Author Topic: Epidemics: Bird Flu, TB, AIDs, Superbugs, Ebola, etc  (Read 105210 times)

Crafty_Dog

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Hungary's Orban given total power
« Reply #450 on: March 31, 2020, 04:28:02 AM »
Hungary’s parliament gave Prime Minister Viktor Orbán the right to rule by decree until his government decides the coronavirus crisis has ended, defying criticism from European Union leaders that the pandemic is providing cover for his and other governments to crack down on democratic freedoms.

The bill, passed on Monday almost entirely by votes from the prime minister’s nationalist party, Fidesz, contained two important provisions: If parliament is unable to meet, which its leaders have already said would be difficult, Mr. Orbán could continue to govern under a state of emergency, creating and suspending laws by decree. Only Mr. Orbán’s government, or a two-thirds majority in parliament, could decide when this period would come to an end.

Secondly, the law imposes a maximum of five years’ prison time against those who intentionally spread false news or “distorted truth” that is seen to be detrimental to the government’s efforts to fight the virus and address its economic toll.


Military police patrolled the Hungarian capital on Monday, amid a national lockdown to halt the spread of the new coronavirus.
PHOTO: ZOLTAN BALOGH/ASSOCIATED PRESS
The law came under criticism from EU leaders and some legal scholars, who said that the coronavirus crisis has now given Mr. Orbán autocratic powers that can only be clawed back by his own cabinet, or his party, which controls two-thirds of seats in parliament.

The bill is part of a spate of new measures in Europe that target individuals who share rumors or falsehoods that hinder the battle against the pandemic.

Mr. Orbán has rejected such criticism, saying that the EU has been less helpful to Hungary than China, which sent 3 million medical masks last week. Fighting the virus will require unusual measures for an indefinite period, said Mr. Orbán, who has promised to relinquish his rule-by-decree powers as soon as the crisis ends.

“There are situations in which one cannot be polite,” he said during a radio broadcast on Saturday. “So I plainly told EU nit-pickers, if I may put it that way, that this is not the time to come to me pontificating about all sorts of no doubt fascinating legal and theoretical questions. Because now we have a crisis, now we have an epidemic, and now we must save lives.”

Hungary has had 447 confirmed Covid-19 cases as of Monday, with 15 deaths, since its first case on March 4. Members of Mr. Orbán’s party said they worried that the government would cease to function if they fell ill before affording their prime minister extraordinary powers.

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The White House extends social-distancing guidelines to April 30, bills are due this week for millions of Americans, and while China gradually reopens, India sees a mass exodus of workers leaving cities. WSJ’s Shelby Holliday has the latest on the pandemic. Photo: Michael Ciaglo/Getty Images
“We needed a law for the worst-case scenario when parliament is unable to operate,” said a Fidesz member of parliament who declined to be named because he wasn’t authorized by the party to speak to the press. “What if all of us will be in the hospital?”

The law is one in a number of emergency measures that human-rights groups worry will leave parts of the world less democratic than before the coronavirus pandemic, including Russia, Bolivia and Israel.

Europe has seen a crackdown on press freedoms and social media, as some governments try to snuff out news that they feel spreads unwarranted panic. Serbia, Montenegro and Hungary have launched investigations into some social-media posts, and in some cases arrested individuals involved. In February, police in Budapest raided a building and detained two people suspected of seeding articles and Facebook posts that inflated Hungary’s death toll.

“Political leaders could abuse the coronavirus crisis to undermine democracy,” wrote Andras Racz, senior fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations. “Europe’s biggest risk is Hungary.”

Mr. Orbán, a nationalist known for fencing off his border to migrants, has long feuded with the EU’s center-right and liberal blocs. The 56-year-old prime minister, who has led Hungary for nearly half of its postcommunist history, has won repeat landslide elections in part by campaigning against the union’s political establishment.

“We’re not preventing anyone from doing their job,” said Eric Mamer, the spokesperson of the European Commission, after receiving a question on Mr. Orbán’s comments on Monday. “At the same time, however, we are vigilant and we ensure compliance with EU standards in all areas of politics during the fight against the coronavirus.”

Write to Drew Hinshaw at drew.hinshaw@wsj.com


Crafty_Dog

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DougMacG

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Re: FDA and CDC blocking uncertified face mask imports
« Reply #458 on: March 31, 2020, 05:33:24 PM »
https://reason.com/2020/03/31/america-could-import-countless-more-face-masks-if-federal-regulators-would-get-out-of-the-way/

Is it too much to ask that everyone get a mask and a 2 ounce bottle of sanitizer as we head into MONTH SIX of the Wuhan Plague?

Screw the $1200.  Let us buy what we need to protect ourselves and know that the people around us have the ability to cover their mouth and clean their hands on the fly a hundred times a day if they have to.  Too much to ask, or are we too G*d D*mned regulated for safety to find our way to safety?
« Last Edit: March 31, 2020, 05:40:57 PM by DougMacG »

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Re: FDA and CDC blocking uncertified face mask imports
« Reply #459 on: March 31, 2020, 07:22:07 PM »
https://reason.com/2020/03/31/america-could-import-countless-more-face-masks-if-federal-regulators-would-get-out-of-the-way/

Is it too much to ask that everyone get a mask and a 2 ounce bottle of sanitizer as we head into MONTH SIX of the Wuhan Plague?

Screw the $1200.  Let us buy what we need to protect ourselves and know that the people around us have the ability to cover their mouth and clean their hands on the fly a hundred times a day if they have to.  Too much to ask, or are we too G*d D*mned regulated for safety to find our way to safety?

https://m.washingtontimes.com/news/2020/mar/31/how-fda-thwarting-distilleries-trying-make-hand-sa/

Crafty_Dog

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ccp

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stop whining; this is a rare pandemic
« Reply #461 on: April 01, 2020, 08:18:52 AM »
do your job or stay home,
and stop blaming Trump for a natural phenomenon. everyone is doing the best they can asshole:

https://www.yahoo.com/news/nurse-30-years-were-being-180054180.html



Crafty_Dog

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GPF: Brazil, Bolsonaro, vertical isolation and economy first
« Reply #463 on: April 01, 2020, 10:32:40 AM »
April 1, 2020   View On Website
Open as PDF



    The Method to Bolsonaro’s Madness
By: Allison Fedirka

Known for his contrarian and uncouth behavior, Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro frequently comes under intense scrutiny for his decisions. The latest controversy stems from his refusal to shut down economic activity in response to the coronavirus outbreak. Many governments face this decision but few have opted for Bolsonaro’s economy-first approach. The policy hasn’t been well received at home: Governors have lined up against him, media outlets have raised the idea of removing him from office, and even Facebook removed a video of Bolsonaro speaking to street vendors on the grounds that the content violated misinformation standards related to the virus. But however controversial it may be, there is a method to Bolsonaro’s apparent madness. Brazil’s economy is simply too weak to deliberately close down for a prolonged period of time.

Backlash

Brazil first addressed the coronavirus as an economic problem rather than a public health one because the economic effects arrived a month before its first confirmed case. At the end of January, Brazilian mining giant Vale suspended operations in China and restricted travel to and from the country. In early February the electronics industry, particularly makers of small electronics such as mobile phones, started experiencing supply chain problems, and by mid-month firms were implementing short-term closures and discussing furloughs. Leading solar power companies in Brazil, also highly dependent on China, forecast supply shortages in April and May as well as a 5-10 percent drop in sales. Brazilian beef exports – worth billions of dollars when it comes to China trade – experienced a sharp drop in demand, putting small and medium-sized slaughterhouses in peril of closing. Oil giant Petrobras, which sends 72 percent of its exports to China, also reported slumping demand. The shipping industry and exporters expressed worries about a potential shortage of containers by April. All this occurred before Feb. 25, when Brazil reported its first confirmed case of COVID-19.

Once the virus arrived in Brazil, the question in the government of balancing competing demands between health and economic needs unsurprisingly turned contentious. Bolsonaro leads the economy-first camp, downplaying health risks in public and rejecting restrictions on social movement on the grounds that they will destroy the economy. He advocates “vertical isolation,” which calls for the elderly and those with preexisting conditions to self-isolate while everyone else goes about business as usual. On the public health side, several state governors, led by Sao Paulo’s Joao Doria and accompanied by Rio de Janeiro’s Wilson Witzel, have called for restrictions on movement for the whole population. Together, these two states account for nearly 40 percent of national gross domestic product and are home to 63.2 million of Brazil’s 210 million inhabitants. Restricting economic activity in these states will greatly reduce the country’s GDP. On one hand, the governors fear that their densely populated major cities are conducive to the virus’ rapid spread. But on the other hand, those cities also have concentrations of poor neighborhoods whose residents cannot afford extended periods of limited or no work.

A further complication is the question of jurisdiction. In mid-March, the executive proposed legislation aimed at centralizing power to regulate the closure of businesses and social distancing measures to ensure an efficient response. The proposal now has 126 amendments and is currently in a joint commission for discussion, allowing governors to pursue their own measures in the meantime. A second measure that addresses workers’ rights and unemployment during the crisis has already been rejected by some legislators as unconstitutional. Judges have weighed in, encouraging the federal government to coordinate efforts more closely with states.

