage. Therefore, interstate cooperation is critical, and it presents opportunities for regions like Latin America to accrue the funding and expertise to develop their own space capabilities.
Information Mobility for Space Operations
(click to enlarge)
National space programs in Latin America are more than 60 years old, but funding has always been a problem. Prior to the pandemic, the U.S. government allocated $22.7 billion to space programs, while Brazil, Argentina and Mexico together spent roughly $100 million. Until fairly recently, space was not a priority in the region. China’s emergence in the sector, combined with the falling cost of launching a satellite, helped change this. Vast borders are ripe for smuggling, while remote areas are difficult to monitor for illegal mining or deforestation. Satellites would boost governments’ abilities to secure their borders and enforce the law within them.
China was quick to develop space partnerships in the Western Hemisphere. Determined to become a leading space power, Beijing targeted middle-income countries for partnerships and leveraged its technology and expertise through commercial agreements. Moreover, ground stations close to the equator provide more robust satellite coverage, making South America even more attractive. Today, China operates or can access a series of space observation centers across South America.
Chinese Satellite Ground Stations in Latin America
(click to enlarge)
Beijing’s growing footprint in the Latin American space sector triggered alarm in Washington. The U.S. worries that China could use the proximity of its space facilities to spy on U.S. communications. There is hardly any daylight between civilian or commercial space research and military applications, especially in the Chinese case. (For example, GPS is useful whether you are trying to pinpoint a local restaurant or armed insurgents.) Latin American governments have few problems with this, given their own interest in the technology’s contributions to national security. For instance, Brazil’s national defense strategy promotes heavy use of satellites to monitor the border. Although its satellite negotiations with China will center on deforestation, the areas of interest significantly overlap with Brazil’s military interests.
Washington Joins the Race
The U.S. strategy for countering China’s ambitions for space in Latin America started to take shape last year. Last summer, U.S. Southern Command and the Space Force’s Space Training and Readiness Command hosted their first Latin America Space Doctrine Conference, intended to incorporate space into the U.S. security cooperation framework for the region. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru and Uruguay attended. A second conference in January 2023 attracted 11 Latin American countries. Washington hopes to convince Latin American states to adopt U.S. standards and procedures so that they can share information – and shut China out. It has highlighted the immediate payoffs of cooperation, such as access to information to counter illegal logging, mining and fishing, as well as crop monitoring. Eventually, the U.S. says it wants to conduct large-scale space-based exercises with Latin American militaries, which China has never done.
Alignments in much of the region are practically settled. Venezuela and Bolivia are firmly in China’s camp, while traditional U.S. security allies Colombia, Chile and Peru are sticking with Washington. The current focus of the U.S.-Chinese competition for space partnerships is the southernmost part of South America. The Southern Cone countries, along with Mexico, have the most advanced space programs, and their alignments will shape security in the Antarctic region. A presence there is important to keep the Strait of Magellan and the Drake Passage free and clear for navigation.
By far the most prized relationship is with Brazil, the Latin American country with the most advanced space program. Brazil is well positioned to monitor most of the South Atlantic and hosts the Alcantara Space Center, the closest launching base to the equator. Five years ago, the U.S. and Brazil signed an agreement to share information about known space objects, including Brazilian satellites. They also discussed a deal to permit the U.S. to launch satellites from Alcantara. Some of the Space Force’s first international outreach efforts in 2020 involved discussions with Brazil about opportunities to collaborate. Not to be outdone, China has leveraged its decades-old relationship with Brazil in satellite development and launches as well as telecommunications.
After Brazil, Chile was the next Latin American country that U.S. Southern Command engaged in direct space talks. China leases some facilities at the Santiago Satellite Station in Chile, but the station’s operator, the Swedish Space Corp., has said it will not renew the contracts. The U.S. will probably fill the void. Meanwhile, Argentina hosts China’s most important space observation facility in the region. The secretive Espacio Lejano station in Neuquen is owned and operated by China; even the Argentine government’s access is restricted. The intelligence community assumes China conducts both scientific and military activity there.
Mexico is the exception to the U.S.-China competition for space partnerships. Mexico is too close to the U.S. to form a strong partnership with China, but space is too sensitive for Mexico to depend on the United States. Therefore, Mexico has advocated the creation of a Latin American and Caribbean space agency. A regional grouping to pool resources makes sense for Mexico – and many countries have signed on – but funding and the huge technological disparities between members remain obstacles. Mexico will likely have to give the U.S. major concessions to secure a partnership, or accept that it will trail its regional peers
92065
28
Espanol Discussion / Stratfor: What the Matamoros kidnapping says about Cartel Violence in Mexico
« Last post by Crafty_Dog on March 22, 2023, 06:27:58 PM »What the Matamoros Kidnapping Says About the State of Cartel Violence in Mexico
undefined and Latin America Analyst at RANE
Carmen Colosi
Latin America Analyst at RANE, Stratfor
undefined and Global Security analyst with RANE
Caroline Hammer
Global Security analyst with RANE, Stratfor
12 MIN READMar 21, 2023 | 21:21 GMT
The recent armed attack on four U.S. citizens in the Mexican border city of Matamoros, Tamaulipas state, illustrated well-documented security risks in Mexico's many crime hotspots, where gang and cartel violence disrupts daily life and hinders business operations. But while the demonstrated risks are nothing new, much about the incident was out of the ordinary, including the abnormal targeting of American civilians, the subsequent calls by U.S. Republicans for military intervention, and the cartel's highly out-of-character note apologizing for the whole affair. The oddities of the incident and the response to it by the cartel, as well as the Mexican and U.S. governments, confirm and expand on long-standing security, political and logistical risks from organized crime in Mexico.
