Author Topic: China  (Read 279715 times)

ccp

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Re: China
« Reply #700 on: December 06, 2019, 02:52:07 PM »
good news
though waiting the military put down.

hopefully not bloody

G M

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Re: Hong Kong virus spreading
« Reply #701 on: December 06, 2019, 07:56:18 PM »
https://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2019/12/chicom_nightmare_hong_kong_protests_spread_to_gigantic_guangdong.html?fbclid=IwAR2BwkHWpvTOsmIwEuN9kVQxZxTQdkvez4Etz_Y8MsA3T-mIx8h6r2PK34o

My core pessimist nature says this will be crushed, but I figured that Hong Kong would have been crushed by now. If this spark spreads and and the PRC ends as a result, this will be the greatest win for freedom in human history.




Crafty_Dog

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Corona Kung Flu hitting tech sector in China?
« Reply #705 on: February 07, 2020, 02:24:39 PM »
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The Coronavirus Spreads Fears of a Shutdown in China's Tech Sector
Matthew Bey
Matthew Bey
Senior Global Analyst, Stratfor
9 MINS READ
Feb 7, 2020 | 10:00 GMT
An employee sits in the showroom of an Apple store in Beijing after it closed for the day on Feb. 1, 2020.
An employee sits in the showroom of an Apple store in Beijing after it closed for the day on Feb. 1. So far, China's technology industry has been spared the worst of the new coronavirus outbreak, but that could quickly change.

(KEVIN FRAYER/Getty Images)
HIGHLIGHTS
Because Wuhan is a relatively minor player in China's technology industry, the sector has been spared the worst of the new coronavirus. That could change if the outbreak spreads to the country's R&D heartland right next door....

Without question, the new coronavirus has taken a toll on China and many other places in the world, infecting at least 30,600 people and killing 633 as of Feb. 7. But only now, as the Lunar New Year holiday draws to a close, is Beijing preparing to assess just how much economic damage the coronavirus outbreak has wrought, especially as China is central to the global electronics and information technology sector.

The Big Picture
China is an indispensable part of the global tech sector, and the new coronavirus has the potential to drastically affect its supply chains and operations. But the virus' epicenter, Wuhan, is not as crucial as other areas, meaning authorities could minimize the impact of the virus to a few specific product types in the industry if it manages to contain the geographic scope and scale of the outbreak. If the virus does lose its intensity, for instance, the vast majority of the tech sector's operations, especially in cities in Jiangsu province and Shanghai, might suffer only limited impacts.

See The Geopolitics of Disease
Ultimately, the breadth of the impact depends on how far the virus spreads beyond its current location. Hubei province and its capital, Wuhan, are not critical nodes for the vast majority of China's electronics sector. But neighboring provinces, including Shaanxi, Henan and Jiangxi, are all home to cities that are prominent in the global technology sector, while the provinces with the second and third most confirmed cases so far, Zhejiang and Guangdong, are arguably China's two most critical areas for tech. For the moment, the risk of the new coronavirus to such provinces is somewhat limited — but all that depends on the success of China's containment strategy in Hubei: For if the outbreak continues, it would have a monumental impact on China's tech sector, resulting in significant shortages.

A Limited Effect on Tech — For Now
If the worst of the virus remains centered on Hubei, then the impact on supply chains for the Chinese — and, thus, the global — tech sector is likely to remain relatively limited. In 2017, Hubei produced less than 1 percent of China's overall integrated circuit production and just 1 percent of the country's overall television output. The following year, the province accounted for only 2.4 percent of the country's mobile phone output and 3.6 percent of its microcomputer equipment — two goods for which China's share of global production isn't high. Undoubtedly, there will be individual supply chains that will lack components as a result of the quarantine in Hubei, but large producers of goods like circuits, TVs, mobile phones and microcomputer equipment would be able to find suppliers outside the province over time if necessary.

Four maps showing industrial output by Chinese province for selected sectors.
But while Wuhan sits on the margins of China's semiconductor industry and broader tech sector, a prolonged industrial shutdown would have three important implications. First, China has penciled in Wuhan as a key location for domestic semiconductor manufacturing. There are two primary companies currently operating in Wuhan, primarily in the Donghu New Technology Development Zone. The more established company, Wuhan Xinxin Semiconductor Manufacturing Corp. (XMC), operates a small, 300 mm fabrication plant and functions as a contract pure-play foundry for the semiconductor industry. The other major semiconductor firm is Yangtze Memory Technologies Co. (YMTC), which was founded by China's Tsinghua Unigroup and is now owned by several other public investment funds, including the National Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund, colloquially known as China's "Big Fund." YMTC acquired a 100 percent stake in XMC in 2016.