Bolsonaro is reluctant to limit economic activity because the Brazilian economy is weak and can ill afford another economic crisis. Brazil has yet to recover from its two-year recession from 2015 to 2016. During that time, GDP contracted by nearly 7 percent. In the three years since, the economy essentially stagnated, registering growth of just about 1 percent annually. Prior to the recession, in 2014, Brazil overtook the United Kingdom to become the seventh-largest economy in the world, with a GDP of $2.4 trillion. Now the economy ranks ninth globally, with a GDP of $1.89 trillion. The unemployment rate in 2014 was 6.8 percent before doubling to 13.7 percent in early 2017. Now unemployment has been reduced to 11.6 percent, though the quality of jobs created is low, as is remuneration.
 
(click to enlarge)
Plans Interrupted

Bolsonaro was elected in 2018 on a pledge to reform and jump-start the economy, but economic measures taken early in his term have reduced the country’s arsenal for dealing with the impending global recession. Last year, the government focused on structural reforms and facilitating household consumption, which accounts for over 70 percent of GDP. The central bank launched monetary easing in July 2019 in an effort to boost lending to consumers. In the second half of 2019, the government also permitted individuals to withdraw funds from their Workers’ Severance Fund accounts to help boost economic activity. The effect of these policies was supposed to kick in during the first half of 2020, but the onset of the global recession doomed the strategy from the get-go. In just two months, the central bank cut interest rates to 3.75 percent from 4.5 percent. Though there is still room to go lower, these rates are already very low by Brazilian standards.
 
(click to enlarge)

The global downturn has hampered other stimulus policies. A privatization drive was intended to raise 150 billion reais ($29 billion) this year, but this week the electric utilities company Eletrobras postponed its privatization plans until 2021, and others will likely follow. The government also loosened rules to give foreign companies equal footing in competition for government contracts, with public tenders valued at 50 billion reais, but foreign investment interest has dried up. Finally, the government planned limited trade deals to open markets and diversification in trade with China, the U.S., Mexico and India. But trade has fallen off a cliff, and governments are focused on mitigating the contagion and economic damage at home.

Other plans to remake the economy have had to be repurposed to limit the short-term damage from the virus. A plan launched in February called Brazil More included funds to incentivize startups and provide more credit to small and medium-sized businesses, but it will now be used to save existing companies. Around the same time, after months of study, the central bank loosened reserve requirements in a move that could inject up to 135 billion reais into the economy. The central bank will also allow individuals to use personal retirement plans as collateral to access lower interest loans.

And lastly, there are the reforms that risk being undone as a result of the government’s all-out effort to mitigate the impact of the recession. One of the main objectives of the reforms was to cap government spending and reduce debt. However, in mid-March, it became apparent that government bailouts and other costly measures would be necessary to prop up the Brazilian economy. A state of emergency was declared, enabling the government to remove national spending caps and launch a 147.3 billion-real support package to ensure liquidity, prevent layoffs and support vulnerable groups. The government also intended to reduce its support for states’ debt but has now released an 85.8 billion-real bailout package for them (and that’s after suspending debt payments). At the end of 2019, the government stayed on track for a primary budget surplus of 1 percent of GDP, well below the official goal of 2.3 percent. The National Treasury now anticipates a primary deficit for 2020 of 4.5 percent of GDP (over 350 billion reais), well over the previous goal of 124.1 billion reais.

Difficult Choices Ahead

Support packages like these can keep firms afloat only for so long, and the ability to extend them depends on disposable resources. Herein lies the problem for Brazil: It has very limited headroom to deal with these matters. There are already concerns over the potential for a credit crisis and future lack of investment. The government does have $359 billion in reserves, but it is extremely reluctant to tap these resources – the government would do so only if it believed it was entering the worst-case scenario. All of this is further complicated by the fact that dollar gains against the real since the start of this year resulted in a 43.4 billion-real increase in gross debt, and low oil prices have wiped out tens of billions of reais in oil-related royalties and tax revenue (the budget was based on an average price of oil of $61.25 per barrel).
 
(click to enlarge)

Under these circumstances, Bolsonaro’s effort to preserve what’s left of Brazil’s economy at any cost does not seem unfounded.

At present, the economic pause in parts of Brazil has been in place for only a couple of weeks. During this time, the government has worked to better position the economy to stay afloat. The calls for vertical isolation demonstrate that the government believes it is reaching the limits of its ability to save the economy from severe recession if more economic activity is not restored soon. Bolsonaro, of course, is not alone in being trapped between two bad policy options, and many leaders will soon have to decide when measures to protect public health no longer outweigh the economic cost. When this shift will occur depends on the economic resilience of the country in question, and Brazil came in with a weak hand already half-played.   




Crafty_Dog

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G M

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Re: FBI warned of Chinese researchers transporting disease samples in US
« Reply #467 on: April 01, 2020, 09:28:36 PM »

DougMacG

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Re: Just a coincidence?
« Reply #468 on: April 02, 2020, 05:33:41 AM »
https://www.zerohedge.com/health/one-worst-coverups-human-history-msm-turns-gaze-chinese-biolab-near-covid-19-ground-zero

From the article:  "it shouldn't take Perry Mason to conclude that a virulent coronavirus outbreak which started near a biolab that was experimenting with -- coronavirus -- bears scrutiny."

Tucker Carlson video:  https://twitter.com/ndrew_lawrence/status/1245143177037787141
"The virus likely came from  one of these two labs in Wuhan."
"There were no horseshoe bats living within 900 km."

"27 of 41 infected patients were found to have contact with the Huanan Seafood Market in Wuhan. We noted two laboratories conducting research on bat coronavirus in Wuhan, one of which was only 280 meters from the seafood market. We briefly examined the histories of the laboratories and proposed that the coronavirus probably originated from a laboratory....

... somebody was entangled with the evolution of 2019-nCoV coronavirus. In addition to origins of natural recombination and intermediate host, the killer coronavirus probably originated from a laboratory in Wuhan."
---------------------
Given that this outbreak was said to begin in early winter when most bat species in the region are hibernating and the Chinese horseshoe bat’s habitat covers an enormous swath of the region containing scores of cities and hundreds of millions people, the fact that this Wuhan Strain of coronavirus, denoted as COVID-19, emerged in close proximity to the only BSL-4 virology lab in China, which in turn was staffed with at least two Chinese scientists – Zhengli Shi and Xing-Yi Ge – both virologists who had previously worked at an American lab which had already bio-engineered an incredibly virulent strain of bat coronavirus – the accidental release of a bio-engineered virus from Wuhan’s virology lab cannot be automatically discounted, especially when the Wuhan Strain’s unnatural genomic signals are considered.

UPDATE 2/14, 3:02am EST: A probable smoking pre-print has been released, by the National Natural Science Foundation of China:

“In summary, somebody was entangled with the evolution of 2019-nCoV coronavirus. In addition to origins of natural recombination and intermediate host, the killer coronavirus probably originated from a laboratory in Wuhan.”

In a predictable turn, that article has been removed and both researchers have since deleted their profiles off of the ResearchGate site completely. Furthering the appearance of a cover-up, back on January 2nd, the Wuhan Institute of Virology’s director sent out a memo forbidding discussion of an “unknown pneumonia in Wuhan” after ordering the destruction of all related lab materials a day earlier, making it abundantly clear that the Chinese government knew about this outbreak long before they took any steps to contain it, or made any public announcement.
https://harvardtothebighouse.com/2020/01/31/logistical-and-technical-analysis-of-the-origins-of-the-wuhan-coronavirus-2019-ncov/
------------------------

Chinese government researchers isolated more than 2,000 new viruses, including deadly bat coronaviruses, and carried out scientific work on them just three miles from a wild animal market identified as the epicenter of the COVID-19 pandemic.
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2020/mar/30/china-researchers-isolated-bat-coronaviruses-near-/

DougMacG

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Re: Epidemics: Bird Flu, TB, AIDs, Superbugs, Ebola, etc
« Reply #469 on: April 02, 2020, 05:41:06 AM »
"Coronavirus: pathogen could have been spreading in humans for years, study says
Virus may have jumped from animal to humans long before the first detection in Wuhan, according to research by an international team of scientists
Findings significantly reduce the possibility of the virus having a laboratory origin, director of the US National Institute of Health says"

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3077442/coronavirus-pathogen-could-have-been-spreading-humans-decades
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Doug's observations from above:  Wouldn't that be, 'reduce the probability'.  You can't reduce a "possibility".

All of the studies indicating its likely otherwise leave open the possibility that This Virus Came Directly from That Lab.

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https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3077442/coronavirus-pathogen-could-have-been-spreading-humans-decades

Coronavirus: pathogen could have been spreading in humans for years, study says
Virus may have jumped from animal to humans long before the first detection in Wuhan, according to research by an international team of scientists
Findings significantly reduce the possibility of the virus having a laboratory origin, director of the US National Institute of Health says

Published: 29 Mar, 2020

An international team of scientists say the coronavirus may have jumped from animal to humans long before the first detection in China. Photo: APAn international team of scientists say the coronavirus may have jumped from animal to humans long before the first detection in China. Photo: AP
An international team of scientists say the coronavirus may have jumped from animal to humans long before the first detection in China. Photo: AP
The coronavirus that causes Covid-19 might have been quietly spreading among humans for years or even decades before the sudden outbreak that sparked a global health crisis, according to an investigation by some of the world’s top virus hunters.

Researchers from the United States, Britain and Australia looked at piles of data released by scientists around the world for clues about the virus’ evolutionary past, and found it might have made the jump from animal to humans long before the first detection in the central China city of Wuhan.
Though there could be other possibilities, the scientists said the coronavirus carried a unique mutation that was not found in suspected animal hosts, but was likely to occur during repeated, small-cluster infections in humans.