The Attack
On Friday, March 3, the four American citizens entered Matamoros from Brownsville, Texas, in order to receive cosmetic surgery. A few hours after crossing the border, armed gunmen in trucks shot at their vehicle while they drove through the city, leading to a crash, after which the gunmen forced them out of their vehicle and into one of their trucks. During the incident, a stray bullet killed a Mexican woman at the scene of the initial attack. In a video of the attack that subsequently circulated on social media, three of the Americans appeared unconscious. Over the next few days, word of the kidnapping spread in U.S. media and the FBI announced a $50,000 reward for the return of the victims. Mexican authorities discovered two of the victims alive and two dead on March 7 in a cabin southeast of Matamoros. On March 8, the Mexican government deployed 200 members of the army and 100 members of the National Guard to Matamoros to strengthen security in the border region. Based on the location of the incident, it was clear that the Gulf Cartel — once one of Mexico's most powerful criminal groups — was likely behind the attack. This appeared to be confirmed on March 9, when five men were left beaten and tied up in the street, along with a narco banner apologizing for the attacks signed ''the Scorpions,'' a faction of the Gulf Cartel. The banner claimed the men were the perpetrators of the attack and that the attack was a mistake ''caused by lack of discipline.''
The Cartel's Response
Mexican cartels are widely understood to not want to target U.S. citizens or tourists from other countries, except in circumstances where they're involved in drug trafficking. While the response to the murder or kidnapping of Mexican citizens or migrants from poor countries would barely make national Mexican news, security risks to Americans (and other, usually Western, foreigners) create an outsized backlash that cartels view as simply bad for business and thus not worth it. This was acutely demonstrated by the response to the Matamoros attack and kidnapping; the level of media coverage, the FBI reward and the hundreds of newly-deployed Mexican troops all make cartel operations more difficult and threaten their ability to make money.
The Gulf Cartel faction's apology note — an uncharacteristic action for a group with a penchant for extreme violence — also demonstrates the Scorpions leaders' immediate recognition that their people made a mistake. Criminal groups elsewhere in Mexico have similarly learned this lesson, with massive security deployments to Baja California Sur state in 2017 and Quintana Roo state in 2021 and 2022 following violence in tourist areas that killed and injured foreigners. Cartels know the Mexican government will devote ample resources to ensure the safety of foreigners and particularly tourists, and they'd prefer to avoid such encroachment into their territory.
Intentions aside, the attack and murder of two Americans in Matamoros was not the first incident that illustrates that mistakes can and do occur. In January 2020, gunmen likely belonging to the Northeast Cartel in Ciudad Mier, another border town in the Tamaulipas state, attacked an American family and killed their 13-year-old child. The attack may have occurred because the perpetrators believed the family's SUV resembled the SUVs used by rival cartels. Mexican cartels vary in size and structure, but while all are hierarchical, they tend to also be decentralized, providing lower-ranking members the leeway to launch rash attacks to gain their leadership's approval, in retaliation for violence by rivals, or for personal financial gain. When cartel attacks on foreign tourists do occur, they are most likely cases of mistaken identity in which cartels think the victims belong to a rival cartel, making such incidents far more likely in areas experiencing intense inter-cartel territorial struggles (Tamaulipas among them).
The Matamoros attack additionally shows how U.S. citizens and other foreigners who look like they may be locals or migrants may be at greater risk. Matamoros, like other Mexican cities and towns located near U.S. border crossings, has seen its population of migrants from other parts of the Americas surge over the last decade. In recent years, people escaping the poor security and economic conditions in Haiti have made up an increasing portion of Matamoros' migrant community. In February, NGOs estimated a total of 1,000 Haitian migrants were in Matamoros. Cartels and smaller local gangs commonly target migrants for kidnapping for ransom, human trafficking, or to recruit (and sometimes outright force) them into their criminal enterprises, including drug trafficking.
The four Americans who were targeted in the recent attack were Black and it is possible the cartel members racially profiled them, believing they were migrants or Haitian traffickers encroaching on the Scorpion's territory (as Mexican and U.S. authorities reportedly theorized). The possibility that the gunmen racially profiled the Americans prior to the attack has already fueled fear among the city's migrants, leading 100 Haitian asylum-seekers to flee one of Matamoros' camps following the attack. Hispanic and Latino U.S. citizens have long faced similar risks in Mexico, and the Matamoros attack demonstrates that Black tourists and business travelers may be similarly at greater risk of a mistaken identity attack in Mexico's high-violence regions, especially those with large Haitian migrant populations.
The Mexican Government's Response
The Mexican government's quick reaction to the kidnapping illustrates the trend of Mexican authorities conducting a highly public and elevated security response when U.S. citizens or other tourists are victims of violent crime, given the importance of tourism to the Mexican economy. Tourism accounted for just over 7% of Mexico's total GDP in 2021 as the country attracted over 31 million visitors that year. The Mexican government will likely continue to prioritize sending security forces to areas where tourism serves as the lifeblood of the local economy (like Quintana Roo, Baja California and Baja California Sur) in an effort to maintain the image of low criminal activity in these popular tourist destinations, despite Mexico's overall high rate of violent crime.