Both XMC and YMTC are presently building two new, large facilities that will boost Hubei's overall production capacity by a factor of nearly 15. That, ultimately, will make Wuhan one of the pillars of China's long-term push to achieve greater self-reliance and global prominence in the semiconductor sector — especially in the memory segment of the industry — and a key city in the country's Made in China 2025 initiative. Before the outbreak, XMC and YMTC had ramped up construction on the facilities, but the companies could now slow down the building process or delay it by several months — if not a year. But once fully operational, YMTC's Wuhan plant will be China's largest memory semiconductor chip plant, with a planned capacity of 300,000 wafers per month. And with their Wuhan investments, both XMC and YMTC are focusing heavily on 3D NAND memory chips, which are central to China's push for self-reliance in chip production as they are an integral component of smartphones and other mobile devices. There are only a few companies that specialize in 3D NAND memory chips, such as South Korea's Samsung and SK Hynix, Japan's Toshiba and the United States' Intel and Micron — the latter of which Tsinghua Unigroup tried to buy in 2015 before running into opposition from the Obama administration. Thwarted, Tsinghua Unigroup formed YMTC instead.

A map showing the location of integrated circuit production and semiconductor plants in China.
The second key implication will be the more acute impact on China and Wuhan's optical fiber industry, which accounts for roughly 20 percent of China's overall output in the sector and, according to officials in the city, boasts a global market share of 25 percent. As a focal point for China's fiber optics industry, the Donghu New Technology Development Zone has referred to itself as "China Optics Valley" thanks to major firms like Wuhan Yangtze Optical Technology Co. (YOTC) — the world's largest supplier of optical fiber preform, optical fiber and optical cables — Fiberhome Technologies and Accelink Technologies. While there may be some global inventories that can withstand a limited, weekslong outage in the Wuhan fiber-optic sector's production capacity, a shutdown that lasts more than a few weeks could substantially hurt supply chains in the industry.

Finally, Wuhan is a leading center for research and development in China's technology sector. At the university level, Wuhan is home to Wuhan University, which is consistently ranked among China's top five universities, as well as the Huazhong University of Science and Technology, which is invariably among China's top 10 research universities and the operator of the Wuhan National Laboratory for Optoelectronics. Wuhan is also the site of research and development centers for Hon Hai Precision manufacturing (also known as Foxconn), United Imaging, Tencent, Huawei and Xiaomi (which opened its second headquarters in the city in December 2019), but the outbreak will halt new R&D endeavors, potentially setting China back in terms of novel advancements — especially if Wuhan suffers a long-term decline in overseas visitors because of its damaged reputation even after the outbreak subsides.

A graphic showing the breakdown of Hubei province's total manufacturing output.
The Consequences of Contagion Beyond Hubei
Unsurprisingly, if the provinces beyond Hubei continue to suspend their industrial activities, the ramifications would be much more severe for China. Many of Hubei's neighbors are crucial tech hubs, and the three provinces that have witnessed the next most cases, Zhejiang, Guangdong and Henan, are particularly big players in the sector. Already, a number of these areas have delayed the resumption of operations after the end of the Lunar New Year as a precaution, pushing back the start date from Jan. 29 to Feb. 9. Apple, for instance, has noted that orders for 45 million AirPods are at risk because of the measures necessary to contain the virus.

Hangzhou, the capital of Zhejiang, is the headquarters of Alibaba and one of the key hubs for China's overall tech sector. In terms of manufacturing, the province is not as critical as some neighbors, like Shanghai and Jiangsu, but it is crucial to the technological development of China's internet services sector and — together with Beijing — a leader in the country's artificial intelligence development. But in response to the new coronavirus, Hangzhou officials have reduced and restricted travel in several districts, including the area where Alibaba's center is located, in hopes of limiting the expansion of the virus. (The technology departments of China's services sector can at least mitigate the impact of the coronavirus by asking their employees to work remotely.) But if Hangzhou were to suffer a similar outbreak to Hubei, it would likely portend other major outbreaks in places like Shanghai and Jiangsu, as it would indicate the failure of efforts to halt the spread of the virus.

The most important Chinese province for tech, however, is Guangdong, an area that is home to more than 113 million people and major cities like Guangzhou, Shenzhen and Zhongshan. If the virus spreads to such a degree that officials must take extreme measures, it would paralyze the innovation, production and export of tech components in Guangdong. After all, the province manufactures 50 percent of China's TVs, produces 45 percent of its mobile phones and makes more than 15 percent of its semiconductor and microcomputer equipment.

A graphic showing the spread of the new coronavirus beyond China.
Henan province, which had registered 851 cases as of Feb. 6, directly borders Hubei to the north. Its capital, Zhengzhou, is particularly important for the manufacture of smartphones and iPhones — in fact, the presence of Foxconn's largest iPhone assembly line has led some to dub the metropolis "iPhone City." While its share of domestic smartphones is somewhat smaller, Zhengzhou and Henan province shipped a quarter of China's total smartphone exports last year, more than half of which were directly from Foxconn's operations. On Feb. 5, Foxconn issued new targets for 2020 sales, increasing the rate from just 1 to 3 percent this year. That's down from goals of 3 to 5 percent issued just two weeks earlier on Jan. 22. And in a further measure to check the virus' spread, Foxconn has vowed to subject any employee who returns from the Lunar New Year holiday from anywhere outside Henan province — not just from Hubei — to 14 days of quarantine.