The study, conducted by Kristian Andersen from the Scripps Research Institute in California, Andrew Rambaut from the University of Edinburgh in Scotland, Ian Lipkin from Columbia University in New York, Edward Holmes from the University of Sydney, and Robert Garry from Tulane University in New Orleans, was published in the scientific journal Nature Medicine on March 17.

Dr Francis Collins, director of the US National Institute of Health, who was not involved in the research, said the study suggested a possible scenario in which the coronavirus crossed from animals into humans before it became capable of causing disease in people.
“Then, as a result of gradual evolutionary changes over years or perhaps decades, the virus eventually gained the ability to spread from human to human and cause serious, often life-threatening disease,” he said in an article published on the institute’s website on Thursday.

In December, doctors in Wuhan began noticing a surge in the number of people suffering from a mysterious pneumonia. Tests for flu and other pathogens returned negative. An unknown strain was isolated, and a team from the Wuhan Institute of Virology led by Shi Zhengli traced its origin to a bat virus found in a mountain cave close to the China-Myanmar border.

The two viruses shared more than 96 per cent of their genes, but the bat virus could not infect humans. It lacked a spike protein to bind with receptors in human cells.

Coronaviruses with a similar spike protein were later discovered in Malayan pangolins by separate teams from Guangzhou and Hong Kong, which led some researchers to believe that a recombination of genomes had occurred between the bat and pangolin viruses.
Doctors in Wuhan began noticing a surge in the number of people suffering from a mysterious pneumonia in December. Photo: Handout
But the new strain, or SARS-Cov-2, had a mutation in its genes known as a polybasic cleavage site that was unseen in any coronaviruses found in bats or pangolins, according to Andersen and his colleagues.

This mutation, according to separate studies by researchers from China, France and the US, could produce a unique structure in the virus’ spike protein to interact with furin, a widely distributed enzyme in the human body. That could then trigger a fusion of the viral envelope and human cell membrane when they came into contact with one another.

Some human viruses including HIV and Ebola have the same furin-like cleavage site, which makes them contagious.

It is possible that the mutation happened naturally to the virus on animal hosts. Sars (severe acute respiratory syndrome) and Mers (Middle East respiratory syndrome), for instance, were believed to have been direct descendants of species found in masked civets and camels, which had a 99 per cent genetic similarity.

There was, however, no such direct evidence for the novel coronavirus, according to the international team. The gap between human and animal types was too large, they said, so they proposed another alternative.

“It is possible that a progenitor of SARS-CoV-2 jumped into humans, acquiring the genomic features described above through adaptation during undetected human-to-human transmission,” they said in the paper.

“Once acquired, these adaptations would enable the pandemic to take off and produce a sufficiently large cluster of cases to trigger the surveillance system that detected it.”

They said also that the most powerful computer models based on current knowledge about the coronavirus could not generate such a strange but highly efficient spike protein structure to bind with host cells.

The study had significantly reduced, if not ruled out, the possibility of a laboratory origin, Collins said.
“In fact, any bioengineer trying to design a coronavirus that threatened human health probably would never have chosen this particular conformation for a spike protein,” he said.

The findings by Western scientists echoed the mainstream opinion among Chinese researchers.
Zhong Nanshan, who advises Beijing on outbreak containment policies, had said on numerous occasions that there was growing scientific evidence to suggest the origin of the virus might not have been in China.

“The occurrence of Covid-19 in Wuhan does not mean it originated in Wuhan,” he said last week.
A doctor working in a public hospital treating Covid-19 patients in Beijing said numerous cases of mysterious pneumonia outbreaks had been reported by health professionals in several countries last year.

Re-examining the records and samples of these patients could reveal more clues about the history of this worsening pandemic, said the doctor, who asked not to be named due to the political sensitivity of the issue.

“There will be a day when the whole thing comes to light.”
« Last Edit: April 02, 2020, 06:00:14 AM by DougMacG »

DougMacG

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Epidemic, Gov Kristi Noem, South Dakota
« Reply #470 on: April 02, 2020, 06:35:06 AM »

DougMacG

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Re: Epidemics: observations, queries
« Reply #471 on: April 02, 2020, 06:50:07 AM »
From Scott Johnson, Brian Sullivan, posted on Powerline:

• New York has 10 times more Wuhan virus cases per capita than the rest of the country. If banning travel from China made sense, why doesn’t it make sense to restrict the interstate travel of New Yorkers in some fashion?

• The elderly and those with underlying health issues are most at risk of dying from Wuhan virus. Why don’t we find ways to isolate and protect them without shutting the entire country down?

• The United States has reported 14 deaths per million of population. Italy and Spain have reported over 200 deaths per million. France, England, and Germany have reported an average of 35 deaths per million. Critics claim Trump’s response is costing American lives. If relatively fewer Americans have died than every other major European country, what is the basis for the critics’ charge?

• Governor Cuomo said New York would start enrolling patients in clinical trials to test hydroxychloroquine last week, but the trials are described as “not yet recruiting” on the ClinicalTrials.gov site? Why are these trials delayed?

• On January 21 the first case of Wuhan virus was confirmed. Ten days later, after Trump promulgated his order limiting travel from China, critics condemned the step as unnecessary and xenophobic. Are these critics still of the same opinion? (Note: Thank “The Senator who saw the coronavirus coming.”)

• The model Minnesota government officials used to justify our current shutdown policies projected that 1.5 percent, or 74,000, of all Minnesotans could die from the Wuhan virus. If these modelers used these same assumptions to estimate deaths in the United States, their model would project 5,000,000 Americans deaths. This is roughly 3 times more deaths per capita than died from the Spanish flu in 1918-19. Do Minnesota government officials think the Wuhan virus is possibly 3x more deadly than the Spanish flu? What model are they using?

https://www.powerlineblog.com/archives/2020/04/the-wuhan-virus-six-notes-queries.php


Crafty_Dog

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Chinese second waves?
« Reply #473 on: April 02, 2020, 10:14:29 AM »
China’s “second waves” start to build. A county in the central Chinese province of Henan went back into lockdown mode on Wednesday following a modest surge in coronavirus infections. Yunnan province, meanwhile, is preventing citizens from crossing into Vietnam, Laos and Myanmar. The broader body of evidence suggests China is still generally bringing the outbreak under control. But as we’ve noted, its behavior at home will speak louder than somewhat dubious Chinese data regarding its success in managing the outbreak. And given that China is facing a surge of imported cases and still trying to figure out just how big a threat is posed by asymptomatic cases, the risk of coronavirus revival in China is high enough – and the geopolitical implications of an uncontainable second wave would be wide-ranging enough – that any such events merit close observation. Irrespective of just how much China has the virus contained, its economy is also facing a second wave of damage as foreign demand for its exports plummets. Both the state and Caixin PMI surveys released this week showed contractions in new orders. Small and medium-sized enterprises are getting hit particularly hard.

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Bill Gates' solution
« Reply #475 on: April 02, 2020, 02:13:51 PM »

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G M

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Re: Time for a Second Opinion: Vertical vs. Horizontal
« Reply #480 on: April 02, 2020, 05:40:19 PM »
https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2020/03/31/time_for_a_second_opinion_142817.html

I guess some people still can’t grasp the concept of exponential growth, or visualize what happens when you push the medical infrastructure beyond capacity. Lockdown is buying us time. At a serious financial cost, to be sure. Break the medical system and everyone gets to die in big community hospice centers pretending to be hospitals. Then people with other medical issues will also die from lack of treatment or medication along with virus victims.

ccp

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Re: Epidemics: Bird Flu, TB, AIDs, Superbugs, Ebola, etc
« Reply #481 on: April 02, 2020, 07:46:23 PM »
last week our calls were ~ 39 % corona. = correction ~30 not 39. 
now closer to 50 %
« Last Edit: April 03, 2020, 04:51:39 AM by ccp »

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Re: Epidemics: Bird Flu, TB, AIDs, Superbugs, Ebola, etc
« Reply #482 on: April 02, 2020, 07:54:00 PM »
last week our calls were ~ 39 % corona
now closer to 50 %

32 days ago, the NY Slimes reported the FIRST NY case of coronavirus. Where will we be 32 days from now?

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-8181893/Bodies-flow-Brooklyn-hospital-like-conveyor-belt-NYC-expects-reach-16-000-deaths.html



« Last Edit: April 02, 2020, 07:57:26 PM by G M »

ccp

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WSJ: Testing is our way out
« Reply #484 on: April 03, 2020, 07:33:41 AM »
Testing Is Our Way Out
Returning to normal is too dangerous. Lockdowns are unsustainable. Let’s save lives without a depression.
By Paul Romer and Rajiv Shah
April 2, 2020 7:21 pm ET

For now, social distancing is the best America can do to contain the Covid-19 pandemic. But if the U.S. truly mobilizes, it can soon deploy better weapons—advanced tests—that will allow the country to shift gradually to a protocol less disruptive and more effective than a lockdown.

Instead of ricocheting between an unsustainable shutdown and a dangerous, uncertain return to normalcy, the U.S. could mount a sustainable strategy with better tests and maintain a stable course for as long as it takes to develop a vaccine or cure. The country will once more be able to plan for the future, get back to work safely and avoid an economic depression. This will require massive investment to ramp up production and coordinate the construction of test centers. But the alternatives are even more costly.

