Author Topic: Argentina  (Read 51747 times)

Cecilio Andrade

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Re: Argentina
« Reply #50 on: January 13, 2017, 09:22:28 AM »
Se que no es lo mismo, pero quisiera compartir este evento.

https://www.facebook.com/events/1060375357405685/

Cuídense.

« Last Edit: January 27, 2017, 09:33:57 AM by Cecilio Andrade »
"Ve a decirles a los espartanos,
extranjero que pasas por aqui,
que, obedientes a sus leyes,
aqui yacemos."
                                   Simonides.

WebBlog: http://cecilioandrade.blogspot.com

Crafty_Dog

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Re: Argentina
« Reply #51 on: February 09, 2017, 08:19:59 AM »
Report from Argentine investigative body reveals extent of Kirchner family corruption



6 Feb 2017 | Argentina | Politics — A report released by la Unidad de Investigación Financiera (UIF) brought to light new details regarding the Los Sauces SA lawsuit—one of several high-profile cases involving former President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner and her children, Florencia and Máximo. Los Sauces SA, a real estate company in which Cristina, Máximo, and Florencia managed stakes of 45, 32.5 and 22.5 percent respectively, has been under investigation since spring 2016, when accusations of money laundering, bribery and fraud (including attempts at sabotaging the incoming Macri regime) rocked the K administration. In a summary of the report N° 0100/2016, El Clarín pointed to findings of US$3.17 million in unjustifiable transfers, nearly US$250,000 in undocumented withdrawals, and cash deposits also lacking substantive records. Between 2009 and 2015, both the company and associated bank account “Sucesión Néstor Kirchner” were recipients of US$1.59 million in checks from Lázaro Báez and Cristóbal López— two Kirchnerista businessmen previously implicated in the 2014 Hotesur scandal. During the same period, Florencia Kirchner was maintaining Banco Galicia accounts totaling over US$5million, while her brother as administrator authorized US$650,000 in transfers from the Sucesión account between 2014 and 2015 alone. According to El País, those implicated are set to give statements in court beginning 20 February 2017. It will be the first time that Fernandez’s children appear before a judge for testimony.


Cecilio Andrade

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Re: Argentina
« Reply #52 on: February 28, 2017, 08:58:24 AM »
Cursos saturados pero aun así gracias a la profesionalidad y disciplina no se perdió ni un minuto ni un byte de información.

Decir que fue una magnífica experiencia es ser muy muy muy parco en adjetivos.









Gracias a cada uno de los participantes.

Hasta pronto... amenazo con buscar regresar.
"Ve a decirles a los espartanos,
extranjero que pasas por aqui,
que, obedientes a sus leyes,
aqui yacemos."
                                   Simonides.

WebBlog: http://cecilioandrade.blogspot.com

Crafty_Dog

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Argentina energy reforms
« Reply #53 on: October 02, 2017, 04:35:42 AM »
Argentina Powers Ahead With Economic Reforms
Oct 2, 2017

 
By Allison Fedirka
Argentina has passed a milestone in its efforts to open its economy and reduce government interference in the energy sector. For years, domestic fuel prices had been set by the state and energy companies, but starting Oct. 1, they will instead be tied to global oil prices, and companies will be able to adjust them accordingly. This is one part of the government’s broader efforts to reduce subsidies and state controls over the economy in order to move the country toward a more market-friendly environment.

Controlling the Market

Fuel prices in Argentina haven’t been harmonized with international fuel prices for over 16 years. The government controlled the market – restricting domestic prices and exports when prices were high globally and propping up domestic prices when they were low – while also keeping energy costs low for consumers.

This was part of the populist policies supported by the administrations of former Presidents Nestor Kirchner and Cristina Fernandez. They prioritized consumers’ access to cheap fuel and domestic energy production to maintain high employment rates and ensure that provinces would continue to receive royalty payments from producers. This is one of the major reasons subsidies and state intervention persisted regardless of whether oil prices were high or low.

As a result of these policies, Argentine oil – Medanito light crude, which is used to set national prices, and Escalante heavy crude – has been priced independent of the international oil market. Prior to the 2014 crash in international oil prices, the government’s main goal was to limit as much as possible the impact of high global oil prices on domestic prices, in part to also limit inflation. The government therefore heavily regulated oil exports and created subsidy programs that incentivized Argentine producers to sell domestically at prices below international rates.