More likely than not, the impact on tech supply chains beyond Hubei will be limited so long as the number of new coronavirus cases does not reach crisis-level proportions. At present, it appears that the virus will lay low some operations outside Hubei for upward of 10 days, given that many factories are planning to resume operations by Feb. 9. In the coming days, it will become clearer whether further contagion beyond Hubei's border will occur and, if so, how much it will impact operations outside Wuhan. If the virus does spread more significantly than most suspect, then almost all of China's tech sector along the Yangtze River Basin will be at risk of more acute disruptions — either from the direct impact of shutdowns or the secondary impact from closures among suppliers. In such a case, factories in China's technological heartland might remain shuttered long after Feb. 9.

G M

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Re: Corona Kung Flu hitting tech sector in China?
« Reply #706 on: February 07, 2020, 09:19:06 PM »
It's hitting every sector of the Chinese economy. Not long until it's hitting the world's economy as well.


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ASSESSMENTS
The Coronavirus Spreads Fears of a Shutdown in China's Tech Sector
Matthew Bey
Matthew Bey
Senior Global Analyst, Stratfor
9 MINS READ
Feb 7, 2020 | 10:00 GMT
An employee sits in the showroom of an Apple store in Beijing after it closed for the day on Feb. 1, 2020.
An employee sits in the showroom of an Apple store in Beijing after it closed for the day on Feb. 1. So far, China's technology industry has been spared the worst of the new coronavirus outbreak, but that could quickly change.

(KEVIN FRAYER/Getty Images)
HIGHLIGHTS
Because Wuhan is a relatively minor player in China's technology industry, the sector has been spared the worst of the new coronavirus. That could change if the outbreak spreads to the country's R&D heartland right next door....

Without question, the new coronavirus has taken a toll on China and many other places in the world, infecting at least 30,600 people and killing 633 as of Feb. 7. But only now, as the Lunar New Year holiday draws to a close, is Beijing preparing to assess just how much economic damage the coronavirus outbreak has wrought, especially as China is central to the global electronics and information technology sector.

The Big Picture
China is an indispensable part of the global tech sector, and the new coronavirus has the potential to drastically affect its supply chains and operations. But the virus' epicenter, Wuhan, is not as crucial as other areas, meaning authorities could minimize the impact of the virus to a few specific product types in the industry if it manages to contain the geographic scope and scale of the outbreak. If the virus does lose its intensity, for instance, the vast majority of the tech sector's operations, especially in cities in Jiangsu province and Shanghai, might suffer only limited impacts.

See The Geopolitics of Disease
Ultimately, the breadth of the impact depends on how far the virus spreads beyond its current location. Hubei province and its capital, Wuhan, are not critical nodes for the vast majority of China's electronics sector. But neighboring provinces, including Shaanxi, Henan and Jiangxi, are all home to cities that are prominent in the global technology sector, while the provinces with the second and third most confirmed cases so far, Zhejiang and Guangdong, are arguably China's two most critical areas for tech. For the moment, the risk of the new coronavirus to such provinces is somewhat limited — but all that depends on the success of China's containment strategy in Hubei: For if the outbreak continues, it would have a monumental impact on China's tech sector, resulting in significant shortages.

A Limited Effect on Tech — For Now
If the worst of the virus remains centered on Hubei, then the impact on supply chains for the Chinese — and, thus, the global — tech sector is likely to remain relatively limited. In 2017, Hubei produced less than 1 percent of China's overall integrated circuit production and just 1 percent of the country's overall television output. The following year, the province accounted for only 2.4 percent of the country's mobile phone output and 3.6 percent of its microcomputer equipment — two goods for which China's share of global production isn't high. Undoubtedly, there will be individual supply chains that will lack components as a result of the quarantine in Hubei, but large producers of goods like circuits, TVs, mobile phones and microcomputer equipment would be able to find suppliers outside the province over time if necessary.

Four maps showing industrial output by Chinese province for selected sectors.
But while Wuhan sits on the margins of China's semiconductor industry and broader tech sector, a prolonged industrial shutdown would have three important implications. First, China has penciled in Wuhan as a key location for domestic semiconductor manufacturing. There are two primary companies currently operating in Wuhan, primarily in the Donghu New Technology Development Zone. The more established company, Wuhan Xinxin Semiconductor Manufacturing Corp. (XMC), operates a small, 300 mm fabrication plant and functions as a contract pure-play foundry for the semiconductor industry. The other major semiconductor firm is Yangtze Memory Technologies Co. (YMTC), which was founded by China's Tsinghua Unigroup and is now owned by several other public investment funds, including the National Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund, colloquially known as China's "Big Fund." YMTC acquired a 100 percent stake in XMC in 2016.