Two types of testing will be essential. The first test, which relies on a technology known as the polymerase chain reaction, or PCR, can detect the virus even before a person has symptoms. It is the best way to identify who is infected. The second test looks not for the virus but for the antibodies that the immune system produces to fight it. This test isn’t so effective during the early stages of an infection, but since antibodies remain even after the virus is gone, it reveals who has been infected in the past.

Together, these two tests will give policy makers the data to make smarter decisions about who needs to be isolated and where resources need to be deployed. Instead of firing blindly, this data will let the country target its efforts.

Here’s a simple illustration of how test data can save lives. Every day millions of health-care professionals go to work without knowing whether they are infectious and might spread the virus to their colleagues. We both have close relatives on the front lines. As soon as one of them developed a cough, she pulled herself out of service. But at that point she may have been infectious for several critical days. If she and her colleagues had all been tested every day, her infection would have been caught earlier and she would have isolated herself sooner.

To be used as a screening mechanism at the beginning of a shift, the test would need to be able to give a result within minutes. Developers are making progress on speeding up these PCR tests—so much so that the aforementioned physician received the results from her second test, conducted five days after the first, before those from the first test. Abbott and Roche, two pharmaceutical companies, are moving forward with tests that can decrease reporting times from days or hours to minutes. Now that the doctor has recovered, an antibody test could help determine when she can return to the frontlines of patient care.

As testing capacity expands, the same tests could be offered to all essential workers, such as police officers and emergency technicians, and then to other overlooked but critical workers—pharmacists, grocery clerks, sanitation staff. The next step would be to test people throughout the country at random to get up-to-date information about who is infected now and who has ever been infected.

For those who are currently infected, governments can provide immediate assistance to make sure they don’t infect anyone else, especially family members. Those infected before who now have antibodies may be less susceptible to reinfection. If that is proved in the weeks to come, they could also return to work.

Putting this system in place will take resources, creativity and hard work. Test developers will have to increase the production rate of kits by an order of magnitude. In his work fighting Ebola in West Africa, Dr. Shah saw how a virus can cause a 30% reduction in economic output. Mr. Romer’s back-of-the-envelope calculation is that the recession caused by the coronavirus pandemic has already caused a 20% reduction in U.S. output, which means the country is losing about $350 billion in production each month. If a $100 billion investment in a crash program to make antibody and PCR tests ubiquitous brought a recovery one month sooner, it would more than pay for itself.

Building this testing system would be complicated and require the best of American science, business and philanthropy working together. But it is the type of challenge that the U.S. has overcome before. It isn’t viable to wait a year or two for a vaccine before getting people back to work safely. To save lives and prevent a depression, testing on a massive scale is essential.

Mr. Romer is a professor at New York University and a 2018 Nobel laureate in Economics. Dr. Shah is president of the Rockefeller Foundation and served as administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development, 2010-15.

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Re: Epidemics:Mask debate
« Reply #486 on: April 03, 2020, 09:25:17 AM »
IYI bureaucrats opposed to masks used (bogus) arguments abt the protection of the wearer ("not perfect", etc.)

They didn't think that since it ALSO prevents (more effectively) ASYMPTOMATIC sick pple from spreading it, there wd be yuuge systemic effect.

    - n.n. taleb 4/2/20  https://twitter.com/nntaleb

[IYI: intellectual yet ignorant.]
« Last Edit: April 03, 2020, 09:27:40 AM by DougMacG »

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Re: Epidemics: Bird Flu, TB, AIDs, Superbugs, Ebola, etc
« Reply #487 on: April 03, 2020, 10:11:01 AM »
Attributed to Martin Luther regarding the plague:
"I shall avoid places and persons where my presence is not needed in order not to become contaminated and thus perchance inflict and pollute others and so cause their death as a result of my negligence.

If God should wish to take me, he will surely find me and I have done what he has expected of me and so I am not responsible for either my own death or the death of others.

If my neighbor needs me however I shall not avoid place or person but will go freely as stated above. See this is such a God-fearing faith because it is neither brash nor foolhardy and does not tempt God."
"Martin Luther, Luther’s Works, Vol. 43: Devotional Writings II, ed. Jaroslav Jan Pelikan, Hilton C. Oswald, and Helmut T. Lehmann, vol. 43 (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1999), 119–38."
--------------------------------
Pandemic wisdom from other religions:
“Trust in Allah but tether your camel first — because Allah has no other hands than yours.”
https://sufiway.eu/trust-in-allah-but-tether-your-camel/

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Re: Epidemics: Bird Flu, TB, AIDs, Superbugs, Ebola, etc
« Reply #488 on: April 03, 2020, 11:49:37 AM »
during the great Black Death
a moniker first used in the 19 th century previously known as the great pestulence

the wealthy in England would escape to their chateaus castles etc.

their death rate ~ 25 %

everyone else~ 35 or up to 40 or more %.

they were half right
the plague was mostly spread from the bite of  flea infested rats

so did these flea infested rats travel from the cities into the rural areas ?  or was some of the deaths in the rural areas from cattle to human anthrax that happened around the same time?

unlike Martin Luther , the wealthy were not likely thinking of contaminating others when they fled to their estates in the countryside.




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Re: Epidemics: Bird Flu, TB, AIDs, Superbugs, Ebola, etc
« Reply #491 on: April 03, 2020, 02:30:55 PM »
Cuomo cuts off his nose to spite NY's face

will never hear this in MSM

where are all those f'ng columbia profs coming and claiming he is killing people by refusing this offer from Remington?


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Pandemic Local Stats
« Reply #492 on: April 03, 2020, 05:00:52 PM »
Just talked with neighbor, a nurse at the major west suburban hospital here in the Twin Cities.  They have 17 COVID cases out of 361 beds.  Week 4 of exponential growth.

Therefore the liquor stores are open but the golf courses are all locked up.  Essential / non-essential.  Target is open but a friend's gift shop is state ordered shut.  Housing open, rent optional.  Eviction courts closed.
« Last Edit: April 04, 2020, 03:44:08 AM by DougMacG »

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If Talib and Omar get their way
« Reply #493 on: April 03, 2020, 05:29:08 PM »
Therefore the liquor stores are open but the golf courses are all locked up.  Essential / non-essential

soon prisons emptied
of criminals
and those who don't cover faces with scarf or hijab or walk their dog
fill up the prisons again



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CDC expert: How could we have been so wrong?
« Reply #494 on: April 03, 2020, 08:12:42 PM »
A Pandemic Expert Tells Us Why She Was So Wrong About Coronavirus
'I just assumed that the US system would be a little bit better...and I just couldn't have been more wrong.'
By Matthew Gault
31 March 2020, 1:39pmShareTweetSnap

IMAGE: ANGUS MORDANT/BLOOMBERG VIA GETTY IMAGES

In the early days of the coronavirus pandemic, many public health experts were sure that the virus could be beaten before it had a disastrous impact: as long as testing was robust, and the systems in place functioned properly, America would pull through relatively unscathed.

They may have been right, but we’ll never know, because testing has not been robust, and the systems in place have all failed miserably.

One expert I spoke with in late February was Theresa MacPhail, a medical anthropologist, Assistant Professor at Stevens Institute of Technology, and author of the book The Viral Network: A Pathology of the H1N1 Influenza Pandemic. MacPhail worked with the CDC in 2009 as a volunteer intern as part of its Global Disease & Detection unit, taking part in global conference calls on the H1N1 pandemic and seeing how the organization is structured. She was in Hong Kong during its H1N1 outbreak.

In late February, she spoke optimistically with me about America’s ability to handle the coming Covid-19 outbreak. In early March, she got sick with what she believes to be Covid-19. She reached out to me recently, insisting to go on the record again to say that she was wrong, and that she put too much faith in the CDC and America’s ability to manage the crisis.

How are you feeling?
I feel guilty. I feel like I should have known better.

What was it about our previous conversation that made you feel guilty?
I made a lot of assumptions and didn’t think twice about having made them. I know I’m not alone, I’m just one of the only people that is saying publicly, "Well, I got this completely wrong."

I think it was overconfidence. I feel like what we're seeing is a bit of hubris. We're basically suffering, partially, because there was no plan for when the [Center for Disease Control] fucked up, because they don't fuck up, or they haven't in the past. They don't have a protocol for when they can't do an assay. And that's exactly what happened. Their assays didn't work. And there was no plan for that.

What do you mean by an assay?
I just assumed that the US system would be a little bit better, would be a little bit more robust and do more testing and containment than China was able to do, and I just couldn't have been more wrong.

When we talked, I was still so confident that this response was gonna look like the 2009 [H1N1] pandemic response, which was a good response. Initially, it had some problems… but once they realized what was going on, they kicked into gear and everything went pretty well.

One thing that's super different is that the CDC in 2009 provided central leadership. They were proactively reaching out to state, regional, and local Health officials saying, ‘Here's what you need to be doing. Here's what this should look like.’ And people did it.

I am scared and enraged because there's no central authority here. I don't understand what's going on. The CDC isn't giving press briefings. They're just absent. And that could be because the administration is muzzling them. Or it could mean that there's disarray inside the CDC. And I guess all of that will come out.

But I feel guilty because I knew them. So it's a bit like not wanting to think your Uncle Bob did something wrong or was capable of doing something wrong. That's why I feel bad, because I just assumed that this response would look like the old response. And it doesn't at all, and I just feel so awful.

I wasn't one of those people sounding the warning alarm. I really felt like we had a shot at containing [it]. But that meant that we had to have tests. I didn’t realize what 10 years of underfunding public health had done.

