In Belarus, an Election Fuels the Fight for Russia's Borderlands
Sim Tack
Sim Tack
Senior Global Analyst , Stratfor
6 MINS READ
Aug 4, 2020 | 10:00 GMT
Plainclothed Belarus' security forces and riot police officers detain a protester at an opposition demonstration in Minsk, Belarus, on July 14, 2020.
Plainclothed Belarus' security forces and riot police officers detain a protester at an opposition demonstration in Minsk, Belarus, on July 14, 2020.
(SERGEI GAPON/AFP via Getty Images)
The likely tumultuous aftermath of Belarus's upcoming presidential election could significantly shake up the balance of power in the strategic borderland region between Russia and Western Europe. Amid the growing popularity of opposition movements in Belarus, the outcome of the country's Aug. 9 presidential election is widely expected to be heavily contested. The likely emergence of post-election protests will cast doubt over President Alexander Lukashenko's grasp on power and could open the door to a potential regime change. Belarus's importance to Russia's external security strategy will make Moscow extremely invested in the outcome of any power struggle in the country, which could prompt Russia to intervene directly.
A Heated Political Battle
Lukashenko's heavy-handed crackdowns against political activism have consolidated support for increasingly popular opposition candidates. The Belarusian government's repression of opposition activities, in particular — including detainments and refusal to register candidates — has concentrated opposition backing behind Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, Lukashenko's primary challenger in the upcoming election. His government's perceived poor handling of the country's COVID-19 outbreak and subsequent economic crisis, as well as ongoing concerns over Lukashenko's moves to limit political freedoms, has also helped propel her bid for the presidency. In response to EU demands and sanctions, Lukashenko scaled back pressure on opposition activities during the 2010 and 2015 presidential elections. But the current rise of opposition support and anti-government sentiment has resulted in a renewed culture of repression and crackdowns ahead of this year's election.
The opposition is unlikely to win the election given Belarus's history of electoral interference, which will almost certainly fuel intense protests rejecting the outcome. Lukashenko's regime depends on the active repression of political opposition and has been suspected of rigging elections to secure its grasp on power. There is no reason to believe this year's vote will be any different, especially given the particularly heated opposition campaign. Opposition candidates are calling for a high turnout to make any falsification of votes obvious. They are also already priming the Belarusian population to defend their vote after the election, though opposition leaders have yet to outright call for post-election protest action for fear of prosecution. The outcome of the 2006 election in Belarus resulted in protests that were eventually quelched by security forces. A repeat of those 2006 events, later dubbed the "Denim Revolution," is likely following the Aug. 9 presidential ballot. This time, however, post-election protests have the potential to escalate into larger or more violent persistent demonstrations given the current levels of opposition activity and large turnout at rallies.
President Lukashenko's ability to weather the coming round of post-election unrest is uncertain and may largely depend on his ability to maintain the loyalty of security forces. In many cases where governments have fallen to similar protests in the past, such as Ukraine's Euromaidan protests in 2013-2014, the alignment of security forces was decisive in shaping the outcome. Lukashenko maintains an active policy of frequently reassigning government officials and leaders of security branches to keep any individual position from amassing too much power. But while this practice avoids the rise of internal competitors, it also leads to weaker patronage structures that Lukashenko may come to depend upon to remain in control throughout intense protests. The position of security forces, and their behavior in response to post-election protests, will thus be critical in establishing the strength of Lukashenko's continued ability to repress dissent.
Gauging the Russian Response
A regime change in Belarus would intensify the geopolitical competition between Russia and the West by upending the current balance of power in Moscow's borderlands. The Belarusian opposition led by Tikhanovskaya has demonstrated a clear pro-Western orientation, meaning her rise to power could reorient the country toward the European Union and the United States. Such a geopolitical shift would present a clear existential threat to Russia, which depends on Belarus as it's last real buffer between it and NATO. Losing influence with Belarus would deny Russia of the strategic depth the country provides, and would leave Russia's core dangerously exposed to potential expansions of Western influence to its borders, which are located less than 400 kilometers (or roughly 250 miles) away from Moscow.
Russia's Slipping Grasp On Its Borderlands
Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the ongoing conflict against Russian-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine have decisively pivoted Kyiv toward the West in recent years. This shift, which itself followed over 20 years of gradual NATO expansion into Eastern Europe toward Russia's borders, has drastically remapped the balance of power between Russia and the West in the borderlands that lie between them. In trying to balance between its powerful neighbors, Belarus has also flirted frequently with the West, as evidenced by Lukashenko's government agreeing to host NATO forces for military exercises earlier this year. But a complete pivot to a clearly pro-Western administration would solidify Russia's losing battle against the eastward encroachment of NATO's influence.
The potential for a significant upheaval of Belarus governance will force Russia to choose between either throwing its weight behind Lukashenko, or finding other means to guarantee its influence over the country. Russia will take whatever actions necessary to try and guarantee an election outcome that doesn't shift Belarus even closer to the West. But while Russia actively supported Lukashenko in the past, his government's oil diversification efforts over the past year, as well as Minsk's resistance to Moscow's push for deeper political and economic integration, has recently driven a wedge between the two countries. Russia would still prefer Lukashenko over the pro-Western opposition. Though if his position becomes untenable, Moscow may go to great lengths — including the deployment of covert military actions — to try and gain control over the political transition process in Belarus. Indeed, the recent arrest of 30 suspected Russian mercenaries in Belarus could indicate that Moscow is already preparing such plans. This approach, however, would be prone to strategic risk or miscalculations, as was the case in Ukraine. But Moscow is unlikely to stand idly by if there is a real risk of losing Belarus entirely to the West.
A complete pivot to a pro-Western administration in Minsk would solidify Moscow’s losing battle against the encroachment of NATO’s influence.
If Lukashenko manages to hold on to power, he will find himself strengthened in countering both Russian integration efforts and Western demands for political liberalization. Lukashenko's ability to survive heavily contested elections, whether through Russian support or by his own means, would grant him a greater degree of maneuverability. Lukashenko would be in an even better position to negotiate beneficial energy trade terms with Moscow, as well as resist Russian demands for greater economic and political integration. His firm grasp on power would also enable him to ward off European demands for political liberalization, though the oppression of opposition activity during the presidential election and possible violent crackdowns against protests thereafter could raise the risk of EU sanctions. Such sanctions would most likely target individuals engaged in violence against civilians as opposed to having a broader economic impact, thus representing only a temporary rollback in the warming of Minsk-EU relations.