But the kidnapping of the four U.S. citizens is unlikely to change Mexican President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador's overall approach to containing cartel violence in his country. The Lopez Obrador administration has never clearly outlined a security strategy since taking office in December 2018. But the president's catchphrase of approaching cartels with ''hugs, not bullets'' has reflected his government's broadly non-interventionist approach to cartels' presence. As such, Mexico's security forces rarely seek to proactively combat cartel influence, opting instead to simply keep violent crime statistics down in tourist areas and major cities. This strategy relies heavily on the use of a militarized policing force created under his presidency called the National Guard, which has absorbed units and officers from the Federal Police, Military Police and Naval Police. The Lopez Obrador government will almost certainly continue to utilize the National Guard to attempt to curb migration patterns, protect critical infrastructure and ensure increased safety in tourist destinations. But these areas of emphasis will likely continue to leave certain areas vulnerable to the influence of cartels — especially in states where rival cartels are fighting for control over territory, which include Tamaulipas (where the four U.S. citizens were kidnapped), Michoacan, Mexico State and Guerrero.
The Lopez Obrador administration's reaction to the Matamoros attack will also raise the risk of protests in Mexico by showcasing the government's continued failure to address security threats facing Mexican citizens. Many Mexicans have already expressed anger on social media over their government's swift response to the kidnapping of U.S. citizens, which stands in stark contrast to the historically slow or nonexistent response to the daily kidnappings of Mexican citizens. According to data compiled by the Mexico-based Alto Al Secuestro (Association to Stop Kidnapping), there were 5,256 reported kidnappings in Mexico between December 2018 and January 2023 — an average of four per day. But Mexican authorities rarely respond to these kidnappings in a proactive manner unless U.S. citizens and other foreigners are involved.
Activists have previously organized mass protests over kidnappings in the country — most prominently in response to the kidnapping of 43 student teachers in Guerrero state in 2014, which saw some demonstrations turn violent. Against this backdrop, incidents that highlight the disparity in security reactions for foreigners and locals — like the Matamoros kidnapping — raise the risk of renewing such protests by reminding Mexican citizens of their government's apparent disregard for their safety.
The U.S. Government's Response
The United States remains highly unlikely to directly intervene in the fight against cartels in Mexico, despite Republican lawmakers' increased calls for such action following the Matamoros incident. In recent weeks, certain members of the Republican Party have used the kidnappings to criticize the Mexican government's record on security, with some — including Representative Dan Crenshaw (R-TX) and Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC) — going so far as to propose legislation that would allow the U.S. military to intervene in Mexico. The draft bill would seek to designate nine of the most powerful Mexican cartels as terrorist organizations, thus allowing U.S. armed forces to be dispatched to Mexico. Former U.S. President Donald Trump also suggested labeling Mexican cartels as terrorist entities, though his administration never followed through on the effort. While the legislation is currently being debated by the House Foreign Affairs Committee, it is highly unlikely to be passed as it has been criticized by Democrats and some Republicans for proposing to interfere with another country's security policy. But even on the off-chance that the bill is ratified, Lopez Obrador has indicated that his government would not cooperate with any U.S. armed forces sent to his country to contain cartel violence, stating such a deployment would ''breach Mexico's sovereignty.''
But while the United States is unlikely to respond at the federal level, U.S. state governments could make regulatory changes in an effort to push Mexico to increase security efforts. Similar violent events against U.S. citizens could spur U.S. authorities to implement increased border security measures in an effort to prevent cartel violence from spilling across the border. Such measures would most likely come from Texas Governor Greg Abbott, who previously implemented inspections along his state's border with Mexico in response to a surge in illegal border crossings in April 2022. The measures imposed by the Texan state government slowed cross-border traffic to a crawl and angered truckers, who formed a blockade at the Pharr-Reynosa International Bridge that nearly stopped traffic in both directions for three days. Economists estimated that delays from the inspections, which were only in place for less than two weeks (from April 6 to April 15), led the U.S. economy to lose an estimated $8.97 billion, with Texas alone losing $4.23 billion, as fruits and vegetables rotted in trucks. The re-implementation of such measures would risk similar logistical and financial challenges.
The United States will also likely continue to release periodic statements to further warn citizens about the dangers of traveling to Mexico. In the aftermath of the U.S. citizens' deaths in Matamoros, the U.S. Embassy & Consulates in Mexico released a statement warning the thousands of U.S. students expected to visit the country in the coming weeks for spring break to exercise caution and to avoid visiting Mexican states designated ''Do Not Travel'' on the U.S. State Department's website. The advisory is the latest in the U.S. diplomatic push to educate American citizens about the dangers of traveling in Mexico. Such statements will continue to appear in the future, particularly in reaction to U.S. citizens falling victim to violent crime.
Sticking to the Script
In Mexico's criminal landscape, there is little room for a change of course. Cartel members must always fight for their survival, lest risk being assassinated by rival criminals or arrested by authorities. The Mexican government must balance between enforcing security to keep high-priority areas safe (like economically-important tourism destinations), while still granting cartels enough leeway to stave off a larger backlash. And the U.S. government must respond verbally to threats to its citizens and provide whatever direct security assistance to Mexico that its southern neighbor will accept. Barring massive (and unlikely) changes to the economic and/or political environments in the United States and Mexico, or to the U.S. market for illegal drugs, the parties involved will be confined to these roles. Both countries' 2024 general elections provide potential wildcards in the form of opposition candidates. But for all their bluster, any new president in either country will almost certainly return to the standard script amid economic, security and political pressures.