You got sick after we spoke last, right?
I was never tested, but if I had to lay bets I would say I have it. I’m still sick now. I’m on day 25. I got sick on March 1. It was the classic sore throat, feeling a little bit disgusting, and then at day five or six my fever started to spike. It got as high as 102.5 and never went below 100, despite taking massive amounts of fever reducer.

I started having tightness in my chest. I had a dry cough. I went to the ER on March 9. They put me in a separate room. Before all this went down, I had been contacted to go to Washington to the House of Representatives and give a public statement before Congress about what we’ve learned in pandemics past. Of course, that all got shot out of the water.

I asked the ER doctor, “Can you tell me in your professional opinion, are you prepared for this?” He said, "Absolutely not." He had been doing this for 12 years. He was there for the 2009 pandemic. He said in 2009 they were overprepared. They had extra flu kits, they had extra supplies, they were ready. They had been prepared by the Department of Health. The communication had been clear. He said, "I hate to tell you this but we’re underprepared now. We don’t have extra supplies. We don’t have any tests." That’s when I started to think, "This is serious."

The only way we get out of this, the only way we return to a semblance of normal, is massive testing. And I’m starting to get worried because when are we doing that? It’s mind boggling.

You’ve mentioned a few times that past responses were better. What do you mean?
After SARS [in 2003], everyone got real serious for a minute. And there was a lot of funding going into public health surveillance and response because the world got a little preview of what could happen, what was possible. And I feel like maybe that's also why 2009 went better. It was only six years after SARS, people had been drilling, and they had been planning, and they had been prepping. And they had a little bit more money because of SARS.

Why do you think this happened and how do we make sure it doesn’t happen again?
We’ve been too successful. It’s the same story with vaccinations. As a culture, we have no institutional or cultural memory anymore of what it’s like to live with microbes. This is a crash course. It’s a wake up call. My hope is, the only thing that keeps me going, is maybe we’ll learn a lesson from this.

Fund public health. Maybe we’ll change our culture so that it’s not expected or brave of you to go to work sick. Maybe we’ll start to protect each other the way Asian cultures do. It’s pretty normal in Asian societies to wear a mask when you’re sick when you go out in public and to stay home if you can. We are the exact opposite. We wear masks to protect ourselves and we feel free to show up at a meeting when we have a fever.

The CDC has to be cut free of political influence. I can’t believe the agency is a federally-appointed administration. Everytime the administration changes, the leadership of CDC changes and that’s insane. We need to find a way to give places like the CDC and [National Institute of Health] autonomy with oversight.

How are you processing your guilt?
I have made a resolution that going forward, I will not make the same mistake twice. I will not be so certain about what I know in the future. And I will do more due diligence on trying to figure out what the current situation is. And as a second thing that I'm doing with my guilt is I'm being extremely honest with my students and with my colleagues.

This article originally appeared on VICE US.

TAGGED:COVID-19


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Re: CDC expert: How could we have been so wrong?
« Reply #496 on: April 03, 2020, 09:44:03 PM »



A Pandemic Expert Tells Us Why She Was So Wrong About Coronavirus
'I just assumed that the US system would be a little bit better...and I just couldn't have been more wrong.'
By Matthew Gault
31 March 2020, 1:39pmShareTweetSnap

IMAGE: ANGUS MORDANT/BLOOMBERG VIA GETTY IMAGES

In the early days of the coronavirus pandemic, many public health experts were sure that the virus could be beaten before it had a disastrous impact: as long as testing was robust, and the systems in place functioned properly, America would pull through relatively unscathed.

They may have been right, but we’ll never know, because testing has not been robust, and the systems in place have all failed miserably.

One expert I spoke with in late February was Theresa MacPhail, a medical anthropologist, Assistant Professor at Stevens Institute of Technology, and author of the book The Viral Network: A Pathology of the H1N1 Influenza Pandemic. MacPhail worked with the CDC in 2009 as a volunteer intern as part of its Global Disease & Detection unit, taking part in global conference calls on the H1N1 pandemic and seeing how the organization is structured. She was in Hong Kong during its H1N1 outbreak.

In late February, she spoke optimistically with me about America’s ability to handle the coming Covid-19 outbreak. In early March, she got sick with what she believes to be Covid-19. She reached out to me recently, insisting to go on the record again to say that she was wrong, and that she put too much faith in the CDC and America’s ability to manage the crisis.

How are you feeling?
I feel guilty. I feel like I should have known better.

What was it about our previous conversation that made you feel guilty?
I made a lot of assumptions and didn’t think twice about having made them. I know I’m not alone, I’m just one of the only people that is saying publicly, "Well, I got this completely wrong."

I think it was overconfidence. I feel like what we're seeing is a bit of hubris. We're basically suffering, partially, because there was no plan for when the [Center for Disease Control] fucked up, because they don't fuck up, or they haven't in the past. They don't have a protocol for when they can't do an assay. And that's exactly what happened. Their assays didn't work. And there was no plan for that.

What do you mean by an assay?
I just assumed that the US system would be a little bit better, would be a little bit more robust and do more testing and containment than China was able to do, and I just couldn't have been more wrong.

When we talked, I was still so confident that this response was gonna look like the 2009 [H1N1] pandemic response, which was a good response. Initially, it had some problems… but once they realized what was going on, they kicked into gear and everything went pretty well.

One thing that's super different is that the CDC in 2009 provided central leadership. They were proactively reaching out to state, regional, and local Health officials saying, ‘Here's what you need to be doing. Here's what this should look like.’ And people did it.

I am scared and enraged because there's no central authority here. I don't understand what's going on. The CDC isn't giving press briefings. They're just absent. And that could be because the administration is muzzling them. Or it could mean that there's disarray inside the CDC. And I guess all of that will come out.

But I feel guilty because I knew them. So it's a bit like not wanting to think your Uncle Bob did something wrong or was capable of doing something wrong. That's why I feel bad, because I just assumed that this response would look like the old response. And it doesn't at all, and I just feel so awful.

I wasn't one of those people sounding the warning alarm. I really felt like we had a shot at containing [it]. But that meant that we had to have tests. I didn’t realize what 10 years of underfunding public health had done.

You got sick after we spoke last, right?
I was never tested, but if I had to lay bets I would say I have it. I’m still sick now. I’m on day 25. I got sick on March 1. It was the classic sore throat, feeling a little bit disgusting, and then at day five or six my fever started to spike. It got as high as 102.5 and never went below 100, despite taking massive amounts of fever reducer.

I started having tightness in my chest. I had a dry cough. I went to the ER on March 9. They put me in a separate room. Before all this went down, I had been contacted to go to Washington to the House of Representatives and give a public statement before Congress about what we’ve learned in pandemics past. Of course, that all got shot out of the water.

I asked the ER doctor, “Can you tell me in your professional opinion, are you prepared for this?” He said, "Absolutely not." He had been doing this for 12 years. He was there for the 2009 pandemic. He said in 2009 they were overprepared. They had extra flu kits, they had extra supplies, they were ready. They had been prepared by the Department of Health. The communication had been clear. He said, "I hate to tell you this but we’re underprepared now. We don’t have extra supplies. We don’t have any tests." That’s when I started to think, "This is serious."

The only way we get out of this, the only way we return to a semblance of normal, is massive testing. And I’m starting to get worried because when are we doing that? It’s mind boggling.

You’ve mentioned a few times that past responses were better. What do you mean?
After SARS [in 2003], everyone got real serious for a minute. And there was a lot of funding going into public health surveillance and response because the world got a little preview of what could happen, what was possible. And I feel like maybe that's also why 2009 went better. It was only six years after SARS, people had been drilling, and they had been planning, and they had been prepping. And they had a little bit more money because of SARS.

Why do you think this happened and how do we make sure it doesn’t happen again?
We’ve been too successful. It’s the same story with vaccinations. As a culture, we have no institutional or cultural memory anymore of what it’s like to live with microbes. This is a crash course. It’s a wake up call. My hope is, the only thing that keeps me going, is maybe we’ll learn a lesson from this.

Fund public health. Maybe we’ll change our culture so that it’s not expected or brave of you to go to work sick. Maybe we’ll start to protect each other the way Asian cultures do. It’s pretty normal in Asian societies to wear a mask when you’re sick when you go out in public and to stay home if you can. We are the exact opposite. We wear masks to protect ourselves and we feel free to show up at a meeting when we have a fever.

The CDC has to be cut free of political influence. I can’t believe the agency is a federally-appointed administration. Everytime the administration changes, the leadership of CDC changes and that’s insane. We need to find a way to give places like the CDC and [National Institute of Health] autonomy with oversight.

How are you processing your guilt?
I have made a resolution that going forward, I will not make the same mistake twice. I will not be so certain about what I know in the future. And I will do more due diligence on trying to figure out what the current situation is. And as a second thing that I'm doing with my guilt is I'm being extremely honest with my students and with my colleagues.

This article originally appeared on VICE US.

TAGGED:COVID-19


Crafty_Dog

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Re: Epidemics: Bird Flu, TB, AIDs, Superbugs, Ebola, etc
« Reply #498 on: April 04, 2020, 10:23:58 AM »
https://www.washingtonpost.com/

Could someone get and paste here the article today on Inside the Corona Virus Testing Failure?

Thank you.