Both XMC and YMTC are presently building two new, large facilities that will boost Hubei's overall production capacity by a factor of nearly 15. That, ultimately, will make Wuhan one of the pillars of China's long-term push to achieve greater self-reliance and global prominence in the semiconductor sector — especially in the memory segment of the industry — and a key city in the country's Made in China 2025 initiative. Before the outbreak, XMC and YMTC had ramped up construction on the facilities, but the companies could now slow down the building process or delay it by several months — if not a year. But once fully operational, YMTC's Wuhan plant will be China's largest memory semiconductor chip plant, with a planned capacity of 300,000 wafers per month. And with their Wuhan investments, both XMC and YMTC are focusing heavily on 3D NAND memory chips, which are central to China's push for self-reliance in chip production as they are an integral component of smartphones and other mobile devices. There are only a few companies that specialize in 3D NAND memory chips, such as South Korea's Samsung and SK Hynix, Japan's Toshiba and the United States' Intel and Micron — the latter of which Tsinghua Unigroup tried to buy in 2015 before running into opposition from the Obama administration. Thwarted, Tsinghua Unigroup formed YMTC instead.

A map showing the location of integrated circuit production and semiconductor plants in China.
The second key implication will be the more acute impact on China and Wuhan's optical fiber industry, which accounts for roughly 20 percent of China's overall output in the sector and, according to officials in the city, boasts a global market share of 25 percent. As a focal point for China's fiber optics industry, the Donghu New Technology Development Zone has referred to itself as "China Optics Valley" thanks to major firms like Wuhan Yangtze Optical Technology Co. (YOTC) — the world's largest supplier of optical fiber preform, optical fiber and optical cables — Fiberhome Technologies and Accelink Technologies. While there may be some global inventories that can withstand a limited, weekslong outage in the Wuhan fiber-optic sector's production capacity, a shutdown that lasts more than a few weeks could substantially hurt supply chains in the industry.

Finally, Wuhan is a leading center for research and development in China's technology sector. At the university level, Wuhan is home to Wuhan University, which is consistently ranked among China's top five universities, as well as the Huazhong University of Science and Technology, which is invariably among China's top 10 research universities and the operator of the Wuhan National Laboratory for Optoelectronics. Wuhan is also the site of research and development centers for Hon Hai Precision manufacturing (also known as Foxconn), United Imaging, Tencent, Huawei and Xiaomi (which opened its second headquarters in the city in December 2019), but the outbreak will halt new R&D endeavors, potentially setting China back in terms of novel advancements — especially if Wuhan suffers a long-term decline in overseas visitors because of its damaged reputation even after the outbreak subsides.

A graphic showing the breakdown of Hubei province's total manufacturing output.
The Consequences of Contagion Beyond Hubei
Unsurprisingly, if the provinces beyond Hubei continue to suspend their industrial activities, the ramifications would be much more severe for China. Many of Hubei's neighbors are crucial tech hubs, and the three provinces that have witnessed the next most cases, Zhejiang, Guangdong and Henan, are particularly big players in the sector. Already, a number of these areas have delayed the resumption of operations after the end of the Lunar New Year as a precaution, pushing back the start date from Jan. 29 to Feb. 9. Apple, for instance, has noted that orders for 45 million AirPods are at risk because of the measures necessary to contain the virus.

Hangzhou, the capital of Zhejiang, is the headquarters of Alibaba and one of the key hubs for China's overall tech sector. In terms of manufacturing, the province is not as critical as some neighbors, like Shanghai and Jiangsu, but it is crucial to the technological development of China's internet services sector and — together with Beijing — a leader in the country's artificial intelligence development. But in response to the new coronavirus, Hangzhou officials have reduced and restricted travel in several districts, including the area where Alibaba's center is located, in hopes of limiting the expansion of the virus. (The technology departments of China's services sector can at least mitigate the impact of the coronavirus by asking their employees to work remotely.) But if Hangzhou were to suffer a similar outbreak to Hubei, it would likely portend other major outbreaks in places like Shanghai and Jiangsu, as it would indicate the failure of efforts to halt the spread of the virus.

The most important Chinese province for tech, however, is Guangdong, an area that is home to more than 113 million people and major cities like Guangzhou, Shenzhen and Zhongshan. If the virus spreads to such a degree that officials must take extreme measures, it would paralyze the innovation, production and export of tech components in Guangdong. After all, the province manufactures 50 percent of China's TVs, produces 45 percent of its mobile phones and makes more than 15 percent of its semiconductor and microcomputer equipment.

A graphic showing the spread of the new coronavirus beyond China.
Henan province, which had registered 851 cases as of Feb. 6, directly borders Hubei to the north. Its capital, Zhengzhou, is particularly important for the manufacture of smartphones and iPhones — in fact, the presence of Foxconn's largest iPhone assembly line has led some to dub the metropolis "iPhone City." While its share of domestic smartphones is somewhat smaller, Zhengzhou and Henan province shipped a quarter of China's total smartphone exports last year, more than half of which were directly from Foxconn's operations. On Feb. 5, Foxconn issued new targets for 2020 sales, increasing the rate from just 1 to 3 percent this year. That's down from goals of 3 to 5 percent issued just two weeks earlier on Jan. 22. And in a further measure to check the virus' spread, Foxconn has vowed to subject any employee who returns from the Lunar New Year holiday from anywhere outside Henan province — not just from Hubei — to 14 days of quarantine.