This began to change at the end of 2014 when oil prices crashed. The government had to keep prices higher than global levels to encourage domestic production, investments and employment. Oil companies worldwide were reducing production, cutting investment and laying off workers, but the Argentine government wanted to prevent this from happening in the domestic oil industry. Reducing production and rising unemployment would, after all, cause unrest and other political problems that the government wanted to avoid. So starting in 2015, the government set an initial domestic oil price of $77 per barrel, while the price of West Texas Intermediate crude was roughly $41. It would essentially pay companies the difference so that they would continue to produce for the domestic market, maintain employment levels and invest in future projects.

When President Mauricio Macri took office in 2015, he inherited an extremely distorted energy sector that relied heavily on subsidies and was not well integrated with the international market. The amount of money the government was spending to prop up the industry was unsustainable; substantial reform was inevitable. The government, for example, stopped subsidizing oil exports from Argentine producers. But the changes needed to be implemented gradually so as not to destabilize the sector or cause a spike in inflation. As a result, the government held off on completely eliminating its oil production subsidies.
 
Argentine President Mauricio Macri gestures during a meeting of former presidents, businessmen and academics in Buenos Aires, Argentina, on May 11, 2017. EITAN
ABRAMOVICH/AFP/Getty Images

Instead, the Macri government negotiated a lower price per barrel with domestic producers and, at the start of this year, came to an agreement to gradually bring domestic fuel prices in line with international oil prices by the end of the year. The deal called for government-led increases in fuel prices for consumers on a quarterly basis so that they were more in line with the cost of domestic oil production. The agreement also stipulated that the program would end if international oil prices surpassed domestic oil prices for 10 consecutive days. On Sept. 13, the price of Brent crude surpassed the price of Medanito, and has remained higher ever since, triggering an end to the program and allowing the government to eliminate price controls. (If global prices drop later this year – which is unlikely – the agreement will be reactivated.)

Part of a Trend

This move has two major implications. First, it paves the way for refineries in Argentina to buy from either domestic or international suppliers. Second, it marks a significant reduction in oil production subsides in the country, part of a broader trend to reduce subsidies. The Argentine Budget Association and Public Finance Administration recently reported that the government spent 122.8 billion pesos ($7.1 billion) on all subsidies from January to August of this year. That marks a 15.4 percent decline from the same period last year. Energy and transportation account for nearly 90 percent of the drop in spending. Energy subsides themselves declined January to August by 24.5 percent year over year.

But although the Macri administration has removed one major distortion from the country’s energy sector, other challenges remain. The government still heavily subsidizes conventional natural gas production in the country. It spent an estimated 17.7 billion pesos in January-July this year as part of a program to stimulate production at domestic sites. The government plans to end subsides for conventional natural gas production at the start of 2018, though large companies have strongly opposed the move. The companies themselves are important potential sources of private investment for the country. They also help maintain employment for workers who are members of powerful labor unions, and they pay royalties to provincial governments. A cut in subsidies therefore would affect companies, unions and provincial government budgets; the government cannot make this decision lightly. Notably, the government will continue to support and subsidize projects related to unconventional natural gas projects, particularly Vaca Muerta, an expansive shale gas field often compared to Eagle Ford in the United States.

Another major challenge facing the Macri government – and also a product of prolonged intervention in the energy sector – is a decline in oil production and a shortage of investment. According to figures published by the Energy Ministry, 16.02 billion cubic meters (565.74 billion cubic feet) of oil were extracted in the first seven months of this year. This marks a 7.9 percent decline compared to 2016. Low global oil prices have deterred companies from investing in activities, and this was further exacerbated by the many government controls in the sector. Eliminating subsidies will initially hurt profits and therefore further discourage investment. The Energy Ministry reported earlier this year that it anticipated $6.63 billion worth of investments will be made by 43 oil companies in the country. State-run YPF is responsible for 46.5 percent of the anticipated investment.

The realignment of global energy prices with domestic energy prices in Argentina is a major indicator of economic normalization in the country, a trend that we anticipated would grow this year. We also expected to see lower inflation rates and freer trade flows as a result of Macri’s economic reforms. Though it is unlikely the government will hit its 2017 goal of 12-17 percent annual inflation, inflation is still on track to be well below the 36-40 percent rate registered in 2016. (The inflation rate from January to September was 15.4 percent) What’s more, Argentina’s trade deficit in the first eight months of this year increased to $4.5 billion, a result of policies that open the economy and lift restrictions on imports. At its peak, the country’s trade surplus was $10 billion. Argentina is only partway through its economic reform, but the effects of these changes are already taking shape.