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Inside the coronavirus testing failure
« Reply #499 on: April 04, 2020, 11:13:44 AM »
Link added:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2020/04/03/coronavirus-cdc-test-kits-public-health-labs/?arc404=true
-------------
Inside the coronavirus testing failure: Alarm and dismay among the scientists who sought to help
A technician transfers a sample to a tube for coronavirus testing at a lab in Seattle on March 27. (Jovelle Tamayo for The Washington Post)
By Shawn Boburg, Robert O'Harrow Jr., Neena Satija and Amy Goldstein
April 3, 2020

On a Jan. 15 conference call, a leading scientist at the federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention assured local and state public health officials from across the nation that there would soon be a test to detect a mysterious virus spreading from China. Stephen Lindstrom told them the threat was remote and they may not need the test his team was developing “unless the scope gets much larger than we anticipate,” according to an email summarizing the call.

“We’re in good hands,” a public health official who participated in the call wrote in the email to colleagues.

Three weeks later, early on Feb. 8, one of the first CDC test kits arrived in a Federal Express package at a public health laboratory on the east side of Manhattan. By then, the virus had reached the United States, and the kits represented the government’s best hope for containing it while that was still possible.

For hours, lab technicians struggled to verify that the test worked. Each time, it fell short, producing untrustworthy results.

That night, they called their lab director, Jennifer Rakeman, an assistant commissioner in the New York City health department, to tell her it had failed. “Oh, s---,” she replied. “What are we going to do now?”

In the 21 days that followed, as Trump administration officials continued to rely on the flawed CDC test, many lab scientists eager to aid the faltering effort grew increasingly alarmed and exasperated by the federal government’s actions, according to previously unreported email messages and other documents reviewed by The Washington Post, as well as exclusive interviews with scientists and officials involved.

In their private communications, scientists at academic, hospital and public health labs — one layer removed from federal agency operations — expressed dismay at the failure to move more quickly and frustration at bureaucratic demands that delayed their attempts to develop alternatives to the CDC test.

“We have the skills and resources as a community but we are collectively paralyzed by a bloated bureaucratic/administrative process,” Marc Couturier, medical director at academic laboratory ARUP in Utah, wrote to other microbiologists on Feb. 27 after weeks of mounting frustration.

The administration embraced a new approach behind closed doors that very day, concluding that “a much broader” effort to testing was needed, according to an internal government memo spelling out the plan. Two days later, the administration announced a relaxation of the regulations that scientists said had hindered private laboratories from deploying their own tests.

By then, the virus had spread across the country. In less than a month, it would upend daily life, shuttering the world’s largest economy and killing thousands of Americans.

In a statement to The Post, the CDC said an investigation of the initial problems is ongoing. The test is now in use in every state and is “accurate and reliable,” the agency said.

Stephen Hahn, the commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration, which regulates testing, told The Post the agency is continuously adapting to an “unprecedented global public health crisis."

“Right now, our efforts are focused on doing everything we can do to fight COVID-19, but we know there will certainly be a time to learn larger lessons from the agency’s response,” he said in a statement, referring to the disease caused by the novel coronavirus.

In an interview Thursday, Brett P. Giroir, a Public Health Service admiral who on March 12 was named the top administration official on the testing effort, acknowledged the government should have moved more decisively to detect and contain the virus.

“There was a clear need for a more aggressive posture,” said Giroir, an assistant secretary at the Department of Health and Human Services, adding that agency leaders named him to the new role because “unprecedented steps needed to take place.”

Asked who was responsible for the delays in the early stages of the crisis, he paused.

“A problem like this is bigger than any single agency,” he said. “Clearly, there needed to be a higher level of leadership and organization.”

The need for a test

The first reports about a strange, possibly unknown virus started leaking out of China in late December. Scientists and researchers in the United States and around the world began paying keen attention to the apparent epicenter of the spread, a sprawling industrial city in central China called Wuhan.

Among those keeping close track were virologists and other specialists at the CDC, the country’s flagship public health agency. Founded in 1946 to fight malaria in Southern states, the CDC is at the vanguard in the fight against infectious diseases throughout the nation. It employs some 22,000 epidemiologists, biologists, behavioral scientists and others. Recent successes include rapid responses to contain the Zika, MERS and Ebola viruses.

In early January, the CDC publicly treated the virus from Wuhan as a distant potential threat, issuing an advisory urging that the “usual precautions” be taken when traveling abroad.

The agency also began laying plans to protect the country. Led by Lindstrom, one team began considering the kinds of tests, technically called assays, that could identify the virus.

Lindstrom is a microbiologist with an impressive track record: He had helped develop a testing method critical to detecting the H1N1 virus in 2009. During a Jan. 7 conference call, he told public health officials that the CDC’s aim was to “plan for the worst, hope for the best,” according to an email exchange among scientists and others. Lindstrom, like several other officials named in this report, did not respond to requests for interviews.

On Jan. 10, CDC scientists received an important break when the Chinese government published the pathogen’s genetic sequence. The sequence, a long string of letters representing the RNA structure of SARS-CoV-2 described a coronavirus never before seen in humans. It also gave scientists a path to create a precise diagnostic test that could detect the virus.

CDC has long led the nation’s efforts to create diagnostic tests when a public health threat emerges. The agency usually distributes the tests to a network of state and county public health labs nationwide, using the results to track and contain new pathogens until large-scale commercial tests come on line.

But state and local public health labs juggle an immense array of responsibilities, including water and food safety, and government studies dating back two decades have found the public health labs often lack the money and resources to keep pace with the demands.

On the Jan. 15 call, Lindstrom told more than a dozen public health officials that the CDC planned to make its test available to all state and county public health labs. He assured them “there will not be pressure for everyone (at least from CDC) to implement unless the scope gets much larger than we anticipate right now,” according to the email summary written by Kelly Wroblewski, director of infectious disease programs at the Association of Public Health Laboratories.

CDC scientists were not the only ones interested in creating a test. Commercial laboratories began to mobilize, and scientists at major hospitals and universities sprang into action to develop tests of their own.

One of them was Alex Greninger, 38, an assistant director of the University of Washington’s clinical virology lab. For Greninger, the chance to create a diagnostic test for a novel coronavirus was a rare opportunity.

Researchers at the University of Nebraska, Stanford University and elsewhere also began taking their first steps toward inventing tests for the virus to use in their own labs. These academic labs didn’t have the capacity to process the millions of tests that would be needed in the event of a pandemic, a scale that is achievable only by commercial labs, but their limited testing capabilities might have helped efforts to detect and slow the virus in its early stages.

On Jan. 16, the day Greninger started buying supplies for his test, a 35-year-old man who had recently visited Wuhan became ill with flu-like symptoms after returning to the Seattle area, according to a CDC incident report. The man went to his doctor, who swabbed his nose and sent the sample to the CDC, according to the report.

Four days later, using its newly developed test, the CDC confirmed that the man was the first person in the United States known to be infected with the novel coronavirus.

In a CNBC interview two days after that, President Trump downplayed the threat to Americans.

“We have it totally under control,” he said.

Early December
Dec. 31
Jan. 7
Jan. 8
Jan. 10
Jan. 15
Jan. 16
Jan. 17
Jan. 20
Early December

The first presumed case of the novel coronavirus, which causes the disease covid-19, appears in Wuhan, China.
Dec. 31

China informs the World Health Organization about a strange pneumonia-like illness.
Jan. 7

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention begins planning for tests. In an email, Stephanie Chester from the Association of Public Health Laboratories tells her colleagues that the CDC’s chief microbiologist said the agency’s aim is to "plan for the worst, hope for the best."

Right now the pathogen is still unidentified, but if it is identified and is truly novel, they will be putting together an EUA assay. He said they are in a "plan for the worst, hope for the best" mode. A lot of their response efforts are contingent on being able to actually get data and info out of China. The main concern for the US PHLs is general travel and people returning from the Chinese New Year in the coming weeks. Will let you know if I hear more.
Jan. 8

The CDC issues an official health advisory recommending travelers to take the usual precautions.

Read the full document
Jan. 10

China publishes the pathogen’s genetic sequence.
Jan. 15

The first known person in the United States to be infected with the virus arrives in Seattle from China. On the same day, CDC scientists say the agency will make its tests available to all state and county public health labs.
Jan. 16

Alex Greninger, a scientist at the University of Washington who was creating a coronavirus test, orders the necessary chemical reagents. He is one of several scientists across the country rushing to design their own test.
Jan. 17

Nancy Messonnier, a CDC official, says that "for a family sitting around the dinner table tonight, this is not something that they generally need to worry about."

Since the outbreaks of MERS and SARS, we have made improved in our capacity in the United States and around the world. We’re now better poised to respond to this new threat quickly and collaboratively. Based on the information that CDC has today, we believe the current risk from this virus to the general public is low. For a family sitting around the dinner table tonight this is not something that they generally need to worry about.
Jan. 20

After developing a test over the weekend, the CDC in an internal incident report confirms the first positive case of the coronavirus in the United States.

Read the full document
A significant moment

Designing the test took CDC scientists seven days — a stunningly short period of time for a health-care system built around the principles of medical quality and patient safety, not speed.

The CDC could use the test in its Atlanta labs but could not send it out to public health labs until it won approval from the FDA. On Jan. 28, Lindstrom and others at the CDC assured public health scientists in a conference call that “CDC’s goal is to get (FDA approval) as quickly as possible and expects the assay will be ready to deploy within two weeks, possibly sooner,” according to an Association of Public Health Laboratories’ summary of the call.

Although the CDC test was a priority, the FDA was also fielding inquiries from other test developers. At the end of January, about 20 companies and scientific groups were talking with the FDA about their plans to develop tests, according to two government officials familiar with those inquiries who like many others interviewed for this story spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive matters.