Cartel violence is a slow-moving tragedy — Mexico's personal forever war. Organized crime bleeds the Mexican economy and contributes to poverty, even as new manufacturing facilities and tech startups improve conditions for few. Incidents like the attack on the four Americans in Matamoros, while horrific, are sadly the norm for locals in much of the country. And that grim reality is unlikely to change anytime soon. With no serious, existential threat from domestic security forces, cartels and smaller gangs will continue to threaten the lives and livelihoods of locals, foreigners and businesses alike, requiring constant vigilance as crime rates forever fluctuate between ''acceptable'' and ''catastrophic.''
531266
undefined and Latin America Analyst at RANE
Carmen Colosi
Latin America Analyst at RANE, Stratfor
undefined and Global Security analyst with RANE
Caroline Hammer
Global Security analyst with RANE, Stratfor
12 MIN READMar 21, 2023 | 21:21 GMT
The recent armed attack on four U.S. citizens in the Mexican border city of Matamoros, Tamaulipas state, illustrated well-documented security risks in Mexico's many crime hotspots, where gang and cartel violence disrupts daily life and hinders business operations. But while the demonstrated risks are nothing new, much about the incident was out of the ordinary, including the abnormal targeting of American civilians, the subsequent calls by U.S. Republicans for military intervention, and the cartel's highly out-of-character note apologizing for the whole affair. The oddities of the incident and the response to it by the cartel, as well as the Mexican and U.S. governments, confirm and expand on long-standing security, political and logistical risks from organized crime in Mexico.
The Attack
On Friday, March 3, the four American citizens entered Matamoros from Brownsville, Texas, in order to receive cosmetic surgery. A few hours after crossing the border, armed gunmen in trucks shot at their vehicle while they drove through the city, leading to a crash, after which the gunmen forced them out of their vehicle and into one of their trucks. During the incident, a stray bullet killed a Mexican woman at the scene of the initial attack. In a video of the attack that subsequently circulated on social media, three of the Americans appeared unconscious. Over the next few days, word of the kidnapping spread in U.S. media and the FBI announced a $50,000 reward for the return of the victims. Mexican authorities discovered two of the victims alive and two dead on March 7 in a cabin southeast of Matamoros. On March 8, the Mexican government deployed 200 members of the army and 100 members of the National Guard to Matamoros to strengthen security in the border region. Based on the location of the incident, it was clear that the Gulf Cartel — once one of Mexico's most powerful criminal groups — was likely behind the attack. This appeared to be confirmed on March 9, when five men were left beaten and tied up in the street, along with a narco banner apologizing for the attacks signed ''the Scorpions,'' a faction of the Gulf Cartel. The banner claimed the men were the perpetrators of the attack and that the attack was a mistake ''caused by lack of discipline.''
The Cartel's Response
Mexican cartels are widely understood to not want to target U.S. citizens or tourists from other countries, except in circumstances where they're involved in drug trafficking. While the response to the murder or kidnapping of Mexican citizens or migrants from poor countries would barely make national Mexican news, security risks to Americans (and other, usually Western, foreigners) create an outsized backlash that cartels view as simply bad for business and thus not worth it. This was acutely demonstrated by the response to the Matamoros attack and kidnapping; the level of media coverage, the FBI reward and the hundreds of newly-deployed Mexican troops all make cartel operations more difficult and threaten their ability to make money.
The Gulf Cartel faction's apology note — an uncharacteristic action for a group with a penchant for extreme violence — also demonstrates the Scorpions leaders' immediate recognition that their people made a mistake. Criminal groups elsewhere in Mexico have similarly learned this lesson, with massive security deployments to Baja California Sur state in 2017 and Quintana Roo state in 2021 and 2022 following violence in tourist areas that killed and injured foreigners. Cartels know the Mexican government will devote ample resources to ensure the safety of foreigners and particularly tourists, and they'd prefer to avoid such encroachment into their territory.
Intentions aside, the attack and murder of two Americans in Matamoros was not the first incident that illustrates that mistakes can and do occur. In January 2020, gunmen likely belonging to the Northeast Cartel in Ciudad Mier, another border town in the Tamaulipas state, attacked an American family and killed their 13-year-old child. The attack may have occurred because the perpetrators believed the family's SUV resembled the SUVs used by rival cartels. Mexican cartels vary in size and structure, but while all are hierarchical, they tend to also be decentralized, providing lower-ranking members the leeway to launch rash attacks to gain their leadership's approval, in retaliation for violence by rivals, or for personal financial gain. When cartel attacks on foreign tourists do occur, they are most likely cases of mistaken identity in which cartels think the victims belong to a rival cartel, making such incidents far more likely in areas experiencing intense inter-cartel territorial struggles (Tamaulipas among them).
The Matamoros attack additionally shows how U.S. citizens and other foreigners who look like they may be locals or migrants may be at greater risk. Matamoros, like other Mexican cities and towns located near U.S. border crossings, has seen its population of migrants from other parts of the Americas surge over the last decade. In recent years, people escaping the poor security and economic conditions in Haiti have made up an increasing portion of Matamoros' migrant community. In February, NGOs estimated a total of 1,000 Haitian migrants were in Matamoros. Cartels and smaller local gangs commonly target migrants for kidnapping for ransom, human trafficking, or to recruit (and sometimes outright force) them into their criminal enterprises, including drug trafficking.