Crafty_Dog

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Stratfor: Argentina default looms
« Reply #57 on: February 20, 2020, 04:09:54 PM »
Stratfor Worldview
In Argentina, Another Default Looms Ever Larger
4 MINS READ
Feb 20, 2020 | 21:52 GMT
HIGHLIGHTS
The IMF's latest assessment of the Argentine economy has sent a clear message to the country's many creditors: Get ready for a significant -- and likely painful -- debt restructuring....

The Big Picture

Argentina's economy is in a recession. And after several years of debt-fueled fiscal deficits, the country is also now on the brink of its ninth default. President Alberto Fernandez has attempted to satisfy voters by increasing public spending. But this has come at the cost of maintaining a budget surplus to ensure its debt is sustainable.

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What Happened

In a Feb. 19 public statement, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) said Argentina's debt was unsustainable, and that the primary surplus required to reduce its public debt was neither "economically nor politically feasible." In its June 2019 review of Argentina's aid program, the IMF noted a primary fiscal surplus of 3.5 percent was needed to stabilize the country's debt as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP). The IMF also projected a gross external financing requirement of more than $90 billion for Argentina in 2020. But a closer reading of the IMF's quantitative projections behind those previous assessments revealed that a heroic fiscal adjustment should have been undertaken to substantially mitigate Argentina's debt, which the IMF said has since "deteriorated decidedly." As a result, the IMF called on private bondholders to enter “collaborative” negotiations with the Argentine government to restructure its debt.

Why It Matters

By recognizing the country's economic reality, the IMF is setting the stage for what could eventually be a large-scale debt restructuring, provided Argentina also takes actions to stem the fiscal deficits driving its debt problem. Creditors have likely been preparing for major losses in their Argentine investments, given that the country's debt was already priced at distress levels in secondary markets. But the IMF's new sobering assessment announcement has likely put Argentina's bondholders on official notice that a full-scale reorganization of debt is coming — and with it, a substantial cut to their investments.

The Argentine government will likely weaponize the IMF's new assessment to justify a significant restructuring of its debt and make unreasonable demands of its foreign creditors. Earlier this week, Vice President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner called on the IMF to write-off part of its outstanding $45 billion in loans to the country. The IMF, however, promptly rejected this proposal. Convincing creditors that recognizing losses is a worthwhile endeavor would require a credible and comprehensive economic program that shows Argentina is on a realistic path to debt sustainability. Without that assurance, the country's foreign creditors are thus unlikely to accept such a restructuring. Unlike in a domestic bankruptcy proceeding, the IMF cannot order a "standstill," nor can it force terms on creditors.

The IMF has sent a clear message to Argentina's many creditors: Get ready for a significant — and likely painful — debt restructuring.

Moreover, the IMF statement didn't discuss the amount of fiscal retrenchment that such an adjustment would require from Argentina. As such, it remains to be seen just how much of the burden will fall on creditors, which could further stymie the process. The IMF statement could also embolden holdouts among bondholders that refuse to participate in a debt exchange and demand full payment, as with holdouts from the 2005 bond swap, precluding a critical mass of acceptance under collective action clauses in bond contracts.

Background

Argentina has defaulted on its external debt payments eight times in its history. Still, after defaulting in 2002, engaging in a controversial bond exchange in 2005, and not paying recalcitrant creditors until 2016, Argentina again borrowed heavily in global financial markets. As a result, Buenos Aires again began to struggle to make payments in 2018, prompting the IMF to support a lending program. In accordance with the IMF program, Argentina's previous government began to implement a small degree of fiscal discipline. But the unpopular cuts to public spending ultimately resulted in the election of a populist government in late 2019.

Crafty_Dog

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Re: Argentina
« Reply #58 on: May 28, 2020, 12:18:20 PM »
HIGHLIGHTS
Argentina's debt restructuring negotiations with creditors appear stuck, but the recent extension of the country's self-imposed deadline for talks with private debt bondholders keeps alive the possibility of reaching some form of a long-term deal. Ultimately, however, debt restructuring will not by itself change the fiscal and monetary policies that...

The Big Picture
Argentina has formally entered its ninth sovereign debt default in its history, but negotiations with creditors are still ongoing to prevent this default unraveling into a larger economic crisis that could again push the South American country down a populist and nationalistic path.