At the same time, pressure on the Trump administration to take action was growing. The number of people who had died of the infection worldwide spiked to 200 by Jan. 30, when the World Health Organization declared the virus a public health emergency of international concern.

The next day, Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar announced a health emergency in the United States. At the time, Azar was the leader of the White House’s newly created coronavirus task force.
Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex Azar speaks during a January briefing with members of President Trump's coronavirus task force. (Jabin Botsford/The Washington Post)

The declaration was one of the most significant moments in the unfolding crisis. Such declarations provide the FDA flexibility to speed up approvals for critical medical products, including commercial diagnostic tests. But they also trigger strict limits on scientists in government-certified clinical labs at universities, research centers and hospitals.

Those labs are typically permitted by the FDA to make and use their own tests without government approval, including to make decisions about patient care, as long as they use them only in their own facilities and do not sell them.

But once Azar announced a public health emergency, tests created in such laboratories had to receive an “emergency use authorization,” or EUA, from the FDA. The additional regulation is intended to ensure the efficacy of tests in public health crises in which inaccurate results could be damaging.

The new regulatory hurdle stalled efforts like the one underway by Greninger at the University of Washington. Greninger and other scientists were located in some of the nation’s early coronavirus hot spots, where successful tests might have helped reveal the scope of the outbreak. Suddenly, their hands were tied.

Clinical scientists fumed about the new obstacle, according to exchanges in private online chat groups among academics and scientists.

“The EUA process is flawed, broken, and inefficient,” Couturier, the medical director and diagnostic specialist at ARUP Laboratories in Utah, wrote later on ClinMicroNet, a private message system for microbiology lab directors across the world.
Alex Greninger, an assistant director of the University of Washington’s clinical virology lab, said his efforts to develop a test for coronavirus were stalled by an FDA regulation. (Jovelle Tamayo for The Washington Post)

In a statement this week, the FDA said its regulations “had not hindered or been a roadblock” to the rollout of tests.

“Every action the FDA has taken during this public health emergency to address the COVID-19 pandemic has balanced the urgent need to make diagnostic tests available with providing a level of oversight that ensures accurate tests are being deployed,” the agency said.

But in his interview, Giroir offered a different analysis.

“If someone says they were a barrier, to me, you have to believe them,” he told The Post. “If they thought it was a barrier, it becomes a barrier.”

One person familiar with the emergency declaration told The Post that FDA career staff did not raise concerns about the EUA’s burdens on clinical labs to Azar or to FDA leaders. Azar oversees the FDA.

Hahn had been confirmed by the Senate as FDA commissioner on Dec. 12 — just seven weeks before Azar’s declaration. Before that, Hahn was a radiation oncologist and chief medical executive at the MD Anderson Cancer Center in Houston.

Hahn’s agency approved the CDC test on Feb. 4, making it the country’s only accepted test for the novel coronavirus. Public health officials in New York City, Nebraska, Colorado, Minnesota, New York State and elsewhere began receiving them four days later.

The test kits contain compact collections of chemicals known as reagents. The chemicals help isolate viral genetic material and then amplify it so that it can be detected by probes that also came with the kit.

Scientists in the local labs quickly recognized something was wrong. The assays often produced results that suggested the virus was present in samples in which scientists knew it was not.

On Feb. 8, when lab technicians for New York City’s health department ran the test on samples that contained the virus, they saw on their computer screens a logarithmic curve sloping upward, indicating the virus was present. The problem was, they saw something similar when they ran the test on distilled water that contained no trace of the virus.

When they finally gave up that evening, the technicians called their director, Rakeman. Shortly before midnight, she relayed the bad news in an email to local health authorities. “The issue will need to be investigated and could result in significant impact to testing availability at the CDC and across the country until the issue is resolved,” she wrote.

New York State lab officials also passed on the news, according to documents and interviews. “There is a technical problem in one of the reagents which invalidates the assay and will not allow us to perform the assay,” the lab director of New York State’s Wadsworth Center, Jill Taylor, wrote to state health officials in an email that same night.

“I am sorry to not have better news,” she wrote. “It is a bummer.”

Word that some labs were having problems with the test quickly made its way back to the CDC.

“Is this something to worry about?” Daniel Jernigan, a leader of the CDC’s coronavirus response, wrote to the Association of Public Health Laboratories the next morning as he prepared to board a plane.

It was, he was told.

Later that day, Scott Becker, chief executive of the association, raised concerns to another CDC official. “The states and their governors are going to come unglued,” he wrote, adding later, “If CDC doesn’t get ahead of this it will be a disaster.”

As they struggled to make the test kit work, many of the public health labs realized they might succeed by eliminating one of its three main chemical components. But under the FDA’s emergency rules, they could use the test only as it was approved. The flaw meant they could not use it at all.

“The silence from CDC … is deafening,” Joanne Bartkus, the Minnesota health department’s lab director, wrote to Becker on Feb. 10. “What is going on? We are getting questions from our governor’s office and other labs are getting media requests asking when we will be starting.”

By Feb. 12, a total of 2,009 tests had been conducted in the United States, according to CDC data.

“We’re screwed from a testing standpoint if this thing takes off in the US,” Susan Butler-Wu, director of medical microbiology at the Los Angeles County and University of Southern California Medical Center, warned in a Feb. 13 email to fellow scientists.
Scott Becker, chief executive of the Association for Public Health Laboratories, raised concerns to the CDC about issues with its test. (Bill O'Leary/The Washington Post)
Falling behind

The United States was clearly falling behind in the fight against covid-19. Other countries such as Singapore and Taiwan were ramping up testing quickly. In South Korea, 1,000 people were being tested each day by mid-February, a number that would increase more than tenfold by the end of the month.

The Geneva-based World Health Organization, meanwhile, had already delivered 250,000 diagnostic tests designed and manufactured by a German lab to 70 laboratories around the world.

Academic and hospital researchers including Greninger eagerly experimented with the German lab design early on and found it workable, but U.S. health officials continued on their own path.

“To our knowledge, no discussions occurred between WHO and CDC (or other USG agencies) about WHO providing COVID-19 tests to the U.S.,” WHO spokesman Tarik Jasarevic told The Post.

Hahn defended the U.S. government’s approach at a news conference weeks later.

“In the U.S., we have policies in place that strike the right balance during public health emergencies of ensuring critical independent review by the scientific and public health experts and timely test availability,” he said in a White House press briefing. “What’s important here is that we have a test that the American people can trust.”

The FDA’s confidence in the flawed test was based in part on assurances from the CDC that it could be fixed easily, according to officials familiar with the agency’s deliberations.

In its statement to The Post, the CDC said it collaborated closely with the FDA and “encouraged our government partners to work with the private sector to develop diagnostic tests for commercial use and to remove restrictions for … labs in hospitals and universities across the county.”

On Feb. 16, officials from the FDA and CDC met to discuss solutions, including the possibility of eliminating the component of the test that was causing problems, officials said. FDA officials said that would be a fast solution that could quickly get the public health labs up and running. But in the following days, the FDA learned that some public labs were reporting continuing problems with the test, the officials said.

As officials struggled to understand the test flaws, leading clinical labs were spending much of their time and energy on the FDA’s paperwork and data demands to win approval for their tests.

The Mayo Clinic created its first-ever rapid response team. A third of the 15 members were devoted solely to the FDA’s data and paperwork demands. Like others on the team, they worked 15-hour days for three weeks.

“It’s unlike anything we’ve ever done before,” said Matt Binnicker, a director of clinical virology at Mayo.

He said they decided to persist because, in a worst-case scenario, the public health labs alone could not test on the scale that would be needed. “The public health infrastructure is really not set up to handle a pandemic,” he said.

At the University of Washington, Greninger and his fellow scientists were initially baffled by an FDA process they viewed as baroque. They had always worked under strict guidelines, aimed at protecting patients and guaranteeing quality. But the EUA was a bureaucratic puzzle they had never encountered.

“The most pernicious effect of the current regulatory environment is that it kneecaps our ability for preparedness should a true emergency emerge,” Greninger wrote to colleagues on Feb. 14.

Greninger channeled his energy into the paperwork problem, spending more than 100 hours filling out forms and collecting information needed for the application, he told The Post. But when he finally submitted the material, an FDA official told him the agency could not accept it — because he had emailed it.

“We received your email and attachments regarding the UW 2019-nCoV assay pre-EUA,” an FDA official wrote on Feb. 20. “However, we have not received the official submission through DCC.”

“What is the DCC?” Greninger wrote back.

“The Document Control Center,” came the reply.

“What is the Document Control Center?”

Greninger then learned about another requirement. Under FDA rules, he was supposed to digitally copy the electronic documents he had emailed to the FDA, burn the copies onto a disk and mail the hard disk to an office in suburban District of Columbia.

Greninger shared his exasperation in a Feb. 20 email to a colleague: “repeat after me, emergency.”

In a statement, an FDA official said information sent by Greninger on Feb. 19 was promptly reviewed, despite not having been submitted properly, and was found to be insufficient to demonstrate that the test would work. The official said that after that interaction, “we immediately addressed how we receive applications.”

“The FDA is improving ways we interact with developers of products to address the pandemic, including those we don’t normally interact with,” the official said.

By the time Greninger sent his email, the FDA was in discussions with dozens of test developers, a number that was growing quickly. But none had managed to complete a formal application to the FDA, according to officials familiar with the agency’s actions. FDA officials interpreted the paucity of applications as a sign of limited ability or interest, the officials said.