The four Americans who were targeted in the recent attack were Black and it is possible the cartel members racially profiled them, believing they were migrants or Haitian traffickers encroaching on the Scorpion's territory (as Mexican and U.S. authorities reportedly theorized). The possibility that the gunmen racially profiled the Americans prior to the attack has already fueled fear among the city's migrants, leading 100 Haitian asylum-seekers to flee one of Matamoros' camps following the attack. Hispanic and Latino U.S. citizens have long faced similar risks in Mexico, and the Matamoros attack demonstrates that Black tourists and business travelers may be similarly at greater risk of a mistaken identity attack in Mexico's high-violence regions, especially those with large Haitian migrant populations.
The Mexican Government's Response
The Mexican government's quick reaction to the kidnapping illustrates the trend of Mexican authorities conducting a highly public and elevated security response when U.S. citizens or other tourists are victims of violent crime, given the importance of tourism to the Mexican economy. Tourism accounted for just over 7% of Mexico's total GDP in 2021 as the country attracted over 31 million visitors that year. The Mexican government will likely continue to prioritize sending security forces to areas where tourism serves as the lifeblood of the local economy (like Quintana Roo, Baja California and Baja California Sur) in an effort to maintain the image of low criminal activity in these popular tourist destinations, despite Mexico's overall high rate of violent crime.
But the kidnapping of the four U.S. citizens is unlikely to change Mexican President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador's overall approach to containing cartel violence in his country. The Lopez Obrador administration has never clearly outlined a security strategy since taking office in December 2018. But the president's catchphrase of approaching cartels with ''hugs, not bullets'' has reflected his government's broadly non-interventionist approach to cartels' presence. As such, Mexico's security forces rarely seek to proactively combat cartel influence, opting instead to simply keep violent crime statistics down in tourist areas and major cities. This strategy relies heavily on the use of a militarized policing force created under his presidency called the National Guard, which has absorbed units and officers from the Federal Police, Military Police and Naval Police. The Lopez Obrador government will almost certainly continue to utilize the National Guard to attempt to curb migration patterns, protect critical infrastructure and ensure increased safety in tourist destinations. But these areas of emphasis will likely continue to leave certain areas vulnerable to the influence of cartels — especially in states where rival cartels are fighting for control over territory, which include Tamaulipas (where the four U.S. citizens were kidnapped), Michoacan, Mexico State and Guerrero.
The Lopez Obrador administration's reaction to the Matamoros attack will also raise the risk of protests in Mexico by showcasing the government's continued failure to address security threats facing Mexican citizens. Many Mexicans have already expressed anger on social media over their government's swift response to the kidnapping of U.S. citizens, which stands in stark contrast to the historically slow or nonexistent response to the daily kidnappings of Mexican citizens. According to data compiled by the Mexico-based Alto Al Secuestro (Association to Stop Kidnapping), there were 5,256 reported kidnappings in Mexico between December 2018 and January 2023 — an average of four per day. But Mexican authorities rarely respond to these kidnappings in a proactive manner unless U.S. citizens and other foreigners are involved.
Activists have previously organized mass protests over kidnappings in the country — most prominently in response to the kidnapping of 43 student teachers in Guerrero state in 2014, which saw some demonstrations turn violent. Against this backdrop, incidents that highlight the disparity in security reactions for foreigners and locals — like the Matamoros kidnapping — raise the risk of renewing such protests by reminding Mexican citizens of their government's apparent disregard for their safety.
The U.S. Government's Response
The United States remains highly unlikely to directly intervene in the fight against cartels in Mexico, despite Republican lawmakers' increased calls for such action following the Matamoros incident. In recent weeks, certain members of the Republican Party have used the kidnappings to criticize the Mexican government's record on security, with some — including Representative Dan Crenshaw (R-TX) and Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC) — going so far as to propose legislation that would allow the U.S. military to intervene in Mexico. The draft bill would seek to designate nine of the most powerful Mexican cartels as terrorist organizations, thus allowing U.S. armed forces to be dispatched to Mexico. Former U.S. President Donald Trump also suggested labeling Mexican cartels as terrorist entities, though his administration never followed through on the effort. While the legislation is currently being debated by the House Foreign Affairs Committee, it is highly unlikely to be passed as it has been criticized by Democrats and some Republicans for proposing to interfere with another country's security policy. But even on the off-chance that the bill is ratified, Lopez Obrador has indicated that his government would not cooperate with any U.S. armed forces sent to his country to contain cartel violence, stating such a deployment would ''breach Mexico's sovereignty.''
But while the United States is unlikely to respond at the federal level, U.S. state governments could make regulatory changes in an effort to push Mexico to increase security efforts. Similar violent events against U.S. citizens could spur U.S. authorities to implement increased border security measures in an effort to prevent cartel violence from spilling across the border. Such measures would most likely come from Texas Governor Greg Abbott, who previously implemented inspections along his state's border with Mexico in response to a surge in illegal border crossings in April 2022. The measures imposed by the Texan state government slowed cross-border traffic to a crawl and angered truckers, who formed a blockade at the Pharr-Reynosa International Bridge that nearly stopped traffic in both directions for three days. Economists estimated that delays from the inspections, which were only in place for less than two weeks (from April 6 to April 15), led the U.S. economy to lose an estimated $8.97 billion, with Texas alone losing $4.23 billion, as fruits and vegetables rotted in trucks. The re-implementation of such measures would risk similar logistical and financial challenges.