See Economics
Argentina's debt restructuring negotiations with creditors appear stuck, but the recent extension of the country's self-imposed deadline for talks with private debt bondholders keeps alive the possibility of reaching some form of a long-term deal. Ultimately, however, debt restructuring will not by itself change the fiscal and monetary policies that initially led to Argentina overborrowing. Whether the country's default again transforms into another full-fledged economic crisis will instead hinge on its government's willingness to reach a compromise with bondholders, as well as produce a credible, long-term economic growth plan that remedies the country's currently untenable levels of public spending.

Argentina's prolonged tango with international investors and private sector creditors is about to reach a crescendo in which capital markets will either intensify their embrace with Buenos Aires, or move into a prolonged rift that would be costly for both sides.

On May 22, Argentina officially entered its ninth default on international debt after failing to make a $503 million interest payment on Eurobonds by the end of a contractual 30-day grace period.
Argentina was already in default on dollar-denominated domestic debt, on which it unilaterally declared a moratorium on April 6.
On May 14, the province of Buenos Aires also defaulted on $7 billion in debt when it missed a $150 million payment.

President Alberto Fernandez's administration has yet to present a long-term economic plan, and instead seems to be betting on a debt deal that will give some reprieve to public finances.

On April 17, Argentina proposed an initial debt restructuring deal that as many as 80 percent of investors in Eurobonds totaling $66.2 billion have rejected.
Bondholders presumably found the original proposal, which Buenos Aires says is still on the table, objectionable because Argentina would capture nearly all of the existing secondary market discount of 65-70 percent through a 5 percent “haircut” on principle, as well as a 62 percent reduction in the value of interest payments with no payments to creditors for three years.
Argentina's proposal also lacks a “menu” of alternative options from which creditors could choose from to provide equivalent debt relief via a mix of par bonds with reduced interest or discount bonds with higher interest rates.
The draft deal includes very low long-term economic growth assumptions as well, which creditors deem as very conservative.
Argentina recently extended its debt restructuring negotiations with creditors until June 2, but is giving conflicting signals about what kind of new proposal it is ready to present, if any.

Economy Minister Martin Guzman says the country is waiting for creditors to further modify their proposals to bring them closer to Argentina's request to delay any payment until 2024, which is unlikely.
But in a May 22 interview with Reuters, Guzman also indicated that some revisions to the draft deal could be forthcoming, which may include concessions on Argentina's proposed interest rate cut that Argentina, as well as some modest payments.
Three groups of bondholders have presented counteroffers to Argentina's original April 17 proposal, which still suggests a willingness from both parties to negotiate in good faith and the existence of some common ground. This, combined with the continuation of talks and the lack of public acrimony that characterized previous negotiations, signal that there is ground for some compromise that could provide the basis for a settlement where the latest missed payments would be only a hiccup in Argentina's long debt saga. A potential agreement may include:

A grace period on all payments of less than three years, perhaps with small interest payments that increase over time and a shorter overall maturity for when final payments are due.
Compromises on the overall amount of the “haircut” or reduction in the present value of cash flows.
Allowing creditors to choose between par bonds, discount bonds or interest reduction bonds.
A proposal by a minority group, mainly holding previously restructured debt from 2005, for GDP-linked contingencies in which creditors could conceivably recover higher amounts if the economy does better than now projected.
Avoiding another full-fledged crisis after Argentina's latest default will hinge on whether its government can produce a credible economic growth plan and reach a debt restructuring deal with bondholders.

However, there are still obstacles that could complicate the final success of a debt restructuring agreement between Buenos Aires and bondholders.

Some hard-line bondholders could decide to hold out from any deal that the majority of the private lenders agree with Argentina.
Argentina and creditors could also fail to agree on what a credible long-term economic recovery plan for the country, and the Argentine's government willingness to present one in the first place.
But even with a deal, Argentina's future economic prospects remain dire.

Due to the fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic, the Argentine economy is expected to contract by more than five percent in 2020.
The global oil price crash has complicated Argentina's plans to continue exploiting the shale-rich area of Vaca Muerta, which requires reference oil prices upwards of $45 per barrel to be viable.
Tensions with neighboring Brazil and an initially protectionist outlook from Argentina complicate the possibility of the Common Market of the South (Mercosur) successfully negotiating more free-trade agreements that would expand export markets for Argentina, as well as the rest of the region.
Avoiding a prolonged default and the subsequent financial crisis will thus also require deft management of the economy, as well as the involvement of key external institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund.
 
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