Thailand: A Possible Respite in Southern Violence
Three days before the Sept. 19 military coup that ousted Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, six bombs exploded in the city of Hat Yai, in southern Thailand's Songkhla province, killing four people. Among the dead was a Canadian schoolteacher, the first Westerner known to have died as a result of the ongoing violence in Thailand's Muslim-dominated south. Although the coup has raised hopes that the country's new military leader, a Muslim, will be able to ease the level of violence in the south, only a temporary respite can be expected.
The bombs, which exploded at approximately 9:15 p.m. local time, targeted a bar, a massage parlor, a hotel and two department stores. In addition to the four deaths, about 60 other people were injured, including at least nine foreigners. Although it is a commercial center rather than a cultural or historic location, Hat Yai has a thriving tourist industry based largely on visitors from Muslim counties such as Malaysia or Indonesia who are attracted to Thailand's less-conservative culture.
Thai authorities were quick to blame the bombings on Muslim militants who have been known to attack tourist locations that provide sex and alcohol to Muslim tourists. The attacks, however, could be linked to business or organized crime. In April 2005, two improvised explosive devices detonated nearly simultaneously at the Hat Yai International Airport and a supermarket. The airport attack killed one person.
The causes of the violence in Yala, Pattani, Narathiwat and Songkhla provinces are varied and complex. In addition to ethnic strife between predominantly Muslim Malays and Buddhist Thais, there also is violent competition between rival criminal elements and corrupt security forces. Thai military leaders have been known to take their political battles to the region as well, manipulating problems in the south to gain a political edge in Bangkok.
In the days since the Royal Thai Army seized control in a bloodless coup, speculation has mounted that the country's new leaders will be able to ease the tensions in the south, thus reducing the level of violence. One of the reasons for this thinking is that Thailand's army commander and now acting Prime Minister Lt. Gen. Sonthi Boonyaratglin is a Thai Muslim who presumably will have more influence with the Muslim militants blamed for most of the violence.
Indeed, Sonthi was put in charge of the army largely because it was thought that, as a Muslim, he would be more effective in dealing with the militants than were previous commanders. Another reason for the high hopes is the belief that any government will do a better job addressing the problems than did Thaksin's. Although the bombings in Hat Yai certainly did not help Thaksin on the domestic front, they were not a significant factor in causing the coup.
Sonthi's Muslim background could give him an advantage in dealing with the south's religious strife -- especially since he favors dialogue rather than a heavy-handed military approach. However, even with Sonthi in power, a significant overall reduction in violence is unlikely. Even if he could stop the Muslim militants from attacking without having to resort to a massive army crackdown, other sources of violence would remain.
The coup has been popular in southern Thailand, where many citizens believed Thaksin's policies made the situation worse, not better. Thai officials, businesspeople and Muslim leaders are encouraged by the change in government, and believe in Sonthi's ability to deal with the problem. In the short term, violence probably will decline as criminals and corrupt officials adopt a wait-and-see attitude to gauge the new government's policy in the south. The honeymoon period, however, is likely to be short-lived. Once the criminal element figures out how to adjust to the changing policies and determines which newly appointed officials to bribe, there will be a return to business as usual.
Muslim militants, who mainly hit schools, government offices and other targets associated with Bangkok's control over the region, also could hold off on attacks to see how well Sonthi can deal with the problems affecting them. If their grievances are not addressed quickly and effectively, they could resume attacks. If Sonthi responds with a larger military presence in the region, or a more serious crackdown, they could counter with more violence. After a while, a return to nearly the same level of violence as before is quite possible.
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