The United States will also likely continue to release periodic statements to further warn citizens about the dangers of traveling to Mexico. In the aftermath of the U.S. citizens' deaths in Matamoros, the U.S. Embassy & Consulates in Mexico released a statement warning the thousands of U.S. students expected to visit the country in the coming weeks for spring break to exercise caution and to avoid visiting Mexican states designated ''Do Not Travel'' on the U.S. State Department's website. The advisory is the latest in the U.S. diplomatic push to educate American citizens about the dangers of traveling in Mexico. Such statements will continue to appear in the future, particularly in reaction to U.S. citizens falling victim to violent crime.
Sticking to the Script
In Mexico's criminal landscape, there is little room for a change of course. Cartel members must always fight for their survival, lest risk being assassinated by rival criminals or arrested by authorities. The Mexican government must balance between enforcing security to keep high-priority areas safe (like economically-important tourism destinations), while still granting cartels enough leeway to stave off a larger backlash. And the U.S. government must respond verbally to threats to its citizens and provide whatever direct security assistance to Mexico that its southern neighbor will accept. Barring massive (and unlikely) changes to the economic and/or political environments in the United States and Mexico, or to the U.S. market for illegal drugs, the parties involved will be confined to these roles. Both countries' 2024 general elections provide potential wildcards in the form of opposition candidates. But for all their bluster, any new president in either country will almost certainly return to the standard script amid economic, security and political pressures.
Cartel violence is a slow-moving tragedy — Mexico's personal forever war. Organized crime bleeds the Mexican economy and contributes to poverty, even as new manufacturing facilities and tech startups improve conditions for few. Incidents like the attack on the four Americans in Matamoros, while horrific, are sadly the norm for locals in much of the country. And that grim reality is unlikely to change anytime soon. With no serious, existential threat from domestic security forces, cartels and smaller gangs will continue to threaten the lives and livelihoods of locals, foreigners and businesses alike, requiring constant vigilance as crime rates forever fluctuate between ''acceptable'' and ''catastrophic.''
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29
Martial Arts Topics / Re: **WEBSITE UPDATES**
« Last post by Bob Burgee on February 10, 2023, 08:38:32 AM »Greetings DBMA Association Members,
The Dog Brothers Canadian Gathering of the Pack - 2022 is now available! 88 Fights & Full Playlist.
https://dogbrothers.com/gathering-of-the-pack-canada-2022/
Enjoy!
The Dog Brothers Canadian Gathering of the Pack - 2022 is now available! 88 Fights & Full Playlist.
https://dogbrothers.com/gathering-of-the-pack-canada-2022/
Enjoy!
30
Espanol Discussion / RANE: US-Mexico Chips
« Last post by Crafty_Dog on February 08, 2023, 04:30:45 PM »February 8, 2023
View On Website
Open as PDF
Mexico Will Benefit From Washington’s Chip Focus
The U.S. wants to build a North American semiconductor supply chain.
By: Allison Fedirka
The United States is prioritizing the creation of a regional semiconductor production chain to give itself alternatives to Asian firms, especially those with ties to China. Even for the country that invented the semiconductor, this is a massive task. The manufacture of cutting-edge chips is incredibly expensive and complicated, and just a few companies around the world are dominant. If the U.S. is going to succeed in its chips drive, it will need to involve Mexico.
Chip Race
Today, semiconductors are used in everything from consumer goods (computers, cellphones, automobiles, etc.) to military equipment and communication satellites. But despite the ubiquity of chips in modern technology, the manufacturing equipment for more than three-quarters of the global chip supply comes from just five companies. Three of these firms (Applied Materials, Lam Research Corp. and KLA Corp.) are in the United States, and the other two are in U.S. allies: the Netherlands’ ASML and Japan’s Tokyo Electron. ASML holds a monopoly on the machinery needed to make the most advanced semiconductors.
The U.S. is determined to defend and extend this advantage over China. In 2022, Washington passed the CHIPS and Science Act, which allotted $52.7 billion for the research, development and manufacturing of microchips. It also passed the Inflation Reduction Act, which supports the manufacture of electric vehicles and relevant chips in North America. Internationally, the U.S. in late January convinced Japan and the Netherlands to work with it on restricting semiconductor technology sales to China. This builds on a 2019 agreement that banned ASML from exporting its most advanced machinery to China. The latest agreement expands these restrictions, although details have not been released. The U.S. is likely trying to strike a balance between pressuring China and not spurring Beijing to accelerate development of domestic capabilities.
Over time, Washington wants to reduce its own reliance on foreign firms, particularly those tied to China as well as companies like ASML. According to the Semiconductor Industry Association, from 1990 to 2021, the U.S. share of global semiconductor manufacturing capacity fell to 12 percent from 37 percent. Most of it is now in Asia. The U.S. is now trying to coax chipmakers into moving to North America. Major players like GlobalFoundries, Intel, Samsung Foundry, TSMC and Texas Instruments are building new semiconductor production facilities in the United States, especially New York, Texas, Arizona and New Mexico. Washington is mainly focused on the automotive sector, where the U.S. is highly integrated with Canada and Mexico. This sector plays a major role in driving the U.S. and Mexican economies. The three countries agreed to develop a joint chipmaking initiative, including coordinating supply chains and investments. They also want to work together to map critical minerals.