More likely than not, the impact on tech supply chains beyond Hubei will be limited so long as the number of new coronavirus cases does not reach crisis-level proportions. At present, it appears that the virus will lay low some operations outside Hubei for upward of 10 days, given that many factories are planning to resume operations by Feb. 9. In the coming days, it will become clearer whether further contagion beyond Hubei's border will occur and, if so, how much it will impact operations outside Wuhan. If the virus does spread more significantly than most suspect, then almost all of China's tech sector along the Yangtze River Basin will be at risk of more acute disruptions — either from the direct impact of shutdowns or the secondary impact from closures among suppliers. In such a case, factories in China's technological heartland might remain shuttered long after Feb. 9.

G M

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Crafty_Dog

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From the Heart
« Reply #709 on: February 16, 2020, 08:42:31 AM »

Crafty_Dog

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DougMacG

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Re: Forbes: Corona could be end of China as global mfg hub
« Reply #714 on: March 02, 2020, 06:42:52 AM »
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2020/03/01/coronavirus-could-be-the-end-of-china-as-global-manufacturing-hub/?utm_campaign=forbes&utm_source=facebook&utm_medium=social&utm_term=Valerie%2F#2fc431dc5298

Yes.  The decoupling began when China chose to fight back in the tariff war.  They had a good thing going and blew it when they should have locked it in.  Now US and global companies (like Apple) HAVE to source elsewhere.

ccp

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Re: China
« Reply #715 on: March 02, 2020, 07:37:44 AM »
I just read
maybe on drudge that about 80% of generics are manufactured in Red Communist China

I was shocked
prescribing these all day long
and never knew this  :-o :-o


Crafty_Dog

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Wuhan Kung Flu
« Reply #717 on: March 13, 2020, 09:05:23 AM »


March 13, 2020   View On Website
Open as PDF



    The Next Phase of China’s Fight with the Coronavirus
By: Phillip Orchard

The Communist Party of China would like you to know it’s winning the war against the coronavirus, and that we all have Xi Jinping to thank. That’s been the core message from Chinese state media over the past few weeks, which marked a major turning point in the crisis. Internally, China’s massive mobilization against the virus appears to have stemmed the tide, with new infections slowing to single digits and Chinese industry gingerly getting back to work. And as the outbreak became a pandemic, Western governments’ spotty responses have put both Beijing’s early missteps and its later successes in a more favorable light.

It’s been a boon to Beijing’s propagandists, who can now call attention to China’s triumphs and the world’s woes. Their messaging has also made it clear that Xi and his inner circle will emerge from the public health crisis intact – and perhaps even stronger. Xi has commanded the decisive battles in the “People’s War” against an invisible enemy, at least according to state media hell-bent on elevating the president to almost Mao-like status.

But if Xi is safe on his throne, his realm is not. The Chinese economy is, to put it plainly, in really bad shape. Nearly every problem Beijing couldn’t figure out how to fix has been made an order of magnitude worse by the coronavirus crisis. And while the virus going global may be a shot in the arm for China’s hype machine, its spread may very well shut down the country’s most promising roads to a rapid recovery.

Xi’s Glorious Battle

A month ago, the CPC was reeling. The epidemic had become nearly uncontainable, and Xi’s tightly centralized decision-making structure and a culture of censorship were at least partially to blame. This created pressure both at home and abroad, forcing Beijing to implement a twist on Mao’s Hundred Flowers Campaign and relax the restrictions on independent reporting and to censor social media with a lighter touch. The outrage that followed, particularly after the death of whistleblowing doctor Li Wenliang, scared Beijing, forcing it into a series of clumsy moves to squelch dissent. Beijing was also forced to postpone its annual National People’s Congress, which the CPC relies on to align the machinery of the state with its agenda. For much of this time, Xi himself was conspicuously absent from the spotlight. When the central government finally launched a campaign to demonstrate its command of the crisis response, it was led not by Xi but by Premier Li Keqiang, the closest thing Xi has to a rival in the Politburo Standing Committee. But as soon as the outbreak looked like it would soon crest in early February, Xi was firmly back out in front.

The pillars of power in China are often described as “the three Ps”: the People's Liberation Army, personnel and propaganda. And by becoming the public face of the government’s response, Xi has demonstrated his control over each of them. In early February, he deployed the PLA, which answers directly to him as chairman of the Central Military Commission and had been noticeably absent from the response in January, to build hospitals, transport supplies, ensure public order and dispatch medics to the front lines in Wuhan. If Xi were losing control over key personnel appointments, he wouldn’t have been able to replace the party leadership in Hubei province with a pair of loyalists. Finally, the propaganda machine has gone into overdrive in lionizing the president. State media has begun referring to the president as “the People’s Leader” and, particularly during Xi’s long-awaited visit Wuhan this week, equating his leadership in the fight against coronavirus to Mao’s command of the Communist Party’s civil war victory in 1949. This matters more than mere symbolism. By effectively elevating Xi to Mao-like status, the Communist Party is wrapping its own legitimacy in Xi’s cult of personality even more tightly, making it near-impossible for rivals to dislodge him.