Some private labs struggled to obtain samples of the virus necessary to verify their tests and complete their applications, according to government officials and lab representatives. An FDA official said that, at the time, the agency supported efforts to help those labs secure the necessary samples.

Jan. 28
Jan. 30
Jan. 31
Feb. 4
Feb. 8
Feb. 13
Jan. 28

HHS Secretary Alex Azar praises the CDC for developing a coronavirus test in one week: "This was really a historic accomplishment."
Jan. 30

The World Health Organization declares a "public health emergency of international concern."

It is important to note that as the situation continues to evolve, so will the strategic goals and measures to prevent and reduce spread of the infection. The Committee agreed that the outbreak now meets the criteria for a Public Health Emergency of International Concern and proposed the following advice to be issued as Temporary Recommendations.
Jan. 31

Azar declares a public health emergency, triggering tight restrictions on FDA approvals for tests called emergency use authorizations, or EUAs. Though meant to expedite approval of medical products, the EUAs added delays to the development of coronavirus tests at clinical labs at hospitals and universities.

Following the World Health Organization’s decision to declare the 2019 novel coronavirus a Public Health Emergency of International Concern, I have declared today that the coronavirus presents a Public Health Emergency in the United States.
Feb. 4

The CDC receives an emergency use authorization from the FDA to distribute its test to public health labs around the country. The CDC also announces it will start shipping test kits to around 100 public health labs. It is the only test kit available.
Feb. 8

CDC test begins arriving at labs in New York, Nebraska, Colorado, Minnesota and elsewhere. By the end of the day, public health lab directors tell the CDC it doesn’t work properly. Through the weekend, the lab directors share notes of the test not working and start to realize, "this could be really bad."

The silence from CDC on the nCoVtest kit failures is deafening. What is going on? We are getting questions from our governor’s office and other labs are getting media requests asking when we will start testing. We need to be able to respond.
Feb. 13

Susan Butler-Wu, director of medical microbiology at the Los Angeles County and University of Southern California Medical Center, warns in an email to fellow scientists: "We’re screwed from a testing standpoint if this thing takes off in the US."
Anxiety intensifies

On Feb. 22, an FDA official named Timothy Stenzel flew to Atlanta. The director of a diagnostic office at the FDA, Stenzel was a key figure in the decisions about testing. The purpose of his visit was not clear to CDC officials, but he said he wanted to understand the testing development and help find a way to fix the troubled assay, according to three people familiar with the visit.

Stenzel spent much of the following week attending CDC meetings, touring the facilities and offering suggestions about how to cobble together viable tests from existing materials, the officials said.

At the same time, CDC officials, including Jernigan from the agency’s influenza division, urged Stenzel to convince the FDA to approve other tests under development in private laboratories.

Anxiety about the lack of widespread testing, meanwhile, was cresting among scientists and public health officials nationwide. Many felt the country could wait no longer.

On Feb. 24, the Association of Public Health Laboratories formally asked Hahn to loosen the FDA’s rules.

“We are now many weeks into the response with still no diagnostic or surveillance test available outside of the CDC for the vast majority of our member laboratories,” the association’s letter said. “While we understand that the EUA process is open to [public health labs], we believe a more expeditious route is needed at this time.”

Two days later, the FDA allowed public health labs to begin using the CDC test, with the troubled component eliminated.

On Feb. 27, Anthony S. Fauci, the government’s top infectious disease expert, added to the pressure to expand testing further. He spoke in person with Brian Harrison, Azar’s chief of staff, and underscored the urgent need to accelerate the approval of new tests, according to two people familiar with the call. At noon that day, Harrison convened a teleconference of officials from the FDA, CDC and other agencies.

In strong language, Harrison told the group to come up with a new test approval plan before they left the meeting. The participants scrambled to swap ideas. At the FDA and CDC, Stenzel, Jernigan and others worked on a memo into the evening that outlined a new strategy.

The memo, “A Plan to Increase Covid-19 testing in the U.S.,” frankly acknowledged that the original approach had not worked. The spread of the virus was “leading to significant impact on healthcare systems and causing social disruption,” it said.

“CDC has worked with FDA to assure that testing is available at Public Health Laboratories to support public health investigations and control efforts; however, a much broader interagency approach is needed to fill the greater need for diagnostics by commercial manufacturers and laboratories capable of developing their own tests.”

It recommended giving clinical laboratories, such as the University of Washington, leeway to create and begin using their own tests while seeking FDA approval. The memo was forwarded to top government officials, including Azar, who supported loosening the regulations.

The next day, Greninger and scores of other clinical scientists appealed to Congress in a letter of their own. They complained that “significantly more stringent” FDA rules had nearly frozen the country’s fight against the virus.

“Notably, no test manufacturer or clinical laboratory has successfully navigated the EUA process for SARS-CoV-2 to date,” the Feb. 28 letter said. “Therefore, the CDC test remains the only test available with EUA status, and it has not been made available to hospital laboratories.”
A laboratory test kit for coronavirus that was developed by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (CDC/AP)
FDA’s turnaround

On Feb. 29, the FDA finally reversed course, opening the way for clinical labs outside the government to begin testing for coronavirus. Under a revised policy Hahn announced at a White House briefing, the labs would have to notify the FDA when testing began, but they would not have to submit paperwork for 15 days.

“The FDA recognized the urgent need for even faster testing availability,” the agency said in a statement this week. “Although laboratories could use the EUA pathway, many were hesitant or didn’t know the pathway was available to them.”

Giroir told The Post that the FDA was right to reverse itself but could have done so sooner.

“In retrospect, it might have been useful earlier, right?” he said. “I mean, it was the right decision to make.”

On March 2, Greninger and his colleagues at the University of Washington went live, testing 30 patients in a single day. Two days later, they tested 202 people. That number soon soared to over 2,800 per day, roughly the equivalent of a quarter of tests done by all state and federal public health labs on the same day.

About two weeks after the FDA loosened its grip on testing, two major manufacturing giants, Roche and Thermo Fisher Scientific, won approval. By then the number of confirmed cases in the United States had grown to more than 2,000.

On March 12, Fauci, who runs the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, told lawmakers the problem was not simply the failure of the CDC test. The coronavirus testing debacle had exposed deep structural problems in the nation’s public health system, he said.

“Yeah, it is a failing, let’s admit it,” he said. “The idea of anybody getting it easily the way people in other countries are doing it, we’re not set up for that. Do I think we should be? Yes, but we’re not.”

Feb. 14
Feb. 18
Feb. 24
Feb. 26
Feb. 27
Feb. 28
Feb. 29
Mar. 11
Mar. 12
Feb. 14

As of this date, more than three dozen public health labs are having problems with the CDC test. Greninger writes a message to his colleagues about the bureaucratic difficulties for clinical labs at universities trying to make their own tests.

The most pernicious effect of the current regulatory environment is that it kneecaps our ability for preparedness should a true emergency emerge, as Susan notes. Why bother getting ready as a clinical lab if you think that you won’t ever be allowed to do anything until May or June (per the time frame on the prior Zika virus EUAs).
Feb. 18

The CDC warns clinical laboratories around the country against testing on their own without FDA approval. Meanwhile, it has still not provided public health labs with instructions on how to modify its test to make it work properly.
Feb. 24

A coalition of public health labs asks the FDA for permission to make their own tests: "We are now many weeks into the response with still no diagnostic or surveillance test available outside of CDC for the vast majority of our member laboratories."

We are now many weeks into the response with still no diagnostic or surveillance test available outside of CDC for the vast majority of our member laboratories. While we understand that the EUA process is open to PHLs, we believe a more expeditious route is needed at this time.

Read the full document
Feb. 26

The FDA commissioner sends a letter to the coalition of public health labs that had asked for permission to make tests: "False diagnostic test results can lead to significant adverse public health consequences -- not only serious implications for individual patient care but also serious implications for the analyses of disease progression and for public health decision-making.

Read the full document
Feb. 26

The CDC announces to public health labs that a workaround for the test has been approved.
Feb. 27

CDC Director Robert R. Redfield testifies to the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific and nonproliferation that the "CDC believes that the immediate risk of this new virus to the American public is low." Privately, the CDC concluded that a "much broader" effort to testing is needed.  An internal memo titled, "A Plan to Increase Covid-19 testing in the U.S.," frankly acknowledged the approach was not working. The spread of the virus was "leading to significant impact on healthcare systems and causing social disruption," it said. "A much broader interagency approach is needed to fill the greater need for diagnostics by commercial manufacturers and laboratories capable of developing their own tests."

Read the full document
Feb. 28

Dozens of clinical laboratory scientists from across the nation write to Congress asking for more leeway to create new tests, saying "this regulatory process is significantly more stringent than that required for every other virus we test for."
Feb. 29

The FDA reverses course and announces it will permit clinical labs to develop tests with less stringent review. By this date, the CDC and public health labs have tested 3,999 people nationwide.
March 11

WHO declares the coronavirus outbreak a pandemic.
March 12

Anthony S. Fauci, the nation's top infectious diseases expert, testifies to Congress about coronavirus testing and the nation’s response to the outbreak: "The system does not, is not really geared to what we need right now," he said. "Yes, it is a failure, let's admit it."

Emily Rauhala, Yasmeen Abutaleb and Josh Dawsey contributed to this report.
« Last Edit: April 07, 2020, 10:21:22 AM by DougMacG »