Woof Caffein8ted:
I opened your post with the idea of moving it to the WW3 thread, but now that I see it is related to the Philippines, I will leave it as its own independent thread.
Perhaps the following sheds a little light?
Woof,
Crafty Dog
===================================
Geopolitical Diary: Tuesday, July 13, 2004
Appearing on Al Jazeera television late July 12, Philippine Deputy Foreign
Minister Rafael Seguis read a statement addressed to the so-called Islamic Army in Iraq, which is holding a Filipino truck driver hostage. In the statement -- a response to threats to behead Angelo de la Cruz if Manila does not withdraw troops from Iraq by July 20 -- Seguis said the Philippines "will withdraw its humanitarian forces [from Iraq] as soon as possible," adding that he hoped the statement would "touch the heart of this group" and noting that "Islam is the religion of peace and mercy."
Seguis' statement came as the deadline for de la Cruz's execution was
imminent, and in fact, Al Jazeera already had broadcast a tape from the
militants showing de la Cruz in orange clothes similar to those worn by
other beheading victims, with a statement from the group that he had been moved to the place of execution. Both Manila and the militants have been using Al Jazeera as the middleman in negotiations for de la Cruz's release.
This is not the first time a foreign national has been held hostage by
militants in Iraq and threatened with beheading if the host nation does not
withdraw troops from the country, but it does appear to be the first time
that such a staunch ally of the United States apparently has conceded to the militants' demands. For Washington, Manila's announcement has come as a surprise -- and could, from the U.S. point of view, set an undesirable precedent for other allies in Iraq. It also might embolden the many militant groups active in Iraq and elsewhere to step up their kidnapping campaigns.
The apparently last-minute decision to capitulate to the kidnappers' demands was both unusual and unexpected, particularly in its public nature. Quiet, behind-the-scenes negotiations do occur, and in this case an offer of money failed to secure the hostage's release. Manila faces several internal threats from Islamists and militants -- ranging from the Moro Islamic Liberation Front to the Abu Sayyaf to Jemaah Islamiyah -- and giving in to demands on one front sets a precedent the government has little intention of repeating on another. Furthermore, while there has been domestic pressure for Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo to withdraw the country's 50-odd troops from Iraq earlier than scheduled, she has recently been confirmed as the victor in this year's presidential elections and has little reason, at least on the surface, to fear mass sentiment. Besides, opposition sentiment concerning a military commitment that should end in about six weeks is not all that "mass."
In April, when she was still facing a difficult election campaign, Arroyo
mooted the point of withdrawing early, but let it drop. With the election
already under her belt, the timing just does not seem right. Moreover,
Manila has been a staunch ally of Washington in the international war
against Islamist militants, with U.S. forces in the Philippines for various
exercises since 2002. The decision seems even more anomalous in light of the fact that other allies less directly connected to international Islamist
militancy -- such as South Korea and Japan -- have refused to leave Iraq,
despite having their own nationals taken hostage (and in the South Korean case, beheaded).
Several theories could explain this situation. First, Al Jazeera could have
mistranslated Seguis' statement, either unintentionally or with Manila's
knowledge. In this way, the Philippine government could have a chance to
delay or even avert the beheading, while maintaining the ability to deny
that it gave in to the militants. A second -- albeit similar -- idea is that
Manila will win the release with this statement, then keep its troops in
Iraq until (or nearly up to) the originally scheduled withdrawal date of
Aug. 20, saying that that was "as soon as possible."
Both of these ideas carry significant negatives, both for the Philippines
and for the United States. Either way, it would appear that Manila gave in
to the demands of the militants -- which for the militants would translate
to the appearance of a political victory that would set the tone for
additional kidnappings. This could even carry over into the Philippines,
where Manila is in the midst of a delicate redefinition of relations with
the MILF and enlisting the militant group in the fight against the Abu
Sayyaf and JI. Furthermore, if Manila wins de la Cruz's freedom and then
reneges on its promise concerning troops in Iraq, it is likely to become the target of more direct and immediate attacks against its citizens in Iraq and the region.
The third scenario concerns internal more than external factors for Manila.
Though Arroyo's position appears solid, there is a possibility that former
President Joseph Estrada and failed presidential bidder Fernando Poe Jr. may have a stronger position than is readily apparent. An article in the Manila Times pointed to de la Cruz's love for Estrada and Poe movies when he was younger (both were action stars before entering politics). This may well have been a plant by the opposition to set up Arroyo for a fall. If she did not do anything to gain de la Cruz's freedom, her failure to act might be perceived as politically motivated -- simply because the hostage is a fan of her political rivals. A less petty argument is that de la Cruz would not have been in his current predicament if Estrada or Poe were in office because they would not have sent troops to Iraq. However, this argument is likely disingenuous, since either politician would have been equally keen to support U.S. President George W. Bush and gain the economic and military benefits of such a relationship.
In the conspiratorially minded Philippines, such a ploy to undermine Arroyo might well carry disproportional weight in public opinion and translate into real trouble for Arroyo, who initially came to power during a "people power" rising. By at least appearing to negotiate for de la Cruz's release, she might be trying to insulate herself against the potential for a people-power movement that seeks her ouster. The risk, of course, is that by changing her mind about troop withdrawal, she would appear indecisive -- and therefore less presidential. In the personal world of Philippine politics, decisions often are made on the basis of what is the least damaging rather than on what is best.
A fourth possibility is that Seguis' statement on Al Jazeera represented an
uncoordinated effort to effect the hostage's release by any means
possible -- even without Manila's direct permission. Philippine military
officials have denied receiving any orders for an early withdrawal from
Iraq, and an emergency meeting was called at the Foreign Affairs Ministry -- a potential sign of confusion.
Whatever the cause for the change in stance by Manila -- domestic insecurity or a ploy -- it is likely to trigger a tremor in relations with the United States, and might well spark an uptick in kidnappings in Iraq. And as Washington tries to finesse the Iraqi situation in the run-up to the U.S.
presidential election, the tiniest ripple from elsewhere in the world could
generate large waves within the U.S. political scene farther on.
......................................................................
(c) 2004 Strategic Forecasting, Inc. All rights reserved.
http://www.stratfor.com