Still, there are at least two other “Ps” that also matter. The first is the public, which for now appears to broadly support the CPC. To be sure, there are glimpses of discontent over Beijing’s mismanagement – and not just in social media circles where outfoxing censors has become something of an art form. Doctors in Wuhan haven’t stopped speaking out about the government’s suppression of information about the virus. An exceedingly tone-deaf speech given by Wuhan’s party chief calling for a “gratitude education campaign” for the city’s residents ahead of Xi’s inspection tour had to be buried by censors after earning so much backlash. And leaked videos showed Chinese Vice Premier Sun Chunlan getting showered with insults from quarantined citizens during her own visit to Wuhan. But this has yet to translate into any sort of mass movement on the streets.

This is, in part, because the country has been effectively in lockdown. (Indeed, the digital systems put in place to combat the spread of the virus will be useful in combating attempts to mobilize against the government going forward.) It’s also because there’s no prominent opposition figure or party to rally around. (This is why any signs of a major split in the PLA or Politburo would be so important). But the power of the state’s messaging machine shouldn’t be dismissed. Propaganda is more effective when it contains nuggets of truth. Beijing can reasonably point to the lockdowns in Italy and elsewhere to make the case that its own response was within bounds, and it can point to the severe shortage of medical masks, testing kits, hospital beds and so forth in places like the U.S. to make the case that, whatever its flaws, the CPC’s model of governance is superior to Western democracies in a crisis.

The War Isn’t Over

The other “P” is prosperity. Breakneck growth was already becoming impossible to sustain. In February, the economy effectively ground to a halt. As many as a third of Chinese businesses remain shut down, with many more operating at only partial capacity. As was made clear by anemic credit growth figures released this week, Beijing's chronic struggles with getting liquidity to small and medium-sized businesses – which account for as much as 80 percent of employment in China, and more than half of which say they can’t last two months on their savings – persist. Even “shadow banking" hit a three-year low in February. This is good news for Beijing’s long-term battle against reckless lending, but it’s bad news in the current environment.

We’ve noted that China would be reasonably well-positioned for a “V-shaped” recovery once it could contain the virus enough to restart its manufacturing engine – that is, so long as it could keep systemic risks in, say, the financial or property sectors from rupturing. That’s basically what happened following the SARS epidemic in 2003. Once people can actually get back to work en masse, it won’t be hard to rev up Chinese factories and services sectors.

The pace of the recovery will therefore depend primarily on demand. Massive stimulus spending and the state sector will help here. But with the mass, short-term loss of wages likely to drag down domestic consumption for at least a month or two more, external consumption will once again be the key.

This is why the global spread of the crisis is such a problem for China – especially since it's happening at a pace that’s likely to last months and may surge again in the fall. Prolonged disruptions to trade would be bad enough for Chinese exports, which dropped more than 17 percent in January and February alone. The more European and the U.S. economies slow down, the more Western demand for Chinese goods will dry up. In this light, “doomsday scenarios” like the one put out by the United Nations predicting a $2 trillion hit to global gross domestic product somehow seem optimistic.
 
(click to enlarge)

Meanwhile, stress on financial markets in the West – combined with the likely boost to anti-globalization political forces and the broad awareness among multinational corporations that supply chains have become overly dependent on China – will blunt investment and capital flows into China. Despite China’s impressive capacity to screen just about everyone for the virus at just about every factory door or airport gate, it’s not impossible for the virus to come back. Additional mass quarantines, of course, could be incalculably disruptive. (One silver lining of the global slowdown for Beijing: The collapse of oil prices will have mixed effects on the Chinese economy, but on the whole it will do more good than harm.)

For almost a decade now, we’ve been waiting for the next big shock that would test the resilience of the CPC-led system. The assumption has been that the most likely shock would come from external forces. Turns out, the shock came from within, spread to the rest of the world and now looks likely to boomerang back. There’s nothing China’s propagandists can do about it.   


DougMacG

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COVid 19 Turning point for China?
« Reply #718 on: March 18, 2020, 06:26:04 AM »
https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2020/03/18/beijing_fears_covid-19_is_turning_point_for_china_globalization__142686.html

"Instead of acting with necessary speed and transparency, the party-state looked to its own reputation and legitimacy. It threatened whistleblowers like the late Dr. Li Wenliang, and clamped down on social media to prevent both information about the virus and criticism of the Communist Party and government from spreading."
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Never again to be trusted.


G M

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Re: COVid 19 Turning point for China?
« Reply #719 on: March 18, 2020, 06:43:12 AM »
Pariah State. Hard decoupling needs to be the policy.


https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2020/03/18/beijing_fears_covid-19_is_turning_point_for_china_globalization__142686.html

"Instead of acting with necessary speed and transparency, the party-state looked to its own reputation and legitimacy. It threatened whistleblowers like the late Dr. Li Wenliang, and clamped down on social media to prevent both information about the virus and criticism of the Communist Party and government from spreading."
----------------------------
Never again to be trusted.