Typical Global Semiconductor Production Pattern
(click to enlarge)
Mexico’s Advantages
About 40 percent of U.S. semiconductor plants are in states along its southern border, a significant opportunity for Mexico. Likewise, many of Mexico’s manufacturing hubs, especially for high-end manufacturing and automobiles, are in northern border states. Mexico’s foreign minister estimates that a quarter or more of imports from Asia could be replaced by North American production, boosted by the U.S.-Mexico-Canada free trade agreement.
Nearshoring Opportunities in Latin America
(click to enlarge)
The Mexican government has already begun laying the diplomatic groundwork to support its chip ambitions. At the beginning of the year – prior to the U.S.-Japan-Netherlands agreement – Japan’s foreign minister was in Mexico discussing trade and semiconductors. Later in January, a Dutch delegation along with U.S. officials visited the northwestern Mexican state of Baja California for talks on investment opportunities, with a focus on agro-industry, electric vehicles, semiconductors, supply chains and energy.
Talks are also underway between the Mexican government and the business community. Firms like Intel, Skyworks Solutions, Texas Instruments and Infineon Technologies are already operating in Mexico and working on chip R&D and test manufacturing. Conversations with Taiwanese chipmakers like TSMC are ongoing. Foxconn, the world’s biggest contract electronics manufacturer, already established a headquarters in Mexico in order to be closer to clients (mostly in the electronic vehicles sector) in North America. Mexico is also working with the Inter-American Development Bank to identify semiconductor opportunities, and with the National College of Professional Technical Education to produce more skilled workers to serve in chip manufacturing. Finally, Mexican industry and higher education institutions have partnered with Arizona State University to boost the production of semiconductors in North America through training and increased production capacity in northwest border states.
FDI Inflows to Mexico
(click to enlarge)
Some in Mexico hope that Washington’s semiconductor drive will help develop the country's southern region. This would help the government solve one of its biggest challenges, but the initiative is no quick fix. Currently, Mexico’s chip industry is limited to lower-skill roles like assembly, testing and packaging – ideal starting points for the development of more skilled, formal work in Mexico’s underdeveloped south. Moreover, chipmaking uses large amounts of water, which is more plentiful in southern Mexico. But although the south is close to the narrow Isthmus of Tehuantepec, giving exporters quick access to the Atlantic and Pacific, its transportation (and energy) infrastructure is poor. Existing Mexican industrial complexes, particularly for automobiles, are farther north, in Guadalajara, Nuevo Leon, Baja California, Aguascalientes and Chihuahua. Semiconductor manufacturing will probably stay close to these clusters to leverage existing infrastructure and shorter distances to the United States.
Rules and Rivals
While Mexico is on paper a promising location for chipmakers, there are several challenges it must address to play a major role in the U.S. semiconductor manufacturing chain. First, the U.S. and Mexico are at odds over the government’s management of the electricity sector. A stable and secure electricity supply is critical for chipmaking, but future investments in the Mexican electricity network are in jeopardy because of these disputes, which adds risk for manufacturers. Similarly, U.S. companies have taken issue with Mexico’s labor laws. This recurring point of contention generally occurs at the company or plant level and cannot be ruled out. Foreign firms also want Mexico to alter its regulations and incentives to make itself a better business environment for semiconductor manufacturing.
However, the main threat to U.S.-Mexican cooperation is increasing Chinese investment in Mexico. The U.S. will expect Mexico to restrict Chinese firms from entering the Mexican segments of the North American chip supply chain. This is a major reason Washington wants much closer coordination with Mexico City on strategic goods. It is also why the U.S. is starting with less sophisticated chips used in things like cars rather than high-end products related to defense. The U.S. can leverage its relationships with Japan and South Korea – which already relocated some manufacturing to Mexico – to encourage non-Chinese investment in the country. And of course, the U.S. can threaten to restrict investment, trade, remittances, etc. to its southern neighbor to drive its point home.
None of Mexico’s challenges are insurmountable. And the U.S. interest in becoming self-sufficient in semiconductor production, as well as the importance of the auto industry to the U.S. economy, means the U.S. will be very willing to work with Mexico to find solutions.
527558
View On Website
Open as PDF
Mexico Will Benefit From Washington’s Chip Focus
The U.S. wants to build a North American semiconductor supply chain.
By: Allison Fedirka
The United States is prioritizing the creation of a regional semiconductor production chain to give itself alternatives to Asian firms, especially those with ties to China. Even for the country that invented the semiconductor, this is a massive task. The manufacture of cutting-edge chips is incredibly expensive and complicated, and just a few companies around the world are dominant. If the U.S. is going to succeed in its chips drive, it will need to involve Mexico.
Chip Race
Today, semiconductors are used in everything from consumer goods (computers, cellphones, automobiles, etc.) to military equipment and communication satellites. But despite the ubiquity of chips in modern technology, the manufacturing equipment for more than three-quarters of the global chip supply comes from just five companies. Three of these firms (Applied Materials, Lam Research Corp. and KLA Corp.) are in the United States, and the other two are in U.S. allies: the Netherlands’ ASML and Japan’s Tokyo Electron. ASML holds a monopoly on the machinery needed to make the most advanced semiconductors.