Crafty_Dog

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Re: China
« Reply #720 on: March 24, 2020, 11:49:02 AM »
China's Economy Braces for a COVID-19 Double Hit
7 MINS READ
Mar 24, 2020 | 14:59 GMT
Workers operate a production line of a new material company in Lianyungang, China, on March 23, 2020.
Workers operate a production line of a new material company in Lianyungang, China, on March 23, 2020.

(Costfoto/Barcroft Media via Getty Images)
HIGHLIGHTS
China's economy will sustain a double hit in 2020 due to COVID-19 given both the direct domestic impact of the virus control measures and the looming hit to global demand.
The government will need to tread carefully in stimulus spending given the risk of increasing economic instability by fueling unsustainable debt.
However, if the global outbreak worsens, the risk to economic growth and employment may compel Beijing to engage in large-scale spending in order to ensure political stability in the long term.
In China, the economic fallout of the COVID-19 outbreak will drag on 2020 GDP growth as the country endures the twin hits of both the early-year domestic slowdown and the as-yet-unknown drop in overseas demand in key markets. But the country’s high debt levels — partly fueled by its massive stimulus during the 2008 financial crisis, in addition to the structural slowdown already underway before the outbreak — means Beijing will hesitate to mirror the large-scale spending being implemented in other virus-ravaged economies, such as the United States, Japan and South Korea. China will now have to choose whether to help buoy its employment and annual growth targets through spending that could jeopardize long-term economic stability.

The Big Picture
China's COVID-19 economic damage and recovery path will be a key bellwether for the rest of the world as more countries weather the spread of the virus. However, government efforts to ensure a smooth rebound will be challenged by the legacy of the country's 2008 stimulus spending and ongoing structural slowdown.

See COVID-19
The Virus Fallout
The COVID-19 outbreak originating in China saw the country’s economy locked down for the better part of two months — a massive blow to export-oriented industries, as well as consumer and travel spending during a key annual holiday period. China’s combined January-February economic data released in mid-March showed a worse than expected hit to the economy due to the virus, with value-added industrial production down 13.5 percent, fixed asset investment down 24.5 percent and retail sales down 20.5 percent. Those months also saw at least 5 million workers lose their jobs, bringing the official unemployment rate to 6.2 percent — the highest on record and not even counting the massive pool of migrant workers inside the country that were idle during the same period but not counted in official unemployment numbers.

Even before COVID-19’s unexpected emergence, China had been in the throes of a structural slowdown in its economic growth. Over the past decade, China’s GDP growth, according to government figures, has gradually moderated from above 10 percent in 2010, to below 8 percent in 2015 before hitting 6.6 percent in 2018 and softening further to 6.1 percent in 2019 — the slowest in three decades. There is a broad consensus that the first quarter of the year will bring a contraction in GDP with COVID-19 factored in. And for the full year of 2020, economists across the board have revised their growth projections downward. Goldman Sachs dropped their initial 5.5 percent forecast to 3 percent, S&P lowered it from 4.8 percent to 2.9 percent and Nomura from 4.8 percent to 1.3 percent. High-level Chinese government leaks suggest that even the official projections may be revised downward from the current 6 percent for 2020 to 5 percent.


China’s growth figures will also depend on the scope and trajectory of the COIVID-19 outbreaks now burning through Europe, the United States and elsewhere. These outbreaks will dampen global consumer demand, posing a secondary hit to China’s economy even as the domestic sector tries to effect a recovery. 20 percent of China’s exports go to the United States; 9.2 percent to Germany, France, Italy and Spain; with 10.6 percent to South Korea and Japan.

What China Can Do
The spike in unemployment and drop in growth rates presents something of a political crisis for the Communist Party of China, which has based its legitimacy on the ability to deliver consistently rising prosperity and economic stability to the population. The 2020 party-mandated goal of doubling China’s 2010 GDP in order to achieve a “moderately prosperous society” is likely now out of reach. News of authorities’ early mishandling of the virus only deepens this risk — and spurs the party not only to focus on maintaining growth but also on ensuring blame for the pandemic rests at the local level and does not rise to the central government and President Xi Jinping.

So far, the government has emphasized an expectation that the second quarter will bring a recovery and return to normal. In mid-March, the government announced that, outside of the Hubei province epicenter, 90 percent of state-owned enterprises have resumed operations after virus-related shutdowns as have 60 percent of small- to medium-sized enterprises. Given the strong incentive to signal a robust rebound, there is reason to doubt this optimism and the true numbers are likely lower. An Economist Intelligence Unit survey of 200 large, foreign-backed firms found only half had resumed operations. Many provinces appear to have officially branded all businesses operating at one-third of normal capacity as having resumed their operations. Around 32 percent of Chinese manufacturers in the southern industrial core are reportedly facing shortages in supplies needed for production with a further 15 percent out of key stocks due to lingering supply chain disruptions related to COVID-19, according to an American Chamber of Commerce survey.