The U.S. is determined to defend and extend this advantage over China. In 2022, Washington passed the CHIPS and Science Act, which allotted $52.7 billion for the research, development and manufacturing of microchips. It also passed the Inflation Reduction Act, which supports the manufacture of electric vehicles and relevant chips in North America. Internationally, the U.S. in late January convinced Japan and the Netherlands to work with it on restricting semiconductor technology sales to China. This builds on a 2019 agreement that banned ASML from exporting its most advanced machinery to China. The latest agreement expands these restrictions, although details have not been released. The U.S. is likely trying to strike a balance between pressuring China and not spurring Beijing to accelerate development of domestic capabilities.
Over time, Washington wants to reduce its own reliance on foreign firms, particularly those tied to China as well as companies like ASML. According to the Semiconductor Industry Association, from 1990 to 2021, the U.S. share of global semiconductor manufacturing capacity fell to 12 percent from 37 percent. Most of it is now in Asia. The U.S. is now trying to coax chipmakers into moving to North America. Major players like GlobalFoundries, Intel, Samsung Foundry, TSMC and Texas Instruments are building new semiconductor production facilities in the United States, especially New York, Texas, Arizona and New Mexico. Washington is mainly focused on the automotive sector, where the U.S. is highly integrated with Canada and Mexico. This sector plays a major role in driving the U.S. and Mexican economies. The three countries agreed to develop a joint chipmaking initiative, including coordinating supply chains and investments. They also want to work together to map critical minerals.
Typical Global Semiconductor Production Pattern
(click to enlarge)
Mexico’s Advantages
About 40 percent of U.S. semiconductor plants are in states along its southern border, a significant opportunity for Mexico. Likewise, many of Mexico’s manufacturing hubs, especially for high-end manufacturing and automobiles, are in northern border states. Mexico’s foreign minister estimates that a quarter or more of imports from Asia could be replaced by North American production, boosted by the U.S.-Mexico-Canada free trade agreement.
Nearshoring Opportunities in Latin America
(click to enlarge)
The Mexican government has already begun laying the diplomatic groundwork to support its chip ambitions. At the beginning of the year – prior to the U.S.-Japan-Netherlands agreement – Japan’s foreign minister was in Mexico discussing trade and semiconductors. Later in January, a Dutch delegation along with U.S. officials visited the northwestern Mexican state of Baja California for talks on investment opportunities, with a focus on agro-industry, electric vehicles, semiconductors, supply chains and energy.
Talks are also underway between the Mexican government and the business community. Firms like Intel, Skyworks Solutions, Texas Instruments and Infineon Technologies are already operating in Mexico and working on chip R&D and test manufacturing. Conversations with Taiwanese chipmakers like TSMC are ongoing. Foxconn, the world’s biggest contract electronics manufacturer, already established a headquarters in Mexico in order to be closer to clients (mostly in the electronic vehicles sector) in North America. Mexico is also working with the Inter-American Development Bank to identify semiconductor opportunities, and with the National College of Professional Technical Education to produce more skilled workers to serve in chip manufacturing. Finally, Mexican industry and higher education institutions have partnered with Arizona State University to boost the production of semiconductors in North America through training and increased production capacity in northwest border states.
FDI Inflows to Mexico
(click to enlarge)
Some in Mexico hope that Washington’s semiconductor drive will help develop the country's southern region. This would help the government solve one of its biggest challenges, but the initiative is no quick fix. Currently, Mexico’s chip industry is limited to lower-skill roles like assembly, testing and packaging – ideal starting points for the development of more skilled, formal work in Mexico’s underdeveloped south. Moreover, chipmaking uses large amounts of water, which is more plentiful in southern Mexico. But although the south is close to the narrow Isthmus of Tehuantepec, giving exporters quick access to the Atlantic and Pacific, its transportation (and energy) infrastructure is poor. Existing Mexican industrial complexes, particularly for automobiles, are farther north, in Guadalajara, Nuevo Leon, Baja California, Aguascalientes and Chihuahua. Semiconductor manufacturing will probably stay close to these clusters to leverage existing infrastructure and shorter distances to the United States.
Rules and Rivals
While Mexico is on paper a promising location for chipmakers, there are several challenges it must address to play a major role in the U.S. semiconductor manufacturing chain. First, the U.S. and Mexico are at odds over the government’s management of the electricity sector. A stable and secure electricity supply is critical for chipmaking, but future investments in the Mexican electricity network are in jeopardy because of these disputes, which adds risk for manufacturers. Similarly, U.S. companies have taken issue with Mexico’s labor laws. This recurring point of contention generally occurs at the company or plant level and cannot be ruled out. Foreign firms also want Mexico to alter its regulations and incentives to make itself a better business environment for semiconductor manufacturing.
However, the main threat to U.S.-Mexican cooperation is increasing Chinese investment in Mexico. The U.S. will expect Mexico to restrict Chinese firms from entering the Mexican segments of the North American chip supply chain. This is a major reason Washington wants much closer coordination with Mexico City on strategic goods. It is also why the U.S. is starting with less sophisticated chips used in things like cars rather than high-end products related to defense. The U.S. can leverage its relationships with Japan and South Korea – which already relocated some manufacturing to Mexico – to encourage non-Chinese investment in the country. And of course, the U.S. can threaten to restrict investment, trade, remittances, etc. to its southern neighbor to drive its point home.
None of Mexico’s challenges are insurmountable. And the U.S. interest in becoming self-sufficient in semiconductor production, as well as the importance of the auto industry to the U.S. economy, means the U.S. will be very willing to work with Mexico to find solutions.
527558