Given the uncertain next steps for the Chinese economy, the government is weighing its options to intervene. With governments worldwide moving quickly to stimulate their economies through monetary and fiscal policy, China’s central government has so far proceeded cautiously. Large-scale stimulus spending would exacerbate China’s already massive debts, which currently stand at three hundred percent of GDP. It also needs to be careful of measures that could fuel a bubble in the already potentially volatile property market. The central government is particularly watching local governments very carefully to prevent them from borrowing off balance sheets and increasing the risk of default. But without resorting to debt, local governments will face major limitations in their spending given that their budgets have already been squeezed by 2019 nationwide tax cuts that had been meant to offset the impacts of the U.S.-China trade war. Central-local tensions are already playing out, with local government plans for consumer handouts sparking a central government warning that they exercise caution and not overspend.

The direct domestic impact of lockdown measures to contain the virus, combined with the looming hit to global demand, will stymie China's economic growth in 2020.

To date, China’s central government has largely focused on tax relief and increased liquidity to try to offset the effects of the virus. It has not engaged in steep interest rate cuts (only 10 basis points) and shied away from massive stimulus spending on par with the $570 billion it spent during the global financial crisis. Instead, the People’s Bank of China has cut the reserve ratio requirement by 0.5 to 1 percent, freeing up $78.8 billion for lending by banks nationwide with instructions that this lending be targeted to smaller businesses most hit by the COVID-19 disruptions. China's Financial Stability and Development Committee has opened more offices across the country to oversee this process. China has more room to cut the reserve requirement ratio, which is currently around 10 percent (down from 20 percent in 2011) and a cut to zero could open up 20 trillion yuan in lending.

But the global spread of COVID-19 is rapidly unfolding a demand-side crisis for China as key markets experience economic damage. Given the drawbacks of aggressive government spending, China may wait until the second quarter when the other shoe drops in the form of demand-side hits to Chinese growth. More decisions could come ahead of the previously delayed sessions of both China's legislature, the National People’s Congress, and the government advisory body, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, which are now likely to be held in late April or early May. Leaks suggest Beijing is considering a massive stimulus that would see the 2020 government budget deficit rise to 3.5 percent, breaking the informal 3 percent cap of recent years. This spending could include $394 billion in special local government bonds, funds for infrastructure spending related to public health, emergency materials, 5G and data centers.

But such stimulus layout comes with downsides in the form of increased borrowing and threats to economic stability at a time when China is not only weathering a structural slowdown but still saddled with the debts accrued during the 2008 global financial crisis. However, China may calculate that these measures — and the attendant risks — are worth hazarding given the risks to the economy and political stability.

G M

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Unpossible!
« Reply #721 on: March 24, 2020, 12:12:20 PM »

DougMacG

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China, Unprecedented 21 Million Cellphone Users Disappear
« Reply #722 on: March 26, 2020, 08:36:33 AM »
troubling disappearance of some 21 million cell telephone accounts in China about the previous three months – an unprecedented decrease that hints at much more fatalities than disclosed by the government.
https://www.theepochtimes.com/the-closing-of-21-million-cell-phone-accounts-in-china-may-suggest-a-high-ccp-virus-death-toll_3281291.html
https://abc14news.com/2020/03/24/21-million-chinese-cellphone-users-disappear-in-three-months/

Crafty_Dog

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DougMacG

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Re: China
« Reply #724 on: March 26, 2020, 09:38:11 AM »
My son's theory is that they are taking away the phones of those that have made or received international calls.
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https://www.theepochtimes.com/where-ties-with-communist-china-are-close-the-coronavirus-follows_3268389.html?utm_source=Epoch+Times+Newsletters&utm_campaign=b751c4c659-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2020_03_24_11_05&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_4fba358ecf-b751c4c659-239065853

That explanation makes sense - with a duplicitous, totalitarian, oppressive, repressive regime.  They can take their phones or just disconnect their service. 

I wonder if it is still considered free and universal health care if you can't have a phone to call a doctor?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_with_universal_health_care

G M

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Re: China, Unprecedented 21 Million Cellphone Users Disappear
« Reply #725 on: March 26, 2020, 10:32:15 AM »
troubling disappearance of some 21 million cell telephone accounts in China about the previous three months – an unprecedented decrease that hints at much more fatalities than disclosed by the government.
https://www.theepochtimes.com/the-closing-of-21-million-cell-phone-accounts-in-china-may-suggest-a-high-ccp-virus-death-toll_3281291.html
https://abc14news.com/2020/03/24/21-million-chinese-cellphone-users-disappear-in-three-months/

Probably not, given that my wife and her family in the US routinely talks to friends and family in China on a constant basis, uninterrupted since the Kung Flu started.

Crafty_Dog

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Re: China
« Reply #726 on: March 26, 2020, 12:25:07 PM »
Presumably the Commies are listening in and take the phones of those of disloyal to the Party , , ,

G M

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Re: China
« Reply #727 on: March 26, 2020, 01:25:04 PM »
Presumably the Commies are listening in and take the phones of those of disloyal to the Party , , ,

At the minimum. The social credit system wasn't created for giggles. The Chicoms have never hesitated to disappear dissenters.

Crafty_Dog

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Crafty_Dog

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